All language subtitles for 06-012gyud4rew4p

Russia spends munitions faster than it can
produce. To date, Russian troops on the

entire front line per day produce an average
of 20,000 shots. At the initial stage of the

full-scale invasion of Ukraine, this figure
per day was 70 and even 80 thousand shots!

In turn, Russia's production capacity allows
it to produce from 1 to 1.5 million artillery

rounds of various calibers per year. In other
words, relying solely on domestic production,

Russia can provide an average
of 2,500 to 4,000 rounds a day.

That is, the depletion of ammunition stockpiles
will lead the Russian troops to a shell famine in

tactical terms, as the forces of the Armed
Forces also make 4-5 thousand shots a day.

The artillery of the Russian troops
is much worse than that of Ukraine.

Less range, much lower accuracy, exhausted life
of barrels and not only. All these shortcomings

were compensated for by the large number
of shells and the firing rampart tactics.

You don’t need precision when the amount of
ammunition allows you to simply wipe out cities,

villages, and woodlands. But when your
ammunition does not allow you to do so,

you can neither attack nor defend,
and artillery becomes a liability.

And it is at this stage of turning Russian
artillery into a liability that Russian troops are

now. In the next 3-4 months, the Russian artillery
as a branch of the army will cease to exist.

Not because it will be destroyed,

no, but because it will, metaphorically
speaking, simply have nothing to shoot.

That is, the use of artillery will
continue, but without any efficiency

or critical influence on the course of combat
operations, as before, and the presence of the

kind of troops itself in the combat zone
will represent a rudimentary outgrowth.

Now Russian troops are erecting defense
lines and fortifications throughout the

entire zone of combat operations. On the
left bank of the Kherson region, on Lugansk,

near Mariupol and even in temporarily
occupied Crimea in the Dzhankoy region.

And all this while the senselessness
of these actions is known to them.

For example, three lines of defense have been
erected on the left bank of the Kherson region,

which are supposed to block the counteroffensive
of the AFU by forcing the Dnieper.

But no one is in a hurry to force the Dnieper,
and there are daily strikes on the defense lines.

In this way, the Russian troops have
driven themselves into a senseless trap,

turning into targets for the AFU. And every
day in this dash the potential of Russian

troops is reduced, a precedent is set for
levelling the combat effectiveness of units,

and therefore the potential
of the defense is reduced.

And similar tactics will be
used by the AFU everywhere.

Slow, methodical, systematic punching of lines of
defense, which in time will simply be abandoned.

It’s only a matter of time, and
the result will always be the same.

Therefore Russian troops can build as many
fortifications as they like according to

the old Soviet methodology, but they will
not help them in modern warfare at all.

But the Russians have not understood
this by the 9th month of the war.