All language subtitles for 24-01-2023shfdyewgqytu

I really like the optimism of some of the
media regarding the plans to liberate Crimea.

But what seems logical to journalists, namely the
discussion of these plans now, is not really so.

Any topic concerning the liberation of Crimea that

might be discussed now has no
clear specifics at the moment.

A full-fledged plan for the liberation of
the temporarily occupied territory of the

peninsula of Crimea will be discussed when
the Armed Forces stand on the administrative

border with the peninsula and has an idea
of its own and the enemy's resources.

That is, after the liberation of the South.

And here's why.

The liberation of the South:
the Zaporizhzhia region,

the left-bank Kherson region and even
the southern part of the Donetsk region,

is a very serious task that will
require significant resources.

No one can say with certainty what the potential
of the AFU will be at the end of this operation.

Similarly, no one can now say how this liberation
will take place, in stages or in waves?

Will there still be locations in the
South that, even after reaching the

administrative border of Crimea, will
not be able to be liberated immediately.

Perhaps the liberation of these areas will
be put on hold and postponed "for later.

But perhaps the most important question is
what potential Russian troops will have left

at the moment when the Ukrainian armed forces
reach the administrative border of Crimea.

And where will the retreating enemy resource be
concentrated? Whether it is distributed in the

rush of flight between the Crimea and the eastern
regions, or mostly concentrated on the peninsula.

In fact, at the time of the
release of the APU to the Crimea,

there may be so many variables
affecting the situation tactically

and even strategically that planning
as of today, just loses its meaning.

When it comes to the liberation of Crimea,

the guarantees of support from international
partners are of primary importance.

The partners recognize the full right
to return this territory to Ukraine,

which could not be otherwise. And the
importance of this fact says also that

the process of return will be provided by
the technical component in full measure.

And therefore, for the Crimea it is too early
to talk, but at least 3 bridgeheads can be

considered with a very interesting perspective
and on each of them it is possible to implement

certain scenarios for the liberation. You
should agree that there is enough to do.

The Ukrainian winter could
be fatal for the Russian

army - with such an interesting headline
was published in The Wall Street Journal.

For both armies, winter weather affects
everything from maneuverability to battery charge.

But the cold and damp can have
a crushing effect on soldiers'

morale and fighting ability, while
creating potential health problems.

The U.S. and allies have sent hundreds of
thousands of winter clothing to Ukrainian

fighters and now the AFU has a better
chance on the battlefield than the enemy,

as they are experiencing problems with
their equipment due to hasty mobilization.

According to the AFU General Staff, the occupants
have sent reinforcements to the Kherson region,

but the detachment sent has only small arms,
while only individuals have body armor,

nno military equipment to
the detachment is attached.

It seems that the occupiers are not taking
the threat of a Ukrainian winter seriously,

and are instead relying on their own delusions
of grandeur. But as history has shown,

Mother Nature does not discriminate, and even the
"mighty Russian army" is not immune to her wrath.

So let's wait and see who will be
laughing when the AFU is storming

the beaches of Crimea, while the occupiers
are shivering in their ill-equipped boots.