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Thereโs a lot of information now on the slowdown of the counteroffensive, that the
occupants are saturating the bridgehead, it seems they are not going to flee anymore,
reinforcements have arrived in the form of new recruits.
The enemy either retreats or prepares to defend and it is difficult to understand what is
happening, but I will try.
So, currently there are about 40 battalion tactical groups of Russian occupation troops
concentrated on the right and left banks of the Dnieper River in the Kherson region.
This is practically comparable to the potential of the enemy on the northern bridgehead in
February-March and the Donbass bridgehead.
Is it a lot?
Yes, a lot.
But quantity does not mean quality, which has been proven repeatedly at the Northern
bridgehead, in the Kharkiv region, and at the Bakhmut-Avdeev location, which the superior
enemy forces have not been able to swallow for more than 4 months.
In addition, many of these BTGs are understaffed.
The lack of personnel was plugged partially-mobilized, but the technique is often incomplete.
This has a very significant impact on the quality of these units and their ability to
perform their direct functions.
In turn, up to 25 enemy BTGs are now concentrated on the right bank.
On the one hand, they give the appearance of strengthening the line of defense, and
on the other, they do export everything that can be taken out, including all medical equipment.
In addition, almost all the main efforts of the Russian engineering units are now concentrated
on the construction of defense lines on the left bank.
While they provide the right side with manpower.
Also an important factor is the system of supply and management of units.
Both systems on the right bank function, to say the least, poorly.
Under constant pressure from the Ukrainian armed forces, the occupiers are unable to
restore their functioning and fully provide defensive actions.
It should be understood that the AFU counteroffensive on the right bank will not follow the same
scenario as in the Kharkiv region.
It will consist of several stages, with pauses in between.
The liberation of one location, the second, the third, and then Kherson.
At each of these stages, the Russians will not be able to hold back the onslaught of
the AFU for longer than within 1-2 weeks.
That is, in fact, the right bank issue can be solved by the end of 2022 or at the beginning
of 2023.
In the case of a combined counterattack, covering several locations at once - even faster.
It is also worth understanding that these are all my assumptions, and that real events
could follow a different scenario.
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