Original subtitles

About new opportunities in the liberation of Crimea and Putin's "new wunderwaffle".

Literally 2 months ago on the channel there was a video in which I demonstrated how a firing zone

can be implemented in Crimea, when the Ukrainian defense forces come to its administrative borders.

That is, even at that time, the presence on the territory of the temporarily occupied peninsula

of the Crimea of a large number of defense lines, fortifications and other "placebo", absolutely

will not create a sense of security under the sounds of regular "claps" from drone strikes.

Since 2022, I have consistently held the view that the liberation of Crimea would

follow the Serpent Island scenario, adapted for a slightly larger area.

A scenario of complete isolation of the Crimean peninsula from the outside world and methodical,

systematic annihilation of the occupants.

The main task of the AFU to start the active phase of this scenario is to reach the administrative

border of the peninsula. After that, it will begin to form a shock and fire capability to carry out

the task of destroying all military facilities and military infrastructure on the peninsula.

But if, as of March 2023, I was considering the 4 zones of destruction that the AFU can provide,

taking into account the existing and prospective means of destruction that they can receive (or

already receive), now we should make adjustments and declare the 5th zone.

I should note in advance that the kill zones are specified taking into account the safety

buffer for means of destruction up to 20 km and without taking into account

the specifics of the shots, with an averaged value of the range.

That is, conventionally, up to 20% in range to the specified values.

In turn, an important point will be restoring full

control over the Sea of Azov and causing incomparable damage to the only logistic

artery connecting mainland Russia and the peninsula - the Crimean bridge.

Preservation of the ferry service is possible only for civilian purposes,

but in case it is used to provide the peninsula with forces and means of the

Russian troops, such ferries must be destroyed, either at sea or in ports,

because they can and will be covered by civilians during transportation of troops.

Thus, the occupant contingent on the peninsula will find itself in isolation

and will suffer daily losses, which will not be possible to restore. In other words,

a daily minus, which will lead after some time to a complete loss of the

combat effectiveness of the units of the Russian forces in Crimea.

This is just one of the scenarios I see most clearly. At the same time, on the table in the

General Staff of the Army, I am sure, there are several similar scenarios and some of them are

much more unexpected than this template sketch of a larger operation than was on Snake Island.

Taking into account the transfer of long-range missiles to Ukraine and the emergence of the

5th zone of influence, we can safely say that the Russian occupiers on the

temporarily occupied peninsula of Crimea will have absolutely no peace in any corner of it.

Meanwhile, Russia plans to begin production of a new configuration of the Yars-M intercontinental

missile. The product is planned to be made much more difficult to detect, improve accuracy, and

generally expand capabilities. Moscow has already tested a new version of the Yars in the past, but

only now are they ready to begin mass production of the missiles. Now a number of enterprises on

Russian soil are modernizing their capabilities, among other things. These enterprises are busy

producing missiles, the control system and other important parts of the missile.

But there is nothing good in this news for the Russian armed forces.

The more resources a poor and degraded Russian military-industrial complex will spend on any

hangar, senseless, but insanely expensive and resource-consuming wunderruffle, the better.

This war has shown that they will only be able to build another obsolete,

"unparalleled" Soviet archaism, designed only for the domestic consumer of Russian propaganda.