All language subtitles for Soviet Storm WWII in the East Series 1 8of9 The Battle of the Caucasus 1080p.eng

July 1942. One year after
Hitler s invasion of the Soviet
Union,

the Germans launch a great
offensive in southern Russia.

Their goal is the Soviet oil
fields of the Caucasus.

Originally produced
for Russian television in 2011,

this is the story of Russia s
Great Patriotic War and the Red
Army s long road

from defeat to victory.

In a guardhouse in
southern Russia,

two men in Red Army uniforms
talked casually to each other in
German.

A third man, wearing the uniform
of a German combat engineer,
listened in closely.

They were men of the Brandenburg
Regiment an elite German
special forces unit

that often dressed in enemy
uniform to carry out its
missions.

They had just prevented Russian
engineers from destroying the
dam on the River Manich.

They thought the operation
had been successfully completed.

But suddenly a stranger
appeared in the doorway.

The unknown soldier blew up the
Veselovskoye Reservoir Dam on
27th July 1942.

It caused a sudden and dramatic
rise in the water level
down-river,

and placed a major obstacle in
the path of the German advance.

The River Manich had been
transformed from a 40 metre-wide
river,

to a huge lake, 4
kilometres across.

German tanks, that would have
driven straight across the dam,

now had to be ferried across
the lake one by one.

It bought some much-needed time
for the retreating Red Army.

But this was only a small, local
victory. Three days previously,

Germans Army Group A had
captured Rostov-on-Don, the
gateway to the Caucasus.

The main German attack came from
that direction, further to the
west.

The only good news was that
the German Fourth Panzer Army

would soon be redirected from
the Caucasus to support the
attack on Stalingrad.

The same day the dam was blown,
Stalin received a report

from the Commander
of the North Caucasus Front,

Marshal Semyon Mikhailovich
Budyonny. He recommended an
immediate withdrawal

of his forces to the line of the
Terek river and the Caucasus
Mountains.

After recent Soviet defeats in
the Crimea, at Kharkov and in
the Donbas,

the Germans possessed a
significant numerical advantage

over the Soviets
in the Caucasus.

Budyonny believed the only way
to stabilize the situation

was an immediate
withdrawal south.

The next day, Stalin signed the
famous Order Number 227, "Not a
Step Back!".

At the same time, he approved
Budyonny s plan of retreat.

It seemed a contradiction.
But in the Caucasus,

military logic dictated
just one course of action.

The Terek River and the Caucasus
Mountains comprised a formidable
natural defence.

The troops would withdraw
to this line immediately,

before the Germans could
encircle and destroy them.

All Soviet reserves
were being sent to Stalingrad,

where one of the decisive
battles of the war was
unfolding.

There were no troops to spare
for the North Caucasus Front.

And so Budyonny s troops
began to dig in along the Terek.

The great German summer
offensive of 1942 was underway.

Army Group B was advancing on
Stalingrad, from where it could
protect

the northern flank of Army Group
A bound for the Soviet oil
fields of the Caucasus.

Before the war, 70% of all
Soviet oil came from the Baku
oil fields of the Caucasus.

About a quarter came from the
area around Grozny and Maykop.

Their capture would be a
disaster, and leave the Red Army
without fuel.

Hitler believed the war would be
decided by the control of oil
supplies.

He was obsessed by oil, and had
even studied how it was drilled,
and refined.

As Case Blue began, Army Group
A breached Soviet defences

and began a rapid advance
towards these vital oil fields.

Von Kleist s First
Panzer Army led the way.

In 1941, von Kleist had
commanded 1st Panzer Group in
Ukraine.

In the first week of the war he
had won a giant four day tank
battle at Brody.

Now he had been entrusted with
the capture of the Caucasus oil
fields.

Marshal Budyonny, by contrast,
had experienced only defeat.

Now he oversaw his forces
retreat to the mountains.

The Caucasus Mountains stretched
1,300 km from the Caspian to the
Black Sea.

The range is divided
into three parts.

The Eastern Caucasus runs from
the Absheron peninsula to Mount
Kazbek;

The Central Caucasus
from Kazbek to Mount Elbrus,

and the Western Caucasus
from Elbrus to Anapa.

Snow and ice cover the highest
peaks all year round, and to
reach Grozny,

one must also cross
the fast-flowing Terek River.

Von Kleist planned to advance
straight to Ordzhonikidze,

and follow the old Georgian
Military road straight to
Tbilisi.

He would ignore the mountain
passes of the Western Caucasus,

in order to concentrate
his forces.

But Hitler rejected this plan,

and the 49th Mountain Corps was
diverted to the Western
Caucasus.

Hitler was adding another
objective to Army Group A s
ambitious list of goals.

He now also demanded that it
capture the Soviet naval bases
on the Black Sea coast.

Budyonny had very
few tanks at his disposal.

But because of his static
positions, he did have the
advantage in heavy artillery.

He was also supported
by powerful air units.

The summer of 1942 saw
an important change

in the organization
of the Red Army Air Force.

Air armies were now assigned
to Red Army fronts.

It was a similar system to the
one used by the Luftwaffe.

It meant air force command was
now more centralized, allowing
concerted action.

Previously, Soviet air units
had been parceled out

into small ineffective
formations.

Soviet air strength
in the Caucasus

comprised the naval aviation
of the Black Sea Fleet,

5th Air Army under
Lieutenant General Goryunov,

and 4th Air Army
under Major General Vershinin.

Konstantin Andreevich Vershinin
began his military career in the
infantry,

during the Russian Civil War.

He only learned to fly in his
thirties after he was
transferred to the Air Force
Academy.

Initially he wasn t enthusiastic
about the air force.

But his infantry background
helped him to appreciate

how air power could be used
to support ground troops.

In August 1942, the survival of
Budyonny s Front depended on
Vershinin s pilots.

They constantly harried the
advancing German columns with
bombs and rockets.

The air force was also the eyes
of the retreating Red Army.

Reconnaissance aircraft tracked
the southern progress of von
Kleist s Panzer Army.

Following in the footsteps
of the retreating Soviet troops,

came soldiers of the German 1st
and 4th Mountain Divisions.

These men were mountain
warfare specialist

from the Austrian Tyrol
and the Bavarian Alps.

They travelled with climbing
gear, pack animals and
specialized equipment,

including lightweight artillery
that could be disassembled,

and carried in sections
on the backs of mules.

The mountain infantry
were ordered to fight their way

through the mountains passes
west of Elbrus, and advance on
Tbilisi.

They only had a few weeks
to get through the mountains

before winter weather
made them impassable.

If they did break through,
here and to the west,

they could also capture the last
Soviet naval bases on the Black
Sea.

The local Soviet commanders
believed the mountains posed
such a formidable obstacle,

that the passes only needed to
be held by small detachments.

But they had not counted on the
expertise of the German mountain
divisions

The German mountain troops
began their advance

through the Western Caucasus
Mountains on 15th August.

They planned a bold flanking
movement of the Klukhov pass.

Two squads armed with machine
guns and mortars climbed for
hours.

The Soviet defenders suddenly
found the enemy was behind them.

Poor communications
added to the crisis.

Soviet Headquarters only found
out about the battle two days
after it happened.

Reserves were
immediately sent in,

including NKVD troops and cadets
from the Sukhumi Military
Academy.

The Stavka High Command
radioed an urgent warning:

The enemy has specially trained
mountain troops, and will use
every road

and path in the Caucasus
mountains to reach the South
Caucasus.

Commanders who believe the
mountains to be an impassable
obstacle

are gravely mistaken.

Only a skillfully-prepared and
well-defended line is
impassable .

But the warning had come too
late for the defenders of the
Klukhov pass.

Soviet reserves reached the
Klukhov pass a week after the
initial attack.

By then the Germans were already
on the southern slopes.

Though they were prevented from
advancing any further, they
could not be dislodged.

The Germans meanwhile had sent
a detachment to Mount Elbrus,

the highest peak
in the Caucasus.

On 18th August they reached
"The Refuge of 11" tourist camp.

At 4,130 metres above sea level,

The Refuge of 11 has been
described as the highest hotel
in the world.

The first wooden shelter was
erected in 1932. Six years
later,

a three-story shelter, coated in
metal and resembling an airship,

was built in its place.

From this shelter, the Germans
set off for the summit.

On 21st August, soldiers of the
German 1st Mountain Division

raised the Swastika flag over
Mount Elbrus, the highest
mountain in Europe.

It was a propaganda triumph,
though Hitler himself

was said to have been furious at
what he regarded as a mere
stunt.

Meanwhile in Moscow, events in
the Caucasus were causing
serious alarm.

The feared head of the NKVD
secret police Lavrenty Beria

flew personally to Sukhumi
his hometown

and sacked the Commander of the
46th Army General Sergatskov.

In the eastern Caucasus,
von Kleist s 1st Panzer Army

had secured a toehold
across the Terek River.

But they encountered fierce
resistance from Soviet units,

which contained many local men
who knew the mountains like the
back of their hand.

Artillery observers on the high
ground were able to direct
accurate fire from Katyushas

and howitzers onto German
pontoons across the Terek.

The Germans were also confronted
with a novel form of anti-tank
barrier.

Soviet soldiers filled ditches
with oil, then set fire to them
with flamethrowers.

It created an impenetrable wall
of fire, and thick, noxious
black smoke.

Villages around Malgobek
changed hands several times.

It was not until the Germans
secretly moved the 13th Panzer
Division south

across the Terek that they
were able to secure the area.

They were reinforced by the SS
Motorized Division "Viking".

On 27th September,
the Germans captured Elkhotovo,

but were forced back onto
the defensive the next day.

Meanwhile Luftwaffe units in the
Caucasus had been sent north to
Stalingrad,

giving the Soviet Air
Force a free hand.

Vershinin s aircraft targeted
the German pontoon bridges
across the Terek.

Vershinin always emphasized to
his men the importance of
supporting the ground forces.

We exist for them, he told his
pilots, not the other way
around .

It was difficult to get tanks
from factories in Russia to the
troops in the Caucasus.

But an Allied lend-lease supply
route came up through the
Caucasus from Iran.

As a result, many Soviet tanks
on this front were British and
American models.

By October 1942, the Caucasus
Front had a total of 300 tanks.

British and American
types made up 42%.

T-34 medium tanks made up 20%
and heavy KV tanks just 2%.

The remaining 36% were various
types of Soviet light tank.

The American M3 Stuart
and the British Valentine

were inferior to the T-34
and most German tanks.

But they were an improvement
on the Soviet light tanks,

such as the T-26 and the BT-7,
which were poorly armoured, and
seriously undergunned.

Vershinin s 4th Air Army also
received Lend Lease equipment.

Its pilots were among the first
to master the American
twin-engined Boston bomber.

They particularly liked its
navigational instruments, which
made it safer

than most aircraft to fly
through the mountains in
unpredictable weather.

Another aircraft that thrived in
the mountains was the I-153
Seagull biplane.

Low speeds and superb
maneuverability

made it an effective
fighter-bomber amid the ravines
and passes.

Rocket-attacks by low-flying
seagulls were a common sight

in these high-altitude battles.

On the ground, special NKVD
units with alpine training were
formed.

They carried the fight back to
the Germans, with their own
deep, outflanking maneuvers.

Their gear was a strange mix
of pre-war sportswear,

military uniform and
captured German kit.

Painstaking reconnaissance was
the bedrock of these units
operations.

In early September, one of these
units was able to turn the
tables

on the Germans in the Klukhov
pass, the scene of their earlier
defeat.

Soviet mountain troops spotted a
long caravan of German soldiers

and pack animals heading
up to the pass.

They were a long way off
beyond rifle range.

Just then three aircraft marked
with the Red Star zoomed
overhead.

Gusev, a section commander of
engineers, described what
happened:

Our pilots weren t only
skilled, they also knew the
mountains.

First they attacked the convoy
itself, but the results weren t
great.

So then they bombed
the slopes above the road.

Huge chunks of stone fell right
on top of Hitler s convoy.

The slope disappeared in a thick
cloud of dust, and when it
cleared,

we saw the convoy had
been devastated.

By September 1942,

a stalemate had been reached in
the mountain passes of the
Caucasus.

German mountain infantry
couldn t build on their initial
success

and break through to the coast.

But nor were Soviet
forces strong enough

to recapture the high passes
they d lost in August.

On 28th September, one of the
most unusual battles of the
Second World War took place,

at more than 4,000
metres above sea level.

The Soviets had formed a special
NKVD detachment, about 100
strong,

to recapture the "Refuge of the
11", near the summit of Mount
Elbrus.

They were led by
Lieutenant Grigoryants,

and armed with machineguns,
mortars, and sniper rifles.

The German mountain troops were
stunned by the audacity of the
Soviet attack.

But they quickly rallied.

Machinegun fire echoed across
the mountains for several hours.

Slowly, the tide of battle
turned against Lieutenant
Grigoryants and his men.

Only 4 men from his detachment
made it back alive.

The Lieutenant s body was one of
many that littered the mountain
slope.

A few days later, the
temperature in the mountains
plummeted.

Soon both sides were losing more
men to frostbite and avalanches

than they were from combat. It
was impossible to fight in such
conditions.

There would be no German
breakthrough in the mountains in
1942.

In the Caucasus, the Germans
found some support from
nationalists

and anti-Communists
amongst the local population.

The strong history of
nationalism in the Caucasus

made it fertile recruiting
ground for the Wehrmacht.

They had captured many
conscripts from Georgia,
Chechnya,

Armenia and Azerbaijan, some of
whom were prepared to fight
against the Soviet Union.

They were formed into the
so-called Eastern Legions.

But many of these units turned
out to be deeply unreliable.

In October, the 23rd
Panzer Division was informed

that a battalion of Georgian
volunteers planned to go over to
the Soviet side.

The Germans immediately made
arrangements to disarm the unit

and take if off the front line.

But after a shoot-out
with the Germans,

some of the Georgians did manage
to slip over to the Soviet
lines.

The German bridgehead
across the Terek River

was of continuing concern
to the Soviet Front Command.

In November it was decided
to eliminate this foothold

with an overwhelming infantry
and tank assault.

But before it could
begin, von Kleist,

using the last of his fuel and
ammunition reserves, launched
his own assault.

He had decided to try and fight
his way through to Ordzhonikidze

along a new route, which lay
through the towns of Baksan and
Nalchick.

Tanks of the 1st Panzer Army,
supported by air strikes, made a
rapid advance.

The Germans, it seemed, had
rediscovered the blitzkrieg
spirit.

Soon they had reached
the outskirts of Ordzhonikidze.

But their success
was short-lived.

Forces from the South Caucasus
front were sent to crush the
Terek bridgehead.

Two German Panzer divisions were
surrounded near the village of
Gizel.

The Germans were forced to
abandon their vehicles and heavy
weapons,

and fight their way out on foot.

For the Germans, reaching
Tbilisi was now out of the
question.

In 2007, President Putin would
award both Malgobeck and
Ordzhonikidze

today known as Vladikavkaz the
title "City of Military Glory",

for their wartime heroism.

In November the
encirclement of 6th Army

at Stalingrad turned
the campaign on its head.

If the Germans did not
immediately evacuate the
Caucasus,

the Red Army might reach Rostov,
and cut off the entire Army
Group A.

On 22nd November, von Kleist was
promoted to command of Army
Group A.

He immediately ordered the 1st
Panzer Army to withdraw to
Rostov,

while 17th Army retreated
to the Kuban Bridgehead.

The only way to keep the Kuban
Bridgehead supplied was by air.

It would have been impossible if
6th Army had still been holding
out at Stalingrad.

But its surrender freed up
enough Luftwaffe transport
aircraft

to establish an air
bridge to Kuban.

On 13th March,
Army Group A received new orders

from the Army High Command
hold the Kuban Bridgehead and
the Crimea at all costs.

Von Kleist made his own report
to the Army High Command

about the value of the Kuban
Bridgehead: Advantages of the
position:

a considerable number
of Russian forces it tied up;

the enemy Black Sea Fleet is
unable to conducting defence
operations;

the defence of the
Crimea is facilitated.

In the spring of 1943, most of
the Eastern Front was quiet,

as both sides geared up
for the Battle of Kursk.

But at Kuban the
fighting rumbled on.

Vershinin ordered the
construction of an air force
command post near the front
line.

The battlefield was small here.

Air raids and fighter patrols
could be observed from the
ground,

and information relayed
back to the squadrons.

Dogfights above the
Kuban Bridgehead

frequently involved
30 to 40 aircraft on each side.

Vershinin had demanded that his
fighters keep enemy bombers away

from their infantry
lines at all costs.

The air battle over Kuban became
one of the most famous of the
Eastern Front.

Under unrelenting pressure
from the Red Army,

the Kuban Bridgehead finally
began to buckle in August 1943.

The Germans were outflanked
by Soviet advances to the north,

and by amphibious
landings at Novorossiysk.

In October the 17th Army
was evacuated to the Crimea.

Hitler s quest for oil
had proved to be a disaster.

A Soviet artillery officer
studied enemy positions on the
Perekop Isthmus

the gateway to the Crimea.

He was looking for targets
for the 280 millimetre mortars.

Their 200 kilogram shells could
smash through the thickest
walls.

Preparations for the Crimea
offensive were underway.

The Red army s advance
through Ukraine

had isolated German and Romanian
forces in the peninsula.

But only three narrow strips of
land connect the Crimea to the
mainland.

At Perekop, the isthmus
is just 14 kilometres wide.

There would be no
room to maneuver.

German and Romanian
troops of the 17th Army

had had 5 months to fortify
the Perekop Isthmus.

Machine gun crews stood ready to
mow down advancing Soviet
infantry.

Howitzers were hidden
in the valleys.

Romanian dictator Marshal
Antonescu wanted Hitler to
evacuate the Crimea,

where 7 Romanian divisions
were stationed.

But the Fuehrer feared the
Soviets would use Crimean
airfields

to bomb Romanian oil fields.

Germany s chrome supplies from
Turkey would also be threatened.

Admiral Doenitz assured
Hitler that, if required,

the navy could evacuate
17th Army by sea.

But he was counting on the
Germans holding on to the port
of Odessa.

And on 10th April 1944,
Odessa fell to the Red Army.

Ten days earlier, Hitler had
fired von Kleist from command of
Army Group A.

His replacement was Colonel
General Ferdinand Scörner.

After arriving in the Crimea,
Scörner reported back to
Hitler,

telling him the situation was
stable, and the Crimea could
hold out for many months.

On 8th April 1944, at Perekop,
Sivash and Kerch, the Soviet
guns roared into life.

Timber gun emplacements
were turned into matchwood.

Buildings were
reduced to rubble.

Finally uniformed men sprang up
from the Red Army trenches.

Shouts of "Ura!", the Russian
battle cry, could be heard,

and the squeal of tank tracks.

The Germans raced from their
dugouts to their fighting
positions.

Concealed guns opened fire.
It was an old trick.

A Soviet forward artillery
observer was meticulously noting
the muzzle flashes,

and sending their co-ordinates
back to the batteries by
telephone.

Soviet artillery pummelled
the German positions

that had just given
themselves away.

The dummies were cut to ribbons.
But they had served their
purpose.

Now the soldiers took them down,
and prepared for the real
attack.

They were supported by T-34s
of the 2nd Guards Army.

Amongst them, the feared
OT-34 flamethrower tanks.

The Red Army onslaught
proved irresistible.

The assault was supported
by amphibious landings

that outflanked the German
defences at Perekop.

The Commander of the 17th Army,
General Jaenecke, received
permission to retreat.

The Germans began a swift
withdrawal towards Sevastopol,

where Hitler expected them
to hold out for many months

as the Soviets had in 1942.

The evacuation of German and
Romanian troops from Sevastopol
began.

The transports would
be highly exposed.

But after losing a battleship
and two destroyers to airattack
the previous year,

the Stavka ordered the big ships
of the Black Sea Fleet

to stay out of range
of the Luftwaffe.

Soviet submarines
had also suffered heavy losses.

It would primarily fall to the
air force to prevent the
evacuation.

By 1944, navy pilots
of the Black Sea Fleet

had mastered a lethal new form
of attack. It was known as
skip-bombing.

Skip-bombing attacks had to be
made at high speed and low
altitude.

When the bomb was released, it
would skip like a pebble across
the surface of a lake,

and strike the side of the ship.
Meanwhile the pilot climbed hard

to avoid the ship s
superstructure.

Skip-bombing had several
advantages over aerial torpedo
attacks.

Firstly, it was effective
against ships with very shallow
drafts, like landing craft.

Secondly, a ship could spot a
torpedo and dodge it with
evasive action

but the bomb was on
them in just seconds.

Thirdly, torpedoes were
expensive and in high demand.

By comparison,
bombs were plentiful and cheap.

Boston bombers proved
the most effective skip-bombers,

but the new tactic was also
successfully employed by
Lavochkin-5 fighters,

Ilyushin 2s and Ilyushin 4s.

Units of the 4th Ukrainian Front
pursued the enemy to the gates
of Sevastopol.

The heavy artillery was brought
up in preparation for a long
siege.

On 5th May 1944, after a 90
minute barrage, the Soviet
infantry began their assault.

In 1941 the Red Army had held
Sevastopol for 9 months against
the Germans.

But this time, it would not
be such a drawn-out affair.

Sevastopol s Northern Shore fell
to the Red Army within three
days,

putting the harbour
in range of Soviet artillery.

German ships arriving from the
Romanian port of Constanta

had to run a gauntlet of air
attacks, and shelling at the
landings stages.

Admiral Oktyabryski, Commander
of the Black Sea Fleet,

requested permission to send his
cruisers to attack the German
and Romanian transports.

But the Stavka refused. The big
warships were not to be exposed
to air attack.

This was a job for the
submarines, and the air force.

In the small hours of 10th May,

the German transport ships
Totila and Teja arrived off
Sevastopol.

It was too dangerous
for them to approach the harbour

so the ships anchored two miles
off-shore, while 10,000 soldiers

were ferried out to them in
assault boats from the
southwestern docks of
Chersonese.

As the embarkation was underway,

more than twenty Ilyushin 2
Shturmoviks appeared overhead.

The Totila was hit by three
bombs and sank in minutes.

The second transport, Teja,
weighed anchor and headed for
the open sea.

But the Soviet air force
soon caught up with her.

The Teja was hit by no fewer
than six 100 kilogram bombs.

She lost steering
and engine power,

before eleven Boston bombers
arrived to finish her off.

Two bombs hit the Teja near the
water line. These were the fatal
blows.

The loss of both transports
cost up to 8,000 lives.

These were by far the greatest
losses of the evacuation.

In all about two-thirds
of 17th Army were evacuated,

including its commander
General Allmendinger,

who reached Constanta by torpedo
boat on the night of the 11th.

General Hartmann was left
in charge at Sevastopol.

But without heavy weapons,

there was no chance of holding
off the Red Army for more than a
few hours.

The remnants of 17th Army were
overrun the next day, 12th May
1944.

British war correspondent
Alexander Werth

visited Sevastopol
when the fighting was over:

Around Chersonese it was
gruesome. All the area in front
of the earthworks

and beyond was ploughed up
by thousands of shells,

and scorched by the
fire of Katyushas.

The ground was littered with
thousands of German helmets,
rifles,

bayonets, and other
arms and ammunition.

Nearly all the dead had been
buried, but around the shattered
lighthouse

dead Germans and rafts
were bobbing in the water.

The German 17th Army had been
effectively destroyed in the
Crimea.

In the month-long campaign, it
had suffered nearly 70,000 men
killed or captured.

Soviet dead and captured
totaled approximately 18,000.

The Wehrmacht was suffering a
series of devastating defeats on
the Eastern front.

After his dismissal by Hitler,
Field Marshal von Kleist went
into enforced retirement.

At the end of the war,
he was arrested by the Americans

and later extradited
to Yugoslavia.

There he was sentenced
to 15 years for war crimes.

But he was also wanted
in the Soviet Union,

and in 1948, Marshal Tito agreed
to extradite von Kleist to the
USSR.

In 1952, the Military Collegium
of the Supreme Court of the USSR

sentenced him to 25 years.

Von Kleist died in a Soviet
P.O.W. camp from ill health two
years later.

After the liberation of the
Crimea, the 4th Air Army was
sent to Byelorussia.

There, its squadrons would
support Operation Bagration,

as the war in the east turned
decisively against Nazi Germany.

They would pursue the Wehrmacht
across the battlefields of East
Prussia

and Pomerania, and on to the
very streets of Berlin.