All language subtitles for 28-04-2023qefrqtg

Welcome folks, I would like to talk to you
today about the imbalance of the Russian

occupational forces and the potential
threat of their invasion of Ukraine.

According to the information that has appeared in

open sources on the composition
of Russian troops, we can confirm

the fact of their absolute inability to
conduct large-scale offensive operations.

But in order to explain why the Russians are now
limited in their ability to conduct full-scale

offensive operations, one should use such
a measure as a battalion-tactical group.

Yes, it is not really applicable
to Russian forces right now,

for a number of reasons,
but it is a telling measure.

So, according to the latest data on the
composition of the occupation troops deployed on

the territory of Ukraine we can observe a complete
inconsistency of this entire mass with the

staffing of Battalion tactical groups. According
to the table, there are only 74 full-fledged

groups on the territory of Ukraine, all the
rest will have a deficit of functionality in all

parameters except cannon fodder. This is largely
why the Russian forces have no classic Battalion

tactical groups for a long time, but only adaptive
homunculi like the Storm and others like it.

After the loss of manpower and equipment
led to the disappearance of the Battalion

tactical groups as a class, the Russian army
began to move less and less on a broad front.

As its losses continued to rise,
and its equipment deteriorated,

the army began to confine itself
to narrower areas and locales.

At the end of April 2023 with 369 thousand
soldiers on the territory of Ukraine the Russian

command proudly and aspirationally reports in its
daily report not about the capture of the region,

district, city or village, but about the capture
of the street in the small town of Bakhmut.

The most interesting thing is that
all this mass, driven into Ukraine,

is now unable not only to attack
on a broad front and seize regions

and districts, but also to conduct
full-fledged defensive operations.

Also, tell me at least one example of a successful
occupant defense in an AFU counteroffensive ?

They could not hold the Northern
bridgehead in the defense,

they could not hold Kharkov region,
the right-bank Kherson region as well,

although there natural channels allowed to conduct
a long-term defense and not only, but - no.

So, no matter how many Russian soldiers
dig trenches, it doesn’t help them...

But what is most interesting about this story
is that having all this mass on the territory

of Ukraine, without any result for itself,
Russian troops have weakened the contingent

in the territory of Russia itself, which is
practically unprotected and, the funniest,

the weakest contingent they have in the
temporarily occupied territories of Crimea.

Those "brilliant" minds have managed to
dig themselves into an even deeper hole

than they were in back in July 2022, when
it was already painfully obvious that their

presence on the right bank was a one-way
ticket to oblivion. And now, it seems like

they're repeating the same mistake all over
again in virtually every occupied territory.

It's like they're trying to set a new
world record for military incompetence!

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Hit that subscribe button! I'm wrapping up
for today, but I'll see you all tomorrow.