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The Main Directorate of Intelligence is behind many high-profile special operations to eliminate
occupiers in Ukraine and military facilities in Russia. Today I will share the main theses from
an interview with the head of this very service Kirill Budanov, which confirm my observations.
With its flurry of military activity in Belarus,
Russia is trying to persuade Ukraine to withdraw its soldiers from the war zone in the southeast.
These are not routine maneuvers. These are all elements of a disinformation campaign.
The Russian army is trying to raise alarm in the Ukrainian army by loading
soldiers onto trains in Belarus that are headed toward the Ukrainian border.
The Soviet Union used similar tactics during World War II,
sending soldiers on pointless train rides, simulating offensives and retreats.
In Belarus, one of the trains loaded with Russian soldiers recently stopped for half
a day near the Ukrainian border and then returned with all the soldiers "on board."
This is a merry-go-round, and it was not an isolated incident.
Although the threat of a new Russian offensive from the territory of Belarus is not imminent,
it still cannot be dismissed. None of the Russian troops on the territory of Belarus
are lined up in offensive formations. The training camps are filled with new
mobilized men who are sent to fight in the Donbass at the end of the exercises.
There are not enough armored vehicles at the training grounds to plan an attack.
Similarly, the shelling of Sumy and Kharkov from Russian territory,
killing and wounding dozens of people, is not a precursor to an imminent repeat offensive.
Russian units are not assembled for an attack and cannot be formed in one day.
The military strategy in the Donbass depends entirely on the political ambitions of Prigozhin,
Putin's cook who now heads the Wagner group.
Prigozhin has launched a march on Bakhmut to oust generals in the regular Russian army.
At the moment, the Wagner is coordinating with the army, but is the main strike force in Bakhmut.
The fierce assault on Bakhmut is a matter of ideology and media. This is the reason why
the Wagner units are so frantically trying to take the city. They need to show that they are a force,
that they can do what the Russian army cannot. The Ukrainian side clearly sees and understands this.
Capturing Bakhmut is not strategic, but it will improve Russia's position in the east
by opening roads to other cities in the Donbass under Ukrainian control.
The alliance between Prigozhin and the Russian commander-in-chief led to the transfer of
heavy weapons into the hands of convict units, increasing the organization's role in the war.
The Russian war against Ukraine is now being waged in two separate arenas: ground battles
in the south and east, and the confrontation between Ukrainian air defenses and Russian
cruise missiles and drones aimed at civilians and the destruction of energy infrastructure.
And I'll add the latest information from British Intelligence:
Lack of artillery ammunition most likely remains the key
factor limiting Russian offensive operations.
It is unlikely that Russia has been able to accumulate enough artillery
ammunition for large-scale offensive operations.
The vulnerability of the current Russian operational plan is that
even continuing defensive operations along a long
front line requires a significant daily expenditure of ammunition and missiles.
In the near future we are waiting for news on the release of Kinburn Spit, see you tomorrow.
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