All language subtitles for 0010-0011

When partial mobilization was announced in
Russia, the question was repeatedly raised

as to what this mass of people would make
a difference in the war zone?

To what extent would these 300,000 be the
tipping point and decisive factor in resuming

the offensive?

In fact, the answer has always been very clear.

All of this biomass will not have a decisive
factor, much less a turning point, in order

to resume large-scale offensives along the
entire front line.

The fact is that during the 8 months of the
war in Ukraine, the total number of Russian

various security forces that passed through
the war zone was more than 300,000.

More than half of them represent losses, both
direct non-return and sanitary.

The rest are units in need of rotation and
restoration of combat effectiveness.

In fact, partial mobilization is just compensation
for losses and replenishment of the units

with only personnel up to the authorized strength.

At first sight it would solve the manning
problem, but no.

The fact is that the resource of new recruits
is unprofessional and of poor quality.

In conditions of full-scale war it is the
same living meat with which the Red Army during

the Second World War pelted the Nazis, without
regard for human lives.

In addition, by compensating for losses in
units with personnel, the Russian command

has no way to effectively compensate for losses
of military equipment.

The shortage of which has a negative impact
on the ability to fulfill assigned tasks.

Thus, even taking into account the number
of recruits comparable to the total number

of professional servicemen in the Russian
army who have gone through the war, they are

unable to change the situation in the combat
zone.

This is because while the number of personnel
has been restored, its quality has fallen

catastrophically.

Disastrously.

At the same time this low-quality squad does
not have enough equipment in service, which

further underestimates their effectiveness.

Partial mobilization has revealed even more
problems in Russia than the full-scale invasion

of Ukraine, and they are all related to the
real capacity to provide the army and soldiers

with everything they need.

Therefore, if partial mobilization continues,
the quality of the resource will only worsen,

which, again, will not give them the opportunity
to implement not only large-scale successful

offensive operations, but also to create a
deaf, impenetrable defense.