All language subtitles for 04-02-2023hhhhhhhhghhh

I often mention the Russian invaders' problems
with artillery, lack of ammunition, shortage

of tanks, and so on.

But if everything is clear when it comes to
artillery - no artillery means no life, and

everything seems to be clear with tanks, then
the dependence on Armored Fighting Vehicles

is not disclosed.

At the moment almost all units of the Russian
occupation troops do not have a complete set

of these very armored fighting vehicles.

They are medium and lightly armored vehicles
used both for transporting infantry and providing

fire support for it.

But, an important point is that it is mobile
equipment, having some, but armor, protecting

the personnel from defeat.

Battalion tactical group should have 33 armored
vehicles, but in reality the occupants' complement

consists of 18-21 armored vehicles, if you’re
lucky.

You may think this is some kind of triviality,
but no.

33 armored vehicles are mobile medium and
lightly armored transports for 165-230 paratroopers,

and sometimes much more when stuffed like
sprats in a can.

That is, providing armor for several hundred
assault troops, under small arms and artillery

fire.

But there is a critical shortage of armor,
and it is necessary to advance, because Putin

needs even a local victory, for example in
the Donbass.

He really wants an epic victory on the anniversary
of the shameful invasion of Ukraine.

On Kyiv to attack guaranteed will not work,
but to occupy a dozen villages in the Donetsk

direction - what a tempting plan!

However, for Putin this plan may end with
the fact that, firstly, it will destroy a

huge human resource.

Secondly - the combat-ready tank component
will be finally levelled.

Thirdly, the armored vehicles are already
in minimum quantity and will become even less.

In other words, for the occupants the offensive
equals demilitarization.

For example, in March 2022 losses among the
Russian troops were many times less, because

each unit had a standard number of armored
vehicles.

Thus, in March there were 4-5 destroyed occupants
per 1 destroyed armored vehicles.

In January 2023, there were 72 occupiers for
every 1 armored vehicles destroyed.

Feel the difference and remember the pointless
meat waves with no vehicle cover that we have

seen recently.

Armored vehicles are a very important element
in an offensive and any assault action.

They protect personnel not only from small
arms, but also from the shrapnel impact of

artillery, allowing them to cover distances
much faster and conduct assault actions more

effectively.

But the Russian army has a catastrophic shortage
of armored vehicles if we consider their proportional

distribution across units.

That is why the increase in losses compared
to March-April 2022 is gigantic.

And now, the most interesting part.

The massive offensive that the Russian forces
are planning.

How do you think it will end if the advancing
side does not have enough artillery support,

does not have the necessary number of tanks,
there is a severe shortage of armored vehicles?

And it will end, if it starts, with a new
record of losses.

Therefore, artillery with artillery, tanks
with tanks, but the absence of armored vehicles

during the offensive is suicide for those
units that will be thrown into the field without

armor.

But, as we know, the Russian command does
not count losses, continuing the demilitarization

of the Russian army.