All language subtitles for 06-04-2023sdfdaswe

The 59th Motorized Infantry Brigade showed
an attempt to break through enemy tanks into

positions.

This is how the Ukrainian armed forces use
anti-tank guided missiles transmitted by the

West.

After seeing this video, I want to remind
everyone of how Russian propagandists ironically

say, 'let them keep sending them, we don't
care.'

Of course, they don't care in their studios,
but the enemy's losses are growing every hour.

Meanwhile another aid package has been approved,
HIMARS, drones, millions of rounds of ammunition,

radars, anti-drone weapons, grenade launchers,
everything for a future counter-offensive.

I read a curious countdown that the British
Royal Institute for Defence Studies released

titled: "Preliminary Findings from Russian
Non-Conventional Operations in the Russia-Ukraine

War, for February 2022-February 2023."

Here are some of the findings:

- Russia's Federal Security Service received
orders to prepare for a full-scale invasion

of Ukraine back in July 2021.

- Russia's strategy was based on creating
a huge network of agents in Ukraine - one

that Russia had been preparing for decades.

By now, Kyiv has already exposed part of this
network.

- Russia's special services recruited many
influential Ukrainians, who then independently

created networks of agents under their leadership.

This is a typical strategy described back
in Soviet textbooks.

- One of the major agents of the Russian Federation
was former deputy Andrei Derkach, who in 2006-2007

was the head of Energoatom and made the Ukrainian
nuclear industry dependent on Russia.

- Derkach himself was building his own network
of agents, which included, among others, Ukrainian

Security Service General Oleg Kulinich, who
was detained in the summer of 2022.

- According to Russia's plan, Kulinich, with
the help of former policemen, was to provoke

large-scale protests such as the Euromaidan,
inside which Russia wanted to launch its provocateurs,

and which would have caused clashes with the
police.

For the Russian audience, it would look like
a 'far-right coup' and should have justified

the invasion.

However, in January 2022, the Ukrainian security
forces thwarted this plan by detaining the

accomplices.

- In addition, Russia was also setting the
stage for pro-Russian protests.

Viktor Medvedchuk and members of his political
party were engaged in this area.

Remember that Putin is the godfather of Medvedchuk's
daughter.

- The most important ideological group of
Russian agents was the Ukrainian Orthodox

Church of the Moscow Patriarchate.

Russia recruited and led its priests, and
after the big invasion used their premises

as bases for Russian equipment and military.

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- Recognizing Russia's unpreparedness, Russian
intelligence recommended postponing the invasion

until the summer of 2022, but Putin started
it anyway.

- The Kremlin viewed the introduction of so
much equipment into Ukraine only as a demonstration

of military power.

Moscow was not preparing for a prolonged full-fledged
military action, but expected to repeat the

success of the annexation of Crimea.

The Russians' strategy was based almost entirely
on the assumption that the Ukrainian military

and society would offer no resistance.

The capture of Ukraine's nuclear infrastructure,
particularly its nuclear power plants, played

a crucial role in Russia's plans for occupation.

And these are very brief conclusions that
show that plans to seize Ukraine were in place

long before 2014, when Russia invaded Ukraine
and occupied Crimea and the east of the country.