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I think everyone paid attention to the increase in the number of occupants liquidated in recent
days in the reports of the AFU General Staff.
In the last three days alone, the Russian army has been reduced by 2,200, not counting
the wounded.
Now two factors have formed in the zone of combat operations that influence this increase
in Russian casualties.
The first is the entry into direct contact of units that have been replenished by partially
mobilized untrained civilians.
For example, the 423rd Motorized Rifle Regiment was assembled only from recruits.
The 57th Motorized Rifle Brigade has over 60% of recruits there.
And so on.
Completely unprepared and understaffed units now stand against motivated AFU forces, and
the result of this confrontation is reflected in numbers.
The second factor is that quantity is not always quality, but also the problem of safe
accommodation.
For example, by concentrating a large number of troops in one small location, you make
them more vulnerable.
About 25 Battalion tactical groups are now concentrated on the right bank of the Kherson
region, but such density leads to, shall we say, crowding on the bridgehead and vulnerability
of the enemy to AFU artillery.
Fall 2022 is the final transition of the Ukrainian Armed Forces from the model of "contain the
enemy" to the model of "knock out the enemy".
The best strategy now is to wear down and exhaust the enemy, destroying the Russians'
already sparse supply routes as much as possible so that the mobilized meet the winter without
ammunition, food, heating and medical supplies.
The emaciated and hungry Russian army will surrender on its own, without a fight.
So far there is no chance that the situation for Russia will change.
We see that saturation of the front with incapable Russians mobilized only complicates the war
for the Russian command, increases casualties, and has a negative impact on the controllability
of the troops.
And a lack of basic supplies in the winter will lead to an even greater crisis for the
Russian troops.
Of course, when most of the Russian mobilized will be eliminated, there will be a part of
those who, even in cold, famine and without ammunition, will learn to survive.
But itโs a few months.
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