All language subtitles for Soviet Storm WWII in the East Series 1 4of9 The Battle of Moscow 1080p.eng

Autumn 1941. In the first
three months of the war,

the Germans have
advanced 500 miles

and inflicted massive casualties
on the Red Army.

Both sides prepare to commit
their final reserves

to the decisive battle of the
campaign, which will be fought
for the Soviet capital.

September 1941 - 10 weeks after
the German invasion of the
Soviet Union.

Now Moscow itself was braced
for the German onslaught.

Barricades and anti-tank
obstacles blocked the streets.

Windows were taped up to reduce
the danger from flying glass
caused by explosions.

And at night, the city was
immersed in total darkness.

Lit windows help the enemy ,
warned the posters.

Stalingrad, for the moment, was
safe in the Russian heartland.

Bandaged soldiers on the city s
streets were the only visible
sign of battles

that raged many
miles to the west.

In the workshops of the
Stalingrad Tractor Factory,

tank production was
round the clock.

The enormous losses suffered by
the Red Army that summer had to
be made good.

That summer hundreds of tanks
had been abandoned

because their crews couldn t fix
simple mechanical failures.

Now tank crews began their
training inside the factories.

They were taught every
mechanical detail of their new
tank,

and how to fix them
if they broke down.

One of the commanders of these
newly-formed tank brigades

was the 40 year old
Colonel Mikhail Katukov.

Katukov began the war as the
commander of the 20th Tank
Division.

But its obsolete tanks
had proved cannon fodder

for the Germans in
the summer of 1941.

Katukov and the remnants of his
division had been lucky to
escape encirclement.

In late September, his brigade s
new T-34 tanks were loaded onto
trains.

Mikhail Katukov and the 4th Tank
Brigade were going to Moscow.

Moscow had already
had its first taste of war.

The first German air raid came
exactly one month after the war
began,

on 22nd July, 1941.

German pilots were told, You ve
bombed England. This will be
much easier.

If the Russians even have
antiaircraft guns, there won t
be many of them.

They don t have searchlights,
balloons or night-fighters.

But these illusions
were soon shattered.

The skies over
Moscow were defended

by thousands of antiaircraft
guns of all calibres.

Soviet night-fighters attacked
German bombers caught in the
searchlights.

Barrage balloons rose to 2500
metres, and in pairs as high as
4500 metres

much higher than over London.

The risk of flying into their
steel cables forced German
bombers

to fly at much higher altitudes,
from where they were much less
accurate.

But inevitably, some
bombers got through.

The Belorussky Rail Terminal,
the telephone exchange,

and army supply
depots were all hit.

The Kremlin itself was hit by 6
incendiaries and one 250kg
high-explosive bomb.

It pierced the roof
of the Grand Kremlin Palace

and the ceiling of the
Georgiyevsky Hall. But it failed
to explode.

On the night of 12th August, a
1,000 kg bomb landed in
Nikitskiye Vorota Square,

making a crater 12 metres deep,
and 32 metres across.

But German bomber crews were
made to pay a heavy price for
these successes.

A total of 134 air raids
were made on Moscow.

More than 1,500 bombs and 45,000
incendiaries were dropped

on the city during the war.

The biggest raid was
on 29th October, 1941.

More than 300 bombers took part.
Bombs hit the Bolshoi Theatre,

the Moscow State University, and
the Central Committee of the
Communist Party.

47 German planes
were brought down that day.

Hitler s invasion plan called
for the capture of Moscow

in the first three to four
months of the war.

But fighting around Smolensk and
Kiev had held the Germans up for
2 months.

The assault on Moscow was not
ready to begin until 30th
September.

The Soviet High
Command, the Stavka,

expected the Germans to attack
along the highway from Smolensk
to Vyazma.

The Red Army units
under General Rokossovsky

began to dig in
along this route.

But the Germans were
planning a surprise.

General Hoepner s 4th Panzer
Group had been secretly
redeployed

from the Leningrad front to join
the attack on Moscow.

To conceal this manoeuvre,

the Panzer Group left its
headquarters radio operator near
Leningrad.

Each radio operator
working in Morse code

has a distinct style of
transmitting based on their
rhythm

just as each pianist has their
own unique style of playing.

Experts can pick out
individual radio operators

just by listening in
to their transmissions.

When the Soviets intercepted
radio messages near Leningrad,

which they knew came from the
radio operator of 4th Panzer
Group,

they assumed Hoepner s forces
were still in the area.

But all they were listening to
was one lone radio operator.

Commander of 4th Panzer Group,
Erich Hoepner was an
old-fashioned general,

known as the Old Cavalryman .

Nevertheless he d been one of
the first generals to understand

and embrace the principles
of armoured warfare.

Three German panzer groups now
targeted Moscow, led by Hoepner,

Guderian and Hoth, who was
replaced in October by General
Reinhardt.

The German plan was to force a
final decisive battle for
Moscow,

in which they would encircle and
annihilate the remnants of the
Red Army.

The operation was
codenamed Typhoon .

The offensive began
near Bryansk.

Red Army troops were ready
to defend the town itself,

which lay at the centre
of the local road network.

But on 30th September 1941,
Guderian s panzers attacked much
further south.

Heinz Guderian had a reputation
as the Father of German
blitzkrieg,

based on his early writings on
the theory of offensive,
mechanized warfare.

He was also a bold
and energetic field commander,

who often quarrelled
with his superior officers.

In three days,
Guderian s tanks had encircled

the bulk of the enemy
forces opposing him.

In two more days his troops had
reached Orel, and were advancing
on Tula.

In a desperate attempt
to halt Guderian s advance,

the Soviet High Command took a
bold decision: to reinforce Orel
by air.

Giant Tupolev TB-3s and Lisunov
Li-2s landed at the deserted
airfield.

The Germans, recovering from
their surprise, opened a
withering fire on the second
wave.

Nevertheless, 6,000 men plus
equipment and ammunition was
landed.

The troops immediately went into
action against the advancing
Germans.

Soon, T-34s from Colonel
Katukov s 4thTank Brigade also
began to arrive,

after their 500 mile train
journey from Stalingrad.

Tank brigades replaced
the Soviet mechanized corps

that had been destroyed
that summer.

A mechanized corps
had contained 36,000 men,

1,000 tanks plus guns and other
vehicles. It was a huge and
unwieldy formation.

The new, more mobile tank
brigades had just 3,000 soldiers
and 91 tanks.

Katukov now had a chance
to test the tank ambush tactics

that so far he d only been able
to practice on the training
ground.

First the tanks had to be
concealed, using buildings,
bushes or uneven ground.

Several alternative positions
were needed for each tank.

Dummy positions were also built
to confuse the enemy.

A T-34 s gun could destroy any
German tank from a range of 1
kilometer.

But the key to success was
patience, and discipline.

Katukov told his men: The
crew in ambush may open fire

only at point blank range
when a hit is guaranteed.

This means a range of
200 to 300 metres.

When taking on a
German panzer column,

Soviet gunners would target
the lead tank first,

and then the rear tank. With the
road blocked in both directions,

the rest of the column
became sitting ducks.

One member of Katukov s brigade
was the Soviet tank ace Dmitriy
Lavrinenko.

In 28 engagements
he destroyed 52 German tanks,

believed to be the most by any
Soviet tank commander in the
whole war.

The tank ambushes proved
to be highly effective.

Orel fell to the Germans, but
Katukov s tanks bought time to
reinforce Tula.

As Red Army paratroopers
reinforced the southern flank,

the Germans launched
their main thrust in the centre.

German Army Group Centre rapidly
outmanoeuvred and defeated the
Soviet Reserve

and Western Fronts, securing the
highway from Smolensk to Vyazma.

Operation Typhoon was in full
swing. The fate of Russia hung
in the balance.

The Germans had broken through
on the road to Moscow.

On 4th October 1941, General
Konev told the Soviet High
Command

that his forces were about to be
cut off. But he received no
order to retreat.

The Stavka seemed
unable to accept

that another major disaster
was unfolding in front of them.

Hitler, meanwhile,
was convinced of final victory.

He addressed the crowds
at the Sportpalast in Berlin:

Huge events are now
unfolding on the Eastern front.

We have launched a
large-scale operation

that will lead to the final
elimination of the enemy in the
East.

Once again, the Stavka s
order to retreat came too late.

More than half a million
Red Army soldiers

had become encircled
around Vyazma and Bryansk.

The divisions and regiments that
did escape the encirclement
began a headlong retreat.

With bitter humour, they
referred to this manoeuvre as
the scarper-march .

It was becoming all too familiar
to the Red Army soldiers who d
survived the summer.

Enemy air superiority had a
particular impact on Soviet
morale.

The 43rd Army reported: German
bombers attack without mercy.

They make raids in groups
of 20 to 25 aircraft.

Survivors are left senseless.

One aircraft was especially
feared by the soldiers.

The Junkers JU 87 Stuka
dive-bomber was the airborne
artillery

of the German blitzkrieg
machine. By attacking targets in
a steep dive,

it was able to deliver its bombs
with pinpoint accuracy.

The aircraft would then circle
and attack other targets

with light bombs
and machine guns.

These sustained
attacks sowed chaos

and destruction ahead
of advancing ground troops.

The bulk of German
Army Group Centre was needed

to encircle the Soviet armies
of Generals Konev and Budyonny.

But several divisions, led by SS
Panzer Division Das Reich, began
moving east.

These troops had been given
the honour of being the first

to enter the Russian capital.

The Germans were just 205km from
Moscow, and the road ahead was
almost clear.

The Red Army rushed a battalion
of paratroopers to the area.

Armed only with machine guns,
rifles and Molotov cocktails,

they fought ferociously to hold
the bridge over the Ugra River.

By the end of the day, from
430 men, just 29 were left.

By the time a tank brigade
arrived to help them,

the signpost read 180 kilometres
to Moscow. The Germans had
advanced just 25km.

Despite such fierce resistance,
the Red Army faced a
catastrophe.

It had suffered huge losses
over the course of the summer.

The enemy was
at the doorstep of the capital.

Reinforcements were on
their way from the east,

but Stalin desperately
needed more time.

In this, the darkest hour,
he sent for General Zhukov.

After arriving at General
Headquarters in Moscow and
quickly appraising the
situation,

Zhukov drew a simple,
stark conclusion:

The defensive front in the west
has been destroyed.

A huge gap has appeared in our
front line, and there is nothing
to fill it

as there are no reserves. The
roads leading to Moscow are
open.

Hitler s confidence
seemed well placed.

But there was a small window
of time for General Zhukov.

Soviet troops encircled near
Vyazma were fighting on, meaning
for a short time,

only a few German divisions
could be spared for the advance
on Moscow.

Zhukov s immediate task
was to halt this German advance,

and restore Moscow s defences
before the full weight

of German Army Group
Centre fell upon them.

The Mozhaysk defensive line,
120 km from Moscow,

was the last obstacle between
the Germans and the capital.

In early October everyone not
fighting who could lift a shovel

was helping to build
the Mozhaysk line.

Zhukov planned to
fill it with troops.

But the only spare ones he could
find were officer cadets

from Moscow s military schools.

It was a sign of how desperate
the situation had become.

The Mozhaysk line was more than
200km long. It could not all be
held by teenage cadets.

Seven rifle divisions
were being formed near Moscow,

but realistically these raw
recruits could only fend off the
Germans for a few hours.

The Stavka had to take one of
the war s many hard decisions.

In besieged Leningrad, there
were already serious food
shortages.

The Stavka had gathered reserves
to launch a counter-attack

that would lift the siege
and end the city s suffering.

But just hours after the
disaster at Vyazma, this
operation was cancelled.

The reserves were
ordered to reboard the trains.

They were now bound for Moscow,
and the Mozhaysk line.

The elite SS Das Reich division
was spearheading the German
advance on Moscow.

Its troops were well trained,
experienced, and had the best
equipment.

Near the battlefield of
Borodino, where the Russians had
fought Napoleon in 1812,

they met the Soviet
32nd Division.

These were fresh troops,
hurriedly redeployed from the
Far East.

Their headquarters
had been symbolically sited

where General Kutuzov s
headquarters had stood in 1812.

The first German tanks appeared
on the Moscow Minsk highway.

Near the village of Yelnia,

the road descended into a deep
hollow as it crossed the river.

Soviet pillboxes
housing antitank guns

overlooked the crossing
from the opposite bank.

When the German tanks reached
the bottom, the Soviet guns
opened fire.

There was no space for the tanks
to turn around or get off the
road.

The German panzers
were knocked out one by one.

The SS troops included
fascist volunteers from France.

Field Marshal von Kluge
addressed them before the
battle,

reminding them how
under Napoleon,

Germans and French had fought
side-by-side against the
Russians on this very field.

The next day the French legion
plunged into battle.

But in the face of Soviet
armoured counter-attacks,

it suffered devastating losses.
The unit had to be withdrawn
from the front line.

Zhukov s orders were clear:
Hold fast at the Mozhaysk
line.

Every day they held out allowed
more time for reinforcements to
reach Moscow.

The German advance was now
measured in hundreds of metres,
not miles.

The Das Reich division
suffered massive casualties

that included most
of its officers.

The Germans tried to blast the
defenders out of their
positions.

Ivan Makukha, a cadet from the
Podolsk Artillery School,
recalled the experience:

Direct hits on our pillbox
caused blast waves that knocked
us off our feet,

and left us bleeding
from our eyes and ears.

The reinforced Germans
renewed the assault.

Kaluga fell on 13th October,
Borovsk three days later.

The 32nd Division was forced to
retreat from Borodino. In
ferocious fighting,

the enemy s advance was halted
once more at the Protva and Nara
rivers.

A staff officer of the German
52nd Panzer Corps reported:

The recent fighting
to take Russian positions

was the fiercest of
the entire campaign.

Our tank losses have risen
dramatically since the start of
this operation .

For the Germans, the honour of
being the first troops into
Moscow

had turned into a nightmare
of blood and smoke.

All possible measures were being
taken for the defence of Moscow.

All the major roads into Moscow
were mined, including those
leading to Kiev,

Old Kiev, Mozhaysk, Zvenigorod,
Leningrad and Dmitrov.

The bridges were also mined.
Obstacles were placed across the
rail tracks.

In total, more than 150
minefields surrounded the city.

Meanwhile Soviet troops
encircled near Vyazma and
Bryansk continued to resist,

much to the surprise and
frustration of the German
planners.

24 German divisions earmarked
for the attack on Moscow

had to be held back to fight
the encircled Red Army units.

Von Funck, commander of the 7th
Panzer Division, reported that,

Combat following
the encirclement of the Russians

was some of the heaviest
the division ever experienced.

Some of our panzergrenadier
platoons were wiped out to a
man.

It took a full week for the
Germans to crush resistance
inside the pocket.

Of 580,000 men encircled
near Vyazma and Bryansk,

130,000 were killed or missing
in action, and 370,000 were
taken prisoner.

Only 85,000 men broke out
of the encirclement.

Front commander Yeryomenko was
seriously wounded and evacuated
by air.

Major General Petrov,
Commander of the 50th Army,

and Major General Rakutin,
Commander of the 24th Army, were
amongst the dead.

Among those captured were
Lieutenant General Yershakov,

who died in a German
prisoner of war camp;

Major General Vishnevskiy,
liberated by the Red Army in
1945;

and the wounded Commander of the
19th Army, Lieutenant General
Lukin.

Lukin survived the German camps
and was liberated in 1945.

When Stalin heard
the news, he said:

Tell Lukin my words
of gratitude for Moscow.

Stalin wrote on Lukin s file,
Loyal man. To be restored in
rank.

He was not always so generous to
those who d surrendered to the
Germans.

It was mid-October.
As the bulk of Army Group Centre

completed the destruction
of the encircled Soviet Armies,

the autumn rains began to fall.
The roads soon turned to rivers
of mud.

The German troops complained
that it was impossible

to conduct offensive operations
in these conditions.

But muddy roads were
a handicap to both sides.

Colonel Katukov recalled:

Even T-34s could foul their
tracks and become stranded in
the mud.

Staff cars had to be towed
by tanks or carried on trucks,

otherwise they would
never get though.

Many German officers later
blamed their failure

to take Moscow entirely
on the weather.

But in private, many admitted
that the German High Command

had badly underestimated
Soviet determination,

and the scale of their reserves.

For now, the German offensive
was literally bogged down.

In Moscow, news of the German
advance threatened to cause
panic on the streets.

On 15th October, the Central
Committee of the Communist Party
was evacuated,

as well as most of the
ministries and foreign
embassies.

The next day, many shops
and factories stayed closed.

Workers were left on the streets
with nothing to do. Rumours
began to spread.

On the orders of Commissar Lazar
Kaganovich, the metro stopped
running.

It was rigged with explosives
so that it could be blown up

if the Germans entered the city.

Trams stayed in their depots.

The roads leading east, to
safety, were blocked with cars.

The Luftwaffe stepped
up its air raids.

The streets were awash with
rumours of spies and saboteurs.

The situation demanded
urgent measures.

Aleksandr Shcherbakov, First
Secretary of the Moscow City
Committee, went on the air.

He assured citizens that Moscow
would not be abandoned.

The NKVD secret police would
patrol the streets and restore
order.

Check points were
set up everywhere.

People trying to leave the city
with valuables were closely
scrutinised.

Looters and scaremongers were
sentenced by military tribunals,

and shot by firing squad.

And posters went
up across the city

announcing a concert
by the film star Liubov Orlova.

The posters had their
desired effect.

If Russia s biggest celebrity
was in town, the situation
couldn t be that bad.

In fact at the beginning of
November, the Moscow front was
relatively stable.

But there was no room
for complacency.

The cry was Not a step back! ,
and it was rigorously enforced.

On 4th November, an order was
read out to the officers of the
133rd Rifle Division.

Its commander Gerasimov
and Commissar Shabalov

were to be executed by firing
squad for disobeying orders to
hold the town of Ruza.

They had retreated
without authorisation.

Stalin knew his own movements
would be crucial.

He choose to remain in Moscow,

and inspect the parade held
every year to mark the
anniversary of the Revolution.

All preparations for the parade
were made in complete secrecy.

Even the units taking part
weren t told in advance,

and at the last moment, the
start time was brought forward
by two hours.

At ten past 8 on the morning
of 7th November,

every radio station in the
Soviet Union broadcast Stalin s
speech from Red Square.

It was a supreme act
of state theatre.

No other parades were held in
Moscow until the end of the war.

To hold one in 1941,
the hour of greatest danger,

showed the world Stalin and the
Soviet Union s determination

to fight to the bitter end.

The troops seen here
parading through Red Square

would go straight on
to the front line.

There they would take part
in some of the bloodiest

and most decisive
fighting of the entire war.

Muscovites had been fully
mobilised for the defence of
their city.

They built fortifications
and made weapons.

The Dynamo and Kalinin
factories produced mortars.

Automobile factories now
made submachine guns.

By 5th November, Muscovites had
made donations to the Defence
Fund worth

more than 80 million roubles.
They had given 8 kilos of gold,

377 kilos of silver
and 1.4 kilos of platinum.

But now, with the
ground frozen hard,

German Army Group Centre
received orders to renew its
offensive.

Moscow was not just
the spiritual heart of Russia.

It was also the transport hub
for the entire Soviet Union.

All the major road and rail
networks converged here.

If Moscow fell, the Soviet Union
would be almost defenceless.

By the time Army Group Centre
renewed its assault,

the city s defences had been
considerably strengthened.

Reinforcements continued to
arrive from the Far East.

Katukov s Tank Brigade was one
of the units sent to guard the
approaches to Moscow.

Like an increasing
number of Red Army officers,

Katukov could now consider
himself a combat veteran.

Understanding the role of air
reconnaissance in German
success, Katukov wrote:

Tank tracks and footsteps in
deep snow can clearly be seen
from the air.

This isn t taken into
consideration by our soldiers,

who walk around their positions
creating a network of paths

that can be seen from above.

Katukov recommended changes to
standing orders to reduce
visibility from the air.

The Red Army was slowly
learning its craft.

Guderian s 2nd Panzer Army

resumed its advance through the
city of Tula towards Kolomna.

3rd and 4th Panzer Groups had
been redeployed to the north.

Their objectives were the
crossings over the Ivankovo
Reservoir,

with the aim of encircling
Moscow from the north.

The simultaneous assault of two
panzer groups caused Soviet
defences to buckle.

But the line did not break.

The Red Army retreated and dug
in again around the town of
Klin.

Katukov recalled:
We retreated with heavy hearts:

every single kilometre yielded
to the enemy brought the
fighting closer to Moscow.

We passed road signs reading 60
km to Moscow , then 55 , then
53 .

South of Moscow,
Guderian bypassed Tula,

but ran into determined
resistance from General Belov s
dismounted cavalry units.

By 30th November, German
observers could see the spires
of the Kremlin.

Motorcyclists from Hoepner s
Fourth Panzer Group reached
Khimki,

a Moscow suburb less
than 15 miles from the Kremlin.

According to one account,
the intruders were all killed.

In another, they were forced
to beat a hurried retreat.

It would prove to be the
high-water mark of the German
invasion.

In his memoirs Guderian wrote:
The offensive on Moscow failed.

All the sacrifices and efforts
of our valiant troops had been
in vain.

As a result, the army s strength
and morale was greatly
undermined.

Just as German reserves
were stretched to the limit,

the Stavka was gathering fresh
divisions to unleash a
devastating counter-attack.

One army prepared to hit
Reinhardt s panzer group from
the flank near Solnechnogorsk.

Another was aimed at the flank
of Guderian s panzer army near
Stalinogorsk.

Another army would roll back the
Germans from immediate vicinity
of Moscow.

On 29th November
Zhukov phoned Stalin to request

that he give the order
to begin the counteroffensive.

Stalin issued the
order that evening.

As German soldiers struggled to
cope with plummeting
temperatures

as low as minus 30 degrees
centigrade by night

they could at least take comfort
in the latest intelligence
reports.

The enemy s combat
capababilities in this area,
they claimed,

are not sufficient to conduct
any large scale
counter-offensive .

But sunrise on 5th December
brought a terrible shock.

Fresh Soviet tank brigades
and infantry divisions

launched a full-scale assault
along the whole front.

They tore across the frozen
landscape, forcing the Wehrmacht
into retreat,

and fighting fierce battles
against a desperate rear-guard.

Hundreds of German vehicles,
having run out of fuel or
anti-freeze,

lay abandoned at the road side.

Many German soldiers now
thought of nothing but survival.

General Schaal recalled, More
and more soldiers abandoned
their weapons,

but could be seen
leading livestock,

or perhaps dragging a sleigh
loaded with sacks of potatoes.

Soldiers killed in air attacks
were left unburied.

In the south, Guderian was
also in full retreat:

With a heavy heart, he wrote,
on 6th December

I ordered our troops to cease
all attacks, and begin a retreat
to our original lines.

The pursuers had
become the pursued.

The call Not a step back!
became the battle cry Forward!

There was to be no
mercy for the invader.

Meanwhile, Field
Marshal von Bock

was echoing Soviet orders
of just a few weeks before:

A commander may only
order a withdrawal

with the permission of
his army commander.

A division will not retreat
without my personal
authorisation.

To add to the suffering,
the troops were experiencing

the coldest Russian
winter in 140 years.

A German doctor s diary
recorded: A Russian can live in
this wilderness.

He can make a stove out
of a pair of empty jerry cans.

Our men only know how to warm
themselves by burning precious
petrol.

The Wehrmacht faced the same
fate as Napoleon s army total
ruin.

They had been forced back more
than 100 kilometres from the
gates of Moscow.

It was the first large-scale
repulse of German forces in
World War Two.

Footage of thousands of German
prisoners and their wrecked
vehicles

was seen around the world.

Hitler blamed defeat on a
failure of will amongst his
top generals.

Field Marshal von Brauchitsch
was sacked as Commander-in-Chief
of the German army.

His successor..
was Adolf Hitler.

Von Bock was replaced as
commander of Army Group Centre

by Field Marshal
Gunter von Kluge.

Guderian clashed with the High
Command once more, and was
relieved of command.

For ordering a retreat, Hoepner
was sacked and stripped of his
decorations.

In 1944 he was hanged
for plotting against Hitler.

However, Hitler s demands
that the army stand fast

and offer fanatical resistance
had effect.

The front line was
eventually stabilised,

as the Germans dug in and fought
the Red Army to a standstill.

Meanwhile, the Soviet Supreme
Command launched an offensive

along the entire front

from besieged Leningrad in the
north to the Black Sea in the
south.

Outside Moscow, the Red Army
tried to break through to Vyazma

and cut off Army Group Centre s
main supply route.

Stalin hoped for a
grand encirclement.

The German High Command fed in
fresh divisions from Western
Europe.

As they reinforced
the front line,

the lead elements of the Soviet
encirclement themselves became
cut off.

Two Soviet armies,
General Belov s cavalry corps

and thousand of paratroopers
were trapped around Vyzama.

Their attempts to fight
their way out ended in failure.

As 33rd Army was
surrounded and crushed,

its commander General Yefremov
committed suicide rather than be
taken prisoner.

Maslennikov s 39th Army and the
paratroopers dispersed to fight
on as guerrillas.

Only part of Belov s cavalry
corps managed to escape,

galloping through the forests
to rejoin the Soviet front line.

The Red Army still
had much to learn.

Zhukov told his officers: If
you want to keep your commands,

I insist that you stop ordering
criminal frontal attacks

on well-defended
enemy positions.

You should attack along ravines,

through forests or where there
is some cover from enemy fire.

By April 1942, the disruption
to Soviet industry

meant the Red Army was running
out of tanks and ammunition.

Its losses, exacerbated by its
own tactical blunders, had been
enormous.

As the spring thaw began, the
Soviet counteroffensive was
called off.

Germany had entered a war of
attrition against the Soviet
Union

its spirits raised by the
successful defence of the
capital.

In the battle for Moscow and in
the Soviet counteroffensive,

the Germans suffered
400,000 casualties.

They had lost 1,300 tanks.
2,500 guns.

By comparison, in the conquest
of Poland they had suffered just
44,000 casualties,

and in the defeat
of France, 154,000.

At the Nuremberg Trials,
Field Marshal Keitel,

Chief of the German
High Command, was asked

when he knew that the invasion
of the Soviet Union had failed.

He replied with one word:

Moscow .