All language subtitles for 20-06-2023dxdree

As I noted earlier, the Russian occupiers
in southern Ukraine have an acute shortage

of personnel to provide a full defense along
the entire front line, which is now convulsing.

Therefore, they are reinforcing only certain
locations.

If we look at what kind of resources, from
where and where they have been moving over

the last 2 weeks, a very interesting "geometric
phenomenon" emerges, namely - I will conventionally

call it a "parallelogram of Russian occupants".

Basically, the concentration of forces and
means of the enemy takes place within the

2nd and 3rd lines of defense of Zaporizhzhia
region.

But at the same time, given the density of
defense lines and concentrated personnel,

this entire mass is resting on the administrative
border of the temporarily occupied peninsula

of Crimea.

Even from the left bank of the Kherson region,
they are pulling in units to reinforce this

particular parallelogram.

From all of the above, the question arises,
but what will happen to the weakened areas

that remain outside of this figure?

After all, it would seem that that is where
the most impenetrable defense of the Russian

troops will be.

But there is a nuance.

And who says that this geometry is precisely
for defense?

Despite the concentration of forces and resources
there, this whole geometry is designed not

so much for defense to the last drop of blood,
but rather, for the safest, unhurried, systematic,

but escape.

And the defense lines that are now being built
on the territory of Crimea are direct proof

of that.

There is no way the Russian contingent on
the peninsula will be able to hold those defense

lines that are being built in Crimea.

But on the other hand, this entire defense
architecture will make at least some sense

only if they receive an inflow of up to 100,000
personnel.

That is why it is obvious that the Russian
command has long realized that they will not

be able to hold the South, but they will try
to imitate a desperate "heroic" defense for

as long as possible, which is why they see
a parallelogram as the best way to stretch

the process.

I'd also like to make a note of the increase
in the number of enemy Ka-52 attack helicopters

destroyed.

In May the enemy had a record 553 artillery
pieces destroyed.

In the first half of June the Ukrainian forces
have already destroyed 373 units.

It would seem that what does artillery have
to do with attack helicopters?

It has something to do with it.

In a month and a half the Russians have lost
a huge number of artillery pieces, without

which they are not only unable to attack,
but even to defend.

Naturally, they urgently need compensation
for the losses, which can not be compensated

through withdrawal from storage and lame logistics.

And therefore helicopters come into play.

A similar scheme worked on the right bank
of the Kherson region, when the Ukrainian

defense forces began to destroy Russian artillery
non-stop, and logistics did not allow them

to compensate for losses.

Attack helicopters began to act as artillery,
launching attack missiles at Ukrainian positions

using the method of a sharp climb with a nose
up.

And so a similar tactic began to work in the
South.

There is a critical shortage of artillery,
which means that attack helicopters, which

more and more often have to come close to
the front line and get into the coverage of

Ukrainian air defense and mobile groups with
MANPADs, are coming into play.

The enemy's situation is consistently bad,
and these fools were going to war with NATO.

And if anyone thinks that it is not bad, I
would like to remind you that the stage of

"capturing Kiev in three days" has changed
to the stage of "AFU advances and something

happens on Russian territory".