Original subtitles

The Russian occupiers in Ukraine are incapable of attacking on all fronts.

I often emphasize that the Russian occupiers do not currently have sufficient forces and means for

a full-scale offensive. I will now explain what it means to be unable to advance on all fronts.

The fact is that an offensive requires not only significant

resources for the offensive itself, but also the retention of territory.

For example, the temporarily occupied Zaporizhzhya region is now held by 30

battalion-tactical groups, hereinafter referred to as groups. In order to implement an offensive on

the front of just over 100 km, each group will have to cover a front of 2 to 4 km in length.

And it would seem that, given the functionality of these formations, allowing them to control from

2 to 4 km of the front, 30 groups is quite enough to attack and move the front line.

But, in fact, they are not.

First, in the Zaporizhzhia region there are no full-fledged groups,

since almost every unit has a shortage of both equipment and personnel. That is,

they are all fundamentally incapable of performing their functions, and can cover much smaller areas.

Second, suppose these 30 groups go on the offensive along the entire

front in the Zaporizhzhya region, and who will remain in the rear?

What about reserves, rotations, restoration of unit readiness, and so on?

Especially if the Ukrainians break through the Russian offensive, who will be on the defensive?

And lastly, Vuhledar... The enemy offensive front there was less than 10 km,

and to be more precise, the main direction was even less than 3 km. But in this area

were completely exhausted and exsanguinated almost 9 groups,

which had much better equipment than the current Zaporizhzhya group of the invaders.

That is, the Russian army set an anti-record for the use of groups at Vuhledar.

They failed the offensive not even in the ratio of 1 group per 1 km, but 3 groups per

1 km! I don't even know who, where, and when else could embarrass themselves like this... Ah yes,

the same army of occupants in 2022 practically on every beachhead of combat operations.

And now, the most interesting thing, or rather, our favorite rubric "this

entertaining mathematics". If at the moment the incomplete groups of Russian troops are

not able to fulfill their functions even in the proportion of 1 group per 1 km,

then how many resources do they need for 400 km of frontline?

Thus, speaking of a great, large-scale, epic offensive,

it should be understood that it will be, but not in the way it is drawn or presented.

It will be a movement in strictly defined directions, along a narrow front. For example,

in the Zaporizhzhya region - the maximum risk will be conditional for a small city Orikhiv.

In the direction of Kreminna-Lyman, they will certainly launch an offensive, but they will not

succeed. Bakhmut - they will press to the maximum, they still have enough resources for this in this

sector. Marinka and Avdiivka - no options for enemy forces. Kup'yans'k - they will start,

but they won't pull it out - it's a dead end.

And all because no one cares about the

consequences, there is an order - there is no obstacle to comply. But it's like

stepping on a rake all the time and hoping it will break before your forehead does.