Original subtitles

[John F. Kennedy] We choose to go to the moon.

- We choose to go to the moon. - [crowd applauding]

We choose to go to the moon in this decade and do the other things,

not because they are easy, but because they are hard.

[over radio] Look at that.

That's beautiful.

It's got to be one of the most proud moments of my life. I guarantee you.

[man] In the weeks leading up to any manned space mission,

the crew and the spacecraft are put through a series of dress rehearsals,

each one more like the real thing than the last.

The plugs-out test is just one of these.

The crew is wearing full pressure suits locked inside the hatch,

confirming that the spacecraft can operate under its own power

with all the umbilical plugs connecting it to the ground removed.

Even for the very first Apollo mission,

the plugs-out test was routine and hardly considered hazardous.

For astronauts Gus Grissom, Ed White and Roger Chaffee,

it was supposed to be just another long afternoon spent on their backs

inside the Apollo 1 command module.

Another test of the complicated vehicle that would someday, perhaps,

take all three of them on a voyage from the Earth to the moon.

[radio crackling]

[man 1 ] Okay, command pilot, how do you read?

[man 2, distorted] I read you loud and clear... read me?

[man 1 ] Well, you're pretty garbled here, Gus.

Senior pilot, can you hear us?

[man 2, distorted] Yes, [indistinct] loud and clear.

[man 1 ] Okay, Ed, you're worse than Gus. How about you, Roger?

[Roger, distorted] Okay. Pilot reads you five-by-five.

[man 1 ] Roger, you are just a little bit better.

[Roger] Better than Ed or better than Gus?

[man 1 ] Better than both.

[Roger] That's what I always say.

[man 1 ] Gus, what we'd like to do is try using strictly S-band communication.

- See if we can clear this up. - [radio crackling]

Can we get all three of you in the S-band mode?

[Gus] We're all now in the S-band.

[man 1 ] That's real clean, Gus.

[man 1 ] Let's try one more, and maybe we can make the run.

[Gus, distorted] Okay. This is the command pilot.

One, two, three, four, five.

[man 1 ] Okay, you're garbled.

But I think maybe we can get through like this.

Senior pilot, one more time, please.

[Ed] Roger. Senior pilot transmitting.

One, two, three, four...

- [crackling] - senior pilot.

[man 1 ] Well, we're not copying anybody five-by.

We've tried about every mode.

We never did hear the pilot.

[Roger, distorted] Pilot hasn't talked to you yet. How's this?

- [crackling] - One, two, three, four, five.

[man 1 ] Okay, roger. You're all coming in about the same now.

You'll have to bear with us. Sometimes we don't get your transmission.

- [man 2] Okay, STC... - [radio crackling]

five hours. If you run into many more communication problems,

well, we're down. Copy?

[man 3] Steve, I need you at the phone.

[man 1 ] No, I didn't read you, Chuck, at all.

I can't read you, Chuck. Want to try the phone?

How are we gonna get to the moon if we can't talk between three buildings?

- [crackling] - Didn't read you. Can you repeat?

I can't hear a thing you're saying. Jesus Christ.

I said, how are we gonna get to the moon

if we can't talk between two or three buildings?

- [crackling] - That's a little better, gentlemen.

Give us a count on black-three.

We're trying to figure out why you're coming in on black-two.

Okay, well, you want us to sit by here until we get this stuff squared away?

- Uh, Chuck, I didn't read you. - [crackling]

Test countdown hold continues at T-minus ten.

Apollo 1, how do you read?

[over PA] Apollo 1, how do you read?

[over PA] Apollo 1, how do you read?

[Gus] I read you fine. The problem is you're not reading me.

We're gonna get a new backup system, Gus.

I, uh, sent a guy out for a couple of empty soup cans and some string.

- [chuckling] - A lot of string.

- This is really getting ridiculous. - [crackling]

[feedback whines]

Seems like we got an open mic in there somewhere.

- We'd better find it. - Fire!

- We got a fire in the cockpit! - [crackling]

- Did he say fire? - On the monitor.

We got a bad fire!

Fire, go!

[alarm blaring]

Let's get out!

We're burning up!

[urgent chatter, alarm continues]

[people yelling]

We keeping you from something, Stormy?

Oh, Rick's rehearsal dinner.

I promised Phyllis that I wouldn't be late. [chuckles]

I'm sure she's never heard that before.

Control is on the line from the Cape. There's a fire in the spacecraft.

[heavy breaths echoing]

Mr. Shea, I was just trying the house.

I thought you were going straight home from the airport.

Yeah, well, I have a couple things I still need to take a look at.

Mission Control just called. There's some situation with the test.

They wanted you to come over right away.

What kind of situation?

Chris, what's going on?

We lost the crew.

There was a fire. The crew is...

They're dead.

[talking quietly]

Jan?

Hi.

Would you like a sedative, Betty?

- Something to... - No, thank you.

I've got a lot of important decisions to make in the next few days.

I don't want to be zonked out on pills.

I better go call Gus's folks.

Martha, Mike Collins is here.

[man] Just so you know, Joe, uh,

the suits failed, but they...

The doctors said they didn't burn to death.

It was the smoke. They were asphyxiated.

[metal creaking]

Hello? ls anybody home?

Mom? Dad?

[whispers]

[whispering] There was a terrible accident today.

[man] It could have been any of us in there.

Hell, it almost was me.

I was gonna sit in the spacecraft for the test. Either me or Joe.

What?

We'd been having so many problems with the communication system

that we thought it might be a good idea to have somebody in there listening in.

So, up until breakfast this morning, Joe Shea and I were gonna flip a coin

to see who got to ride in there with the guys.

- Where would we sit? - Not on my lap, that's for damn sure.

Well, we could fit one person across the cabin underneath the footrail.

Whichever one of us is going in,

we'll be able to hear what it is you fellas are hearing.

Which won't be much.

- Approximately. - Approximately?

Well, we can't patch you into the cabin comm lines.

We'd have to run a separate line through the hatch.

Well, then the hatch would have to be open. That's not gonna work.

We decided that if we weren't gonna hear exactly what they were hearing,

that there really wasn't much point.

[man sighs]

Hell, we've been doing that test since Mercury, Frank.

So, Joe flew back to Houston, and I went out to the pad.

Don't really know why I went out there with the guys.

I usually don't.

I think I just really wanted to ride in the spacecraft.

At least see what it was like to ride a test out up there.

But, anyway...

You know, I'm kind of concerned about Joe.

I mean, I saw him up at the tower, but...

I don't know how he's handling it.

How are you handling it?

[sighs]

I'm drunk. [chuckles]

You know, the thing is, Frank, that...

I mean, you and I, we both know that people die testing unproved aircraft.

It happens all the time.

It's not nice and we don't like it,

but we all knew it'd happen someday.

No, Deke. We all knew it'd happen someday in space.

It's one thing to die on a mission.

It's another to die on the pad during a routine goddamn test.

Senator Mondale's thoughts are with the families of these brave Americans.

That's it. No, that's it for now.

You seen The Times? Listen to this.

"The astronauts were badly burned.

Rescue workers needed five hours to remove their bodies."

I always knew this was a waste of money.

It turns out it's a dangerous waste of money.

For five, six years now, they've been spending money hand over fist.

No one's been able to do anything about it.

Until now. We're going to look into this.

I talked to Anderson's office. He wants to wait until NASA's finished...

Its own investigation? For Christ's sake.

That's the fox guarding the henhouse. It'll be a complete and utter...

Whitewash.

They don't like NASA employees investigating NASA.

Well, as far as I'm concerned, I didn't come here from Langley

to put a good face on this for my employers.

Matter of fact, the way I see it,

while we're doing this, we're not working for NASA.

We're working for Gus and Ed and Roger.

You're each gonna head up a panel or two.

Max, I want you to go over all the data that came out of the spacecraft.

Printouts, voice transmissions, everything.

Pin down the precise sequence of events.

We're gonna have one panel focusing squarely on the fire.

How it started, how it spread.

They'll be reporting to Dr. Robert Van Dolah

of the Bureau of Mines Explosives Research Center.

Frank, I want you to head up the panel

responsible for dismantling the spacecraft.

[cigarette lighter clicking]

Sorry I'm late. I got a call from Joe Shea.

Stormy, he had a good idea.

They're gonna use spacecraft 14 as a model for taking apart 12.

Before they remove a screw from 12, they'll try it out first on 14.

All right, fine.

Stormy, we're gonna help them any way we can.

I know, but we've also got to get the Block II's ready to fly.

Anything else?

- Do you think they'll try to nail us? - How can they nail us for it, Bud?

It wasn't our fault.

We were gonna run an emergency egress test at the end of the plugs-out,

see how fast they could get out of there.

How far did Ed manage to turn the latch handle?

We don't know. Even if he'd managed to turn the handle all the way...

He still never would've gotten out. It's an inward-opening hatch.

Yeah. As strong as Ed was, the pressure from the fire and smoke

would've been too much for him to pull against.

You know what haunts me?

In a way, if it wasn't for me,

the fire might not have been fatal.

Why is that?

The capsules in the Mercury program had explosive hatches, right?

You pull a lever and, bam, you're out of there in a second.

Remember when Gus's capsule sank,

and everyone said he must have blown the hatch by accident?

I was on the review board for that.

I was the one who found out Gus was telling the truth.

The hatch could blow by itself.

It was because of that they decided not to use an explosive hatch with Apollo.

Nice irony, huh?

If I hadn't proved Gus right,

we might have had an explosive hatch on this spacecraft.

In which case, Gus and the boys would still be alive and well.

I'm not a big fan of irony.

- [radio crackling] - We got a bad fire!

Let's get out!

We're burning up!

We got a bad fire!

Let's get out!

We're burning up!

[click, tape rewinds]

We got a bad fire!

[knock on door]

I'm going now, Mr. Shea. Is there anything I can get you?

You believe in time travel, Kathy?

I mean, if you could go back in time, what would you do?

I mean, I'd... I'd be on that spacecraft for the test.

That's where I'd be.

Good night, sir.

Next is TPS4CM183, item 1018.

Panel 209 mount, upper right.

Panel 209 mount, upper right.

Panel 209 mount, upper right.

Uh, counterclockwise rotation, 22 pounds torque.

Counterclockwise rotation, 22 pounds torque.

- [wrench clicks] - Release at 22.5.

Confirmed as panel 209 mount, upper right.

Mm, threading's intact. No visible marking.

- 22.5. Noted. - [clicks pen]

[man in module] Hold on. I think you're gonna wanna see this.

It's a socket wrench.

We found it behind a panel door.

Must have been left there by one of the North American workmen.

There's no other reasonable explanation for it.

A socket wrench?

[scoffs] Did it have anything to do with the fire?

Uh, we haven't finished our analysis, but I'd have to say no.

That's a long way away from where we think that fire started.

But it still shouldn't have been there, should it?

No, sir.

Well, I think we better hear what North American has to say.

Gentlemen, this is off the record.

First off, I want to thank Stormy and Joe for coming in to talk to us.

We're gonna be writing this report in the next three weeks,

and we have some questions for you both that might help us clear some things up.

Stormy, we'll start with you.

- I'm sure you've seen this. - Yes, no, I've seen that.

Uh, leaving that wrench in those wires was careless and sloppy.

And when we find the person responsible for leaving it there,

we're going to make our displeasure known in the strongest possible way.

But we all know that that wrench had absolutely nothing to do with the fire.

[man clears throat]

Stormy, a number of people have told me Gus wasn't happy with North American.

When he made suggestions or had complaints,

he didn't think he was being listened to.

No, we listened, at first.

But after a while, we had to stop listening.

The good old days of Mercury and Gemini are gone, Frank.

On Gemini, if you wanted to make a change in the spacecraft,

all you had to do was call up old man McDonnell.

Right? Well, you can't do that on Apollo. You know that, Frank.

The smallest change has huge ramifications.

Mercury missions, you launched, orbited a couple times, came back down.

You could hold your breath through some of those flights.

We're going to the moon now.

So, if the accusation is we haven't done everything you astronauts have asked us,

well, all I can say is guilty as charged.

No one's accusing you of anything, Stormy. This isn't a court of law.

Damn right it's not a court of law. It's an ambush.

No. You say you got questions for Joe and me.

Why do I think there aren't gonna be too many questions for Joe?

Because if you don't have any, I got a couple, Joe.

You want to tell them the real reason for the wiring problems?

How NASA keeps changing mission requirements,

and yet you still, you push us to meet these arbitrary deadlines.

We never made changes regarding Velcro, Stormy.

What?

There was not supposed to be more than 500 square inches in the cabin.

You guys had over 5,000 square inches in there.

I wasn't aware that was a problem.

You weren't aware? Of course you were aware.

- We talked about it last August. - [laughter]

You guys got any other complaints?

- Uh, no steering wheel, huh? - No.

How about tinted windows, maybe some power steering?

- No. - No problem.

Come on, now. We do have a couple of other things.

Joe, check the fine print. There's no warranty on this vehicle.

As soon as we signed the pink slip over, it was yours.

- Caveat emptor, buddy. - No, it's the Velcro.

It's flammable, and there's too much of it inside. So, how did this happen?

Talk to them. They're the ones who put it there.

Look, Joe, when you get up in zero-G, crap just starts floating around.

But you put a little bit on your pen, a little on the bulkhead, and presto.

Okay, well, then maybe there's just a few too many little bits in there.

So, wherever Velcro is,

there should be at least four inches between it and any ignition source.

- Sure. Yeah. - All right, other than that...

Not one piece of Velcro, or anything flammable,

was within four inches of any ignition source.

Not that it mattered. A ten-inch gap wouldn't have been enough.

The fire wasn't caused by Velcro.

It was caused by the use of 100% pure goddamn oxygen under pressure.

North American was given mission requirements.

One of the requirements was a spacecraft designed to operate filled with oxygen

and to do so without exploding!

Joe, I think it's time that you and your friends at NASA,

you took a little remedial math course.

In space, the cabin was supposed to contain

five pounds per square inch of pure oxygen, right?

Fine. So, we built it to those specifications.

But you weren't conducting the test in space.

You were conducting it at sea level,

where the atmospheric pressure is already 14.8.

That means that in order to simulate the positive pressure of spaceflight,

you had to add some PSI.

You guys tanked up that spacecraft

with almost 17 pounds per square inch of pure oxygen.

At 17 PSI pure oxygen, Velcro explodes.

The fact remains, we conducted over 15,000 hours of manned tests

with pressurized oxygen environments without anything going wrong, ever!

This time something did go wrong.

You told us there wouldn't be ignition sources.

We begged you not to test at high pressure.

[man] All right.

All right.

Sorry.

Now, normally, Velcro is not much of a fire risk.

This is Velcro in air at sea level.

Under intense direct heat...

it'll burn, it'll melt...

it will not support combustion.

Now, this is Velcro in an atmosphere of 100% oxygen.

As for the spark that started it,

from our fire propagation test and analysis of the spacecraft,

we believe the fire started down here.

Because of the severity of fire damage in this part of the spacecraft,

we'll never know for certain how the fire started.

Our best guess is

that a wire was resting against the inside of this panel door here.

After the door opened and shut a few times,

the Teflon insulation became abraded in two spots.

When a current went through the wire, there was an arc and...

well, you've heard the rest.

You're saying the fire was the result of frayed wiring?

Yes.

[man] Disassembly of the Apollo 1 command module was completed

at the Kennedy Space Center on the 27th of March, 1967,

during the first shift.

[click, door creaks]

You keep working these hours, you're gonna have a heart attack.

- Did you read this thing? - It's 2,300 pages, Stormy.

They're nailing us, Lee. They're saying it was our fault.

There's a couple of references to the fact

that testing in highly pressurized pure oxygen is a tiny bit dangerous.

Other than that, we get our butt kicked.

- We gotta let them know... - No, we don't.

- We're not just gonna take this? - Yes, we are.

We have got files filled with memos begging them not to test like that.

And we are going to forget about those files.

- Forget about them? - We can't blame NASA, Stormy.

We make NASA look bad, they could cancel the whole program.

Mondale's looking for any excuse to shut it down.

This way, we take a few hits, but the program rolls on.

- With a new contractor. - It's too late to get a new contractor.

Kennedy promised the moon by the end of the decade.

They switch contractors now, they can forget about that.

And if it looks like they're gonna miss Kennedy's goal,

public sentiment will evaporate and Congress will pull the plug.

They can't replace us.

We put our cap in our hands and we beg forgiveness,

and we promise it will never happen again.

We do not fight back.

And we forget those files exist.

What files?

[Storms] He must be loving this.

- Who? - Joe Shea.

I can't believe how he's been able to skate through all this unscathed.

That's not what I hear, Stormy.

From what I hear, Joe has been anything but unscathed.

I'm okay. I'm fine.

Well, it's just that you got a lot of people worried about you, Joe.

Yeah? Well, I'm just a little overtired. That's all.

Hey, I know, I know. Hell, we're all feeling the pressure.

Hear about Ron Tucker?

Got up in the middle of a review board meeting

and started drawing an organizational chart of heaven on the blackboard.

[chuckles]

At the top goes God, who we'll call Big Daddy.

Ron's eating soft food in a soft room now,

but, hell, at least he's alive.

Quality-control inspector out at the Cape

that drove his whole family out in front of a train...

wasn't so lucky.

You, uh... You don't think I'm gonna snap like that, do you?

Look, I don't know, Joe. Um...

You know, a lot of people heard you say that

you wished you'd been in the spacecraft with the guys.

I'm not saying that I wish I was dead.

No, no, no. That's... That's not what I'm saying at all.

It's just...

Forget it. What do they want me to do?

- Who? - The three wise men.

Webb, Seamans, Mueller.

They think I've gone over the edge here. What would they like me to do?

I don't know what they want you to do.

I'll tell you what I think you should do.

I think you should take a break. Just a leave of absence.

A couple of weeks and get some rest.

No. No.

- No. - [sighs]

Come on, Joe.

You said yourself you were overtired.

Yeah, I got a lot of work to do. You see that desk there?

[sighs]

Well, then, maybe...

I just think maybe you ought to just talk to somebody, you know?

Maybe see a psychiatrist.

You really do think I've cracked.

It's just to put everybody's mind at ease.

Fine, I'll see a psychiatrist. I'll see a couple.

Why don't you bring on a whole platoon of psychiatrists?

But I'm not leaving the program. Not voluntarily.

Not till we get to the moon.

Joe, I'm gonna come right to the point.

We got letters from the two psychiatrists.

It seems...

It seems like you passed with flying colors.

One of those psychiatrists complained that seeing you was a waste of his time.

Yeah.

Joe, I don't want you to think that this reflects on what I think of you.

I mean, I honestly feel you're the most valuable man in NASA today.

And that's why I'm gonna say what I'm gonna say.

Joe... [sighs]

NASA is about more than just going to the moon.

We got the space station to think about and the manned mission to Mars.

And I want you to be a part of all of that.

It's time you left the detail work behind, got involved in making policy.

I want you to join me here in Washington, Joe.

You'll be at the highest level.

You won't have to report to anyone except maybe me.

- What do you say? - [chuckles]

What do I say?

- How soon you want me? - How does now sound?

That sounds great.

- I mean, we got kids in school... - You don't have to decide right now.

You can go back to the hotel, phone your wife, talk about it.

I'll call you tomorrow, all right?

- Thanks. - Call you tomorrow.

- Hey, Jim. You talk to Joe? - Yeah.

- Did he bite? - Mm-hmm.

And I feel like a complete and utter heel.

It had to be done, Jim. We had to get him out of the way before the hearings.

They'd have torn him to shreds.

I don't know, George.

Maybe these hearings aren't gonna be as horrible as we think.

Look, I'll see you in the morning.

Now, going back to your statement, Dr. Mueller,

I think I understood you to say there were nearly 500 inspectors

in the Apollo Program at the Cape.

Yes.

Now, for the life of me,

I cannot understand, with all those people,

how a socket wrench could have gone undetected in the capsule

from October until January the 27th.

[clears throat]

You're saying it was not because NASA was in a hurry.

- The contractor is responsible... - Wasn't that a failure?

Did you consider cancellation of North American's contract?

Wouldn't you say they were negligent?

Sir, I have not found anyone at North American or NASA

who would not give anything they had to prevent what happened.

Yes, but there was negligence on the part of North American.

Was there not?

I don't see how you can call what they did negligence.

Unless you mean that a company is negligent

if 100% of its work is not done without a mistake.

As someone with extensive experience in testing experimental aircraft,

I can tell you that that standard is just not achievable.

So, I don't feel that negligence is the proper word.

Thank you, Senator.

Senator Mondale.

[sighs] Well, it seems that my colleagues have asked

all the questions I was going to ask.

Except one.

Now, I have been told, and I would like to have this set straight if I'm wrong,

that there was a report

prepared for NASA by General Phillips in mid or late 1965

which very strongly criticized the Apollo program

for what were regarded as

"very serious inadequacies in terms of quality control."

Would you comment on that?

Was there a Phillips report?

Would you comment on that?

Um...

I'm not aware of it, sir.

Is it then your testimony that no such unusual General Phillips report existed?

Is this rumor unfounded?

[softly] That's something we gotta take a look at.

Let us look it up, sir.

- Is there something somebody forgot? - It was a memo, Jim.

- It wasn't a big deal. - It is now.

It came out of the tiger team audit from North American.

- It's old news. - It's still gonna be damaging to us!

"I heard a rumor." Rumor, my foot. Probably got a copy in his hand.

The only reason why he didn't throw it in front of me like Perry Mason

is because he knows the fool thing is classified!

He's gonna kill us.

We're dead. We're dead before we even got off the damn launchpad.

Hold on. We don't know what Anderson's thinking.

He can steer the committee any way he wants.

George, where were you this morning? He's got us twisting in the wind.

Clinton Anderson has to worry about getting reelected

just like everybody else.

Who's left to testify?

Lee Atwood and some of the folks from North American.

They're gonna get torn to pieces right after lunch.

And then there are some members of the review board.

- Borman? - Frank's going at the end.

That's good. Everybody loves an astronaut.

Come on, George. Are you kidding me?

You think Frank Borman's gonna paint a rosy picture?

Hell, it could have been him in that spacecraft.

You're right.

Where you going, Jim?

I'm gonna do the only thing left for me to do. Beg for mercy.

I'm sorry, Mr. Webb, but I've got a job to do,

and I'm going to do it.

With all due humility, Senator, what did we do wrong?

- That's what I'm going to find out. - No. I mean, why are you so down on us?

You and I are both Democrats.

Going to the moon was Kennedy's dream.

It was one of his dreams. Jack Kennedy had a lot of dreams.

Do you really want to kill Apollo?

No. I'll tell you what I want, Mr. Webb.

I want no more American children going hungry in any of our cities.

I want to do something about our boys dying halfway around the world.

I want to do a lot of things.

And if getting what I want means we don't go to the moon...

then so be it.

[crowd chattering]

[chattering stops]

Colonel Borman, would you have entered the spacecraft

on the morning of the accident if your turn had been called?

Yes, sir.

Would you have had any hesitancy?

No, sir.

Were there defects in workmanship?

There were.

And did these defects go beyond workmanship?

Yes, sir. There were defects in design.

If you had entered the spacecraft on that morning,

would you have been motivated by a desire to take risks?

No, sir.

Sometimes there are, uh, romantic, silk-scarf notions

attributed to this business, but, uh, we're professionals.

We'll accept risk, certainly, but not undue risk.

Let me rephrase the question.

Knowing what you know now, would you have entered that spacecraft?

No, sir.

[people murmuring]

Colonel Borman,

how did Commander Grissom and his crew feel about the readiness of the vehicle?

I talked to Ed White shortly before the accident.

Uh... He thought they were over most of their problems and on their way.

Colonel, didn't Commander Grissom once hang a lemon on the simulator?

You, uh... You had to know Gus.

Did Commander Grissom hang a lemon on the simulator?

Yes, sir.

Tell us about him, Colonel.

Sorry, Senator, I have a couple quick questions.

Would you yield for a minute or two?

- Actually, Mr. Chairman, I... - Thanks.

Colonel Borman, you just said,

"You had to know Gus."

And I think that that's been missing in here these past two days.

I'd like for the record to contain at least a little bit

about the men who perished in that fire.

Colonel, could you do that for us?

[clears throat]

Um...

Gus Grissom was the first astronaut to be asked to fly three times.

Mercury, Gemini and Apollo.

He loved being an astronaut.

Except for the publicity and being on display that comes with the job.

There are no front windows on the house he built for Betty in Timber Cove

because he didn't want people looking in.

Now, if that gives you the impression that Gus was a cranky SOB,

well, he was at times.

But I would have trusted him with my life.

Ed White was a big man for an astronaut.

A shade under six feet.

An exceptional athlete.

As you all know, Ed was the first American to walk in space.

There was a story going around that when he was on his space walk,

he stayed out after he'd been ordered in because he was having such a good time.

It's a funny story.

But it would have meant that Ed White disobeyed an order.

Not gonna happen.

Ed was a West Point man.

And duty, honor, country weren't just words to him, they were him.

He was one of my closest friends.

Uh...

Roger Chaffee, I, uh...

I didn't know that well. He was one of the new guys.

Very energetic, very excited.

I heard a story about him though.

He was out on Long Island visiting the Grumman facility

where they're building the descent stage for the lunar module.

And he saw a group of men standing in a corner.

Well, he found out these were the fellas that make the tools

that make the machines.

None of the bigwigs being escorted through there ever talked to these guys.

But Roger went over and made them feel

like they were the most important part of the program.

Colonel, this isn't a court of law,

so I can ask you something that's completely hypothetical.

If we could somehow reach beyond the wall of death...

and talk to Grissom, White and Chaffee,

what do you imagine they would say about the fire?

I was, uh... I was hoping someone would ask that.

I don't know what Roger or Ed would say,

but, uh, I can let Gus speak for himself.

Back in January, he talked to a group of reporters.

They asked him about the dangers involved in going to the moon.

it will not delay the program.

The conquest of space is worth the risk of life.

Our God-given curiosity will force us to go there ourselves because,

in the final analysis, only man can fully evaluate the moon

in terms understandable to other men.

Colonel, at the risk of being gruesome,

we've heard about the fire from everyone who was there.

Everyone except the astronauts themselves, of course.

Can you tell us what they went through?

What it was like for them?

I can only tell you what we know, or at least what we think we know.

Uh...

When it happened, they were just waiting for the test to resume.

How are we gonna get to the moon if we can't talk between three buildings?

[indistinct radio chatter]

I can't hear a thing you're saying. Jesus Christ.

I said, how are we gonna get to the moon

if we can't talk between two or three buildings?

[radio crackling]

They wouldn't have seen the spark that started the fire

because it was behind a panel door down below Gus's feet.

Because of the oxygen,

the spark was able to jump out to the nylon netting under the seats.

Gus probably saw it first because it was closest to him.

Fire!

We got a fire in the cockpit!

The procedure would have had Gus push down Ed's headrest

so that Ed could start turning the latch handle.

We got a bad fire!

We're burning up!

[Borman] By now, the, uh, temperature and the pressure were astronomical.

Let's get out!

[breathing heavily, clock ticking]

[flames roaring]

Now...

it just took me a minute or more to tell you all that.

In actuality, from the first mention of the fire to the rupture of the hull,

only 15 seconds went by.

Colonel, what caused the fire?

I'm not talking about wires and oxygen.

It seems that some people think that NASA pressured North American

to meet unrealistic and arbitrary deadlines.

And that in turn, North American allowed safety to be compromised.

I won't deny that there's been pressure to meet deadlines.

But safety has never been intentionally compromised.

Then what caused the fire?

A failure of imagination.

We've always known there was the possibility of fire in a spacecraft.

But the fear was always that it would happen in space

when you're 180 miles from Terra firma and the nearest fire station.

That was the worry.

No one ever imagined that it would happen on the ground.

If anyone had thought of it, the test would've been classified as hazardous.

But it wasn't. We just didn't think of it.

Now, whose fault is that?

Well, it's North American's fault.

It's NASA's fault.

It's the fault of every person who ever worked on Apollo.

It's my fault. I didn't think the test was hazardous.

No one did.

I wish to God we had.

Now, before we all go home,

is there any statement you personally would like to make?

I think I'm safe in speaking for all the astronauts when I say that...

we're confident in our management,

we're confident in our training,

in our engineering and in ourselves.

The real question is, are you confident in us?

What do you think we should do, Colonel?

I think you should stop this witch hunt and let us go to the moon.

[applause]

Please.

Please. Senator Mondale, back to you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I have nothing further.

[Anderson] Thank you, Colonel.

[overlapping chatter]

[children playing outside]

Those are beautiful.

Well, thank you, dear.

Who called?

Lee Atwood.

He wants to see me.

On a Sunday?

I think this is it.

[sighs]

[sobs]

I wanted to see it through to the landing.

Goddamn it.

- [buzzer] - [woman] Mr. Shea.

- Yeah? - There's a Mr. Storms to see you.

[thunder rumbling]

Well, they said I wouldn't have to report to anyone.

The trouble, of course, is there's no one to report to me either.

- So, what do you do? - I go to the movies and I go to museums.

There's a lot of damn fine museums in this town. Did you know that?

Yeah. Oh, yeah. I think I've heard that.

- So, what's next? - Oh, I'm getting out.

I joined a company in Boston.

How about you?

Well, they moved me over to the brake yard. I'm still a VP, but...

I still talk with my old buddies over at the space division now and then.

And, you know, they say that things have really improved since the fire.

Everybody's working together better than ever.

There's a whole new sense of purpose, a sense of relief.

Relief?

Well, everyone knew an accident was inevitable, Joe.

I know. I talked to some UPI reporters a couple of weeks before the fire.

I said to them that I believed some kind of accident was probably inevitable.

I also said I thought it would be harder on those of us on the ground.

The astronauts are dead, God rest them,

but we have to live with the knowledge we could've done something different.

There's nothing you could've done, Joe.

I could have been in the cockpit that day, Stormy.

Why is it every time I say that, people assume I mean I wish I were dead?

The fire started on the left side

- below Gus's feet, right? - Yeah.

Well, if I'd been on the spacecraft that day,

I would've been lying below the footrest,

right there where it started.

Figure I had a 50-50 chance of putting the fire out

before it got out of control.

My years in flight test, I saw a number of crews slam into the desert floor.

Too many.

I love those guys, you know, and each time that happened, I wanted to die.

But I've learned that you've gotta let go of the "what ifs."

They're meaningless, and they'll kill you.

Yeah.

[Shea] it really meant a lot you coming by, Stormy.

- I know we didn't always see eye to eye. - Oh...

[chuckles]

I got mine up in the den.

Yeah? I'm thinking about the front hall.

You had to know it was Gus's idea.

Take care.

- Good luck. - You too.

Bye, Joe.

Okay, well, then that leaves only one very important thing,

which is, of course, who's paying for dinner.

North American, I guess.

That didn't take long.

Uh, wait, gentlemen, before we go,

Roger, Ed and I have a little presentation

we'd like to make to Joe and Stormy here.

- Oh, yeah? - It's not a lot.

- Just a little something from us. - That's very nice.

From us to you. A little something from the guys.

Plain brown paper.

- I don't know, I'm a little nervous. - Frightened for my life, why is that?

- Because you know us. - It's not ticking, is it?

All those designs for the power steering, I'll bet.

[laughter]

Look at that. Oh, that's great.

Wow. That's very funny, you guys. Thank you.

- We have absolute faith in you, really. - Yeah, right.

- [Shea] Thank you. - Thank you. That's very nice.

"It isn't that we don't trust you, Joe,

but this time we've decided to go over your head."

I got a call from some woman at NASA, Deke.

They say they don't want to call it Apollo 1 because it never flew.

They're gonna call it Apollo 2-0...

Two-oh-four. That was the internal designation.

It's like they already want people to forget it ever even happened.

This is the reason we wanted to see you, Deke.

[chuckles]

Open it.

It's an astronaut pin.

The guys knew you would never get into space 'cause of your heart problem.

But they wanted you to know

that they considered you as much of an astronaut as any of them.

They were gonna give that to you when they got back.