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Pegasus... Pegasue...
Pegasue...
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00:00:23,623 --> 00:00:26,626
NARRATOR: In collaboration
with Forbidden films, a two-part
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00:00:26,626 --> 00:00:27,761
investigation...
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00:00:27,761 --> 00:00:29,596
This story would be huge...
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00:00:29,596 --> 00:00:32,932
NSO was established with an
ambition to make the world a
safer place...
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00:00:32,932 --> 00:00:34,834
NARRATOR: Into powerful
spyware...
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00:00:34,834 --> 00:00:37,404
It is a military weapon used
against civilians.
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00:00:37,404 --> 00:00:38,938
NARRATOR: Used around the
world...
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00:00:38,938 --> 00:00:42,642
There is no control over how
countries use it, and they have
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00:00:42,642 --> 00:00:45,345
been using it in the worst way
you could imagine.
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00:00:45,345 --> 00:00:50,050
NARRATOR: Now on FRONTLINE
part two of "“Global Spyware
Scandal: Exposing Pegasus."
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00:01:14,474 --> 00:01:18,178
♪ ♪
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(sirens blaring in distance)
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00:01:21,481 --> 00:01:23,483
When you have your hands on a
technology like this,
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00:01:23,483 --> 00:01:27,187
the power must be
quite intoxicating.
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00:01:33,126 --> 00:01:36,096
You can get into the phone
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00:01:36,096 --> 00:01:38,598
of most people in the world.
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00:01:39,799 --> 00:01:42,535
And no one's looking over your
shoulder.
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00:01:49,109 --> 00:01:50,910
(distant siren blaring)
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00:01:50,910 --> 00:01:51,945
LAURENT (speaking French):
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00:02:05,125 --> 00:02:07,460
♪ ♪
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00:02:18,805 --> 00:02:22,909
(multiple international
journalists saying "Pegasus")
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00:02:22,909 --> 00:02:24,344
It's like a person over your
shoulder,
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00:02:24,344 --> 00:02:26,946
a person who will see
what you are seeing,
25
00:02:26,946 --> 00:02:29,149
a person who will watch what
you are watching, your emails,
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00:02:29,149 --> 00:02:30,183
your encrypted communication,
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00:02:30,183 --> 00:02:31,784
everything.
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00:02:31,784 --> 00:02:33,786
So once you are infected,
you're trapped.
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00:02:33,786 --> 00:02:38,091
♪ ♪
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It was against
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00:02:41,594 --> 00:02:43,363
so many people in civil society
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00:02:43,363 --> 00:02:47,033
who clearly were not terrorists
or criminals.
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00:02:47,033 --> 00:02:49,002
And you got a real sense
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00:02:49,002 --> 00:02:51,404
that it was a free-for-all.
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00:02:58,178 --> 00:03:00,180
De acuerdo con la pesquisa
acabada
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00:03:00,180 --> 00:03:02,015
por "The Washington Post,"
"The Guardian,"
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00:03:02,015 --> 00:03:04,050
"Le Monde" y otros medios...
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00:03:04,050 --> 00:03:07,053
A joint investigation
by 17 news outlets
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00:03:07,053 --> 00:03:09,088
and Forbidden Stories...
Activists, lawyers
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00:03:09,088 --> 00:03:10,890
and journalists are reportedly
among those
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00:03:10,890 --> 00:03:12,392
who've been targeted by the
phone spyware...
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00:03:12,392 --> 00:03:15,528
Phone numbers belonging to
some big name politicians.
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00:03:15,528 --> 00:03:19,532
(speaking Mandarin):
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00:03:21,601 --> 00:03:24,504
NSO says they sell the
software to governments
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for legitimate purposes,
fighting terrorism
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00:03:27,907 --> 00:03:29,676
or violating local laws.
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You have here
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00:03:32,378 --> 00:03:36,282
a go-to spy service for tyrants.
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♪ ♪
50
00:03:48,795 --> 00:03:51,731
(distant traffic)
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00:03:57,904 --> 00:04:00,573
♪ ♪
52
00:04:00,573 --> 00:04:02,508
(indistinct phone chatter)
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00:04:03,810 --> 00:04:05,845
When we started analyzing the
list,
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00:04:05,845 --> 00:04:08,681
we saw a lot of French numbers.
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00:04:08,681 --> 00:04:12,619
More than 1,000 potentially
targeted by Morocco.
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00:04:12,619 --> 00:04:14,153
There were journalists,
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00:04:14,153 --> 00:04:16,356
lawyers, activists,
but not only.
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00:04:16,356 --> 00:04:19,726
We also saw members of the
French government,
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00:04:19,726 --> 00:04:21,928
and the president, Macron,
himself.
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00:04:24,897 --> 00:04:28,635
We immediately realized that
this story would be huge.
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(speaking French)
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Oh!
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00:05:05,204 --> 00:05:07,307
We knew politicians were on
the list.
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00:05:07,307 --> 00:05:10,843
And to prove that they're...
actually been infected
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00:05:10,843 --> 00:05:12,979
with Pegasus,
we needed their phones.
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00:05:12,979 --> 00:05:17,517
But politicians wouldn't hand
you their phone that easily,
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00:05:17,517 --> 00:05:19,419
specifically, if you're
an investigative journalist.
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♪ ♪
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LELOUP (speaking French):
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(conversing in French)
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Mm-hmm.
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(makes explosion sound)
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LELOUP:
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00:08:11,491 --> 00:08:13,192
(train announcer
speaking French)
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♪ ♪
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00:08:20,399 --> 00:08:22,201
UNTERSINGER
(speaking French):
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00:08:53,499 --> 00:08:55,902
LELOUP:
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00:09:18,190 --> 00:09:21,060
We don't know exactly who in
Morocco was using Pegasus.
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00:09:21,060 --> 00:09:23,930
There were Moroccan dissidents
on the list,
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00:09:23,930 --> 00:09:26,399
even the king of Morocco
himself was on the list.
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00:09:26,399 --> 00:09:29,235
But we do know that NSO only
sells to governments
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00:09:29,235 --> 00:09:31,337
and government agencies.
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00:09:31,337 --> 00:09:34,473
We were reaching out to another
dimension of the project.
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00:09:34,473 --> 00:09:39,111
We were at this stage entering
a space,
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00:09:39,111 --> 00:09:41,080
a dangerous space,
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where we were talking about a
country, a state,
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00:09:43,482 --> 00:09:44,650
attacking another one.
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00:09:44,650 --> 00:09:47,987
♪ ♪
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♪ ♪
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Each time you look at how
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a client of NSO Group used the
technology,
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00:10:16,115 --> 00:10:18,050
it tells you something about
that government.
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00:10:21,020 --> 00:10:22,421
In the UAE,
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00:10:22,421 --> 00:10:25,091
Sheikh Mohammed bin Rashid
Al Maktoum is
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00:10:25,091 --> 00:10:27,326
prime minister, vice president
and, of course,
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00:10:27,326 --> 00:10:28,327
the ruler of Dubai.
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00:10:28,327 --> 00:10:30,997
Here is an autocratic leader.
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Massively powerful.
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00:10:38,070 --> 00:10:41,240
Princess Latifa is the daughter
of Sheikh Mohammed.
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00:10:41,240 --> 00:10:44,877
She had for a long time been,
by her account,
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unhappy about her life in Dubai.
102
00:10:48,381 --> 00:10:52,618
She had been...
incarcerated, effectively,
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00:10:52,618 --> 00:10:54,654
by her father's regime.
104
00:10:57,657 --> 00:10:59,325
I'm making this video
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00:10:59,325 --> 00:11:04,497
because it could be the last
video I make, yeah.
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00:11:04,497 --> 00:11:05,498
(sighs)
107
00:11:05,498 --> 00:11:08,434
This video can help me because
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00:11:08,434 --> 00:11:10,469
all my father cares about is his
reputation.
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00:11:11,904 --> 00:11:14,807
He will kill people to protect
his own reputation.
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00:11:14,807 --> 00:11:20,346
He, he only cares about himself
and his ego.
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00:11:25,418 --> 00:11:27,186
The Princess Latifa concocted
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00:11:27,186 --> 00:11:29,021
this extraordinary attempted
escape
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00:11:29,021 --> 00:11:32,291
that involved jet skis,
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00:11:32,291 --> 00:11:35,261
a yacht, and a trip
to the Indian Ocean.
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00:11:37,329 --> 00:11:38,531
I mean, it's an audacious thing
to do.
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00:11:38,531 --> 00:11:41,000
Incredible, even,
that she attempted it.
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00:11:41,000 --> 00:11:44,036
I think remarkable
that it nearly succeeded.
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00:11:47,573 --> 00:11:51,377
♪ ♪
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00:11:55,681 --> 00:11:58,851
The day after Princess Latifa
went missing from Dubai,
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00:11:58,851 --> 00:12:03,022
we saw her number
entered in the list.
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00:12:03,022 --> 00:12:05,491
And in the days after that,
as she was traveling
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00:12:05,491 --> 00:12:08,461
toward India on this yacht,
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00:12:08,461 --> 00:12:12,498
her friends, people she knew,
people within her orbit,
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00:12:12,498 --> 00:12:14,667
their phone numbers also
appeared on the list.
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00:12:17,136 --> 00:12:19,271
If you look at the dates
and times
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00:12:19,271 --> 00:12:21,540
that her number and those
of people
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00:12:21,540 --> 00:12:25,044
close to her were entered
into the system,
128
00:12:25,044 --> 00:12:27,580
you have something that has
to be more than a coincidence.
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00:12:28,814 --> 00:12:30,349
Eight days after her escape,
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00:12:30,349 --> 00:12:32,184
Indian special forces boarded
the yacht,
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00:12:32,184 --> 00:12:35,621
and then the princess was
forcibly returned to Dubai.
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00:12:38,157 --> 00:12:41,527
We don't know exactly why the
attempted escape didn't succeed,
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00:12:41,527 --> 00:12:44,029
but NSO's technology was,
it seems,
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00:12:44,029 --> 00:12:45,431
from the evidence we've seen,
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00:12:45,431 --> 00:12:49,201
one of the tools that was being
used by the state
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00:12:49,201 --> 00:12:52,404
in a desperate attempt to find
Princess Latifa,
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00:12:52,404 --> 00:12:55,307
kidnap her, and return her back
to Dubai.
138
00:12:57,543 --> 00:13:00,045
We tried hard to get hold of
a phone Latifa had used
139
00:13:00,045 --> 00:13:01,580
but we couldn't.
140
00:13:01,580 --> 00:13:03,749
So we contacted her friends
and her associates
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00:13:03,749 --> 00:13:05,518
to ask if we could check their
phones
142
00:13:05,518 --> 00:13:08,187
to see if they'd been
targeted with Pegasus.
143
00:13:09,488 --> 00:13:13,025
♪ ♪
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00:13:13,025 --> 00:13:16,095
Given how much David Haigh was
working on the Latifa case,
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00:13:16,095 --> 00:13:18,364
it wasn't a surprise when we
discovered that
146
00:13:18,364 --> 00:13:21,667
there was Pegasus activity on
his phone.
147
00:13:33,579 --> 00:13:37,183
I was infected on 3rd of
August 2020 with Pegasus,
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00:13:37,183 --> 00:13:38,818
I believe at 3:00 a.m.
in the morning
149
00:13:38,818 --> 00:13:40,953
and the next day as well.
150
00:13:42,521 --> 00:13:45,090
The fact that you can be
hacked...
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00:13:45,090 --> 00:13:46,492
on British soil,
152
00:13:46,492 --> 00:13:49,695
and that they can do that,
it's, it's frightening.
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00:13:49,695 --> 00:13:50,396
It really is.
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00:13:56,335 --> 00:13:58,270
(waves crashing)
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00:14:00,973 --> 00:14:02,341
My name is David Haigh,
156
00:14:02,341 --> 00:14:04,777
from Detained International.
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00:14:04,777 --> 00:14:06,312
We founded the campaign
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00:14:06,312 --> 00:14:10,282
to free the Dubai princess,
Princess Latifa, in 2018.
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00:14:11,817 --> 00:14:14,086
David Haigh was actually
imprisoned in Dubai
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00:14:14,086 --> 00:14:15,087
for alleged fraud,
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00:14:15,087 --> 00:14:16,889
and it was after his release
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00:14:16,889 --> 00:14:19,592
that he became
a human rights campaigner.
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00:14:21,393 --> 00:14:23,195
Princess Latifa began to message
him
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00:14:23,195 --> 00:14:25,898
after her failed attempt at
escape.
165
00:14:25,898 --> 00:14:30,202
This is a picture that Latifa
drew of the jail villa,
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00:14:30,202 --> 00:14:33,839
Villa 96 in Jumeirah,
Dubai, near the Burj al-Arab.
167
00:14:33,839 --> 00:14:36,508
Um, and you can see here,
"beach in this direction"
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00:14:36,508 --> 00:14:38,344
where she was held captive.
169
00:14:41,313 --> 00:14:43,115
(on laptop): This villa has
been converted into a jail.
170
00:14:43,115 --> 00:14:46,118
All the windows are barred shut,
I can't open any window.
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00:14:46,118 --> 00:14:48,420
Uh, there's five policemen
outside,
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00:14:48,420 --> 00:14:49,889
and two policemen inside the
house.
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00:14:49,889 --> 00:14:51,924
I don't know what can happen to
me
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00:14:51,924 --> 00:14:54,159
and how long this will last
175
00:14:54,159 --> 00:14:56,829
and if they decide
to release me,
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00:14:56,829 --> 00:14:58,764
like, how my life will be?
177
00:14:58,764 --> 00:15:01,066
But, um, I'm not safe at all.
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00:15:03,435 --> 00:15:06,338
♪ ♪
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00:15:06,338 --> 00:15:07,806
That week before I was
hacked,
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00:15:07,806 --> 00:15:09,775
our secret contact with
Latifa
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00:15:09,775 --> 00:15:11,777
had stopped suddenly.
182
00:15:14,747 --> 00:15:17,483
The seven hours became a day
and then two days.
183
00:15:18,984 --> 00:15:20,486
And then we start to worry
because
184
00:15:20,486 --> 00:15:21,820
that was not normal.
185
00:15:24,523 --> 00:15:28,394
We had recorded a lot of videos
and a lot of evidence Latifa had
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00:15:28,394 --> 00:15:31,764
that could be used to tell the
world about her predicament,
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00:15:31,764 --> 00:15:32,965
the fact she'd been held
hostage.
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00:15:35,267 --> 00:15:38,070
At the time I was hacked,
we were in London
189
00:15:38,070 --> 00:15:41,273
with the videos that Latifa
recorded, the evidence,
190
00:15:41,273 --> 00:15:43,008
to meet media to decide
191
00:15:43,008 --> 00:15:46,345
if we were going to use it at
that time or not.
192
00:15:46,345 --> 00:15:48,747
It was effectively dynamite
evidence on that phone.
193
00:15:48,747 --> 00:15:51,784
♪ ♪
194
00:15:55,487 --> 00:15:58,290
The fact that they know your
location...
195
00:15:59,658 --> 00:16:01,060
...someone could be listening
to us now,
196
00:16:01,060 --> 00:16:02,895
and seeing what we're doing.
197
00:16:02,895 --> 00:16:04,663
And it's that,
198
00:16:04,663 --> 00:16:08,434
sitting in the back
of your head every day.
199
00:16:11,670 --> 00:16:13,105
We can't let
200
00:16:13,105 --> 00:16:17,109
NSO and the governments that
abuse their system,
201
00:16:17,109 --> 00:16:18,811
get away with what they've done.
202
00:16:18,811 --> 00:16:20,813
Because if we do,
and if nothing happens,
203
00:16:20,813 --> 00:16:22,381
and people are not brought to
justice,
204
00:16:22,381 --> 00:16:24,516
people are not put in jail and
people are not taken to court,
205
00:16:24,516 --> 00:16:27,653
the next company and the next
company, and the next company,
206
00:16:27,653 --> 00:16:29,455
wherever they may be,
will do exactly the same.
207
00:16:30,756 --> 00:16:33,392
And it will just carry on,
but get worse.
208
00:16:35,427 --> 00:16:38,630
♪ ♪
209
00:16:53,946 --> 00:16:56,015
♪ ♪
210
00:17:01,153 --> 00:17:02,654
(brakes screeching)
211
00:17:10,195 --> 00:17:14,333
AMITAI (speaking Hebrew):
212
00:18:13,959 --> 00:18:18,230
♪ ♪
213
00:18:22,634 --> 00:18:24,703
(voice distorted): Israel has
this advantage
214
00:18:24,703 --> 00:18:28,307
of not only developing new
technologies and weaponry,
215
00:18:28,307 --> 00:18:30,309
but testing it live.
216
00:18:30,309 --> 00:18:32,244
And this is something Israel
knows
217
00:18:32,244 --> 00:18:35,147
it can use to sell outside.
218
00:18:42,654 --> 00:18:44,790
When you want to control
219
00:18:44,790 --> 00:18:48,660
a huge population like we do
with Palestinians,
220
00:18:48,660 --> 00:18:51,463
you have to have assets
everywhere.
221
00:18:51,463 --> 00:18:54,833
So everyone can be a target,
because
222
00:18:54,833 --> 00:18:56,802
you don't want only the,
I don't know,
223
00:18:56,802 --> 00:18:58,804
terrorist from the Hamas,
but also
224
00:18:58,804 --> 00:19:01,673
maybe his neighbor or the...
225
00:19:01,673 --> 00:19:05,344
his cousin,
or the person who sells milk
226
00:19:05,344 --> 00:19:08,247
in the corner of the street.
227
00:19:09,348 --> 00:19:11,950
If you want to recruit human
agents,
228
00:19:11,950 --> 00:19:15,087
you need to collect
229
00:19:15,087 --> 00:19:16,822
their weaknesses,
230
00:19:16,822 --> 00:19:19,691
things that you can use
to blackmail.
231
00:19:19,691 --> 00:19:24,530
And so part of what 8200 does
is to collect
232
00:19:24,530 --> 00:19:27,933
this blackmail, potential
information about everybody.
233
00:19:30,435 --> 00:19:32,104
If you're gay,
234
00:19:32,104 --> 00:19:34,706
or if you have medical,
a special medical condition,
235
00:19:34,706 --> 00:19:39,344
or you have financial problems,
or someone
236
00:19:39,344 --> 00:19:41,180
from your family has one of
those,
237
00:19:41,180 --> 00:19:43,649
then that's something we can use
against you
238
00:19:43,649 --> 00:19:46,852
to blackmail you and get you
to cooperate.
239
00:19:48,687 --> 00:19:51,123
Israeli intelligence has a
strategic view
240
00:19:51,123 --> 00:19:54,026
of how their employees
should be used
241
00:19:54,026 --> 00:19:56,094
after they leave their employ.
242
00:19:56,094 --> 00:19:57,596
They promote them.
243
00:19:57,596 --> 00:19:59,965
They want them to start these
companies.
244
00:19:59,965 --> 00:20:04,403
And they see a deep
communications,
245
00:20:04,403 --> 00:20:07,239
a continued relationship between
the government
246
00:20:07,239 --> 00:20:09,074
and their former employees
247
00:20:09,074 --> 00:20:12,177
as valuable to Israel's
national security interest.
248
00:20:12,177 --> 00:20:15,247
(siren blaring)
249
00:20:16,615 --> 00:20:18,684
There's a lot of evidence
to suggest
250
00:20:18,684 --> 00:20:21,386
that NSO Group had the direct
backing
251
00:20:21,386 --> 00:20:23,789
in support of Bibi Netanyahu's
government.
252
00:20:28,594 --> 00:20:31,930
In order to sell its product to
governments around the world,
253
00:20:31,930 --> 00:20:33,365
it required permits,
254
00:20:33,365 --> 00:20:36,201
effectively licenses from
the Israeli Defense Ministry.
255
00:20:38,070 --> 00:20:41,873
I decided several years ago
to turn Israel into one of
256
00:20:41,873 --> 00:20:44,543
the five cyber powers
of the world.
257
00:20:45,777 --> 00:20:47,813
In order for the companies to
develop,
258
00:20:47,813 --> 00:20:49,781
they need to make--
what do they need to make?
259
00:20:49,781 --> 00:20:50,849
(distant): Money.
260
00:20:50,849 --> 00:20:52,851
Money!
261
00:20:54,353 --> 00:20:56,588
They need to make money.
262
00:20:56,588 --> 00:20:59,825
Now the easiest way to make sure
that they don't make money
263
00:20:59,825 --> 00:21:03,562
is one, high taxes, right?
264
00:21:03,562 --> 00:21:05,931
What's the other one?
265
00:21:05,931 --> 00:21:08,233
Regulations!
266
00:21:08,233 --> 00:21:11,270
Have you ever heard
of regulations?
267
00:21:11,270 --> 00:21:14,306
We have a problem with
regulations.
268
00:21:14,306 --> 00:21:17,743
So the policy we have is keep
taxes low
269
00:21:17,743 --> 00:21:20,078
and keep regulations low.
270
00:21:20,078 --> 00:21:22,281
Minimize regulations.
271
00:21:22,281 --> 00:21:24,783
There is no industry more
susceptible
272
00:21:24,783 --> 00:21:28,320
and more inviting of regulations
than cybersecurity.
273
00:21:28,320 --> 00:21:30,555
It's like weapons--
it is a weapon.
274
00:21:30,555 --> 00:21:35,193
♪ ♪
275
00:21:44,069 --> 00:21:47,706
(speaking Hebrew)
276
00:22:40,292 --> 00:22:43,729
The timeline for Hungary is
that
277
00:22:43,729 --> 00:22:47,032
the visit was in July 2017,
278
00:22:47,032 --> 00:22:50,469
and the operation
279
00:22:50,469 --> 00:22:53,839
of Hungary, we know almost the
exact date
280
00:22:53,839 --> 00:22:56,508
by the database
of Forbidden Stories.
281
00:22:56,508 --> 00:22:59,478
It's February 2018.
282
00:22:59,478 --> 00:23:01,279
So, similarities.
283
00:23:03,048 --> 00:23:07,352
(speaking Hebrew)
284
00:23:20,832 --> 00:23:21,800
(audience applauds)
285
00:23:32,711 --> 00:23:34,713
♪ ♪
286
00:24:18,490 --> 00:24:22,160
♪ ♪
287
00:24:29,501 --> 00:24:34,439
♪ ♪
288
00:24:37,709 --> 00:24:40,912
Going through all the numbers
on the list was a huge job.
289
00:24:40,912 --> 00:24:44,382
More than 15,000 of the
numbers were in Mexico.
290
00:24:46,251 --> 00:24:48,353
And one of those numbers
291
00:24:48,353 --> 00:24:49,821
belonged to a journalist
who was murdered
292
00:24:49,821 --> 00:24:51,656
just weeks after he was put on
the list.
293
00:24:54,392 --> 00:24:57,128
Was Pegasus used in that case
294
00:24:57,128 --> 00:24:59,297
to spy on a journalist,
295
00:24:59,297 --> 00:25:02,300
or to geolocate him?
296
00:25:11,843 --> 00:25:15,180
¿Sabes que Cecilio Pineda es
también en la lista?
297
00:25:15,180 --> 00:25:18,083
Sí, ¿el que fue asesinado?
298
00:25:18,083 --> 00:25:20,285
Sí, es en la lista, sí.
299
00:25:20,285 --> 00:25:22,220
Uf, qué fuerte.
300
00:25:24,523 --> 00:25:27,893
♪ ♪
301
00:25:44,142 --> 00:25:47,412
En México es muy grave que se
haya usado Pegasus como se usó.
302
00:25:49,481 --> 00:25:52,617
Me remito al caso
de Cecilio Pineda.
303
00:25:52,617 --> 00:25:55,220
♪ ♪
304
00:25:55,220 --> 00:25:58,823
Y The Pegasus Project lo mostró
públicamente
305
00:25:58,823 --> 00:26:02,060
que su teléfono fue ingresado,
306
00:26:02,060 --> 00:26:05,931
días antes o semanas
antes de haber sido cometido
307
00:26:05,931 --> 00:26:07,866
al asesinato.
308
00:26:16,808 --> 00:26:19,578
El estado de Guerrero es
una de las entidades
309
00:26:19,578 --> 00:26:21,613
más impactadas
por el crimen organizado.
310
00:26:21,613 --> 00:26:24,816
Hay lugares en donde
literalmente
311
00:26:24,816 --> 00:26:26,685
el estado ya no tiene dominio.
312
00:26:26,685 --> 00:26:28,019
Las autoridades en realidad
313
00:26:28,019 --> 00:26:31,256
están pues mezcladas
con el crimen organizado
314
00:26:31,256 --> 00:26:34,793
y hay pues actividad
del narcotráfico,
315
00:26:34,793 --> 00:26:38,463
hay actividad diversa,
delincuencial.
316
00:26:38,463 --> 00:26:41,466
(dog barking)
317
00:26:43,969 --> 00:26:46,605
De acuerdo
con el reporte de la policía
318
00:26:46,605 --> 00:26:49,975
varios sujetos armados
llegaron a un autolavado
319
00:26:49,975 --> 00:26:53,044
donde el periodista
Cecilio Pineda
320
00:26:53,044 --> 00:26:57,649
esperaba que le entregaran
su camioneta y le dispararon.
321
00:27:02,921 --> 00:27:04,756
(dog barking)
322
00:27:06,358 --> 00:27:09,527
No me sorprende que Cecilio
Pineda estuviera en esa lista
323
00:27:09,527 --> 00:27:12,697
porque el tema que se estaba
tocando era serio.
324
00:27:14,799 --> 00:27:18,036
Pues calentando, ya estamos
cansados de violencia.
325
00:27:18,036 --> 00:27:21,606
Pero nadie, eh,
tiene segura su vida.
326
00:27:21,606 --> 00:27:24,442
La mera verdad, vivimos en
una región donde estamos solos.
327
00:27:24,442 --> 00:27:26,878
En una región en donde
todas las autoridades
328
00:27:26,878 --> 00:27:28,880
pues no te... no te apoyan.
329
00:27:28,880 --> 00:27:31,683
Y aquí uno tiene que defenderse
con sus propias uñas.
330
00:27:31,683 --> 00:27:33,618
Mm.
331
00:27:39,324 --> 00:27:42,093
Buenas tardes,
amigos de Tierra Caliente,
332
00:27:42,093 --> 00:27:44,696
pues aquí ya de regreso después
de estar en dos municipios
333
00:27:44,696 --> 00:27:48,099
de la región y pues
nos encontramos con esto.
334
00:27:48,099 --> 00:27:50,435
Cecilio había hecho un video.
335
00:27:50,435 --> 00:27:55,440
Venía en camino y quiso dar
un mensaje anticipado
336
00:27:55,440 --> 00:27:56,741
de lo que iba a presentar
después.
337
00:28:01,479 --> 00:28:05,350
Él dijo que unas horas después
338
00:28:05,350 --> 00:28:07,519
iba a mostrar el video
339
00:28:07,519 --> 00:28:11,122
de la relación que había
entre el gobierno del Estado
340
00:28:11,122 --> 00:28:12,724
y el grupo del Tequilero.
341
00:28:12,724 --> 00:28:15,493
Después de eso ya no presentó
nada, a él lo asesinaron.
342
00:28:19,364 --> 00:28:22,567
♪ ♪
343
00:28:34,179 --> 00:28:36,047
Ese día, este...
344
00:28:42,120 --> 00:28:45,323
♪ ♪
345
00:28:49,227 --> 00:28:50,829
Y al llegar a la clínica,
346
00:28:50,829 --> 00:28:52,464
este, yo quise pasar a verlo.
347
00:28:52,464 --> 00:28:53,531
Entonces me dice la señorita,
dice: <« No,
348
00:28:53,531 --> 00:28:55,033
lo están atendiendo ».
349
00:28:55,033 --> 00:28:56,801
Entonces yo pensé
pues que iba a estar bien.
350
00:28:56,801 --> 00:28:59,270
Dije, no, pues nada más fue,
pues algo...
351
00:29:03,408 --> 00:29:06,611
Ya como a los tres minutos
sale el doctor,
352
00:29:06,611 --> 00:29:09,514
dice, <« No », dice,
<« pues ya... ya falleció ».
353
00:29:13,651 --> 00:29:16,888
Y es la única vez en mi vida
que me he desmayado.
354
00:29:18,690 --> 00:29:20,592
Cuando volví,
pues estaba toda aturdida.
355
00:29:20,592 --> 00:29:23,695
Dije, pues no sabía que...
Y pues ya,
356
00:29:23,695 --> 00:29:26,998
fue cuando me volvió a decir
pues que había fallecido
357
00:29:26,998 --> 00:29:29,167
Que, este...
358
00:29:29,167 --> 00:29:32,604
Que ya había llegado
prácticamente casi muerto pues.
359
00:29:36,174 --> 00:29:40,145
♪ ♪
360
00:29:43,481 --> 00:29:45,183
You can only prove infection
361
00:29:45,183 --> 00:29:47,986
if you do forensics on the phone
362
00:29:47,986 --> 00:29:51,089
and find traces of Pegasus,
but in many cases,
363
00:29:51,089 --> 00:29:52,557
the phone was not findable.
364
00:29:54,092 --> 00:29:56,427
That was the case
of Cecilio Pineda.
365
00:29:59,030 --> 00:30:01,933
No se puede afirmar
categóricamente
366
00:30:01,933 --> 00:30:04,702
que lo que se obtuvo de
el posible espionaje
367
00:30:04,702 --> 00:30:06,704
haya sido lo que provocó
el asesinato.
368
00:30:09,174 --> 00:30:11,776
Pero tampoco podemos
ser ingenuos.
369
00:30:11,776 --> 00:30:15,313
♪ ♪
370
00:30:41,339 --> 00:30:42,974
(bird caws)
371
00:30:50,548 --> 00:30:54,052
We were able to set up a date
where we all agreed
372
00:30:54,052 --> 00:30:55,954
that will be the day
of the publication.
373
00:30:57,222 --> 00:30:59,991
In 2021, July 18.
374
00:31:03,228 --> 00:31:06,564
And we knew that the most
dangerous phase was
375
00:31:06,564 --> 00:31:10,568
those two weeks before the
publication,
376
00:31:10,568 --> 00:31:13,037
when you knock on the door of
the NSO group to say
377
00:31:13,037 --> 00:31:16,608
"We are Forbidden Stories,
we are 80 reporters,
378
00:31:16,608 --> 00:31:18,877
we investigate your businesses
379
00:31:18,877 --> 00:31:20,111
and we have evidence
of a global misuse
380
00:31:20,111 --> 00:31:21,246
that is threatening democracy.
381
00:31:22,847 --> 00:31:24,649
(speaking French)
382
00:31:29,254 --> 00:31:34,692
They can come blackmail the
source, they can hack me,
383
00:31:34,692 --> 00:31:36,494
one of the person of the team,
384
00:31:36,494 --> 00:31:38,162
they can follow us.
385
00:31:38,162 --> 00:31:40,899
They can come into our offices.
386
00:31:44,936 --> 00:31:46,871
By now the members of the
consortium
387
00:31:46,871 --> 00:31:49,574
had managed to do forensics on
over 60 phones
388
00:31:49,574 --> 00:31:51,042
connected to numbers
on the list,
389
00:31:51,042 --> 00:31:55,513
and we had forensic proof that
at least 37 phones
390
00:31:55,513 --> 00:31:58,850
had been targeted or infected
with Pegasus.
391
00:32:00,451 --> 00:32:02,654
The more publication day was
approaching,
392
00:32:02,654 --> 00:32:04,923
the more paranoid we all became.
393
00:32:04,923 --> 00:32:08,526
Before publication we already
had that habit
394
00:32:08,526 --> 00:32:12,330
to switching off the phones or
even our computers
395
00:32:12,330 --> 00:32:14,399
before having any conversation
about the investigation,
396
00:32:14,399 --> 00:32:17,001
so most of the day were living
and working
397
00:32:17,001 --> 00:32:20,171
without our phones,
or even our computers.
398
00:32:20,171 --> 00:32:22,173
So we had different ways of
working,
399
00:32:22,173 --> 00:32:24,309
we had other devices we could
work on.
400
00:32:26,277 --> 00:32:28,680
LAURENT:
401
00:32:44,295 --> 00:32:48,232
I remember that day clicking
on the button "send."
402
00:32:48,232 --> 00:32:51,836
I was sending the official
request for comment
403
00:32:51,836 --> 00:32:54,038
from the 80 reporters
404
00:32:54,038 --> 00:32:57,075
with dozens of questions inside.
405
00:32:57,075 --> 00:33:00,111
We were giving a deadline to
the NSO group,
406
00:33:00,111 --> 00:33:02,013
and to all the state actors.
407
00:33:03,648 --> 00:33:05,383
And we were expecting some
answers.
408
00:33:11,055 --> 00:33:14,959
♪ ♪
409
00:33:19,230 --> 00:33:21,232
(phone beeps)
410
00:33:23,468 --> 00:33:24,869
(on phone): Hello?
411
00:33:24,869 --> 00:33:26,704
This is Laurent Richard
from Forbidden Stories.
412
00:33:26,704 --> 00:33:28,139
How are you doing?
413
00:33:28,139 --> 00:33:29,707
(on phone): Yeah, I am good.
414
00:33:29,707 --> 00:33:33,544
Yeah, thank you for taking
the time to answer.
415
00:33:33,544 --> 00:33:37,648
I was just wondering if you,
416
00:33:37,648 --> 00:33:41,119
um, are planning to answer
our questions.
417
00:33:41,119 --> 00:33:43,521
(on phone): Well, you can
see it in your email now.
418
00:33:43,521 --> 00:33:46,557
Yes?
Okay, I see it.
419
00:33:46,557 --> 00:33:48,092
Thank you.
Okay, thank you, bye.
420
00:33:48,092 --> 00:33:49,660
Bye.
(phone beeps)
421
00:33:52,397 --> 00:33:54,732
Okay.
What we got
422
00:33:54,732 --> 00:33:56,868
is an email from the NSO Group,
423
00:33:56,868 --> 00:33:59,303
saying that,
"All you think is wrong,
424
00:33:59,303 --> 00:34:00,905
thank you, best regards."
425
00:34:00,905 --> 00:34:04,976
"NSO Group firmly denies false
claims made in your report
426
00:34:04,976 --> 00:34:07,845
which many of them are
uncorroborated theories
427
00:34:07,845 --> 00:34:11,916
"that raise serious doubts about
the reliability of your sources,
428
00:34:11,916 --> 00:34:14,786
as well as the basis
of your story."
429
00:34:24,462 --> 00:34:26,697
But then,
430
00:34:26,697 --> 00:34:28,366
when I woke up in the next
morning,
431
00:34:28,366 --> 00:34:30,635
I opened my phone.
432
00:34:35,173 --> 00:34:37,875
And I saw that NSO sent letters
from lawyers
433
00:34:37,875 --> 00:34:40,878
to most of the partners
at the same time,
434
00:34:40,878 --> 00:34:43,147
on all continents,
to threaten them,
435
00:34:43,147 --> 00:34:45,049
and to tell them that if you
publish anything,
436
00:34:45,049 --> 00:34:47,618
we will sue you.
437
00:34:47,618 --> 00:34:52,557
♪ ♪
438
00:34:58,996 --> 00:35:01,299
It's a bit tense here,
if I'm honest.
439
00:35:01,299 --> 00:35:02,867
Yeah?
Yeah.
440
00:35:02,867 --> 00:35:05,670
Um, we've had a provisional
response
441
00:35:05,670 --> 00:35:07,605
from NSO to
"The Washington Post,"
442
00:35:07,605 --> 00:35:11,342
um, and we will have the formal,
another response
443
00:35:11,342 --> 00:35:16,013
from them to us in about...
15, 20 minutes.
444
00:35:16,013 --> 00:35:18,416
So we're gonna keep this call
really quick.
445
00:35:18,416 --> 00:35:20,551
(voiceover):
Um, the stakes are really high
446
00:35:20,551 --> 00:35:22,320
when you do this kind of
reporting.
447
00:35:22,320 --> 00:35:26,390
Here was a company valued at
over a billion dollars.
448
00:35:27,792 --> 00:35:32,497
And the NSO Group and
its clients, these governments,
449
00:35:32,497 --> 00:35:33,798
were not going to put their
hands up
450
00:35:33,798 --> 00:35:35,566
and confess to this activity.
451
00:35:35,566 --> 00:35:38,536
They were fighting as hard as
they possibly could.
452
00:35:39,937 --> 00:35:43,007
All going well if we're
proceeding with this project.
453
00:35:43,007 --> 00:35:44,842
I think the crunch point,
really,
454
00:35:44,842 --> 00:35:47,278
is going to be
in the next 12 hours.
455
00:35:47,278 --> 00:35:51,482
In the sense of, if we are
proceeding, Paul?
456
00:35:51,482 --> 00:35:53,084
Yeah.
457
00:35:53,084 --> 00:35:54,619
Is that in doubt?
458
00:35:54,619 --> 00:35:57,788
Well, it's always-- it's never
confirmed,
459
00:35:57,788 --> 00:36:00,992
until it's confirmed, right?
460
00:36:08,232 --> 00:36:11,169
(typing on keyboard)
461
00:36:12,670 --> 00:36:14,071
(computer chimes)
462
00:36:19,544 --> 00:36:20,745
We can confirm at least--
463
00:36:20,745 --> 00:36:22,346
(speaking French):
464
00:36:35,626 --> 00:36:37,795
♪ ♪
465
00:36:40,331 --> 00:36:41,799
(door beeps)
466
00:37:10,528 --> 00:37:12,496
ELODIE (speaking French):
467
00:37:22,273 --> 00:37:23,541
(on phone): So Paul,
just to be 100% clear,
468
00:37:23,541 --> 00:37:24,909
you guys are ready
to hit the button
469
00:37:24,909 --> 00:37:28,813
on a version of the story
in 42 minutes?
470
00:37:28,813 --> 00:37:29,847
Of the heads of states story.
471
00:37:29,847 --> 00:37:31,382
Heads of state only.
472
00:37:31,382 --> 00:37:34,352
We're not ready now, but in
42 minutes we will be ready.
473
00:37:34,352 --> 00:37:36,420
(laughs)
474
00:37:37,622 --> 00:37:39,657
Here we were simultaneously
publishing
475
00:37:39,657 --> 00:37:42,560
17 different media
outlets all over the world
476
00:37:42,560 --> 00:37:44,528
in several different languages,
477
00:37:44,528 --> 00:37:46,797
all at the same time,
at the same minute,
478
00:37:46,797 --> 00:37:50,301
the same day after
months of investigating.
479
00:37:53,471 --> 00:37:56,374
The investigation into the
NSO...
480
00:37:56,374 --> 00:37:57,908
(speaking French)
481
00:37:59,143 --> 00:38:02,413
That's okay...
482
00:38:02,413 --> 00:38:03,347
(speaking French)
483
00:38:11,422 --> 00:38:14,158
We've done it.
A tiff!
484
00:38:14,158 --> 00:38:16,627
(chattering in French)
485
00:38:19,897 --> 00:38:20,898
So the story is now live.
486
00:38:20,898 --> 00:38:23,234
An explosive investigation
487
00:38:23,234 --> 00:38:26,437
from the "Washington Post," and
a consortium of media partners.
488
00:38:26,437 --> 00:38:28,472
Activists, lawyers,
and journalists...
489
00:38:28,472 --> 00:38:32,510
(overlapping news reports in
multiple languages)
490
00:38:32,510 --> 00:38:35,279
De la utilización de Pegasus
en el mundo.
491
00:38:35,279 --> 00:38:41,719
(speaking French)
492
00:38:48,592 --> 00:38:52,363
What can be done to protect
our country
493
00:38:52,363 --> 00:38:55,666
from commercial spyware?
494
00:38:55,666 --> 00:39:00,037
The kind of threat that is now
being reported
495
00:39:00,037 --> 00:39:04,475
at the top of the news across
the nation.
496
00:39:05,576 --> 00:39:08,713
There had been reporters
who've been doing stories
497
00:39:08,713 --> 00:39:11,148
on Pegasus for years.
498
00:39:11,148 --> 00:39:13,050
This sort of tipped the scale,
499
00:39:13,050 --> 00:39:16,220
because it was in so
many countries,
500
00:39:16,220 --> 00:39:20,391
it was against so many people in
civil society
501
00:39:20,391 --> 00:39:22,727
who clearly were not terrorists
or criminals.
502
00:39:22,727 --> 00:39:26,230
And you got a real sense
503
00:39:26,230 --> 00:39:29,367
that it was an...
it was a free-for-all.
504
00:39:33,671 --> 00:39:36,674
We even found out afterwards
that the FBI considered using
505
00:39:36,674 --> 00:39:40,211
a version of Pegasus that could
hack into US phones.
506
00:39:42,346 --> 00:39:45,349
But that fell apart and the
Biden administration actually
507
00:39:45,349 --> 00:39:47,218
blacklisted NSO Group.
508
00:39:51,655 --> 00:39:54,225
They've made a bigger deal than
I would have expected against
509
00:39:54,225 --> 00:39:55,926
not just an Israeli company,
510
00:39:55,926 --> 00:39:58,662
but really they're criticizing
the Israeli government
511
00:39:58,662 --> 00:40:00,297
for allowing this to happen,
512
00:40:00,297 --> 00:40:01,932
because it actually could not
happen
513
00:40:01,932 --> 00:40:04,101
without the Israeli
government's permission.
514
00:40:07,338 --> 00:40:08,806
You have here
515
00:40:08,806 --> 00:40:12,877
a go-to spy service for tyrants.
516
00:40:12,877 --> 00:40:17,014
♪ ♪
517
00:40:17,014 --> 00:40:20,651
What the executives of these
companies
518
00:40:20,651 --> 00:40:24,054
and the engineers are hoping for
most
519
00:40:24,054 --> 00:40:27,658
is to make a whole lot of money,
520
00:40:27,658 --> 00:40:30,227
and do it in a way where there's
521
00:40:30,227 --> 00:40:34,398
minimal regulation
and minimal oversight.
522
00:40:35,766 --> 00:40:38,135
A U.S. appeals court is
allowing
523
00:40:38,135 --> 00:40:41,138
WhatsApp messaging
service to move forward
524
00:40:41,138 --> 00:40:44,542
with a lawsuit against NSO group
over allegedly targeting...
525
00:40:44,542 --> 00:40:46,977
Silicon valley has a
big role to play.
526
00:40:46,977 --> 00:40:51,816
Company like WhatsApp, company
like Apple, they are suing NSO.
527
00:40:51,816 --> 00:40:53,617
They are the ones with money.
528
00:40:53,617 --> 00:40:56,353
They are the ones who promise
you safety and security.
529
00:40:57,988 --> 00:41:01,959
All we've seen NSO Group is
deny, deny, deny.
530
00:41:01,959 --> 00:41:03,761
And that's showed up entirely
through
531
00:41:03,761 --> 00:41:05,062
the legal process as well.
532
00:41:06,163 --> 00:41:08,699
The way I think about it is
533
00:41:08,699 --> 00:41:11,735
tech companies can and should
do everything they can
534
00:41:11,735 --> 00:41:14,438
to make their software as secure
as possible.
535
00:41:14,438 --> 00:41:19,009
But at the end of the day,
if there's no consequences
536
00:41:19,009 --> 00:41:20,811
for people who try to break that
software
537
00:41:20,811 --> 00:41:22,379
to commit human rights abuses,
538
00:41:22,379 --> 00:41:24,582
then there will always be people
trying to do it.
539
00:41:24,582 --> 00:41:28,919
It's just like the only solution
to stopping bank robbery
540
00:41:28,919 --> 00:41:31,322
is not to have the best
technology in banks.
541
00:41:31,322 --> 00:41:32,656
Yes, you do that too.
542
00:41:32,656 --> 00:41:35,025
It's also that bank robbers
get caught
543
00:41:35,025 --> 00:41:38,295
and have consequences for trying
to rob banks.
544
00:41:38,295 --> 00:41:40,865
And we need that
for the spyware industry.
545
00:41:40,865 --> 00:41:44,668
♪ ♪
546
00:41:48,439 --> 00:41:51,709
Pegasus spyware is once
again back in the spotlight.
547
00:41:51,709 --> 00:41:54,144
This time for targeting
pro-independence
548
00:41:54,144 --> 00:41:55,479
supporters in Spain...
549
00:41:55,479 --> 00:41:57,548
Several members of Poland's
opposition
550
00:41:57,548 --> 00:42:00,551
have produced evidence they were
hacked by Pegasus software...
551
00:42:00,551 --> 00:42:04,288
This scandal is being dubbed
the Polish Watergate.
552
00:42:04,288 --> 00:42:05,723
In Europe,
553
00:42:05,723 --> 00:42:08,259
we were discovering new victims
of the spyware,
554
00:42:08,259 --> 00:42:10,561
and new countries were accused
555
00:42:10,561 --> 00:42:13,163
of using Pegasus
to spy on their opponents.
556
00:42:17,067 --> 00:42:18,669
At the European parliament,
557
00:42:18,669 --> 00:42:21,972
representatives from NSO agreed
to answer questions
558
00:42:21,972 --> 00:42:23,908
from politicians.
559
00:42:23,908 --> 00:42:27,278
It was the first
time they'd done this.
560
00:42:27,278 --> 00:42:30,080
(speaking German):
561
00:42:58,208 --> 00:43:00,144
We know that NSO is now
on the market.
562
00:43:00,144 --> 00:43:03,414
So maybe they are trying
to polish their image.
563
00:43:03,414 --> 00:43:06,016
That would be interesting
to see.
564
00:43:14,858 --> 00:43:17,962
(indistinct chatter)
565
00:43:25,669 --> 00:43:26,670
(chiming)
566
00:43:33,444 --> 00:43:35,012
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
567
00:43:35,012 --> 00:43:36,714
On behalf of NSO,
568
00:43:36,714 --> 00:43:38,983
I want to thank the members
of the committee of inquiry
569
00:43:38,983 --> 00:43:40,417
for having us here today.
570
00:43:40,417 --> 00:43:43,220
Before we begin we should note
there are limits
571
00:43:43,220 --> 00:43:45,322
to the information we can share
with the committee and others.
572
00:43:45,322 --> 00:43:48,292
As you know,
NSO is a private company
573
00:43:48,292 --> 00:43:51,462
providing export-controlled
cyber intelligence technologies
574
00:43:51,462 --> 00:43:54,098
only and exclusive
to government agencies
575
00:43:54,098 --> 00:43:56,900
for the purpose of preventing
and investigating terrorism
576
00:43:56,900 --> 00:43:57,935
and other serious crimes.
577
00:43:57,935 --> 00:43:59,336
As a result,
578
00:43:59,336 --> 00:44:02,606
we are unable to share
details about our customers,
579
00:44:02,606 --> 00:44:05,709
as well as the crimes prevented
and criminals tracked
580
00:44:05,709 --> 00:44:07,244
and apprehended using our
technologies
581
00:44:07,244 --> 00:44:08,879
or trade secrets of the
technology.
582
00:44:08,879 --> 00:44:12,449
It is not true that NSO group
operates Pegasus
583
00:44:12,449 --> 00:44:14,151
and collects information about
individuals.
584
00:44:14,151 --> 00:44:16,620
It is not true that NSO Group
585
00:44:16,620 --> 00:44:18,589
sells its technology
to private companies.
586
00:44:18,589 --> 00:44:21,492
The issues that came up about
587
00:44:21,492 --> 00:44:23,927
Jamal Khashoggi,
588
00:44:23,927 --> 00:44:26,430
about President Macron,
589
00:44:26,430 --> 00:44:28,032
the system was not used on those
numbers.
590
00:44:28,032 --> 00:44:30,868
I will go immediately into
591
00:44:30,868 --> 00:44:32,536
the Q&A session of today's
meeting,
592
00:44:32,536 --> 00:44:35,706
we already have 15 members who
have asked for the floor.
593
00:44:37,074 --> 00:44:39,343
Have you ever terminated a
contract
594
00:44:39,343 --> 00:44:41,612
with an EU member state?
595
00:44:41,612 --> 00:44:45,783
We have terminated a contract
with EU member states,
596
00:44:45,783 --> 00:44:47,518
but to get into, again,
the exact numbers...
597
00:44:47,518 --> 00:44:50,187
That's fine, thank you--
next question.
598
00:44:50,187 --> 00:44:54,558
If a country does not give you a
permission to audit,
599
00:44:54,558 --> 00:44:58,128
is that a reason for you to
terminate a contract?
600
00:44:58,128 --> 00:45:00,064
Yes or no?
601
00:45:00,064 --> 00:45:02,232
As stated before,
if they do not allow us
602
00:45:02,232 --> 00:45:04,301
to do the audit
and do not participate
603
00:45:04,301 --> 00:45:07,237
and provide us with information
needed in our investigation,
604
00:45:07,237 --> 00:45:08,372
yes, that is a reason
to terminate a contract.
605
00:45:08,372 --> 00:45:10,507
I can state that we've
terminated
606
00:45:10,507 --> 00:45:14,144
eight customers over the past
several years.
607
00:45:14,144 --> 00:45:16,880
Have the United Arab
Emirates and Saudi Arabia
608
00:45:16,880 --> 00:45:20,451
ever gone through
your due diligence check
609
00:45:20,451 --> 00:45:22,086
and have they passed it?
610
00:45:22,086 --> 00:45:23,687
(person coughs)
611
00:45:23,687 --> 00:45:27,091
As I said, I'm not going to
respond to questions
612
00:45:27,091 --> 00:45:30,160
regarding specific potential
customers.
613
00:45:30,160 --> 00:45:31,962
Given that UAE
and Saudi Arabia
614
00:45:31,962 --> 00:45:33,997
have been using Pegasus
software,
615
00:45:33,997 --> 00:45:36,767
who are legitimate actors
to issue warrants
616
00:45:36,767 --> 00:45:40,237
in these countries according to
your checks?
617
00:45:40,237 --> 00:45:41,972
Again, I repeat it again,
618
00:45:41,972 --> 00:45:43,507
I'm not going to respond
to questions
619
00:45:43,507 --> 00:45:44,875
regarding specific customers.
620
00:45:46,744 --> 00:45:47,678
(speaking Polish)
621
00:46:01,258 --> 00:46:03,227
I cannot and again, I repeat,
622
00:46:03,227 --> 00:46:05,963
I cannot because of various
623
00:46:05,963 --> 00:46:07,698
confidentiality and secrecy
issues,
624
00:46:07,698 --> 00:46:09,833
I cannot get into specific
questions
625
00:46:09,833 --> 00:46:11,635
regarding specific customers
or specific cases.
626
00:46:11,635 --> 00:46:15,672
(speaking Hungarian):
627
00:46:35,959 --> 00:46:38,896
First of all, every customer
that we sell to
628
00:46:38,896 --> 00:46:43,467
goes through the due diligence
review in advance,
629
00:46:43,467 --> 00:46:48,071
and if, and very often
if the concerns are raised
630
00:46:48,071 --> 00:46:49,540
regarding the rule of law--
631
00:46:49,540 --> 00:46:51,542
'cause what we're looking at is
also the rule of law.
632
00:46:51,542 --> 00:46:54,144
And any country that we've
decided to sell to
633
00:46:54,144 --> 00:46:56,680
has been approved in this
manner.
634
00:46:56,680 --> 00:46:59,750
Please, stop the,
stop the storytelling.
635
00:46:59,750 --> 00:47:02,119
I'm going to continue in
Hungarian.
636
00:47:02,119 --> 00:47:03,821
(speaking Hungarian):
637
00:47:18,101 --> 00:47:19,970
(quietly):
Good question.
638
00:47:22,072 --> 00:47:24,641
Again, as I said,
639
00:47:24,641 --> 00:47:27,678
Not "again," it was
a new question, so please.
640
00:47:27,678 --> 00:47:30,514
(clears throat)
I have not said...
641
00:47:30,514 --> 00:47:33,617
we have not said that we
have determined recently
642
00:47:33,617 --> 00:47:36,186
that Hungary is or is not a
secure country.
643
00:47:36,186 --> 00:47:37,588
You did consider it secure
644
00:47:37,588 --> 00:47:39,389
because you sold the stuff
to them!
645
00:47:39,389 --> 00:47:41,124
Excuse me, colleague...
I said, now we will,
646
00:47:41,124 --> 00:47:43,694
Let's keep a little bit of
order in the meeting as well.
647
00:47:43,694 --> 00:47:45,395
I understand there is
frustration,
648
00:47:45,395 --> 00:47:47,364
but you have the concrete
question,
649
00:47:47,364 --> 00:47:49,499
we have a concrete answer,
and, uh, please.
650
00:47:49,499 --> 00:47:51,468
You keep repeating
the same thing,
651
00:47:51,468 --> 00:47:53,937
and there seems to be a complete
disconnect
652
00:47:53,937 --> 00:47:56,273
between reality
and between what you're saying.
653
00:47:56,273 --> 00:47:57,541
This is like, you know,
654
00:47:57,541 --> 00:47:59,810
it's an insult to our
intelligence, sorry.
655
00:48:03,380 --> 00:48:07,751
♪ ♪
656
00:48:13,557 --> 00:48:14,725
(horn honks)
657
00:48:16,660 --> 00:48:20,130
(speaking Hebrew)
658
00:48:40,984 --> 00:48:45,656
(speaking Hebrew):
659
00:49:12,282 --> 00:49:17,321
♪ ♪
660
00:49:21,058 --> 00:49:24,895
AMARAI (speaking Hebrew):
661
00:49:48,885 --> 00:49:55,359
♪ ♪
662
00:49:55,359 --> 00:49:57,961
(indistinct chatter)
663
00:50:02,566 --> 00:50:04,501
(speaking Hebrew):
664
00:51:15,072 --> 00:51:17,741
The bottom line is nobody
regulates these companies.
665
00:51:17,741 --> 00:51:19,209
That's the bottom line.
666
00:51:19,209 --> 00:51:23,346
Technology is just so far ahead
of government regulation
667
00:51:23,346 --> 00:51:25,549
and even of public understanding
668
00:51:25,549 --> 00:51:27,818
of what's happening out there.
669
00:51:29,920 --> 00:51:31,855
It's a wild west.
670
00:51:31,855 --> 00:51:33,490
And this is where we are when
you have
671
00:51:33,490 --> 00:51:35,592
a private security company
672
00:51:35,592 --> 00:51:38,528
meeting state actors with no
regulation
673
00:51:38,528 --> 00:51:40,430
in the cyber civilian space,
674
00:51:40,430 --> 00:51:42,999
and when it's possible to use
675
00:51:42,999 --> 00:51:45,602
military weapons against
civilians.
676
00:51:48,572 --> 00:51:50,340
In some ways, we can talk
677
00:51:50,340 --> 00:51:52,542
about the impact on the company
678
00:51:52,542 --> 00:51:55,312
and say it's been really
profound.
679
00:51:55,312 --> 00:51:59,382
A more pessimistic view would be
to look at the entire industry,
680
00:51:59,382 --> 00:52:04,087
which remains unreformed,
pretty wild,
681
00:52:04,087 --> 00:52:08,658
unregulated...
and NSO may vanish.
682
00:52:08,658 --> 00:52:12,496
But I feel no more secure
683
00:52:12,496 --> 00:52:18,869
talking in front of my phone now
than I did when we first
published.
684
00:52:20,704 --> 00:52:21,638
You know, I don't think these
issues have gone away.
685
00:52:22,372 --> 00:52:24,541
♪ ♪
686
00:52:37,154 --> 00:52:39,589
Go to pbs.org/frontline for a
Q&A with the journalists
687
00:52:39,589 --> 00:52:43,026
at Forbidden Stories who led the
Pegasus investigation.
688
00:52:43,026 --> 00:52:47,230
And once on the phone it can
extract and access everything
689
00:52:47,230 --> 00:52:48,698
from the device.
690
00:52:48,698 --> 00:52:52,502
Everything, so once you are
infected, you're trapped.
691
00:52:52,502 --> 00:52:54,938
And an archive of stories
with our reporting partners
692
00:52:54,938 --> 00:52:57,507
on the Pegasus project.
693
00:52:57,507 --> 00:53:00,477
Connect with FRONTLINE on
Facebook, Instagram and Twitter,
694
00:53:00,477 --> 00:53:03,880
and stream anytime on the PBS
App, YouTube or
695
00:53:03,880 --> 00:53:04,981
pbs.org/frontline.
696
00:53:26,503 --> 00:53:30,307
Captioned by Media Access Group
at WGBH access.wgbh.org.
697
00:53:34,678 --> 00:53:37,747
For more on this and other
Frontline programs visit our
698
00:53:37,747 --> 00:53:39,583
website at pbs.org/frontline.
699
00:53:39,583 --> 00:53:58,134
♪ ♪
700
00:53:58,134 --> 00:54:01,938
Frontline's "Global Spyware
Scandal: Exposing Pegasus"
701
00:54:01,938 --> 00:54:04,574
is available on
Amazon Prime Video.
52761
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