All language subtitles for 17-05-2023swewq

Russian occupant losses and dependence on
the professional and technical component.

The number of Russian troop
losses exceeded the 200,000

mark and it makes sense to analyze how
enemy losses varied and what it depended on.

I have repeatedly pointed out that
Russian troop losses have increased

depending on how the two main components,
namely, the professional composition of

the troops, as well as their level of
equipment on payroll, have changed.

For example, in March 2022, Russian occupation
troops lost about 4,000 personnel, in turn,

at that time they had lost almost 900
armored fighting vehicles (including

medium and light armored vehicles). The ratio
of losses of personnel to equipment is 4.

But as of January 2023, the enemy had already lost
21,700 personnel, and only about 300 vehicles.

The ratio of losses of
personnel to equipment is 72.

It is well known that in 2023 the Russian army
began to experience not just an acute but a

critical shortage of armored fighting vehicles.
Not every unit had a full complement of vehicles,

keeping the paratroopers alive
during assault or other operations.

So, it would seem that the technical component
affects casualties in a factor of 4 as a base?

In other words, under other conditions, with
sufficient equipment for the Russian troops,

the destruction of 21,700 occupants
would have been possible if 4,930

armored fighting vehicles had been destroyed.
But under conditions of equipment shortage,

the proportion has changed
negatively to the infantry component.

In a sense yes, but still not exactly so.

The fact is that the increase in Russian
casualties has also been recorded since

September 2022, after the announcement of
the partial mobilization across Russia,

although the first figures for the
increase were already noted in August.

What is this period? This is the period when the
combat zone began to be increasingly saturated

with representatives of various kinds of volunteer
units, which were collected throughout the summer

in Russian districts, these are convicts from
penal colonies and, later on, partially mobilized.

That is, not a professional resource, not
military men who have spent years in the

army and have a certain experience, even of
combat operations, but something incompetent.

And in the period from October to
November the losses increased by 30%.

Incidentally, losses in the enemy's armored
fighting vehicles in October amounted to

552 units, and in November to 376. In other
words, if the professional level of the troops

is maintained, the average losses should
have been 2,428 and 1,650, respectively.

Thus, the professional component
in losses on the Russian side is

even more prevalent than the technical one ?

Actually, they should be evaluated
comprehensively. The figure of 4-5

fighters to 1 armored fighting vehicle can
be considered a relative gold standard,

because it is influenced by the quality of the
personnel already in the geometric proportion.

In turn, this all suggests that in the
long term Russia will be able to reduce

its casualties solely by reducing the intensity
of combat operations. Otherwise each subsequent

mobilization on the background of the growing
shortage of equipment and professional personnel

will only lead to an increase in losses that
they will not be able to compensate in any way.

We are witnessing an uroboros of Russian
hopelessness, the same case where the amount

of meat doesn't solve anything. Even during
the Second World War, it was not the number

of assaults and the amount of personnel
thrown into battle that was decisive for

the Soviet Union's army, but rather the support
provided by technology and artillery. Therefore,

the erroneous exaggeration of the importance of
manpower is detrimental to the perception of the

overall picture. It creates an apocalyptic
scenario for the Russian regime. So be it.