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Original subtitles

[music]

In August of 1953 Iran had a democratic government.

Its parliament and prime minister,

the popular Mohammad Mosaddegh,

had nationalized the oil industry

to control the country's chief asset.

Then, the CIA intervened.

[music]

[music]

[music]

[music]

I am honored to be in the timeless city of Cairo.

[Applause and Cheering]

We meet at a time of great tension

between the United States and Muslims around the world.

Tension rooted in historical forces

that go beyond any current policy debate.

For many years Iran has defined itself in part

by its opposition to my country and there is,

in fact, a tumultuous history between us.

Since the Islamic revolution Iran has played

a role in acts of hostage taking and violence

against US troops and civilians.

In the middle of the Cold War the United States

played a role in the overthrow

of a democratically elected Iranian government.

This history is well known.

I have never heard anything about the CIA,

especially in 1953.

I don't know anything about it.

I'm sorry, I don't know anything about that.

I have no knowledge of that whatsoever.

Something I've never heard of, never known anything about.

I have no clue.

Uh...

Uh...

Uh... can you repeat that?

Well I wasn't born in 1953 so I've never heard of the coup.

That was a little bit before my time.

After the Eisenhower administration made its decision

to overthrow Mosaddegh, Allen Dulles selected Kermit Roosevelt

to carry out the coup. At the beginning of august 1953

Kermit Roosevelt arrived in Tehran

and began this covert operation.

It's really a fascinating operation to study

because it answers this odd question.

How do you overthrow a government?

[music]

Former Premier Mosaddegh’s ruined house is a mute testimony

to three days of bloody rioting culminating in a military coup.

Suppose you get sent to a country and you're told

"overthrow the government" so what do you do on the first day?

What do you do on the second day?

In the quick shift of power, Mosaddegh

was finally apprehended and awaits trial for treason.

The Shah, who had fled to Rome, comes home

backed by General Zedekiah, military strongman,

who engineered his return to power.

The general will now have a strong voice

in the newly formed government whose cabinet

is seen here with Shah Pahlavi.

How do you overthrow a government?

[music]

Many countries in the Middle East are what you might call

fake countries or invented countries.

They're countries that were created by outside powers,

usually in the wake of World War I and I think

there's a temptation for people that aren't familiar

with the region to see Iran in that category

but that's not true. Actually the opposite is true.

Iran, formerly known as Persia,

is one of the world's oldest civilizations.

At a time when Europeans are still living in caves

and wearing animal skins people in Persia

were conducting experiments in astronomy

and learning about mathematics

and writing beautiful poetry.

So this is a civilization that has a great deal of sense

of its history, a sense of self confidence, a sense of identity

and a sense of being rooted

in the long course of world history.

This is not a country that just arrived and it is trying

to figure out who or what it is.

In 1908 the British discovered oil in Iran.

Geologists soon learned that Iran sits on an ocean of oil.

The British decided that they needed oil to run their cars,

to power their Navy and to fuel their economy.

But Britain has no oil.

When oil was discovered there the British decided

that they would like to control that entire resource.

Soon after the discovery this Anglo Iranian Oil Company

was formed and it purchased the majority stake

and then the oil company arranged a concession with Iran.

The entire stock of Iranian oil was the property

of this British company and all the rights to exploit oil

in Iran belonged to this company.

Oil, of course, became very profitable

from the 1920s onwards

and the way the division was, was abysmal.

For instance, Iran was getting sometimes

16 percent of the profits

and the profits were defined in such a way

that it actually short changed Iran.

Books were not open to the public,

even to the Iranian government.

In 1951, Mohammad Mosaddegh was chosen Prime Minister of Iran.

Mosaddegh was a tireless social reformer,

fiercely nationalistic and incorruptible.

No account of the 20th century

is complete without a chapter on him.

Mohammad Mosaddegh was an outstanding politician,

political figure in Iran for a long, long time.

He had relatives who were part of the previous dynasty,

The Qajar dynasty and he was a prominent figure

for a number of decades in Iran.

Before he became Prime Minister in 1951 he was

a vocal opponent of British control over Iran's oil industry

and generally Britain's control over Iran as a country.

We have to remember this is at a time

when there's a wave of nationalism going through Iran.

There's been long struggle against the British

since the late 1800s and there was a feeling in the country

that it was time for Iran to really be independent.

As Iran's vast petroleum reserves aroused nationalists

following seizure by the Iranian government

of the British operated refineries

and distribution facility.

Demonstrations at the huge oil port of Ibadan culminate

in the tearing down of signs over company offices

and the raising of the Iranian flag over the installations.

- And here comes Gossamer, a very well respected person,

a lawyer, who managed to get himself

in this very powerful position in the country.

Mosaddegh was a fascinating figure.

He must be one of the towering figures

in the 20th century history of the developing world.

Bear in mind that when he emerged there had never been

a figure from a poor country who had risen up in such

a visible way to challenge the masters of the universe.

Nobody from a poor country had ever stood up and said

"we own this resource, it belongs to us,

it doesn't matter what companies you've imposed on us

or what agreements you've imposed on us;

all of that was unjust.

We have this resource and we are miserably poor.

We need the money from this resource

and we insist on having it."

Mosaddegh is very much interested

in national sovereignty but there's something more

than that. He's not just a national leader.

He was very sincerely committed

to the notion of liberal democracy.

Time Magazine made Mohammad Gossamer

its man of the year for 1951.

They chose him over Douglas MacArthur, Harry Truman,

Winston Churchill and a number of other

towering world figures and they were right.

He was the most important person in the world at that time.

And he did what a lot of Iranians strongly agreed with,

which was to make sure that Iran would keep

the revenues of its own oil, at least a big portion of it,

whereas in the past it didn't keep any of it.

So people in Iran began challenging

Anglo Iranian Oil Company and saying

"you've got to change your contract with us

and give us 50 percent, you keep 50 percent",

not keep 90 percent or more, whatever it was,

no one ever knew since Iranians were never allowed

to audit the books.

The Anglo Iranian Oil Company refused.

They would not concede an inch. They were quite pigheaded.

I think they were still maybe caught

in the colonial mentality of the past and thought that

the idea that some poor country could try

to pressure them or dictate terms to them was unthinkable.

The important thing is who actually controls oil production

because if you control oil production then you can decide

whether you're going to increase it or lower it

and that then determines, of course, price.

What Mosaddegh was doing was threatening that

because by nationalizing he was saying MANIOC is not going

to be in charge of production, Iran will be in charge.

We can decide how much to produce,

who to sell it to and that could influence the market.

So that's where it became the threat.

The ability of a foreign company to control oil

in the Middle East was also important, not just

for the British but also in the American's eyes.

They didn't want other countries in the Middle East

to begin thinking that all you have to do is make trouble

and foreign companies are going to have to

make concessions to you.

The pretense was that they were willing to compromise

but the Brits from right at the beginning

they didn't want to give up control.

They started spending some money on, you know,

parks, swimming pools and stuff.

So by '51 they were saying "the Iranians should be

grateful to us because we've built you

swimming pools and stuff."

Well of course a swimming pool might cost

the oil company 2,000 pounds.

What's that when you know profits are like

50 million pounds a year or something like that.

They were treating them kind of like the way

we treated black Americans in per civil war south,

or even post civil war south when we put them in

economic slavery instead of real slavery and persisted,

even more adamantly, in their desire to rape,

pillage and plunder Iran.

The Persians had every reason to dislike the way

that MANIOC was treating them.

The British didn't really know

how to deal with a situation like this.

It was a new era for them but they were

still thinking in an older era.

One of their first impulses was"well we're going to send

an army and we'll just invade Iran."

Harry Truman, in Washington, got wind of this and he went crazy.

You got this situation where Harry Truman, I think,

says"I'm not having any of this, this is imperialism,

this is colonialism. We've fought a damn war.

Winston Churchill when you come back to the

government you can go to hell."

President Truman was increasingly concerned about

the intensity of this argument between Iran and Britain.

At one point he sent a leading figure in the United States,

Aver ell Harridan, who had been famous as governor of New York

and had held a number of international positions,

to Iran with instructions to negotiate with Mosaddegh

and see if he could get Mosaddegh to make

some kind of a compromise with the British.

I want to express to you my appreciation

for your willingness to undertake this trip to Iran.

It's a very important job that you have undertaken

and one which I think you can handle

with satisfaction and success.

Mr Harridan undertakes a series of conferences

with Prime Minister Mosaddegh.

Out of these conferences hope emerges,

that the crisis that threatens world peace may now be averted.

Poor Averell Harriman was shuttling back and forth

between British and Iranian representatives,

trying to make a deal, and realised

that neither side was willing to.

The British policy was to actually undermine Mosaddegh

initially by putting economic pressure.

So one way of economic pressure was to try to close down

the oil industry, thinking that the Iranians

wouldn't be able to run the oil industry.

Actually Iranians were able to run it.

They kept turning up the pressure, hoping

that as one official of the old British company said

"when they need money they will come

crawling to us on their bellies."

So the next step was to have a blockade so Iran

couldn't sell its oil and so whenever tankers from Italy

or somewhere came to buy oil the British

would actually impound them.

This way the main source of revenue of course

for Iran dried up because Iran's main source

of foreign exchange and revenue was in fact oil.

The British then decided they would take Mosaddegh

to international tribunals.

The first thing Britain did was to submit a resolution

to the United Nations Security Council

in which the Security Council would order Iran

to give back the oil company.

When Mosaddegh heard about this he decided to do something

that no leader of any poor country had ever done.

He would fly himself to New York, which wasn't so easy

in those days, and personally present Iran's case

to the Security Council.

He made quite a splash in New York City.

He went to visit the Liberty Bell, went to Washington DC.

He was a very colorful figure, something like your beloved

but perhaps slightly eccentric favourite uncle.

His speech at the Security Council was very potent.

It was the first time that most people at the UN

and most people in the world had ever heard the leader

of a poor country explain a clash like this

from the perspective of the poor country.

We'd always been hearing it from the other perspective.

[music]

The United Nations, once again, confronts a grave problem

as Premier Mohammad Mosaddegh of Iran arrives

with Secretary [Trig Hurley] at the Security Council

to present his side of the explosive Iranian oil case.

The ailing statesman electrifies the Council as he denies

the right of the United Nations to intervene

in what he calls a purely internal matter.

He accuses Britain of intimidation by a display

of armed might after the nationalization

of the oil industry. Sir Goldwyn Ebb,

Britain's representative, is an attentive listener

to his arguments, as is America's Warren Austin.

The issue could be peace or war.

After that debate the Security Council did something

that it had never done in the brief history of the UN,

which was to refuse to pass a resolution that had been

sponsored by one of the leading members

of the Security Council, Britain.

So the UN refused to order Mosaddegh

to give back the oil company.

Then the British decided "we're gonna take Mosaddegh

to the world court in the Hague"

and Mosaddegh himself flew to The Hague.

Hearings before the International Court

at The Hague failed to solve the difference

as Premier Mosaddegh, with his parliament behind him,

firmly pursued his nationalist course.

The same thing happened.

He had a great impact, not just on public opinion

but on the judges there and those judges

also refused to order him to give back the oil company.

So the British were running out of options.

From their point of view Iran had stolen something

that belonged to Britain.

It seemed like an open and shut case.

"We had a contract with them.

They gave us the right to own their oil.

Now they want it back. But this is a contract,

it cannot be violated, they signed it."

The United Nations did not accept this argument;

the World Court did not accept this argument.

This was quite a shock for the British.

The British tried to oust Mosaddegh

by bribing members of Parliament.

But Mosaddegh got wind of the plot,

he promptly kicked the Brits out of the country.

After the British Embassy in Tehran was closed

the British were more or less out of options.

They had tried everything from blockading ports

to appeals to international bodies, threats,

embargoes, everything. Now they didn't even have anyone in Iran.

So they turned to the Americans. Churchill asked

President Truman,"can you do us this favour?

Can you overthrow this madman

who has taken away our oil company?"

Harry Truman, I think, was violently opposed

on principle to supporting the coup and Britain

worked hard to get Harry Truman to support the coup.

And Truman said "no". The CIA had never overthrown

a government up to that time and it was

Truman's firm belief that it never should.

That seemed like the end of the line for Britain.

Then, in November of 1952, a surge of excitement

charged through the British foreign service.

In Washington, a new President

had been elected - Dwight Di. Eisenhower.

IKE for President. IKE for President.

You like IKE. I like IKE.

Everybody likes IKE for President.

Hang out the banner and beat the drum.

We'll take IKE to Washington.

We've got to get where we are going,

travel day and night for President.

Let Ladling go the other way. We'll all go with Ike.

You like IKE. I like IKE.

Everybody likes IKE for President.

Hang up the banner and beat the drum.

We'll take IKE to Washington.

We'll take IKE to Washington. We'll take IKE to Washington.

We'll take IKE to Washington.

Now is the time for all good Americans

to come to the aid of their country.

There was a fundamental disagreement

between Truman and Eisenhower on the question of

whether Mosaddegh was the problem or the solution.

Truman and his Secretary of State, Dean Acheson,

had for some time been working fairly closely with Mosaddegh.

They had a fundamental sympathy towards Iran

and its efforts to get itself out

from under the influence of Great Britain.

They became convinced that negotiations

with Mosaddegh were the way to go.

Eisenhower and his group, on the other hand,

although they didn't reach this conclusion right away,

were much more disposed towards finding some other solution.

The British approached the incoming

Republican Administration about overthrowing

Mosaddegh.

John Foster Dulles, the new Secretary of State,

had long railed against the dangers of

communism.

For much of his career, he had served as a top lawyer

for large mulch-national corporations.

His brother Allen became the new director of the CIA.

It was the first and only time that

siblings controlled both the overt and covert sides

of American foreign policy.

It wasn't hard for the British to talk the brothers

into overthrowing Mosaddegh.

The Dulles brothers then sold the new president

on the idea of a coup by playing the

communist card.

There's only one person in the whole Eisenhower administration

whoever raises this question of Mosaddegh’s true beliefs

and that person was President Eisenhower himself.

There was a meeting of the National Security Council

at which Eisenhower said something like

"I'm glad we're overthrowing this communist Mosaddegh

but I actually wasn't aware that he really was

a communist" and Dulles had a great answer.

Dulles said"well it's true that Mosaddegh

is not a communist, however Mosaddegh

is an elderly man, he could die, he could be overthrown.

That would produce instability in Iran.

There is a communist party in Iran.

Iran is on the border with the Soviet Union,

therefore circumstances could unfold in a way

that might leave Iran open to communism."

And then the straw that breaks the camel's back

is"the Soviets are coming."

Where have we heard this before?

"The Soviets are coming, the Soviets are coming."

When Eisenhower heard that he said

"okay, you've convinced me."

And Eisenhower approves it and it goes ahead

and there's one other thing operating here.

Eisenhower has this incredible aversion for war,

not so counter intuitive if you think about it for a moment.

He doesn't want to see a nuclear war in particular

and so he develops this penchant

for clandestine operations

because compared to war they're cheap.

After the Eisenhower administration made its decision

to overthrow Mosaddegh, Allen Dulles

selected Kermit Roosevelt to carry out the coup.

Kermit Roosevelt was the grandson of Theodore Roosevelt.

He's very well educated, my god he's a Roosevelt.

He is full of energy, the energy of youth,

the dynamism of youth and good education

and he wants to serve his country but he wants to do it

in a secretive way, he wants to do it

in an adventurous way, he wants to do it overseas and so forth.

- As the chief of the Middle East section of the CIA

he was the logical choice.

So he's the perfect person for this kind of operation.

At the beginning of August, 1953 Kermit Roosevelt

arrived in Tehran and began this covert operation.

It's really a fascinating operation to study

because it answers this odd question;

how do you overthrow a government?

Suppose you get sent to a country and you're told

"overthrow the government" so what do you do on the first day?

What do you do on the second day?

Kermit Roosevelt, who really was something

like a true life James Bond,

carried out a very effective policy.

Roosevelt bribed tribal leaders and newspaper editors

who now claimed that Mosaddegh was a dictator and had to go.

Every day they were printing articles about

how evil Mosaddegh was, that he was a Jew,

he was a homosexual, he was a criminal,

he was an agent of the British;

anything they could think of to undermine him.

Leaving nothing to chance,

Roosevelt bribed military officers, religious leaders,

and members of Parliament.

One of the most interesting things

that Kermit Roosevelt did, besides bribing

members of parliament and military officers

and everyone else, was his decision

to throw Tehran into chaos.

He had this idea that if there were riots

and outbreaks of violence every day around Tehran

people would begin to think that Prime Minister Mosaddegh

had completely lost control of the country.

So as the coup day drew closer he bribed

the chief leader of the protection rackets in Tehran,

a guy named Shaman the Brainless, to turn out his mob.

It was Kermit Roosevelt's idea that this gang, this mob,

should charge through the streets of Tehran,

beat up pedestrians, break shop windows,

fire guns into mosques and then yell

"up with communism, we love Mosaddegh"

and that wasn't even enough.

Kermit Roosevelt had an even better idea.

He hired another mob to attack that mob.

That created a huge outbreak of street violence.

The first idea that Kermit Roosevelt had

was to bring the Shah into the plot.

The British had occupied Iran

during the second world war, at which time they placed

Mohammad Reza Pahlavi on the throne

as Shah or"King".

Prior to doing so, they forced the Shah's father

- a ruthless strongman - to abdicate the throne

due to suspected pro-Nazi sympathies.

In placing the son on the throne,

the Brits hoped the younger, weaker Shah would be

easier to control.

The Shah was a great coward and a great pipsqueak

and real afraid cat, very much different

from the image that we had of him 20 years later.

He was terrified of becoming involved in this operation

because he feared, perhaps quite rightly,

that if it went wrong he'd be finished,

he'd be chased all out of the country.

This was really dicey up to the last minute.

The Shah even didn't think this was gonna work.

They had to fly his sister in, for example,

who was hated and didn't even wanna go,

to try and convince him to do it.

It took a great deal of persuasion and a lot of pressure

by Kermit Roosevelt and a number of people

that he brought in to persuade the Shah to join the plot.

[music]

Now what did Kermit Roosevelt want the Shah to do?

It was his idea that the Shah should sign two orders,

"firmands" they're called in Farsi.

The first order dismisses Mosaddegh as Prime Minister

and the second order names

General Zahedi as his successor.

So late one night, around midnight, one of the generals

or a colonel at that time, loyal to the Shah,

arrived with a few soldiers at Mosaddegh’s house,

bangs on the door and when the door is opened

says, "I have two orders from the Shah."

Now everyone, including the Shah and Kermit Roosevelt

understood what Mosaddegh’s reaction

to these orders would be.

He would say"these are illegal, I reject these orders.

You have no right to name a new Prime Minister

or to fire a Prime Minister without parliament's approval,"

and when he did that they would arrest him, that was the plan.

That simple plan failed because Mosaddegh

actually got wind of the plan so when the Shah's troops

came to Mosaddegh’s home to arrest him

Mosaddegh had actually more troops there waiting for them.

So they arrested the Shah's kernel.

The next morning Radio Tehran broadcast the news

that a British plot,

that's what the Iranians, naively thought it was,

had been crushed.

When the Shah heard this he fled the country immediately

and went to Baghdad and then on to Rome.

The CIA cabled Roosevelt that the situation had become

too dangerous and to leave Tehran at once.

Kermit Roosevelt, however, thought to himself

"wait, I can still do this; I have many assets

I haven't used yet.

I can still get this done" and showing the resourcefulness,

for which he became famous, he decided to stay on in Tehran

and try, four days later, to stage another coup.

For the next several days,

Roosevelt played the roll of puppeteer.

Throwing Tehran deeper into chaos, he had one

gang take to the streets, followed by another.

After Mullahs marched to denounce Mosaddegh,

he had the military storm the streets.

They never had any idea that there was such a person

as Kermit Roosevelt, that he was operating

in the basement of the US Embassy.

When two Iranian agents working for the CIA got cold feet,

Roosevelt made them an offer they couldn't refuse.

Kermit Roosevelt produced a valise

with 50,000 dollars in cash.

He told them: "if you agree to continue helping me

I'll give you this 50,000 dollars, and by the way,

if you don't I'm gonna kill you."

Considering that option they changed their mind

and decided to help.

Roosevelt knew that the other officers under his control

hadn't been touched yet. He had Loyd Henderson,

the US Ambassador deliver a message to Mosaddegh:

establish law and order and clear the streets

of demonstrators or the US would cease

to recognize him as prime minister.

Henderson falsely claimed that American lives were at risk.

Mosaddegh fell for the trap and effectively disarmed himself.

He ordered his supporters off the streets, and established

martial law which allowed the coup plotters

to gain access to needed fuel and weapons.

The military officers in on the plot then rolled their tanks

into Tehran - not to clear the streets of demonstrators,

but to arrest Mosaddegh.

At Mosaddegh's residence there was a final fire fight.

Mosaddegh’s men with their 3 tanks were no match

for the 36 tanks that besieged the residence,

which was soon destroyed.

Finally, late at night, the firing stopped.

The people inside fled.

Mosaddegh jumped over a back wall and disappeared.

The house was looted. They brought out whatever

they could find and some of Mosaddegh’s personal furnishings

were actually for sale on the street. His refrigerator

was sold to somebody for about 35 dollars.

It was time to deliver the coup DE grace,

that was the naming of Zahedi.

To head up the coup, the CIA had chosen

Fazlollah Zahedi who had a reputation for ruthlessness.

General Zahedi had spent WWII in a British internment camp

due to his connections to Nazi agents.

Now General Zahedi was in the custody, essentially,

of Kermit Roosevelt. Roosevelt had stashed him at a safe house

near the American Embassy.

So he arrived there to tell him, "everything's worked out,

it's all set, you're gonna be the Prime Minister."

The guy was just sitting there in his underwear

waiting for news. Zahedi was brought out onto the streets

and rode aboard a tank through the streets of Tehran

to the radio station where he was to make his statement

announcing that Mosaddegh was overthrown

and, "I'm now your new Prime Minister."

It was quite a festive event although there was one hitch.

As he was about to make his radio speech

the radio announcers decided we need some marshal music

to show that Iranian patriotism has finally triumphed.

So he went running off, according to this account,

to the Embassy library, pulled the first, you know,

record album that he could find off the shelf

and immediately put this record on the turntable

and the very first song that came out

was The Star-Spangled Banner.

So this was another kind of wink of history

maybe since it actually was the Americans

who were coming to power. That was quickly changed.

Iranian music was put on. Zahedi made his speech,

announced that the evil Mosaddegh was gone

and, "I will now take over and restore Iran's greatness."

The Shah was sitting at lunch in a hotel in Rome,

probably thinking to himself what he was gonna do now.

He had already told people he would have to look for work

because he wasn't gonna be able to go back to Iran.

Suddenly some news reporters burst in and handed him

the news and they said, "you're back.

The coup... there was another coup... it succeeded.

You're back on, you're gonna be the king."

He was in complete shock and, for some time,

couldn't speak at all. Finally, his first words were

"I knew it, they love me."

Back at the US Embassy, the champagne flowed

as jubilation reigned.

The message the Dulles brothers took away

was that they had a whole new way to shape world events.

After the coup several hundred military officers were arrested,

about 60 were executed.

There was a purge of all officers who were deemed loyal

to the democratic government

and not loyal to Zahedi or the Shah.

It was a way of cleansing the army and doing something

that Mosaddegh had refused to do, which is build

an army loyal to the people in power at that moment.

For his part in the coup, Zahedi was paid

5 million dollars by the CIA.

The oil industry was denationalized.

An international consortium was formed with

40 percent of the shares now going to American companies.

Profits were split with Iran on a 50/50 basis.

But the British effectively retained overall control,

and its oil company renamed itself British Petroleum.

Three months after the coup, Mosaddegh was tried

in a military court on trumped-up chargers of treason.

His fiery defense electrified the courtroom

and is still remembered today.

[applause]

Well the McCarthy era was a dark time in the United States.

This was from about 1950 to '54 thereabouts when McCarthy

was on the scene and he both was created by

and came to symbolize this period of absolute fear

of communism, excessive fear, hysteria, as it's often called.

I intend to go into those States and give the American people

the cold documented picture of the sell-out in Korea,

the extent to which communism has been directing

our foreign policy, our suicidal foreign policy if you please.

It was a time that created pressures against different

American administrations, presidential administrations,

to move their policies to the right. John Foster Dulles

was one of the big proponents of rollback of communism

under the Eisenhower administration. He had been,

for a long time, an outspoken critic of Truman's policies,

about the fears of the United States being soft on communism

and he is known for being a vocal advocate of pushing back

hard against the communists. He later admitted that

he tended to exaggerate the threat,

purely because it served certain interests.

I think the conclusion that the Soviets didn't have

any real implementable, executable designs on Iran

in '52, '53, '54, I think it's a pretty sound conclusion

but on the other side of that coin an even sounder conclusion

I think is that, at this time, the so-called communists,

the Tutor, in Iran was indisposed

to be a lackey of the Soviet Union.

Basically they were an indigenous group,

not a common turn group, not a group that was recruited

and funded and marshaled in Moscow and sent to Iran.

The ideas of communism were certainly very much opposed

to Mosaddegh’s idea.

You could speculate on whether circumstances might

have changed over time and communist influence

might have grown there.

The question of communism threat is often used

as a rhetorical when it's useful.

So in the early part, when the oil crisis starts, the Americans

keep pressuring the British to actually deal with Mosaddegh

and the Americans say to the British"if you don't deal,

Mosaddegh will be overthrown and the communists move in"

and the British pooh-poohs this and say

"there's absolutely no danger of that.

We can pressure Mosaddegh as much as we want,

there's no communist threat." Later on you find the British

then say: "we have to get rid of Mosaddegh to stop

the communist guy" and then people like Acheson are then

repeating the earlier British pooh-poohing that really

there's no real danger of a communist takeover. At the time,

of course, you can say the discourse in the West

was the communist danger. So if you want to get anything

done you say that. Nowadays you can say the discourse

is international terrorism and you can justify anything.

But even the Dulles brothers' view that this country

was very susceptible to communist takeover

is something that they developed themselves

and is quite dubious from historical perspective.

The distortion we usually get in the conventional view

of the coup is that it's part of the Cold War;

it's the US/USSR rivalry that leaves the CIA to carry out

the coup. I would argue that the coup's really rooted

in the oil crisis, when Iran nationalized the oil company.

This wasn't just a threat to the British; it was as much

a threat actually to all the Western companies including

the American companies because the same thing

could happen to American companies in the Middle East

or South America.

The summer of 1953 was a turbulent time and of course

very threatening and dangerous for Mosaddegh.

Mosaddegh’s house should have been sacrosanct.

It was not and the mob went after it.

I was horrified by the bloodletting in the streets.

There were tanks attacking the house, there was a lot

of killing then. 300 people died in that couple of hours.

I interviewed the Shah amongst a group of reporters there;

me and people from United Press and he just was kind

of bubbling over with glee at having been saved.

I met Kermit Roosevelt for the first time after the coup.

I had several discussions with him later about

"do you really think now that was a good idea?"

and he said, "oh yes, it gave us another 20 years

or something like that." It was the most reactionary,

he was obeying orders Kermit was.

I think he truly believed in his mission.

- The '53 coup is like a guillotine in Iran,

it inaugurated a massive repression

and it changed the landscape so the political situation,

besides being more repressive, secular organizations

like the National Front, the Etude Party,

were in fact disassembled, they've dismantled.

They couldn't function after '53.

The '53 coup was clearly a big success for the CIA

as they saw it at the time and it fit perfectly with the ideas

of President Eisenhower, the Dulles brothers and others

who thought that covert operations

was a very powerful tool in US foreign policy

and it clearly served as a model or, you know,

provided lessons for future operations,

including the following year, in 1954, in Guatemala.

At the time this coup seemed like a great success

but let's look back at it from the perspective of history,

from the perspective of today.

The Shah ruled for 25 years, with increasing repression

His repression produced the explosion of the late 1970's,

what we call the Islamic revolution.

That revolution brought to power a clerk

of fanatically anti-American Mulls,

who had spent the next quarter century,

vigorously and sometimes very violently,

trying to undermine western power all over the world.

So from the perspective of history, this

coup doesn't quite so successful at all.

A lot of history came out of three weeks in Tehran,

in the summer of 1953.

These people remember this,

even if it's not something that necessarily happened yesterday,

you have to remember, Iran is a country with very long history.

It is a culture that is very much dependent on people,

understanding and knowing it's history.

So something that happened 50 or 60 years ago,

is not that very far back for a country

who's history stretches 3000 years.

What's interesting about 53,

that is the episode, that is the time

in which America in the Iranian mindsets,

becomes a violator, becomes an aggressor.

Prior to that,

the view of Americans and the view of America

amongst Iranian public, was an extremely positive one

and well deserving so because America was correctly viewed

as an anti colonial power, who opposed colonization,

who itself had fought a war of independence against who,

Great Britain.

[music]

You know we in the United States have short memories,

people in the Middle East never forget and I

think there is a political truth to that and the Iranian people

I believe know all about it but

the average American doesn't have the vaguest idea

that we interfered with an elected government.

What bothers me so much, is that the American people believe that

we can do no harm,

that we are willing to go to war, start a war

to promote democracy with force, at the same time,

sometimes when there's a leader in a country that's been elected

even in recent years.

elected leaders in the middle east,

we don't like them, we don't support them.

What CIA for many years has warned about blow back

I know that when I brought that term up in the presidential

debate, it wasn't my term and I referenced it to it haven't been

established by the CIA, because they knew and understood this

that they can come back on us, it was an unintended consequence

We should know what went on in 1953,

what happened with the coup there

but I think that

the goal of all individuals ot to be to know the truth

The truth about our history and not to hide from us

and when history is distorted, I think we

just continue to make mistakes.

So history is helpful if we're honest with ourselves.

I think that's the most important thing

for any country or any people, is to be honest with ourselves

because when your own government does harm and you ignore it,

or pretended it never existed or defend it

for the wrong reasons, it's very detrimental.

If the United States

had not overthrown the Mosaddegh government

it's at least conceivable that democracy

would've continued to thrive and consolidate itself in Iran.

We might have had a stable democracy

in the heart of the Muslim middle east, all these 50 years.

I can hardly wrap my mind around how different

the middle east might look today, had that been the case.

[music]

The idea that

it is necessary nefarious, it's always engaged in

overthrowing governments, that's false.

Asides from the birds.

The government of Mosaddegh if you recall

His was over thrown by the accident, the Shah.

As far a I know, we don't engage in

assassinations and kidnappings and things of that kind.

As far as I know, we never have.

I hope I have a reasonable moral standard.

Well the Iranians were organizing themselves

and really all they needed was support and to some extent

professional guidance.

It was my feeling then, that remains my feeling

that the British understood the extent

of paranoia in this country concerning communism

this was the day of Joel McCarthy

and the British consciously played on that fear in order to

help persuade us, to involve ourselves in the coup.

What we did from Washington, was to write some of the articles

that would appear on the Persian press

and these articles would appear thanks to the Dravidian’s

who had contacts I believe

with probably 4/5 of the Iranian press

and they were designed to show most of that

as a communist collaborator and as a fanatic, as a person

who didn't understand that you could be

both nationalistic and positive.

These two agents

saw the opportunity, and sent the people we had

under our control, into the streets

and acted as if they were today.

They were provocateurs. We had more than just

provocateurs we had a lot of shot troops

who actually acted as if they were two dead people

throwing rocks at mosques, at priests.

That mob that came into north Tehran and was decisive in the

overthrow was a mercenary mob, had no ideology

and that mob was paid for by American dollars

and the amount of money that was used

it has to have been very large.

The CIA prepared a report on how the coup had be carried out.

It would serve as a guide for conducting coups in the future

bu the report left out key details.

But even if we saw the full report,

there were certain things

the author Donald Wilbert wouldn't have put in there

because it wouldn't have been caution to put those in.

Things such as the CIA working very closely

with the Iranian Nazi party.

That wouldn't have gone very well down in Washington.

He also doesn't deal with actually

questions of assassination

which I suspect the MI6 and the CIA were involved.

So that sort of sanitized out of the report.

I think that in the 53 coup, the CIA was much more involved

in the actual mechanics in of coup

that in other places like Guatemala

or Indonesia and places

So there's much more very incriminating information

and that's why the CIA has been very reluctant to

release the stuff.

Well I remember the start of the CIA from when I was in college

it had just been recently started, 1947 after the war.

The main purpose of course was so there

would never be another pearl harbor

When there were little snippets of information around

and nobody to, these days we would say connect the dots.

There was no one central place where

all this information together

and so Harry Truman was hell-bent and determined that

would never happen again, there would be one central place which

would be possessed of all the information

available on a given country or situation.

He was equally determined

to have it one place where he could go

and say look, Mr.Director I want to know what you and those

two universities worth of

specialists out there in the woods

in Virginia. I want to know what you really think.

I don't care what the State department is saying

or the pentagon. The pentagon is telling me that the Russians

are 10ft tall. I know they're not 10 ft tall.

They may not be 5'9ft like you're saying,

but I want to know what you think okay

No, speak to me in truth. And man,

it was clear that that's what Truman Intended

What we got instead, was an apparatus that seemed revel

in covert operations, Clandestine operations

spend billions of tax payer dollars

for those operations in total secrecy

and expend blood and treasure in those operations,

often times failing, in total secrecy.

He wrote a not bad, I have a copy of it here.

Not bad in the Washington Post

December 22, 1963. As he watched these things happen

you know, he watched Iran and he watched Guatemala and he saw

governments toppled and he said hey man, hey time out

That's not what I intended here.

It says he simply does not recognize

the entity that he helped create in 1947

in the CIA and clearly his angst is about the

covert operations aspect of the CIA.

and he sees it as a danger to the integrity and the health

of our democratic republic.

I have a copy of this, this thing.

What he says is this, the title is

Limit CIA Role To Intelligence

Well ya, hello. That's what it's supposed to be all about right?

Okay.

Quote, I never thought that when I set up the CIA,

it would be injected into peacetime

cloak and dagger operations.

Now there are some searching questions

that need to be answered.

I, therefore, would like to see the CIA restored to

it's original assignment as the intelligence arm of

the President, and that whatever else it can properly

perform in that special field

and that its operational duties be

terminated or properly used elsewhere

Well, you were right about a lot of things Harry.

you're dead right about that.

Truman ended his stinging rebuke of the CIA,

by writing that "The agency

is casting a shadow over our historic

position and I feel that we need to correct it."

Of course the Brits came over, as for our help, Allen Dulles

and yes that would be great covert action authorized by

the President and so they went in and they overthrew Mosaddegh,

They threw him out okay, now that's where history begins,

recent history for Iranians and Americans don't have

any idea that there is this very legitimate grievance.

and what came in? The Shah.

What he did was bring in the most brutal secret police,

bunch of torturers, second to none, even the German Gestapo.

They were called Saks.

With the help of American aid and training,

Savak was created in 1957, it's name alone would come to strike

fear in the hearts and minds of Iran’s citizens.

Well the Savak becomes essentially the secret police

for the Shah and

their training and education and their mode to

stop Iranians so forth are more or less given to them

by the CIA person personnel who are, as far as I can tell,

are also some military involved in this. The CIA and the

military often work together, a very

insidious relationship in my view.

The 53 coup deprived the regime that ruled in Iran of legitimacy

and the overwhelming majority of the people, even many of the

people of were working for the regime.

They previewed the regime as dependent on the United States,

as fundamentally born of a sinful act.

What Savak becomes for the Shah, is secret police do and

many of these more autocratic societies, particularly when

they're becoming more and more autocratic as the Shah was,

is it takes care of all of it's oppositions, either arrest them

and spirits them away to sites unknown, for purposes unknown,

never to be contacted again, buries them in the desert,

or whatever but it becomes the

Shah's way of dealing with residence and dealing with it

in a very draconian harsh way and of course this just breeds

more and more discontent amongst the populous in Iran and makes

him look more and more the tyrant rather than

the beloved leader that he always wanted to be seen as.

Under the Shah was unimaginable,

that anybody would say anything

critical within the political word, against anybody,

absolutely not.

So it was a combination of not that Savak was all pervasive

or powerful

but the physiological perimeter’s of the Savak

and the political order

had created a situation that we were all

conscious and fearful of Savak.

So the aura was created that the Savak is everywhere

and it contributed to

the terrorization and internalization of

that terror in the society and the arch.

and I made so many trips to Savak’s office

answering questions

and just, sometimes they take you in

and you sit there for 5 hours and nobody comes out

and there are a number of other people sitting in the room

you're too fearful to say a word because

you don't know who they are.

So I did experience,

it was the very beginning, it became far more viscous

as time went on because it was the beginning of its formation

when I was still in Iran.

Several of our students you know, got refuge on the roofs

the fifth floor, the sixth floor, they threw them away

just threw them like garbage, down and many

people got killed that way, many people had broken legs or arms.

Being in the center of this torture chambers hearing all

of these cries and screams coming everywhere.

I mean, I couldn't sleep for a minute, yet 24 hours.

because of this you are in solitary

and this guy is screaming kill me! Don't do that, just kill me!

I mean screams all over, you feel like you are there

and they handcuffed me this way

there was this hook and they could

raise it so I could be kind of hanged from my hands

and the pain

[inaudible dialogue]

and death would be, I mean just a relief.

This is difficult for you to talk about

it's a horrible experience.

You don't have to if you don’t want to.

I have a duty to say these things

for American people to know

what it was like under the Shah.

The main reason that the Savak and the Shah was sent packing

was because ever other family in Iran knew somebody

or had one of the members of their family tortured

That's what torture brings you okay.

[music]

After 25 years of increasingly despotic by the Shah

millions of Iranians took to the streets

in what would become known as The Islamic Revolution.

The Shah fled the country in January of 1979.

Later that year, Iranian students

overran the US embassy in Tehran

when the Shah was allowed to enter the United States.

[crowd chanting]

The man who called me was a man by the name of

Frank Re dice who as on the desk that Sunday

and he told me that

a number of

student demonstrators had broken into

the US embassy and apparently had

taken some American diplomats hostage

and he wanted me to come in the state department

I was then the senior diplomatic correspondent for ABC

to do a piece on it for that evenings news

and it was Sunday and I didn't want to come in

and I told him I didn't think this thing would last

more than an hour or two

as I said like this things going to die.

I mean it's not going to last.

But regrettably every single day in Iran

was a noninvasive day.

Ultimately the hostages were held for 440 days.

They appointed me as ambassador to the UN

in order to facilitate this agreement.

The group of us were throwing out names for this new program

and Dick Wald said

you know in racing, horse raising

there is something called The Morning Line

since this program is going at 11:30 at night

why don’t we call it the Night Line.

and I said that the dumbest I've ever heard

I think that's a really stupid title for a program

I left Tehran

with the hope that I'm coming to the United

States going to the security council

doing everything we could

to expedite the release of hostages.

I met Jimmy Carter at the White house

and he joked that the two people

who had benefited most from the hostage take

and were first the guy Ayatollah Khomeini

and second, me.

I didn't want to be the ambassador of a country

that had taken hostages.

I accepted the position in order to resolve the hostage crisis

and when I came to realize that the hostage

crisis is not going to be resolved

there was absolutely no reason for me to stay there

it would have been absurd

because I thought the act was criminal and

illegal and inhuman in every sense of the word.

Certainly in the initial months of America Held Hostage

I think the title was hysterical.

Later turned out to be

more accurate than it was at the outset.

Nightlife and many other television programs

and journalists, they were shocked.

but the immorality and the illegality of the act

which was understandable and yet after 25 years

of supporting an illegitimate government, overthrowing

democratic elected the prime minister in 1953

it was the responsibility of the press

to gain an understanding of why it happened

but at the same time "" The Nightlife

and other television programs did not do that

I forget whether we did that

if we didn't it would have been a huge oversight, we should've.

because that clearly was

that was and is to this day

you know I mean, 50 whatever it is

56 years later.

That continues to be a very sole point

with the Iranian people.

When they had guests, or the newspapers

interviewed various people in an article you could read

a sentence or a phrase about the coup

but the reader of the article is not going to end up thinking

about the connection between what happened in 1953

and what happened in 1979.

And if you show just a little of imagination

and think how we would feel if some power

greater than the United States had overthrown

one of our presidents,

had assisted one of our enemies in assaulting the homeland of

the United States, had supported someone that

we felt was a pretender to the White House,

and giving him all kinds of weapons

and overlooked human rights abusers

that he and his secret police inflicted

on the people of the United States

I think we'd feel pretty upset about that and we would

probably harbor that grudge a generation or five.

The hostage crisis in one sense was a very simple thing

I mean you had a group of students

who wanted to demonstrate against the US

who were unhappy with the way things were going.

The role of the Shah was an important element

in the evolution of the events in Tehran

after the revolution.

What was going to happen to him?

should we anticipate that he would

again be restored to the thrown?

would we engage ourselves in the kind of coup we did in 1953

to restore him to the thrown?

that was the concern among the part of the revolutionary

elements in the city of Tehran at that time, in 1979.

The Shah had been admitted back into the United States

and this was considered to be the first

step to returning him to the thrown

that was not true but that's the way people remembering 1953

they thought this was the first step in bringing him back.

to admit him into the United States in the context

of the revolutionary afferment that was abroad in that country

at that time, in 1979.

There was something else

so I said no, let's not admit him.

Jimmy Carter was extremely reluctant to do this

in fact he was the very last one of all of his advisers to

finally agree to do this and in that final meeting that he had

where he looked around the room and

everybody in the room was telling him

yes you you've got to let him in,

he's dying, you can't reject his

you can't tell him he can't have medical treatment and so forth

and he looked around the room and I said well okay

he said I hear what all of you are

saying but he said I wonder what

you're all going to say to me when they

take our people hostage in Tehran.

It was clear that this was a dangerous thing to do.

He was admitted

and we paid for it.

[crowd chanting]

The actions of Iran

have shocked the civilized world

for a government to applaud mob violence and terrorism

for a government actually to support

and in effect participate

in the taking and holding of hostages

is unprecedented in human history.

They do about sit ins

and they were going to come in, make their point

they had done it once before, it had

been done once before at the embassy

in February and ended within 48 hours

they very much had the same idea that

this would be a short lived thing

and they were as surprised as anybody else

when Khomeini threw his support to the students

they didn't come prepared to stay for 444 days

and suddenly they found themselves not

having a sit in, but running a prison.

Lousy.

Treatment during captivity was lousy.

Not in the sense where they beat me everyday

but it was

in-violation of something very

profound in the Iranian zone culture

one of the leaders of the student militants

who were then holding the three of us

in solitary confinement

each of us in separate cells.

He came in to see me one day, in my cell

and I proceeded, I took the opportunity to say look

why are you doing this?

It is totally contrary to all Iranian traditions

of freedom

human rights

treating us this way

physically abused as hostages

it is totally absolutely wrong

why are you doing this?

He responded by saying you have nothing to complain about

your country took my country hostage in 1953

totally and abrogated the opportunities that we had then

we're a free participatory democracy.

I was reminded of 1984

particularly if you remember the incident in there

of the two minutes hate

that everyday at Winston Smiths ministry

they would all stop work and they would get together

and they would have two minutes of hate

and they would scream, shout slogans and scream and yell

and get all excited and then they would have hate week

that seemed very much the situation we were in

I couldn't identify today, where it was or is

but it was a prison, a dark cold prison

where my colleagues had been held

in and out of prisons during those months

and I could do nothing to help them, that was my hurt

that was my mental hurt if you will.

but beyond what happened to me personally

the event still

resonates, it resonates in this country

it resonates around the world

and for better or worse and mostly for worse

it shapes the way people look at Iran

The student captures also controlled

all of the library of the embassy compound

and so we all got access to books, eventually

not the books you wanted

one of my colleagues is much quoted as having said

first book they gave me was a god damn geometry book

I never liked geometry but I read everything in that book.

You ignore history and you ignore Iranians view of history

and you ignore the history of the

United States and Iran at your peril.

to give you the simplest example

in October of 1979, when the White House

decided to admit the Shah to the country

it said alright we will do this

but we will tell the Iranians

that we're doing this only for humanitarian reasons

because the Shah is sick and so he's coming to the

United States only for medical treatment

and there is no political agenda.

Well, that may have been true

but given the history of US Iranian relations

I doubt that any Iranian over the age of 3

would have believed such an explanation

and perhaps that was why the events of 1953

and the Americans coming eventually

siding with the British

working to overthrow

Dr.Mosaddegh's nationalist government

came as such a profound shock

I mean had it been the British they

probably would've been expected, had it been the Russians

would've been expected

but from someone who you thought was your friend

it was seen as a

very deep betrayal

Freedom

as one comes to appreciate, eventually and certainly

as a hostage in solitary confinement

is a beautiful thing.

They were 20 years old at the time

we were all 20 years old at the time.

when we're at that age you're emotional

you don't think through what you do.

I don't blame them so much for what they did

I blame those who rode the wave

who did not take up their responsibilities.

I understood their zeal

you have to understand that even though you think they are wrong

you give them credit for being zealous

and they sure as hell were

determined to hold as long as they could

I have no particular malice towards each

and every one of them except

my hope my them, my I wish for them

is they never get a visa to come to my country.

I can get emotional in that subject.

You make gestures, you lower the tone

of the rhetoric, you stop the sermonizing

you put your preconceptions aside

I have said since the day I left

since the moment I entered the Algerian

aircraft to return me to freedom

I said it to the principle hostage

taker at the top of the ramp

I look forward to the day your when your country and mine

can again have a normal diplomatic relationship

I have advocated that ever since,

I have preached the need to talk.

We should be talking.

Now, will that bring

an immediate change?

will that bring

immediate positive results?

probably not, suspicions still run deep

you don't overcome 30 years of hostility

with one speech or one gesture

but you keep at it.

[music]

Khatami made a speech in January of 88'

in which he basically went as far as any

Iranian leader is ever likely to go

and saying that clearly we would never do that again

and those were different times and so forth

he can't come out and say

oh we were completely wrong, he can't say that

I mean Khomeini was behind it, he supported it all the way

and he's the father of their country

it's like saying George Washington

made a foolish mistake

you don't just say things like that.

The problem with US Iran relations

is not so much foreign policy

it's domestic policy.

In the United States, Iran is a dirty word

and has been since the time of the hostage crisis

it's very hard to get politicians

to say anything constructive about Iran

and our relations with Iran

it's easier to dismiss them, to criticize them

or to suggest harder sanctions on them or punishment

In Iran it's the same thing.

The revolution was as much an anti-American revolution

as it was an anti-Shah revolution

we're going to have to give up something

but Iran is going to have to give up something

and that's what negotiations are all about.

[music]

In January of 2002, George Bush gave his second state

of the union address

he singled out Iran for special attention

and thereby damaged chances for a better relationship

Here we've got after all

an administration that finds in Afghanistan in 2000

late 2001, 2002 that the Iranians are very cooperative

that the Iranians are helping you

that the Iranians are helping you with everything from

rounding up the Taliban, finding Al-Qaeda

who might have flown into Iran

working for The Bonn conference, in stalling Karzai

that they are helping you as much

as anybody else in the region

and you pay them back by giving a

state of union address which calls them

a member of the access of evil

which is imponderable to them

they don't even know what that means

but they know it's bad

Iran aggressively prosue these weapons and exports terror

states like these and their terrorist allies

constitute and access of evil

arming to threaten the peace of the world

and so their payback for having cooperated in Afganistan

is to be called a member of the access of evil

imagine their befuddlement and imagine their anger

I'm Iranian and that's funny cause people I tell them

my American friends, I go ya I'm Iranian

they go oh so you're Arab and I'm like no we're actually

different we're not Arab but I mean you know we're similar

you know we're all getting shot at, you know that's one thing

but you Iranians are actually ethnically, we're actually Arian

we're white, we're white, so stop shooting you know

a lot of the times I would get in an argument with people

around the time of the Iraq war, cause I was against the war

and a lot of the times people would say we got to do this

got to do that and I'd always say do you know the history

let's go back a little bit and see how we got here in

the first place and I would always

bring the 53 coup into the argument

The Iranians don't even say their Iranian

Iranians say they're Persian.

In Iran we say we are Persian

you know it sounds nicer and friendlier

we even smile, when we say we're Persian we smile

"I am Persian!"

"I am Persian!"

"I am not dangerous, I am Persian!"

"I am Persian like the cat"

"I am the cat!"

"I am Persian like the rug, hello

rug colorful, hand woven."

I have a friend who's conservative

and we have these debates and I go

go back and look that Iran had a democracy

and that US with England, they came in overthrew that democracy

to implement a monarchy for the oil.

So you know you got to have a historical perspective before

before you get into these debates.

People think that just because I'm from the Middle East

I'm an expert on the Middle East

So like I got a friend, every time the gas prices go up

he'll always ask my opinion about it

he'll always corner me, "hey Mass, hey Mass

in your opinion what's going on with this gas thing

what's going to happen, what's going on

50 words or less, breakdown would you

you're my middle eastern friend."

like dude I don't work at Opek, I don't know

I pay the same price as you you know, like I don't have a

discount pump at the gas station

I don't want in like

"Hassan Hussein discount pump, okay my friend."

[laughter and applause]

Fuck America

[laughter]

I joke about that, I said you know it was funny cause

the hijackers were Saudis and Egyptians and somehow

Iran ended up in the access of evil

I remember watching that and he was like

there's an access of evil, I was like yes there is

and he goes it's North Korea, I'm like ya

he goes it's Iraq, I go right on

he goes it's Iran, I'm like what the hell, what do we do

you know okay we might have a nuclear program

but we're not admitting to it, maybe we have a nuclear program

maybe we don't, define nuclear.

I think that goes back to that whole

cause Iran also calls America the great Satan

It's kind of like five year old’s

on a playground just name calling.

So it was unfortunate, it's undiplomatic

let's put it that way.

[music]

The Bush administration came into office thinking there was

a quick and easy solution to the proliferation problem

fortunately there is now a wide spread

at least expert consensus that this strategy of forced

regime change didn't work, that the solution is to leave the

regime change up to the people of the country themselves

the only ones who can really change the regime

and to seek other combinations of pressures and incentives

to convince those countries, convince those people to abandon

nuclear programs.

The Iranian program is a threat in many ways, but the answer

isn't to force the regime to give up the program

no country has ever been forced to give up a nuclear program

but lots of countries have be convinced to do so.

The NIE also correctly understood that the drivers

behind Iran’s program were not some crazy idea

of a global genocide or annihilation of Israel

they were the same motives that have motivated most countries

who have pursued nuclear weapons,

a desire for security to protect them from attack

a desire for enhanced prestige.

Think India getting the bomb,

there is no real military option here

history is very clear on this score, an attack on a country

causes the people of that country to rally

around the leadership, not flee from it

it often will lead to an acceleration

of military programs

containment works, deterrence is alive and well

the worst case, scenario is not good

but it's a lot better than starting a nuclear war

in the neighborhood.

No US President has ever spoken that way to the Muslim people

and when he referenced the 1953 coup against the democratic

leadership of Iran, he was doing so not as an apology

but just stating a truth

everybody knows what the US has done in that region

and when he coupled that with an explicit reference

to colonialism, for many Muslims this was unbelievable

that you heard a western leader acknowledging this

just as a fact that we have to deal with

and then let's move on, let's have a new relationship

new structures, based on our needs now, fully aware

of the sins and omissions hat both sides have committed

in the years passed.

Iran's a country, it's a very youthful country

vast majority of the country are less than 30 years old

born after the revolution actually

and very well educated, it's a majority Shia country

over 90% Shia

but it's also pretty ethnically diverse

and there are lots of minorities, there's Arabs

there's Kurd, there's Turks, there's Christians,

Jews, Muslims, Sunnis as well as Shia

so it's pretty ethnically diverse, at the same time

it is overwhelmingly Shia.

Ya every Iranian you can talk about in the 1953

CIA backed coup against the

democratically elected government of

Prime minister Mosaddegh and the reason every Iranian knows

knows that history is cause they're taught it

every school kid knows about it, the same way we know

that George Washington fought the British,

the same we way know who Benjamin Franklin

was and Iranians will know

that there was a democratically elected government

that was overthrown by the CIA.

President Khatami expressed regret rather than an apology

or feeling shameful about it, certainly not proud of it

I don't think hardly anybody is proud of it

including the students who took over the embassy

Out beyond the ideas of wrongdoing and right-doing

there's a field, I'll meet you there

and the reason I put that in the introduction was because

I think it speaks very well to the idea of why I wrote

the book in the first place,

which is complete misunderstanding

between Iran and the United States and it's accusations

fly back and forth, you did this, you did this

you are doing this, you are doing that

you're wrong here, you're right here

I'm right here, you're wrong there

none of that ever gets us anywhere, that's all rhetoric

and it's always accusations, like a fight

any fight and we’re in this conflict

but there's place where you go, go beyond those accusations

beyond those fights, beyond those issues

that we have between us, there's a place where

we could meet and discuss things.

On June 12th 2009

Iranians went to the polls in large numbers.

when the Presidential election appeared stolen, they took

to the streets in protests,

situations seem to harpen back to what happened to Iran’s

nascent democracy of the 1950's.

[music]

The protests have subsided but it's obvious that peoples

sense of anger and injustice hasn't subsided

and millions of people which represented diverse swathe

of Iranian society,

not only in Tehran but throughout the Country

are risking their lives, almost on a daily basis

for greater political voice, for more economic opportunities

for more social freedoms

and I think Iranians have really

inspired people throughout the world.

Mousavi has earned a tremendous respect from people

for not backing down to the hardliners,

for continuing the fight

and in a way the relationship between Mousavi and the crowd

is somewhat symbiotic

in the sense that I think that the crowds are inspired by

Mousavi unwillingness to back down

and Mousavi is frankly is odd I think by

the courage of the crowd and that allows him the

political capital to remain defiant.

What's interesting about Mousavi is that he is not

an opposition candidate who has actually been an opponent

of the regime, he's someone with

impeccable revolutionary credentials,

he was prime minister for 8 years, he was someone

who was close to the father of the revolution,

Ayatollah Khomeini

and he's not for a wholesale revolution, what he's saying is

that the revolution, the ideals of the 1979 revolution

have veered off onto a dangerous path

and we need to take it back onto the

[Persian word]

as they say in Persian, 'the right path'.

In the last 1970's, the iconic images which emerged from

the revolution were bearded, middle aged, traditional men.

The iconic images from this movement have been

young, educated, modern female like

Neda Agha-Soltan

who was killed

and women's role in these protests I think have been

quite frankly awesome.

women have continued to go to the streets despite the regimes

indiscriminate use of words

I think any change which takes place in Iran

will and will have played an incredibly important role in

bringing about that change

and it's remarkable that days and weeks and months and

I'm sure years after Neda’s death,

people from around the world are never going to forget that

image and are never going to forget her tremendous bravery

and are never going to forget the conditions

under which she died.

Right now theres an incredible whirlwind

of emotions that Iranians are feeling

there's tremendous hope and tremendous fear

all at the same time.

there is this hope that finally after 30 years

there is light at the end of the tunnel

there's hope for a more modern, progressive, tolerant Iran.

You have a unique situation in the sense that,

right now about two thirds of Iranians are under 33

so they don’t remember the 1979 revolution

they have no inherent enmity towards the United States

they have no inherent loyalty towards the Islamic republic.

2009 is a much different world than 1979

1979, there wasn't internet,

there wasn't satellite television, people couldn’t see

what was taking place beyond their borders

this has been a movement which has transcended

age, it's transcended gender,

it's transcended geographic location,

it's transcended religiosity,

it's transcended socioeconomic class

and again when millions of people have taken to the streets

despite the risk of wars

despite the risks to the security

you can only imagine that there's millions of people

who feel solidarity with them at home.

So we should not underestimate the magnitude of

this moment.

The problems are not that intractable

we have huge common interest here

and we have resolved problems much greater than this.

In my life, I've seen miracles happen

I've seen Germany unite, the Soviet Union collapse,

the war in Vietnam

now embraces American tourism.

I've seen Catholics and Protestants in Northern Ireland

who swore never, never, never,

and denounced each other as terrorists, shake hands

and form a united government.

I've seen a man walk out of a prison cell that held him for

28 years to become the majority leader of South Africa.

Don't tell me that miracles can't happen

don't tell me that any of these challenges are too big

or too intractable that we have to

use military force to resolve them

I think that the US and Iran are

destined to become partners once again.

We have the power to make the world we seek

but only if we have the courage to make a new beginning

keeping in mind what has been written

the Holy Qur’an tells us

Oh man kind, we have created you male and a female

and we have made you into nations and tribes

so that you make know one another

The Talmud tells us:

"The whole of the Tūrān is for the purpose of promoting peace."

The Holy Bible tells us:

"Blessed are the peacemakers

for they shall be called sons of God."

[applause]

The people of the world can live together in peace

we know that is Gods vision

now that must be our work here on earth.

Thank you and may Gods peace be upon you.

[applause]

I do believe that when democracy

finally returns in it's full form to Iran,

Mohammad Mosaddegh will be revered as a hero,

you will see his picture once again

on every banner in every office

on every street corner

and he will be understood officially

as he is now understood privately: as the great hero

of 20th century Iran.

"If I sit silently, I have sinned."

[music]

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