All language subtitles for 14-06-2023ersoko

Topical issues about the counteroffensive
and general issues.

About the pace of the offensive and this is
very important.

This is not World War II.

And not the First World War.

And the Ukrainian Armed Forces against the
Russian Armed Forces is not the American army

with total superiority in missiles and aircraft
against Hussein's army in 1991 or 2003.

There will be no attacks by tank columns of
100 tanks (because of missiles and air power)

and there will be no infantry breakthroughs
supported by tanks in the style of a can and

firing from hundreds of guns (as in the Hundred
Days Offensive of 1918).

Under normal circumstances, the Ukrainian
offensive will be gradual and cautiously decisive.

To minimize losses, to have time to pull up
air defense (remember, Russia still has a

significant advantage in the air), to avoid
getting caught in fire traps, etc.

Therefore, point by point, fortification by
fortification, village by village - gradually,

methodically, without hysterics.

So expect this campaign to last for weeks
and months.

Unless there are black swans or other colors.

But we have to count on a moderate scenario
and be happy if the process accelerates.

And the effectiveness should be measured not
by whether the Ukrainian Armed Forces liberate

something every day, but by how the map changes
over the course of weeks, the intensity of

the Ukrainian side's actions, and how successful
Russian counterattacks will be.

It is desirable to evaluate in terms of weeks
(at least), not 1-3 days.

Regarding the successes, they exist, but again,
the main forces of the Ukrainian Armed Forces

are likely not yet involved.

And the further the Ukrainians advance, the
more cautiously they will have to act in the

context of air cover, for example.

So the best thing to say about the dynamics
is to be patient.

Caution is life.

The Ukrainians will be given equipment, but
the trained soldiers are the most valuable

resource that will not be provided by partners.

When and what will happen?

I said in March that the first tangible results
would be no earlier than the end of May or

beginning of June.

I was almost right.

So here we are.

We will be able to analyze some preliminary
results of the summer campaign of the Armed

Forces somewhere closer to the beginning to
mid-August.

As it was with the campaign in Kherson region,
which began in August, and we got the first

fundamental results in October.

But for some reason everyone thought that
everything was instantaneous, no, it wasn't.

There was a long preparatory process.

In addition, when you assess the capabilities
of the Ukrainian Armed Forces, don't forget

that the Ukrainian Armed Forces is not yet
the US Army.

The Ukrainian Armed Forces lack a lot of things,
and they get a lot of things right in the

course of operations.

From drones to tanks.

From electronic warfare to anti-drone weapons
of all kinds.

And people continue to train and master the
equipment at the training grounds.

Tens of thousands of people continue to study.

Procurement procedures are changing.

The equipment is being tested.

The Ukrainian army not only has to fight,
but also has to evolve and change right during

the war.

This is especially difficult.

That's why we have several parallel tracks
now:

1.

The summer campaign of the Armed Forces of
Ukraine, which should improve the strategic

position based on the available forces and
means.

2.

Preparation for the next campaigns, because
this is unlikely to end the war.

This includes preparations to counteract the
next campaign of Russian attacks on Ukrainian

cities with drones and missiles.

3.

Planning what to do when the war is over.

What will be the armed forces and security
sector, what will be the security guarantees.

There are a number of other economic and security
issues, but this is another story that is

not relevant to this channel.