Original subtitles

Russian occupant losses and dependence on the professional and technical component.

The number of Russian troop losses exceeded the 200,000

mark and it makes sense to analyze how enemy losses varied and what it depended on.

I have repeatedly pointed out that Russian troop losses have increased

depending on how the two main components, namely, the professional composition of

the troops, as well as their level of equipment on payroll, have changed.

For example, in March 2022, Russian occupation troops lost about 4,000 personnel, in turn,

at that time they had lost almost 900 armored fighting vehicles (including

medium and light armored vehicles). The ratio of losses of personnel to equipment is 4.

But as of January 2023, the enemy had already lost 21,700 personnel, and only about 300 vehicles.

The ratio of losses of personnel to equipment is 72.

It is well known that in 2023 the Russian army began to experience not just an acute but a

critical shortage of armored fighting vehicles. Not every unit had a full complement of vehicles,

keeping the paratroopers alive during assault or other operations.

So, it would seem that the technical component affects casualties in a factor of 4 as a base?

In other words, under other conditions, with sufficient equipment for the Russian troops,

the destruction of 21,700 occupants would have been possible if 4,930

armored fighting vehicles had been destroyed. But under conditions of equipment shortage,

the proportion has changed negatively to the infantry component.

In a sense yes, but still not exactly so.

The fact is that the increase in Russian casualties has also been recorded since

September 2022, after the announcement of the partial mobilization across Russia,

although the first figures for the increase were already noted in August.

What is this period? This is the period when the combat zone began to be increasingly saturated

with representatives of various kinds of volunteer units, which were collected throughout the summer

in Russian districts, these are convicts from penal colonies and, later on, partially mobilized.

That is, not a professional resource, not military men who have spent years in the

army and have a certain experience, even of combat operations, but something incompetent.

And in the period from October to November the losses increased by 30%.

Incidentally, losses in the enemy's armored fighting vehicles in October amounted to

552 units, and in November to 376. In other words, if the professional level of the troops

is maintained, the average losses should have been 2,428 and 1,650, respectively.

Thus, the professional component in losses on the Russian side is

even more prevalent than the technical one ?

Actually, they should be evaluated comprehensively. The figure of 4-5

fighters to 1 armored fighting vehicle can be considered a relative gold standard,

because it is influenced by the quality of the personnel already in the geometric proportion.

In turn, this all suggests that in the long term Russia will be able to reduce

its casualties solely by reducing the intensity of combat operations. Otherwise each subsequent

mobilization on the background of the growing shortage of equipment and professional personnel

will only lead to an increase in losses that they will not be able to compensate in any way.

We are witnessing an uroboros of Russian hopelessness, the same case where the amount

of meat doesn't solve anything. Even during the Second World War, it was not the number

of assaults and the amount of personnel thrown into battle that was decisive for

the Soviet Union's army, but rather the support provided by technology and artillery. Therefore,

the erroneous exaggeration of the importance of manpower is detrimental to the perception of the

overall picture. It creates an apocalyptic scenario for the Russian regime. So be it.