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This is the terrifying story

of the titanic duel fought

between the armies of Hitler and Stalin in the bitter cold

of an Arctic winter outside Leningrad.

It was here that the men of the German Army Group North

fought and died with the men of the Red Army.

The German forces were so constantly short of manpower

and material, that they christened the pitiless war

they were fighting, "The eternal war of the poor man".

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The Russians too, had to endure terrible hardship.

And the siege of Leningrad contains heartrending tales

of suffering and heroism,

but the Russian sacrifice was ultimately to be vindicated.

For the men of Army Group North

there was to be no such satisfaction.

Most were destined never to return to Germany.

The ceaseless demands of the cruelest conflict in history

would ultimately claim the whole Army Group as its victim.

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In late 1940

when Adolf Hitler finally confirmed to the general staff

that he had irrevocably decided to attack Russia,

a plan was swiftly conceived by General Marcks

which envisaged a two pronged advance by two huge army

groups totaling over 3,500,000 men.

The German grand strategy

was for two great parallel advances.

The first aimed at Leningrad in the North,

then swinging South to Moscow.

And the second at Odesa on the black sea.

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During the winter of 1939,

Finland had been involved in an uneven struggle with Soviet

Russia to protect her territory.

Under the leadership of field marshal Mannerheim

the Fins had doggedly resisted

the superior Russian forces,

but ultimately had to yield

valuable territory around Leningrad.

Britain had refused to help the Fins who in 1941,

turned to Germany for aid in regaining their lost territory.

Hitler hoped to draw Finland

into an offensive war with Russia,

but the finish objective was simply to address the balance,

not the conquest of Russia.

Although the Fins would play a small part

in the battle for Leningrad,

their refusal to mount an invasion of Soviet territory

would ultimately have dire consequences for Hitler.

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Under the Marcks plan,

elements of Army Group North,

were to capture Leningrad,

then drive North to link up with the Fins

and eliminate all Russian forces

in the Baltic region.

Only then was Moscow to be attacked

from the West and North simultaneously.

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From the very outset

Hitler found it impossible to prioritize

the objectives for his Russian campaign.

After much discussion and argument,

the Marcks plan was subsequently revised to produce three

separate army groups.

Each aimed at a different objective.

Army Group North was to capture Leningrad,

Army Group Center was to capture Moscow

and Army Group South was aimed at Odesa.

With three major objectives to achieve

it was clear from the outset that German forces

would be dangerously overstretched.

Sections of the German military

were very opposed to the venture,

but Hitler refused to accept

the advice of his staff officers.

His gamblers instinct told him that if he delayed

even for one year,

the crowds that cheered the latest successes

so fervently, might no longer be willing to follow him into

so hazardous an undertaking.

And there was surely no greater military adventure

than the invasion of Russia.

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Following the spectacular victories in Poland, Norway,

France and the Balkans,

the German forces assembled for Barbarossa expected to fight

a short campaign,

which would secure their victories throughout Europe.

Hitler became convinced that he could crush the Red Army

as easily as he had defeated his other enemies.

In the spring of 1941

field marshal von Rundstedt,

who had spent most of the first world war

on the Eastern front, asked Hitler outright

if he knew what it meant to invade Russia.

The commander in chief, field marshal von Brauchitsch

and his chief of the general staff general Halder

also counseled Hitler against the operation.

It was all to no avail

as Hitler simply refused to heed their warnings.

Field Marshall von Rundstedt,

the commander of Army Group South

was forthright in his views on the forthcoming battle.

"This war with Russia is a nonsensical idea

to which I can see no happy ending.

But if for political reasons,

the war is unavoidable,

then we must face the fact that it cannot be won

in a single summer campaign.

Just look at the distances involved.

We cannot possibly defeat the enemy and occupy the whole

of Western Russia from the Baltic to the black sea

within a few short months.

We should prepare for a long war

and go for our objectives step by step.

First of all,

a strong Army Group North should capture Leningrad

and the area around it.

This would enable us to link up with the Fins,

eliminate the red fleet from the Baltic and increase

our influence in Scandinavia.

The central and Southern army groups should

for the time being

advance only to align running Odesa, Kiev,

Orsha, Lake Ilmen.

Then if we have sufficient time this year

Army Group North could advance Southeast

from Leningrad towards Moscow while Army Group Center

move eastwards on the capital.

All further operations should be postponed until 1942,

when we should make new plans based on the situation

as it then is."

Had Hitler followed von Rundstedt's good advice,

the history of the Western world may well have followed

a very different pattern.

Hitler, however, did have good grounds

for rejecting the advice of his officers.

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While the German army in the 1930s had been building

its strength under Hitler,

Stalin had been destroying the Russian officer Corps.

By the end of the purge,

the Russian army had lost three of the five remaining

marshals of the Soviet union,

all 11 deputy ministers of defense,

75 of the 80 members of the military Soviet,

all the commanders of the military districts,

13 of the 15 army commanders,

more than half the Corps commanders

and approximately 30% of the officers

below brigade level.

Stalin had considered himself safe

as he did not intend to become involved in Western affairs.

He had made complex peace treaties

and alliances with both Britain and Germany

and hoped they would fight a mutually destructive war

in the West.

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Less than one year later, however,

Stalin's hopes of a protracted war between the Western

powers and Hitler, evaporated with the brilliant success

of Hitler's Blitzkrieg tactics, which saw Denmark, Norway,

Holland, Belgium, and France fall in rapid succession.

The lightning campaign through the Balkans in Greece in 1941

could only produce more grounds for disquiet.

Though Stalin accepted that war with Germany

was now almost inevitable,

he certainly did not expect to be attacked in 1941.

He decided Russia had at least until the spring of 1942

to prepare herself.

His explosive denials of all contrary

information was so fierce that vital intelligence concerning

German preparations was kept from him by subordinates

fearful of the violence of his temper.

As the German buildup towards operation Barbarossa continued

Stalin's attempts to pacify Hitler grew more desperate.

He had already stated in an interview with Pravda

in November 1939,

that it was not Germany who had attacked Britain and France,

but Britain and France who had attacked Germany.

Stalin now forbade

any criticism of Germany to be printed in the newspapers.

In 1940, he increased Russian supplies

to Germany and withdrew

recognition of the Norwegian

and Belgian governments in exile.

In the following year

when Hitler successfully invaded

Greece and Yugoslavia, Stalin quickly expelled

the Yugoslavian ambassador

to Moscow and refused a request

to recognize the Greek government in exile.

Stalin felt he was continuing to buy time with these

unrequited concessions, but his use of the breathing space,

which he had already obtained was totally devoid of any

worthwhile attempt to remedy his military disadvantages.

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The main Russian force charged with defending Leningrad

was the Northwest Front under Kuznetsov.

In theory, the Russian forces

were larger and more generously supplied

with tanks, guns, and aircraft.

In practice, the Red Army as a whole

proved to be so demoralized by

internal disruptions that they were disastrously unprepared.

In addition, much of the Russian equipment

was obsolete or unserviceable

with the result that in the opening battles at least,

there was to be no real contest.

As a result of Stalin's purges,

the Soviet forces were less than equal to the task

of combating a highly professional, well organized army,

which was accustomed to success on the battlefield.

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Many divisions where between six to 7,000 men short

of wartime establishment.

Levies of experienced personnel had been hived off to build

new tank and aviation units.

Only one of the six Soviet mechanized Corps had received

their full compliment of equipment.

Three of the four motorized divisions

had no tanks whatsoever.

And four out of every five vehicles

in the tank fleets were obsolete.

Four of the Corps could only deploy one quarter of their

designated motor vehicles.

And in another four Corps

one in three motor vehicles needed repairs.

From even a cursory analysis,

the Soviet Red Army and the German Wehrmacht

were anything but equal adversaries.

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In the Western part of Russia,

the Red Army consisted of about 5,000,000 men

with 1,000,000 in the Leningrad sector.

Although the tank strength of the Red Army

on the 21st of June, 1941 was an impressive 23,108 machines,

only 8,000 were battle ready and in good condition.

Of these, less than 1200 were deployed

in the Leningrad sector.

Many of the Soviet tanks where the outdated T26

and T28 medium tanks,

there were even a few of the outdated T35 machines,

a massive multi turreted tank,

which proved to be a disastrous failure in action.

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In June, 1941

the time of the German attack,

Army Group North was commanded

by field Marshall Ritter Von Leeb

and was composed of two subsidiary armies.

The 16th army, initially commanded by field Marshall Busch

and the 18th army commanded by general Von Kuchler.

For the initial thrust into Russia

under the Barbarossa directive

Army Group North enjoyed the support

of a powerful tank force

designed as Panzer Group IV under the leadership

of general Hoepner.

For air support Army Group North could call

upon Luftflotte One, commanded by general Keller.

The Stukas of Luftflotte One

were to provide the flying artillery

for the lightning attack of the 22nd of June.

Naval support was available from the powerful battle group

North under the command of Admiral Carls,

who set about planning the campaign

with his senior commanders.

As commander of Army Group North

Von Leeb had excellent credibility.

He had formerly commanded the German Army Group center,

which had succeeded brilliantly in the attack

on France in 1940.

He was extremely well-supported by some of the most capable

commanders the German army had in its ranks.

As the German officers could draw on the experiences

of the war in Poland, France, Norway, and the Balkans,

the quality of their commanders was always likely

to be superior to that of the Russians.

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For the great assault on Russia,

Army Group North could count

on over 800,000 men and 800 tanks

organized into three armored divisions,

three motorized infantry divisions,

20 infantry divisions, and three security divisions.

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Army group North was by no means the armored juggernaut

of popular mythology.

Four-fifths of the soldiers had to walk

into battle like the soldiers of Napoleon

over a century earlier.

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In 1941, the mechanized era

was still in its infancy

and Army Group North

needed 200,000 horses to draw their guns and equipment.

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The Army Group could deploy 1200 guns

in terms of tanks and aircraft,

Army Group North could boasts 600 tanks and 430 aircraft.

Most of them superior to the Russian tanks

and all of them in better condition.

Army Group North tends to be treated in some respects

as the poor relation

compared to Army Group South and army group Center.

But initially, although there were fewer formations

of Army Group North,

they actually achieved their initial objectives

with great skill and speed.

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Ribbentrop, Hitler's foreign minister had successfully

concluded a non-aggression pact

between Germany and Russia in 1940.

Nevertheless, Stalin was wise enough

to remain wary of his sinister

neighbors to the West.

Stalin's overall military strategy

required the expansion of Soviet territory to create a deep

barrier of Russian held territory between the Soviet union

and Nazi Germany.

It was this consideration which had led Stalin

to collaborate with Hitler in the invasion of Poland.

Ironically, the secret negotiations

instigated by Germany had also

granted Stalin the freehand in the Baltic and Finland,

which had precipitated the winter war,

which the Fins were now so keen to avenge.

From behind this defensive wall

Stalin planed to allow the Western allies

and Germany to fight a mutually destructive war in the West,

as they had done for four years during the great war.

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The early war Russian fighters were already obsolete.

Aircraft such as the Polikarpov I153

a lumbering biplane,

and the Polikarpov I16 known as the ratter were easily

outclassed by the new generation of German fighters.

These included the German Messerschmitt 109 fighters,

which were faster and more maneuverable than anything

the Russians could throw against them.

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At last, at 04:00 on the 22nd of June, 1941,

the code word "Dortmund" crackled down the wires

and the full force of operation Barbarossa,

Germany's invasion of Soviet Russia, was unleashed.

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AS they had come to expect

the German army sliced through

the opposition on the way to Leningrad.

Faced by the result of his own failures

in military matters, Stalin panicked.

While his army headquarters desperately

tried to piece together the most rudimentary

picture of what was happening,

he ordered an immediate counter offensive on all fronts.

As the first reports of the devastation

he had helped to create filtered through,

he was close to breaking point.

"All that Lennon created, we have lost forever",

he declared, before retreating to his dacha not to emerge

until the 3rd of July.

What really stunned the Red Army commanders was that this

massive German assault had proceeded long after it had left

its artillery support behind.

The Red Army command had planned

for conventional meeting engagements and frontline battles.

The perceived wisdom was that these would develop

over days or even weeks.

Next would come a large series of complex engagements.

And then the real war would begin.

In reality, using the new Blitzkrieg tactics,

the German advance was so swift that within hours of

the launch of Barbarossa

tank columns from Panzer Group IV were

approaching Riga some 50 miles behind the front.

This extended Blitzkrieg technique,

especially the bold use of armor came as an extraordinary

and disorientating surprise to the Russians,

even to the senior Soviet commanders.

Within 48 hours,

general staff reports made it perfectly plain,

that they had lost control of the situation.

They were in complete chaos,

and many did not know where their troops were

or what was happening.

They certainly did not have accurate reports of German

movements, and there was no real intelligence.

So they were not even sure

where the German thrusts were aimed.

All that they did know was that in the Northwest,

there was total collapse.

In consequence, Stalin operated his usual practice.

He had most of the front commanders arrested and then shot

as a consequence of the confusion

which raged throughout the army,

many of the Red Army divisions simply broke up

and formed very large pockets

of leaderless troops.

Passing these groups

of disorientated men, Von Leeb's Army Group North

scythed into the Baltic States, capturing Riga,

the Latvian capital.

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The number of prisoners taken and the war material captured

or destroyed in operation Barbarossa

was assuming astronomical proportions.

It is hardly surprising that Hitler, his commanders

and the troops themselves

now believed that the Red Army

must be nearing the end of its resources,

both in manpower and in weapons.

Prisoners confess that the German attack

had been completely unexpected.

Moscow, it seemed, was certain to fall into German hands.

Great optimism prevailed in Army Group Center.

Hitler had already set up a special engineer command

whose task was to be the demolition of the Kremlin.

The propaganda ministry saw fit to make a bombastic

statement announcing that the war in the East was won

and the Red Army practically annihilated.

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During the early stages of the campaign,

the Stuka dive bombers of Luftflotte One

played their familiar role

as the German storm broke against Russia.

The initial moves followed the classic Blitzkrieg pattern,

no declaration of war and a fast moving assault

designed to disorientate and confuse the Russian army.

As the forces of Army Group North drove further

into the Baltic States,

Latvia and Estonia were quickly captured.

These lightning advances were greeted

with joy by the citizens of cities like Riga,

where the population viewed the German armies as liberators.

In scenes of unprompted joy,

the German soldiers were greeted with flowers and kisses

from the local girls.

A great deal of the Naval effort throughout the campaign

lay in suppressing Soviet Naval activity

by laying thousands of mines,

a task, which continued

even in the face of fierce air resistance.

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These ships of Carl's battle group

continued with the task

of mine laying, despite the attentions of the red air force.

On land, the presence of a strong armored force

in the form of Panzer Group IV

gave Army Group North some much needed tank support

during the headlong advance into Russia.

Nevertheless, the rudimentary road system

of the Baltic States

and Northern Russia played havoc with the tanks.

Right at the beginning of the Russian campaign,

the Germans experienced the problems which dust can cause

in motor vehicles.

Tanks sustained severe damage from the dust

they stirred up while crossing vast sandy regions,

many tanks had no dust filters and on those which were

equipped, the filters soon became thoroughly clogged.

Quartz dust was sucked into engines,

which became so ground out that many tanks were rendered

unserviceable, in other tanks,

the abrasive action of dust reduced engine efficiency

and massively increased fuel consumption.

The sand roads undoubtedly caused problems.

They greatly slowed tanks or trucks.

They also caused huge dust clouds,

which were raised by convoys.

These dust clouds frequently provoked air attacks

by the surviving aircraft of the red air force.

As the red air force re-gathered its strength,

these attacks resulted in serious losses of men,

vehicles and horses.

For as long as they were in support of Army Group North,

the tanks of Panzer Group IV played an invaluable role,

but even with the Panzers,

the swift advances of June and July ground to a halt against

the tough defenses of the Stalin line,

which were encountered in August and early September.

While the fortifications of the frontier districts left much

to be desired,

there were still extensive fortifications to be overcome

deep within mother Russia.

Although they did not form a solid unbroken line

of fortifications, like the French Maggiano line,

the heavily defended Stalin line or the Leningrad line

as the German forces in the North knew it,

was a formidable series of prepared defenses.

Areas of great importance were

surrounded with heavy fortifications and the German armored

units driving for Leningrad encountered fortification

systems up to six miles in depth,

including well-positioned earth and concrete bunkers

with built-in guns and other heavy weapons.

There were also concrete pillboxes with disappearing

armored cupolas for artillery and machine guns.

A speedy elimination of these strong defenses with the means

available to a force designed for mobile warfare

was extremely difficult.

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The area of Krasnogvardeysk,

South of Leningrad, had been developed

according to sound soviet defensive principles,

and was effectively turned into an outlying fortress

for the defensive Leningrad.

During early September, 1941

it presented great difficulties

to the advance of the German forces.

Krasnogvardeysk blocked all highways and railroads leading

to Leningrad from the South

and constituted the main bulwark of Russian resistance.

The Russians defended it persistently.

Repeated attacks by several

infantry divisions were repulsed.

It was only taken in the course of a general attack

on the Leningrad line

and after bitter pillbox fighting in the area

immediately surrounding Krasnogvardeysk.

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Only the flexible leadership of battle-tested armored forces

attacking with great vigor

made it possible to overcome the defense zones

which had been set up with a sound knowledge

of the latest defense techniques.

Within a week, the German sixth Panzer division

had been forced to break

through and roll up 12 positions, repel several

counter attacks and take

more than 300 heavily fortified bunkers.

Like all German operations in Russia

from an early stage, it became apparent to the commanders,

to the troops,

to the high command that the task they had taken on and the

tasks they may have to take on were beginning to exceed

by far, the resources to hand.

In general terms,

the forces were adequate for the immediate tasks

which Army Group North had to fulfill.

It was a very accomplished command

and it did manage to achieve what Hitler ordered to be done,

which was to seize the Baltic States,

establishing them as a base for further operations in Russia

and move right up to Leningrad.

From October, 1941 onwards,

Hitler tended to vacillate between striking

into the Ukraine as the main strategic objective

and attacking Moscow,

which was the nerve center of Soviet Russia.

Army Group North therefore

came a poor third in terms of allocation of resources.

It is fair to suggest that Hitler's high command

failed to provide Von Leeb with enough resources,

which in turn prevented Army Group North from achieving

its objective of the capture of Leningrad.

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In the North,

the fighting for the Stalin line

proved to be an attritional nightmare

with German casualties soon mounting

to first world war levels.

The Russians were very adept at preparing

inhabited places for defense.

In a short time,

a village would be converted into a little fortress.

Wooden houses had well camouflaged gun ports

almost flush with the floor.

Their interiors were reinforced with sandbags or earth.

Observation slots were cut into roofs and bunkers built into

floors and connected with adjacent houses or outside

defenses by narrow trenches.

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Although almost all inhabited places

were crammed with troops,

they seem deserted to German reconnaissance since even water

and food details were allowed to leave

their shelters only after dark.

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The Russians blocked approach routes with well camouflaged

anti-tank guns or dug-in tanks.

Wrecks of knocked out tanks were specially favored

for use as observation posts.

And as in placements for heavy infantry weapons

and bunkers for living quarters were dug under them.

Permanent structures destroyed by artillery fire,

or aerial bombs were utilized as defense points,

the ruins hid weapons and served to strengthen

the underlying bunkers.

Even the heaviest shelling would not drive the Russians

from these positions.

They could only be dislodged with hand grenades

or flame throwers in costly hand-to-hand fighting.

The Russians when they did retreat

frequently burned or blasted building suitable for housing

command posts or other important military installations.

Quite often, however, they left castles,

former country seats and other spacious dwellings intact,

but only after they had mined the walls in a completely

inconspicuous manner with delayed action bombs,

which were often set to explode several weeks later.

These were meant to blow up entire German headquarters

at one time.

The possible presence of time bombs in cities,

railroad stations, bridges,

and other important structures always had to be taken into

account in German thinking,

exacting a great psychological toll.

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Entirely new to the Germans was the Russian use of forest

fires as a hot weather weapon.

In mid-summer when the trees

were tinder dry,

the Russians attempted to delay German forces advancing

on Leningrad by putting forests to the torch.

Not only the physical,

but the psychological impact of such fires was severe.

The crackling of the burning trees,

the acrid gray black smoke,

the increasingly unbearable heat and the feeling

of uncertainty put troops under a severe strain.

Despite the tenacity of a hard fought series of grueling

battles in which the SS police division particularly

distinguished itself, the Stalin line

was finally broken in late August

and Army Group North surged onwards.

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On the Baltic front, Von Leeb's Army Group North

had captured the city of Novgorod,

a vital target in the approach to Leningrad.

The beleaguered defenders of Novgorod

had fought to the death.

But this resistance too had been in vain.

The Germans had discovered the city's defensive plans

on the corpse of a Soviet officer.

With the Stalin line broken

general Hoepner's fourth Panzer group resumed its drive

toward Leningrad, but without supporting infantry

its progress was limited.

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Leningrad was a vital center of the wartime production

industry and reserves and equipment were poured

into the defense of the city.

As the Germans approached,

the citizens now formed into militia divisions of which

were flung against the Germans more in despair than hope.

Following a basic training period, averaging 16 hours,

the first militia divisions were sent to the front only six

days after being formed.

The second division marched to the front only two days after

its establishment and the third,

the same day it was established.

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Nonetheless, some Russian civilians

obviously felt caught between two fires,

one senior Soviet officer

later summed up the choices available.

He declared, "We were faced with a choice

between two dictators Hitler on the one hand

and Stalin on the other.

But we prefer to pick the one who spoke Russian."

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An ominous development for the Germans at this point

was the appearance on the battlefield

of the Russian medium T34 tank and the heavy KV 1.

Both of these machines were clearly superior to the German

tanks and were all but impervious

to most German anti-tank weapons,

especially the puny 37 millimeter anti-tank gun,

which was then the main German anti-tank weapon.

The 37 millimeter was so ineffective against Soviet armor

that it was nicknamed "the door knocker" by the disgruntled

German anti-tank gunners.

These puny 37 millimeter guns were intended to deal

with some of the best armor in the world.

General Erhard Raus who fought with Army Group North

left a clear account of the first encounter

with the new Russian armor

in the shape of the trusty KV1 tanks,

which attacked the third Panzer division.

"Then there suddenly appeared for the first time a battalion

of heavy enemy tanks of previously unknown type.

The tanks overran the armored infantry regiment and broke

through into the artillery position.

The projectiles of all defense weapons bounced off the thick

enemy armor, 100 German tanks were unable to check the 20

Russian dreadnoughts and suffered losses.

Several Czech built tanks,

which are bogged down in the grain fields because of

mechanical trouble were flattened by the enemy monsters.

The same fate befell a 150 millimeter

medium Howitzer battery,

which kept on firing until the last minute.

Despite the fact that it scored numerous direct hits from as

close a range as 200 yards, it's heavy shells

were unable to put even a single rank out of action.

The situation became critical.

Only the 88 millimeter flak finally knocked out a few

of the Russian KV1s

and forced the others to withdraw into the woods."

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The only bright sign for the Wehrmacht was that the new

Russian tanks were still in relatively short supply

and their battle drill was poor.

Once the scattered formations have been dealt with the road

to Leningrad lay open again.

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Despite the limitations of some of its weaponry,

by September, Army Group North

had destroyed for all practical purposes,

the Soviet Northwest front,

it had virtually eliminated two Russian armies

driven to the outskirts of Leningrad.

The collapse of the Northwestern front was a real

catastrophe for the Red Army and brought Stalin

to the brink of despair.

Leningrad's fate hung by a thread

at the beginning of September,

but Stalin was to make one inspired move.

He appointed Marshal Zhukov to the command of Leningrad.

And this remarkable soldier

was to prove himself equal to the task.

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As Army Group North drove headlong towards Leningrad,

a further huge haul of confused Russian prisoners was taken

in the Baltic States and a large body of Russian troops was

isolated in what became known as the Oranienbaum pocket

on the Baltic coast to the West of Leningrad.

The Oranienbaum pocket was a small semicircle

of Russian held territory,

an area of ground that was never to be taken

by army group North,

despite all attempts over the next three years.

And it was to prove a tactical thorn

in the side of the 18th army.

When the 18th army in Panzer Group IV

burst into the Leningrad area in September, 1941,

they swept forward at high speed

and as they moved swiftly North,

they either destroyed or brushed aside the Soviet armies.

One tiny element of the Soviet eighth army,

which had suffered catastrophically from the attack

was pushed right up to the coast.

There, around the town of Oranienbaum,

three elements of the eighth army kept up resistance

for virtually three years.

The bridge had acquired enormous strategic significance.

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The Oranienbaum area enabled the Russians

to protect the Island of Kronstadt.

This Island was vital to the Naval base directly

to the West of Leningrad.

It enabled the Soviet forces in the region,

both Naval and military, to prevent the German forces

of army group North completely denying

Leningrad the resources which enabled it to survive

the subsequent siege of Leningrad.

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On September the fourth, 1941

senior lieutenant Dariusz of the first Panzer regiment

radioed back to headquarters

that his unit had reached Leningrad.

Other units from the 18th army pressed on to capture

Shlisselburg to the East of Leningrad.

With the arrival of the rest of the 18th army

to reinforce the Panzers, on the 8th of September,

the German stranglehold

on the city of Leningrad tightened further.

The capture of Shlisselburg to the East

signaled the end of rail transport.

The German invaders surged on as far as Tikvin

deep inside the Russian hinterland.

Despite the best efforts of the population,

the first shells began to rain down

on Leningrad early in September.

It marked the beginning of a crucial episode in the war.

The Epic siege of the city, which would last for 900 days.

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As the German advance into Northern Russia continued

the rail link to Leningrad was cut.

The fate of Leningrad and with it,

30 Russian divisions appeared to be sealed.

The next stage of the battle was expected to be an attack

on the beleaguered city.

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weapon blasts

distant gunfire

Contrary to their own expectations

the men of the German 18th army were not to be asked

to mount a full-scale attack on the city.

And after a series of hotly contested battles

for the outskirts,

Hitler uncharacteristically ordered his troops to take

Leningrad by means of a long drawn out siege.

It has been suggested that he was unnerved

by the remote controlled explosions,

which the Russians had used so effectively in Kiev.

It is a decision which still provokes debate today.

There are really two possible explanations for the failure

of Army Group North to take Leningrad.

One was the conflicting priorities in the mind

of Adolf Hitler and the army high command.

Hitler vacillated between

prioritizing a number of objectives.

There is also a school of thought

which favors Hitler's adverse reaction to the huge losses

of the German sixth army in Kiev in August and September.

In Kiev, thousands of German troops

were lost to remote controlled explosions

and thousands of others to desperate street fighting.

This, it is thought,

persuaded Hitler that no German troops should

be made vulnerable by committing them to the inner city

streets of Moscow and Leningrad.

In any event,

the 18th army lacked the really heavy artillery necessary

to reduce the defenses of Leningrad.

The massive guns of the German siege train had already been

allocated to the sector of Army Group South,

where they were earmarked for the coming battles

in the Crimea.

To move them all the way across Russia

would have delayed the operation into winter.

To compound the problems of the battles

for the attackers, Panzer group four

was withdrawn from Army Group North in late September, 1941

in order to support Army Group Center in operation Typhoon,

the final drive on Moscow.

No German Army Group could afford to lose its tanks,

but Army Group North lost virtually all of its armor.

The withdrawal of the tanks from Army Group North

meant that the army was virtually immobile.

It was to remain so for almost three years.

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It is easy to suggest that the loss of Panzer Group four

in September, 1941

was directly responsible for the failure

of Army Group North to take its strategic

objective of Leningrad.

However, this is by no means certain.

The capture of a city as large

and well defended as Leningrad was by no means certain,

even with a strong armored force.

Nevertheless, the removal of Panzer Group four

clearly did not help the cause of Army Group North.

It meant that Army Group North would be denied this one

formation and the size, speed and fighting power to advance

quickly into the regions beyond the city of Leningrad,

link up with the Fins and effectively cut off

the city from its supplies.

The disappearance of Panzer Group four proved to be

a forerunner of things to come.

From that point onwards,

the evidence was clear that of the three German army groups

Army Group North was considered to be the poor relation.

It soon became obvious that they could expect to receive no

substantial additional support of any kind.

And the artillery siege train

would never be sent to Leningrad.

The 18th army, therefore, had no alternative,

but to take Leningrad by siege.

It seemed that the decisive battles on the Eastern front

would be fought elsewhere.

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loud blast

weapon blast

With the commencement of the siege of Leningrad,

a relatively stable frontline

appeared in the Northern sector.

The 16th army fought on the right flank

of the Northern sector,

where it was adjacent to the left wing of Army Group Center.

The 18th Army fought on the left flank

of the 16th army and as such

formed the extreme Northern end of the front line.

Army Group North was to remain doggedly committed

to the Northern flank

of the German armies fighting on the Eastern front

for the entire duration of the war.

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weapon blasts

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rapid gunfire

The siege of Leningrad was the stage for an intense struggle

that would in later years be recognized as a key event

in that conflict of inhuman savagery.

The opening stages were bitterly fought

in the suburbs of the city.

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weapon blasts

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When general Zhukov arrived to take over the defense

of the city on the 10th of September, 1941,

he found the defenders in an advanced state

of disorganization and the inhabitants close to panic.

Undaunted, he briskly set about bolstering its defenses.

A shortage of anti-tank guns was dealt with by converting

anti-aircraft artillery to the task

of attempting to halt the Panzers.

Six brigades of Naval infantry and students were

formed and reinforcements drafted in

from the Karelian Isthmus.

Zhukov began to take the fight to the Germans

through raids and counter attacks.

But by now the German troops had pierced the inner circle

of defenses and were rampaging through the suburbs.

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After a furious exchange of advances and retreats,

by the end of the month,

the defenders were hanging onto their city

by their fingernails.

It seemed inevitable that Leningrad would capitulate,

but as Zhukov awaited a renewed assault,

the fourth Panzer group suddenly departed

to join the battle for Moscow

and the remaining German forces began to build defenses.

Hitler had decreed that Leningrad

would not be taken by force.

It would instead be starved into submission,

but there was a flaw in the plan.

Although the supply situation was difficult,

without Panzer Group four

the ring around the city was never completely closed.

It was still possible to reach the city over land through

the Virgin forests of the Russian motherland.

It was also possible to bring in supplies by boat,

across the waters of Lake Lagoda.

In October, there was some temporary relief

for the defenders.

The roads had disintegrated into canals of bottomless mud

along which wheeled vehicles could drive only at a snail's

pace and only if they were towed by tanks.

This was the "rasputitsa", the season of mud,

which came as a debilitating surprise

to the Germans in 1941,

general Raus went to great lengths after the war to explain

the great significance of the muddy season.

"German losses of tanks and motorized equipment of all types

were extraordinarily high during the autumn

muddy period of 1941.

The first time that the mud of Russia was encountered a

division of the fourth Panzer group operating in the area

North of Gzhatsk, during the same period,

lost 50 tanks without a shot being fired.

35 of them within three days,

these losses were extremely serious since no

replacements were received."

The Germans had no conception of mud as it exists

in European Russia.

In the autumn of 1941,

when frontline troops were already stuck fast,

the German high command still believed that mud could be

conquered by brute force.

An idea that led to serious losses

of vehicles and equipment.

At the height of the muddy season,

tractors and recovery vehicles normally capable

of traversing difficult terrain are helpless,

and attempts to plow through the muddy mass

makes roads even more impassable.

Tanks, heavy recovery vehicles,

and even vehicles with good ground clearance

simply pushed an ever-growing wall of mud before them,

until they finally stopped half buried by their own motion.

A sudden frost in the autumn of 1941,

cemented a crippled buried column

into a state of complete uselessness.

And it never moved again.

Because it could not be reached in any other way,

gasoline, tow ropes and food supplies were airdropped along

the line of stranded armor,

but all attempts to move, were futile.

Often when drivers found themselves bogged down

far from any habitation,

they abandoned their vehicles and set out on foot to contact

friendly troops in the nearest village

or sought food and shelter

from local civilians in order to remain alive until

the worst of the muddy season passed.

For the muddy seasons, vehicles with high ground clearance,

lightweight and low unit ground pressure were necessary.

German trucks had low ground clearance and could not get

traction in deep mud.

Since German supply cars had wheels too narrow for muddy

terrain, they sank deep into soft ground.

Even the German Maultier and Ost schlepper

of the later years were bogged down in mud

as their tracks were too narrow.

Raus noted that the awkward looking

and slow Russian tractor of pre-war vintage

salvaged the heaviest most deeply mired loads

after German equipment failed to budge them.

Inside Leningrad, food supplies to the besieged city

had been diminishing throughout the autumn.

By late November,

they were at their lowest ebb for the entire duration

of the siege.

Manual workers were receiving

only 250 grams of bread per day.

One third of their normal requirement.

Without water for sanitation

and basic medical supplies,

disease became inevitable.

As winter arrived and temperatures

fell to the minus twenties,

thousands began to die each day.

Total starvation threatened constantly.

To the Germans

collapse seemed imminent.

Back in Berlin, a reception with Adolf Hitler

as a guest of honor,

was organized to celebrate the fall of the stricken city.

The invitations were printed, but never posted.

Russian resistance remained stubborn and defiant.

Even women soldiers in the Red Army were in combat units,

the ferocity and inhumanity of the conflict

beggars the imagination.

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In an attempt to relieve the appalling conditions

in the city, the Russians marked a road

across the frozen Southwest corner of Lake Ladoga.

And by the 22nd of November, convoys of supply lorries

were just managing to stave off famine in the city.

It was a hazardous passage through the biting Northeastern

gales, which swept across the Lake.

The German Luftwaffe also did its best

to intercept the convoys and break the surface of the ice.

Yet for all its horror,

the Russians knew that defending this lifeline to the city

was the only possible way of keeping the inhabitants alive.

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But for some,

the food coming across the ice was too little too late.

Victims of starvation, suffering from falling blood pressure

and the wasting of the heart and internal organs would never

regain their health.

Many would die months after food

and medical supplies finally arrived.

The children who survived would emerge totally traumatized

by the siege as an eyewitness recalled.

"It was reflected in the way many of the children played all

by themselves in the way that even in that collective games,

they played in silence with grave faces.

I saw faces of children,

which reflected such thoughtfulness and sorrow that those

eyes and faces told one more than could be gathered from all

the stories of the horrors of famine."

As events unfolded it soon became clear that in spite of all

the hardships of the siege of Leningrad,

the Northern sector was considered by both sides

to be of secondary importance.

The men of Army Group North

soon became convinced that they were fighting

what they referred to as, "the eternal war of the poor man".

Casualties along the whole of the Russian front

had been enormous,

but only 67,000 replacements were allocated

to army group North

as against 131,000 to Army Group Center

and 119,000 to Army Group South.

When it came to allocating fresh divisions

from the reserves, the situation

was even less favorable.

Of 21 new divisions released

by army high command in the autumn of 1941,

only three were allocated to Army Group North.

It was a further indication of things to come.

One unexpected benefit for the Army Group was the occasional

support which they received from German Naval units

operating in the Baltic.

As one flank rested on the Baltic seas

Army Group North was the only formation which could

look for substantial support from the Kriegsmarine.

The German Navy had played a significant role

in the Soviet German war.

In the Baltic,

the Germans sealed up

the powerful Russian front with minefields.

By doing so,

they also trapped the Soviet submarine fleet.

As the Germans advanced along the Baltic coastline,

they took control of Russian bases so that the Soviet Baltic

fleet had to remain bottled up in Leningrad.

The function of the Soviet Baltic fleet during 1941 and 42

was limited solely to supplying fire support to the Soviet

forces fighting to defend the city.

This aspect of the fighting was also to provide the stage

for a daring attack led by the Stukas of Hans-Ulrich Rudel.

The Luftwaffe was ordered

to sink the Soviet battleship Marat.

Rudel managed this amazing feat in the face of fierce

anti-aircraft fire with a single well-placed bomb.

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On the deficit side,

the 18th army had to become involved in a number

of amphibious operations to capture the Baltic islands,

which placed a great strain on what were already

severely limited resources.

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Throughout the whole course of the war,

the lack of powerful reinforcements severely limited

the strategic options available for the Army Group command.

It also required a great deal of juggling of available

divisions to maintain the extended frontline and the siege

of Leningrad, which was to drag on for almost three years.

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The Germans had closed right up on the city

and into the outer suburbs, but the ring was not closed.

An important consideration

at this time was the role of the Fins.

They agreed to move close to Leningrad, their fifth general

Mannerheim making it quite clear that he was prepared

to take action to recover Finnish territory,

yielded to Russia in the winter war of 1939,

but that he would not take part in the direct attack

on Leningrad itself.

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That was one of the conditions Finland made

on entering the war against Russia

on the side of the Germans.

Mannerheim was as mindful

of the political conditions as he was

of the military conditions because of Finland's

vulnerability to future Russian aggression.

This meant that the German and Finnish armies were never

able to cut off Leningrad completely

from the rest of the world.

In both winter and summer,

the Russian forces were still able to get resources across

Lake Ladoga in the Northeast of the city.

From the winter of 1942 onwards,

the railway to the East of Leningrad was completed

and Leningrad was connected to the rest of the Soviet union,

which enabled the forces to supply the inhabitants

of the city, helping some of them to survive the siege.

The Soviet negotiators in the Soviet Finnish peace talks,

which took place in 1944,

actually recalled that the Russians recognized what the Fins

had done for them.

If the Fins had moved forward and closed the ring of siege

around Leningrad, it would've meant the death of the city.

Despite the fact that some supplies

got through, it was precious little.

Starvation drove the population to extreme measures,

including the horrifying excess of cannibalism.

The first cases occurred at the beginning of December, 1941.

The Soviet criminal code

made no mention of such a crime as cannibalism.

So Soviet officials could at first only define it as an

extreme form of banditry.

According to the top secret report of the military

procurator of Leningrad, A. A Kuznetsov,

dated 27th of February, 1942

investigations of cannibalism led to criminal charges

against 26 individuals in December, 1941,

366 in January, 1942 and 494

in the first two weeks of February, 1942.

Investigation revealed that not only was human flesh

consumed by individuals,

but it was also sold to other citizens.

By the 20th of February 1942, 866 individuals were under

criminal investigation or actual indictment

for suspected cannibalism.

Only 18% of this number had any previous criminal record.

Of the 886 suspect individuals, 322 were men

and 564 women.

Almost 30% were aged over 40.

The next largest group being in their thirties.

More ghoulish still,

was the discovery of extensive intrusions

into cemeteries and the mutilation of the recent dead.

One evening in March, 1942,

the watchman at the Piskaryovskoye cemetery detained a woman

with a sack.

Once opened, the sack revealed the bodies of five infants.

The increase in cannibalism forced the city authorities

to set up police guards at all the major cemeteries.

With the first snows of 1941 came a cruelly bitter winter.

The temperature continued to fall and the German soldiers

now paid dearly for the arrogance of the high command

that had refused to admit the possibility of anything other

than a quick decisive campaign.

Few men in the German trenches had more than summer clothing

and frostbite took an agonizing tole.

German machinery and guns had never been designed

to function in such extremes.

Engines seized up, metal tank tracks split apart

in the cold, ammunition would not fire.

The fierceness of the cold

was far beyond the experience of most Germans.

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distant explosions

Emboldened by the problems they saw in the German ranks

a series of Soviet counterattacks managed to roll back

many of the German gains around Leningrad.

With incredible exertions,

the Germans kept up a semblance of defense.

The tactics of winter warfare centered around contests

for the possession of roads and inhabited places.

In Russia, villages and roads

were infinitely more important than they

were on the rest of the continent.

In other German theaters of war,

no one particular road ever became a crucial factor

since a well-developed road network

always offered a choice of alternate routes.

In Russia, the possession of a single road

was often a matter of life

or death for an entire army.

The extreme tactical importance of inhabited places during

the six months of winter explains the fact that the Russians

would frequently much rather destroy them than surrender

them to the enemy.

In the bitter trench warfare outside Leningrad,

the defender had a definite advantage in winter

because as a rule,

their positions could not be seen in the snow,

except at very close range.

The defenders were able to keep their forces undercover

and wait until the moment their fire

could be used most effectively.

The attacker was also impeded and easily detected

even in camouflaged clothing.

The principal weapon of the defender became the machine gun

as its performance was not diminished by snow

in which mortars and light artillery lost

most of their effectiveness.

Replacements were also becoming a problem

for the German forces.

After the war,

it became clear from the diaries of Army Group North

that the commanders of both formations had intentionally

prohibited, even during calm periods,

the removal of a unit from the front in order to grant it

a period of rest.

It was better to keep the divisions at the front and assign

them to a narrower sector

as otherwise a reserve unit,

which had been removed from the Northern front was certain

to be taken by the Supreme command and assigned more

pressing pressure points on either the central

or the Southern front.

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Although the Northern front was regarded as being

of secondary importance, it was in no sense, a backwater.

There was still a great deal of terrible fighting in very

difficult terrain with extensive swamps and few roads

through the vast sections of trackless forest,

which presented a logistical nightmare.

Army group North and the army divisions were facing the most

difficult conditions on the Eastern front.

The climate and the terrain were completely different.

Around Leningrad, it is very marshy and boggy.

There were also very few roads.

So all transport logistics were very difficult indeed.

To compound the difficulties for the Germans,

by October of 1941,

the first partisan attacks had begun to cause severe

difficulties in the rear areas.

The effects of these attacks were further compounded

by the fact that the underdeveloped

infrastructure of Russia

meant that there were very few roads or railways

which could be used as alternatives

to those blocked by partisan activity.

The Russian winter was a nightmare

along the whole of the front,

but it was Army Group North

which bore the brunt of the most extreme Russian winters.

It is impossible to exaggerate the cruel realities

of fighting in the ferocious winters of Northern Russia.

In addition to their geographical

and climactic difficulties,

the fighting spirit of the Red Army facing Army Group North

was no less intense

than that displayed on the other sectors.

The siege of Leningrad has become synonymous

with endurance and suffering,

but there was also a great deal of intense combat

as a series of miniature battles rolled

backwards and forwards

around the siege lines outside Leningrad.

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Despite coming very close to victory

on a number of occasions,

Army Group North was never able to close the ring

around Leningrad completely.

And the high command continued to draw desperately needed

divisions away from the Army Group North sector,

in order to feed other hard-pressed sectors.

The result of this attrition from two directions

was that a ferocious Soviet offensive in January, 1944,

finally broke the resistance

of Army Group North and raised the siege.

The lifting of the siege of Leningrad in 1944

forced Army Group North

to fall back to a new defensive front

composed of a series of partially constructed

defenses known as "The Panther line".

This line should have represented a fallback position

for the German forces, but work was beginning much too late.

The Panther line was envisaged as a series of strong

fortifications incorporating parts of the Northern regions

of the Soviet union in a line running Southwards

from Lake Dvina and Lake Pscov

near the town of Nava

on the Baltic coast of Estonia.

It was envisaged that the German troops

retreating behind the line

would occupy a series of excellent defensive points.

The German troops would therefore have a respite

from the rigors of the retreat

and be able to hold the Soviet army at bay.

Meanwhile, the armored formations

and the air formations of the German army

were repaired and returned to the fray to renew combat

with their Soviet foes.

However, the Panther line

was constructed merely as an afterthought

when it was much too late.

The German armies had suffered defeats

and simply did not have

enough troops to man the line effectively.

In those areas where adequate defenses

had been prepared in the line

and there were sufficient German troops

and aircraft available,

it proved a very formidable obstacle

for the Soviet army to overcome.

Had it been properly prepared

as part of a coherent overall strategic plan,

the Panther line could have been held.

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The Panther line was only ever going to provide a temporary

solution to the mounting problems of Army Group North.

The destruction of the neighboring Army Group Center

in June, 1944,

tore a huge gap in the German lines and left the right flank

of Army Group North vulnerable to a Soviet attack.

Hitler was forced to sanction another series of withdrawals.

From the Panther line, Army Group North

were forced to retreat in relatively good order

towards Germany fighting a series of ferocious defensive

battles as they went.

The most notable of these being

the defense of Nava in 1944.

The battle for Narva plays a very important part

in the Soviet German war

because Narva is the gateway to Estonia.

The Germans recognized the importance of holding Narva.

And there were initially 12 divisions organized

into what was called "Abteilung Narwa",

a special force grouping,

which was to fight with enormous courage and distinction.

The defense of Narva was a bitterly fought encounter.

A breakthrough here would have compromised

many German troops in the Baltic regions

of Estonia and Latvia.

European SS, along with the German

regular army divisions managed to hold

back the forces of the Soviet Leningrad front

throughout January, February, and March.

Their bitter attritional contest was not characterized

by sophisticated tactical maneuvers.

It was a bloody slugging-match.

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weapon blasts

The German formations were saved by the early spring thaw

of late March, 1944,

which produced seas of mud floods of at least one foot deep

in an area of 100 to 140 miles square.

Even Soviet tanks stuck fast in the torrents of mud

and the German forces were able to retreat once more.

The incredible resistance offered by Army Group Narva,

a scratch formation drawn from the slender resources

of Army Group North

represents an impressive example

of military improvisation

and stands comparison with the other

German defensive battles fought elsewhere

in Russia and Italy.

The mainstay of resistance in Narva was the third SS Panzer

Corps, which included the long serving SS police division

along with the new SS Viking division

comprised of volunteers from different nationalities.

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By October, 1944,

the situation around Narva

from a German point of view, was hopeless.

But unlike the countless garrisons squandered by Hitler

in a pointless series of hold-at-all-costs orders,

Army Group Narva managed to escape

and rejoin Army Group North.

Constant retreat was now the order of the day as the army

group was driven back

through the Baltic States towards Germany.

But Army Group North would never make it home.

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While the Red Army rolled on towards Berlin,

the men of Army Group North were finally cornered

in the Courland peninsula of Latvia.

There, the battered remnants

of the Army Group held off all attacks

by the Red Army for six long months.

They were under siege from late October,

1944 through to May, 1945.

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rapid gunfire

In January, 1945, the two armies,

which had served since 1941 as Army Group North

were renamed Army Group Courland.

The hard-won mantle of Army Group North

was transferred to a scratch assembly

of beaten units under the command

of a swift succession of temporary leaders.

The spirit of the men of Army Group North

remained behind in Courland.

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distant blasts

The German divisions,

which found their way to Courland

were stuck there.

They were blockaded by the Russians and there was nothing

they could do.

They could no longer make any useful contribution

to the greater course of the war elsewhere.

In many respects,

it was a very wasteful and irresponsible

gesture on the part of Hitler.

This albeit scratch army was still a considerable force,

which could have made a valuable contribution elsewhere,

but it was not to be made available.

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Despite everything that the besieged Red Army

could throw at them,

the surviving elements of the 16th and 18th armies

now officially known as Army Group Courland

continued to resist all further attempts

to force them into surrender.

Fighting for the Courland peninsula was grinding in nature.

It was not like the Western and Eastern fronts

characterized by large formations,

sweeping along the frontier and impressive sophisticated

operations, in the Courland fighting, the Germans

trapped in this region were gradually, slowly

and surely pushed back

in spectacular fashion into something

of a geographical cul-de-sac by the Red Army.

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They were well served to the bitter end by the ships

of the Kriegsmarine

who managed to evacuate some divisions

recalled to Germany.

On occasion, they even managed to bring in

some much needed reinforcements.

The German Navy did have an important role to play

when the Red Army began to advance

along the Baltic coast to break into East Prussia,

because if at all possible the German Navy

had to try and contain Soviet Naval operations.

Even more importantly,

they had a grievous burden,

to try and evacuate as many of the German civilians

and German military units

who had been trapped and transport them back

into German territory.

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airplane roars past

The Naval aspect in the closing stage of the war

does demonstrate that the German Navy

could operate well even in the face of disaster,

which was now pending.

The Kriegsmarine was absolutely vital in explaining why

German formations fought bitterly

to the end for the pointless

battle for the Courland peninsula.

The peninsula, from the Army's point of view

was militarily useless,

indeed many German commanders in late 1944 and spring 1945

constantly requested Hitler

to give up the Courland peninsula.

This would release the 26 divisions

that were fighting there

in order to bolster their defense in what

were more important military regions nearer to home.

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rapid gunfire

The German Navy had used the Baltic sea throughout

World War Two as a training ground

for its submarine commanders.

Donitz, a committed Nazi

who was in charge of the Navy at this stage,

regarded the retention of the Gulf of Danzig in the Baltic

sea as essential in order to train his submarine commanders

to use the extremely powerful new submarine, the type 21,

which the German Navy were developing

towards the end of the war.

The Kriegsmarine therefore played a critical role in

explaining why the German formations fought so bitterly for

the Courland peninsula.

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Trapped in Courland, the survivors

of the old Army Group North

maintained their cohesion and fighting ability

until the final surrender on may the eighth, 1945,

almost four years since they had first moved into Russia.

On that day 203,000 men began the long march

into Soviet captivity.

Many would never return.

And others were held as slave laborers until 1955,

a high price to pay for their long defense.

Of the three huge army groups which Hitler sent into Russia,

it could be argued that Army Group North was the most

successful in carrying out the tasks assigned to it.

Although the campaign ultimately ended in failure for them,

the men of Army Group North retained their military cohesion

with some units achieving the rare distinction of serving

for the whole four years

of the Russian war in the same army group.

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