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When partial mobilization was announced in Russia, the question was repeatedly raised
as to what this mass of people would make a difference in the war zone?
To what extent would these 300,000 be the tipping point and decisive factor in resuming
the offensive?
In fact, the answer has always been very clear.
All of this biomass will not have a decisive factor, much less a turning point, in order
to resume large-scale offensives along the entire front line.
The fact is that during the 8 months of the war in Ukraine, the total number of Russian
various security forces that passed through the war zone was more than 300,000.
More than half of them represent losses, both direct non-return and sanitary.
The rest are units in need of rotation and restoration of combat effectiveness.
In fact, partial mobilization is just compensation for losses and replenishment of the units
with only personnel up to the authorized strength.
At first sight it would solve the manning problem, but no.
The fact is that the resource of new recruits is unprofessional and of poor quality.
In conditions of full-scale war it is the same living meat with which the Red Army during
the Second World War pelted the Nazis, without regard for human lives.
In addition, by compensating for losses in units with personnel, the Russian command
has no way to effectively compensate for losses of military equipment.
The shortage of which has a negative impact on the ability to fulfill assigned tasks.
Thus, even taking into account the number of recruits comparable to the total number
of professional servicemen in the Russian army who have gone through the war, they are
unable to change the situation in the combat zone.
This is because while the number of personnel has been restored, its quality has fallen
catastrophically.
Disastrously.
At the same time this low-quality squad does not have enough equipment in service, which
further underestimates their effectiveness.
Partial mobilization has revealed even more problems in Russia than the full-scale invasion
of Ukraine, and they are all related to the real capacity to provide the army and soldiers
with everything they need.
Therefore, if partial mobilization continues, the quality of the resource will only worsen,
which, again, will not give them the opportunity to implement not only large-scale successful
offensive operations, but also to create a deaf, impenetrable defense.
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