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Topical issues about the counteroffensive and general issues.

About the pace of the offensive and this is very important.

This is not World War II.

And not the First World War.

And the Ukrainian Armed Forces against the Russian Armed Forces is not the American army

with total superiority in missiles and aircraft against Hussein's army in 1991 or 2003.

There will be no attacks by tank columns of 100 tanks (because of missiles and air power)

and there will be no infantry breakthroughs supported by tanks in the style of a can and

firing from hundreds of guns (as in the Hundred Days Offensive of 1918).

Under normal circumstances, the Ukrainian offensive will be gradual and cautiously decisive.

To minimize losses, to have time to pull up air defense (remember, Russia still has a

significant advantage in the air), to avoid getting caught in fire traps, etc.

Therefore, point by point, fortification by fortification, village by village - gradually,

methodically, without hysterics.

So expect this campaign to last for weeks and months.

Unless there are black swans or other colors.

But we have to count on a moderate scenario and be happy if the process accelerates.

And the effectiveness should be measured not by whether the Ukrainian Armed Forces liberate

something every day, but by how the map changes over the course of weeks, the intensity of

the Ukrainian side's actions, and how successful Russian counterattacks will be.

It is desirable to evaluate in terms of weeks (at least), not 1-3 days.

Regarding the successes, they exist, but again, the main forces of the Ukrainian Armed Forces

are likely not yet involved.

And the further the Ukrainians advance, the more cautiously they will have to act in the

context of air cover, for example.

So the best thing to say about the dynamics is to be patient.

Caution is life.

The Ukrainians will be given equipment, but the trained soldiers are the most valuable

resource that will not be provided by partners.

When and what will happen?

I said in March that the first tangible results would be no earlier than the end of May or

beginning of June.

I was almost right.

So here we are.

We will be able to analyze some preliminary results of the summer campaign of the Armed

Forces somewhere closer to the beginning to mid-August.

As it was with the campaign in Kherson region, which began in August, and we got the first

fundamental results in October.

But for some reason everyone thought that everything was instantaneous, no, it wasn't.

There was a long preparatory process.

In addition, when you assess the capabilities of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, don't forget

that the Ukrainian Armed Forces is not yet the US Army.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces lack a lot of things, and they get a lot of things right in the

course of operations.

From drones to tanks.

From electronic warfare to anti-drone weapons of all kinds.

And people continue to train and master the equipment at the training grounds.

Tens of thousands of people continue to study.

Procurement procedures are changing.

The equipment is being tested.

The Ukrainian army not only has to fight, but also has to evolve and change right during

the war.

This is especially difficult.

That's why we have several parallel tracks now:

1.

The summer campaign of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, which should improve the strategic

position based on the available forces and means.

2.

Preparation for the next campaigns, because this is unlikely to end the war.

This includes preparations to counteract the next campaign of Russian attacks on Ukrainian

cities with drones and missiles.

3.

Planning what to do when the war is over.

What will be the armed forces and security sector, what will be the security guarantees.

There are a number of other economic and security issues, but this is another story that is

not relevant to this channel.