All language subtitles for 08-02-2023ffffffffffffaaaaaaaa

The enemy offensive is inevitable and Liman
is one of the probable directions for Russian

troops to attack, which everyone has been
discussing for a week.

In my deep conviction, an offensive in the
direction of Liman is a very foolish undertaking

for the Russian troops with an extremely dubious
outlook.

But judging by the way the occupants are saturating
this location with forces and means, we can

say that they will take this step after all.

If in general speaking about constantly pulsating
information about some epic offensive of Russia,

this pulsation is partly true - the offensive
will be.

But for some reason he is being credited with
the scale that the occupying forces will not

be able to muster.

And besides that, they will also trap themselves.

For example, the Luhansk Region, the Svatovo-Kreminna
sector.

Preparing for a conventional offensive, the
Russian occupation troops drove additional

paratrooper units there, thus bringing the
total grouping to nearly 9,000.

This is quite a serious concentration of forces
and equipment, but there is a nuance.

The nuance lies in the fact that the direction
from which all this biomass can launch an

offensive is, so to speak, extremely uncomfortable
due to a number of terrain, landscape and

logistical factors.

Yes, using the factor of quantitative superiority
and ignoring losses, they can achieve temporary

goals.

But, first, this phenomenon will have a temporary
effect, until the exhaustion of the limited

resource for such an offensive.

And second, by achieving a temporary objective,
in this direction, Russian troops lose a resource

that could have been used in other locations.

For example, near Vuhledar, where the marines
of the Pacific Fleet were sent to be canned,

while units of the 12th Special Forces Brigade
of Military Intelligence were ground into

mincemeat.

Or near Avdiivka, where another gang unit
lost its combat effectiveness due to the prohibitive

level of losses.

Or, returning to 0the subject of Bakhmut,
to redeploy and concentrate these forces to

reinforce the assault on the city, under which
the occupants continue to lose their forces.

And this is happening regardless of who is
storming it, the convicts or the brave paratroopers.

The results of all this disposable biomass
are practically the same.

Russian troops are limited in their ability
to freely distribute human and technical resources.

They cannot send units where they are needed
and vice versa without appreciable damage

to combat capability.

Limited resources mean limited capabilities.

So the question arises when you are critically
limited in resources, but preparing an offensive

in several directions, some of which are obviously
a failure, how can this whole adventure for

you end up in general, even where you can
expect situational success?

Back to the theme of the last video.

Yes, the information campaign about the "colossal"
losses of the AFU continues.

But when I first talked about it, I understood
that it would be organized on a large scale

(different countries, speakers, and platforms),
but I did not think that it would be so mediocre

- cheap stuffing sources and worthless information
platforms, as well as complete intra-Russian

incoherence.

In general, this psychological attack showed
that Russia as of 2023 has already exhausted

resources for such campaigns of 2014 and even
2021.

Russian propaganda can only rely on cheap,
long-discredited characters, or on platforms

whose affiliation with Russia is more obvious.