Original subtitles

Now much is being said about the fact that the armed forces of Ukraine gain superiority

from the right bank over the left bank of the Kherson region, on the implementation

of fire pressure.

This is indeed true and it is very important, in the process of forming conditions for the

depletion of the enemy.

But much more interesting are the other distances.

In fact, much more interesting is not the possibility of Ukrainian trunk artillery to

exert pressure on the line from Skadovsk and rocket artillery to the northern locations

of the Crimea.

What’s interesting is 10 to 20 kilometers inland on the left bank.

The fact is that the armed forces of Ukraine have superiority in range and accuracy of

artillery, although still inferior in fire potential, but still the suppression of enemy

positions is from 10 to 20 km deep with minimal risks for Ukrainian artillery.

By risks I mean counter-battery combat of the enemy, which Russian troops can carry

out from the left bank with risk to their positions, but not the other way around.

And this is very important in the issue of effective impact on the left-bank location.

Interestingly, similarly, Ukrainian forces can control airspace within the same 10 to

20 km inside occupied territory, as well as with minimal risks for air defence assets.

That is, the optimal deepening of the front on a particular area of combat in the near

future may well be these 10-20 km.

And it is obvious that their retention for the Russian troops is suicide.

In fact, these 10-20 km is a kind of buffer operating zone, where the presence of the

enemy is uncomfortable for him, but the Ukrainian forces can conduct all sorts of existential

and metaphysical experiments.

The important thing is that exactly such a deepening is at least a breakthrough of the

defense line, but most likely there will be a collapse of the enemy's defense as a whole

in the area.

That is, the advance with artillery and air defense cover could be more than the depth

I have voiced.

And, most importantly - when retreating, the enemy itself complicates the situation, expanding

the possibilities of both fire pressure and expansion of the operational zone for the

AFU, but it has no other choice.

Suicidal stalemate.

About her I have already spoken about before the release of Kherson, it is repeated in

this area.