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September 12th, 2002.

The 57th session

of the United Nations General
Assembly opens in New York City.

On behalf
of the General Assembly,

I have the honour to welcome
to the United Nations,

His Excellency
Mr. George W. Bush,

President of
the United States of America,

and to invite him to address
the General Assembly.

Mr. Secretary-General,

Mr. President,

distinguished delegates,

and ladies and gentlemen,

we meet one year

and one day
after a terrorist attack

that brought grief
to my country,

and brought grief
to many citizens of our world.

All the world now faces a test,

and the United Nations,

a difficult and defining moment.

Will the United Nations serve
the purpose of its founding,

or will it be irrelevant?

It's not the first time

Secretary-General Kofi Annan

has heard the UN
accused of irrelevancy.

Right now, there are
60 nations fighting wars,

and the UN has peacekeeping
missions in 15 of them.

Iraq has tarnished the UN,

but Annan's got
a much bigger problem:

the Democratic Republic
of Congo.

The UN and the Congo

have been linked
since the beginning.

... New York,

where the future of
the United Nations lies at stake

upon the Congo issue.

We believe
that the only way

to keep the Cold War
out of the Congo

is to keep the United Nations
in the Congo.

The speech is interrupted

by a well-organized
demonstration in the gallery.

The stage is set for a test
between the Free World

and the Communist plot,
the most critical moment

in the 15 years of
the United Nations' existence.

Forty years later,
a five-year civil war

in the Congo
is coming to an end.

The result of the war:

three-million Congolese dead.

The United Nations is spending
600-million dollars a year

creating peace in the Congo.

Whether it will work
is uncertain.

Hanging in the balance:

the lives
of 55-million Congolese.

The UN's mission in the Congo
is called MONUC.

Comment ça va?
Comment ça va?

MONUC's frontline
troops are military observers,

"milobs."

Milobs don't carry guns.

They do get shot at.

In the first phases
of the Congo mission,

it was essentially
an observer mission.

And so we gave the impression
that we had lots of troops -

because we already
had 3,000 troops, 4,000 troops -

which looks like a big number,

but which were there
essentially to make sure

that a helicopter
would not be looted,

that an oil depot
would not be looted,

protecting our own assets.

But I think that a mission

in a place like Congo that
is only an observer mission,

that's a very dangerous
proposition politically.

Because the gap that you open
between the expectations

of the people and what you can
actually deliver

is just unsustainable.

The Congo has been
fractured by the civil war.

The Western half,
a madhouse,

controlled
by President Joseph Kabila.

Its capital, Kinshasa,

will be the site
of a transitional government.

A thousand miles from Kinshasa,

and still outside government
control, the Eastern Congo.

The area is blessed
with gold and diamonds,

and cursed by those who want it.

One Eastern district
is particularly dangerous.

It's called Ituri.

Although outwardly peaceful,

the region is controlled
by a dozen violent warlords.

In Ituri, they make machetes
out of car springs.

They're the favourite tool
of Ituri warlords,

who traffic in minerals

and death.

If the UN is going
to save the Congo,

it will have
to first save Ituri.

New York.

The UN's Department of
Peacekeeping Operations, DPKO,

constantly monitoring
the situation in Ituri.

The news from the ground
is not good.

Good morning, General Diallo.

Good morning, Miss Carey.

I'm sorry we're somewhat
disorganized this morning;

it's been a rough week
on our side.

But we understand

that you're chairing
the meeting this morning?

- Yes.
- Ah, okay.

As you see!
Okay.

We have, this morning,
an incident.

Two of our milobs
went out of their house

to go to the spring for water,

and they were attacked
by a group of eight individuals,

in civics,
but armed with Kalashnikovs,

machetes and knives.

But for deadly - the team leader
who was driving, accelerated

and managed to escape.

I think that as long as there
is no agreement in Ituri,

it will be very risky
to have military,

military unit deployed.

Our understanding
from talking to council members

is that it's unlikely that
we're going to get a resolution

for another two to three weeks.

And apparently,
according to, uh...

our interlocutor, so to speak,
it's tied to Iraq.

Some of the rumours

are that the U.S. Congress sees
the Congo as a French issue,

and since the U.S. Congress is
not very happy with the French

over their position on Iraq,

they're not prepared
to do anything on the Congo

until they settle Iraq.

In the meantime, we will try
to make the situation there

as public as possible,
with the Security Council,

with the SG,
and in the press.

So that if it does
get out of hand,

nobody can say
that the UN didn't warn them.

In the fall,
Ituri does not blow up.

Just before Christmas,

a code cable is received
at UN headquarters.

A formal Congolese peace
agreement is finally ratified.

There have been others;

this one looks promising.

We have just been
through a period

where there was the role
of MONUC on the ground,

monitoring the disengagement,

and the question now is:

How do you establish
the connections

so that the international
community is not perceived

as a sort
of a new colonial power?

There is a core that is
the heart of the peace process:

elections, security sector,

rule of law, in essence.

All the rest, it's important:
there needs to be good schools,

there needs to be a good
health system,

and everything -
and Congo needs everything.

But it's not mission critical

in the sense...

of a peace process.

Spring 2003.

Peace in the Ituri
was too good to be true.

Despite enormous UN pressure,

the ruling warlords refused
to surrender their weapons.

They crave instability;

it's good for business.

The Ituri schools close
due to increasing violence.

The kids, easy prey
for the warlords,

given an AK-47,
bullets and food.

What the warlords
get in return?

Ituri's gold.

Kinshasa.

The UN's MONUC headquarters
is worried.

If Ituri blows,

the entire Congo
could go with it.

Good morning, sir.
Good morning, ma'am.

Request for the morning brief.

We have a couple of reports,
and first is from Bunia,

where team has reported

that there has been
a considerable movement

and increase in the number
of Lendu combatants.

Meanwhile, a number of
civilians, believed to be Hemas,

have left Bunia town.

- And the humanitarian affairs?
- Yeah. There has been fighting

in Baralla between
the Mai-Mai and the RCDG.

There's apparently quite a lot
of people who've been displaced

as a result of that.

We've actually received word

from the Center
for the Prevention of Genocide,

that they are also aware

of the alleged massacres
that are actually taking place.

In Ovira, the situation
stayed calm yesterday.

I think it's enormously
important to understand

the psychology
of some of the people

that were inside the MONUC.

The UN as a whole
has paid a terrible price

for the perceived failures
of what happened in Srebeniza

and what happened in Rwanda.

We would do
everything that we could

to make sure that we didn't have
another Srebeniza,

we didn't have another Rwanda
on our watch.

And that was the key thing;
that the UN couldn't take

another disaster,
another genocide,

while it was deployed
in the area,

no matter how lightly deployed,
no matter how inadequately.

In addition
to the warlords,

soldiers from two neighbouring
countries, Rwanda and Uganda,

roam the town.

The two countries claim

they're legitimately protecting
their borders with the Congo,

but they also want
Ituri's wealth.

They will kill for both.

By the end of March,
early April, we were saying,

"Please, members
of the Security Council,

please, international community,
give us some time."

MONUC had 4,500 people
in this enormous country,

4,500 troops,
doing all sorts of things.

We could not deploy ourselves
into Ituri

to try to prevent the massacres

that we expected
were going to take place.

April 3rd.

Jacques Greenberg's
worst fears come true.

The village of Drodro,
near Bunia, is attacked.

Several-hundred villagers,
mostly women and children,

hacked to death.

The victims, they're
of no strategic importance;

they're minor pawns
in the warlord wars.

Two weeks
post-massacre,

the warlords
signing a peace accord.

No one believes them.

Les signataires
sont ici présents.

The killings
will continue.

But some day, as in Bosnia,
Kosovo, Sierra Leone,

maybe there'll be
war-crimes trials.

Five days later,
a team of UN investigators,

heading for Drodro,

site of the recent massacre.

The investigation
is the first step

in ending impunity
in the Congo.

While Drodro
testimony is being taken,

a young girl,
killed and mutilated.

A taunt from the warlords.

"Investigate if you want.

Nothing will come of it."

And in a jungle hospital,
more victims:

the Drodro survivors.

By day,

the Ituri tribes often share
a local food market.

At night, they hunt each other.

Further down the road,
a village, Zumbe,

guarded entirely
by child soldiers,

with arms supplied
by the warlords.

The village is suspected

of perpetrating
the Drodro massacre.

As they travel
about the countryside,

the UN investigators are
protected by Ugandan troops.

The Ugandans, it is suspected,

helped the village of Zumbe
attack Drodro.

Summer.

The months drag on.

The Security Council
is in a quandary over Uganda.

Ugandan troops are keeping
the warlords in line.

But they, along with Rwanda,
are also suspected

of being behind
much of the Ituri violence.

While there were
some Ugandan elements

behind some of the insecurity
in Ituri,

Uganda's presence there also
provided a degree of stability.

The Ugandans had agreed that
they would withdraw from Ituri.

The Security Council
wanted Uganda out,

and it was because
of the necessity of pursuing

the internal political
reconciliation within the Congo.

There was a fear that,

if and when the Ugandans left,

Ituri would just
blow up into chaos.

Ituri would just
blow up into chaos.

The United Nations
has to be ready

to quickly fill
the Ugandan vacuum.

Finding First World troops
for any dangerous mission

is difficult;

for dangerous African missions,
it's almost impossible.

The majority of the
contributors of Blue Helmets

at present come from
the developing countries.

Let me be clear: they cannot,

nor should not be expected,

to continue
to shoulder this burden alone.

We fully recognize
that many armies are downsizing,

and that defence budgets
are often dwindling.

And finally, scars

from experience in Bosnia,
Rwanda and Somalia

have yet to heal.

Notwithstanding, there is
an equally legitimate concern

that the credibility
and viability of UN peacekeeping

remains under threat.

At my level,
we're discussing the possibility

of how we could diplomatically
get the Ugandans

to stay without ever actually
asking them to stay.

At the same time,

the Security Council
very much wanted

all foreign forces
out of the Congo.

What we did then was try
to establish with Uganda

a slow and measured withdraw

that would enable us to not only
monitor that withdraw,

but enable us to,
in some instances,

fill the vacuum,
as Uganda withdrew.

Uganda wouldn't accept that.

They wanted the United Nations

to publicly come out
and ask Uganda to stay,

which the United Nations

would not and could not
politically do.

Hold it! Hold it!

Whoa, whoa, whoa!

Bunia airport.
May 1st.

Uganda has ordered
pulling out of Ituri.

The Security Council,
pleading for countries to help.

Only Uruguay accepts.

So now,

750 Uruguayan
guard troops

are replacing 5,000
battle-hardened Ugandans.

It's a very dangerous
changing of the guard.

The Uruguayans have gotten
half to two-thirds deployed.

The UPDF,

the Ugandan forces, started
to depart via the airport.

There was a day of quiet,

and then immediately after that,

the various militias
came streaming into town.

As predicted,
Bunia is transformed

into a war zone.

Much of the town
fleeing into the forests.

Thousands of others
turning to UN camps.

They fled basically
in two directions:

one of them to the MONUC
headquarters, which was in town,

and the other one
to the airport area,

where the Uruguayans
had established their base.

I think at one point

we had more than 3,500
of these IDPs

gathered around
our headquarters,

and another 3,000 or 4,000
at the airport.

We were absolutely on the verge
of a humanitarian catastrophe.

Food at the UN
compound running out fast.

The water supply, cut.

Cholera is reported.

At the same time, I think
it was the Lendu militia

that started to attack MONUC,

and with the concentration of
IDPs around our headquarters,

it became an enormously
dangerous situation.

Heavy mortar and shell
landed inside our compound,

killing, I think, a half a dozen
of the IDPs that were there,

and injuring
a much larger number.

On the third day,
MONUC forces, overwhelmed,

retreat to their compound.

The UN is losing its gamble.

The warlords are unstoppable.

A week after fighting starts,

Bunia is a looted ghost town.

UN staff and Red Cross workers
starting the recovery

of some 250 corpses.

The situation
had become so serious

that it was now serious time
to think about deploying,

or asking for a multinational,
robust force,

to re-establish
some degree of order

and normality in Bunia.

New York,

never anticipating
Bunia would fall.

The big fear:

the entire Congo peace process
will collapse.

And if the Congo goes, all of
Central Africa is in jeopardy.

In peacekeeping,

you are confronted
to a kind of a dilemma:

to look the other way

and have to live for the rest
of your life

with maybe the notion that
if you had really moved in,

you would have made
a big difference.

Or to move in, but maybe
with the risk of failure.

At every step, I'll need to
convince the Security Council,

and I'll need to convince
the troop contributors.

If I don't get it right,

then it's the authority
of the United Nations,

it's the good name
of peacekeeping

that will be compromised.

During the Congo's
five-year civil war,

the press was indifferent.

Now, with new Ituri massacres,

media attention shifts briefly
from Iraq to the Congo.

This has been one
of Africa's ugliest wars.

Bunia is Congo's
latest hellhole.

50,000 people
are thought to have died

in that part
of the country alone.

It is a war in which children
are victims and combatants.

The population
continues to flee.

- It's not a nice place.
- A contingent of UN troops

from Uruguay
has been powerless to intervene.

One of the very important
contributions

of the Uruguayan deploying
in Bunia,

because they were there,

they brought the attention
of the world media.

Because you have a lot
of massacres in Congo

where it's just too dangerous
to have any journalist,

any reporter. So you don't even
know that they happen.

It's very hard
for politicians to say,

"Well, we just have
to look the other way."

And so I think this change
in public opinion

has an impact on the politics
of the Security Council.

Two weeks
after fighting in Bunia begins,

a brief lull.

But military observers in
isolated outposts are worried.

Militia in the hills are
preparing to attack the camps.

As fighting in Ituri
intensifies,

refugees are fleeing
to the capital, Kinshasa,

squatting in buildings
abandoned during past wars.

Not far away,

Parliament is being readied
after years of neglect.

But with fighting in Ituri,

Parliament's opening
is questionable.

The Congo,
tilting towards collapse.

Jean-Marie Guéhenno,

desperately looking
for a heavily armed force

to save Bunia,

a force outside the UN.

The French,
still smarting from Iraq,

one possibility
to lead the force.

But the French are clear:

if they accept, it's only Bunia
and the airport,

and only for three months.

With the French
sitting on the fence,

MONUC, nervous.

The French ambassador reacted
by saying that, "No, no, no,

"there is no question
of anyone dealing with Ituri.

This does not concern Ituri,

this is merely concentrated
on Bunia

and that we are not here to
resolve the problems of Ituri,"

etc.

The concept,
as I understand it,

and maybe I am absolutely wrong,

they want to have a compact
and manageable force in Bunia,

which will consist primarily

of something roughly around a
battalion size of French troops,

with a sprinkle,

sprinkle of other troops,

to add flags to the coalition.

And in a sense be thankful
for a member state

who has come...

willing to come
and rescue our troops.

Because otherwise,
the point was last week -

and we all know that -

that they would have
to be withdrawn.

We were very close to that.

I think you heard
our position.

Our position, as far as Ituri
is concerned, is very firm.

The indications we have given
you are not changeable.

We are warning you about the
situation in the entire Ituri.

We are not here to be convinced

that the problem in Ituri
is limited to Bunia.

Okay? Otherwise,

whatever member states
want to decide,

whatever others want to decide,
is fine and dandy,

but we are going to give you
the reports as we see it,

we're going to analyze it
as we see it.

But warnings, warnings,

I'm very good about warnings
myself, as you know,

and you heard my warnings
two weeks ago,

about what may happen in Bunia.

We assumed
that we were talking

about a larger number
than a battalion.

Thank you, and it's all
my fault as always.

- Thanks. Thanks very much.
- No, it's not.

If there is nothing else
to discuss,

I'm adjourning the meeting

and I don't want to adjourn
on this very sour note,

which is developing.

8:30 tomorrow,
New York time?

Okay. Thank you.

I don't like
these acrimonious things.

I don't like these...

May 10th. Bunia.

Urgent calls received from
two isolated military observers

in a town called Mongwalu.

The milobs are very scared.
They want to be taken out.

For three terrifying days,
the milobs wait,

extracting them, impossible,
due to intense fighting.

May 13th, a helicopter finally
dispatched to Mongwalu.

Returning, empty.

Three days later, what everyone
fears comes true.

The deaths of the two milobs
hit MONUC headquarters hard.

Rumours circulate.

The rescue attempt was botched.

- How's the mission doing?
- They're okay.

They're okay?
But a little bit disjointed.

We were in that room
and we got a call from Mongwalu.

And this guy had phoned.

Those military observers
were literally crying.

They said,
"Take us out of here."

I mean, two persons
in a location that's...

There's still element
of mission

being somewhat dysfunctional.

There is no security assessment
in a proper way.

People are thrown sometimes...
These team sides

were established
in the most strange way.

That's the reports I have.

Now, when military observers
were just sent,

without any support,
any previous resources,

and put them in dangerous spots.

So today, can you draft
the cable in consultation

for François Dureau?

Of extreme, most immediate,

of extreme concern on the part
of this headquarters...

that we want immediately,
by tomorrow,

a threat assessment

to all personnel,
civilian and military personnel,

in the northeast.

You spoke
to Germany yesterday?

Can you speak
to Canada today?

- Okay.
- Okay?

Financial support
would be helpful.

Although I don't think
they have much money.

Eventually,

there will be a high-level
UN investigation

into the milobs' deaths.

The report will be kept
strictly confidential.

The Congo. It's always been
a difficult sell

to the international community.

The deaths of the milobs
don't help.

But the crucial question
remains:

What's the worth
of one failed African state?

- Money.
- Money, you say?

Money for the MNF.

I think that's they key thing
right now, right?

Frankly, there are
two key things right now.

One of them is money
for this MNF limited deployment,

and the other one
is this big bell

that the mission is sounding

and that I think we all agree
with, that Bunia is not enough.

You know, I don't think

that we're going to get troops
outside of Bunia,

unless we put
our own troops out there.

And I don't think
we have the capacity

to put our own troops out there.

I don't think that our troops
are capable,

have the kind of equipment
and training to do that.

I absolutely agree with you,

but I think we have
to not only go down on record

but just keep on thinking:

Is there any way
that we can do something

outside of the immediate
environs of Bunia?

Because large numbers of people
are going to die.

You've got
at least two declarations

from the armed combatants
saying,

"We are ready to canton.
Where's the money to feed us?"

- Or whatever.
- Okay.

You need to disarm them,

and then you need to do
something with the weapons.

So there has to be an agreement
of what we do with the weapons.

And then we need to feed them
and then get them into projects,

food for work or training,

or whatever other projects
we have for them.

But then, you won't get
the money from the donors,

because they consider that
feeding armed combatants.

Are there no other options?

We have a plan
for Bunia and airport,

and hopefully
the multinational forces

are going to deploy there.
But there is the rest of Ituri

and the many ways

in which the rest of Ituri
could go badly wrong.

And there we are caught
in a kind of dilemma,

because if we flag the issue
too much,

we might lose the hope

that we have
of a real deployment in Bunia.

If we ignore it,
it is just as bad,

because we might be
surprised by it,

and we'll be misleading those
who will deploy in Bunia.

The dangerous scenario
is a scenario

where we have
some improvement in Bunia,

- but then there's just a shift...
- ...moves outside.

A shift in the killings
to other places.

If their people are cynical
and clever enough,

they don't attack Bunia, no;

they just commit horrors

40 kilometres from Bunia.

The international community,

The French once again,
when it's...

They protect certain people
and not others.

They protect certain people,

but they don't care
about the others.

The other flip side
of the coin

is that if Bunia
is a safe place

and if things go badly
in the rest of Ituri,

instead of having
12,000 refugees,

you're going to have 50,000,
60,000, 100,000.

You can have a colossal
à la Gomachaos developing.

What I'm describing
could happen. It's not...

If there's anybody
who has an interest

in undermining the credibility
of the MNF,

then that's the way to do it,
it's easy.

So, I mean, there's one or two
things that can be done.

One is to ask the French or
whoever is coming with them,

to have a rapid-reaction
capability.

They have the capacity to go in,
you know, and hit very hard...

Yeah, that's why they need
attack helicopters.

...and pull out without
casualties most of the time

and without too many risks,
and make a point, you know.

The killers
are not a massive force.

They are thugs on drugs,

who can be, I mean,

scared and stopped

by a relatively small
professional force

when things go bad,

if that force is there quickly
and decisively.

In May, I decided,

and the Secretary-General
supported that,

to move toward engagement,

because we felt that the risks
of loss of human life

were just too high,

and that maybe,
with the memory of Rwanda,

the possibility did exist

to convince the Security Council
to do the right thing.

Will those in favour of...

May 30th, 2003.

The Security Council accepts a
French-led multinational force.

...please raise their hand.

The force
might possibly save Ituri.

- Those against? Abstentions?
- But only in the short term.

The draft resolution
has been adopted unanimously.

June.

The French-led force
on the ground.

In Bunia, unhampered
by UN rules of engagement,

the French
confront the warlords.

Là-bas. Fais le tour l-bas.

But in the hills,

the murders, rapes
and kidnappings increase.

Eh, dégage!

In three months,

the French
will pull out of Ituri.

Then, it's up to a UN Ituri
brigade to secure the peace.

Since the French
have agreed to deploy in Bunia

only with a very clear timeframe
and a deadline,

we have to be sure

that by September 1st,

our forces
are rolling in and operational.

And that's in the hands
of the council,

and the council
in the hands of their...

of what will be
the U.S. decision,

and there, every day that passes
will make me extremely nervous.

The days
turn into weeks.

The cost of an Ituri brigade:

tens of millions of dollars
a year.

There's only one country in the
world with that kind of money.

Good afternoon,
ladies and gentlemen,

generals and deputy SRSGs.

The general left.

The generals have left,
I can see.

So on Friday, together
with several colleagues,

we visited Washington

and had a three-hour discussion,

plus myself a rather bad lunch
in the State Department

with the...

interdepartmental group headed

by Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for Africa Bellamy,

and they do appreciate
considerably the work,

what has been done
by the United Nations,

both on the ground
and in New York.

But they would like
to have a better feel

as a major financial
contributor, obviously,

and a political lever,

what is the end game,

both in Ituri
and in the Congo as a whole.

And when they see

the proposed ceiling at 10,700,

for them it's a real jump.

As far as the deployment
of the brigade is concerned -

and here I have no choice
but to make a comparison

with NATO in the Balkans -

How is it that a mere brigade

is being questioned for the UN?

The same thing could be said

about what you mentioned
in Sierra Leone.

In Sierra Leone, we suddenly
did agree to go to 17,500,

because a disaster happened.

So we should not wait here
until the disaster is opened,

if you wish,

because we do already have
a disaster on our hands.

The Americans, obviously,
they are the biggest payer,

so, I mean, I...

whenever we increase MONUC,

they will pay
the bigger part of the bill.

At the moment,

it's clear that in the council

what we need to achieve
is to convince the U.S.

to make a decision quickly,
because every day that passes

means that our deployments
are going to be delayed.

On the one hand,
many of my colleagues

were working to give
the information necessary

for troop contributors to
put together the kind of troops

that we would need for Ituri.

My job was more to try and
convince the Security Council

we had a viable plan for Ituri.

And I think one of the problems
with Council,

and I think particularly
with the United States,

was that they did not see
that there was really

a political process in Ituri
worth investing in.

The U.S. told us -

and I think that they had
a legitimate concern -

that they saw Ituri
as a Somalia.

And so our job, really,
was try to convince them

that there was
a political process.

June.
Meg Carey, to Bunia.

Her mission: find an exit
strategy for the Ituri quickly,

one acceptable
to the Americans.

The council met yesterday
in New York

and have decided to give MONUC
a technical rollover,

which basically means
no new mandated activities,

just an extension of the date
of the mandate

until sometime in July.

But the first implication

is that we will only get
a task force of one battalion,

and that we would not have
any additional troops

beyond one battalion,

at the current date of exit
of the international force.

That has major implications for
the work that we do in Ituri.

So we have a lot of work to do,
to try to convince the people

who pay the bills that it's
worth their investing in it.

There was a time
that I did feel

that none of the countries
of the world

who could make a difference
really cared,

and that nobody
was really seeing the lives

that were being wasted,
and it didn't matter to them.

You did feel personally
somewhat responsible,

because you felt:
What am I doing wrong

that I'm not being able to
convince these member states

that they need to provide
the troops necessary

to save these lives?

You can't pull
these people out now,

because then it'll make
the situation worse...

And you also felt responsible

for the United Nations staff

that were putting their lives
at risk in Ituri.

And there was a great deal
of pressure.

It is once again the unilateral
action taken by the government.

The best,
perhaps the only chance,

of stabilizing the region:

something called the
"Ituri Interim Administration."

Whether it can expel Ugandan-
and Rwandan-sponsored fighters,

that's anybody's guess.

What Madam Buweka
is up against,

is a warlord
named Thomas Lubanga.

Lubanga controls Bunia;

he is backed by Uganda.

He has a degree in psychology,

the support of hundreds
of child soldiers.

And blood on his hands.

Most peace processes
that we're dealing with,

in Africa and beyond,

the heads of factions,
to a greater or a lesser extent,

are warlords,

and have
very Mafioso-type tendencies.

You have to deal with them.

You may not want
to deal with them

and they may have committed
all sorts of human-rights abuses

but unfortunately,
you have to deal with them,

because they're the ones
with the power.

What do these military
leaders want?

I think, if we talk about
UPC, the leadership of UPC,

definitely Lubanga wants to play
a national role in the Congo,

using Ituri as a pretext for it,
you know.

- To bargain.
- So he has very big ambitions.

So now, I think what we have
to see is how best we can

try to see at a national level
what we can give him,

even something very small, yes.

If you continue discussing
with him, we can say,

"Yes, you can play a role
at a national level."

But what happens to Lubanga
after he gets to national level?

He will leave everything
and go.

And what happens to UPC
after Lubanga leaves?

It will finish.

You have to exercise pressure
on Lubanga.

Maybe the Security Council
can issue a statement

or something like that,

naming them,
name and shame.

So I think this is one
of the aspects of the problem

- you have to look at.
- If we name and shame,

will that put MONUC individuals
in any danger for reprisals?

I don't think so.

If it is done at the level
of the Security Council.

- So that's the stick?
- Yeah.

And now the carrot
is to try to bring him on board.

Okay.

And the reason that the fighting
started in Jugu and Mongwalu

is because
this is the resource-rich area?

- Yes.
- And that's also a place

where the two tribes
are rubbing...

It's very significant

that our milobs have been
assassinated in the war.

- It wasn't robbery gone bad.
- No, no, no, definitely not.

No, I think they saw something
they shouldn't have seen.

That's my take on it.

While Meg Carey
looks for an Ituri exit strategy

the Bunia jail is renovated.

Local judges
will soon be reinstated.

Rebuilding any society
starts with the rule of law.

There was no functioning

indigenous rule of law.

The quandary that we were in

is that we could not
hold people indefinitely,

without turning them over
to a local judicial process.

We could not also arrest people.

We could detain people,
but we couldn't arrest people.

And so what we needed
as quickly as possible

was for the local police,
even if it was symbolic,

to begin working.

Now, on CIVPOL,

an integrated Congolese
police force for Ituri

is part of our exit strategy.

And it's also part
of our strategy

to strengthen
the Ituri administration

and to get it to be doing
the work for itself.

I've read your cable
for options for Ituri,

but I really have to stress

that anything that you send
to us in New York

has to be realistic,
based on present capacities

and based on a thorough
political analysis

of what is acceptable
to the parties.

Whenever you make a presentation
to Mr. Titov or myself,

start with needs,

not with your desires
for what you're going to deploy.

I want to know
the needs on the ground,

that's what I want to know.

Bottom line at this stage,

everything is needed,
because there isn't...

"Everything is needed"
means nothing to me, Stephan.

I'm a political-affairs officer,
I know nothing about police.

I need details.

What does "everything" mean,
okay?

You have to treat me like a
child who knows nothing, okay?

And explain it from A to Z.

Can I just,
with all due respect,

make a suggestion?
Never say you can't do anything.

We will find ways of doing
if it has to be done, okay?

Let's just find ways
of doing it.

Okay. So, um... Sorry.

Hello.

So basically,
we've got to start,

for purely political reasons,

and not because of substance or
this is the right thing to do,

but purely
for political reasons,

I would like to start training
a police force now.

Okay, no, no, no, it's okay.
I'll call Mr. Titov tomorrow.

Before you hang up,
can you dial my home number?

Thank you.

Late June.

The French declare
Bunia weapons-free.

The Bunia child soldiers now
join the thousands of fighters

camped in the hills,

waiting for the orders
to attack.

That Sunday,

the people in Bunia
celebrate the town's liberation.

The government in Kinshasa

declares the war
officially over.

The fighting may be over,

but the peace,
it's not even close.

Two weeks later,
the newly appointed judges,

fearing for their lives,

will flee Bunia.

Bonjour.

Comment ça va?

CÇa va? Oui?

Within hours
of arriving back in New York,

Meg Carey, drafting
the Ituri exit strategy.

The plan: several-thousand
additional UN troops

to secure Bunia
after the French leave,

and 150-million dollars
to pay for them.

In a few minutes,

Jean-Marie Guéhenno will try
to convince the Security Council

it will all work.

Amin, I need it now.

Just e-mail it to me.

You got it?

Fine, thank you.

- Okay. You send it to me.
- Yeah.

Possibly to reinforce...

detachments in north Kivu.

CÇa va?

Okay, although
this is primarily an allegation

of the MLC.
Have we any MONUC?

- They've apparently confirmed.
- Okay. Fine.

However, the RCD
has put forth three demands

that the DRC government...

Can you take the message
for me, please?

- Sure.
- I'll take it.

Hi. Okay.

- It's 11 pages.
- He said five.

Tough shit.

In the midst of 2003,

there is a window
of opportunity, and you know,

it's like stars
aligning themselves.

There's a combination
of factors.

There's a post-Iraq factor,
that's the sense

that the Security Council
has to demonstrate

that it can deliver

and that it is not focused
just on Iraq.

Thirty-seven floors
down to the Security Council.

Jean-Marie Guéhenno's
made the trip 100 times before.

He knows Council debates
are for public posturing.

He's already made
the private phone calls

to nervous embassies.

What he doesn't know:
Will it work?

The Secretary-General himself
is in close contact

with Colin Powell,
with Condoleeza Rice,

with the president himself, so
there are contacts at top level,

from the UN
and from other countries

which have good relations
with the U.S.

and which made the case
for MONUC.

The African countries

tell the non-African members
of the Council, "Come on!

"Do you care about Africa,
or don't you?

And if you care,
how could you question

that 10,800 troops
is too much for Congo,

a country the size
of Western Europe?"

One of the things
that we used on Council members,

informally, was the guilt.

If we needed to withdraw,

and the Secretary-General would
have withdrawn that battalion

if need be,
he would have had to.

And if it had been a bloodbath,
it would have been

on the shoulders
of the international community.

Unfortunately, the press sees
the international community

as being this blue building
in New York which is the UN.

And so it's the fault
of the UN,

or it's the weakness of the UN.

They don't sort of extend
that to:

it's a weakness
of member states

who don't give the UN
the capability to do something.

To succeed in these tasks,

it is critical
that states in the region

act cooperatively
to support the process

of bringing peace
and stability

to the people of the Democratic
Republic of the Congo.

The Security
Council finally gives MONUC

the money for an Ituri brigade,
and a Chapter 7 mandate,

allowing the UN brigade
to shoot to kill.

Mr. Solana, the United States
would like to thank you...

Chapter 7 comes with a package
of troops, in terms of numbers,

in terms of determination,

and also a package
of political commitment,

of key players

to put the pressure
on all those

who can make a mess
of the situation

if they so decide.

We have to make sure
that the troop contributors

are prepared to draw
the consequences of that.

There's a clear understanding

that they're not getting off
the hook by giving us Chapter 7;

it's not a favour
that they're doing us.

It's a responsibility.

It's a responsibility
that they're taking.

Responsibility, too, in terms
of that arms embargo

and stopping the arm flow
from Uganda and Rwanda.

They have to take
that responsibility.

- Yes.
- Only they can do that.

- That is the package.
- That's the package.

Fall, 2003.

The Congo River once again open.

But the weapons embargo
isn't working.

Arms are travelling
from Ituri down the Congo,

spreading violence
to neighbouring provinces.

September 1st.

On schedule.

The French-led multinational
force leaves Bunia.

At the same time, the newly
arrived UN Ituri brigade,

made up of Pakistanis,
Bangladeshis and Indians,

takes control of Bunia.

This time, the UN brigade is,
by anybody's standards,

a robust force.

Almost immediately,
the UN brigade is tested.

The warlords
are probing for weakness.

But with a Chapter 7 mandate

and the will to use it,

Bunia is stabilized.

Simultaneously,
the brigade,

with attack helicopters
from India,

starts extending its perimeter

into the hills
once owned by the warlords.

Kinshasa.

The Parliament of Reconciliation
finally convenes.

But it won't be easy.

Armies from two
of the vice-presidents

have recently been trying
to kill each other,

and there have been
numerous plots

against the life
of President Joseph Kabila.

No First World country
is going to save the Congo;

the Congo
is going to save the Congo

and the Congolese
will save the Congo.

And in terms of the national
political process,

there are some key issues,

and they are difficult issues
to get over.

But it's not impossible to get
over with sustained support.

October.

As MONUC provides security,

the first class
of the Bunia Police,

the one Meg Carey wanted,
is about to graduate.

In the class,

cadets who not long ago
were trying to kill each other.

AÀ droite.

Droite!

What is happening in Ituri
is at the forefront

of what could be happening
in the country as a whole.

We already have
the first nucleus

of the integrated
national police force

that has been set up
in the town of Bunia,

and the training
that's been done there.

So it seems to me
that sometimes,

if you tackle the toughest
problems

in a concerted
and adequately resourced way,

and you make
real progress there,

it becomes a beacon or a model,

or at least a precedent, for
what can be happening elsewhere.

The risk, in a way,
is that as things look better,

and they are indeed better,

the sense of...
and the pressure,

the sense of imminent risk
is no more there,

which is a good thing

because it reflects progress
on the ground,

but which is a dangerous thing

because that progress
is not so solid

that there is no need

for continued,
very strong engagement.

Throughout the fall,

the Ituri brigade continues
moving outside Bunia.

Mongwalu, site of the murders
of the milobs,

is particularly dangerous.

There's a gold mine here,

gold to buy arms.

But even in Mongwalu,
things are starting to change.

Despite
what their leaders may do,

the Congolese child soldiers

will not turn in their guns
in the coming months.

No one has figured out
an incentive that works.

Every day, an old diesel brings
kids from the countryside

into Kinshasa, to beg and steal.

Each week, some of the kids
perish under the train's wheels.

Others die more slowly,

of hunger or despair.

If the Kinshasa politicians
and the international community

don't give them a future,
and soon,

there are plenty
of Ituri warlords who will.

In the following months, the
violence in Ituri does not stop.

Not far from Bunia,

the village of Kachele
is attacked in the night.

Sixty-five people killed,
including 40 children.

In the fall of 2003,

the UN itself becomes a target.

Several more milobs are killed.

But the worst predictions
have not materialized:

a massacre on the scale
of Rwanda has been averted.

Can you tell them
that he's on his way? Thank you.

Oh, so we've got movement.

It's been a mixed year

for the world's peacekeeper.

The Security Council failed
to stop the war in Iraq.

But Haiti, Burundi and Liberia,
amongst others,

are qualified successes.

And the Congo,

a country no one
wants to think about,

it continues its painful march
towards national elections.

Excellencies, we now see
with chilling clarity,

that a world
where many millions of people

endure brutal oppression

and extreme misery,
will never be fully secure,

even for its most privileged
inhabitants.

Once again this year,

our collective response
to events of this type

in the Democratic Republic
of Congo,

has been hesitant and tardy.

History is a harsh judge.

It will not forgive us
if we let this moment pass.

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