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It's just over mid-January 2023, and the Russian occupation troops are already on a new record

for losses.

According to the General Staff of the AFU, Russian casualties in the first half of January

totaled 9,360 people.

If their liquidation maintains the pace, there will be a record.

That is to say that losses in January 2023 in Russian troops may exceed 18,000 just liquidated,

not to mention those wounded.

And here, I think, it is worth remembering what is going on in general among Russians

with losses in the last few months, especially after they have started so-called partial

mobilization.

After the start of the partial mobilization in September, October, then November, and

after that December, were alternately record months for the occupiers in terms of losses.

Altogether they lost 47,110 liquidated and an unknown number wounded.

And how many were wounded?

This is the whole dilemma of the reports of the General Staff of Ukraine - they do not

indicate the number of wounded, and it is extremely difficult to find out in reality.

On the other hand, there are average casualty rates, in the range of 1 in 3 or 1 in 4, although

this is not an absolutely correct figure.

Many analysts point to the weak medical component of the Russian troops.

The remoteness of hospitals, difficulties with transportation, horrible first aide.

Plus it is winter outside, and the enemy is poorly equipped.

A non-serious wound and a few hours in the freezing cold waiting for help puts the wounded

man in a completely different state.

But even if we multiply that 47,000 by two, not three or even four, we still have 94,000

injured.

It turns out that the amount of sanitary return and irretrievable losses in the range of 150

thousand people accumulated in just 3 months of combat operations.

That is, since the beginning of the mobilization they have lost 50% of the plan of 300,000

men.

And who replaced those 150,000 in the combat zone?

And they replaced them with the rest of the partial mobilization.

That is, by the New Year the enemy had almost completely exhausted the conditional resource

of its autumn mobilization, because every unit that had lost combat effectiveness should

be compensated for.

Based on the acceleration of the loss rate, by the end of winter there will no longer

be September biomass in the Russian military.

That is, occupiers need to compensate for losses of at least 50,000 per month in January

and February.

Only to maintain existing agony and current problems."

50 thousand is the compensatory indicator, which is spent in a month, therefore, the

full compensation should be at least 100 thousand.

And this is only for the part that is in the combat zone, so that the combat effectiveness

of the units is not lost.

And now the question arises - if Russia wants a protracted war and at the same time to attack,

how much cannon fodder is needed per month, in addition to compensation and to form a

new strike group?

In order to implement the plan for a protracted war, this number should be much larger in

monthly terms, and for a new, large-scale offensive operation and even exceed the mobilization

of 150-200 thousand per month.

Does Russia have such a possibility?

Let's talk about this in the following videos...