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(ominous music)
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(engine rumbles)
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(crowd cheers)
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(crowd cheers)
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(bell rings)
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(airplane roars past)
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(siren rings)
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(airplane roars)
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(loud explosions)
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(army marches)
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(siren rings)
(ominous boom)
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(suspenseful music)
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- [Narrator] This is the terrifying story
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of the titanic duel fought
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between the armies of Hitler
and Stalin in the bitter cold
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of an Arctic winter outside Leningrad.
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It was here that the men of
the German Army Group North
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fought and died with
the men of the Red Army.
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The German forces were so
constantly short of manpower
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and material, that they
christened the pitiless war
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they were fighting, "The
eternal war of the poor man".
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(series of explosions)
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The Russians too, had to
endure terrible hardship.
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And the siege of Leningrad
contains heartrending tales
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of suffering and heroism,
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but the Russian sacrifice was
ultimately to be vindicated.
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For the men of Army Group North
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there was to be no such satisfaction.
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Most were destined never
to return to Germany.
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The ceaseless demands of the
cruelest conflict in history
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would ultimately claim the
whole Army Group as its victim.
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(ominous music)
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In late 1940
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when Adolf Hitler finally
confirmed to the general staff
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that he had irrevocably
decided to attack Russia,
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a plan was swiftly
conceived by General Marcks
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which envisaged a two pronged
advance by two huge army
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groups totaling over 3,500,000 men.
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The German grand strategy
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was for two great parallel advances.
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The first aimed at Leningrad in the North,
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then swinging South to Moscow.
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And the second at Odesa on the black sea.
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(ominous music)
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During the winter of 1939,
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Finland had been involved in
an uneven struggle with Soviet
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Russia to protect her territory.
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Under the leadership of
field marshal Mannerheim
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the Fins had doggedly resisted
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the superior Russian forces,
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but ultimately had to yield
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valuable territory around Leningrad.
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Britain had refused to
help the Fins who in 1941,
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turned to Germany for aid in
regaining their lost territory.
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Hitler hoped to draw Finland
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into an offensive war with Russia,
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but the finish objective was
simply to address the balance,
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not the conquest of Russia.
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Although the Fins would play a small part
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in the battle for Leningrad,
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their refusal to mount an
invasion of Soviet territory
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would ultimately have dire
consequences for Hitler.
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(ominous music)
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Under the Marcks plan,
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elements of Army Group North,
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were to capture Leningrad,
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then drive North to link up with the Fins
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and eliminate all Russian forces
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in the Baltic region.
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Only then was Moscow to be attacked
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from the West and North simultaneously.
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(ominous music)
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From the very outset
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Hitler found it impossible to prioritize
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the objectives for his Russian campaign.
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After much discussion and argument,
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the Marcks plan was subsequently
revised to produce three
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separate army groups.
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Each aimed at a different objective.
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Army Group North was to capture Leningrad,
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Army Group Center was to capture Moscow
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and Army Group South was aimed at Odesa.
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With three major objectives to achieve
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it was clear from the
outset that German forces
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would be dangerously overstretched.
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Sections of the German military
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were very opposed to the venture,
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but Hitler refused to accept
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the advice of his staff officers.
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His gamblers instinct told
him that if he delayed
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even for one year,
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the crowds that cheered
the latest successes
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so fervently, might no longer
be willing to follow him into
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so hazardous an undertaking.
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And there was surely no
greater military adventure
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than the invasion of Russia.
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(ominous music)
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(building explodes)
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(loud boom)
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Following the spectacular
victories in Poland, Norway,
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France and the Balkans,
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the German forces assembled for
Barbarossa expected to fight
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a short campaign,
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which would secure their
victories throughout Europe.
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Hitler became convinced that
he could crush the Red Army
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as easily as he had
defeated his other enemies.
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In the spring of 1941
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field marshal von Rundstedt,
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who had spent most of the first world war
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on the Eastern front,
asked Hitler outright
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if he knew what it meant to invade Russia.
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The commander in chief,
field marshal von Brauchitsch
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and his chief of the
general staff general Halder
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also counseled Hitler
against the operation.
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It was all to no avail
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as Hitler simply refused
to heed their warnings.
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Field Marshall von Rundstedt,
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the commander of Army Group South
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was forthright in his views
on the forthcoming battle.
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"This war with Russia
is a nonsensical idea
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to which I can see no happy ending.
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But if for political reasons,
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the war is unavoidable,
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then we must face the
fact that it cannot be won
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in a single summer campaign.
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Just look at the distances involved.
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We cannot possibly defeat the
enemy and occupy the whole
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of Western Russia from the
Baltic to the black sea
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within a few short months.
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We should prepare for a long war
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and go for our objectives step by step.
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First of all,
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a strong Army Group North
should capture Leningrad
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and the area around it.
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This would enable us to
link up with the Fins,
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eliminate the red fleet
from the Baltic and increase
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our influence in Scandinavia.
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The central and Southern
army groups should
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for the time being
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advance only to align running Odesa, Kiev,
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Orsha, Lake Ilmen.
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Then if we have sufficient time this year
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Army Group North could advance Southeast
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from Leningrad towards Moscow
while Army Group Center
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move eastwards on the capital.
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All further operations should
be postponed until 1942,
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when we should make new
plans based on the situation
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as it then is."
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Had Hitler followed von
Rundstedt's good advice,
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the history of the Western
world may well have followed
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a very different pattern.
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Hitler, however, did have good grounds
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for rejecting the advice of his officers.
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(ominous music)
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While the German army in
the 1930s had been building
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its strength under Hitler,
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Stalin had been destroying
the Russian officer Corps.
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By the end of the purge,
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the Russian army had lost
three of the five remaining
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marshals of the Soviet union,
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all 11 deputy ministers of defense,
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75 of the 80 members
of the military Soviet,
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all the commanders of
the military districts,
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13 of the 15 army commanders,
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more than half the Corps commanders
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and approximately 30% of the officers
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below brigade level.
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Stalin had considered himself safe
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as he did not intend to become
involved in Western affairs.
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He had made complex peace treaties
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and alliances with both
Britain and Germany
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and hoped they would fight
a mutually destructive war
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in the West.
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(suspenseful music)
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Less than one year later, however,
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Stalin's hopes of a protracted
war between the Western
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powers and Hitler, evaporated
with the brilliant success
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of Hitler's Blitzkrieg tactics,
which saw Denmark, Norway,
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Holland, Belgium, and France
fall in rapid succession.
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The lightning campaign through
the Balkans in Greece in 1941
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could only produce more
grounds for disquiet.
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Though Stalin accepted
that war with Germany
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was now almost inevitable,
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he certainly did not expect
to be attacked in 1941.
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He decided Russia had at
least until the spring of 1942
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to prepare herself.
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His explosive denials of all contrary
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information was so fierce that
vital intelligence concerning
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German preparations was kept
from him by subordinates
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fearful of the violence of his temper.
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As the German buildup towards
operation Barbarossa continued
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Stalin's attempts to pacify
Hitler grew more desperate.
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He had already stated in
an interview with Pravda
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in November 1939,
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that it was not Germany who had
attacked Britain and France,
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but Britain and France
who had attacked Germany.
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Stalin now forbade
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any criticism of Germany to
be printed in the newspapers.
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In 1940, he increased Russian supplies
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to Germany and withdrew
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recognition of the Norwegian
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and Belgian governments in exile.
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In the following year
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when Hitler successfully invaded
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Greece and Yugoslavia,
Stalin quickly expelled
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the Yugoslavian ambassador
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to Moscow and refused a request
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to recognize the Greek
government in exile.
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Stalin felt he was continuing
to buy time with these
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unrequited concessions, but
his use of the breathing space,
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which he had already obtained
was totally devoid of any
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worthwhile attempt to remedy
his military disadvantages.
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(ominous music)
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(slow suspenseful music)
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The main Russian force charged
with defending Leningrad
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was the Northwest Front under Kuznetsov.
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In theory, the Russian forces
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were larger and more generously supplied
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with tanks, guns, and aircraft.
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In practice, the Red Army as a whole
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proved to be so demoralized by
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internal disruptions that they
were disastrously unprepared.
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In addition, much of the Russian equipment
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was obsolete or unserviceable
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with the result that in the
opening battles at least,
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there was to be no real contest.
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As a result of Stalin's purges,
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the Soviet forces were
less than equal to the task
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of combating a highly
professional, well organized army,
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which was accustomed to
success on the battlefield.
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(melancholy music)
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Many divisions where between
six to 7,000 men short
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of wartime establishment.
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Levies of experienced personnel
had been hived off to build
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new tank and aviation units.
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Only one of the six Soviet
mechanized Corps had received
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their full compliment of equipment.
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Three of the four motorized divisions
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had no tanks whatsoever.
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And four out of every five vehicles
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in the tank fleets were obsolete.
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Four of the Corps could only
deploy one quarter of their
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designated motor vehicles.
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And in another four Corps
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one in three motor
vehicles needed repairs.
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From even a cursory analysis,
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the Soviet Red Army and
the German Wehrmacht
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were anything but equal adversaries.
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(man speaks over radio)
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(loud explosions)
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In the Western part of Russia,
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the Red Army consisted
of about 5,000,000 men
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with 1,000,000 in the Leningrad sector.
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Although the tank strength of the Red Army
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on the 21st of June, 1941 was
an impressive 23,108 machines,
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only 8,000 were battle
ready and in good condition.
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Of these, less than 1200 were deployed
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in the Leningrad sector.
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Many of the Soviet tanks
where the outdated T26
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and T28 medium tanks,
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there were even a few of
the outdated T35 machines,
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a massive multi turreted tank,
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00:15:16,190 --> 00:15:19,023
which proved to be a
disastrous failure in action.
264
00:15:22,132 --> 00:15:24,799
(ominous music)
265
00:15:31,710 --> 00:15:33,620
In June, 1941
266
00:15:33,620 --> 00:15:35,760
the time of the German attack,
267
00:15:35,760 --> 00:15:37,400
Army Group North was commanded
268
00:15:37,400 --> 00:15:39,810
by field Marshall Ritter Von Leeb
269
00:15:39,810 --> 00:15:42,690
and was composed of two subsidiary armies.
270
00:15:42,690 --> 00:15:46,710
The 16th army, initially
commanded by field Marshall Busch
271
00:15:46,710 --> 00:15:49,863
and the 18th army commanded
by general Von Kuchler.
272
00:15:51,240 --> 00:15:53,250
For the initial thrust into Russia
273
00:15:53,250 --> 00:15:55,300
under the Barbarossa directive
274
00:15:55,300 --> 00:15:57,250
Army Group North enjoyed the support
275
00:15:57,250 --> 00:15:59,370
of a powerful tank force
276
00:15:59,370 --> 00:16:02,540
designed as Panzer Group
IV under the leadership
277
00:16:02,540 --> 00:16:03,623
of general Hoepner.
278
00:16:04,600 --> 00:16:07,180
For air support Army
Group North could call
279
00:16:07,180 --> 00:16:10,423
upon Luftflotte One,
commanded by general Keller.
280
00:16:11,330 --> 00:16:12,820
The Stukas of Luftflotte One
281
00:16:12,820 --> 00:16:15,090
were to provide the flying artillery
282
00:16:15,090 --> 00:16:17,553
for the lightning attack
of the 22nd of June.
283
00:16:20,680 --> 00:16:23,640
Naval support was available
from the powerful battle group
284
00:16:23,640 --> 00:16:26,720
North under the command of Admiral Carls,
285
00:16:26,720 --> 00:16:28,330
who set about planning the campaign
286
00:16:28,330 --> 00:16:29,763
with his senior commanders.
287
00:16:38,040 --> 00:16:40,350
As commander of Army Group North
288
00:16:40,350 --> 00:16:42,960
Von Leeb had excellent credibility.
289
00:16:42,960 --> 00:16:46,070
He had formerly commanded
the German Army Group center,
290
00:16:46,070 --> 00:16:48,080
which had succeeded
brilliantly in the attack
291
00:16:48,080 --> 00:16:50,580
on France in 1940.
292
00:16:50,580 --> 00:16:53,300
He was extremely well-supported
by some of the most capable
293
00:16:53,300 --> 00:16:55,813
commanders the German
army had in its ranks.
294
00:17:13,480 --> 00:17:15,840
As the German officers could
draw on the experiences
295
00:17:15,840 --> 00:17:19,430
of the war in Poland, France,
Norway, and the Balkans,
296
00:17:19,430 --> 00:17:21,970
the quality of their
commanders was always likely
297
00:17:21,970 --> 00:17:23,920
to be superior to that of the Russians.
298
00:17:30,251 --> 00:17:32,918
(ominous music)
299
00:17:40,240 --> 00:17:42,210
For the great assault on Russia,
300
00:17:42,210 --> 00:17:43,500
Army Group North could count
301
00:17:43,500 --> 00:17:47,510
on over 800,000 men and 800 tanks
302
00:17:47,510 --> 00:17:50,440
organized into three armored divisions,
303
00:17:50,440 --> 00:17:53,300
three motorized infantry divisions,
304
00:17:53,300 --> 00:17:57,721
20 infantry divisions, and
three security divisions.
305
00:17:57,721 --> 00:17:59,447
(Hitler yells)
306
00:17:59,447 --> 00:18:01,200
(soldiers singing)
307
00:18:01,200 --> 00:18:04,090
Army group North was by no
means the armored juggernaut
308
00:18:04,090 --> 00:18:05,980
of popular mythology.
309
00:18:05,980 --> 00:18:08,180
Four-fifths of the soldiers had to walk
310
00:18:08,180 --> 00:18:10,810
into battle like the soldiers of Napoleon
311
00:18:10,810 --> 00:18:12,634
over a century earlier.
312
00:18:12,634 --> 00:18:15,801
(upbeat German music)
313
00:18:20,030 --> 00:18:22,450
In 1941, the mechanized era
314
00:18:22,450 --> 00:18:24,170
was still in its infancy
315
00:18:24,170 --> 00:18:25,210
and Army Group North
316
00:18:25,210 --> 00:18:29,903
needed 200,000 horses to draw
their guns and equipment.
317
00:18:29,903 --> 00:18:32,820
(German war music)
318
00:18:40,030 --> 00:18:43,170
The Army Group could deploy 1200 guns
319
00:18:43,170 --> 00:18:45,150
in terms of tanks and aircraft,
320
00:18:45,150 --> 00:18:50,150
Army Group North could boasts
600 tanks and 430 aircraft.
321
00:18:50,420 --> 00:18:52,970
Most of them superior to the Russian tanks
322
00:18:52,970 --> 00:18:54,953
and all of them in better condition.
323
00:18:57,100 --> 00:18:59,770
Army Group North tends to
be treated in some respects
324
00:18:59,770 --> 00:19:00,990
as the poor relation
325
00:19:00,990 --> 00:19:04,260
compared to Army Group
South and army group Center.
326
00:19:04,260 --> 00:19:06,890
But initially, although
there were fewer formations
327
00:19:06,890 --> 00:19:08,140
of Army Group North,
328
00:19:08,140 --> 00:19:10,380
they actually achieved
their initial objectives
329
00:19:10,380 --> 00:19:12,760
with great skill and speed.
330
00:19:12,760 --> 00:19:15,677
(vehicle explodes)
331
00:19:17,635 --> 00:19:20,385
(engine rumbles)
332
00:19:22,880 --> 00:19:25,213
(gun fires)
333
00:19:28,487 --> 00:19:30,904
(loud blast)
334
00:19:32,380 --> 00:19:35,260
Ribbentrop, Hitler's foreign
minister had successfully
335
00:19:35,260 --> 00:19:36,960
concluded a non-aggression pact
336
00:19:36,960 --> 00:19:39,723
between Germany and Russia in 1940.
337
00:19:40,590 --> 00:19:42,830
Nevertheless, Stalin was wise enough
338
00:19:42,830 --> 00:19:44,690
to remain wary of his sinister
339
00:19:44,690 --> 00:19:46,760
neighbors to the West.
340
00:19:46,760 --> 00:19:49,030
Stalin's overall military strategy
341
00:19:49,030 --> 00:19:52,330
required the expansion of Soviet
territory to create a deep
342
00:19:52,330 --> 00:19:56,200
barrier of Russian held territory
between the Soviet union
343
00:19:56,200 --> 00:19:57,563
and Nazi Germany.
344
00:19:58,420 --> 00:20:00,760
It was this consideration
which had led Stalin
345
00:20:00,760 --> 00:20:03,483
to collaborate with Hitler
in the invasion of Poland.
346
00:20:07,860 --> 00:20:10,330
Ironically, the secret negotiations
347
00:20:10,330 --> 00:20:12,650
instigated by Germany had also
348
00:20:12,650 --> 00:20:16,000
granted Stalin the freehand
in the Baltic and Finland,
349
00:20:16,000 --> 00:20:17,780
which had precipitated the winter war,
350
00:20:17,780 --> 00:20:20,353
which the Fins were now so keen to avenge.
351
00:20:24,750 --> 00:20:27,220
From behind this defensive wall
352
00:20:27,220 --> 00:20:29,390
Stalin planed to allow the Western allies
353
00:20:29,390 --> 00:20:33,220
and Germany to fight a mutually
destructive war in the West,
354
00:20:33,220 --> 00:20:35,870
as they had done for four
years during the great war.
355
00:20:38,184 --> 00:20:42,101
(series of distant explosions)
356
00:21:02,897 --> 00:21:05,564
(ominous music)
357
00:21:14,830 --> 00:21:18,430
The early war Russian fighters
were already obsolete.
358
00:21:18,430 --> 00:21:21,890
Aircraft such as the Polikarpov I153
359
00:21:21,890 --> 00:21:23,850
a lumbering biplane,
360
00:21:23,850 --> 00:21:27,610
and the Polikarpov I16 known
as the ratter were easily
361
00:21:27,610 --> 00:21:30,673
outclassed by the new
generation of German fighters.
362
00:21:34,930 --> 00:21:38,270
These included the German
Messerschmitt 109 fighters,
363
00:21:38,270 --> 00:21:41,270
which were faster and more
maneuverable than anything
364
00:21:41,270 --> 00:21:43,300
the Russians could throw against them.
365
00:21:53,760 --> 00:21:56,093
(loud boom)
366
00:22:00,373 --> 00:22:03,040
(ominous music)
367
00:22:14,230 --> 00:22:19,010
At last, at 04:00 on
the 22nd of June, 1941,
368
00:22:19,010 --> 00:22:22,790
the code word "Dortmund"
crackled down the wires
369
00:22:22,790 --> 00:22:25,600
and the full force of
operation Barbarossa,
370
00:22:25,600 --> 00:22:28,473
Germany's invasion of Soviet
Russia, was unleashed.
371
00:22:30,525 --> 00:22:32,157
(airplane roars)
372
00:22:32,157 --> 00:22:34,907
(loud explosion)
373
00:22:43,270 --> 00:22:45,130
AS they had come to expect
374
00:22:45,130 --> 00:22:46,670
the German army sliced through
375
00:22:46,670 --> 00:22:48,643
the opposition on the way to Leningrad.
376
00:22:49,530 --> 00:22:51,610
Faced by the result of his own failures
377
00:22:51,610 --> 00:22:54,900
in military matters, Stalin panicked.
378
00:22:54,900 --> 00:22:56,630
While his army headquarters desperately
379
00:22:56,630 --> 00:22:58,740
tried to piece together
the most rudimentary
380
00:22:58,740 --> 00:23:00,530
picture of what was happening,
381
00:23:00,530 --> 00:23:03,923
he ordered an immediate counter
offensive on all fronts.
382
00:23:04,780 --> 00:23:06,810
As the first reports of the devastation
383
00:23:06,810 --> 00:23:09,390
he had helped to create filtered through,
384
00:23:09,390 --> 00:23:10,983
he was close to breaking point.
385
00:23:14,467 --> 00:23:17,790
"All that Lennon created,
we have lost forever",
386
00:23:17,790 --> 00:23:22,240
he declared, before retreating
to his dacha not to emerge
387
00:23:22,240 --> 00:23:23,973
until the 3rd of July.
388
00:23:29,180 --> 00:23:32,070
What really stunned the Red
Army commanders was that this
389
00:23:32,070 --> 00:23:35,350
massive German assault had
proceeded long after it had left
390
00:23:35,350 --> 00:23:38,360
its artillery support behind.
391
00:23:38,360 --> 00:23:40,020
The Red Army command had planned
392
00:23:40,020 --> 00:23:44,550
for conventional meeting
engagements and frontline battles.
393
00:23:44,550 --> 00:23:46,810
The perceived wisdom was
that these would develop
394
00:23:46,810 --> 00:23:49,560
over days or even weeks.
395
00:23:49,560 --> 00:23:53,000
Next would come a large
series of complex engagements.
396
00:23:53,000 --> 00:23:55,523
And then the real war would begin.
397
00:23:56,550 --> 00:23:59,920
In reality, using the
new Blitzkrieg tactics,
398
00:23:59,920 --> 00:24:03,080
the German advance was so
swift that within hours of
399
00:24:03,080 --> 00:24:04,750
the launch of Barbarossa
400
00:24:04,750 --> 00:24:07,210
tank columns from Panzer Group IV were
401
00:24:07,210 --> 00:24:11,183
approaching Riga some 50
miles behind the front.
402
00:24:15,540 --> 00:24:18,060
This extended Blitzkrieg technique,
403
00:24:18,060 --> 00:24:21,350
especially the bold use of
armor came as an extraordinary
404
00:24:21,350 --> 00:24:24,070
and disorientating
surprise to the Russians,
405
00:24:24,070 --> 00:24:26,273
even to the senior Soviet commanders.
406
00:24:36,220 --> 00:24:37,740
Within 48 hours,
407
00:24:37,740 --> 00:24:40,150
general staff reports
made it perfectly plain,
408
00:24:40,150 --> 00:24:42,463
that they had lost
control of the situation.
409
00:24:43,440 --> 00:24:45,420
They were in complete chaos,
410
00:24:45,420 --> 00:24:48,140
and many did not know
where their troops were
411
00:24:48,140 --> 00:24:49,333
or what was happening.
412
00:24:52,020 --> 00:24:54,730
They certainly did not have
accurate reports of German
413
00:24:54,730 --> 00:24:58,100
movements, and there was
no real intelligence.
414
00:24:58,100 --> 00:24:59,350
So they were not even sure
415
00:24:59,350 --> 00:25:01,950
where the German thrusts were aimed.
416
00:25:01,950 --> 00:25:04,550
All that they did know
was that in the Northwest,
417
00:25:04,550 --> 00:25:06,680
there was total collapse.
418
00:25:06,680 --> 00:25:10,450
In consequence, Stalin
operated his usual practice.
419
00:25:10,450 --> 00:25:14,120
He had most of the front
commanders arrested and then shot
420
00:25:16,620 --> 00:25:18,350
as a consequence of the confusion
421
00:25:18,350 --> 00:25:20,310
which raged throughout the army,
422
00:25:20,310 --> 00:25:23,400
many of the Red Army
divisions simply broke up
423
00:25:23,400 --> 00:25:24,950
and formed very large pockets
424
00:25:24,950 --> 00:25:26,273
of leaderless troops.
425
00:25:27,280 --> 00:25:28,400
Passing these groups
426
00:25:28,400 --> 00:25:31,880
of disorientated men, Von
Leeb's Army Group North
427
00:25:31,880 --> 00:25:35,520
scythed into the Baltic
States, capturing Riga,
428
00:25:35,520 --> 00:25:37,428
the Latvian capital.
429
00:25:37,428 --> 00:25:40,428
(suspenseful music)
430
00:25:57,553 --> 00:26:00,303
(loud explosion)
431
00:26:02,040 --> 00:26:05,340
The number of prisoners taken
and the war material captured
432
00:26:05,340 --> 00:26:07,730
or destroyed in operation Barbarossa
433
00:26:07,730 --> 00:26:10,830
was assuming astronomical proportions.
434
00:26:10,830 --> 00:26:13,830
It is hardly surprising
that Hitler, his commanders
435
00:26:13,830 --> 00:26:15,290
and the troops themselves
436
00:26:15,290 --> 00:26:16,800
now believed that the Red Army
437
00:26:16,800 --> 00:26:19,150
must be nearing the end of its resources,
438
00:26:19,150 --> 00:26:21,613
both in manpower and in weapons.
439
00:26:22,540 --> 00:26:24,480
Prisoners confess that the German attack
440
00:26:24,480 --> 00:26:26,870
had been completely unexpected.
441
00:26:26,870 --> 00:26:31,053
Moscow, it seemed, was certain
to fall into German hands.
442
00:26:32,100 --> 00:26:34,683
Great optimism prevailed
in Army Group Center.
443
00:26:35,640 --> 00:26:39,110
Hitler had already set up
a special engineer command
444
00:26:39,110 --> 00:26:41,733
whose task was to be the
demolition of the Kremlin.
445
00:26:45,460 --> 00:26:48,090
The propaganda ministry
saw fit to make a bombastic
446
00:26:48,090 --> 00:26:51,580
statement announcing that
the war in the East was won
447
00:26:51,580 --> 00:26:54,355
and the Red Army practically annihilated.
448
00:26:54,355 --> 00:26:58,050
(German leader gives speech)
449
00:26:58,050 --> 00:27:00,510
During the early stages of the campaign,
450
00:27:00,510 --> 00:27:03,130
the Stuka dive bombers of Luftflotte One
451
00:27:03,130 --> 00:27:04,630
played their familiar role
452
00:27:04,630 --> 00:27:07,830
as the German storm broke against Russia.
453
00:27:07,830 --> 00:27:11,360
The initial moves followed the
classic Blitzkrieg pattern,
454
00:27:11,360 --> 00:27:14,770
no declaration of war
and a fast moving assault
455
00:27:14,770 --> 00:27:17,783
designed to disorientate and
confuse the Russian army.
456
00:27:20,350 --> 00:27:22,860
As the forces of Army
Group North drove further
457
00:27:22,860 --> 00:27:24,430
into the Baltic States,
458
00:27:24,430 --> 00:27:27,163
Latvia and Estonia were quickly captured.
459
00:27:34,020 --> 00:27:35,640
These lightning advances were greeted
460
00:27:35,640 --> 00:27:38,620
with joy by the citizens
of cities like Riga,
461
00:27:38,620 --> 00:27:41,743
where the population viewed the
German armies as liberators.
462
00:28:06,400 --> 00:28:08,400
In scenes of unprompted joy,
463
00:28:08,400 --> 00:28:10,990
the German soldiers were
greeted with flowers and kisses
464
00:28:10,990 --> 00:28:12,040
from the local girls.
465
00:28:42,310 --> 00:28:45,070
A great deal of the Naval
effort throughout the campaign
466
00:28:45,070 --> 00:28:47,900
lay in suppressing Soviet Naval activity
467
00:28:47,900 --> 00:28:50,290
by laying thousands of mines,
468
00:28:50,290 --> 00:28:52,010
a task, which continued
469
00:28:52,010 --> 00:28:54,493
even in the face of fierce air resistance.
470
00:29:01,585 --> 00:29:04,570
(rapid gunfire)
471
00:29:04,570 --> 00:29:06,910
These ships of Carl's battle group
472
00:29:06,910 --> 00:29:08,120
continued with the task
473
00:29:08,120 --> 00:29:11,483
of mine laying, despite the
attentions of the red air force.
474
00:29:20,340 --> 00:29:23,290
On land, the presence of
a strong armored force
475
00:29:23,290 --> 00:29:25,348
in the form of Panzer Group IV
476
00:29:25,348 --> 00:29:28,320
gave Army Group North some
much needed tank support
477
00:29:28,320 --> 00:29:30,320
during the headlong advance into Russia.
478
00:29:31,260 --> 00:29:33,720
Nevertheless, the rudimentary road system
479
00:29:33,720 --> 00:29:34,760
of the Baltic States
480
00:29:34,760 --> 00:29:37,683
and Northern Russia played
havoc with the tanks.
481
00:29:38,990 --> 00:29:41,330
Right at the beginning
of the Russian campaign,
482
00:29:41,330 --> 00:29:44,610
the Germans experienced the
problems which dust can cause
483
00:29:44,610 --> 00:29:46,340
in motor vehicles.
484
00:29:46,340 --> 00:29:48,840
Tanks sustained severe
damage from the dust
485
00:29:48,840 --> 00:29:52,310
they stirred up while
crossing vast sandy regions,
486
00:29:52,310 --> 00:29:55,630
many tanks had no dust filters
and on those which were
487
00:29:55,630 --> 00:29:59,520
equipped, the filters soon
became thoroughly clogged.
488
00:29:59,520 --> 00:30:01,990
Quartz dust was sucked into engines,
489
00:30:01,990 --> 00:30:05,200
which became so ground out
that many tanks were rendered
490
00:30:05,200 --> 00:30:08,010
unserviceable, in other tanks,
491
00:30:08,010 --> 00:30:11,570
the abrasive action of dust
reduced engine efficiency
492
00:30:11,570 --> 00:30:13,923
and massively increased fuel consumption.
493
00:30:16,710 --> 00:30:20,120
The sand roads undoubtedly
caused problems.
494
00:30:20,120 --> 00:30:23,260
They greatly slowed tanks or trucks.
495
00:30:23,260 --> 00:30:25,400
They also caused huge dust clouds,
496
00:30:25,400 --> 00:30:27,083
which were raised by convoys.
497
00:30:28,220 --> 00:30:30,940
These dust clouds frequently
provoked air attacks
498
00:30:30,940 --> 00:30:33,393
by the surviving aircraft
of the red air force.
499
00:30:34,300 --> 00:30:36,900
As the red air force
re-gathered its strength,
500
00:30:36,900 --> 00:30:39,890
these attacks resulted
in serious losses of men,
501
00:30:39,890 --> 00:30:41,783
vehicles and horses.
502
00:30:49,350 --> 00:30:52,060
For as long as they were in
support of Army Group North,
503
00:30:52,060 --> 00:30:55,880
the tanks of Panzer Group IV
played an invaluable role,
504
00:30:55,880 --> 00:30:57,470
but even with the Panzers,
505
00:30:57,470 --> 00:31:01,050
the swift advances of June and
July ground to a halt against
506
00:31:01,050 --> 00:31:03,390
the tough defenses of the Stalin line,
507
00:31:03,390 --> 00:31:06,203
which were encountered in
August and early September.
508
00:31:07,800 --> 00:31:10,720
While the fortifications of the
frontier districts left much
509
00:31:10,720 --> 00:31:12,030
to be desired,
510
00:31:12,030 --> 00:31:15,130
there were still extensive
fortifications to be overcome
511
00:31:15,130 --> 00:31:16,673
deep within mother Russia.
512
00:31:17,700 --> 00:31:20,260
Although they did not
form a solid unbroken line
513
00:31:20,260 --> 00:31:23,410
of fortifications, like
the French Maggiano line,
514
00:31:23,410 --> 00:31:26,900
the heavily defended Stalin
line or the Leningrad line
515
00:31:26,900 --> 00:31:29,270
as the German forces in the North knew it,
516
00:31:29,270 --> 00:31:32,073
was a formidable series
of prepared defenses.
517
00:31:33,400 --> 00:31:35,350
Areas of great importance were
518
00:31:35,350 --> 00:31:38,810
surrounded with heavy fortifications
and the German armored
519
00:31:38,810 --> 00:31:42,030
units driving for Leningrad
encountered fortification
520
00:31:42,030 --> 00:31:44,780
systems up to six miles in depth,
521
00:31:44,780 --> 00:31:48,060
including well-positioned
earth and concrete bunkers
522
00:31:48,060 --> 00:31:50,493
with built-in guns and
other heavy weapons.
523
00:31:51,410 --> 00:31:54,710
There were also concrete
pillboxes with disappearing
524
00:31:54,710 --> 00:31:57,693
armored cupolas for
artillery and machine guns.
525
00:31:58,940 --> 00:32:02,200
A speedy elimination of these
strong defenses with the means
526
00:32:02,200 --> 00:32:05,300
available to a force
designed for mobile warfare
527
00:32:05,300 --> 00:32:06,853
was extremely difficult.
528
00:32:07,774 --> 00:32:10,774
(suspenseful music)
529
00:32:20,400 --> 00:32:22,390
The area of Krasnogvardeysk,
530
00:32:22,390 --> 00:32:24,950
South of Leningrad, had been developed
531
00:32:24,950 --> 00:32:27,970
according to sound soviet
defensive principles,
532
00:32:27,970 --> 00:32:30,580
and was effectively turned
into an outlying fortress
533
00:32:30,580 --> 00:32:32,153
for the defensive Leningrad.
534
00:32:33,030 --> 00:32:35,670
During early September, 1941
535
00:32:35,670 --> 00:32:37,220
it presented great difficulties
536
00:32:37,220 --> 00:32:39,263
to the advance of the German forces.
537
00:32:42,610 --> 00:32:46,150
Krasnogvardeysk blocked all
highways and railroads leading
538
00:32:46,150 --> 00:32:48,300
to Leningrad from the South
539
00:32:48,300 --> 00:32:51,940
and constituted the main
bulwark of Russian resistance.
540
00:32:51,940 --> 00:32:54,800
The Russians defended it persistently.
541
00:32:54,800 --> 00:32:56,430
Repeated attacks by several
542
00:32:56,430 --> 00:32:58,980
infantry divisions were repulsed.
543
00:32:58,980 --> 00:33:01,330
It was only taken in the
course of a general attack
544
00:33:01,330 --> 00:33:02,920
on the Leningrad line
545
00:33:02,920 --> 00:33:05,380
and after bitter pillbox
fighting in the area
546
00:33:05,380 --> 00:33:08,157
immediately surrounding Krasnogvardeysk.
547
00:33:09,013 --> 00:33:12,013
(suspenseful music)
548
00:33:26,950 --> 00:33:30,580
Only the flexible leadership
of battle-tested armored forces
549
00:33:30,580 --> 00:33:32,280
attacking with great vigor
550
00:33:32,280 --> 00:33:34,960
made it possible to
overcome the defense zones
551
00:33:34,960 --> 00:33:36,910
which had been set up
with a sound knowledge
552
00:33:36,910 --> 00:33:38,783
of the latest defense techniques.
553
00:33:39,830 --> 00:33:42,980
Within a week, the German
sixth Panzer division
554
00:33:42,980 --> 00:33:44,130
had been forced to break
555
00:33:44,130 --> 00:33:48,060
through and roll up 12
positions, repel several
556
00:33:48,060 --> 00:33:49,790
counter attacks and take
557
00:33:49,790 --> 00:33:52,733
more than 300 heavily fortified bunkers.
558
00:33:53,820 --> 00:33:56,460
Like all German operations in Russia
559
00:33:56,460 --> 00:33:59,480
from an early stage, it became
apparent to the commanders,
560
00:33:59,480 --> 00:34:00,510
to the troops,
561
00:34:00,510 --> 00:34:04,570
to the high command that the
task they had taken on and the
562
00:34:04,570 --> 00:34:07,800
tasks they may have to take
on were beginning to exceed
563
00:34:07,800 --> 00:34:10,303
by far, the resources to hand.
564
00:34:11,680 --> 00:34:12,760
In general terms,
565
00:34:12,760 --> 00:34:15,350
the forces were adequate
for the immediate tasks
566
00:34:15,350 --> 00:34:18,060
which Army Group North had to fulfill.
567
00:34:18,060 --> 00:34:20,370
It was a very accomplished command
568
00:34:20,370 --> 00:34:23,650
and it did manage to achieve
what Hitler ordered to be done,
569
00:34:23,650 --> 00:34:25,910
which was to seize the Baltic States,
570
00:34:25,910 --> 00:34:29,570
establishing them as a base for
further operations in Russia
571
00:34:29,570 --> 00:34:31,343
and move right up to Leningrad.
572
00:34:37,000 --> 00:34:39,630
From October, 1941 onwards,
573
00:34:39,630 --> 00:34:42,010
Hitler tended to
vacillate between striking
574
00:34:42,010 --> 00:34:45,490
into the Ukraine as the
main strategic objective
575
00:34:45,490 --> 00:34:46,840
and attacking Moscow,
576
00:34:46,840 --> 00:34:49,040
which was the nerve
center of Soviet Russia.
577
00:34:52,870 --> 00:34:54,140
Army Group North therefore
578
00:34:54,140 --> 00:34:57,483
came a poor third in terms
of allocation of resources.
579
00:34:58,330 --> 00:35:00,730
It is fair to suggest
that Hitler's high command
580
00:35:00,730 --> 00:35:04,150
failed to provide Von Leeb
with enough resources,
581
00:35:04,150 --> 00:35:07,180
which in turn prevented Army
Group North from achieving
582
00:35:07,180 --> 00:35:09,280
its objective of the capture of Leningrad.
583
00:35:16,506 --> 00:35:20,173
(series of loud explosions)
584
00:35:32,930 --> 00:35:33,880
In the North,
585
00:35:33,880 --> 00:35:35,610
the fighting for the Stalin line
586
00:35:35,610 --> 00:35:37,810
proved to be an attritional nightmare
587
00:35:37,810 --> 00:35:40,000
with German casualties soon mounting
588
00:35:40,000 --> 00:35:41,773
to first world war levels.
589
00:35:43,310 --> 00:35:45,490
The Russians were very adept at preparing
590
00:35:45,490 --> 00:35:48,230
inhabited places for defense.
591
00:35:48,230 --> 00:35:49,500
In a short time,
592
00:35:49,500 --> 00:35:52,163
a village would be converted
into a little fortress.
593
00:35:53,060 --> 00:35:55,670
Wooden houses had well
camouflaged gun ports
594
00:35:55,670 --> 00:35:57,880
almost flush with the floor.
595
00:35:57,880 --> 00:36:01,650
Their interiors were reinforced
with sandbags or earth.
596
00:36:01,650 --> 00:36:05,220
Observation slots were cut into
roofs and bunkers built into
597
00:36:05,220 --> 00:36:08,380
floors and connected with
adjacent houses or outside
598
00:36:08,380 --> 00:36:10,968
defenses by narrow trenches.
599
00:36:10,968 --> 00:36:13,968
(suspenseful music)
600
00:36:18,290 --> 00:36:20,330
Although almost all inhabited places
601
00:36:20,330 --> 00:36:22,170
were crammed with troops,
602
00:36:22,170 --> 00:36:25,650
they seem deserted to German
reconnaissance since even water
603
00:36:25,650 --> 00:36:27,470
and food details were allowed to leave
604
00:36:27,470 --> 00:36:29,573
their shelters only after dark.
605
00:36:44,935 --> 00:36:47,768
(large explosion)
606
00:36:48,700 --> 00:36:51,330
The Russians blocked approach
routes with well camouflaged
607
00:36:51,330 --> 00:36:54,560
anti-tank guns or dug-in tanks.
608
00:36:54,560 --> 00:36:57,230
Wrecks of knocked out tanks
were specially favored
609
00:36:57,230 --> 00:36:59,170
for use as observation posts.
610
00:36:59,170 --> 00:37:01,880
And as in placements for
heavy infantry weapons
611
00:37:01,880 --> 00:37:04,923
and bunkers for living
quarters were dug under them.
612
00:37:07,270 --> 00:37:09,990
Permanent structures
destroyed by artillery fire,
613
00:37:09,990 --> 00:37:14,060
or aerial bombs were
utilized as defense points,
614
00:37:14,060 --> 00:37:16,560
the ruins hid weapons
and served to strengthen
615
00:37:16,560 --> 00:37:18,750
the underlying bunkers.
616
00:37:18,750 --> 00:37:21,310
Even the heaviest shelling
would not drive the Russians
617
00:37:21,310 --> 00:37:23,200
from these positions.
618
00:37:23,200 --> 00:37:26,230
They could only be
dislodged with hand grenades
619
00:37:26,230 --> 00:37:29,743
or flame throwers in costly
hand-to-hand fighting.
620
00:37:30,830 --> 00:37:33,110
The Russians when they did retreat
621
00:37:33,110 --> 00:37:36,480
frequently burned or blasted
building suitable for housing
622
00:37:36,480 --> 00:37:39,853
command posts or other important
military installations.
623
00:37:40,750 --> 00:37:43,570
Quite often, however, they left castles,
624
00:37:43,570 --> 00:37:47,850
former country seats and other
spacious dwellings intact,
625
00:37:47,850 --> 00:37:51,060
but only after they had mined
the walls in a completely
626
00:37:51,060 --> 00:37:54,010
inconspicuous manner with
delayed action bombs,
627
00:37:54,010 --> 00:37:56,853
which were often set to
explode several weeks later.
628
00:37:58,050 --> 00:38:00,630
These were meant to blow up
entire German headquarters
629
00:38:00,630 --> 00:38:01,633
at one time.
630
00:38:02,750 --> 00:38:05,800
The possible presence
of time bombs in cities,
631
00:38:05,800 --> 00:38:07,828
railroad stations, bridges,
632
00:38:07,828 --> 00:38:11,270
and other important structures
always had to be taken into
633
00:38:11,270 --> 00:38:13,170
account in German thinking,
634
00:38:13,170 --> 00:38:15,593
exacting a great psychological toll.
635
00:38:19,957 --> 00:38:23,040
(distant explosions)
636
00:38:24,120 --> 00:38:27,590
Entirely new to the Germans
was the Russian use of forest
637
00:38:27,590 --> 00:38:30,160
fires as a hot weather weapon.
638
00:38:30,160 --> 00:38:31,930
In mid-summer when the trees
639
00:38:31,930 --> 00:38:33,320
were tinder dry,
640
00:38:33,320 --> 00:38:36,230
the Russians attempted to
delay German forces advancing
641
00:38:36,230 --> 00:38:39,453
on Leningrad by putting
forests to the torch.
642
00:38:40,400 --> 00:38:41,640
Not only the physical,
643
00:38:41,640 --> 00:38:45,480
but the psychological impact
of such fires was severe.
644
00:38:45,480 --> 00:38:47,600
The crackling of the burning trees,
645
00:38:47,600 --> 00:38:49,950
the acrid gray black smoke,
646
00:38:49,950 --> 00:38:52,870
the increasingly unbearable
heat and the feeling
647
00:38:52,870 --> 00:38:56,573
of uncertainty put troops
under a severe strain.
648
00:39:04,620 --> 00:39:07,540
Despite the tenacity of a
hard fought series of grueling
649
00:39:07,540 --> 00:39:10,530
battles in which the SS
police division particularly
650
00:39:10,530 --> 00:39:13,230
distinguished itself, the Stalin line
651
00:39:13,230 --> 00:39:16,160
was finally broken in late August
652
00:39:16,160 --> 00:39:19,103
and Army Group North surged onwards.
653
00:39:22,926 --> 00:39:25,593
(ominous music)
654
00:39:33,680 --> 00:39:36,580
On the Baltic front, Von
Leeb's Army Group North
655
00:39:36,580 --> 00:39:38,950
had captured the city of Novgorod,
656
00:39:38,950 --> 00:39:41,413
a vital target in the
approach to Leningrad.
657
00:39:42,600 --> 00:39:44,970
The beleaguered defenders of Novgorod
658
00:39:44,970 --> 00:39:46,650
had fought to the death.
659
00:39:46,650 --> 00:39:48,933
But this resistance too had been in vain.
660
00:39:50,320 --> 00:39:53,070
The Germans had discovered
the city's defensive plans
661
00:39:53,070 --> 00:39:54,963
on the corpse of a Soviet officer.
662
00:40:00,770 --> 00:40:02,880
With the Stalin line broken
663
00:40:02,880 --> 00:40:06,210
general Hoepner's fourth
Panzer group resumed its drive
664
00:40:06,210 --> 00:40:09,560
toward Leningrad, but
without supporting infantry
665
00:40:09,560 --> 00:40:10,953
its progress was limited.
666
00:40:12,902 --> 00:40:14,310
(ominous music)
667
00:40:14,310 --> 00:40:17,250
Leningrad was a vital center
of the wartime production
668
00:40:17,250 --> 00:40:20,060
industry and reserves
and equipment were poured
669
00:40:20,060 --> 00:40:21,593
into the defense of the city.
670
00:40:22,430 --> 00:40:23,869
As the Germans approached,
671
00:40:23,869 --> 00:40:27,800
the citizens now formed into
militia divisions of which
672
00:40:27,800 --> 00:40:31,163
were flung against the Germans
more in despair than hope.
673
00:40:32,270 --> 00:40:36,170
Following a basic training
period, averaging 16 hours,
674
00:40:36,170 --> 00:40:39,160
the first militia divisions
were sent to the front only six
675
00:40:39,160 --> 00:40:41,660
days after being formed.
676
00:40:41,660 --> 00:40:44,850
The second division marched to
the front only two days after
677
00:40:44,850 --> 00:40:47,260
its establishment and the third,
678
00:40:47,260 --> 00:40:50,128
the same day it was established.
679
00:40:50,128 --> 00:40:53,378
(series of explosions)
680
00:41:01,117 --> 00:41:03,950
(large explosion)
681
00:41:27,860 --> 00:41:30,550
Nonetheless, some Russian civilians
682
00:41:30,550 --> 00:41:33,670
obviously felt caught between two fires,
683
00:41:33,670 --> 00:41:35,620
one senior Soviet officer
684
00:41:35,620 --> 00:41:38,020
later summed up the choices available.
685
00:41:38,020 --> 00:41:40,230
He declared, "We were faced with a choice
686
00:41:40,230 --> 00:41:43,830
between two dictators
Hitler on the one hand
687
00:41:43,830 --> 00:41:46,000
and Stalin on the other.
688
00:41:46,000 --> 00:41:48,667
But we prefer to pick the
one who spoke Russian."
689
00:41:51,139 --> 00:41:53,806
(ominous music)
690
00:42:01,460 --> 00:42:04,370
An ominous development for
the Germans at this point
691
00:42:04,370 --> 00:42:06,020
was the appearance on the battlefield
692
00:42:06,020 --> 00:42:11,020
of the Russian medium T34
tank and the heavy KV 1.
693
00:42:11,570 --> 00:42:14,380
Both of these machines were
clearly superior to the German
694
00:42:14,380 --> 00:42:16,610
tanks and were all but impervious
695
00:42:16,610 --> 00:42:19,090
to most German anti-tank weapons,
696
00:42:19,090 --> 00:42:22,970
especially the puny 37
millimeter anti-tank gun,
697
00:42:22,970 --> 00:42:26,270
which was then the main
German anti-tank weapon.
698
00:42:26,270 --> 00:42:30,240
The 37 millimeter was so
ineffective against Soviet armor
699
00:42:30,240 --> 00:42:33,410
that it was nicknamed "the door
knocker" by the disgruntled
700
00:42:33,410 --> 00:42:34,963
German anti-tank gunners.
701
00:42:36,070 --> 00:42:39,470
These puny 37 millimeter
guns were intended to deal
702
00:42:39,470 --> 00:42:42,400
with some of the best armor in the world.
703
00:42:42,400 --> 00:42:46,030
General Erhard Raus who
fought with Army Group North
704
00:42:46,030 --> 00:42:48,170
left a clear account
of the first encounter
705
00:42:48,170 --> 00:42:49,610
with the new Russian armor
706
00:42:49,610 --> 00:42:51,690
in the shape of the trusty KV1 tanks,
707
00:42:51,690 --> 00:42:53,740
which attacked the third Panzer division.
708
00:42:55,197 --> 00:42:59,040
"Then there suddenly appeared
for the first time a battalion
709
00:42:59,040 --> 00:43:02,523
of heavy enemy tanks of
previously unknown type.
710
00:43:03,460 --> 00:43:06,700
The tanks overran the armored
infantry regiment and broke
711
00:43:06,700 --> 00:43:08,500
through into the artillery position.
712
00:43:15,430 --> 00:43:19,400
The projectiles of all defense
weapons bounced off the thick
713
00:43:19,400 --> 00:43:24,400
enemy armor, 100 German tanks
were unable to check the 20
714
00:43:24,460 --> 00:43:27,063
Russian dreadnoughts and suffered losses.
715
00:43:28,060 --> 00:43:29,860
Several Czech built tanks,
716
00:43:29,860 --> 00:43:32,120
which are bogged down in
the grain fields because of
717
00:43:32,120 --> 00:43:36,250
mechanical trouble were
flattened by the enemy monsters.
718
00:43:36,250 --> 00:43:39,080
The same fate befell a 150 millimeter
719
00:43:39,080 --> 00:43:40,940
medium Howitzer battery,
720
00:43:40,940 --> 00:43:43,313
which kept on firing
until the last minute.
721
00:43:44,200 --> 00:43:47,650
Despite the fact that it scored
numerous direct hits from as
722
00:43:47,650 --> 00:43:51,270
close a range as 200
yards, it's heavy shells
723
00:43:51,270 --> 00:43:54,413
were unable to put even a
single rank out of action.
724
00:43:55,360 --> 00:43:57,840
The situation became critical.
725
00:43:57,840 --> 00:44:01,440
Only the 88 millimeter flak
finally knocked out a few
726
00:44:01,440 --> 00:44:02,450
of the Russian KV1s
727
00:44:03,360 --> 00:44:06,317
and forced the others to
withdraw into the woods."
728
00:44:07,725 --> 00:44:10,725
(suspenseful music)
729
00:44:15,000 --> 00:44:17,940
The only bright sign for the
Wehrmacht was that the new
730
00:44:17,940 --> 00:44:21,180
Russian tanks were still
in relatively short supply
731
00:44:21,180 --> 00:44:22,873
and their battle drill was poor.
732
00:44:24,200 --> 00:44:27,090
Once the scattered formations
have been dealt with the road
733
00:44:27,090 --> 00:44:29,313
to Leningrad lay open again.
734
00:44:39,478 --> 00:44:41,895
(gun blasts)
735
00:45:03,050 --> 00:45:05,960
Despite the limitations
of some of its weaponry,
736
00:45:05,960 --> 00:45:08,160
by September, Army Group North
737
00:45:08,160 --> 00:45:10,930
had destroyed for all practical purposes,
738
00:45:10,930 --> 00:45:12,623
the Soviet Northwest front,
739
00:45:13,555 --> 00:45:16,290
it had virtually eliminated
two Russian armies
740
00:45:16,290 --> 00:45:18,363
driven to the outskirts of Leningrad.
741
00:45:19,340 --> 00:45:21,890
The collapse of the
Northwestern front was a real
742
00:45:21,890 --> 00:45:25,170
catastrophe for the Red
Army and brought Stalin
743
00:45:25,170 --> 00:45:26,743
to the brink of despair.
744
00:45:28,139 --> 00:45:30,150
Leningrad's fate hung by a thread
745
00:45:30,150 --> 00:45:32,180
at the beginning of September,
746
00:45:32,180 --> 00:45:35,780
but Stalin was to make one inspired move.
747
00:45:35,780 --> 00:45:39,170
He appointed Marshal Zhukov
to the command of Leningrad.
748
00:45:39,170 --> 00:45:40,870
And this remarkable soldier
749
00:45:40,870 --> 00:45:43,635
was to prove himself equal to the task.
750
00:45:43,635 --> 00:45:46,635
(suspenseful music)
751
00:45:48,970 --> 00:45:52,500
As Army Group North drove
headlong towards Leningrad,
752
00:45:52,500 --> 00:45:56,110
a further huge haul of confused
Russian prisoners was taken
753
00:45:56,110 --> 00:45:59,800
in the Baltic States and a
large body of Russian troops was
754
00:45:59,800 --> 00:46:03,570
isolated in what became known
as the Oranienbaum pocket
755
00:46:03,570 --> 00:46:06,263
on the Baltic coast to
the West of Leningrad.
756
00:46:11,700 --> 00:46:14,610
The Oranienbaum pocket
was a small semicircle
757
00:46:14,610 --> 00:46:16,740
of Russian held territory,
758
00:46:16,740 --> 00:46:19,350
an area of ground that
was never to be taken
759
00:46:19,350 --> 00:46:20,800
by army group North,
760
00:46:20,800 --> 00:46:24,150
despite all attempts over
the next three years.
761
00:46:24,150 --> 00:46:26,000
And it was to prove a tactical thorn
762
00:46:26,000 --> 00:46:27,733
in the side of the 18th army.
763
00:46:29,820 --> 00:46:32,010
When the 18th army in Panzer Group IV
764
00:46:32,010 --> 00:46:35,840
burst into the Leningrad
area in September, 1941,
765
00:46:35,840 --> 00:46:38,430
they swept forward at high speed
766
00:46:38,430 --> 00:46:40,290
and as they moved swiftly North,
767
00:46:40,290 --> 00:46:43,853
they either destroyed or
brushed aside the Soviet armies.
768
00:46:49,090 --> 00:46:51,840
One tiny element of
the Soviet eighth army,
769
00:46:51,840 --> 00:46:54,480
which had suffered
catastrophically from the attack
770
00:46:54,480 --> 00:46:57,110
was pushed right up to the coast.
771
00:46:57,110 --> 00:47:00,080
There, around the town of Oranienbaum,
772
00:47:00,080 --> 00:47:02,940
three elements of the eighth
army kept up resistance
773
00:47:02,940 --> 00:47:05,400
for virtually three years.
774
00:47:05,400 --> 00:47:08,573
The bridge had acquired
enormous strategic significance.
775
00:47:09,924 --> 00:47:12,924
(suspenseful music)
776
00:47:28,350 --> 00:47:30,590
The Oranienbaum area enabled the Russians
777
00:47:30,590 --> 00:47:33,300
to protect the Island of Kronstadt.
778
00:47:33,300 --> 00:47:36,150
This Island was vital to
the Naval base directly
779
00:47:36,150 --> 00:47:37,543
to the West of Leningrad.
780
00:47:38,660 --> 00:47:40,900
It enabled the Soviet
forces in the region,
781
00:47:40,900 --> 00:47:44,230
both Naval and military, to
prevent the German forces
782
00:47:44,230 --> 00:47:46,890
of army group North completely denying
783
00:47:46,890 --> 00:47:49,640
Leningrad the resources
which enabled it to survive
784
00:47:49,640 --> 00:47:51,643
the subsequent siege of Leningrad.
785
00:47:52,577 --> 00:47:56,400
(suspenseful music)
786
00:47:56,400 --> 00:47:58,850
On September the fourth, 1941
787
00:47:58,850 --> 00:48:02,060
senior lieutenant Dariusz
of the first Panzer regiment
788
00:48:02,060 --> 00:48:04,010
radioed back to headquarters
789
00:48:04,010 --> 00:48:06,313
that his unit had reached Leningrad.
790
00:48:09,670 --> 00:48:12,720
Other units from the 18th
army pressed on to capture
791
00:48:12,720 --> 00:48:15,043
Shlisselburg to the East of Leningrad.
792
00:48:16,490 --> 00:48:19,210
With the arrival of the
rest of the 18th army
793
00:48:19,210 --> 00:48:22,500
to reinforce the Panzers,
on the 8th of September,
794
00:48:22,500 --> 00:48:23,860
the German stranglehold
795
00:48:23,860 --> 00:48:26,353
on the city of Leningrad
tightened further.
796
00:48:27,220 --> 00:48:29,680
The capture of Shlisselburg to the East
797
00:48:29,680 --> 00:48:31,953
signaled the end of rail transport.
798
00:48:32,880 --> 00:48:36,020
The German invaders
surged on as far as Tikvin
799
00:48:36,020 --> 00:48:37,963
deep inside the Russian hinterland.
800
00:48:39,040 --> 00:48:41,730
Despite the best efforts
of the population,
801
00:48:41,730 --> 00:48:43,940
the first shells began to rain down
802
00:48:43,940 --> 00:48:47,060
on Leningrad early in September.
803
00:48:47,060 --> 00:48:50,880
It marked the beginning of a
crucial episode in the war.
804
00:48:50,880 --> 00:48:55,880
The Epic siege of the city,
which would last for 900 days.
805
00:48:56,044 --> 00:48:59,044
(suspenseful music)
806
00:49:05,055 --> 00:49:07,805
(loud explosion)
807
00:49:25,127 --> 00:49:27,794
(ominous music)
808
00:49:40,740 --> 00:49:43,950
As the German advance into
Northern Russia continued
809
00:49:43,950 --> 00:49:46,143
the rail link to Leningrad was cut.
810
00:49:47,180 --> 00:49:49,080
The fate of Leningrad and with it,
811
00:49:49,080 --> 00:49:51,953
30 Russian divisions
appeared to be sealed.
812
00:49:52,840 --> 00:49:55,910
The next stage of the battle
was expected to be an attack
813
00:49:55,910 --> 00:49:57,173
on the beleaguered city.
814
00:49:58,695 --> 00:50:01,641
(weapon blasts)
815
00:50:01,641 --> 00:50:04,354
(weapon blasts)
816
00:50:04,354 --> 00:50:07,187
(distant gunfire)
817
00:50:14,000 --> 00:50:16,320
Contrary to their own expectations
818
00:50:16,320 --> 00:50:19,310
the men of the German 18th
army were not to be asked
819
00:50:19,310 --> 00:50:21,880
to mount a full-scale attack on the city.
820
00:50:21,880 --> 00:50:24,270
And after a series of
hotly contested battles
821
00:50:24,270 --> 00:50:25,650
for the outskirts,
822
00:50:25,650 --> 00:50:29,090
Hitler uncharacteristically
ordered his troops to take
823
00:50:29,090 --> 00:50:32,183
Leningrad by means of
a long drawn out siege.
824
00:50:33,240 --> 00:50:35,360
It has been suggested that he was unnerved
825
00:50:35,360 --> 00:50:37,440
by the remote controlled explosions,
826
00:50:37,440 --> 00:50:41,000
which the Russians had used
so effectively in Kiev.
827
00:50:41,000 --> 00:50:44,503
It is a decision which
still provokes debate today.
828
00:50:48,870 --> 00:50:51,910
There are really two possible
explanations for the failure
829
00:50:51,910 --> 00:50:54,980
of Army Group North to take Leningrad.
830
00:50:54,980 --> 00:50:57,280
One was the conflicting
priorities in the mind
831
00:50:57,280 --> 00:51:00,063
of Adolf Hitler and the army high command.
832
00:51:01,270 --> 00:51:02,940
Hitler vacillated between
833
00:51:02,940 --> 00:51:05,323
prioritizing a number of objectives.
834
00:51:06,410 --> 00:51:07,740
There is also a school of thought
835
00:51:07,740 --> 00:51:10,830
which favors Hitler's adverse
reaction to the huge losses
836
00:51:10,830 --> 00:51:14,333
of the German sixth army in
Kiev in August and September.
837
00:51:15,390 --> 00:51:17,900
In Kiev, thousands of German troops
838
00:51:17,900 --> 00:51:20,710
were lost to remote controlled explosions
839
00:51:20,710 --> 00:51:23,663
and thousands of others to
desperate street fighting.
840
00:51:25,330 --> 00:51:26,800
This, it is thought,
841
00:51:26,800 --> 00:51:29,620
persuaded Hitler that
no German troops should
842
00:51:29,620 --> 00:51:32,150
be made vulnerable by committing
them to the inner city
843
00:51:32,150 --> 00:51:35,000
streets of Moscow and Leningrad.
844
00:51:35,000 --> 00:51:36,150
In any event,
845
00:51:36,150 --> 00:51:39,670
the 18th army lacked the really
heavy artillery necessary
846
00:51:39,670 --> 00:51:41,883
to reduce the defenses of Leningrad.
847
00:51:42,790 --> 00:51:46,060
The massive guns of the German
siege train had already been
848
00:51:46,060 --> 00:51:48,930
allocated to the sector
of Army Group South,
849
00:51:48,930 --> 00:51:50,930
where they were earmarked
for the coming battles
850
00:51:50,930 --> 00:51:51,913
in the Crimea.
851
00:51:52,920 --> 00:51:55,630
To move them all the way across Russia
852
00:51:55,630 --> 00:51:57,953
would have delayed the
operation into winter.
853
00:52:14,090 --> 00:52:15,880
To compound the problems of the battles
854
00:52:15,880 --> 00:52:18,270
for the attackers, Panzer group four
855
00:52:18,270 --> 00:52:22,600
was withdrawn from Army Group
North in late September, 1941
856
00:52:22,600 --> 00:52:26,610
in order to support Army Group
Center in operation Typhoon,
857
00:52:26,610 --> 00:52:28,293
the final drive on Moscow.
858
00:52:30,930 --> 00:52:34,250
No German Army Group could
afford to lose its tanks,
859
00:52:34,250 --> 00:52:37,623
but Army Group North lost
virtually all of its armor.
860
00:52:38,890 --> 00:52:41,280
The withdrawal of the
tanks from Army Group North
861
00:52:41,280 --> 00:52:43,910
meant that the army
was virtually immobile.
862
00:52:43,910 --> 00:52:47,253
It was to remain so
for almost three years.
863
00:52:53,423 --> 00:52:56,090
(rapid gunfire)
864
00:53:05,201 --> 00:53:07,534
(loud boom)
865
00:53:10,217 --> 00:53:12,884
(weapon blasts)
866
00:53:14,660 --> 00:53:17,360
It is easy to suggest that
the loss of Panzer Group four
867
00:53:17,360 --> 00:53:19,460
in September, 1941
868
00:53:19,460 --> 00:53:21,570
was directly responsible for the failure
869
00:53:21,570 --> 00:53:23,820
of Army Group North to take its strategic
870
00:53:23,820 --> 00:53:25,770
objective of Leningrad.
871
00:53:25,770 --> 00:53:29,220
However, this is by no means certain.
872
00:53:29,220 --> 00:53:30,890
The capture of a city as large
873
00:53:30,890 --> 00:53:34,790
and well defended as Leningrad
was by no means certain,
874
00:53:34,790 --> 00:53:36,973
even with a strong armored force.
875
00:53:38,030 --> 00:53:41,170
Nevertheless, the removal
of Panzer Group four
876
00:53:41,170 --> 00:53:44,690
clearly did not help the
cause of Army Group North.
877
00:53:44,690 --> 00:53:47,380
It meant that Army Group
North would be denied this one
878
00:53:47,380 --> 00:53:51,210
formation and the size, speed
and fighting power to advance
879
00:53:51,210 --> 00:53:54,960
quickly into the regions
beyond the city of Leningrad,
880
00:53:54,960 --> 00:53:57,760
link up with the Fins
and effectively cut off
881
00:53:57,760 --> 00:53:59,423
the city from its supplies.
882
00:54:01,490 --> 00:54:04,210
The disappearance of Panzer
Group four proved to be
883
00:54:04,210 --> 00:54:07,070
a forerunner of things to come.
884
00:54:07,070 --> 00:54:08,500
From that point onwards,
885
00:54:08,500 --> 00:54:12,450
the evidence was clear that of
the three German army groups
886
00:54:12,450 --> 00:54:16,013
Army Group North was considered
to be the poor relation.
887
00:54:18,430 --> 00:54:21,440
It soon became obvious that
they could expect to receive no
888
00:54:21,440 --> 00:54:24,490
substantial additional
support of any kind.
889
00:54:24,490 --> 00:54:26,420
And the artillery siege train
890
00:54:26,420 --> 00:54:28,233
would never be sent to Leningrad.
891
00:54:29,220 --> 00:54:31,690
The 18th army, therefore,
had no alternative,
892
00:54:31,690 --> 00:54:34,800
but to take Leningrad by siege.
893
00:54:34,800 --> 00:54:38,090
It seemed that the decisive
battles on the Eastern front
894
00:54:38,090 --> 00:54:40,038
would be fought elsewhere.
895
00:54:40,038 --> 00:54:43,038
(suspenseful music)
896
00:54:44,092 --> 00:54:46,985
(loud blast)
897
00:54:46,985 --> 00:54:49,568
(weapon blast)
898
00:55:04,200 --> 00:55:06,690
With the commencement of
the siege of Leningrad,
899
00:55:06,690 --> 00:55:08,610
a relatively stable frontline
900
00:55:08,610 --> 00:55:11,190
appeared in the Northern sector.
901
00:55:11,190 --> 00:55:13,480
The 16th army fought on the right flank
902
00:55:13,480 --> 00:55:14,790
of the Northern sector,
903
00:55:14,790 --> 00:55:18,173
where it was adjacent to the
left wing of Army Group Center.
904
00:55:19,250 --> 00:55:21,680
The 18th Army fought on the left flank
905
00:55:21,680 --> 00:55:24,080
of the 16th army and as such
906
00:55:24,080 --> 00:55:26,963
formed the extreme Northern
end of the front line.
907
00:55:31,260 --> 00:55:34,440
Army Group North was to
remain doggedly committed
908
00:55:34,440 --> 00:55:35,510
to the Northern flank
909
00:55:35,510 --> 00:55:38,210
of the German armies
fighting on the Eastern front
910
00:55:38,210 --> 00:55:40,253
for the entire duration of the war.
911
00:55:41,743 --> 00:55:44,826
(distant explosions)
912
00:56:03,254 --> 00:56:06,309
(weapon blasts)
913
00:56:06,309 --> 00:56:08,976
(weapon blasts)
914
00:56:13,539 --> 00:56:16,206
(rapid gunfire)
915
00:56:18,010 --> 00:56:21,930
The siege of Leningrad was the
stage for an intense struggle
916
00:56:21,930 --> 00:56:25,220
that would in later years
be recognized as a key event
917
00:56:25,220 --> 00:56:27,773
in that conflict of inhuman savagery.
918
00:56:30,800 --> 00:56:33,280
The opening stages were bitterly fought
919
00:56:33,280 --> 00:56:34,850
in the suburbs of the city.
920
00:56:49,100 --> 00:56:51,767
(weapon blasts)
921
00:56:54,742 --> 00:56:57,409
(weapon blasts)
922
00:57:02,188 --> 00:57:04,855
(weapon blasts)
923
00:57:06,158 --> 00:57:09,630
(weapon blasts)
924
00:57:09,630 --> 00:57:12,297
(ominous music)
925
00:57:20,241 --> 00:57:22,470
(people chattering)
926
00:57:22,470 --> 00:57:24,930
When general Zhukov arrived
to take over the defense
927
00:57:24,930 --> 00:57:28,180
of the city on the 10th
of September, 1941,
928
00:57:28,180 --> 00:57:30,420
he found the defenders
in an advanced state
929
00:57:30,420 --> 00:57:34,163
of disorganization and the
inhabitants close to panic.
930
00:57:38,180 --> 00:57:41,863
Undaunted, he briskly set
about bolstering its defenses.
931
00:57:42,930 --> 00:57:46,020
A shortage of anti-tank guns
was dealt with by converting
932
00:57:46,020 --> 00:57:48,530
anti-aircraft artillery to the task
933
00:57:48,530 --> 00:57:50,363
of attempting to halt the Panzers.
934
00:57:51,230 --> 00:57:54,330
Six brigades of Naval
infantry and students were
935
00:57:54,330 --> 00:57:56,870
formed and reinforcements drafted in
936
00:57:56,870 --> 00:57:59,180
from the Karelian Isthmus.
937
00:57:59,180 --> 00:58:02,000
Zhukov began to take
the fight to the Germans
938
00:58:02,000 --> 00:58:04,360
through raids and counter attacks.
939
00:58:04,360 --> 00:58:07,640
But by now the German troops
had pierced the inner circle
940
00:58:07,640 --> 00:58:10,943
of defenses and were
rampaging through the suburbs.
941
00:58:13,290 --> 00:58:15,957
(rapid gunfire)
942
00:58:20,730 --> 00:58:24,000
After a furious exchange
of advances and retreats,
943
00:58:24,000 --> 00:58:25,250
by the end of the month,
944
00:58:25,250 --> 00:58:27,090
the defenders were hanging onto their city
945
00:58:27,090 --> 00:58:28,880
by their fingernails.
946
00:58:28,880 --> 00:58:32,290
It seemed inevitable that
Leningrad would capitulate,
947
00:58:32,290 --> 00:58:35,100
but as Zhukov awaited a renewed assault,
948
00:58:35,100 --> 00:58:37,890
the fourth Panzer group suddenly departed
949
00:58:37,890 --> 00:58:40,150
to join the battle for Moscow
950
00:58:40,150 --> 00:58:43,643
and the remaining German
forces began to build defenses.
951
00:58:44,770 --> 00:58:46,820
Hitler had decreed that Leningrad
952
00:58:46,820 --> 00:58:48,920
would not be taken by force.
953
00:58:48,920 --> 00:58:52,380
It would instead be
starved into submission,
954
00:58:52,380 --> 00:58:54,143
but there was a flaw in the plan.
955
00:58:55,730 --> 00:58:57,780
Although the supply
situation was difficult,
956
00:58:57,780 --> 00:58:59,570
without Panzer Group four
957
00:58:59,570 --> 00:59:03,193
the ring around the city
was never completely closed.
958
00:59:04,260 --> 00:59:07,690
It was still possible to reach
the city over land through
959
00:59:07,690 --> 00:59:10,840
the Virgin forests of
the Russian motherland.
960
00:59:10,840 --> 00:59:14,150
It was also possible to
bring in supplies by boat,
961
00:59:14,150 --> 00:59:15,800
across the waters of Lake Lagoda.
962
00:59:20,420 --> 00:59:23,040
In October, there was
some temporary relief
963
00:59:23,040 --> 00:59:24,900
for the defenders.
964
00:59:24,900 --> 00:59:28,980
The roads had disintegrated
into canals of bottomless mud
965
00:59:28,980 --> 00:59:32,640
along which wheeled vehicles
could drive only at a snail's
966
00:59:32,640 --> 00:59:36,083
pace and only if they were towed by tanks.
967
00:59:37,580 --> 00:59:41,430
This was the "rasputitsa",
the season of mud,
968
00:59:41,430 --> 00:59:43,510
which came as a debilitating surprise
969
00:59:43,510 --> 00:59:46,200
to the Germans in 1941,
970
00:59:46,200 --> 00:59:49,940
general Raus went to great
lengths after the war to explain
971
00:59:49,940 --> 00:59:52,203
the great significance
of the muddy season.
972
00:59:54,527 --> 00:59:58,450
"German losses of tanks and
motorized equipment of all types
973
00:59:58,450 --> 01:00:00,750
were extraordinarily
high during the autumn
974
01:00:00,750 --> 01:00:03,290
muddy period of 1941.
975
01:00:03,290 --> 01:00:07,680
The first time that the mud
of Russia was encountered a
976
01:00:07,680 --> 01:00:10,880
division of the fourth Panzer
group operating in the area
977
01:00:10,880 --> 01:00:13,960
North of Gzhatsk, during the same period,
978
01:00:13,960 --> 01:00:17,240
lost 50 tanks without a shot being fired.
979
01:00:17,240 --> 01:00:19,193
35 of them within three days,
980
01:00:20,160 --> 01:00:23,110
these losses were
extremely serious since no
981
01:00:23,110 --> 01:00:24,887
replacements were received."
982
01:00:35,770 --> 01:00:38,950
The Germans had no conception
of mud as it exists
983
01:00:38,950 --> 01:00:41,080
in European Russia.
984
01:00:41,080 --> 01:00:43,230
In the autumn of 1941,
985
01:00:43,230 --> 01:00:46,310
when frontline troops
were already stuck fast,
986
01:00:46,310 --> 01:00:49,300
the German high command still
believed that mud could be
987
01:00:49,300 --> 01:00:51,590
conquered by brute force.
988
01:00:51,590 --> 01:00:53,560
An idea that led to serious losses
989
01:00:53,560 --> 01:00:55,313
of vehicles and equipment.
990
01:00:56,470 --> 01:00:58,070
At the height of the muddy season,
991
01:00:58,070 --> 01:01:00,880
tractors and recovery
vehicles normally capable
992
01:01:00,880 --> 01:01:03,890
of traversing difficult
terrain are helpless,
993
01:01:03,890 --> 01:01:06,230
and attempts to plow
through the muddy mass
994
01:01:06,230 --> 01:01:09,160
makes roads even more impassable.
995
01:01:09,160 --> 01:01:11,540
Tanks, heavy recovery vehicles,
996
01:01:11,540 --> 01:01:14,030
and even vehicles with
good ground clearance
997
01:01:14,030 --> 01:01:17,550
simply pushed an ever-growing
wall of mud before them,
998
01:01:17,550 --> 01:01:22,050
until they finally stopped half
buried by their own motion.
999
01:01:34,320 --> 01:01:36,860
A sudden frost in the autumn of 1941,
1000
01:01:36,860 --> 01:01:39,770
cemented a crippled buried column
1001
01:01:39,770 --> 01:01:42,100
into a state of complete uselessness.
1002
01:01:42,100 --> 01:01:43,623
And it never moved again.
1003
01:01:44,770 --> 01:01:47,270
Because it could not be
reached in any other way,
1004
01:01:47,270 --> 01:01:51,640
gasoline, tow ropes and food
supplies were airdropped along
1005
01:01:51,640 --> 01:01:53,690
the line of stranded armor,
1006
01:01:53,690 --> 01:01:56,083
but all attempts to move, were futile.
1007
01:02:08,570 --> 01:02:11,490
Often when drivers found
themselves bogged down
1008
01:02:11,490 --> 01:02:13,320
far from any habitation,
1009
01:02:13,320 --> 01:02:16,990
they abandoned their vehicles
and set out on foot to contact
1010
01:02:16,990 --> 01:02:19,340
friendly troops in the nearest village
1011
01:02:19,340 --> 01:02:20,610
or sought food and shelter
1012
01:02:20,610 --> 01:02:24,230
from local civilians in
order to remain alive until
1013
01:02:24,230 --> 01:02:26,363
the worst of the muddy season passed.
1014
01:02:29,410 --> 01:02:33,290
For the muddy seasons, vehicles
with high ground clearance,
1015
01:02:33,290 --> 01:02:37,530
lightweight and low unit
ground pressure were necessary.
1016
01:02:37,530 --> 01:02:40,790
German trucks had low ground
clearance and could not get
1017
01:02:40,790 --> 01:02:43,090
traction in deep mud.
1018
01:02:43,090 --> 01:02:46,410
Since German supply cars had
wheels too narrow for muddy
1019
01:02:46,410 --> 01:02:50,900
terrain, they sank deep into soft ground.
1020
01:02:50,900 --> 01:02:53,510
Even the German Maultier and Ost schlepper
1021
01:02:53,510 --> 01:02:56,360
of the later years were bogged down in mud
1022
01:02:56,360 --> 01:02:58,233
as their tracks were too narrow.
1023
01:02:59,140 --> 01:03:01,380
Raus noted that the awkward looking
1024
01:03:01,380 --> 01:03:04,780
and slow Russian tractor
of pre-war vintage
1025
01:03:04,780 --> 01:03:08,240
salvaged the heaviest
most deeply mired loads
1026
01:03:08,240 --> 01:03:10,523
after German equipment
failed to budge them.
1027
01:03:26,820 --> 01:03:30,970
Inside Leningrad, food
supplies to the besieged city
1028
01:03:30,970 --> 01:03:33,920
had been diminishing
throughout the autumn.
1029
01:03:33,920 --> 01:03:35,220
By late November,
1030
01:03:35,220 --> 01:03:37,640
they were at their lowest
ebb for the entire duration
1031
01:03:37,640 --> 01:03:38,533
of the siege.
1032
01:03:39,700 --> 01:03:41,240
Manual workers were receiving
1033
01:03:41,240 --> 01:03:44,700
only 250 grams of bread per day.
1034
01:03:44,700 --> 01:03:47,500
One third of their normal requirement.
1035
01:03:47,500 --> 01:03:49,440
Without water for sanitation
1036
01:03:49,440 --> 01:03:51,430
and basic medical supplies,
1037
01:03:51,430 --> 01:03:53,253
disease became inevitable.
1038
01:03:54,430 --> 01:03:56,360
As winter arrived and temperatures
1039
01:03:56,360 --> 01:03:58,130
fell to the minus twenties,
1040
01:03:58,130 --> 01:04:01,340
thousands began to die each day.
1041
01:04:01,340 --> 01:04:04,063
Total starvation threatened constantly.
1042
01:04:04,990 --> 01:04:06,000
To the Germans
1043
01:04:06,000 --> 01:04:07,603
collapse seemed imminent.
1044
01:04:26,800 --> 01:04:29,520
Back in Berlin, a
reception with Adolf Hitler
1045
01:04:29,520 --> 01:04:30,540
as a guest of honor,
1046
01:04:30,540 --> 01:04:33,523
was organized to celebrate
the fall of the stricken city.
1047
01:04:35,440 --> 01:04:38,923
The invitations were
printed, but never posted.
1048
01:04:47,930 --> 01:04:51,283
Russian resistance remained
stubborn and defiant.
1049
01:04:52,520 --> 01:04:56,760
Even women soldiers in the
Red Army were in combat units,
1050
01:04:56,760 --> 01:04:59,670
the ferocity and
inhumanity of the conflict
1051
01:04:59,670 --> 01:05:01,093
beggars the imagination.
1052
01:05:03,335 --> 01:05:06,085
(engine rumbles)
1053
01:05:11,110 --> 01:05:13,590
In an attempt to relieve
the appalling conditions
1054
01:05:13,590 --> 01:05:16,100
in the city, the Russians marked a road
1055
01:05:16,100 --> 01:05:19,710
across the frozen Southwest
corner of Lake Ladoga.
1056
01:05:19,710 --> 01:05:23,770
And by the 22nd of November,
convoys of supply lorries
1057
01:05:23,770 --> 01:05:26,683
were just managing to stave
off famine in the city.
1058
01:05:29,640 --> 01:05:32,800
It was a hazardous passage
through the biting Northeastern
1059
01:05:32,800 --> 01:05:34,803
gales, which swept across the Lake.
1060
01:05:42,510 --> 01:05:44,730
The German Luftwaffe also did its best
1061
01:05:44,730 --> 01:05:48,333
to intercept the convoys and
break the surface of the ice.
1062
01:05:56,140 --> 01:05:57,710
Yet for all its horror,
1063
01:05:57,710 --> 01:06:01,190
the Russians knew that defending
this lifeline to the city
1064
01:06:01,190 --> 01:06:04,673
was the only possible way of
keeping the inhabitants alive.
1065
01:06:08,540 --> 01:06:11,707
(airplane roars past)
1066
01:06:15,018 --> 01:06:17,790
(quick succession of blasts)
1067
01:06:17,790 --> 01:06:19,060
But for some,
1068
01:06:19,060 --> 01:06:22,963
the food coming across the
ice was too little too late.
1069
01:06:23,870 --> 01:06:27,750
Victims of starvation, suffering
from falling blood pressure
1070
01:06:27,750 --> 01:06:31,110
and the wasting of the heart
and internal organs would never
1071
01:06:31,110 --> 01:06:33,260
regain their health.
1072
01:06:33,260 --> 01:06:35,570
Many would die months after food
1073
01:06:35,570 --> 01:06:38,380
and medical supplies finally arrived.
1074
01:06:38,380 --> 01:06:41,840
The children who survived would
emerge totally traumatized
1075
01:06:41,840 --> 01:06:44,783
by the siege as an eyewitness recalled.
1076
01:06:46,877 --> 01:06:50,530
"It was reflected in the way
many of the children played all
1077
01:06:50,530 --> 01:06:54,800
by themselves in the way that
even in that collective games,
1078
01:06:54,800 --> 01:06:58,383
they played in silence with grave faces.
1079
01:06:59,430 --> 01:07:01,200
I saw faces of children,
1080
01:07:01,200 --> 01:07:05,120
which reflected such thoughtfulness
and sorrow that those
1081
01:07:05,120 --> 01:07:08,940
eyes and faces told one more
than could be gathered from all
1082
01:07:08,940 --> 01:07:11,237
the stories of the horrors of famine."
1083
01:07:21,210 --> 01:07:25,010
As events unfolded it soon
became clear that in spite of all
1084
01:07:25,010 --> 01:07:27,510
the hardships of the siege of Leningrad,
1085
01:07:27,510 --> 01:07:30,560
the Northern sector was
considered by both sides
1086
01:07:30,560 --> 01:07:33,200
to be of secondary importance.
1087
01:07:33,200 --> 01:07:34,690
The men of Army Group North
1088
01:07:34,690 --> 01:07:36,750
soon became convinced
that they were fighting
1089
01:07:36,750 --> 01:07:41,170
what they referred to as, "the
eternal war of the poor man".
1090
01:07:41,170 --> 01:07:43,510
Casualties along the
whole of the Russian front
1091
01:07:43,510 --> 01:07:44,830
had been enormous,
1092
01:07:44,830 --> 01:07:47,920
but only 67,000
replacements were allocated
1093
01:07:47,920 --> 01:07:49,940
to army group North
1094
01:07:49,940 --> 01:07:53,560
as against 131,000 to Army Group Center
1095
01:07:53,560 --> 01:07:56,773
and 119,000 to Army Group South.
1096
01:08:02,380 --> 01:08:04,530
When it came to allocating fresh divisions
1097
01:08:04,530 --> 01:08:06,450
from the reserves, the situation
1098
01:08:06,450 --> 01:08:08,300
was even less favorable.
1099
01:08:08,300 --> 01:08:10,440
Of 21 new divisions released
1100
01:08:10,440 --> 01:08:13,560
by army high command
in the autumn of 1941,
1101
01:08:13,560 --> 01:08:17,350
only three were allocated
to Army Group North.
1102
01:08:17,350 --> 01:08:19,650
It was a further indication
of things to come.
1103
01:08:29,030 --> 01:08:32,430
One unexpected benefit for the
Army Group was the occasional
1104
01:08:32,430 --> 01:08:35,090
support which they received
from German Naval units
1105
01:08:35,090 --> 01:08:36,423
operating in the Baltic.
1106
01:08:37,270 --> 01:08:39,960
As one flank rested on the Baltic seas
1107
01:08:39,960 --> 01:08:42,450
Army Group North was the
only formation which could
1108
01:08:42,450 --> 01:08:45,263
look for substantial support
from the Kriegsmarine.
1109
01:08:52,820 --> 01:08:55,290
The German Navy had
played a significant role
1110
01:08:55,290 --> 01:08:57,520
in the Soviet German war.
1111
01:08:57,520 --> 01:08:58,560
In the Baltic,
1112
01:08:58,560 --> 01:08:59,800
the Germans sealed up
1113
01:08:59,800 --> 01:09:02,910
the powerful Russian
front with minefields.
1114
01:09:02,910 --> 01:09:03,890
By doing so,
1115
01:09:03,890 --> 01:09:06,693
they also trapped the
Soviet submarine fleet.
1116
01:09:08,010 --> 01:09:11,300
As the Germans advanced
along the Baltic coastline,
1117
01:09:11,300 --> 01:09:15,010
they took control of Russian
bases so that the Soviet Baltic
1118
01:09:15,010 --> 01:09:17,953
fleet had to remain
bottled up in Leningrad.
1119
01:09:30,700 --> 01:09:34,730
The function of the Soviet
Baltic fleet during 1941 and 42
1120
01:09:34,730 --> 01:09:38,410
was limited solely to supplying
fire support to the Soviet
1121
01:09:38,410 --> 01:09:40,693
forces fighting to defend the city.
1122
01:09:52,340 --> 01:09:55,080
This aspect of the fighting
was also to provide the stage
1123
01:09:55,080 --> 01:10:00,040
for a daring attack led by the
Stukas of Hans-Ulrich Rudel.
1124
01:10:00,040 --> 01:10:01,240
The Luftwaffe was ordered
1125
01:10:01,240 --> 01:10:04,400
to sink the Soviet battleship Marat.
1126
01:10:04,400 --> 01:10:07,530
Rudel managed this amazing
feat in the face of fierce
1127
01:10:07,530 --> 01:10:11,443
anti-aircraft fire with a
single well-placed bomb.
1128
01:10:15,385 --> 01:10:17,320
(waves crashing)
1129
01:10:17,320 --> 01:10:18,640
On the deficit side,
1130
01:10:18,640 --> 01:10:20,990
the 18th army had to
become involved in a number
1131
01:10:20,990 --> 01:10:24,460
of amphibious operations to
capture the Baltic islands,
1132
01:10:24,460 --> 01:10:26,600
which placed a great
strain on what were already
1133
01:10:26,600 --> 01:10:28,573
severely limited resources.
1134
01:10:35,256 --> 01:10:36,949
(weapon blasts)
1135
01:10:36,949 --> 01:10:38,510
(deep boom)
1136
01:10:38,510 --> 01:10:41,300
(fire crackles)
1137
01:10:41,300 --> 01:10:43,400
Throughout the whole course of the war,
1138
01:10:43,400 --> 01:10:46,480
the lack of powerful
reinforcements severely limited
1139
01:10:46,480 --> 01:10:50,120
the strategic options available
for the Army Group command.
1140
01:10:50,120 --> 01:10:53,010
It also required a great
deal of juggling of available
1141
01:10:53,010 --> 01:10:56,730
divisions to maintain the
extended frontline and the siege
1142
01:10:56,730 --> 01:11:00,593
of Leningrad, which was to
drag on for almost three years.
1143
01:11:06,107 --> 01:11:09,107
(people chattering)
1144
01:11:10,930 --> 01:11:13,400
The Germans had closed
right up on the city
1145
01:11:13,400 --> 01:11:18,200
and into the outer suburbs,
but the ring was not closed.
1146
01:11:18,200 --> 01:11:19,450
An important consideration
1147
01:11:19,450 --> 01:11:21,823
at this time was the role of the Fins.
1148
01:11:22,740 --> 01:11:26,230
They agreed to move close to
Leningrad, their fifth general
1149
01:11:26,230 --> 01:11:28,640
Mannerheim making it quite
clear that he was prepared
1150
01:11:28,640 --> 01:11:31,260
to take action to recover
Finnish territory,
1151
01:11:31,260 --> 01:11:34,540
yielded to Russia in
the winter war of 1939,
1152
01:11:34,540 --> 01:11:37,420
but that he would not take
part in the direct attack
1153
01:11:37,420 --> 01:11:39,319
on Leningrad itself.
1154
01:11:39,319 --> 01:11:42,880
(gentle guitar music)
1155
01:11:42,880 --> 01:11:45,200
That was one of the
conditions Finland made
1156
01:11:45,200 --> 01:11:47,230
on entering the war against Russia
1157
01:11:47,230 --> 01:11:48,803
on the side of the Germans.
1158
01:11:49,974 --> 01:11:51,040
Mannerheim was as mindful
1159
01:11:51,040 --> 01:11:53,000
of the political conditions as he was
1160
01:11:53,000 --> 01:11:55,810
of the military conditions
because of Finland's
1161
01:11:55,810 --> 01:11:58,223
vulnerability to future
Russian aggression.
1162
01:11:59,530 --> 01:12:01,870
This meant that the German
and Finnish armies were never
1163
01:12:01,870 --> 01:12:04,270
able to cut off Leningrad completely
1164
01:12:04,270 --> 01:12:06,490
from the rest of the world.
1165
01:12:06,490 --> 01:12:08,310
In both winter and summer,
1166
01:12:08,310 --> 01:12:11,160
the Russian forces were still
able to get resources across
1167
01:12:11,160 --> 01:12:13,823
Lake Ladoga in the Northeast of the city.
1168
01:12:14,970 --> 01:12:17,550
From the winter of 1942 onwards,
1169
01:12:17,550 --> 01:12:20,890
the railway to the East
of Leningrad was completed
1170
01:12:20,890 --> 01:12:24,130
and Leningrad was connected to
the rest of the Soviet union,
1171
01:12:24,130 --> 01:12:26,640
which enabled the forces
to supply the inhabitants
1172
01:12:26,640 --> 01:12:30,113
of the city, helping some of
them to survive the siege.
1173
01:12:34,010 --> 01:12:37,040
The Soviet negotiators in the
Soviet Finnish peace talks,
1174
01:12:37,040 --> 01:12:39,270
which took place in 1944,
1175
01:12:39,270 --> 01:12:42,330
actually recalled that the
Russians recognized what the Fins
1176
01:12:42,330 --> 01:12:43,233
had done for them.
1177
01:12:44,070 --> 01:12:47,840
If the Fins had moved forward
and closed the ring of siege
1178
01:12:47,840 --> 01:12:51,393
around Leningrad, it would've
meant the death of the city.
1179
01:12:54,630 --> 01:12:56,400
Despite the fact that some supplies
1180
01:12:56,400 --> 01:12:59,360
got through, it was precious little.
1181
01:12:59,360 --> 01:13:03,110
Starvation drove the
population to extreme measures,
1182
01:13:03,110 --> 01:13:06,023
including the horrifying
excess of cannibalism.
1183
01:13:07,530 --> 01:13:11,243
The first cases occurred at the
beginning of December, 1941.
1184
01:13:12,180 --> 01:13:14,040
The Soviet criminal code
1185
01:13:14,040 --> 01:13:17,123
made no mention of such
a crime as cannibalism.
1186
01:13:18,040 --> 01:13:21,110
So Soviet officials could at
first only define it as an
1187
01:13:21,110 --> 01:13:23,253
extreme form of banditry.
1188
01:13:24,520 --> 01:13:26,790
According to the top secret
report of the military
1189
01:13:26,790 --> 01:13:30,040
procurator of Leningrad, A. A Kuznetsov,
1190
01:13:30,040 --> 01:13:32,710
dated 27th of February, 1942
1191
01:13:33,690 --> 01:13:36,820
investigations of cannibalism
led to criminal charges
1192
01:13:36,820 --> 01:13:41,110
against 26 individuals in December, 1941,
1193
01:13:41,110 --> 01:13:45,343
366 in January, 1942 and 494
1194
01:13:46,840 --> 01:13:49,843
in the first two weeks of February, 1942.
1195
01:13:51,190 --> 01:13:54,070
Investigation revealed that
not only was human flesh
1196
01:13:54,070 --> 01:13:56,290
consumed by individuals,
1197
01:13:56,290 --> 01:13:58,963
but it was also sold to other citizens.
1198
01:13:59,860 --> 01:14:04,860
By the 20th of February 1942,
866 individuals were under
1199
01:14:04,960 --> 01:14:08,320
criminal investigation
or actual indictment
1200
01:14:08,320 --> 01:14:09,963
for suspected cannibalism.
1201
01:14:11,380 --> 01:14:15,093
Only 18% of this number had
any previous criminal record.
1202
01:14:19,120 --> 01:14:24,120
Of the 886 suspect
individuals, 322 were men
1203
01:14:24,470 --> 01:14:27,490
and 564 women.
1204
01:14:27,490 --> 01:14:31,230
Almost 30% were aged over 40.
1205
01:14:31,230 --> 01:14:33,833
The next largest group
being in their thirties.
1206
01:14:38,600 --> 01:14:39,945
More ghoulish still,
1207
01:14:39,945 --> 01:14:42,630
was the discovery of extensive intrusions
1208
01:14:42,630 --> 01:14:46,093
into cemeteries and the
mutilation of the recent dead.
1209
01:14:47,160 --> 01:14:49,480
One evening in March, 1942,
1210
01:14:49,480 --> 01:14:52,210
the watchman at the Piskaryovskoye
cemetery detained a woman
1211
01:14:52,210 --> 01:14:53,710
with a sack.
1212
01:14:53,710 --> 01:14:58,033
Once opened, the sack revealed
the bodies of five infants.
1213
01:14:59,110 --> 01:15:02,440
The increase in cannibalism
forced the city authorities
1214
01:15:02,440 --> 01:15:06,023
to set up police guards at
all the major cemeteries.
1215
01:15:09,360 --> 01:15:14,063
With the first snows of 1941
came a cruelly bitter winter.
1216
01:15:14,950 --> 01:15:18,050
The temperature continued to
fall and the German soldiers
1217
01:15:18,050 --> 01:15:21,110
now paid dearly for the
arrogance of the high command
1218
01:15:21,110 --> 01:15:23,750
that had refused to admit the
possibility of anything other
1219
01:15:23,750 --> 01:15:25,913
than a quick decisive campaign.
1220
01:15:26,760 --> 01:15:30,860
Few men in the German trenches
had more than summer clothing
1221
01:15:30,860 --> 01:15:33,713
and frostbite took an agonizing tole.
1222
01:15:35,980 --> 01:15:38,490
German machinery and guns
had never been designed
1223
01:15:38,490 --> 01:15:40,800
to function in such extremes.
1224
01:15:40,800 --> 01:15:44,560
Engines seized up, metal
tank tracks split apart
1225
01:15:44,560 --> 01:15:48,140
in the cold, ammunition would not fire.
1226
01:15:48,140 --> 01:15:49,580
The fierceness of the cold
1227
01:15:49,580 --> 01:15:52,633
was far beyond the
experience of most Germans.
1228
01:16:08,980 --> 01:16:11,813
(tank roars past)
1229
01:16:13,870 --> 01:16:14,740
(distant explosions)
1230
01:16:14,740 --> 01:16:17,850
Emboldened by the problems
they saw in the German ranks
1231
01:16:17,850 --> 01:16:20,890
a series of Soviet counterattacks
managed to roll back
1232
01:16:20,890 --> 01:16:24,050
many of the German gains around Leningrad.
1233
01:16:24,050 --> 01:16:25,780
With incredible exertions,
1234
01:16:25,780 --> 01:16:28,373
the Germans kept up a
semblance of defense.
1235
01:16:29,480 --> 01:16:32,530
The tactics of winter warfare
centered around contests
1236
01:16:32,530 --> 01:16:36,560
for the possession of
roads and inhabited places.
1237
01:16:36,560 --> 01:16:38,530
In Russia, villages and roads
1238
01:16:38,530 --> 01:16:40,320
were infinitely more important than they
1239
01:16:40,320 --> 01:16:42,820
were on the rest of the continent.
1240
01:16:42,820 --> 01:16:44,700
In other German theaters of war,
1241
01:16:44,700 --> 01:16:48,710
no one particular road ever
became a crucial factor
1242
01:16:48,710 --> 01:16:50,580
since a well-developed road network
1243
01:16:50,580 --> 01:16:53,500
always offered a choice
of alternate routes.
1244
01:16:53,500 --> 01:16:56,380
In Russia, the possession of a single road
1245
01:16:56,380 --> 01:16:57,590
was often a matter of life
1246
01:16:57,590 --> 01:16:59,673
or death for an entire army.
1247
01:17:00,690 --> 01:17:04,080
The extreme tactical importance
of inhabited places during
1248
01:17:04,080 --> 01:17:07,310
the six months of winter explains
the fact that the Russians
1249
01:17:07,310 --> 01:17:10,460
would frequently much rather
destroy them than surrender
1250
01:17:10,460 --> 01:17:11,360
them to the enemy.
1251
01:17:28,840 --> 01:17:31,820
In the bitter trench
warfare outside Leningrad,
1252
01:17:31,820 --> 01:17:34,720
the defender had a definite
advantage in winter
1253
01:17:34,720 --> 01:17:36,320
because as a rule,
1254
01:17:36,320 --> 01:17:39,000
their positions could
not be seen in the snow,
1255
01:17:39,000 --> 01:17:40,893
except at very close range.
1256
01:17:41,850 --> 01:17:44,870
The defenders were able to
keep their forces undercover
1257
01:17:44,870 --> 01:17:46,710
and wait until the moment their fire
1258
01:17:46,710 --> 01:17:48,303
could be used most effectively.
1259
01:17:49,470 --> 01:17:53,950
The attacker was also
impeded and easily detected
1260
01:17:53,950 --> 01:17:55,573
even in camouflaged clothing.
1261
01:17:58,530 --> 01:18:02,050
The principal weapon of the
defender became the machine gun
1262
01:18:02,050 --> 01:18:05,010
as its performance was
not diminished by snow
1263
01:18:05,010 --> 01:18:07,410
in which mortars and light artillery lost
1264
01:18:07,410 --> 01:18:08,883
most of their effectiveness.
1265
01:18:15,400 --> 01:18:17,680
Replacements were also becoming a problem
1266
01:18:17,680 --> 01:18:19,740
for the German forces.
1267
01:18:19,740 --> 01:18:20,573
After the war,
1268
01:18:20,573 --> 01:18:23,390
it became clear from the
diaries of Army Group North
1269
01:18:23,390 --> 01:18:26,310
that the commanders of both
formations had intentionally
1270
01:18:26,310 --> 01:18:29,210
prohibited, even during calm periods,
1271
01:18:29,210 --> 01:18:32,230
the removal of a unit from
the front in order to grant it
1272
01:18:32,230 --> 01:18:33,930
a period of rest.
1273
01:18:33,930 --> 01:18:37,090
It was better to keep the
divisions at the front and assign
1274
01:18:37,090 --> 01:18:39,160
them to a narrower sector
1275
01:18:39,160 --> 01:18:41,420
as otherwise a reserve unit,
1276
01:18:41,420 --> 01:18:44,120
which had been removed from
the Northern front was certain
1277
01:18:44,120 --> 01:18:47,410
to be taken by the Supreme
command and assigned more
1278
01:18:47,410 --> 01:18:50,290
pressing pressure points
on either the central
1279
01:18:50,290 --> 01:18:51,390
or the Southern front.
1280
01:18:52,607 --> 01:18:53,924
(distant gunfire)
1281
01:18:53,924 --> 01:18:56,740
(loud explosion)
1282
01:18:56,740 --> 01:18:58,860
Although the Northern
front was regarded as being
1283
01:18:58,860 --> 01:19:03,063
of secondary importance, it
was in no sense, a backwater.
1284
01:19:03,900 --> 01:19:06,450
There was still a great deal
of terrible fighting in very
1285
01:19:06,450 --> 01:19:10,530
difficult terrain with
extensive swamps and few roads
1286
01:19:10,530 --> 01:19:13,350
through the vast sections
of trackless forest,
1287
01:19:13,350 --> 01:19:15,623
which presented a logistical nightmare.
1288
01:19:20,530 --> 01:19:23,530
Army group North and the army
divisions were facing the most
1289
01:19:23,530 --> 01:19:26,340
difficult conditions on the Eastern front.
1290
01:19:26,340 --> 01:19:29,640
The climate and the terrain
were completely different.
1291
01:19:29,640 --> 01:19:33,510
Around Leningrad, it is
very marshy and boggy.
1292
01:19:33,510 --> 01:19:35,490
There were also very few roads.
1293
01:19:35,490 --> 01:19:38,743
So all transport logistics
were very difficult indeed.
1294
01:19:51,630 --> 01:19:53,960
To compound the difficulties
for the Germans,
1295
01:19:53,960 --> 01:19:56,140
by October of 1941,
1296
01:19:56,140 --> 01:19:59,270
the first partisan attacks
had begun to cause severe
1297
01:19:59,270 --> 01:20:01,193
difficulties in the rear areas.
1298
01:20:02,190 --> 01:20:04,720
The effects of these attacks
were further compounded
1299
01:20:04,720 --> 01:20:06,170
by the fact that the underdeveloped
1300
01:20:06,170 --> 01:20:07,940
infrastructure of Russia
1301
01:20:07,940 --> 01:20:10,230
meant that there were
very few roads or railways
1302
01:20:10,230 --> 01:20:12,310
which could be used as alternatives
1303
01:20:12,310 --> 01:20:14,863
to those blocked by partisan activity.
1304
01:20:16,660 --> 01:20:19,180
The Russian winter was a nightmare
1305
01:20:19,180 --> 01:20:21,450
along the whole of the front,
1306
01:20:21,450 --> 01:20:23,090
but it was Army Group North
1307
01:20:23,090 --> 01:20:27,260
which bore the brunt of the
most extreme Russian winters.
1308
01:20:27,260 --> 01:20:30,510
It is impossible to
exaggerate the cruel realities
1309
01:20:30,510 --> 01:20:34,013
of fighting in the ferocious
winters of Northern Russia.
1310
01:20:54,070 --> 01:20:55,840
In addition to their geographical
1311
01:20:55,840 --> 01:20:57,560
and climactic difficulties,
1312
01:20:57,560 --> 01:21:01,000
the fighting spirit of the Red
Army facing Army Group North
1313
01:21:01,000 --> 01:21:02,110
was no less intense
1314
01:21:02,110 --> 01:21:04,203
than that displayed on the other sectors.
1315
01:21:05,100 --> 01:21:07,720
The siege of Leningrad
has become synonymous
1316
01:21:07,720 --> 01:21:10,200
with endurance and suffering,
1317
01:21:10,200 --> 01:21:13,190
but there was also a great
deal of intense combat
1318
01:21:13,190 --> 01:21:15,700
as a series of miniature battles rolled
1319
01:21:15,700 --> 01:21:16,870
backwards and forwards
1320
01:21:16,870 --> 01:21:19,233
around the siege lines outside Leningrad.
1321
01:21:20,490 --> 01:21:23,157
(weapon blasts)
1322
01:21:25,668 --> 01:21:28,335
(weapon blasts)
1323
01:21:29,627 --> 01:21:33,157
(distant gunfire)
1324
01:21:33,157 --> 01:21:35,824
(weapon blasts)
1325
01:21:39,320 --> 01:21:41,290
Despite coming very close to victory
1326
01:21:41,290 --> 01:21:43,030
on a number of occasions,
1327
01:21:43,030 --> 01:21:45,580
Army Group North was never
able to close the ring
1328
01:21:45,580 --> 01:21:48,090
around Leningrad completely.
1329
01:21:48,090 --> 01:21:51,270
And the high command continued
to draw desperately needed
1330
01:21:51,270 --> 01:21:54,260
divisions away from the
Army Group North sector,
1331
01:21:54,260 --> 01:21:57,023
in order to feed other
hard-pressed sectors.
1332
01:21:58,150 --> 01:22:01,040
The result of this attrition
from two directions
1333
01:22:01,040 --> 01:22:05,230
was that a ferocious Soviet
offensive in January, 1944,
1334
01:22:05,230 --> 01:22:06,990
finally broke the resistance
1335
01:22:06,990 --> 01:22:10,093
of Army Group North and raised the siege.
1336
01:22:11,360 --> 01:22:15,000
The lifting of the siege
of Leningrad in 1944
1337
01:22:15,000 --> 01:22:16,380
forced Army Group North
1338
01:22:16,380 --> 01:22:19,270
to fall back to a new defensive front
1339
01:22:19,270 --> 01:22:21,730
composed of a series of
partially constructed
1340
01:22:21,730 --> 01:22:24,917
defenses known as "The Panther line".
1341
01:22:25,910 --> 01:22:28,300
This line should have
represented a fallback position
1342
01:22:28,300 --> 01:22:32,823
for the German forces, but work
was beginning much too late.
1343
01:22:39,330 --> 01:22:42,180
The Panther line was envisaged
as a series of strong
1344
01:22:42,180 --> 01:22:45,770
fortifications incorporating
parts of the Northern regions
1345
01:22:45,770 --> 01:22:48,890
of the Soviet union in a
line running Southwards
1346
01:22:48,890 --> 01:22:51,860
from Lake Dvina and Lake Pscov
1347
01:22:51,860 --> 01:22:53,120
near the town of Nava
1348
01:22:53,120 --> 01:22:54,823
on the Baltic coast of Estonia.
1349
01:22:55,890 --> 01:22:57,980
It was envisaged that the German troops
1350
01:22:57,980 --> 01:23:00,020
retreating behind the line
1351
01:23:00,020 --> 01:23:03,133
would occupy a series of
excellent defensive points.
1352
01:23:04,170 --> 01:23:06,210
The German troops would
therefore have a respite
1353
01:23:06,210 --> 01:23:07,850
from the rigors of the retreat
1354
01:23:07,850 --> 01:23:10,313
and be able to hold
the Soviet army at bay.
1355
01:23:17,360 --> 01:23:19,590
Meanwhile, the armored formations
1356
01:23:19,590 --> 01:23:21,710
and the air formations of the German army
1357
01:23:21,710 --> 01:23:25,480
were repaired and returned
to the fray to renew combat
1358
01:23:25,480 --> 01:23:27,800
with their Soviet foes.
1359
01:23:27,800 --> 01:23:29,680
However, the Panther line
1360
01:23:29,680 --> 01:23:31,930
was constructed merely as an afterthought
1361
01:23:31,930 --> 01:23:33,293
when it was much too late.
1362
01:23:34,270 --> 01:23:36,480
The German armies had suffered defeats
1363
01:23:36,480 --> 01:23:37,530
and simply did not have
1364
01:23:37,530 --> 01:23:39,943
enough troops to man the line effectively.
1365
01:23:40,930 --> 01:23:43,010
In those areas where adequate defenses
1366
01:23:43,010 --> 01:23:44,660
had been prepared in the line
1367
01:23:44,660 --> 01:23:46,110
and there were sufficient German troops
1368
01:23:46,110 --> 01:23:47,790
and aircraft available,
1369
01:23:47,790 --> 01:23:49,840
it proved a very formidable obstacle
1370
01:23:49,840 --> 01:23:51,583
for the Soviet army to overcome.
1371
01:23:52,470 --> 01:23:54,430
Had it been properly prepared
1372
01:23:54,430 --> 01:23:57,800
as part of a coherent
overall strategic plan,
1373
01:23:57,800 --> 01:24:00,305
the Panther line could have been held.
1374
01:24:00,305 --> 01:24:03,305
(suspenseful music)
1375
01:24:12,050 --> 01:24:14,800
The Panther line was only ever
going to provide a temporary
1376
01:24:14,800 --> 01:24:17,973
solution to the mounting
problems of Army Group North.
1377
01:24:19,000 --> 01:24:21,960
The destruction of the
neighboring Army Group Center
1378
01:24:21,960 --> 01:24:23,940
in June, 1944,
1379
01:24:23,940 --> 01:24:27,790
tore a huge gap in the German
lines and left the right flank
1380
01:24:27,790 --> 01:24:31,203
of Army Group North
vulnerable to a Soviet attack.
1381
01:24:35,220 --> 01:24:39,570
Hitler was forced to sanction
another series of withdrawals.
1382
01:24:39,570 --> 01:24:41,840
From the Panther line, Army Group North
1383
01:24:41,840 --> 01:24:44,610
were forced to retreat
in relatively good order
1384
01:24:44,610 --> 01:24:48,180
towards Germany fighting a
series of ferocious defensive
1385
01:24:48,180 --> 01:24:50,010
battles as they went.
1386
01:24:50,010 --> 01:24:51,750
The most notable of these being
1387
01:24:51,750 --> 01:24:54,103
the defense of Nava in 1944.
1388
01:24:58,540 --> 01:25:01,130
The battle for Narva plays
a very important part
1389
01:25:01,130 --> 01:25:02,950
in the Soviet German war
1390
01:25:02,950 --> 01:25:06,540
because Narva is the gateway to Estonia.
1391
01:25:06,540 --> 01:25:10,290
The Germans recognized the
importance of holding Narva.
1392
01:25:10,290 --> 01:25:12,730
And there were initially
12 divisions organized
1393
01:25:12,730 --> 01:25:14,680
into what was called "Abteilung Narwa",
1394
01:25:15,560 --> 01:25:17,310
a special force grouping,
1395
01:25:17,310 --> 01:25:20,393
which was to fight with enormous
courage and distinction.
1396
01:25:26,930 --> 01:25:31,050
The defense of Narva was a
bitterly fought encounter.
1397
01:25:31,050 --> 01:25:33,470
A breakthrough here would have compromised
1398
01:25:33,470 --> 01:25:35,710
many German troops in the Baltic regions
1399
01:25:35,710 --> 01:25:38,190
of Estonia and Latvia.
1400
01:25:38,190 --> 01:25:40,760
European SS, along with the German
1401
01:25:40,760 --> 01:25:43,090
regular army divisions managed to hold
1402
01:25:43,090 --> 01:25:45,840
back the forces of the
Soviet Leningrad front
1403
01:25:45,840 --> 01:25:49,630
throughout January, February, and March.
1404
01:25:49,630 --> 01:25:53,230
Their bitter attritional
contest was not characterized
1405
01:25:53,230 --> 01:25:55,800
by sophisticated tactical maneuvers.
1406
01:25:55,800 --> 01:25:57,653
It was a bloody slugging-match.
1407
01:26:05,327 --> 01:26:08,160
(distant gunfire)
1408
01:26:12,948 --> 01:26:15,615
(weapon blasts)
1409
01:26:17,770 --> 01:26:21,370
The German formations were
saved by the early spring thaw
1410
01:26:21,370 --> 01:26:23,740
of late March, 1944,
1411
01:26:23,740 --> 01:26:28,020
which produced seas of mud
floods of at least one foot deep
1412
01:26:28,020 --> 01:26:31,720
in an area of 100 to 140 miles square.
1413
01:26:31,720 --> 01:26:35,940
Even Soviet tanks stuck
fast in the torrents of mud
1414
01:26:35,940 --> 01:26:39,263
and the German forces were
able to retreat once more.
1415
01:26:45,410 --> 01:26:48,880
The incredible resistance
offered by Army Group Narva,
1416
01:26:48,880 --> 01:26:51,520
a scratch formation drawn
from the slender resources
1417
01:26:51,520 --> 01:26:53,040
of Army Group North
1418
01:26:53,040 --> 01:26:54,860
represents an impressive example
1419
01:26:54,860 --> 01:26:56,800
of military improvisation
1420
01:26:56,800 --> 01:26:58,470
and stands comparison with the other
1421
01:26:58,470 --> 01:27:00,760
German defensive battles fought elsewhere
1422
01:27:00,760 --> 01:27:02,363
in Russia and Italy.
1423
01:27:03,580 --> 01:27:07,530
The mainstay of resistance in
Narva was the third SS Panzer
1424
01:27:07,530 --> 01:27:11,850
Corps, which included the long
serving SS police division
1425
01:27:11,850 --> 01:27:14,670
along with the new SS Viking division
1426
01:27:14,670 --> 01:27:18,042
comprised of volunteers from
different nationalities.
1427
01:27:18,042 --> 01:27:20,709
(rapid gunfire)
1428
01:27:23,900 --> 01:27:26,080
By October, 1944,
1429
01:27:26,080 --> 01:27:27,580
the situation around Narva
1430
01:27:27,580 --> 01:27:30,570
from a German point of view, was hopeless.
1431
01:27:30,570 --> 01:27:33,820
But unlike the countless
garrisons squandered by Hitler
1432
01:27:33,820 --> 01:27:37,770
in a pointless series of
hold-at-all-costs orders,
1433
01:27:37,770 --> 01:27:40,270
Army Group Narva managed to escape
1434
01:27:40,270 --> 01:27:42,543
and rejoin Army Group North.
1435
01:27:45,130 --> 01:27:48,660
Constant retreat was now the
order of the day as the army
1436
01:27:48,660 --> 01:27:49,770
group was driven back
1437
01:27:49,770 --> 01:27:52,093
through the Baltic States towards Germany.
1438
01:27:52,940 --> 01:27:55,883
But Army Group North
would never make it home.
1439
01:27:57,062 --> 01:28:00,229
(gentle guitar music)
1440
01:28:05,260 --> 01:28:07,950
While the Red Army
rolled on towards Berlin,
1441
01:28:07,950 --> 01:28:10,270
the men of Army Group
North were finally cornered
1442
01:28:10,270 --> 01:28:12,703
in the Courland peninsula of Latvia.
1443
01:28:13,770 --> 01:28:15,320
There, the battered remnants
1444
01:28:15,320 --> 01:28:17,120
of the Army Group held off all attacks
1445
01:28:17,120 --> 01:28:19,720
by the Red Army for six long months.
1446
01:28:19,720 --> 01:28:21,900
They were under siege from late October,
1447
01:28:21,900 --> 01:28:24,783
1944 through to May, 1945.
1448
01:28:31,230 --> 01:28:33,897
(weapon blasts)
1449
01:28:34,851 --> 01:28:37,518
(weapon blasts)
1450
01:28:39,053 --> 01:28:41,720
(rapid gunfire)
1451
01:28:57,990 --> 01:29:00,950
In January, 1945, the two armies,
1452
01:29:00,950 --> 01:29:04,800
which had served since
1941 as Army Group North
1453
01:29:04,800 --> 01:29:07,303
were renamed Army Group Courland.
1454
01:29:08,750 --> 01:29:11,130
The hard-won mantle of Army Group North
1455
01:29:11,130 --> 01:29:13,180
was transferred to a scratch assembly
1456
01:29:13,180 --> 01:29:15,580
of beaten units under the command
1457
01:29:15,580 --> 01:29:18,690
of a swift succession
of temporary leaders.
1458
01:29:18,690 --> 01:29:21,100
The spirit of the men of Army Group North
1459
01:29:21,100 --> 01:29:23,763
remained behind in Courland.
1460
01:29:24,713 --> 01:29:27,380
(ominous music)
1461
01:29:49,041 --> 01:29:49,980
(distant blasts)
1462
01:29:49,980 --> 01:29:50,950
The German divisions,
1463
01:29:50,950 --> 01:29:52,630
which found their way to Courland
1464
01:29:52,630 --> 01:29:54,260
were stuck there.
1465
01:29:54,260 --> 01:29:56,750
They were blockaded by the
Russians and there was nothing
1466
01:29:56,750 --> 01:29:57,990
they could do.
1467
01:29:57,990 --> 01:30:00,310
They could no longer make
any useful contribution
1468
01:30:00,310 --> 01:30:02,653
to the greater course
of the war elsewhere.
1469
01:30:03,510 --> 01:30:04,850
In many respects,
1470
01:30:04,850 --> 01:30:07,210
it was a very wasteful and irresponsible
1471
01:30:07,210 --> 01:30:09,103
gesture on the part of Hitler.
1472
01:30:10,130 --> 01:30:14,430
This albeit scratch army was
still a considerable force,
1473
01:30:14,430 --> 01:30:17,630
which could have made a
valuable contribution elsewhere,
1474
01:30:17,630 --> 01:30:19,430
but it was not to be made available.
1475
01:30:21,941 --> 01:30:25,024
(distant explosions)
1476
01:30:34,210 --> 01:30:36,310
Despite everything that
the besieged Red Army
1477
01:30:36,310 --> 01:30:37,410
could throw at them,
1478
01:30:37,410 --> 01:30:40,870
the surviving elements of
the 16th and 18th armies
1479
01:30:40,870 --> 01:30:43,350
now officially known
as Army Group Courland
1480
01:30:43,350 --> 01:30:46,020
continued to resist all further attempts
1481
01:30:46,020 --> 01:30:47,503
to force them into surrender.
1482
01:30:48,720 --> 01:30:52,560
Fighting for the Courland
peninsula was grinding in nature.
1483
01:30:52,560 --> 01:30:55,020
It was not like the
Western and Eastern fronts
1484
01:30:55,020 --> 01:30:57,180
characterized by large formations,
1485
01:30:57,180 --> 01:31:00,060
sweeping along the frontier
and impressive sophisticated
1486
01:31:00,060 --> 01:31:03,950
operations, in the Courland
fighting, the Germans
1487
01:31:03,950 --> 01:31:06,900
trapped in this region
were gradually, slowly
1488
01:31:06,900 --> 01:31:08,440
and surely pushed back
1489
01:31:08,440 --> 01:31:10,980
in spectacular fashion into something
1490
01:31:10,980 --> 01:31:14,043
of a geographical
cul-de-sac by the Red Army.
1491
01:31:30,787 --> 01:31:34,060
(waves crashing)
1492
01:31:34,060 --> 01:31:36,930
They were well served to
the bitter end by the ships
1493
01:31:36,930 --> 01:31:38,500
of the Kriegsmarine
1494
01:31:38,500 --> 01:31:40,470
who managed to evacuate some divisions
1495
01:31:40,470 --> 01:31:42,010
recalled to Germany.
1496
01:31:42,010 --> 01:31:44,150
On occasion, they even managed to bring in
1497
01:31:44,150 --> 01:31:46,173
some much needed reinforcements.
1498
01:31:47,860 --> 01:31:50,750
The German Navy did have
an important role to play
1499
01:31:50,750 --> 01:31:52,580
when the Red Army began to advance
1500
01:31:52,580 --> 01:31:56,320
along the Baltic coast to
break into East Prussia,
1501
01:31:56,320 --> 01:31:58,950
because if at all possible the German Navy
1502
01:31:58,950 --> 01:32:02,123
had to try and contain
Soviet Naval operations.
1503
01:32:02,980 --> 01:32:04,660
Even more importantly,
1504
01:32:04,660 --> 01:32:06,630
they had a grievous burden,
1505
01:32:06,630 --> 01:32:09,807
to try and evacuate as many
of the German civilians
1506
01:32:09,807 --> 01:32:11,310
and German military units
1507
01:32:11,310 --> 01:32:13,870
who had been trapped
and transport them back
1508
01:32:13,870 --> 01:32:15,855
into German territory.
1509
01:32:15,855 --> 01:32:18,855
(suspenseful music)
1510
01:32:23,133 --> 01:32:26,300
(airplane roars past)
1511
01:32:35,530 --> 01:32:38,440
The Naval aspect in the
closing stage of the war
1512
01:32:38,440 --> 01:32:40,510
does demonstrate that the German Navy
1513
01:32:40,510 --> 01:32:43,890
could operate well even
in the face of disaster,
1514
01:32:43,890 --> 01:32:45,263
which was now pending.
1515
01:32:50,530 --> 01:32:54,170
The Kriegsmarine was absolutely
vital in explaining why
1516
01:32:54,170 --> 01:32:56,010
German formations fought bitterly
1517
01:32:56,010 --> 01:32:57,630
to the end for the pointless
1518
01:32:57,630 --> 01:33:00,260
battle for the Courland peninsula.
1519
01:33:00,260 --> 01:33:02,810
The peninsula, from the
Army's point of view
1520
01:33:02,810 --> 01:33:04,970
was militarily useless,
1521
01:33:04,970 --> 01:33:09,970
indeed many German commanders
in late 1944 and spring 1945
1522
01:33:10,350 --> 01:33:11,740
constantly requested Hitler
1523
01:33:11,740 --> 01:33:13,623
to give up the Courland peninsula.
1524
01:33:14,660 --> 01:33:16,770
This would release the 26 divisions
1525
01:33:16,770 --> 01:33:18,070
that were fighting there
1526
01:33:18,070 --> 01:33:20,460
in order to bolster their defense in what
1527
01:33:20,460 --> 01:33:23,093
were more important military
regions nearer to home.
1528
01:33:33,235 --> 01:33:36,235
(distant explosion)
1529
01:33:39,131 --> 01:33:41,798
(rapid gunfire)
1530
01:33:46,440 --> 01:33:49,050
The German Navy had used
the Baltic sea throughout
1531
01:33:49,050 --> 01:33:51,540
World War Two as a training ground
1532
01:33:51,540 --> 01:33:54,216
for its submarine commanders.
1533
01:33:54,216 --> 01:33:56,060
Donitz, a committed Nazi
1534
01:33:56,060 --> 01:33:58,570
who was in charge of
the Navy at this stage,
1535
01:33:58,570 --> 01:34:01,370
regarded the retention of the
Gulf of Danzig in the Baltic
1536
01:34:01,370 --> 01:34:05,570
sea as essential in order to
train his submarine commanders
1537
01:34:05,570 --> 01:34:10,570
to use the extremely powerful
new submarine, the type 21,
1538
01:34:10,840 --> 01:34:12,680
which the German Navy were developing
1539
01:34:12,680 --> 01:34:14,103
towards the end of the war.
1540
01:34:15,050 --> 01:34:17,870
The Kriegsmarine therefore
played a critical role in
1541
01:34:17,870 --> 01:34:21,300
explaining why the German
formations fought so bitterly for
1542
01:34:21,300 --> 01:34:23,577
the Courland peninsula.
1543
01:34:23,577 --> 01:34:26,827
(weapon fires rapidly)
1544
01:34:55,240 --> 01:34:57,740
Trapped in Courland, the survivors
1545
01:34:57,740 --> 01:34:59,670
of the old Army Group North
1546
01:34:59,670 --> 01:35:03,150
maintained their cohesion
and fighting ability
1547
01:35:03,150 --> 01:35:06,383
until the final surrender
on may the eighth, 1945,
1548
01:35:07,710 --> 01:35:11,343
almost four years since they
had first moved into Russia.
1549
01:35:12,500 --> 01:35:16,620
On that day 203,000 men
began the long march
1550
01:35:16,620 --> 01:35:18,780
into Soviet captivity.
1551
01:35:18,780 --> 01:35:20,850
Many would never return.
1552
01:35:20,850 --> 01:35:23,800
And others were held as
slave laborers until 1955,
1553
01:35:25,210 --> 01:35:28,563
a high price to pay
for their long defense.
1554
01:35:34,060 --> 01:35:37,420
Of the three huge army groups
which Hitler sent into Russia,
1555
01:35:37,420 --> 01:35:40,300
it could be argued that Army
Group North was the most
1556
01:35:40,300 --> 01:35:44,040
successful in carrying out
the tasks assigned to it.
1557
01:35:44,040 --> 01:35:47,410
Although the campaign ultimately
ended in failure for them,
1558
01:35:47,410 --> 01:35:51,640
the men of Army Group North
retained their military cohesion
1559
01:35:51,640 --> 01:35:54,820
with some units achieving the
rare distinction of serving
1560
01:35:54,820 --> 01:35:56,520
for the whole four years
1561
01:35:56,520 --> 01:36:00,963
of the Russian war in the same army group.
1562
01:36:15,018 --> 01:36:17,685
(ominous music)
118233
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