Original subtitles

Russia spends munitions faster than it can produce. To date, Russian troops on the

entire front line per day produce an average of 20,000 shots. At the initial stage of the

full-scale invasion of Ukraine, this figure per day was 70 and even 80 thousand shots!

In turn, Russia's production capacity allows it to produce from 1 to 1.5 million artillery

rounds of various calibers per year. In other words, relying solely on domestic production,

Russia can provide an average of 2,500 to 4,000 rounds a day.

That is, the depletion of ammunition stockpiles will lead the Russian troops to a shell famine in

tactical terms, as the forces of the Armed Forces also make 4-5 thousand shots a day.

The artillery of the Russian troops is much worse than that of Ukraine.

Less range, much lower accuracy, exhausted life of barrels and not only. All these shortcomings

were compensated for by the large number of shells and the firing rampart tactics.

You don’t need precision when the amount of ammunition allows you to simply wipe out cities,

villages, and woodlands. But when your ammunition does not allow you to do so,

you can neither attack nor defend, and artillery becomes a liability.

And it is at this stage of turning Russian artillery into a liability that Russian troops are

now. In the next 3-4 months, the Russian artillery as a branch of the army will cease to exist.

Not because it will be destroyed,

no, but because it will, metaphorically speaking, simply have nothing to shoot.

That is, the use of artillery will continue, but without any efficiency

or critical influence on the course of combat operations, as before, and the presence of the

kind of troops itself in the combat zone will represent a rudimentary outgrowth.

Now Russian troops are erecting defense lines and fortifications throughout the

entire zone of combat operations. On the left bank of the Kherson region, on Lugansk,

near Mariupol and even in temporarily occupied Crimea in the Dzhankoy region.

And all this while the senselessness of these actions is known to them.

For example, three lines of defense have been erected on the left bank of the Kherson region,

which are supposed to block the counteroffensive of the AFU by forcing the Dnieper.

But no one is in a hurry to force the Dnieper, and there are daily strikes on the defense lines.

In this way, the Russian troops have driven themselves into a senseless trap,

turning into targets for the AFU. And every day in this dash the potential of Russian

troops is reduced, a precedent is set for levelling the combat effectiveness of units,

and therefore the potential of the defense is reduced.

And similar tactics will be used by the AFU everywhere.

Slow, methodical, systematic punching of lines of defense, which in time will simply be abandoned.

It’s only a matter of time, and the result will always be the same.

Therefore Russian troops can build as many fortifications as they like according to

the old Soviet methodology, but they will not help them in modern warfare at all.

But the Russians have not understood this by the 9th month of the war.