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(keystrokes)
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- [Voiceover] Long live the Imperial Army.
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Long live the Imperial Army.
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(people shout)
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- I pledge allegiance to the flag
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of the United States of America.
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(explosion)
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- [Voiceover] The atom bomb.
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- [Voiceover] We will arrive
at Yokohama at 0930 hours.
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We will arrive at Yokohama at 0930 hours.
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Debarkation priority will be in accordance
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with the debarkation schedule.
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- [Voiceover] General Douglas MacArthur
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arrived at Atsugi Naval
Aerodrome, near Yokohama
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on August 30, 1945.
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As he emerged from his aircraft,
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he paused at the top of the steps,
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stuck one hand in his hip pocket,
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tightened his jaws
around his corncob pipe,
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and surveyed the conquered lands.
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This pose was repeated several
times from different angles,
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so that all the press photographers
could get a decent shot.
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Democracy was to be instilled
in the Japanese people
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as though they had never heard of it.
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- [Voiceover] Our problem's in the brain
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inside of the Japanese head.
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These brains like our
brains can do good things
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or bad things all depending on the kind of
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ideas that are put inside.
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- [Voiceover] Kabuki plays
featuring loyal samurai
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were banned or heavily censored,
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as were books and films about the bombings
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of Hiroshima and Nagasaki.
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Satirical cartoons of
MacArthur and mention
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of occupation censorship
were strictly forbidden.
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- [Voiceover] The commission
finds you guilty as charged
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and sentences you to death by hanging.
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- [Voiceover] Yamashita
himself thanked the commission
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for the fairness of his trial.
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- [Voiceover] Prime minister at the time
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of the war in the Pacific, General Tojo,
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remarked during his trial
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"None of those Japanese would dare act"
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"against the Emperor's will."
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The cross-examination was
immediately cut short,
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and a week later Tojo dutifully stated
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that the Emperor had always
loved and wanted peace.
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- [Voiceover] General Hideki Tojo,
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who assumed official
responsibility for the conduct
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of the war and did everything possible
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to exonerate his emperor.
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- [Voiceover] MacArthur would later remark
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to the U.S. Senate that in
terms of modern civilization,
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the Japanese were like a 12-year-old boy.
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- You are interested in the unknown,
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the mysterious, the unexplainable.
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That is why you are here.
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- [Voiceover] When the war was over,
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bank loan books had deteriorated.
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00:05:26,883 --> 00:05:30,144
The assets the banks held
were mainly war bonds
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and loans to destroyed industries
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as such the whole banking
sector was virtually bankrupt.
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This problem was easily
solved by the Bank of Japan.
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All it had to do was buy the
banking sector's bad papers
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with newly created reserves
giving them good money
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for assets which were often worthless.
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The first two postwar
central bank governors
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were nominated by the U.S. occupation.
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Eikichi Araki was appointed
the first postwar governor
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of the Bank of Japan,
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but soon after taking up this post,
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he was indicted by war crime's prosecutors
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and had to resign.
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Then in 1951 after a general amnesty
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on suspected war criminals
filling public offices,
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he was made ambassador
to the United States.
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On returning from his post
as ambassador in 1954,
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Araki was again made
governor of the Central Bank.
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After the 1951 amnesty for war criminals,
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much of the Japanese wartime bureaucracy
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was returned to their wartime positions.
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This included wartime politicians
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and most home ministry bureaucrats
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who had been in charge
of the thought police,
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a number of which moved
to the education ministry.
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- Japan is the key to
the fate of the Far East.
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Once again for the second time
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in the march of modern history,
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those words have urgent reality.
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- [Voiceover] In order to
avert the kind of rural unrest
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that was helping the communists in China,
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the Americans initiated the redistribution
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of land from big landowners
to their tenants.
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The capitalist elite in
Japan, known as the Zaibatsu,
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were purged as supporters
of a criminal war
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and prohibited from
further business activity.
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- Basically the fascist
policies of the 30s
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that the reformed fascist bureaucrats
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could not implement during the war even,
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the U.S. occupation managed to complete
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like the land reform
and the Zaibatsu policy.
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- Yeah, it's a very funny encounter
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of Japanese wartime fascists
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and American New Dealers.
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- [Voiceover] The Diet,
home of Japan's Senate
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and House of Representatives.
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- [Voiceover] In Japan fanatic students
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and leftist groups rioted for days on end,
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seeking to block the mutual
defense treaty with America.
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00:08:33,415 --> 00:08:35,276
- [Voiceover] The socialist
deputies staged a riot
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in the Diet itself.
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The police in restoring order
also evicted the socialists.
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(static and distorted voices shouting)
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- [Voiceover] The speaker
was carried to the platform
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and called to order the session
that approved the treaty.
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- [Voiceover] In 1957 the former
class A war crime suspect,
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Kishi Nobusuke became
prime minister of Japan.
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He had been General Tojo's
Minister of Commerce and Industry
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during the war
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where his responsibilities had ranged
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from munitions to slave labor.
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- While Hitler's wartime war minister,
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war economy minister,
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was in Berlin Spandau
prison, Albert Speer,
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his Japanese wartime colleague
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was prime minister of the country.
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00:09:36,755 --> 00:09:38,015
- [Voiceover] Although
Kishi became a defender
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of democracy after the war,
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before and during the war
he had described himself
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as a national socialist.
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With money from crime syndicates,
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industrial corporations,
and CIA slush funds,
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Kishi built the Liberal Democratic Party
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into a powerful political machine.
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00:10:02,095 --> 00:10:05,374
In Japan many of the
most important postwar
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economic and political leaders
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came from an elite group
of wartime bureaucrats,
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the very same people who had
pushed Japan into the war.
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00:10:16,675 --> 00:10:19,845
The Liberal Democratic
Party stayed in power
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for almost 40 years.
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- [Voiceover] "Welcome home" in Japanese
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to these American soldiers.
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After a tour of duty in Korea,
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they are returning to their base in Japan
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where once a short time before
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they were stationed as occupation troops.
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And how do they return?
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How are they received by the people
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whose land they occupied?
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Not as overlords.
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00:10:47,580 --> 00:10:49,200
Not as antagonists.
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Not as men who are distrusted and feared
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and resented but as friends.
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(marching band music plays)
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(people cheering)
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- [Voiceover] In Tokyo's
Central Chiyoda Ward,
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the Ministry of Finance
had its headquarters.
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From here the ministry
controlled most aspects
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00:11:28,643 --> 00:11:30,354
of economic life in Japan.
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00:11:32,002 --> 00:11:35,425
- The Ministry of Finance was
the most powerful ministry,
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and the Bank of Japan had to report
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to the Ministry of Finance.
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00:11:40,665 --> 00:11:42,286
- [Voiceover] Ministry
of Finance officials
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elicited deep and hushed
exclamations of awe and respect,
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and former ministry bureaucrats
obtained influential posts
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as heads of private and
public institutions.
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(whistle)
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But in one area the ministry
did not have actual control
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and that was the quantity
of credit creation
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00:12:03,744 --> 00:12:06,824
and its allocation, which was decided
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00:12:06,824 --> 00:12:09,994
by the Japanese central
bank, the Bank of Japan.
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- They told the Ministry
of Finance and the public
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and the journalists,
"We run monetary policy"
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"through interest rates."
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00:12:20,292 --> 00:12:24,013
And they let the Ministry
of Finance reign in
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their interest rate policies.
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But the rule was done through
not the interest rates,
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which is the price of
money it was done through
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00:12:32,010 --> 00:12:34,380
the quantity of money.
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- It worked this way.
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It's called window guidance.
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The Bank of Japan just told the banks
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how much they were gonna lend,
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they will have to lend
in the coming quarter,
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00:12:54,248 --> 00:12:57,319
and who, which sector of
the economy to lend to.
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It's credit allocation, credit control.
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00:13:00,246 --> 00:13:02,686
- [Voiceover] The Bank of Japan
gave quarterly instructions
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to individual banks on the value of loans
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and which industrial sectors
they should be allocated to.
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00:13:10,126 --> 00:13:14,046
All loans were broken down
in sectors and sub-sectors,
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and large-scale borrowers
had to be listed by name.
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The Bank of Japan could
decide which projects
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should be encouraged and
which should be discouraged
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00:13:27,947 --> 00:13:29,886
by dictating to whom and for what
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00:13:29,886 --> 00:13:31,556
banks could issue loans.
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This was the war economy system,
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adapted to the production
of consumer goods.
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- [Voiceover] The 95
million people of Japan
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now enjoy a national income second only
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to the United States and
the more prosperous nations
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of Western Europe.
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- It's not a good system for capitalists,
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you know, shareholders
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00:13:59,245 --> 00:14:03,185
but for the population it
created a lot of wealth,
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00:14:03,185 --> 00:14:07,224
very even income and wealth distribution,
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00:14:07,224 --> 00:14:10,244
very high growth, and very rapidly raised
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00:14:10,244 --> 00:14:12,035
quality of life and standards of living.
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00:14:13,802 --> 00:14:18,802
- [Voiceover] In 1959 alone
the economy expanded by 17%.
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00:14:21,642 --> 00:14:24,182
But a result of the war economy system
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00:14:24,182 --> 00:14:27,562
was that entire industrial
sectors would compete
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00:14:27,562 --> 00:14:30,812
not for profit but for market share.
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00:14:33,122 --> 00:14:35,782
Companies would fight until bankruptcy
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00:14:35,782 --> 00:14:37,313
to gain market share.
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00:14:40,602 --> 00:14:42,702
This phenomenon was soon recognized
215
00:14:42,702 --> 00:14:44,813
and called "excess competition".
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00:14:46,182 --> 00:14:48,840
The solution was the creation of explicit,
217
00:14:48,840 --> 00:14:50,991
or implicit cartels.
218
00:14:55,221 --> 00:14:58,041
In the banking sector window guidance
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00:14:58,041 --> 00:15:00,430
acted as the cartel control mechanism
220
00:15:01,460 --> 00:15:03,540
because the Bank of Japan could dictate
221
00:15:03,540 --> 00:15:06,370
the number and value of
loans that banks issued.
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00:15:08,862 --> 00:15:11,940
As a result bank rankings never changed
223
00:15:11,940 --> 00:15:15,310
during the postwar era
except after mergers.
224
00:15:17,500 --> 00:15:20,000
According to one banker, "If it were not"
225
00:15:20,000 --> 00:15:23,651
"for window guidance, we
would compete until Harakiri."
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00:15:34,640 --> 00:15:36,170
- [Voiceover] The U.S.
current account deficit
227
00:15:36,170 --> 00:15:38,389
surges to its highest level in nine years.
228
00:15:38,389 --> 00:15:41,672
The size of the increase took
many economists by surprise.
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00:15:42,542 --> 00:15:44,712
(soft somber music)
230
00:15:47,422 --> 00:15:49,476
- [Voiceover] While cartels
controlled competition
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00:15:49,476 --> 00:15:52,516
within Japan there were no such limits
232
00:15:52,516 --> 00:15:54,686
when it came to international markets.
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00:15:58,136 --> 00:16:00,816
Japanese corporations soon became dominant
234
00:16:00,816 --> 00:16:02,646
in many markets in the world.
235
00:16:07,236 --> 00:16:10,416
In America formal congressional
hearings were held
236
00:16:10,416 --> 00:16:11,856
under the title
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00:16:11,856 --> 00:16:14,866
"Japanese Productivity
Lessons For America".
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00:16:18,176 --> 00:16:20,636
Leading economic theories
indicate that only
239
00:16:20,636 --> 00:16:23,146
free markets can lead to success,
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00:16:24,656 --> 00:16:27,496
but Japan rose within decades to become
241
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the second largest economy in the world,
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00:16:30,396 --> 00:16:34,206
without relying only on the
invisible hand of free markets.
243
00:16:38,516 --> 00:16:41,576
Japan's postwar economy
was a fully immobilized
244
00:16:41,576 --> 00:16:44,336
war economy with production shifted
245
00:16:44,336 --> 00:16:47,266
from weapons to consumer goods.
246
00:17:14,496 --> 00:17:16,736
Since the Bank of Japan presented itself
247
00:17:16,736 --> 00:17:19,316
as a champion of free markets,
248
00:17:19,316 --> 00:17:22,086
window guidance was an embarrassment.
249
00:17:23,616 --> 00:17:27,356
Official publications
either failed to mention it,
250
00:17:27,356 --> 00:17:30,856
or downplayed its role by
calling the credit controls
251
00:17:30,856 --> 00:17:32,446
voluntary.
252
00:17:35,176 --> 00:17:37,596
Whenever the Ministry
of Finance would inquire
253
00:17:37,596 --> 00:17:39,856
about the Bank of Japan's credit creation
254
00:17:39,856 --> 00:17:42,246
and allocation policy,
255
00:17:42,246 --> 00:17:46,116
Bank of Japan staff would
engage in complex discussions
256
00:17:46,116 --> 00:17:48,956
full of technical jargon
to make the process
257
00:17:48,956 --> 00:17:51,726
appear impenetrable to non-experts.
258
00:17:57,146 --> 00:18:00,596
In November 1965 the first batch
259
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of Japanese government
bonds came onto the market.
260
00:18:04,676 --> 00:18:08,526
From now on when politicians
wanted to spend more,
261
00:18:08,526 --> 00:18:11,906
they would no longer put
pressure on the Bank of Japan
262
00:18:11,906 --> 00:18:14,816
but instead exert it on
the Ministry of Finance.
263
00:18:16,056 --> 00:18:18,816
So the ministry would ultimately preside
264
00:18:18,816 --> 00:18:21,846
over an ever increasing
national debt mountain.
265
00:18:53,636 --> 00:18:57,316
The 1980s was an era of
financial deregulation
266
00:18:57,316 --> 00:18:58,986
in the industrialized world.
267
00:19:00,616 --> 00:19:03,656
Most industrialized countries
lifted their restrictions
268
00:19:03,656 --> 00:19:05,126
on the movement of capital.
269
00:19:07,956 --> 00:19:11,936
In Japan, Tadashi
Sasaki, a former governor
270
00:19:11,936 --> 00:19:15,776
of the Bank of Japan,
called for a five-year plan
271
00:19:15,776 --> 00:19:18,296
for the transformation and liberalization
272
00:19:18,296 --> 00:19:20,046
of the Japanese economy.
273
00:19:24,376 --> 00:19:29,376
Then in 1986 the Advisory Group
on Economic Restructuring,
274
00:19:29,636 --> 00:19:32,676
headed by the former
Bank of Japan governor,
275
00:19:32,676 --> 00:19:36,655
Haruo Maekawa, proposed a 10-year economic
276
00:19:36,655 --> 00:19:39,875
reform plan designed to
make the living standards
277
00:19:39,875 --> 00:19:43,764
of Japanese more comparable
to those enjoyed in the West.
278
00:19:48,575 --> 00:19:52,314
The proposal stated that,
279
00:20:18,774 --> 00:20:23,221
The report read like a wishlist
by U.S. trade negotiators.
280
00:20:24,110 --> 00:20:27,091
It started with calls
for administrative reform
281
00:20:27,091 --> 00:20:29,281
and the abolition of bureaucratic powers.
282
00:20:31,571 --> 00:20:35,950
The goal was the transformation
of the entire body politic,
283
00:20:35,950 --> 00:20:39,030
the abolition of the war economy system,
284
00:20:39,030 --> 00:20:42,681
and the introduction of a U.S.
style free market economy.
285
00:20:44,870 --> 00:20:46,750
Those members of the advisory group
286
00:20:46,750 --> 00:20:50,341
who uttered dissent were
relieved of their duties.
287
00:20:54,310 --> 00:20:56,860
Reports in the press were highly critical.
288
00:20:57,731 --> 00:21:00,701
Observers recognized the
radical nature of the plan.
289
00:21:01,991 --> 00:21:04,140
It seemed far too ambitious.
290
00:21:05,270 --> 00:21:08,221
It was calling for a wholesale revolution
291
00:21:08,221 --> 00:21:10,971
of all parts of the Japanese economic,
292
00:21:10,971 --> 00:21:13,280
political, and social system.
293
00:21:19,010 --> 00:21:22,590
Although the report was
clear about what was wanted,
294
00:21:22,590 --> 00:21:24,491
it was embarrassingly silent about
295
00:21:24,491 --> 00:21:26,370
how these goals would be achieved.
296
00:21:28,290 --> 00:21:30,911
The only clue hidden in the report was,
297
00:21:42,729 --> 00:21:44,989
- The Bank of Japan has
always been on the record
298
00:21:44,989 --> 00:21:48,845
arguing that this typical
Japanese system that we're
299
00:21:48,845 --> 00:21:51,675
so familiar with should be scrapped.
300
00:21:51,675 --> 00:21:54,015
It just should be entirely scrapped,
301
00:21:54,015 --> 00:21:56,735
and U.S. style capitalism
should be introduced.
302
00:21:56,735 --> 00:21:58,755
Now, whether you agree with that or not
303
00:21:58,755 --> 00:22:00,395
is an entirely separate question
304
00:22:00,395 --> 00:22:02,106
but the Bank of Japan certainly thinks
305
00:22:02,106 --> 00:22:03,446
it should be scrapped.
306
00:22:04,496 --> 00:22:07,016
Now the next question
is how do you do that?
307
00:22:07,016 --> 00:22:09,695
Well, the Ministry of Finance
has been legally in control
308
00:22:09,695 --> 00:22:11,535
for most of the postwar era.
309
00:22:11,535 --> 00:22:13,975
We've got entrenched
bureaucratic structures,
310
00:22:13,975 --> 00:22:17,496
politicians, and all
these cartels and so on.
311
00:22:17,496 --> 00:22:18,896
That was the old system.
312
00:22:18,896 --> 00:22:21,056
Well, history teaches a system changes
313
00:22:21,056 --> 00:22:23,946
only fundamentally if there's a crisis.
314
00:22:27,675 --> 00:22:28,756
- [Voiceover] The commission proposed
315
00:22:28,756 --> 00:22:30,996
that monetary policy should be used
316
00:22:30,996 --> 00:22:33,001
to promote a historic crisis
317
00:22:34,791 --> 00:22:37,251
sufficiently large to
overcome the vested interests
318
00:22:37,251 --> 00:22:39,231
of the Ministry of Finance,
319
00:22:39,231 --> 00:22:41,881
politicians, and corporate Japan.
320
00:22:46,211 --> 00:22:49,092
Every system has groups
that benefit from it,
321
00:22:49,092 --> 00:22:51,421
and hence have no desire to change it.
322
00:22:52,312 --> 00:22:54,732
There is probably no country in the world
323
00:22:54,732 --> 00:22:56,731
that has changed its economic, social,
324
00:22:56,731 --> 00:23:00,781
and political system in a
significant way without a crisis.
325
00:23:02,611 --> 00:23:05,532
It is the crisis that convinces citizens
326
00:23:05,532 --> 00:23:09,471
and interest groups of
the need for change.
327
00:23:09,471 --> 00:23:12,251
- Well then how can you achieve this?
328
00:23:12,251 --> 00:23:14,925
Um, well you need a crisis,
329
00:23:14,925 --> 00:23:17,362
and the best way to create
it is to have a bubble
330
00:23:17,362 --> 00:23:19,252
because that's how nobody stops you.
331
00:23:29,765 --> 00:23:31,506
- [Voiceover] The Bank of Japan began
332
00:23:31,506 --> 00:23:35,785
to significantly increase
window guidance loan quotas.
333
00:23:35,785 --> 00:23:40,145
Average yearly loan growth
quotas were close to 15%
334
00:23:40,145 --> 00:23:41,855
in the late 1980s.
335
00:23:44,227 --> 00:23:47,065
One city banker would later remark,
336
00:23:47,065 --> 00:23:49,485
"During the bubble we
wanted a certain amount"
337
00:23:49,485 --> 00:23:51,485
"of loan increases"
338
00:23:51,485 --> 00:23:54,415
"but the Bank of Japan
wanted us to use more."
339
00:24:17,457 --> 00:24:19,307
- [Voiceover] The credit
boom caused not only
340
00:24:19,307 --> 00:24:23,038
a boom in real estate but
also in the stock market.
341
00:24:24,108 --> 00:24:27,768
Between 1985 and 1989
342
00:24:27,768 --> 00:24:30,771
stocks rose 240%
343
00:24:31,621 --> 00:24:35,200
and land prices 245%.
344
00:24:38,560 --> 00:24:41,640
By the end of the 80s
the value of the garden
345
00:24:41,640 --> 00:24:45,100
surrounding the Imperial
Palace in central Tokyo
346
00:24:45,100 --> 00:24:48,731
was worth as much as the
entire state of California.
347
00:25:06,460 --> 00:25:11,040
Although Japan is only 1/26
the size of the United States,
348
00:25:11,040 --> 00:25:14,790
its land was valued at four
times that of the United States.
349
00:25:18,641 --> 00:25:20,480
The market value of a single one
350
00:25:20,480 --> 00:25:25,301
of Tokyo's 23 districts,
the Central Chiyoda Ward,
351
00:25:25,301 --> 00:25:28,230
exceeded the value of the whole of Canada.
352
00:25:30,460 --> 00:25:32,340
Economists who are trained to believe
353
00:25:32,340 --> 00:25:37,060
in market outcomes tried to
justify the high land prices.
354
00:25:37,060 --> 00:25:39,727
Some thought land scarcity was the reason.
355
00:25:42,437 --> 00:25:45,758
Shiny new corporate
headquarters rose in Tokyo's
356
00:25:45,758 --> 00:25:47,607
posh business districts.
357
00:25:49,237 --> 00:25:51,838
The labor market boomed so much
358
00:25:51,838 --> 00:25:55,017
that there was a genuine fear
of a serious labor shortage.
359
00:25:57,197 --> 00:25:59,397
Companies started to invite final year
360
00:25:59,397 --> 00:26:03,595
university students on expensive
trips to holiday resorts
361
00:26:04,765 --> 00:26:06,455
to entice them to sign up.
362
00:26:12,345 --> 00:26:13,405
- The politicians loved it.
363
00:26:13,405 --> 00:26:14,622
The Ministry of Finance loved it.
364
00:26:14,622 --> 00:26:16,976
We had a boom of tax revenues going up.
365
00:26:16,976 --> 00:26:17,956
The companies loved it.
366
00:26:17,956 --> 00:26:19,816
Everything was wonderful
in the bubble era.
367
00:26:39,865 --> 00:26:42,065
- [Voiceover] With asset
and stock prices rising
368
00:26:42,065 --> 00:26:45,825
inexorably even traditional manufacturers
369
00:26:45,825 --> 00:26:48,506
could not resist the
temptation to try their hand
370
00:26:48,506 --> 00:26:49,955
at playing the markets.
371
00:26:51,206 --> 00:26:54,875
Soon they expanded their
finance and treasury divisions
372
00:26:54,875 --> 00:26:57,096
to handle the speculation themselves.
373
00:26:59,025 --> 00:27:02,665
These company hedge
funds, know as Zaitech,
374
00:27:02,665 --> 00:27:04,886
used borrowed money to engage in property
375
00:27:04,886 --> 00:27:06,495
and share speculation.
376
00:27:08,265 --> 00:27:10,945
The frenzy reached such proportions
377
00:27:10,945 --> 00:27:13,315
that many leading manufacturers,
378
00:27:13,315 --> 00:27:16,355
such as the car maker
Nissan, made more money
379
00:27:16,355 --> 00:27:18,575
through speculative investments
380
00:27:18,575 --> 00:27:20,805
than through manufacturing cars.
381
00:27:24,415 --> 00:27:26,375
Literally thousands of
articles were written
382
00:27:26,375 --> 00:27:28,705
on the new Japanese miracle economy.
383
00:27:30,075 --> 00:27:32,595
A common explanation by economists
384
00:27:32,595 --> 00:27:35,115
was that high and rising productivity
385
00:27:35,115 --> 00:27:38,085
explained the impressive
performance of Japan's economy.
386
00:27:44,915 --> 00:27:47,355
Books on Japanese management techniques
387
00:27:47,355 --> 00:27:49,525
became international bestsellers.
388
00:27:50,915 --> 00:27:54,555
Western businessmen
read 17th century tracts
389
00:27:54,555 --> 00:27:56,405
on samurai strategies.
390
00:28:03,175 --> 00:28:07,835
In reality Japan's stellar
performance in the 1980s
391
00:28:07,835 --> 00:28:10,205
had little to do with
management techniques.
392
00:28:12,315 --> 00:28:15,755
Instead of being used to
limit and direct credit,
393
00:28:15,755 --> 00:28:19,765
window guidance was used
to create a giant bubble.
394
00:28:26,575 --> 00:28:29,815
- I conducted research
actually interviewing
395
00:28:29,815 --> 00:28:32,829
Bank of Japan officers and bankers
396
00:28:32,829 --> 00:28:35,189
both sides on, you know, on tape.
397
00:28:35,189 --> 00:28:36,768
The result was the Bank of Japan
398
00:28:36,768 --> 00:28:40,066
did continue its informal guidance.
399
00:28:40,066 --> 00:28:42,187
In fact it was the Bank of
Japan that forced the banks
400
00:28:42,187 --> 00:28:44,076
to increase their lending so much.
401
00:28:49,386 --> 00:28:51,946
- [Voiceover] The Bank of
Japan knew that the only way
402
00:28:51,946 --> 00:28:54,845
for banks to fulfill their loan quotas
403
00:28:54,845 --> 00:28:57,975
was for them to expand
nonproductive lending.
404
00:29:00,445 --> 00:29:03,925
In the words of one banker,
"If there is no demand"
405
00:29:03,925 --> 00:29:06,545
"for credit from low-risk borrowers",
406
00:29:06,545 --> 00:29:10,115
"and we want to use up the
quota, the risk gets worse."
407
00:29:13,265 --> 00:29:16,021
Another banker is quoted as saying that,
408
00:29:16,021 --> 00:29:17,962
"A side effect of the
window guidance rule"
409
00:29:17,962 --> 00:29:22,331
"of loan increases was that
the banks increased lending"
410
00:29:22,331 --> 00:29:24,840
"even when there was no loan demand."
411
00:29:34,208 --> 00:29:37,188
Like all bubbles the Japanese bubble
412
00:29:37,188 --> 00:29:39,308
was simply fueled by the rapid creation
413
00:29:39,308 --> 00:29:41,418
of new money by the banking system.
414
00:29:45,386 --> 00:29:50,167
Between 1986 and 1989 Toshihiko Fukui
415
00:29:50,167 --> 00:29:52,067
was the head of the Banking Department
416
00:29:52,067 --> 00:29:53,476
at the Bank of Japan.
417
00:29:54,706 --> 00:29:56,886
This was the department
that was responsible
418
00:29:56,886 --> 00:29:58,736
for the window guidance quotas.
419
00:30:00,386 --> 00:30:03,426
When Fukui was asked by a journalist,
420
00:30:03,426 --> 00:30:05,607
"Borrowing is expanding fast."
421
00:30:05,607 --> 00:30:07,767
"Don't you have any
intention of closing the tap"
422
00:30:07,767 --> 00:30:10,416
"on bank loans?", he replied,
423
00:30:55,825 --> 00:30:58,084
- Why were the banks lending so much?
424
00:30:58,084 --> 00:31:00,191
Well, they were lending
so much because they were
425
00:31:00,191 --> 00:31:03,889
forced to do so by the
orders of the Bank of Japan.
426
00:31:09,739 --> 00:31:12,300
- [Voiceover] Normally
banks choose clients
427
00:31:12,300 --> 00:31:15,499
from among a large
number of loan applicants
428
00:31:15,499 --> 00:31:17,829
turning down a significant percentage.
429
00:31:22,039 --> 00:31:25,789
But from 1987 onward
the tables had turned.
430
00:31:26,679 --> 00:31:28,979
It was the bankers who
were aggressively pursuing
431
00:31:28,979 --> 00:31:30,569
potential customers.
432
00:31:32,979 --> 00:31:35,020
Anecdotes abound about how the banks
433
00:31:35,020 --> 00:31:38,779
were soliciting loans at
bargain interest rates
434
00:31:38,779 --> 00:31:41,410
pursuing clients like street peddlers.
435
00:32:01,233 --> 00:32:03,261
- [Voiceover] Bankers made
increasingly exaggerated
436
00:32:03,261 --> 00:32:05,810
assessments of land value
437
00:32:05,810 --> 00:32:09,030
so that the actual ratio
of land value to loan
438
00:32:09,030 --> 00:32:11,640
often jumped to 300% or more.
439
00:32:13,851 --> 00:32:16,841
To the public this was
a strange phenomenon.
440
00:32:17,690 --> 00:32:20,801
People soon dubbed it "excess money".
441
00:32:23,351 --> 00:32:26,451
Only economists, analysts,
and those working
442
00:32:26,451 --> 00:32:29,590
in the financial markets
or for real estate firms
443
00:32:29,590 --> 00:32:30,815
knew better.
444
00:32:31,925 --> 00:32:34,776
They dismissed such simplistic analysis.
445
00:32:36,546 --> 00:32:38,386
Land prices were going up due to
446
00:32:38,386 --> 00:32:41,646
far more complicated reasons
than just excess money,
447
00:32:41,646 --> 00:32:43,206
they claimed.
448
00:32:43,206 --> 00:32:45,346
Ordinary people simply did not understand
449
00:32:45,346 --> 00:32:48,576
the intricacies of advanced
financial technology.
450
00:33:07,787 --> 00:33:10,647
When a country creates too much money,
451
00:33:10,647 --> 00:33:13,026
some of that money spills out abroad
452
00:33:13,026 --> 00:33:14,616
in the form of investment.
453
00:33:17,946 --> 00:33:21,946
In the 1980s Japanese
capital flows multiplied
454
00:33:21,946 --> 00:33:25,897
from a net inflow of more
than $2 billion in 1980
455
00:33:26,747 --> 00:33:31,635
to an outflow of $132 billion in 1986.
456
00:33:35,404 --> 00:33:37,984
Assets including art
objects and other valuables
457
00:33:37,984 --> 00:33:42,034
all over the world became
targets for Japanese buyers.
458
00:33:44,545 --> 00:33:46,704
There were high profile purchases
459
00:33:46,704 --> 00:33:50,624
such as the Rockefeller
Center, Columbia Pictures,
460
00:33:50,624 --> 00:33:52,634
and Pebble Beach Golf Course.
461
00:33:55,204 --> 00:33:58,585
Japanese money bought a staggering 75%
462
00:33:58,585 --> 00:34:03,194
of all United States Treasury
bonds auctioned off in 1986.
463
00:34:06,924 --> 00:34:10,224
But it is not easy for a
country to just print money
464
00:34:10,224 --> 00:34:12,994
and then go on a shopping
spree around the world.
465
00:34:14,445 --> 00:34:17,324
Japan was able to do
this because the markets
466
00:34:17,324 --> 00:34:19,294
did not devalue its currency.
467
00:34:22,204 --> 00:34:24,705
The value of individual currencies
468
00:34:24,705 --> 00:34:26,594
is set by currency dealers.
469
00:34:27,544 --> 00:34:30,070
If the traditional indicators
that the currency dealers
470
00:34:30,070 --> 00:34:32,931
watch do not pick up the
excess money creation
471
00:34:32,931 --> 00:34:34,800
in the country concerned,
472
00:34:35,690 --> 00:34:38,090
then creating large amounts of money
473
00:34:38,090 --> 00:34:41,860
and trying to exchange it for
foreign currency can work.
474
00:34:49,384 --> 00:34:51,465
Japan had pulled off the same trick
475
00:34:51,465 --> 00:34:55,573
that the United States had
used in the 1950s and 1960s,
476
00:34:56,562 --> 00:34:59,772
when U.S. banks excessively
created dollars.
477
00:35:02,582 --> 00:35:04,742
Corporate America used this hot money
478
00:35:04,742 --> 00:35:06,750
to buy up European corporations.
479
00:35:10,040 --> 00:35:12,041
While the United States had the cover
480
00:35:12,041 --> 00:35:16,181
of the dollar gold standard, Japan's cover
481
00:35:16,181 --> 00:35:18,490
was a significant trade surplus.
482
00:35:32,180 --> 00:35:34,500
An early warning indicator of the buildup
483
00:35:34,500 --> 00:35:37,500
of systemic risk in the banking system
484
00:35:37,500 --> 00:35:41,618
is a ratio of loans for
non-GDP based transactions
485
00:35:41,618 --> 00:35:43,487
to total loans.
486
00:35:47,158 --> 00:35:50,877
This ratio increases
significantly in most countries
487
00:35:50,877 --> 00:35:53,867
that are subsequently
struck by a banking crisis.
488
00:35:59,037 --> 00:36:01,717
It was this same process that fueled
489
00:36:01,717 --> 00:36:03,897
the mortgage lending and house price booms
490
00:36:03,897 --> 00:36:06,438
in the United States
and the United Kingdom
491
00:36:06,438 --> 00:36:09,187
in the 1980s and the 2000s.
492
00:36:11,437 --> 00:36:14,987
The same process also
created the Golden Twenties.
493
00:36:15,937 --> 00:36:18,677
In the 1920s United States banks
494
00:36:18,677 --> 00:36:20,647
lent with stocks as collateral.
495
00:36:22,137 --> 00:36:24,398
The principle remains the same.
496
00:36:24,398 --> 00:36:27,697
As each bank took the
stock price as a given
497
00:36:27,697 --> 00:36:29,207
it created new money.
498
00:36:30,258 --> 00:36:32,457
With more money in the stock market,
499
00:36:32,457 --> 00:36:34,808
stock prices had to rise.
500
00:36:36,497 --> 00:36:39,057
Each bank thought it was
safe accepting a certain
501
00:36:39,057 --> 00:36:42,537
percentage of the value of
the stock as collateral,
502
00:36:42,537 --> 00:36:45,217
but the actions of all banks together
503
00:36:45,217 --> 00:36:47,308
drove up the overall market.
504
00:36:51,937 --> 00:36:55,757
In Japan total private sector land wealth
505
00:36:55,757 --> 00:36:59,516
rose from 14.2 trillion yen in 1969
506
00:37:00,587 --> 00:37:03,497
to 2,000 trillion yen in 1989.
507
00:37:08,327 --> 00:37:10,686
At his first press conference as the 26th
508
00:37:10,686 --> 00:37:14,635
governor of the Bank of Japan in 1989,
509
00:37:14,635 --> 00:37:18,554
Yasushi Mieno said that,
"Since the previous policy"
510
00:37:18,554 --> 00:37:21,014
"of monetary easing had
caused the land price"
511
00:37:21,014 --> 00:37:24,615
"rise problems, real
estate related lending"
512
00:37:24,615 --> 00:37:26,144
"would now be restricted."
513
00:37:27,634 --> 00:37:29,915
- He looked around, looked at the bubble
514
00:37:29,915 --> 00:37:32,734
asset prices rising, the
gap between rich and poor
515
00:37:32,734 --> 00:37:33,775
is getting bigger.
516
00:37:33,775 --> 00:37:35,494
Let's stop it.
517
00:37:35,494 --> 00:37:38,774
His name was Mr. Mieno and
he was a hero in the press
518
00:37:38,774 --> 00:37:43,074
because he fought against
this silly monetary policy.
519
00:37:43,074 --> 00:37:46,195
But the fact was he was Deputy Governor
520
00:37:46,195 --> 00:37:47,445
during the bubble era,
521
00:37:47,445 --> 00:37:50,664
and he was in charge
of creating the bubble.
522
00:38:16,790 --> 00:38:17,730
- [Voiceover] All of a sudden
523
00:38:17,730 --> 00:38:20,640
land and asset prices stopped rising.
524
00:38:22,450 --> 00:38:26,921
In 1990 alone the stock
market dropped by 32%.
525
00:38:31,570 --> 00:38:36,041
Then in July 1991 window
guidance was abolished.
526
00:38:38,330 --> 00:38:40,050
This took the window guidance officers
527
00:38:40,050 --> 00:38:42,620
at the Bank of Japan
themselves by surprise.
528
00:38:44,231 --> 00:38:47,281
Bankers were left almost helpless.
529
00:38:47,281 --> 00:38:48,730
They complained that they did not know
530
00:38:48,730 --> 00:38:50,908
how to make their lending plans anymore.
531
00:38:52,528 --> 00:38:55,108
In the past when a certain branch had said
532
00:38:55,108 --> 00:38:57,368
they would like to lend more,
533
00:38:57,368 --> 00:38:59,748
they would respond that
the window guidance quota
534
00:38:59,748 --> 00:39:01,368
had been used up.
535
00:39:03,128 --> 00:39:05,358
Now they couldn't do that anymore.
536
00:39:08,888 --> 00:39:11,268
As banks began to
realize that the majority
537
00:39:11,268 --> 00:39:14,328
of the 99 trillion yen in bubble loans
538
00:39:14,328 --> 00:39:16,888
were likely to turn sour,
539
00:39:16,888 --> 00:39:19,628
they became so fearful that they not only
540
00:39:19,628 --> 00:39:22,188
stopped lending to speculators
541
00:39:22,188 --> 00:39:24,998
but also restricted
loans to everyone else.
542
00:39:26,308 --> 00:39:28,808
- Well it's a bleak
Christmas ahead for Japan,
543
00:39:28,808 --> 00:39:30,568
the stock market on Monday sinking
544
00:39:30,568 --> 00:39:33,509
to its lowest close in over two years.
545
00:39:33,509 --> 00:39:36,049
Last week's collapse of
one of Japan's biggest
546
00:39:36,049 --> 00:39:38,708
food traders was the ninth time this year
547
00:39:38,708 --> 00:39:40,718
that a listed company went under.
548
00:39:43,708 --> 00:39:45,608
- [Voiceover] More than
five million Japanese
549
00:39:45,608 --> 00:39:49,698
lost their jobs and did not
find employment elsewhere.
550
00:39:54,308 --> 00:39:57,228
Suicide became the leading cause of death
551
00:39:57,228 --> 00:40:00,438
for men between the ages of 20 and 44.
552
00:40:21,038 --> 00:40:24,517
- [Voiceover] Between 1990 and 2003,
553
00:40:24,517 --> 00:40:27,947
212,000 companies went bankrupt.
554
00:40:29,097 --> 00:40:33,147
In the same period the
stock market dropped by 80%.
555
00:40:35,617 --> 00:40:39,507
Land prices in the major
cities fell by up to 84%.
556
00:40:41,857 --> 00:40:44,937
Some economists seemed relieved.
557
00:40:44,937 --> 00:40:48,157
The downturn was evidence
that Japan's economic system
558
00:40:48,157 --> 00:40:50,288
was not so successful after all.
559
00:40:53,158 --> 00:40:56,358
Meanwhile the governor
of the Bank of Japan
560
00:40:56,358 --> 00:41:01,358
Yasushi Mieno said that,
"Thanks to this recession"
561
00:41:01,378 --> 00:41:03,358
"everyone is becoming
conscious of the need"
562
00:41:03,358 --> 00:41:06,148
"to implement economic transformation."
563
00:41:15,577 --> 00:41:18,637
The Ministry of Finance
believing that interest rates
564
00:41:18,637 --> 00:41:20,998
were the main policy tool put pressure
565
00:41:20,998 --> 00:41:24,025
on the Bank of Japan
to lower interest rates
566
00:41:25,436 --> 00:41:28,725
until the official rate reached 0.1%.
567
00:41:32,156 --> 00:41:35,805
Most economists predicted
an economic recovery.
568
00:41:41,216 --> 00:41:44,435
But despite frequent assertions
in the financial press
569
00:41:44,435 --> 00:41:47,516
and by central banks
that lower interest rates
570
00:41:47,516 --> 00:41:49,306
will stimulate growth,
571
00:41:49,306 --> 00:41:52,245
and higher interest rates will slow growth
572
00:41:52,245 --> 00:41:55,105
there is no empirical evidence
for this relationship.
573
00:42:03,235 --> 00:42:05,175
- [Voiceover] Japanese
and American businessmen
574
00:42:05,175 --> 00:42:08,135
are meeting here with a
plea from Japan's companies
575
00:42:08,135 --> 00:42:09,964
for a lower yen.
576
00:42:09,964 --> 00:42:13,034
Only 6% of Japanese
exporters can make profits
577
00:42:13,034 --> 00:42:15,452
with the dollar at less than 100 yen.
578
00:42:15,452 --> 00:42:17,511
On average they need the American currency
579
00:42:17,511 --> 00:42:20,861
to rise above 117 yen to break even.
580
00:42:25,311 --> 00:42:26,931
- [Voiceover] The Ministry of Finance
581
00:42:26,931 --> 00:42:28,752
asked the Bank of Japan to sell
582
00:42:28,752 --> 00:42:32,670
large amounts of yen and buy U.S. dollars
583
00:42:32,670 --> 00:42:34,710
so that the exchange rate of the yen
584
00:42:34,710 --> 00:42:37,701
would fall and exports would pick up.
585
00:42:39,811 --> 00:42:41,670
- We all know that two of them
586
00:42:41,670 --> 00:42:44,150
the Ministry of Finance, MOF, in Japan
587
00:42:44,150 --> 00:42:47,467
and the Bank of Japan they
just don't get along well
588
00:42:47,467 --> 00:42:49,474
and what has been happening also
589
00:42:49,474 --> 00:42:51,934
again this month is that the Bank of Japan
590
00:42:51,934 --> 00:42:54,775
has been sterilizing its own intervention,
591
00:42:54,775 --> 00:42:56,994
well to be precise the
intervention ordered
592
00:42:56,994 --> 00:42:58,795
by the Ministry of Finance.
593
00:42:58,795 --> 00:43:00,675
The Ministry of Finance
tells the Bank of Japan
594
00:43:00,675 --> 00:43:01,862
to go out and buy
595
00:43:01,862 --> 00:43:02,882
well we had to figure roughly
596
00:43:02,882 --> 00:43:05,612
20 billion worth of U.S. Treasuries
597
00:43:05,612 --> 00:43:07,972
but the Bank of Japan is sterilizing this
598
00:43:07,972 --> 00:43:11,053
which means it is
basically taking the money
599
00:43:11,053 --> 00:43:14,272
from the economy to fund this purchase.
600
00:43:14,272 --> 00:43:17,752
Most researchers agree
sterilized forex intervention
601
00:43:17,752 --> 00:43:18,792
doesn't work.
602
00:43:18,792 --> 00:43:21,193
The BOJ is again sterilizing.
603
00:43:21,193 --> 00:43:22,612
That's why it doesn't work.
604
00:43:22,612 --> 00:43:25,883
That's why the yen has remained strong.
605
00:43:30,312 --> 00:43:32,212
- [Voiceover] A central
bank can withdraw money
606
00:43:32,212 --> 00:43:35,812
from the economy by selling its assets
607
00:43:35,812 --> 00:43:38,293
just as it can inject
money into the economy
608
00:43:38,293 --> 00:43:39,962
by buying assets.
609
00:43:43,352 --> 00:43:46,113
When central banks buy and sell assets,
610
00:43:46,113 --> 00:43:48,512
they increase or decrease
the amount of money
611
00:43:48,512 --> 00:43:50,412
circulating in the economy.
612
00:43:53,572 --> 00:43:56,863
Officials at the Bank
of Japan ignored this,
613
00:43:56,863 --> 00:43:58,634
and instead claimed that,
614
00:44:18,042 --> 00:44:20,622
Independent observers suggested that
615
00:44:20,622 --> 00:44:22,462
domestic demand had to be boosted
616
00:44:22,462 --> 00:44:24,461
by government spending
617
00:44:25,410 --> 00:44:27,880
and then loan demand would also rise.
618
00:44:29,770 --> 00:44:33,110
For a decade the government
followed their advice,
619
00:44:33,110 --> 00:44:35,760
boosting government
debt to historic levels.
620
00:44:37,210 --> 00:44:41,890
Between 1992 and 2002,
10 stimulation packages
621
00:44:41,890 --> 00:44:45,620
worth 146 trillion yen were issued.
622
00:44:47,671 --> 00:44:49,309
- Mr. Richard Werner is Chief Economist
623
00:44:49,309 --> 00:44:51,448
at Jardine Fleming Securities in Tokyo.
624
00:44:51,448 --> 00:44:53,647
He joins us now to
share his views on where
625
00:44:53,647 --> 00:44:55,146
the Japanese economy is heading.
626
00:44:55,146 --> 00:44:56,165
Mr. Werner, good evening to you.
627
00:44:56,165 --> 00:44:57,265
Thank you for joining us.
628
00:44:57,265 --> 00:44:59,323
- The government was
spending with the right hand,
629
00:44:59,323 --> 00:45:00,802
putting money into the economy
630
00:45:00,802 --> 00:45:03,093
but the fundraising was
done through the bond market
631
00:45:03,093 --> 00:45:04,571
and therefore it took the same money
632
00:45:04,571 --> 00:45:06,602
out of the economy with the left hand.
633
00:45:06,602 --> 00:45:08,401
There was no increase in
total purchasing power
634
00:45:08,401 --> 00:45:09,442
and that's why the government spending
635
00:45:09,442 --> 00:45:10,731
couldn't have an impact.
636
00:45:11,762 --> 00:45:15,421
- [Voiceover] By 2011
Japan's government debt
637
00:45:15,421 --> 00:45:20,051
would reach 230% of GPD
the highest in the world.
638
00:45:27,321 --> 00:45:30,111
The Ministry of Finance
was running out of options.
639
00:45:32,062 --> 00:45:35,741
Observers began to blame the
Ministry for the recession
640
00:45:35,741 --> 00:45:37,801
and started to listen to
the voices that argued
641
00:45:37,801 --> 00:45:41,331
that the recession was due
to Japan's economic system.
642
00:45:45,911 --> 00:45:47,451
But how difficult would it have been
643
00:45:47,451 --> 00:45:49,191
to solve the problems of bad debt
644
00:45:49,191 --> 00:45:51,162
in the banking sector and deflation?
645
00:45:53,571 --> 00:45:55,472
It turns out that this would not have been
646
00:45:55,472 --> 00:45:57,811
so difficult after all.
647
00:45:57,811 --> 00:46:00,048
- The financial system
always looks like catch 22.
648
00:46:00,048 --> 00:46:02,245
There's no loan growth so
there's no economic growth,
649
00:46:02,245 --> 00:46:04,346
so there's no loan growth so
there's no economic growth.
650
00:46:04,346 --> 00:46:07,706
Well, there is one thing
that can break through that,
651
00:46:07,706 --> 00:46:09,265
this circular argument.
652
00:46:09,265 --> 00:46:10,925
That's the central bank.
653
00:46:10,925 --> 00:46:12,823
The job of the central
bank in this situation
654
00:46:12,823 --> 00:46:14,173
is to print money.
655
00:46:22,716 --> 00:46:25,635
What we need now is more radical measures
656
00:46:25,635 --> 00:46:27,155
and there are some painful ones,
657
00:46:27,155 --> 00:46:28,431
but there're also painless ones.
658
00:46:28,431 --> 00:46:29,811
The central bank could for example
659
00:46:29,811 --> 00:46:32,071
just buy all bad debts at face value.
660
00:46:32,071 --> 00:46:35,171
Japan would have the
strongest banks in the world.
661
00:46:37,611 --> 00:46:39,651
- [Voiceover] To bail
out the banking sector,
662
00:46:39,651 --> 00:46:42,251
a central bank can buy up the banks' bad
663
00:46:42,251 --> 00:46:44,621
financial assets with newly created money,
664
00:46:45,551 --> 00:46:47,661
giving them face value for assets,
665
00:46:47,661 --> 00:46:50,141
which are often worth significantly less.
666
00:46:52,511 --> 00:46:55,221
This is what the Bank of
Japan did after the war.
667
00:46:59,191 --> 00:47:02,291
Alternatively money could
be transferred to the banks
668
00:47:02,291 --> 00:47:04,422
by helping them make sizable profits.
669
00:47:05,531 --> 00:47:08,051
One way this can be achieved
is for the central bank
670
00:47:08,051 --> 00:47:12,272
to corner a market in effect
creating a mini bubble
671
00:47:12,272 --> 00:47:15,891
in a certain market in
which banks invest heavily,
672
00:47:15,891 --> 00:47:17,840
providing large profits for them.
673
00:47:20,291 --> 00:47:22,811
This turns out to be a
relatively common technique
674
00:47:22,811 --> 00:47:25,722
by central banks to help
their banking systems.
675
00:47:32,091 --> 00:47:34,373
Other proposals include
measures to introduce
676
00:47:34,373 --> 00:47:37,273
zero-risk borrowers to banks,
677
00:47:37,273 --> 00:47:38,973
or introducing accounting changes
678
00:47:38,973 --> 00:47:40,863
that help their balance sheets.
679
00:47:48,013 --> 00:47:52,273
In Japan the authorities
and the Bank of Japan argued
680
00:47:52,273 --> 00:47:55,933
as did the Western powers
almost two decades later
681
00:47:55,933 --> 00:47:58,463
that the taxpayer should foot the bill.
682
00:48:00,653 --> 00:48:05,033
- In March last year as you may remember
683
00:48:05,033 --> 00:48:09,333
the government injected
a large amount of money
684
00:48:09,333 --> 00:48:14,113
into some 15 major Japanese
financial institutions
685
00:48:14,113 --> 00:48:15,606
and we were one of them.
686
00:48:16,826 --> 00:48:21,605
That helped us write off bad debts
687
00:48:21,605 --> 00:48:24,445
and also to beef up our capital base
688
00:48:24,445 --> 00:48:27,375
so that we would be prepared to lend.
689
00:48:28,863 --> 00:48:30,304
- [Voiceover] Tax money has been used
690
00:48:30,304 --> 00:48:32,091
to recapitalize banks.
691
00:48:33,101 --> 00:48:35,301
However there is no
evidence that taxpayers
692
00:48:35,301 --> 00:48:38,161
have been responsible
for the banks' problems
693
00:48:38,161 --> 00:48:41,691
therefore such policies have
likely created a moral hazard.
694
00:48:47,621 --> 00:48:50,262
The money supply is
determined by the net increase
695
00:48:50,262 --> 00:48:53,172
in money creation by banks
and the central bank.
696
00:48:54,942 --> 00:48:57,361
If moral hazard dictates
that the banking sector
697
00:48:57,361 --> 00:49:01,022
should not be bailed out
deflation and recession
698
00:49:01,022 --> 00:49:03,511
can still be avoided by the central bank
699
00:49:04,761 --> 00:49:08,561
to do this the central bank
can increase the money supply.
700
00:49:10,962 --> 00:49:13,242
A central bank can increase
the amount of money
701
00:49:13,242 --> 00:49:16,462
in an economy at any time without limit
702
00:49:17,402 --> 00:49:20,481
by simply buying assets
from the private sector
703
00:49:20,481 --> 00:49:22,931
and paying with newly created credit.
704
00:49:24,662 --> 00:49:26,501
The Bank of Japan could for instance
705
00:49:26,501 --> 00:49:31,222
have bought real estate and
converted it into public parks.
706
00:49:31,222 --> 00:49:32,997
- And there is an opportunity here
707
00:49:32,997 --> 00:49:35,257
to solve three problems in one stroke.
708
00:49:35,257 --> 00:49:37,617
The economy needs money creation.
709
00:49:37,617 --> 00:49:40,337
The banks need to get
rid of their bad debt.
710
00:49:40,337 --> 00:49:42,917
And the real estate sector
needs some transactions.
711
00:49:42,917 --> 00:49:46,037
Well, what you can do is
just have the central bank
712
00:49:46,037 --> 00:49:50,057
print money, buy the land from the banks,
713
00:49:50,057 --> 00:49:53,297
turn it into parks and actually
you solve another problem
714
00:49:53,297 --> 00:49:55,181
quality of life in Japan.
715
00:49:57,131 --> 00:49:58,491
- [Voiceover] Even if the Bank of Japan
716
00:49:58,491 --> 00:50:02,012
had later sold these parks
at a fraction of the cost,
717
00:50:02,012 --> 00:50:04,272
it would still have made money,
718
00:50:04,272 --> 00:50:06,191
because it costs the central bank nothing
719
00:50:06,191 --> 00:50:08,201
to create the money in the first place.
720
00:50:11,931 --> 00:50:14,591
Another option for injecting
money into the economy
721
00:50:14,591 --> 00:50:16,461
is quantitative easing.
722
00:50:18,768 --> 00:50:21,587
Despite having all
these options available,
723
00:50:21,587 --> 00:50:24,187
the Bank of Japan at every stage
724
00:50:24,187 --> 00:50:28,418
refused to implement policies
that would resolve the crises.
725
00:50:30,227 --> 00:50:32,287
- When I was at the
Bank of Japan, '92, '93,
726
00:50:32,287 --> 00:50:35,487
as a visiting researcher I was convinced
727
00:50:35,487 --> 00:50:37,747
that this recession was
gonna get really bad,
728
00:50:37,747 --> 00:50:40,728
so any Bank of Japan guy who
I could get to talk to me
729
00:50:40,728 --> 00:50:44,227
I would ask, "Why aren't
you printing more money?"
730
00:50:44,227 --> 00:50:46,914
I noticed they were not
printing enough money.
731
00:50:46,914 --> 00:50:49,262
I met one guy who was quite open about it
732
00:50:49,262 --> 00:50:51,641
and he says, "Richard,
yeah sure we could have"
733
00:50:51,641 --> 00:50:52,661
"printed more money."
734
00:50:52,661 --> 00:50:54,160
"We could have created a recovery"
735
00:50:54,160 --> 00:50:56,241
"but then nothing would have changed."
736
00:50:56,241 --> 00:50:59,841
"Japan's economic structure
would not have changed."
737
00:50:59,841 --> 00:51:02,140
Now at that time I still
wasn't ready to believe
738
00:51:02,140 --> 00:51:04,261
that the Bank of Japan was seriously
739
00:51:04,261 --> 00:51:06,481
prolonging the recession on purpose
740
00:51:06,481 --> 00:51:08,842
in order to get structural changes
741
00:51:08,842 --> 00:51:11,451
that just seemed a bit too wild.
742
00:51:12,881 --> 00:51:15,287
- Finance Minister Masajuro Shiokawa
743
00:51:15,287 --> 00:51:17,137
has turned to the Bank of Japan
744
00:51:17,137 --> 00:51:19,078
asking it to help stop deflation
745
00:51:19,078 --> 00:51:20,766
or fight deflation at least.
746
00:51:20,766 --> 00:51:23,305
- [Voiceover] The Bank of
Japan consistently defied
747
00:51:23,305 --> 00:51:25,805
calls by the government, finance minister,
748
00:51:25,805 --> 00:51:28,405
and prime minister to create more money
749
00:51:28,405 --> 00:51:31,716
to stimulate the economy
and end the long recession.
750
00:51:33,965 --> 00:51:37,486
At times the Bank of Japan
even actively reduced
751
00:51:37,486 --> 00:51:40,385
the amount of money
circulating in the economy
752
00:51:40,385 --> 00:51:42,255
which worsened the recession.
753
00:51:48,285 --> 00:51:50,426
The Bank of Japan's arguments always
754
00:51:50,426 --> 00:51:52,885
came to the same conclusion
755
00:51:52,885 --> 00:51:56,835
namely that the blame lay with
Japan's economic structure.
756
00:52:00,205 --> 00:52:03,166
Central bank staff even
argued that significant
757
00:52:03,166 --> 00:52:05,896
monetary easing could cause harm
758
00:52:06,806 --> 00:52:09,405
by inducing a further
delay in the progress
759
00:52:09,405 --> 00:52:11,255
of structural adjustment.
760
00:52:17,726 --> 00:52:20,405
The early postwar Japanese leaders
761
00:52:20,405 --> 00:52:23,166
knew that they were running a war economy,
762
00:52:23,166 --> 00:52:26,075
but they chose not to talk
for political reasons.
763
00:52:28,885 --> 00:52:31,386
The Cold War propaganda message was that
764
00:52:31,386 --> 00:52:34,425
postwar Japan had adopted a U.S. style
765
00:52:34,425 --> 00:52:36,596
political and economic system.
766
00:52:39,645 --> 00:52:43,725
Unwilling to tell the truth
the early postwar leaders
767
00:52:43,725 --> 00:52:45,685
took their intimate
knowledge about the origins
768
00:52:45,685 --> 00:52:49,516
of Japan's miracle economy
with them to their grave.
769
00:52:52,345 --> 00:52:55,045
A generation of bureaucrats
and politicians reigned
770
00:52:55,045 --> 00:52:58,625
in the 1980s and 1990s
who did not understand
771
00:52:58,625 --> 00:53:00,746
the true character and purpose of their
772
00:53:00,746 --> 00:53:02,595
own country's economy.
773
00:53:05,605 --> 00:53:08,446
A whole generation of Japan's economists
774
00:53:08,446 --> 00:53:10,945
had been sent to the United States
775
00:53:10,945 --> 00:53:15,555
to receive PhDs and MBAs
in U.S. style economics.
776
00:53:19,223 --> 00:53:21,584
Since neoclassical economics assumes
777
00:53:21,584 --> 00:53:24,963
that there is only one
type of economic system,
778
00:53:24,963 --> 00:53:27,504
namely unmitigated free market
779
00:53:27,504 --> 00:53:30,653
where shareholders and
central bankers rule supreme
780
00:53:31,823 --> 00:53:34,623
many Japanese economists quickly came
781
00:53:34,623 --> 00:53:37,913
to regurgitate the arguments
of U.S. economists.
782
00:53:50,923 --> 00:53:52,723
- The U.S. and Japan closed two days
783
00:53:52,723 --> 00:53:54,683
of insurance talks on Tuesday.
784
00:53:54,683 --> 00:53:58,396
- Primary sector deregulation is needed
785
00:53:58,396 --> 00:54:03,091
to overcome the entrenched interests
786
00:54:03,091 --> 00:54:07,731
of large insurance
companies, life and non-life,
787
00:54:07,731 --> 00:54:11,719
and the Ministry of Finance bureaucracy.
788
00:54:11,719 --> 00:54:14,478
- They need to reach an
agreement before December 15.
789
00:54:14,478 --> 00:54:16,239
After that date the U.S. has threatened
790
00:54:16,239 --> 00:54:17,918
to impose trade sanctions.
791
00:54:17,918 --> 00:54:19,594
- The key move analysts are expecting
792
00:54:19,594 --> 00:54:21,839
the securitization of real estate.
793
00:54:21,839 --> 00:54:23,439
But will the package be enough?
794
00:54:23,439 --> 00:54:25,389
For more we are talking to Richard Werner.
795
00:54:25,389 --> 00:54:29,734
- To have meaningful
securitization we need deregulation
796
00:54:29,734 --> 00:54:32,175
and that's already the
answer to your question.
797
00:54:32,175 --> 00:54:34,895
To get deregulation you
have to reduce the power
798
00:54:34,895 --> 00:54:36,174
of the Ministry of Finance
799
00:54:36,174 --> 00:54:39,404
and obviously the Ministry
was resisting that.
800
00:54:40,734 --> 00:54:43,274
- [Voiceover] In the
1980s persons who could
801
00:54:43,274 --> 00:54:45,294
introduce themselves with a business card
802
00:54:45,294 --> 00:54:47,855
from the renowned Finance Ministry
803
00:54:47,855 --> 00:54:51,984
elicited deep and hushed
exclamations of awe and respect.
804
00:54:53,914 --> 00:54:57,664
But by the mid 1990s
attitudes had changed.
805
00:54:58,935 --> 00:55:01,754
There now seemed little
doubt to most observers
806
00:55:01,754 --> 00:55:04,664
that the Ministry of Finance
had caused the recession.
807
00:55:06,734 --> 00:55:08,395
The frequent demonstrations were held
808
00:55:08,395 --> 00:55:11,374
outside the Ministry's doors by citizens
809
00:55:11,374 --> 00:55:13,745
disgusted by the bureaucrats' actions.
810
00:55:17,315 --> 00:55:21,814
In early 1998 public
prosecutors for the first time
811
00:55:21,814 --> 00:55:24,784
raided the most powerful
of Japan's ministries.
812
00:55:26,254 --> 00:55:29,335
Both banks and their regulators
were heavily criticized
813
00:55:29,335 --> 00:55:30,625
for their actions.
814
00:55:31,695 --> 00:55:34,314
Scandals highlighted some
of the informal links
815
00:55:34,314 --> 00:55:36,754
that existed between
Ministry of Finance officials
816
00:55:36,754 --> 00:55:38,224
and bankers.
817
00:55:40,275 --> 00:55:43,534
Many bank staff and even
some ministry officials
818
00:55:43,534 --> 00:55:48,164
were arrested and imprisoned
and several committed suicide.
819
00:55:53,845 --> 00:55:57,281
As central banker Masaaki
Shirakawa had explained,
820
00:55:59,170 --> 00:56:02,490
"It is not easy to change
the institutional framework"
821
00:56:02,490 --> 00:56:05,020
"and promote structural reform"
822
00:56:05,020 --> 00:56:07,950
"since it necessarily
involves the vested interests"
823
00:56:07,950 --> 00:56:11,340
"of all the related
individual economic agents."
824
00:56:15,271 --> 00:56:18,210
While Yutaka Yamaguchi a Deputy Governor
825
00:56:18,210 --> 00:56:21,000
of the Bank of Japan had said that,
826
00:56:48,608 --> 00:56:51,808
From the mid 1990s onward the government
827
00:56:51,808 --> 00:56:54,209
began to dismantle much
of the power structure
828
00:56:54,209 --> 00:56:55,758
of the Ministry of Finance.
829
00:56:57,429 --> 00:56:59,428
The Bank of Japan on the other hand
830
00:56:59,428 --> 00:57:01,979
saw its influence grow significantly.
831
00:57:03,348 --> 00:57:05,488
- You have written just
recently there's no doubt
832
00:57:05,488 --> 00:57:07,929
in your mind the central
bank, the Bank of Japan
833
00:57:07,929 --> 00:57:10,570
will be cut loose from
the Ministry of Finance
834
00:57:10,570 --> 00:57:12,388
and become pretty much independent
835
00:57:12,388 --> 00:57:14,789
putting it on a footing
with other central banks.
836
00:57:14,789 --> 00:57:16,948
Briefly why are you so sure?
837
00:57:16,948 --> 00:57:19,828
- Basically the Ministry
of Finance which had been
838
00:57:19,828 --> 00:57:23,287
controlling legally at
least the Bank of Japan
839
00:57:23,287 --> 00:57:25,507
I mean that's what the law says
840
00:57:25,507 --> 00:57:27,276
has lost all credibility.
841
00:57:27,276 --> 00:57:29,076
The Ministry of Finance is being blamed
842
00:57:29,076 --> 00:57:30,717
for the creation of the bubble,
843
00:57:30,717 --> 00:57:34,137
for the long recession and
for many other problems
844
00:57:34,137 --> 00:57:37,096
we had recently in Japan,
845
00:57:37,096 --> 00:57:39,216
whereas the Bank of Japan has been
846
00:57:39,216 --> 00:57:41,396
out of the spotlight of public criticism
847
00:57:41,396 --> 00:57:44,297
and it's using that now to say,
848
00:57:44,297 --> 00:57:46,176
"Well, the MOF has been bad."
849
00:57:46,176 --> 00:57:47,992
"We need independence now."
850
00:57:47,992 --> 00:57:49,152
- Richard, thanks very much.
851
00:57:49,152 --> 00:57:50,891
I have been speaking to Richard Werner,
852
00:57:50,891 --> 00:57:54,521
Chief Economist at Jardine
Fleming Securities in Tokyo.
853
00:57:58,251 --> 00:57:59,751
- [Voiceover] Soon after his retirement
854
00:57:59,751 --> 00:58:01,931
from the position of
governor of the Bank of Japan
855
00:58:01,931 --> 00:58:06,552
in 1994 Mieno embarked on a campaign
856
00:58:06,552 --> 00:58:08,812
giving speeches to various associations
857
00:58:08,812 --> 00:58:10,102
and interest groups.
858
00:58:12,352 --> 00:58:14,921
He lobbied for a change
in the Bank of Japan law.
859
00:58:16,231 --> 00:58:19,012
His line of argument was to subtly suggest
860
00:58:19,012 --> 00:58:20,952
that the Ministry of Finance had pushed
861
00:58:20,952 --> 00:58:23,681
the Bank of Japan into the wrong policies.
862
00:58:26,091 --> 00:58:28,571
To avoid such problems in the future,
863
00:58:28,571 --> 00:58:30,731
the Bank of Japan needed to be given
864
00:58:30,731 --> 00:58:32,921
full legal independence.
865
00:58:36,011 --> 00:58:40,311
According to Mieno making
central banks independent
866
00:58:40,311 --> 00:58:42,632
reflected the human wisdom
that had been nurtured
867
00:58:42,632 --> 00:58:44,099
by history.
868
00:58:46,708 --> 00:58:50,809
In 1998 monetary policy
was put into the hands
869
00:58:50,809 --> 00:58:53,998
of the newly independent Bank of Japan.
870
00:58:55,908 --> 00:58:57,489
- So you're saying that politicians
871
00:58:57,489 --> 00:59:00,268
as well as economists should
be putting more pressure
872
00:59:00,268 --> 00:59:03,569
towards the Bank of Japan in
order to create more money
873
00:59:03,569 --> 00:59:05,989
but a lot of critics are going to say that
874
00:59:05,989 --> 00:59:09,648
that is intervening into the
central bank's independence.
875
00:59:09,648 --> 00:59:10,808
What do you make of that?
876
00:59:10,808 --> 00:59:13,229
- I think that's exactly right.
877
00:59:13,229 --> 00:59:15,928
That is intervening in the
central bank's independence,
878
00:59:15,928 --> 00:59:18,158
and that's exactly what we need.
879
00:59:28,108 --> 00:59:29,609
- [Voiceover] The numerous
scandals that followed
880
00:59:29,609 --> 00:59:32,068
the bursting of the
bubble also brought down
881
00:59:32,068 --> 00:59:35,508
the 1955 system of one party rule
882
00:59:35,508 --> 00:59:37,479
by the Liberal Democratic Party.
883
00:59:40,548 --> 00:59:43,328
In the old system
politicians did not compete
884
00:59:43,328 --> 00:59:45,438
by proposing different policies.
885
00:59:46,588 --> 00:59:49,488
Policy was made by the bureaucrats,
886
00:59:49,488 --> 00:59:51,589
and politicians merely
focused on appeasing
887
00:59:51,589 --> 00:59:55,338
local constituencies with
public works projects.
888
00:59:59,149 --> 01:00:04,149
In October 1997 for the first
time in postwar history,
889
01:00:04,308 --> 01:00:07,285
all policy initiatives
to stimulate the economy
890
01:00:07,285 --> 01:00:11,116
originated from politicians
not bureaucrats.
891
01:00:15,246 --> 01:00:18,986
Then in early 2001 a
new type of politician
892
01:00:18,986 --> 01:00:20,576
was swept to power.
893
01:00:21,746 --> 01:00:24,025
- Japanese government bonds
staged their biggest rally
894
01:00:24,025 --> 01:00:26,483
this month as Junichiro Koizumi emerged
895
01:00:26,483 --> 01:00:28,783
as the hot favorite to
become the country's
896
01:00:28,783 --> 01:00:30,389
next prime minister.
897
01:00:30,389 --> 01:00:33,359
- [Voiceover] Junichiro
Koizumi became prime minister.
898
01:00:35,408 --> 01:00:38,129
In terms of his popularity
and his policies,
899
01:00:38,129 --> 01:00:39,969
he is often compared to Margaret Thatcher
900
01:00:39,969 --> 01:00:41,379
and Ronald Reagan.
901
01:00:42,488 --> 01:00:44,368
His message was simple,
902
01:00:44,368 --> 01:00:47,139
"No recovery without structural reform."
903
01:00:54,243 --> 01:00:58,184
At the Geneva Summit in July 2001 he said,
904
01:00:58,184 --> 01:01:02,210
"Some say recovery comes
first without reforms"
905
01:01:03,260 --> 01:01:06,479
"but if the economy
recovers the will to reform"
906
01:01:06,479 --> 01:01:08,180
"will disappear".
907
01:01:08,180 --> 01:01:11,659
"Therefore, after the
elections I will continue"
908
01:01:11,659 --> 01:01:15,389
"with the plan of no growth
without structural reform."
909
01:01:18,479 --> 01:01:21,899
During 2001 the message
of no economic growth
910
01:01:21,899 --> 01:01:24,880
without structural
reform had been broadcast
911
01:01:24,880 --> 01:01:28,570
on an almost daily basis
on the nation's TV screens.
912
01:01:54,919 --> 01:01:58,151
- Now everyone believes we
need structural changes.
913
01:01:58,151 --> 01:02:00,551
We need to scrap Japanese style capitalism
914
01:02:00,551 --> 01:02:01,330
to get a recovery.
915
01:02:01,330 --> 01:02:01,891
Why?
916
01:02:01,891 --> 01:02:04,071
It seems we tried all the policies.
917
01:02:04,071 --> 01:02:05,671
It seems we've tried everything.
918
01:02:05,671 --> 01:02:06,991
Nothing works.
919
01:02:06,991 --> 01:02:08,891
So the system itself the Japanese style
920
01:02:08,891 --> 01:02:10,810
economic system must be to blame
921
01:02:10,810 --> 01:02:12,861
so we'd better get rid of it.
922
01:02:18,110 --> 01:02:20,631
- [Voiceover] Japan was
shifting its economic system
923
01:02:20,631 --> 01:02:23,741
to a U.S. style market economy
924
01:02:23,741 --> 01:02:26,230
and that also meant that
the center of the economy
925
01:02:26,230 --> 01:02:29,241
was being moved from
banks to stock markets.
926
01:02:32,251 --> 01:02:35,667
To entice depositors to pull
their money out of banks
927
01:02:35,667 --> 01:02:39,227
and into the risky stock
market reformers withdrew
928
01:02:39,227 --> 01:02:42,130
the guarantee on all bank deposits
929
01:02:42,130 --> 01:02:45,060
while creating tax incentives
for stock investments.
930
01:02:47,909 --> 01:02:51,457
As U.S. style shareholder
capitalism spread,
931
01:02:51,457 --> 01:02:54,556
unemployment rose significantly.
932
01:02:54,556 --> 01:02:57,156
Income and wealth disparities rose,
933
01:02:57,156 --> 01:03:00,387
as did suicides and
incidents of violent crime.
934
01:03:03,337 --> 01:03:07,776
Then in 2002 the Bank of
Japan strengthened its efforts
935
01:03:07,776 --> 01:03:10,477
to worsen bank balance
sheets and force banks
936
01:03:10,477 --> 01:03:12,186
to foreclose on their borrowers.
937
01:03:14,276 --> 01:03:19,276
Until then Hakuo Yanagisawa,
minister for financial services
938
01:03:19,327 --> 01:03:22,466
had resisted the Bank of
Japan inspired proposal
939
01:03:22,466 --> 01:03:24,603
to inject tax money into banks
940
01:03:25,536 --> 01:03:27,713
effectively nationalizing them,
941
01:03:27,713 --> 01:03:29,432
taking over their management
942
01:03:29,432 --> 01:03:33,042
and using this power to
call in loans from companies
943
01:03:33,042 --> 01:03:35,932
thus triggering many
bankruptcies of large firms.
944
01:03:40,341 --> 01:03:44,181
Mr. Yanagisawa was duly
sacked by the prime minister
945
01:03:44,181 --> 01:03:46,271
and replaced with Heizo Takenaka.
946
01:03:47,702 --> 01:03:50,552
Takenaka was a supporter
of the Bank of Japan's plan
947
01:03:50,552 --> 01:03:53,412
to increase foreclosures of borrowers.
948
01:03:53,412 --> 01:03:57,413
- Minister Takenaka was
trying to implement a policy
949
01:03:57,413 --> 01:04:00,692
to actually dramatically
weaken the balance sheets
950
01:04:00,692 --> 01:04:03,252
of the banks in order
to give him a free hand
951
01:04:03,252 --> 01:04:05,582
and allow him to nationalize them.
952
01:04:07,052 --> 01:04:09,112
- [Voiceover] Takenaka
appointed a task force
953
01:04:09,112 --> 01:04:11,552
to oversee the banking policies
954
01:04:11,552 --> 01:04:14,262
which included two former
Bank of Japan staff.
955
01:04:15,432 --> 01:04:18,873
One of them, Takeshi
Kimura, immediately demanded
956
01:04:18,873 --> 01:04:21,132
that accounting changes be implemented
957
01:04:21,132 --> 01:04:23,453
which would worsen bank balance sheets
958
01:04:23,453 --> 01:04:26,043
and render nationalization unavoidable.
959
01:04:28,412 --> 01:04:32,392
Takuro Morinaga a well-known
economist in Tokyo
960
01:04:32,392 --> 01:04:35,033
argued forcefully that the Bank of Japan
961
01:04:35,033 --> 01:04:38,172
inspired proposal by
Takenaka would not have many
962
01:04:38,172 --> 01:04:40,951
indigenous beneficiaries
963
01:04:40,951 --> 01:04:42,792
but instead would mainly benefit
964
01:04:42,792 --> 01:04:45,871
U.S. vulture funds
specializing in the purchase
965
01:04:45,871 --> 01:04:47,541
of distressed assets.
966
01:04:50,491 --> 01:04:53,211
These vulture funds had
faced the difficulty
967
01:04:53,211 --> 01:04:57,011
that despite over 200,000 bankruptcies
968
01:04:57,011 --> 01:04:59,431
few firms sufficiently
large for the vulture funds
969
01:04:59,431 --> 01:05:02,201
to be interested were bankrupted.
970
01:05:08,571 --> 01:05:11,711
When Kimura's and Fukui's
support for the bankruptcy plan
971
01:05:11,711 --> 01:05:15,352
was voiced the former
operated a private company
972
01:05:15,352 --> 01:05:18,522
that advised on the securitization
of distressed assets.
973
01:05:19,872 --> 01:05:22,011
And the latter was an
advisor of the Wall Street
974
01:05:22,011 --> 01:05:24,971
investment firm Goldman Sachs
975
01:05:24,971 --> 01:05:28,201
one of the largest operators
of vulture funds in the world.
976
01:05:29,552 --> 01:05:31,872
- Mr. Fukui also his mentor Mr. Mieno,
977
01:05:31,872 --> 01:05:35,471
and his mentor Mr. Maekawa
and you've guessed it,
978
01:05:35,471 --> 01:05:37,451
these are some of the Princes of the Yen
979
01:05:37,451 --> 01:05:39,012
that the book is all about,
980
01:05:39,012 --> 01:05:41,160
they have said on the record in the 80s
981
01:05:41,160 --> 01:05:43,021
and also throughout the 90s
982
01:05:43,021 --> 01:05:44,998
what is the goal of monetary policy?
983
01:05:44,998 --> 01:05:47,538
It is to change the economic structure.
984
01:05:47,538 --> 01:05:48,679
Now, how do you do that?
985
01:05:48,679 --> 01:05:49,638
Well, you need a crisis
986
01:05:49,638 --> 01:05:51,573
and that's really what they've done.
987
01:05:51,573 --> 01:05:54,142
- Richard, we're just out of time.
988
01:05:54,142 --> 01:05:54,902
I have to cut you off.
989
01:05:54,902 --> 01:05:56,058
Thank you so much and we apologize.
990
01:06:26,599 --> 01:06:27,720
- [Voiceover] The department responsible
991
01:06:27,720 --> 01:06:30,959
for the window guidance
quotas of the Bank of Japan
992
01:06:30,959 --> 01:06:33,080
was called the Banking Department.
993
01:06:33,080 --> 01:06:34,836
- And who was in charge of this?
994
01:06:34,836 --> 01:06:37,335
The man at the head of
this Banking Department
995
01:06:37,335 --> 01:06:40,095
inside the Bank of Japan during the bubble
996
01:06:40,095 --> 01:06:43,403
from '86 to '89 was Toshihiko Fukui.
997
01:06:43,403 --> 01:06:46,002
Mr. Fukui the current
governor of the Bank of Japan
998
01:06:46,002 --> 01:06:48,073
he's the man who created the bubble.
999
01:06:49,122 --> 01:06:50,852
- [Voiceover] When Fukui
had become governor
1000
01:06:50,852 --> 01:06:54,082
of the Bank of Japan he would say,
1001
01:06:54,082 --> 01:06:56,673
"While destroying the high-growth model"
1002
01:06:56,673 --> 01:06:59,522
"I am building a model
that suits the new era."
1003
01:07:04,172 --> 01:07:06,592
- They have succeeded on all counts.
1004
01:07:06,592 --> 01:07:09,611
If you look at the list of
their goals and you know
1005
01:07:09,611 --> 01:07:12,008
it was more than a wishlist
it was more or less a plan
1006
01:07:12,008 --> 01:07:14,793
that they mapped out
they wanted to achieve
1007
01:07:14,793 --> 01:07:16,173
they've reached all those goals.
1008
01:07:16,173 --> 01:07:18,453
Destroy the Ministry of Finance.
1009
01:07:18,453 --> 01:07:19,573
Break it up.
1010
01:07:19,573 --> 01:07:22,953
Get an independent financial
supervisory agency.
1011
01:07:22,953 --> 01:07:25,593
Reach independence for
the Bank of Japan itself
1012
01:07:25,593 --> 01:07:28,123
by changing the Bank of Japan law.
1013
01:07:29,193 --> 01:07:34,193
And engineer deep structural
changes in the economy
1014
01:07:34,194 --> 01:07:36,501
by shifting from
manufacturing to services,
1015
01:07:36,501 --> 01:07:38,815
opening up, deregulating, liberalizing,
1016
01:07:38,815 --> 01:07:41,223
privatizing, the whole lot.
1017
01:07:41,223 --> 01:07:44,483
- [Voiceover] In the 1920s
Japan's economy in many ways
1018
01:07:44,483 --> 01:07:46,601
resembled today's U.S. economy
1019
01:07:47,771 --> 01:07:51,852
with fierce competition,
aggressive hiring and firing,
1020
01:07:51,852 --> 01:07:54,771
takeover battles between
large corporations
1021
01:07:54,771 --> 01:07:57,791
few bureaucratic controls,
strong shareholders
1022
01:07:57,791 --> 01:08:00,952
that demanded high dividends,
and corporate funding
1023
01:08:00,952 --> 01:08:02,902
from the markets, not banks.
1024
01:08:04,011 --> 01:08:06,251
Yet throughout the postwar era
1025
01:08:06,251 --> 01:08:09,071
Japan's economy had been the opposite
1026
01:08:09,071 --> 01:08:13,211
highly regulated with
cartels limiting competition,
1027
01:08:13,211 --> 01:08:15,552
bank financing and cross shareholdings
1028
01:08:15,552 --> 01:08:19,432
reducing shareholder power, no takeovers,
1029
01:08:19,432 --> 01:08:22,091
and a frozen labor market
with lifetime employment
1030
01:08:22,091 --> 01:08:23,721
and seniority pay.
1031
01:08:26,072 --> 01:08:28,171
It was claimed that to end the recession
1032
01:08:28,171 --> 01:08:31,071
and improve performance Japan must shift
1033
01:08:31,071 --> 01:08:35,281
from welfare capitalism back
to shareholder capitalism.
1034
01:08:36,451 --> 01:08:38,651
Yet it remains unclear why a country
1035
01:08:38,651 --> 01:08:40,451
that had run a consistent and significant
1036
01:08:40,451 --> 01:08:43,792
balance of trade surplus
would need to change
1037
01:08:43,792 --> 01:08:47,421
its economic system to
become more competitive.
1038
01:09:03,971 --> 01:09:06,372
Japan was not the only high performance
1039
01:09:06,372 --> 01:09:09,572
economy in Asia that in the 1990s
1040
01:09:09,572 --> 01:09:11,751
found itself in the deepest recession
1041
01:09:11,751 --> 01:09:13,201
since the Great Depression.
1042
01:09:20,351 --> 01:09:23,751
In 1997 the currencies
of the Southeast Asian
1043
01:09:23,751 --> 01:09:27,351
Tiger Economies could not
maintain a fixed exchange rate
1044
01:09:27,351 --> 01:09:29,271
with the U.S. dollar.
1045
01:09:29,271 --> 01:09:33,182
They collapsed by between
60% and 80% within a year.
1046
01:09:37,371 --> 01:09:41,301
The causes for this crash
went as far back as 1993.
1047
01:09:42,532 --> 01:09:45,531
In that year the Asian Tiger Economies
1048
01:09:45,531 --> 01:09:48,661
South Korea, Thailand, and Indonesia
1049
01:09:48,661 --> 01:09:51,491
implemented a policy of
aggressive deregulation
1050
01:09:51,491 --> 01:09:53,972
of the capital account
and the establishment
1051
01:09:53,972 --> 01:09:56,851
of international banking facilities
1052
01:09:56,851 --> 01:09:59,311
which enabled the corporate
and banking sectors
1053
01:09:59,311 --> 01:10:02,272
to borrow liberally from abroad
1054
01:10:02,272 --> 01:10:04,632
the first time in the postwar era
1055
01:10:04,632 --> 01:10:06,461
that borrowers could do so.
1056
01:10:15,311 --> 01:10:18,731
In reality there was no need
for the Asian Tiger Economies
1057
01:10:18,731 --> 01:10:20,441
to borrow money from abroad.
1058
01:10:21,471 --> 01:10:24,152
All the money necessary
for domestic investment
1059
01:10:24,152 --> 01:10:25,821
could be created at home.
1060
01:10:27,691 --> 01:10:31,132
Indeed the pressure to
liberalize capital flows
1061
01:10:31,132 --> 01:10:32,781
came from outside.
1062
01:10:35,901 --> 01:10:40,431
Since the early 1990s the IMF,
the World Trade Organization
1063
01:10:40,431 --> 01:10:44,441
and the U.S. Treasury had
been lobbying these countries
1064
01:10:44,441 --> 01:10:47,301
to allow domestic firms
to borrow from abroad.
1065
01:10:49,061 --> 01:10:51,641
They argued that neoclassical economics
1066
01:10:51,641 --> 01:10:54,961
had proven that free markets
and free capital movement
1067
01:10:54,961 --> 01:10:57,071
increased economic growth.
1068
01:11:01,101 --> 01:11:04,101
Once the capital accounts
had been deregulated,
1069
01:11:04,101 --> 01:11:06,141
the central banks set about creating
1070
01:11:06,141 --> 01:11:08,721
irresistible incentives for domestic firms
1071
01:11:08,721 --> 01:11:10,291
to borrow from abroad
1072
01:11:11,161 --> 01:11:13,101
by making it more expensive to borrow
1073
01:11:13,101 --> 01:11:15,141
in their own domestic currencies
1074
01:11:15,141 --> 01:11:17,731
than it was to borrow in U.S. dollars.
1075
01:11:20,081 --> 01:11:23,281
- Domestic local interest rates were high
1076
01:11:23,281 --> 01:11:26,372
were higher than the
U.S. dollar interest rate
1077
01:11:27,592 --> 01:11:31,561
and the exchange rate was
1078
01:11:31,561 --> 01:11:33,331
virtually fixed.
1079
01:11:33,331 --> 01:11:35,061
- It was the government and
the central bank that said,
1080
01:11:35,061 --> 01:11:37,397
"We will maintain the exchange rate."
1081
01:11:37,397 --> 01:11:38,436
- That's right, that's right.
1082
01:11:38,436 --> 01:11:41,684
Central banks of Thailand
1083
01:11:41,684 --> 01:11:43,804
and other East Asian countries
1084
01:11:43,804 --> 01:11:46,794
resisted exchange rate adjustment,
1085
01:11:47,884 --> 01:11:51,984
and they tried to send a signal
1086
01:11:51,984 --> 01:11:54,494
that they would protect the exchange rate.
1087
01:11:57,584 --> 01:11:59,165
- [Voiceover] The central banks emphasized
1088
01:11:59,165 --> 01:12:02,125
in their public statements
that they would maintain
1089
01:12:02,125 --> 01:12:04,792
fixed exchange rates with the U.S. dollar
1090
01:12:06,422 --> 01:12:08,403
so that borrowers did not have to worry
1091
01:12:08,403 --> 01:12:11,683
about paying back more in
their domestic currencies
1092
01:12:11,683 --> 01:12:13,873
than they had originally borrowed.
1093
01:12:16,862 --> 01:12:18,644
- When I went to Thailand I was actually
1094
01:12:18,644 --> 01:12:21,842
on an ADB mission as
an outside consultant.
1095
01:12:21,842 --> 01:12:24,682
I went straight to the Bank
of Thailand and asked them,
1096
01:12:24,682 --> 01:12:28,983
were there any informal
credit guidance schemes,
1097
01:12:28,983 --> 01:12:30,942
and they were surprised
that I asked this question.
1098
01:12:30,942 --> 01:12:33,892
Because of my study of Japan
I thought perhaps there's
1099
01:12:33,892 --> 01:12:35,812
something similar and they told me
1100
01:12:35,812 --> 01:12:37,652
it was a young staffer who
perhaps wasn't aware of the
1101
01:12:37,652 --> 01:12:38,582
politics involved.
1102
01:12:38,582 --> 01:12:42,332
He said, "Yeah, yeah, we have
this credit planning scheme."
1103
01:12:45,202 --> 01:12:48,502
- [Voiceover] Banks were
ordered to increase lending
1104
01:12:48,502 --> 01:12:50,462
but they were faced with less loan demand
1105
01:12:50,462 --> 01:12:52,682
from the productive sectors of the economy
1106
01:12:53,562 --> 01:12:55,762
because these firms had
been given incentives
1107
01:12:55,762 --> 01:12:57,972
to borrow from abroad instead.
1108
01:13:00,043 --> 01:13:02,662
They therefore had to resort
to increasing their lending
1109
01:13:02,662 --> 01:13:04,472
to higher risk borrowers.
1110
01:13:10,382 --> 01:13:13,682
Imports began to shrink
because the central banks
1111
01:13:13,682 --> 01:13:16,499
had agreed to peg their
currencies to the U.S. dollar.
1112
01:13:18,350 --> 01:13:21,709
The economies became less competitive
1113
01:13:21,709 --> 01:13:24,109
but their current account
balance was maintained
1114
01:13:24,109 --> 01:13:26,989
due to the foreign issued loans,
1115
01:13:26,989 --> 01:13:28,549
which count as exports in the balance
1116
01:13:28,549 --> 01:13:30,233
of payment statistics.
1117
01:13:36,923 --> 01:13:40,164
When speculators began
to sell the Thai baht,
1118
01:13:40,164 --> 01:13:43,723
the Korean won, and the Indonesian rupee,
1119
01:13:43,723 --> 01:13:45,903
the respective central banks responded
1120
01:13:45,903 --> 01:13:49,103
with futile attempts to maintain the peg
1121
01:13:49,103 --> 01:13:50,763
until they had squandered virtually all
1122
01:13:50,763 --> 01:13:52,993
of their foreign exchange reserves.
1123
01:13:54,902 --> 01:13:57,923
This gave foreign
lenders ample opportunity
1124
01:13:57,923 --> 01:14:01,212
to withdraw their money at
the overvalued exchange rates.
1125
01:14:04,283 --> 01:14:06,383
The central banks knew
that if the countries
1126
01:14:06,383 --> 01:14:09,003
ran out of foreign exchange reserves,
1127
01:14:09,003 --> 01:14:12,013
they would have to call in
the IMF to avoid default.
1128
01:14:13,783 --> 01:14:17,303
And once the IMF came in
the central banks knew
1129
01:14:17,303 --> 01:14:20,883
what this Washington based
institution would demand
1130
01:14:20,883 --> 01:14:23,763
for its demands in such
cases had been the same
1131
01:14:23,763 --> 01:14:25,593
for the previous three decades.
1132
01:14:27,423 --> 01:14:30,573
The central banks would
be made independent.
1133
01:14:33,243 --> 01:14:36,263
On the 16th of July, the
Thai finance minister
1134
01:14:36,263 --> 01:14:40,213
took a plane to Tokyo to
ask Japan for a bailout.
1135
01:14:45,503 --> 01:14:49,584
At the time Japan had
213 billion U.S. dollars
1136
01:14:49,584 --> 01:14:51,623
in foreign exchange reserves
1137
01:14:52,863 --> 01:14:55,573
more than the total resources of the IMF.
1138
01:14:56,762 --> 01:14:58,613
They were willing to help
1139
01:14:58,613 --> 01:15:01,173
but Washington stopped Japan's initiative.
1140
01:15:02,170 --> 01:15:04,961
Any solution to the emerging Asian crisis
1141
01:15:04,961 --> 01:15:07,890
had to come from Washington via the IMF.
1142
01:15:13,002 --> 01:15:15,241
- [Voiceover] After two
months of speculative attacks,
1143
01:15:15,241 --> 01:15:18,111
the Thai government floated the baht.
1144
01:15:28,061 --> 01:15:29,921
- Well the International
Monetary Fund to date
1145
01:15:29,921 --> 01:15:33,309
has promised almost $120 billion
1146
01:15:33,309 --> 01:15:35,049
to the embattled economies of Thailand,
1147
01:15:35,049 --> 01:15:37,389
Indonesia, and South Korea.
1148
01:15:37,389 --> 01:15:38,868
- [Voiceover] Immediately after arrival
1149
01:15:38,868 --> 01:15:42,569
in the crisis-stricken
countries the IMF teams
1150
01:15:42,569 --> 01:15:45,229
set up offices inside the central banks
1151
01:15:46,449 --> 01:15:48,629
from where they dictated what amounted to
1152
01:15:48,629 --> 01:15:50,099
terms of surrender.
1153
01:15:53,609 --> 01:15:56,769
The IMF demanded a string of policies,
1154
01:15:56,769 --> 01:16:00,259
including curbs on central
bank and bank credit creation,
1155
01:16:01,129 --> 01:16:05,059
major legal changes and sharp
rises in interest rates.
1156
01:16:08,329 --> 01:16:11,389
As interest rates rose
higher risk borrowers
1157
01:16:11,389 --> 01:16:13,359
began to default on their loans.
1158
01:16:16,629 --> 01:16:19,688
Burdened with large amounts of bad debts,
1159
01:16:19,688 --> 01:16:21,849
the banking systems of Thailand, Korea,
1160
01:16:21,849 --> 01:16:24,829
and Indonesia were virtually bankrupt.
1161
01:16:25,999 --> 01:16:28,639
Even otherwise healthy
firms started to suffer
1162
01:16:28,639 --> 01:16:30,429
from the widening credit crunch.
1163
01:16:31,318 --> 01:16:33,939
Corporate bankruptcies soared.
1164
01:16:33,939 --> 01:16:37,449
Unemployment rose to the
highest level since the 1930s.
1165
01:16:44,579 --> 01:16:46,599
- The role of the Fund
in coming to the rescue
1166
01:16:46,599 --> 01:16:49,339
of ailing nations has
been fiercely debated.
1167
01:16:49,339 --> 01:16:51,339
Some have even accused the IMF of actually
1168
01:16:51,339 --> 01:16:54,159
making Asia's economic crisis worse.
1169
01:16:54,159 --> 01:16:56,687
- Even if they have to subvert our economy
1170
01:16:56,687 --> 01:16:59,608
they will do so just to
prove that they are right.
1171
01:16:59,608 --> 01:17:02,138
The IMF has not been very helpful.
1172
01:17:03,227 --> 01:17:05,448
- [Voiceover] The IMF knew
well what the consequences
1173
01:17:05,448 --> 01:17:07,258
of its policies would be.
1174
01:17:08,328 --> 01:17:12,408
In the Korean case they even
had detailed but undisclosed
1175
01:17:12,408 --> 01:17:14,768
studies prepared that had calculated
1176
01:17:14,768 --> 01:17:18,748
just how many Korean
companies would go bankrupt
1177
01:17:18,748 --> 01:17:22,378
if interest rates were to rise
by five percentage points.
1178
01:17:24,108 --> 01:17:27,328
The IMF's first agreement
with Korea demanded
1179
01:17:27,328 --> 01:17:31,838
a rise of exactly five percentage
points in interest rates.
1180
01:17:35,387 --> 01:17:37,868
- The IMF policies are clearly not aimed
1181
01:17:37,868 --> 01:17:41,148
at creating economic recoveries
in the Asian countries.
1182
01:17:41,148 --> 01:17:43,016
They pursue quite a different agenda,
1183
01:17:43,016 --> 01:17:44,877
and that is to change
the economic, social,
1184
01:17:44,877 --> 01:17:47,228
and political systems in those countries.
1185
01:17:47,228 --> 01:17:51,806
In fact, the IMF deals prevent
the countries concerned,
1186
01:17:51,806 --> 01:17:55,435
like Korea, Thailand, to reflate.
1187
01:17:55,435 --> 01:17:56,096
- Interesting.
1188
01:17:56,096 --> 01:17:58,004
You're saying it's
making the crisis worse,
1189
01:17:58,004 --> 01:18:00,624
and you're suggesting that
the IMF has a hidden agenda.
1190
01:18:00,624 --> 01:18:03,171
- Well I mean it's not
very hidden this agenda
1191
01:18:03,171 --> 01:18:05,290
because the IMF quite clearly demands
1192
01:18:06,210 --> 01:18:09,621
that the Asian countries
concerned have to change the laws
1193
01:18:09,621 --> 01:18:12,941
so that foreign interests
can buy anything from
1194
01:18:12,941 --> 01:18:14,721
banks to lands
1195
01:18:14,721 --> 01:18:19,160
and in fact the banking systems
can only be recapitalized
1196
01:18:19,160 --> 01:18:22,560
according to the IMF deals
by using foreign money
1197
01:18:22,560 --> 01:18:23,900
which is not necessary at all
1198
01:18:23,900 --> 01:18:26,809
because as long as these
countries have central banks
1199
01:18:27,809 --> 01:18:29,829
they could just print
money and recapitalize
1200
01:18:29,829 --> 01:18:30,969
the banking systems.
1201
01:18:30,969 --> 01:18:32,969
You don't need foreign money for that.
1202
01:18:32,969 --> 01:18:35,739
So the agenda is clearly
to crack open Asia
1203
01:18:36,619 --> 01:18:38,258
for foreign interests.
1204
01:18:40,468 --> 01:18:42,709
- [Voiceover] The IMF
demanded that troubled banks
1205
01:18:42,709 --> 01:18:46,448
would not be bailed out
but instead closed down
1206
01:18:46,448 --> 01:18:48,939
and sold off cheaply as distressed assets
1207
01:18:49,889 --> 01:18:53,288
often to large U.S. investment banks.
1208
01:18:53,288 --> 01:18:54,809
- One positive coming out of Thailand
1209
01:18:54,809 --> 01:18:58,769
is that they'll be auctioning
off some major assets
1210
01:18:58,769 --> 01:19:01,508
from 56 finance companies.
1211
01:19:01,508 --> 01:19:02,879
In your view should
1212
01:19:04,668 --> 01:19:07,248
some of the owners from
the 56 finance companies
1213
01:19:07,248 --> 01:19:09,745
be allowed to buy back their assets?
1214
01:19:11,495 --> 01:19:14,115
- [Voiceover] In most
cases the IMF dictated
1215
01:19:14,115 --> 01:19:17,455
letters of intent explicitly
stated that the banks
1216
01:19:17,455 --> 01:19:20,145
had to be sold to foreign investors.
1217
01:19:23,995 --> 01:19:26,135
- Let me emphasize in that respect
1218
01:19:26,135 --> 01:19:28,475
that these reform programs are the key
1219
01:19:28,475 --> 01:19:32,234
the absolute key to restoring
financial stability.
1220
01:19:32,234 --> 01:19:34,911
- [Voiceover] For the
first time ever South Korea
1221
01:19:34,911 --> 01:19:37,772
closed five banks in a major step
1222
01:19:37,772 --> 01:19:40,769
toward meeting its IMF mandate.
1223
01:19:40,769 --> 01:19:43,482
- The number of commercial
banks has declined
1224
01:19:43,482 --> 01:19:47,661
has been reduced as a result of closure
1225
01:19:47,661 --> 01:19:50,142
mergers and acquisitions
1226
01:19:50,142 --> 01:19:55,102
and the foreign strategic
investors are now in
1227
01:19:55,102 --> 01:19:57,663
which is a remarkable change.
1228
01:20:02,793 --> 01:20:05,413
- [Voiceover] In Asia
government organized bailouts
1229
01:20:05,413 --> 01:20:08,632
to keep ailing financial
institutions alive
1230
01:20:08,632 --> 01:20:10,035
were not allowed
1231
01:20:11,492 --> 01:20:14,427
but when a similar crisis
struck back home in America
1232
01:20:14,427 --> 01:20:18,467
a year later the very same institutions
1233
01:20:18,467 --> 01:20:20,257
reacted differently.
1234
01:20:28,067 --> 01:20:29,988
The Connecticut based hedge fund,
1235
01:20:29,988 --> 01:20:32,447
Long Term Capital Management
1236
01:20:32,447 --> 01:20:35,267
which accepted as clients
only high net worth
1237
01:20:35,267 --> 01:20:38,548
individual investors and institutions
1238
01:20:38,548 --> 01:20:42,045
had leveraged its $5
billion in client capital
1239
01:20:42,045 --> 01:20:44,455
by more than 25 times
1240
01:20:45,725 --> 01:20:48,685
borrowing more than 100
billion U.S. dollars
1241
01:20:48,685 --> 01:20:50,295
from the world's banks.
1242
01:20:53,665 --> 01:20:55,425
When its losses threatened to undermine
1243
01:20:55,425 --> 01:20:58,385
the banks that had lent
to it with a possibility
1244
01:20:58,385 --> 01:21:01,006
of a systemic banking
crisis that would endanger
1245
01:21:01,006 --> 01:21:04,165
the U.S. financial system and economy
1246
01:21:04,165 --> 01:21:08,445
the Federal Reserve organized
a cartel like bailout
1247
01:21:08,445 --> 01:21:11,365
by leaning on Wall Street
and international banks
1248
01:21:11,365 --> 01:21:15,455
to contribute funds so that
it could avoid default.
1249
01:21:18,885 --> 01:21:22,206
- Yeah, you're right that
the views from Washington
1250
01:21:22,206 --> 01:21:24,536
and New York seemed
certainly quite flexible,
1251
01:21:24,536 --> 01:21:27,595
because soon after they told
all the Asian countries,
1252
01:21:27,595 --> 01:21:30,635
"No bailouts for financial institutions,"
1253
01:21:30,635 --> 01:21:33,540
when Long-Term Capital
Management a hedge fund
1254
01:21:33,540 --> 01:21:36,619
in New York almost went
bust suddenly a bailout
1255
01:21:36,619 --> 01:21:39,549
was organized just
contradicting what they'd said
1256
01:21:39,549 --> 01:21:41,209
to the Asian countries.
1257
01:21:41,209 --> 01:21:44,201
- But they said that no public money
1258
01:21:44,201 --> 01:21:46,560
used to LTCM.
1259
01:21:46,560 --> 01:21:48,359
- But the meeting was held famously
1260
01:21:48,359 --> 01:21:51,009
inside the Federal Reserve, right?
1261
01:21:52,039 --> 01:21:54,060
- [Voiceover] Why would the
United States make demands
1262
01:21:54,060 --> 01:21:56,909
on foreign nations in the
name of the free market,
1263
01:21:57,839 --> 01:22:00,459
when it has no intention
of enforcing the same rules
1264
01:22:00,459 --> 01:22:02,069
within its own borders?
1265
01:22:05,439 --> 01:22:08,759
The examples of the
Japanese and Asian crises
1266
01:22:08,759 --> 01:22:11,719
illustrate how crises can be engineered
1267
01:22:11,719 --> 01:22:15,539
to facilitate the redistribution
of economic ownership
1268
01:22:15,539 --> 01:22:19,009
and to implement legal,
structural, and political change.
1269
01:22:22,259 --> 01:22:26,029
Today similar events are at
work in the Eurozone area.
1270
01:22:32,279 --> 01:22:34,859
Countries within the Euro currency block
1271
01:22:34,859 --> 01:22:38,279
have forfeited their right
to a national currency,
1272
01:22:38,279 --> 01:22:41,430
and handed this power to
the European Central Bank.
1273
01:22:42,459 --> 01:22:44,139
- With me here in the
studio is Richard Werner.
1274
01:22:44,139 --> 01:22:46,220
He's a professor at
Southampton University.
1275
01:22:46,220 --> 01:22:47,980
Richard was an advisor
to the Bank of Japan
1276
01:22:47,980 --> 01:22:49,539
and the Ministry of Finance at the end
1277
01:22:49,539 --> 01:22:51,877
of the bubble era in the 1990s.
1278
01:22:51,877 --> 01:22:52,978
What's your advice to the ECB?
1279
01:22:52,978 --> 01:22:53,678
They meet tomorrow.
1280
01:22:53,678 --> 01:22:56,027
What would you be telling them?
1281
01:22:56,027 --> 01:22:58,698
- Um, well again they have to focus
1282
01:22:58,698 --> 01:23:02,737
on the quantity of credit
creation more than interest rates.
1283
01:23:02,737 --> 01:23:07,578
The ECB has a lot to learn
from its past mistakes,
1284
01:23:07,578 --> 01:23:09,278
because basically I think
it didn't really watch
1285
01:23:09,278 --> 01:23:11,097
carefully enough credit creation
1286
01:23:11,097 --> 01:23:16,097
where in Spain, Ireland we
had a massive credit expansion
1287
01:23:16,097 --> 01:23:18,633
under the watch of the ECB.
1288
01:23:18,633 --> 01:23:19,693
They didn't look at that.
1289
01:23:19,693 --> 01:23:22,273
Interest rates of course
are the same in the Eurozone
1290
01:23:22,273 --> 01:23:25,092
but the quantity of credit
cycle is very different.
1291
01:23:25,092 --> 01:23:27,993
There's one interest
rate for whole Euro area,
1292
01:23:27,993 --> 01:23:30,743
but in 2002 the ECB told the Bundesbank
1293
01:23:30,743 --> 01:23:33,503
to reduce its credit creation
by the biggest amount
1294
01:23:33,503 --> 01:23:34,543
in its history
1295
01:23:34,543 --> 01:23:36,283
and told the Irish Central Bank
1296
01:23:36,283 --> 01:23:38,663
to print as much money as
if there's no tomorrow.
1297
01:23:38,663 --> 01:23:39,721
What do you expect is gonna happen?
1298
01:23:39,721 --> 01:23:40,921
Same interest rate.
1299
01:23:40,921 --> 01:23:41,661
The same growth?
1300
01:23:41,661 --> 01:23:42,541
No.
1301
01:23:42,541 --> 01:23:44,441
Recession in Germany, boom in Ireland.
1302
01:23:44,441 --> 01:23:46,141
Which one tells you that, which variable?
1303
01:23:46,141 --> 01:23:47,711
Credit creation.
1304
01:23:50,201 --> 01:23:54,161
- [Voiceover] From 2004
under the ECB's watch
1305
01:23:54,161 --> 01:23:56,721
bank credit growth in Ireland, Greece,
1306
01:23:56,721 --> 01:24:01,521
Portugal, and Spain increased
by over 20% per annum
1307
01:24:01,521 --> 01:24:03,791
and property prices skyrocketed.
1308
01:24:05,981 --> 01:24:09,821
When bank credit fell
property prices collapsed,
1309
01:24:09,821 --> 01:24:12,961
developers went bankrupt,
and the banking systems
1310
01:24:12,961 --> 01:24:16,731
of Ireland, Portugal, Spain,
and Greece became insolvent.
1311
01:24:19,341 --> 01:24:22,501
The ECB could have prevented these bubbles
1312
01:24:22,501 --> 01:24:24,321
just as it could have ended the ensuing
1313
01:24:24,321 --> 01:24:27,091
banking and economic crises
1314
01:24:27,091 --> 01:24:29,811
but it refused to do so until major
1315
01:24:29,811 --> 01:24:32,659
political concessions had been made
1316
01:24:32,659 --> 01:24:35,419
such as the transfer of
fiscal and budgeting powers
1317
01:24:35,419 --> 01:24:38,649
from each sovereign state
to the European Union.
1318
01:24:42,019 --> 01:24:44,899
In both Spain and Greece
youth unemployment
1319
01:24:44,899 --> 01:24:48,359
has been pushed up to
50% forcing many youths
1320
01:24:48,359 --> 01:24:50,189
to seek employment abroad.
1321
01:24:51,039 --> 01:24:54,119
Greek doctors for whose
education Greek taxpayers
1322
01:24:54,119 --> 01:24:57,109
have paid now work in Germany.
1323
01:25:00,579 --> 01:25:03,299
The deliberations of the
ECB's decision-making bodies
1324
01:25:03,299 --> 01:25:04,709
are secret.
1325
01:25:05,679 --> 01:25:08,779
The mere attempt at influencing the ECB,
1326
01:25:08,779 --> 01:25:11,800
for instance through democratic
debate and discussion,
1327
01:25:11,800 --> 01:25:14,722
is forbidden according
to the Maastricht Treaty.
1328
01:25:17,693 --> 01:25:21,012
The ECB is an international organization
1329
01:25:21,012 --> 01:25:23,632
that is above and outside
the laws and jurisdictions
1330
01:25:23,632 --> 01:25:25,363
of any individual nation.
1331
01:25:27,112 --> 01:25:30,062
Its senior staff carry
diplomatic passports
1332
01:25:30,932 --> 01:25:32,532
and the files and documents inside
1333
01:25:32,532 --> 01:25:35,412
the European Central
Bank cannot be searched
1334
01:25:35,412 --> 01:25:39,403
or impounded by any police
force or public prosecutor.
1335
01:25:43,672 --> 01:25:46,692
The ECB is well known among economists
1336
01:25:46,692 --> 01:25:48,772
as one of the world's most powerful
1337
01:25:48,772 --> 01:25:51,200
and least transparent central banks,
1338
01:25:52,590 --> 01:25:56,470
yet its former president
Jean-Claude Trichet
1339
01:25:56,470 --> 01:25:58,930
dealt with this problem
by merely asserting
1340
01:25:58,930 --> 01:26:00,600
that there was no problem.
1341
01:26:18,918 --> 01:26:20,466
- [Voiceover] The gentleman over there.
1342
01:26:20,466 --> 01:26:21,827
Yes, please.
1343
01:26:21,827 --> 01:26:22,864
- My name's Richard Werner.
1344
01:26:22,864 --> 01:26:23,925
I'm an economist.
1345
01:26:23,925 --> 01:26:25,704
My question is for Monsieur Trichet,
1346
01:26:25,704 --> 01:26:27,104
who's also been for years a member
1347
01:26:27,104 --> 01:26:29,325
of the governing council of the ECB.
1348
01:26:29,325 --> 01:26:31,453
The question is where
in the Maastricht Treaty
1349
01:26:31,453 --> 01:26:34,613
or ECB statutes does it
say that it is the job
1350
01:26:34,613 --> 01:26:37,504
of the ECB to back structural reform
1351
01:26:37,504 --> 01:26:39,751
or any other political agenda?
1352
01:26:39,751 --> 01:26:41,769
- I said very very clearly
and we have all said
1353
01:26:41,769 --> 01:26:45,529
very very clearly that
we had no responsibility
1354
01:26:45,529 --> 01:26:46,707
in this domain.
1355
01:26:46,707 --> 01:26:50,327
We have a voice and we say in this domain
1356
01:26:50,327 --> 01:26:52,655
and in some others what we think
1357
01:26:52,655 --> 01:26:56,895
and perhaps if we can help
in explaining from our side
1358
01:26:56,895 --> 01:26:59,475
to the general people that
they would be better off
1359
01:26:59,475 --> 01:27:03,695
perhaps it would help Europe embarking
1360
01:27:03,695 --> 01:27:06,155
in this implementation
of structural reforms
1361
01:27:06,155 --> 01:27:09,515
which is so important and
there is a consensus on that.
1362
01:27:09,515 --> 01:27:13,712
The diagnosis again is a very very
1363
01:27:13,712 --> 01:27:17,541
very large consensus on this point.
1364
01:27:25,011 --> 01:27:28,131
- [Voiceover] The European
Commission an unelected group
1365
01:27:28,131 --> 01:27:31,031
whose aim is to build a
United States of Europe
1366
01:27:31,031 --> 01:27:34,411
with all the trappings of a unified state
1367
01:27:34,411 --> 01:27:37,731
has an interest in weakening
individual governments
1368
01:27:37,731 --> 01:27:40,482
and the influence of the
democratic parliaments of Europe.
1369
01:27:44,891 --> 01:27:48,211
It turns out that the evidence
for central bank independence
1370
01:27:48,211 --> 01:27:51,092
that was relied upon in
the Maastricht Treaty
1371
01:27:51,092 --> 01:27:53,492
derived from a single
study that was commissioned
1372
01:27:53,492 --> 01:27:56,140
by none other than the
European Commission itself
1373
01:27:58,409 --> 01:28:03,409
published in 1992 under the
name One Market, One Money.
1374
01:28:03,789 --> 01:28:05,749
The study purported to demonstrate
1375
01:28:05,749 --> 01:28:09,200
that central bank independence
led to low inflation.
1376
01:28:11,550 --> 01:28:14,769
James Forder an Oxford academic
1377
01:28:14,769 --> 01:28:16,450
has since demonstrated that this study
1378
01:28:16,450 --> 01:28:19,299
was manipulated to obtain
the desired result.
1379
01:28:21,809 --> 01:28:24,230
- The story we're being
told by the central banks
1380
01:28:24,230 --> 01:28:26,049
just does not add up
1381
01:28:26,049 --> 01:28:29,005
and there is evidence
that central banks work
1382
01:28:29,005 --> 01:28:33,025
differently from what they
would like us to believe
1383
01:28:33,025 --> 01:28:34,815
as to how they work.
1384
01:28:35,685 --> 01:28:38,245
- [Voiceover] The world over central banks
1385
01:28:38,245 --> 01:28:41,611
hold significant yet
little understood powers.
1386
01:28:42,801 --> 01:28:46,537
Often independent,
unaccountable, and obscure
1387
01:28:46,537 --> 01:28:49,317
central banks operate in the shadows
1388
01:28:49,317 --> 01:28:51,327
yet their actions affect us all.
1389
01:28:53,397 --> 01:28:57,557
- Central banks in almost
all countries worldwide
1390
01:28:57,557 --> 01:29:00,097
and the IMF has helped
a lot in achieving this
1391
01:29:00,097 --> 01:29:01,875
they've become totally independent
1392
01:29:01,875 --> 01:29:04,256
and in practice not accountable to any
1393
01:29:04,256 --> 01:29:06,266
democratic institution
1394
01:29:06,266 --> 01:29:09,995
and accountability to
parliaments is usually minor
1395
01:29:09,995 --> 01:29:12,295
and in practice meaningless.
1396
01:29:12,295 --> 01:29:14,075
- [Voiceover] Whether
it is the Bank of Japan,
1397
01:29:14,075 --> 01:29:16,655
the Federal Reserve, the Bank of England,
1398
01:29:16,655 --> 01:29:19,475
or the European Central Bank examples
1399
01:29:19,475 --> 01:29:21,825
of central bank deception abound.
1400
01:29:23,575 --> 01:29:26,395
In the United States in the 1920s
1401
01:29:26,395 --> 01:29:28,655
banks were encouraged to create money
1402
01:29:28,655 --> 01:29:30,423
and give it to speculators.
1403
01:29:32,073 --> 01:29:34,113
The resulting depression persuaded
1404
01:29:34,113 --> 01:29:37,093
the freedom loving Americans
that a decentralized
1405
01:29:37,093 --> 01:29:40,513
federal system without
strong national controls
1406
01:29:40,513 --> 01:29:41,984
could not work.
1407
01:29:45,793 --> 01:29:48,883
In the 1990s the Japanese were persuaded
1408
01:29:48,883 --> 01:29:51,033
that their economic system
1409
01:29:51,033 --> 01:29:54,643
which had brought considerable
prosperity and equality
1410
01:29:54,643 --> 01:29:58,354
needed to be changed into a
so called free market system.
1411
01:30:00,543 --> 01:30:03,473
And while Japan's transformation
was not yet complete
1412
01:30:04,543 --> 01:30:07,343
the central bankers struck again
1413
01:30:07,343 --> 01:30:10,733
with an IMF led raid on
the Asian Tiger Economies.
1414
01:30:15,683 --> 01:30:18,483
The present European debt crisis
1415
01:30:18,483 --> 01:30:21,314
is yet another example of
central bank deception.
1416
01:30:23,943 --> 01:30:26,083
To create a public consensus for the need
1417
01:30:26,083 --> 01:30:29,283
for structural reform by purposefully
1418
01:30:29,283 --> 01:30:33,483
creating a recession and
then needlessly prolonging it
1419
01:30:33,483 --> 01:30:35,774
must constitute an abuse of power.
1420
01:30:39,703 --> 01:30:42,424
Do citizens really want to be manipulated
1421
01:30:42,424 --> 01:30:45,053
in such a costly and dishonest manner?
108864
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