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September 12th, 2002.

The 57th session

of the United Nations General Assembly opens in New York City.

On behalf of the General Assembly,

I have the honour to welcome to the United Nations,

His Excellency Mr. George W. Bush,

President of the United States of America,

and to invite him to address the General Assembly.

Mr. Secretary-General,

Mr. President,

distinguished delegates,

and ladies and gentlemen,

we meet one year

and one day after a terrorist attack

that brought grief to my country,

and brought grief to many citizens of our world.

All the world now faces a test,

and the United Nations,

a difficult and defining moment.

Will the United Nations serve the purpose of its founding,

or will it be irrelevant?

It's not the first time

Secretary-General Kofi Annan

has heard the UN accused of irrelevancy.

Right now, there are 60 nations fighting wars,

and the UN has peacekeeping missions in 15 of them.

Iraq has tarnished the UN,

but Annan's got a much bigger problem:

the Democratic Republic of Congo.

The UN and the Congo

have been linked since the beginning.

... New York,

where the future of the United Nations lies at stake

upon the Congo issue.

We believe that the only way

to keep the Cold War out of the Congo

is to keep the United Nations in the Congo.

The speech is interrupted

by a well-organized demonstration in the gallery.

The stage is set for a test between the Free World

and the Communist plot, the most critical moment

in the 15 years of the United Nations' existence.

Forty years later, a five-year civil war

in the Congo is coming to an end.

The result of the war:

three-million Congolese dead.

The United Nations is spending 600-million dollars a year

creating peace in the Congo.

Whether it will work is uncertain.

Hanging in the balance:

the lives of 55-million Congolese.

The UN's mission in the Congo is called MONUC.

Comment ça va? Comment ça va?

MONUC's frontline troops are military observers,

"milobs."

Milobs don't carry guns.

They do get shot at.

In the first phases of the Congo mission,

it was essentially an observer mission.

And so we gave the impression that we had lots of troops -

because we already had 3,000 troops, 4,000 troops -

which looks like a big number,

but which were there essentially to make sure

that a helicopter would not be looted,

that an oil depot would not be looted,

protecting our own assets.

But I think that a mission

in a place like Congo that is only an observer mission,

that's a very dangerous proposition politically.

Because the gap that you open between the expectations

of the people and what you can actually deliver

is just unsustainable.

The Congo has been fractured by the civil war.

The Western half, a madhouse,

controlled by President Joseph Kabila.

Its capital, Kinshasa,

will be the site of a transitional government.

A thousand miles from Kinshasa,

and still outside government control, the Eastern Congo.

The area is blessed with gold and diamonds,

and cursed by those who want it.

One Eastern district is particularly dangerous.

It's called Ituri.

Although outwardly peaceful,

the region is controlled by a dozen violent warlords.

In Ituri, they make machetes out of car springs.

They're the favourite tool of Ituri warlords,

who traffic in minerals

and death.

If the UN is going to save the Congo,

it will have to first save Ituri.

New York.

The UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations, DPKO,

constantly monitoring the situation in Ituri.

The news from the ground is not good.

Good morning, General Diallo.

Good morning, Miss Carey.

I'm sorry we're somewhat disorganized this morning;

it's been a rough week on our side.

But we understand

that you're chairing the meeting this morning?

- Yes. - Ah, okay.

As you see! Okay.

We have, this morning, an incident.

Two of our milobs went out of their house

to go to the spring for water,

and they were attacked by a group of eight individuals,

in civics, but armed with Kalashnikovs,

machetes and knives.

But for deadly - the team leader who was driving, accelerated

and managed to escape.

I think that as long as there is no agreement in Ituri,

it will be very risky to have military,

military unit deployed.

Our understanding from talking to council members

is that it's unlikely that we're going to get a resolution

for another two to three weeks.

And apparently, according to, uh...

our interlocutor, so to speak, it's tied to Iraq.

Some of the rumours

are that the U.S. Congress sees the Congo as a French issue,

and since the U.S. Congress is not very happy with the French

over their position on Iraq,

they're not prepared to do anything on the Congo

until they settle Iraq.

In the meantime, we will try to make the situation there

as public as possible, with the Security Council,

with the SG, and in the press.

So that if it does get out of hand,

nobody can say that the UN didn't warn them.

In the fall, Ituri does not blow up.

Just before Christmas,

a code cable is received at UN headquarters.

A formal Congolese peace agreement is finally ratified.

There have been others;

this one looks promising.

We have just been through a period

where there was the role of MONUC on the ground,

monitoring the disengagement,

and the question now is:

How do you establish the connections

so that the international community is not perceived

as a sort of a new colonial power?

There is a core that is the heart of the peace process:

elections, security sector,

rule of law, in essence.

All the rest, it's important: there needs to be good schools,

there needs to be a good health system,

and everything - and Congo needs everything.

But it's not mission critical

in the sense...

of a peace process.

Spring 2003.

Peace in the Ituri was too good to be true.

Despite enormous UN pressure,

the ruling warlords refused to surrender their weapons.

They crave instability;

it's good for business.

The Ituri schools close due to increasing violence.

The kids, easy prey for the warlords,

given an AK-47, bullets and food.

What the warlords get in return?

Ituri's gold.

Kinshasa.

The UN's MONUC headquarters is worried.

If Ituri blows,

the entire Congo could go with it.

Good morning, sir. Good morning, ma'am.

Request for the morning brief.

We have a couple of reports, and first is from Bunia,

where team has reported

that there has been a considerable movement

and increase in the number of Lendu combatants.

Meanwhile, a number of civilians, believed to be Hemas,

have left Bunia town.

- And the humanitarian affairs? - Yeah. There has been fighting

in Baralla between the Mai-Mai and the RCDG.

There's apparently quite a lot of people who've been displaced

as a result of that.

We've actually received word

from the Center for the Prevention of Genocide,

that they are also aware

of the alleged massacres that are actually taking place.

In Ovira, the situation stayed calm yesterday.

I think it's enormously important to understand

the psychology of some of the people

that were inside the MONUC.

The UN as a whole has paid a terrible price

for the perceived failures of what happened in Srebeniza

and what happened in Rwanda.

We would do everything that we could

to make sure that we didn't have another Srebeniza,

we didn't have another Rwanda on our watch.

And that was the key thing; that the UN couldn't take

another disaster, another genocide,

while it was deployed in the area,

no matter how lightly deployed, no matter how inadequately.

In addition to the warlords,

soldiers from two neighbouring countries, Rwanda and Uganda,

roam the town.

The two countries claim

they're legitimately protecting their borders with the Congo,

but they also want Ituri's wealth.

They will kill for both.

By the end of March, early April, we were saying,

"Please, members of the Security Council,

please, international community, give us some time."

MONUC had 4,500 people in this enormous country,

4,500 troops, doing all sorts of things.

We could not deploy ourselves into Ituri

to try to prevent the massacres

that we expected were going to take place.

April 3rd.

Jacques Greenberg's worst fears come true.

The village of Drodro, near Bunia, is attacked.

Several-hundred villagers, mostly women and children,

hacked to death.

The victims, they're of no strategic importance;

they're minor pawns in the warlord wars.

Two weeks post-massacre,

the warlords signing a peace accord.

No one believes them.

Les signataires sont ici présents.

The killings will continue.

But some day, as in Bosnia, Kosovo, Sierra Leone,

maybe there'll be war-crimes trials.

Five days later, a team of UN investigators,

heading for Drodro,

site of the recent massacre.

The investigation is the first step

in ending impunity in the Congo.

While Drodro testimony is being taken,

a young girl, killed and mutilated.

A taunt from the warlords.

"Investigate if you want.

Nothing will come of it."

And in a jungle hospital, more victims:

the Drodro survivors.

By day,

the Ituri tribes often share a local food market.

At night, they hunt each other.

Further down the road, a village, Zumbe,

guarded entirely by child soldiers,

with arms supplied by the warlords.

The village is suspected

of perpetrating the Drodro massacre.

As they travel about the countryside,

the UN investigators are protected by Ugandan troops.

The Ugandans, it is suspected,

helped the village of Zumbe attack Drodro.

Summer.

The months drag on.

The Security Council is in a quandary over Uganda.

Ugandan troops are keeping the warlords in line.

But they, along with Rwanda, are also suspected

of being behind much of the Ituri violence.

While there were some Ugandan elements

behind some of the insecurity in Ituri,

Uganda's presence there also provided a degree of stability.

The Ugandans had agreed that they would withdraw from Ituri.

The Security Council wanted Uganda out,

and it was because of the necessity of pursuing

the internal political reconciliation within the Congo.

There was a fear that,

if and when the Ugandans left,

Ituri would just blow up into chaos.

Ituri would just blow up into chaos.

The United Nations has to be ready

to quickly fill the Ugandan vacuum.

Finding First World troops for any dangerous mission

is difficult;

for dangerous African missions, it's almost impossible.

The majority of the contributors of Blue Helmets

at present come from the developing countries.

Let me be clear: they cannot,

nor should not be expected,

to continue to shoulder this burden alone.

We fully recognize that many armies are downsizing,

and that defence budgets are often dwindling.

And finally, scars

from experience in Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia

have yet to heal.

Notwithstanding, there is an equally legitimate concern

that the credibility and viability of UN peacekeeping

remains under threat.

At my level, we're discussing the possibility

of how we could diplomatically get the Ugandans

to stay without ever actually asking them to stay.

At the same time,

the Security Council very much wanted

all foreign forces out of the Congo.

What we did then was try to establish with Uganda

a slow and measured withdraw

that would enable us to not only monitor that withdraw,

but enable us to, in some instances,

fill the vacuum, as Uganda withdrew.

Uganda wouldn't accept that.

They wanted the United Nations

to publicly come out and ask Uganda to stay,

which the United Nations

would not and could not politically do.

Hold it! Hold it!

Whoa, whoa, whoa!

Bunia airport. May 1st.

Uganda has ordered pulling out of Ituri.

The Security Council, pleading for countries to help.

Only Uruguay accepts.

So now,

750 Uruguayan guard troops

are replacing 5,000 battle-hardened Ugandans.

It's a very dangerous changing of the guard.

The Uruguayans have gotten half to two-thirds deployed.

The UPDF,

the Ugandan forces, started to depart via the airport.

There was a day of quiet,

and then immediately after that,

the various militias came streaming into town.

As predicted, Bunia is transformed

into a war zone.

Much of the town fleeing into the forests.

Thousands of others turning to UN camps.

They fled basically in two directions:

one of them to the MONUC headquarters, which was in town,

and the other one to the airport area,

where the Uruguayans had established their base.

I think at one point

we had more than 3,500 of these IDPs

gathered around our headquarters,

and another 3,000 or 4,000 at the airport.

We were absolutely on the verge of a humanitarian catastrophe.

Food at the UN compound running out fast.

The water supply, cut.

Cholera is reported.

At the same time, I think it was the Lendu militia

that started to attack MONUC,

and with the concentration of IDPs around our headquarters,

it became an enormously dangerous situation.

Heavy mortar and shell landed inside our compound,

killing, I think, a half a dozen of the IDPs that were there,

and injuring a much larger number.

On the third day, MONUC forces, overwhelmed,

retreat to their compound.

The UN is losing its gamble.

The warlords are unstoppable.

A week after fighting starts,

Bunia is a looted ghost town.

UN staff and Red Cross workers starting the recovery

of some 250 corpses.

The situation had become so serious

that it was now serious time to think about deploying,

or asking for a multinational, robust force,

to re-establish some degree of order

and normality in Bunia.

New York,

never anticipating Bunia would fall.

The big fear:

the entire Congo peace process will collapse.

And if the Congo goes, all of Central Africa is in jeopardy.

In peacekeeping,

you are confronted to a kind of a dilemma:

to look the other way

and have to live for the rest of your life

with maybe the notion that if you had really moved in,

you would have made a big difference.

Or to move in, but maybe with the risk of failure.

At every step, I'll need to convince the Security Council,

and I'll need to convince the troop contributors.

If I don't get it right,

then it's the authority of the United Nations,

it's the good name of peacekeeping

that will be compromised.

During the Congo's five-year civil war,

the press was indifferent.

Now, with new Ituri massacres,

media attention shifts briefly from Iraq to the Congo.

This has been one of Africa's ugliest wars.

Bunia is Congo's latest hellhole.

50,000 people are thought to have died

in that part of the country alone.

It is a war in which children are victims and combatants.

The population continues to flee.

- It's not a nice place. - A contingent of UN troops

from Uruguay has been powerless to intervene.

One of the very important contributions

of the Uruguayan deploying in Bunia,

because they were there,

they brought the attention of the world media.

Because you have a lot of massacres in Congo

where it's just too dangerous to have any journalist,

any reporter. So you don't even know that they happen.

It's very hard for politicians to say,

"Well, we just have to look the other way."

And so I think this change in public opinion

has an impact on the politics of the Security Council.

Two weeks after fighting in Bunia begins,

a brief lull.

But military observers in isolated outposts are worried.

Militia in the hills are preparing to attack the camps.

As fighting in Ituri intensifies,

refugees are fleeing to the capital, Kinshasa,

squatting in buildings abandoned during past wars.

Not far away,

Parliament is being readied after years of neglect.

But with fighting in Ituri,

Parliament's opening is questionable.

The Congo, tilting towards collapse.

Jean-Marie Guéhenno,

desperately looking for a heavily armed force

to save Bunia,

a force outside the UN.

The French, still smarting from Iraq,

one possibility to lead the force.

But the French are clear:

if they accept, it's only Bunia and the airport,

and only for three months.

With the French sitting on the fence,

MONUC, nervous.

The French ambassador reacted by saying that, "No, no, no,

"there is no question of anyone dealing with Ituri.

This does not concern Ituri,

this is merely concentrated on Bunia

and that we are not here to resolve the problems of Ituri,"

etc.

The concept, as I understand it,

and maybe I am absolutely wrong,

they want to have a compact and manageable force in Bunia,

which will consist primarily

of something roughly around a battalion size of French troops,

with a sprinkle,

sprinkle of other troops,

to add flags to the coalition.

And in a sense be thankful for a member state

who has come...

willing to come and rescue our troops.

Because otherwise, the point was last week -

and we all know that -

that they would have to be withdrawn.

We were very close to that.

I think you heard our position.

Our position, as far as Ituri is concerned, is very firm.

The indications we have given you are not changeable.

We are warning you about the situation in the entire Ituri.

We are not here to be convinced

that the problem in Ituri is limited to Bunia.

Okay? Otherwise,

whatever member states want to decide,

whatever others want to decide, is fine and dandy,

but we are going to give you the reports as we see it,

we're going to analyze it as we see it.

But warnings, warnings,

I'm very good about warnings myself, as you know,

and you heard my warnings two weeks ago,

about what may happen in Bunia.

We assumed that we were talking

about a larger number than a battalion.

Thank you, and it's all my fault as always.

- Thanks. Thanks very much. - No, it's not.

If there is nothing else to discuss,

I'm adjourning the meeting

and I don't want to adjourn on this very sour note,

which is developing.

8:30 tomorrow, New York time?

Okay. Thank you.

I don't like these acrimonious things.

I don't like these...

May 10th. Bunia.

Urgent calls received from two isolated military observers

in a town called Mongwalu.

The milobs are very scared. They want to be taken out.

For three terrifying days, the milobs wait,

extracting them, impossible, due to intense fighting.

May 13th, a helicopter finally dispatched to Mongwalu.

Returning, empty.

Three days later, what everyone fears comes true.

The deaths of the two milobs hit MONUC headquarters hard.

Rumours circulate.

The rescue attempt was botched.

- How's the mission doing? - They're okay.

They're okay? But a little bit disjointed.

We were in that room and we got a call from Mongwalu.

And this guy had phoned.

Those military observers were literally crying.

They said, "Take us out of here."

I mean, two persons in a location that's...

There's still element of mission

being somewhat dysfunctional.

There is no security assessment in a proper way.

People are thrown sometimes... These team sides

were established in the most strange way.

That's the reports I have.

Now, when military observers were just sent,

without any support, any previous resources,

and put them in dangerous spots.

So today, can you draft the cable in consultation

for François Dureau?

Of extreme, most immediate,

of extreme concern on the part of this headquarters...

that we want immediately, by tomorrow,

a threat assessment

to all personnel, civilian and military personnel,

in the northeast.

You spoke to Germany yesterday?

Can you speak to Canada today?

- Okay. - Okay?

Financial support would be helpful.

Although I don't think they have much money.

Eventually,

there will be a high-level UN investigation

into the milobs' deaths.

The report will be kept strictly confidential.

The Congo. It's always been a difficult sell

to the international community.

The deaths of the milobs don't help.

But the crucial question remains:

What's the worth of one failed African state?

- Money. - Money, you say?

Money for the MNF.

I think that's they key thing right now, right?

Frankly, there are two key things right now.

One of them is money for this MNF limited deployment,

and the other one is this big bell

that the mission is sounding

and that I think we all agree with, that Bunia is not enough.

You know, I don't think

that we're going to get troops outside of Bunia,

unless we put our own troops out there.

And I don't think we have the capacity

to put our own troops out there.

I don't think that our troops are capable,

have the kind of equipment and training to do that.

I absolutely agree with you,

but I think we have to not only go down on record

but just keep on thinking:

Is there any way that we can do something

outside of the immediate environs of Bunia?

Because large numbers of people are going to die.

You've got at least two declarations

from the armed combatants saying,

"We are ready to canton. Where's the money to feed us?"

- Or whatever. - Okay.

You need to disarm them,

and then you need to do something with the weapons.

So there has to be an agreement of what we do with the weapons.

And then we need to feed them and then get them into projects,

food for work or training,

or whatever other projects we have for them.

But then, you won't get the money from the donors,

because they consider that feeding armed combatants.

Are there no other options?

We have a plan for Bunia and airport,

and hopefully the multinational forces

are going to deploy there. But there is the rest of Ituri

and the many ways

in which the rest of Ituri could go badly wrong.

And there we are caught in a kind of dilemma,

because if we flag the issue too much,

we might lose the hope

that we have of a real deployment in Bunia.

If we ignore it, it is just as bad,

because we might be surprised by it,

and we'll be misleading those who will deploy in Bunia.

The dangerous scenario is a scenario

where we have some improvement in Bunia,

- but then there's just a shift... - ...moves outside.

A shift in the killings to other places.

If their people are cynical and clever enough,

they don't attack Bunia, no;

they just commit horrors

40 kilometres from Bunia.

The international community,

The French once again, when it's...

They protect certain people and not others.

They protect certain people,

but they don't care about the others.

The other flip side of the coin

is that if Bunia is a safe place

and if things go badly in the rest of Ituri,

instead of having 12,000 refugees,

you're going to have 50,000, 60,000, 100,000.

You can have a colossal à la Gomachaos developing.

What I'm describing could happen. It's not...

If there's anybody who has an interest

in undermining the credibility of the MNF,

then that's the way to do it, it's easy.

So, I mean, there's one or two things that can be done.

One is to ask the French or whoever is coming with them,

to have a rapid-reaction capability.

They have the capacity to go in, you know, and hit very hard...

Yeah, that's why they need attack helicopters.

...and pull out without casualties most of the time

and without too many risks, and make a point, you know.

The killers are not a massive force.

They are thugs on drugs,

who can be, I mean,

scared and stopped

by a relatively small professional force

when things go bad,

if that force is there quickly and decisively.

In May, I decided,

and the Secretary-General supported that,

to move toward engagement,

because we felt that the risks of loss of human life

were just too high,

and that maybe, with the memory of Rwanda,

the possibility did exist

to convince the Security Council to do the right thing.

Will those in favour of...

May 30th, 2003.

The Security Council accepts a French-led multinational force.

...please raise their hand.

The force might possibly save Ituri.

- Those against? Abstentions? - But only in the short term.

The draft resolution has been adopted unanimously.

June.

The French-led force on the ground.

In Bunia, unhampered by UN rules of engagement,

the French confront the warlords.

Là-bas. Fais le tour l-bas.

But in the hills,

the murders, rapes and kidnappings increase.

Eh, dégage!

In three months,

the French will pull out of Ituri.

Then, it's up to a UN Ituri brigade to secure the peace.

Since the French have agreed to deploy in Bunia

only with a very clear timeframe and a deadline,

we have to be sure

that by September 1st,

our forces are rolling in and operational.

And that's in the hands of the council,

and the council in the hands of their...

of what will be the U.S. decision,

and there, every day that passes will make me extremely nervous.

The days turn into weeks.

The cost of an Ituri brigade:

tens of millions of dollars a year.

There's only one country in the world with that kind of money.

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen,

generals and deputy SRSGs.

The general left.

The generals have left, I can see.

So on Friday, together with several colleagues,

we visited Washington

and had a three-hour discussion,

plus myself a rather bad lunch in the State Department

with the...

interdepartmental group headed

by Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Bellamy,

and they do appreciate considerably the work,

what has been done by the United Nations,

both on the ground and in New York.

But they would like to have a better feel

as a major financial contributor, obviously,

and a political lever,

what is the end game,

both in Ituri and in the Congo as a whole.

And when they see

the proposed ceiling at 10,700,

for them it's a real jump.

As far as the deployment of the brigade is concerned -

and here I have no choice but to make a comparison

with NATO in the Balkans -

How is it that a mere brigade

is being questioned for the UN?

The same thing could be said

about what you mentioned in Sierra Leone.

In Sierra Leone, we suddenly did agree to go to 17,500,

because a disaster happened.

So we should not wait here until the disaster is opened,

if you wish,

because we do already have a disaster on our hands.

The Americans, obviously, they are the biggest payer,

so, I mean, I...

whenever we increase MONUC,

they will pay the bigger part of the bill.

At the moment,

it's clear that in the council

what we need to achieve is to convince the U.S.

to make a decision quickly, because every day that passes

means that our deployments are going to be delayed.

On the one hand, many of my colleagues

were working to give the information necessary

for troop contributors to put together the kind of troops

that we would need for Ituri.

My job was more to try and convince the Security Council

we had a viable plan for Ituri.

And I think one of the problems with Council,

and I think particularly with the United States,

was that they did not see that there was really

a political process in Ituri worth investing in.

The U.S. told us -

and I think that they had a legitimate concern -

that they saw Ituri as a Somalia.

And so our job, really, was try to convince them

that there was a political process.

June. Meg Carey, to Bunia.

Her mission: find an exit strategy for the Ituri quickly,

one acceptable to the Americans.

The council met yesterday in New York

and have decided to give MONUC a technical rollover,

which basically means no new mandated activities,

just an extension of the date of the mandate

until sometime in July.

But the first implication

is that we will only get a task force of one battalion,

and that we would not have any additional troops

beyond one battalion,

at the current date of exit of the international force.

That has major implications for the work that we do in Ituri.

So we have a lot of work to do, to try to convince the people

who pay the bills that it's worth their investing in it.

There was a time that I did feel

that none of the countries of the world

who could make a difference really cared,

and that nobody was really seeing the lives

that were being wasted, and it didn't matter to them.

You did feel personally somewhat responsible,

because you felt: What am I doing wrong

that I'm not being able to convince these member states

that they need to provide the troops necessary

to save these lives?

You can't pull these people out now,

because then it'll make the situation worse...

And you also felt responsible

for the United Nations staff

that were putting their lives at risk in Ituri.

And there was a great deal of pressure.

It is once again the unilateral action taken by the government.

The best, perhaps the only chance,

of stabilizing the region:

something called the "Ituri Interim Administration."

Whether it can expel Ugandan- and Rwandan-sponsored fighters,

that's anybody's guess.

What Madam Buweka is up against,

is a warlord named Thomas Lubanga.

Lubanga controls Bunia;

he is backed by Uganda.

He has a degree in psychology,

the support of hundreds of child soldiers.

And blood on his hands.

Most peace processes that we're dealing with,

in Africa and beyond,

the heads of factions, to a greater or a lesser extent,

are warlords,

and have very Mafioso-type tendencies.

You have to deal with them.

You may not want to deal with them

and they may have committed all sorts of human-rights abuses

but unfortunately, you have to deal with them,

because they're the ones with the power.

What do these military leaders want?

I think, if we talk about UPC, the leadership of UPC,

definitely Lubanga wants to play a national role in the Congo,

using Ituri as a pretext for it, you know.

- To bargain. - So he has very big ambitions.

So now, I think what we have to see is how best we can

try to see at a national level what we can give him,

even something very small, yes.

If you continue discussing with him, we can say,

"Yes, you can play a role at a national level."

But what happens to Lubanga after he gets to national level?

He will leave everything and go.

And what happens to UPC after Lubanga leaves?

It will finish.

You have to exercise pressure on Lubanga.

Maybe the Security Council can issue a statement

or something like that,

naming them, name and shame.

So I think this is one of the aspects of the problem

- you have to look at. - If we name and shame,

will that put MONUC individuals in any danger for reprisals?

I don't think so.

If it is done at the level of the Security Council.

- So that's the stick? - Yeah.

And now the carrot is to try to bring him on board.

Okay.

And the reason that the fighting started in Jugu and Mongwalu

is because this is the resource-rich area?

- Yes. - And that's also a place

where the two tribes are rubbing...

It's very significant

that our milobs have been assassinated in the war.

- It wasn't robbery gone bad. - No, no, no, definitely not.

No, I think they saw something they shouldn't have seen.

That's my take on it.

While Meg Carey looks for an Ituri exit strategy

the Bunia jail is renovated.

Local judges will soon be reinstated.

Rebuilding any society starts with the rule of law.

There was no functioning

indigenous rule of law.

The quandary that we were in

is that we could not hold people indefinitely,

without turning them over to a local judicial process.

We could not also arrest people.

We could detain people, but we couldn't arrest people.

And so what we needed as quickly as possible

was for the local police, even if it was symbolic,

to begin working.

Now, on CIVPOL,

an integrated Congolese police force for Ituri

is part of our exit strategy.

And it's also part of our strategy

to strengthen the Ituri administration

and to get it to be doing the work for itself.

I've read your cable for options for Ituri,

but I really have to stress

that anything that you send to us in New York

has to be realistic, based on present capacities

and based on a thorough political analysis

of what is acceptable to the parties.

Whenever you make a presentation to Mr. Titov or myself,

start with needs,

not with your desires for what you're going to deploy.

I want to know the needs on the ground,

that's what I want to know.

Bottom line at this stage,

everything is needed, because there isn't...

"Everything is needed" means nothing to me, Stephan.

I'm a political-affairs officer, I know nothing about police.

I need details.

What does "everything" mean, okay?

You have to treat me like a child who knows nothing, okay?

And explain it from A to Z.

Can I just, with all due respect,

make a suggestion? Never say you can't do anything.

We will find ways of doing if it has to be done, okay?

Let's just find ways of doing it.

Okay. So, um... Sorry.

Hello.

So basically, we've got to start,

for purely political reasons,

and not because of substance or this is the right thing to do,

but purely for political reasons,

I would like to start training a police force now.

Okay, no, no, no, it's okay. I'll call Mr. Titov tomorrow.

Before you hang up, can you dial my home number?

Thank you.

Late June.

The French declare Bunia weapons-free.

The Bunia child soldiers now join the thousands of fighters

camped in the hills,

waiting for the orders to attack.

That Sunday,

the people in Bunia celebrate the town's liberation.

The government in Kinshasa

declares the war officially over.

The fighting may be over,

but the peace, it's not even close.

Two weeks later, the newly appointed judges,

fearing for their lives,

will flee Bunia.

Bonjour.

Comment ça va?

CÇa va? Oui?

Within hours of arriving back in New York,

Meg Carey, drafting the Ituri exit strategy.

The plan: several-thousand additional UN troops

to secure Bunia after the French leave,

and 150-million dollars to pay for them.

In a few minutes,

Jean-Marie Guéhenno will try to convince the Security Council

it will all work.

Amin, I need it now.

Just e-mail it to me.

You got it?

Fine, thank you.

- Okay. You send it to me. - Yeah.

Possibly to reinforce...

detachments in north Kivu.

CÇa va?

Okay, although this is primarily an allegation

of the MLC. Have we any MONUC?

- They've apparently confirmed. - Okay. Fine.

However, the RCD has put forth three demands

that the DRC government...

Can you take the message for me, please?

- Sure. - I'll take it.

Hi. Okay.

- It's 11 pages. - He said five.

Tough shit.

In the midst of 2003,

there is a window of opportunity, and you know,

it's like stars aligning themselves.

There's a combination of factors.

There's a post-Iraq factor, that's the sense

that the Security Council has to demonstrate

that it can deliver

and that it is not focused just on Iraq.

Thirty-seven floors down to the Security Council.

Jean-Marie Guéhenno's made the trip 100 times before.

He knows Council debates are for public posturing.

He's already made the private phone calls

to nervous embassies.

What he doesn't know: Will it work?

The Secretary-General himself is in close contact

with Colin Powell, with Condoleeza Rice,

with the president himself, so there are contacts at top level,

from the UN and from other countries

which have good relations with the U.S.

and which made the case for MONUC.

The African countries

tell the non-African members of the Council, "Come on!

"Do you care about Africa, or don't you?

And if you care, how could you question

that 10,800 troops is too much for Congo,

a country the size of Western Europe?"

One of the things that we used on Council members,

informally, was the guilt.

If we needed to withdraw,

and the Secretary-General would have withdrawn that battalion

if need be, he would have had to.

And if it had been a bloodbath, it would have been

on the shoulders of the international community.

Unfortunately, the press sees the international community

as being this blue building in New York which is the UN.

And so it's the fault of the UN,

or it's the weakness of the UN.

They don't sort of extend that to:

it's a weakness of member states

who don't give the UN the capability to do something.

To succeed in these tasks,

it is critical that states in the region

act cooperatively to support the process

of bringing peace and stability

to the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo.

The Security Council finally gives MONUC

the money for an Ituri brigade, and a Chapter 7 mandate,

allowing the UN brigade to shoot to kill.

Mr. Solana, the United States would like to thank you...

Chapter 7 comes with a package of troops, in terms of numbers,

in terms of determination,

and also a package of political commitment,

of key players

to put the pressure on all those

who can make a mess of the situation

if they so decide.

We have to make sure that the troop contributors

are prepared to draw the consequences of that.

There's a clear understanding

that they're not getting off the hook by giving us Chapter 7;

it's not a favour that they're doing us.

It's a responsibility.

It's a responsibility that they're taking.

Responsibility, too, in terms of that arms embargo

and stopping the arm flow from Uganda and Rwanda.

They have to take that responsibility.

- Yes. - Only they can do that.

- That is the package. - That's the package.

Fall, 2003.

The Congo River once again open.

But the weapons embargo isn't working.

Arms are travelling from Ituri down the Congo,

spreading violence to neighbouring provinces.

September 1st.

On schedule.

The French-led multinational force leaves Bunia.

At the same time, the newly arrived UN Ituri brigade,

made up of Pakistanis, Bangladeshis and Indians,

takes control of Bunia.

This time, the UN brigade is, by anybody's standards,

a robust force.

Almost immediately, the UN brigade is tested.

The warlords are probing for weakness.

But with a Chapter 7 mandate

and the will to use it,

Bunia is stabilized.

Simultaneously, the brigade,

with attack helicopters from India,

starts extending its perimeter

into the hills once owned by the warlords.

Kinshasa.

The Parliament of Reconciliation finally convenes.

But it won't be easy.

Armies from two of the vice-presidents

have recently been trying to kill each other,

and there have been numerous plots

against the life of President Joseph Kabila.

No First World country is going to save the Congo;

the Congo is going to save the Congo

and the Congolese will save the Congo.

And in terms of the national political process,

there are some key issues,

and they are difficult issues to get over.

But it's not impossible to get over with sustained support.

October.

As MONUC provides security,

the first class of the Bunia Police,

the one Meg Carey wanted, is about to graduate.

In the class,

cadets who not long ago were trying to kill each other.

AÀ droite.

Droite!

What is happening in Ituri is at the forefront

of what could be happening in the country as a whole.

We already have the first nucleus

of the integrated national police force

that has been set up in the town of Bunia,

and the training that's been done there.

So it seems to me that sometimes,

if you tackle the toughest problems

in a concerted and adequately resourced way,

and you make real progress there,

it becomes a beacon or a model,

or at least a precedent, for what can be happening elsewhere.

The risk, in a way, is that as things look better,

and they are indeed better,

the sense of... and the pressure,

the sense of imminent risk is no more there,

which is a good thing

because it reflects progress on the ground,

but which is a dangerous thing

because that progress is not so solid

that there is no need

for continued, very strong engagement.

Throughout the fall,

the Ituri brigade continues moving outside Bunia.

Mongwalu, site of the murders of the milobs,

is particularly dangerous.

There's a gold mine here,

gold to buy arms.

But even in Mongwalu, things are starting to change.

Despite what their leaders may do,

the Congolese child soldiers

will not turn in their guns in the coming months.

No one has figured out an incentive that works.

Every day, an old diesel brings kids from the countryside

into Kinshasa, to beg and steal.

Each week, some of the kids perish under the train's wheels.

Others die more slowly,

of hunger or despair.

If the Kinshasa politicians and the international community

don't give them a future, and soon,

there are plenty of Ituri warlords who will.

In the following months, the violence in Ituri does not stop.

Not far from Bunia,

the village of Kachele is attacked in the night.

Sixty-five people killed, including 40 children.

In the fall of 2003,

the UN itself becomes a target.

Several more milobs are killed.

But the worst predictions have not materialized:

a massacre on the scale of Rwanda has been averted.

Can you tell them that he's on his way? Thank you.

Oh, so we've got movement.

It's been a mixed year

for the world's peacekeeper.

The Security Council failed to stop the war in Iraq.

But Haiti, Burundi and Liberia, amongst others,

are qualified successes.

And the Congo,

a country no one wants to think about,

it continues its painful march towards national elections.

Excellencies, we now see with chilling clarity,

that a world where many millions of people

endure brutal oppression

and extreme misery, will never be fully secure,

even for its most privileged inhabitants.

Once again this year,

our collective response to events of this type

in the Democratic Republic of Congo,

has been hesitant and tardy.

History is a harsh judge.

It will not forgive us if we let this moment pass.

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