Original subtitles

Russian troops near Vuhledar were defeated and moved about three kilometers away from the city.

The AFU are in the city, and the approaches to Vuhledar are strewn with the bodies

of Russian soldiers. No one is picking them up or even asking to pick them up!

This is a horrifying debacle. The Ukrainians let the Russian columns pull into the roads (and there

were mines all around the fields, no way to get around them) and shot them down like at a firing

range - correcting artillery fire from drones and city heights. There is nowhere to hide - bare

snow-covered fields and sparse wooded areas.

At the intersections of these very roads are jams

of burnt-out equipment. The 155th Marines Brigade as a combat-ready unit no longer exists, as its

losses are such that it is not even possible to quickly replace them with mobilized units.

Why did the Russian army suffer such a terrible defeat at Vuhledar?

Geography - such a place to storm in the forehead on the roads among open fields - complete madness.

The superiority of the AFU in artillery and the absolute tactical

illiteracy of the Russian commanders.

In total, of all the winter successes of

the Russians - only Soledar area of 12 km, occupied by the price of monstrous losses,

destroyed to pieces. Bakhmut is holding on, fresh AFU reserves have arrived there, but the situation

is complicated and controlled. In the direction of Svatove-Kreminna, the enemy has a tiny advance,

but also at the cost of heavy losses and with no prospects of breaking through the front.

I understand that February will set a new record for the number of invaders liquidated.

For the first third of the month already 8460,

which is comparable to the daily loss of the occupiers of one Battalion tactical group.

I would not be surprised if by the end of the month enemy losses exceeded 24,000 eliminated.

In the context of such losses, which from month to month show an increase of up to 20 %, a question

arises: what about compensation for these very losses? After all, all this biomass,

should be promptly compensated? And if 24 thousand snowdrops in February will ripen after all,

then the losses of the wounded and prisoners of war will be up to 70 thousand. In its turn

the mobilization and compensation potential of the enemy does not exceed 50 thousand per month.

And it looks like the occupants are seriously freaking out. Otherwise, how else can one

explain their bombing of Snake Island where there is nobody on it? But they risked the

Su-24 for this case and made a series of bombing strikes on the island in the night from 10 to 11.

Immediately after that a video of the alleged strike of the Unmanned Surface

Vehicle on the bridge in Zatoka began to circulate in the Russian mass media.

This video was immediately picked up by Russian war correspondents, with bravado, gasps and pride,

stating that if not from the air, then from the sea, but they would bomb that bridge!

Really?

Since the beginning of the full scale invasion of Ukraine, the unfortunate bridge in Zatoka has been

subjected to 8 or 9 missile strikes... It is not usable, then the logical question arises - why?

Why bomb a deserted island? Why aim a surface drone at a bridge, which has long ceased to

function, for it has turned into a target in a shooting gallery for drunken shooters?

And the answer is simple.

The Russians just need something to show they can do something.

No, not in a war zone.

Not on the battlefield. But in a war against deserted islands and ruined bridges.

So, what is this, if not hysteria?