All language subtitles for 26-02-2023fddsr

In the previous video, I only mentioned
the fact that the Russian General Staff

is trying to dispose the inconvenient
private military company "Wagner Group".

The conflict between the Russian Defense
Ministry and Prigozhin (the one who owns

the private military company Wagner) only
confirms that the situation with artillery

ammunition for Russian troops is getting worse
by the day. At the same time, they are leaking

quite detailed information about the supply and
shortage of ammunition to assess this situation.

For example, the enemy defense ministry
reported that the Wagner group, near Bakhmut,

received 1,660 rockets, 1,071 shells
for barrel artillery and mortars,

and 980 rounds for tanks
between February 18 and 20.

For his part, Prigozhin lamented that the Wagner

Group was under-receiving 80%
of the required ammunition.

And here is very interesting, 80% of the
under-received ammunition, taking into account

the 10,171 is another 40,684 rounds. So Prigozhin
was expecting about 50,855 shells in total for

barrel artillery? Well, keep this figure in mind,
because it will come up during our discussion.

Well, in the meantime, our favorite
rubric is "this entertaining mathematics".

In particular, 980 rounds for tanks is actually
a full ammunition for two tank companies.

That's enough for one active day of the war. And
this ammunition was supplied within three days.

10,171 shells for artillery is 3,390 rounds for
3 days, or even less. In turn, an average of up

to 200 rounds per kilometer of frontline per
day should be used to support the offensive,

that is, at the current line of engagement
at Bakhmut - more than 6,000 rounds per day.

But if Prigozhin had received 50,855
artillery shells, it would have been almost

17,000 rounds per day or more than
550 rounds per kilometre of the front.

Overall, this is a requirement
consistent with the firing rampart

tactics used by Russian forces at the
very beginning of the invasion of Ukraine.

Thus, we can speak of a shortage of ammunition
in the most active area of combat operations.

And this deficit is at least
50% of the requirements.

That is, the information about the general
deficit and the decline of the Russian

troops' ability to proportionally provide
their units with ammunition is confirmed.

Moreover, even in the hottest part of the combat
zone, concentrating enormous forces and means,

especially artillery, which the occupants
have the most of all the sectors near

Bakhmut, they are unable not only to
implement the tactics of a rampart,

but even to provide artillery ammunition by half.

Meanwhile, Russian occupiers continue to remove
from conservation the oldest Soviet scrap metal,

experiencing a sharp shortage of armored vehicles.

The first footage of deconserved BTR-50P sent
to the combat zone in Ukraine has appeared.

BTR-50P was produced from 1954 to 1970.
Russia has up to a thousand units in storage.

It should be noted that not all BTR-50Ps in
Russian storage are suitable for refurbishment.

The emergence of these mastodons once
again confirms the crisis in the Russian

Armed Forces in supplying equipment to its
units. But more on that in the next issue.