Original subtitles

In the last few days I often hear that Russia is preparing an offensive with a

numerical capacity of 200,000 troops. It certainly sounds scary, but...

But first, I would like to congratulate the invaders on another record. The maximum number of

cannon fodder entered a different aggregate state in January 2023. Yes, the number of destroyed

invaders exceeded 21 thousand in one month. That is, even according to the most conservative

assumptions, the total losses with wounded and prisoners of war amounted to 50 thousand.

And these losses were to be compensated by the Russian command during January.

But let us go back to the figure of 200 thousand. In fact, this is two months of mobilization

processes in Russia. On the other hand, didn't we see the same thing in the fall of 2022?

There was a draft of 300,000 in three months... What serious breakthrough did the occupiers

make after that? Rhetorical question.

Over the past four months the Russian

command has been busy feverishly compensating for personnel losses in the combat zone with

resources of new recruits. And the more of them there were in the combat zone,

the higher the losses were. And the average figure for all losses is now the same 50,000.

With such figures of losses you will never be able to assemble a strike group for the offensive,

having organized mobilization for 200 thousand. Because this cannon fodder will only be enough

to compensate for losses over the next 2-3 months, and not for an offensive operation.

So there will be no offensive?

No, there will be - it's their maniacal, fanatical

goal. But for that they need more mobilization resource, namely 150-200 thousand every month.

200 thousand is a very difficult goal, but they will try to provide 150 thousand a month.

In this way, the Russian command will be able to compensate for losses in the combat zone and,

in parallel, to form a strike force. But it will take 2 to 4 months to do this. That is, perhaps

by May the occupiers will be able to form a strike grouping for an offensive, but there is a nuance.

It is unlikely that the Russian command will wait that long. And this means that they may launch an

offensive with incomplete units, without a potential resource to compensate for losses.

In other words, if the offensive fails, they will have no forces or resources.

There is another very important point, and that is the enemy's inability to provide the new units

with a full complement of equipment. After all 200,000, this is about 250 Battalion tactical

group, or 2,750 tanks, 8,250 Armored fighting vehicles and so on, I have already told earlier.

That is, even from this it is clear that these are all unrealistic figures.

The current capacity of Russian troops in Ukraine is various units,

with a total active combat unit strength of about 120 incomplete Battalion tactical groups.

Therefore, the offensive that the Russian leadership is planning in the near future

will be the potential of those 100-120 Battalion tactical groups currently stationed in Ukraine,

which will receive constant compensation for unit losses during the offensive,

because Russia is not capable of more. But it will not be easy with this either.

The Kremlin is now approaching precisely the line at which a cornered rat usually

finds itself. It begins to attack, knowing full well that it will die anyway. In this phase,

it is particularly dangerous, because it does not even count with his own life.

But the outcome for her will be unchanging.