Original subtitles

"Armies win battles, logistics win wars".

While at the strategic level russian logistics are simple and straightforward-it relies primarily

on railroad connections-but at the operational level, because of the heavy and protracted war,

enemy logistics have taken on a unique shape unlike anything else.

Ukraine's use of high-precision and long-range weapons and the backward

state of Russian army logistics have resulted in the main warehouses to which

supplies are delivered being moved 100 or more kilometers from the front line.

The constant fear of a high-precision ammunition strike forces the use of

any means of supply to the maximum extent possible to be decentralized.

One must remember that the main enemy of any logistician is distance.

After the shipment of equipment and ammunition, they are driven to the

very line of contact in anything that rides and can lift any amount of cargo.

This can be both army trucks and civilian cars down to scooters,

motorblocks and even wheelbarrows. All of this is usually taken from the local population.

Usually cargo is carried no closer than two kilometers from the front line.

If there are rivers in the area, boats and even homemade rafts are used.

Already directly to the trenches and positions the cargo is dragged by soldiers on their backs

to the very front line. Ukrainian defenders have already managed to call them "donkeys."

"Donkey" rushes to the front lines with a backpack full of ammunition,

medical supplies, spare parts, or other cargo. This practice of widespread use

of porters has been documented in the Bakhmut, Svatove and Kreminna directions.

As you can imagine, such couriers will not be able to supply the enemy's armored vehicles

with ammunition. For a reason, some of the only places where we see the enemy using

large tank and mechanized formations since the beginning of this year are Avdiivka and Vuhledar.

They have the ability to refuel and resupply in Donetsk.

But the farther the enemy units are from such logistics centers, the more helpless they are.

One reason for the enemy's limited and localized successes in the Bakhmut direction is the constant

dilemma before Ukrainian commanders whether to use high-precision ammunition for each "donkey" lone.

If a decision is made to save ammunition, drop by

drop such a system allows one to saturate a particular area at the tactical level.

Of the hundreds of "donkeys" scattering and moving in groups or singles, even if some of

them are hit, another part will reach the line of contact and saturate the units with ammunition.

In summary, such a system allows to saturate the front during positional warfare,

when it is necessary to constantly feed infantry

formations and when the enemy does not undertake major offensive operations.

During the mobile phase, the maneuvering and movement of enemy forces, and during a breakout,

such a system is inadequate and cannot sustain units on a dynamically changing battlefield.

Such a primitive system cannot supply large armored, artillery, and mechanized units,

which must rely on echelons of trucks, fuel trucks, and other means and measures

of modern combined-arms combat and deep maneuver operations.

Therefore I will repeat once again: War is always won by logistics.