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They say life is a competition.
The fight to be first.
The survival of the fittest.
Winning.
Nobody wants to be a loser.
Now, winning basically means getting more of what you want in life,
and, as a mathematician, I can help with that.
Because there is a real science to success,
based on ideas from some of the last century's most beautiful minds.
# Everyone's a winner, baby That's the truth. #
From how you can analyse and take advantage of your opponents...
You need to find a way to be as unpredictable as possible.
..to deciding whether to cheat or play fair...
You can put a good apple in a barrel of bad apples,
it's always going to turn bad.
..being more strategic will help you get ahead.
But if all of this sounds a bit selfish,
I'll also be showing you how cooperation can trump conflict,
and how everyone can be a winner.
Hello, Sheriff. Hi, Hannah. How are you?
You are walking away with no money because you are an idiot. No. You're an idiot.
Whether it is happier relationships you are after, a bargain,
or a better world,
a look at the science of winning can help
and reveal some surprising truths.
So join me. You'll lose out if you don't.
To get the best result in any situation, maths can help.
Let's take just one example.
Something as simple as ordering dinner.
Should you choose burger or steak?
Now, you absolutely cannot afford it,
but that steak does look incredibly tempting.
And it's almost your birthday,
surely you deserve a £25 splurge every now and then?
First of all, ask yourself, what do you really want -
steak or savings?
Well, you need to decide what winning means for you.
And that might change when your mates arrive.
Let's imagine that everybody has exactly the same choice.
Burger or steak.
But you know that your friends are notoriously frugal, so
if they all go for the burger and you split the bill evenly,
you could end up getting that tasty steak for a lot less.
The £25 hit from your steak
combined with the £5 for their burgers means
everyone pays £10 each,
which frankly, for you, is an amazing bargain.
But hold on. The waiter is coming over and is heading towards
your friend, who you know loves a rib eye.
Is she thinking what you're thinking?
And what about the others?
And so begins a frankly very British game of silent guessing and
calculating. If she goes for the steak as well as you,
then you're shelling out £15 each,
but if he goes for the steak too, then that's £20 a head,
which is far more than you can possibly afford.
But is it really fair that your best friend,
who always does the generous thing,
ends up spending £20 for a measly burger?
So what is the real win here?
Well, it's complicated.
Do you prefer saving money,
a delicious dinner, or being fair to your friend?
Having been fleeced, will she ever want to meet up again?
The key thing is that what you want can be scored,
and mathematicians like me give it a fancy name - your expected utility.
We express your preferences
as values that capture just how much
you instinctively want something,
against the price, and then factor in other stuff, like risk.
In this case, that your dear friend
might ditch you for busting her budget.
Looks like steak pipped friendship this time.
So there you go.
If you can figure out everyone's preferences
and you know what YOU want,
then the key question becomes, at the lowest cost to yourself,
without having any control over other people's actions,
how do you get what YOU want?
Well, thankfully, mathematics can
help you find a winning strategy, too.
Whatever decisions we make,
having a good strategy means the difference
between knowing what you want and getting it.
It was the mid-20th-century maths genius John von Neumann
who, more than anyone else,
turned our winning instincts into a science.
Von Neumann established a completely new field of study,
called Game Theory, which was concerned with the mathematics
of both cooperation and of conflict.
How to avoid losing and, more importantly, how to win.
His efforts culminated in this here.
A Theory Of Games And Economic Behaviour, 641 pages,
packed to the brim with formulas,
which was once described as one of the most-influential
and least-read books of the last century.
Written with the economist Oskar Morgenstern and published in 1944,
it proved how we can all get ahead
when one party's loss is the other's gain.
It's not for the mathematically faint-hearted,
but at the core of the book is a strategic principle
that is surprisingly intuitive.
And easily explained with some cold, hard cash.
So, you and me are here.
I'm going to have a go on those slot machines
and I have got a nice bag of 2p coins
that you and I are going to share.
Now, the polite way to do this is just to let you help yourself.
After all, I trust you to play fair.
But actually, I really shouldn't.
Von Neumann assumes, rightly so,
that we both want as many coins as we can get.
So, what SHOULD I do?
Well, I should split this into two piles, as evenly as possible,
and then let you decide which half you want.
Given that you're watching me like a hawk, the only way I can guarantee
I don't lose out to you is by me splitting and you choosing.
I don't get as many 2ps as I might like, but I win by minimising the
maximum amount of fun at the fair that I can lose to you.
This is known
as the min-max theory, and as strategies go,
you can apply it to pretty much anything.
So, if you have got two kids that are fighting over toys,
just get one of them to make two piles
and the other one to pick which pile they prefer,
or if you've got boring household chores, you write two lists,
and your partner chooses which list.
It sounds pretty simple,
but you have to remember that your split will take into account
your preferences, so you get to decide if you think
the utility of a huge pile of ironing and doing
all of the hoovering is the equivalent of
the utility of unblocking the loo, and sorting out all of the bins.
Now, strangely, Von Neumann didn't get into that particular conundrum
in his book, but his proof that you can always minimise the losses
and maximise the gains, while taking into account
the preferences of two warring parties was hugely influential.
Such an analytical approach to winning
gripped people's imagination.
And crucially, Von Neumann took inspiration
from one rather unpredictable game.
Von Neumann was an exceptional mathematician.
And perhaps because of its strategic complexity,
he was particularly interested in poker.
He said that real life is about bluffing,
about little tactics of deception,
about asking yourself, what does the other man think I mean to do?
"And that is what games are about in my theory."
When it comes to winning big at poker,
there's one woman you need to know.
Wow! This is bold. Four bet of 4,100.
Sick move. Liv Boeree is the European top-ranking
female poker player.
Really strong play by Liv Boeree,
she's clearly been eating her vitamins.
Vitamin B - for bluff.
I'm meeting Liv to find out how poker strategy might help us
get more of what we want in life.
These days, the very best players are very analytically minded folks
who are comfortable working with maths,
to sort of really get a solid understanding
of the theory behind the game. And then the psychology is,
I like to think of it as the cherry on top.
OK, let's talk about the basics, then.
What calculations are you making?
Um, if I'm going to bet chips, if it's 30% of the time
I'm going to be the best hand, and 70% of the time I'm going to be
the worst, then I can multiply those
numbers against the chips that are involved, and that'll be my expected
value from a situation.
And that applies in many real-life situations, too.
Say I am running late for a flight.
I have two options. I can either...
..go to the airport and try to make my flight but run the risk
of then missing it and losing the value of the flight,
and having to buy a new one,
or I can stay home and do the sort of safer bet,
and call and pay the change fee.
Thinking rationally and quantifying things is the very first step to
thinking strategically. Exactly. Yes.
It's very hard to build strategies
if you don't have a numerical idea of the value of the outcomes
of different strategies.
By evaluating both the chances of something happening
and the outcome when it does,
you have a better view of your best options.
But at this level, everyone is just as calculating.
To beat the optimal strategy, you have to find an edge.
There something that's called game theory optimal, where,
if you're playing this style, then it means that you are unexploitable,
basically. The best case that an opponent can do to counter it
is to also play game theory optimal,
therefore you just sort of reach the same very high standard of play,
and you're trying to not deviate from it at all.
And that's where sort of the more, like, creativity
and, I guess, the artistic side of the game comes in,
where you can do these deviations from the optimal play
to exploit your opponent's weaknesses.
But they could be doing that to you as well.
Exactly. So you need to find a way to be as unpredictable as possible.
Von Neumann's maths proves that poker players must bluff,
unpredictably,
to avoid exploitation by a savvy opponent.
It is an essential strategy and it can be applied elsewhere.
You know, if you're in a business negotiation,
what is the minimum amount you will take?
There's a great opportunity to bluff and give a high number because
you're giving yourself the option
for them to pay you that high number.
It might seem obvious, but bluffing like this
is exactly what gives you the edge over others.
Particularly if their loss is your gain.
Anything that is a competition, to make yourself unexploitable
will just put you at a huge advantage.
So quantify everything, folks.
And don't make yourself too easy to read.
In win-lose games your carefully calculated strategies
can only get you what you want if your opponents are in the dark.
But what if you're involved in a conflict where everyone could lose?
During the second half of the 20th century,
the biggest problem that game theorists has had to contend with
was the Cold War. The US and the Soviet Union
were facing off against each other, and just as in poker,
every strategy, every move and countermove had to be analysed.
Except, this time, the stakes could not have been higher.
As an ally to the US, Britain had to prepare for the worst.
In 1961, a top-secret facility was set up here in rural Worcestershire,
Regional Seat of Government 9.
It is one of a network of bunkers
from which the British Government would
have operated in the event of a nuclear war.
The moment that the Second World War
ended with such a devastating show of nuclear force,
the talk in the West began to focus on trying to prevent
a military face-off that would mean that nuclear bunkers like this one
would become a necessity.
Now, the strategy that was on the table at the time was referred to,
somewhat euphemistically, as preventative war.
The idea being that the Americans would launch an unprovoked attack
on the Soviet Union before they had the chance to acquire the bomb.
But it would at least avoid a slow,
expensive and far more dangerous cold one.
Preventative war is an argument still used today over North Korea
and at the time, its supporters included Winston Churchill
and von Neumann himself.
In 1950, von Neumann remarked, "With the Russians,
"it's not a question of whether, but of when.
"If you say, 'Why not bomb them tomorrow?' I say, 'Why not today?'
"And if you say, 'Today at five o'clock,'
"I say, 'Why not one o'clock?'"
You can see where this kind of reasoning ends,
and it is perfectly rational.
If someone has to win, better that it be us.
Despite the impeccable logic, America didn't attack Russia.
And then it was too late because Russia got the bomb, too.
By 1953, there was no outcome in which only one side could win.
This demanded a new strategy.
Something which became known as
mutually assured destruction, or MAD for short. Basically,
the threat of you using massively destructive weapons on your enemy
prevents your enemy from using those same weapons on you.
Once everybody is armed,
nobody has an incentive to either initiate a conflict or to disarm.
And so, nuclear war was avoided, but places like this
and a hugely expensive, vast global nuclear arsenal, was the result.
Compared to von Neumann's games,
in which one person's loss is the other's gain,
mutually assured destruction, strangely,
is something we come across far more in real life.
Because most conflicts, whether at work, with friends or family
have the potential to end up in a stalemate.
So often we choose strategies that mean no-one wins.
To explain why,
I'd like to begin with a rather unusual detective story.
I'm looking at the Instagram page of the rapper Ludacris.
In 2015, he shared this picture with his millions of followers.
It had originally been posted on the Facebook page of the police
department in Franklin County, Kentucky.
And it reads... "Attention, drug dealers.
"We offer a free service to help you eliminate your drug competition."
And then under a quite large marijuana leaf,
there are a series of sections where dealers
can identify their competitors.
You can fill out who your competition is, where they live,
their phone numbers, even their hours of operation.
It might seem like a gimmick, but the fact is,
Franklin County PD were onto something.
I think I need to find out a bit more about this,
so I'm going to call the sheriff.
RINGING TONE
Hello, Sheriff.
Hi, Hannah. How are you? I'm good, thank you.
Why would a dealer call in and tip off one of their competitors?
Obviously, if they eliminate it,
the more they get, the more business they do,
the more money, the potential earning that they have,
that they will make. And it helps you get rid of your competition,
you're the only game in town.
Especially by having law enforcement do it.
Does this really work for you, then, as a tactic,
getting the criminals to do the dirty on each other?
Yes. It's something that was very simple to do
and, at the end of the day, if we have got drug dealers
turning in drug dealers, that is a win.
Police 1, drug dealers 0.
Wow. This was obviously a pretty good score
for Sheriff Melton because what he did was force
the local drug dealers into the most famous conundrum in
the history of winning.
It is called, appropriately enough, the prisoner's dilemma,
and it demonstrates very clearly the dangers
of falling into a lose-lose situation
when acting in your own best interests.
Think of it like this.
Imagine Sheriff Melton has chucked a couple of shady looking characters
from his local beat into jail.
He has got evidence to charge them with possession,
but can only get them for dealing if they rat each other out.
So, he puts them in two separate cells
and gives them both his clever flyer.
Our suspects must now consider whether they should
both keep their traps shut and only
go away for one year each for possession...
..both rat the other out for dealing
and each get a three-year sentence...
..or hope that they alone grass the other up,
getting off scot-free while their competition gets
a whopping five years - otherwise known as the sucker's payoff.
So, what to do?
Well, this option is the best.
But there's a risk it could quickly turn sour if one person decides
to basically betray the other.
Good old Sheriff Melton knows these two are toerags,
and they know it too.
So, to avoid being screwed over,
the only stable solution for them is this.
They both must implicate the other.
A win for Sheriff Melton, but lose-lose for them.
This unhappy scenario is called the Nash equilibrium.
It's a beautifully simple proof that was published in 1950 by the
mathematician John Nash, when he was still in his early 20s.
It won him a Nobel Prize, and it transformed the analysis of winning.
What Nash proved was that in a situation
with several possible outcomes, like this one,
where people either can't or won't cooperate with each other,
there is always a strategy
which you and everyone else is best off opting for.
Now, in the case of the prisoner's dilemma,
paradoxically that strategy ends up with lose-lose.
Everybody wants to win by ratting out their competition,
and everyone wants to avoid the sucker's payoff.
And as a result, everyone ends up going to jail.
Being uncooperative can cost you more than you bargained for.
The reason Nash's proof matters so much
is because these kind of dilemmas
constantly appear in real life because of the way our individual
interests often clash with those of others and of society.
Whether you are a drug dealer, or just out for dinner with your mates,
no-one wants to be the sucker, right?
I remember the day I was arrested, then I was locked up for 48 hours.
I remember thinking...
"Oh, THIS is what happens."
If ever there was an example of Nash's theory in action,
it is in the controversial world of professional cycling.
The global hero at the time was Lance Armstrong.
We were really good friends.
I remember him saying, "I got caught with my hand in the cookie jar".
I knew what Lance was doing.
It was like... Hang on a second.
David is one of the highest profile riders to talk candidly
about the use of performance-enhancing drugs within cycling.
Tell me about the first time that you realised that cycling
perhaps wasn't squeaky-clean.
Um, my very first pro race in February, 1997.
My roommate was offered a cortisone pill.
We all carried around medical bags and it was omnipresent.
It was white noise, is what I've always described it as.
For four years, David trained and raced clean,
but the pressure to remain competitive took its toll.
Eventually, despite your initial resistance,
you did decide to give in.
Yeah. I think that is the term - I gave in.
I didn't decide to join them, I gave in and thought, "Well, you know,
"I can't fight this any more".
I was an ethical person, but over time I just went...
It wears you down?
Well, just...the environment you are in wears you down.
You can put a good apple in a barrel of bad apples,
it's always going to turn bad.
It's a classic prisoner's dilemma.
In professional cycling, riders compete to win.
If doping makes winning more likely,
then abiding by the rules risks the sucker's payoff...
..and so the rational thing to do is cheat.
Because a faster field and a doping arms race has become the new norm.
This dilemma unites all competitive sport.
Though it is a lose-lose scenario if everyone cheats, nonetheless,
for individuals, cheating can give you the edge,
IF you can get away with it.
The fundamental reason I was there was because I wanted to win.
I was very ambitious. If the goals you want to achieve
are being achieved by the people who are cheating, why don't I do it?
David was the reigning world time-trial champion
when he was caught in 2004, receiving a two-year ban.
But after his punishment, he returned to racing clean.
David Millar comes up, hits the line. Best time, 31:15.
Millar is back.
Every time I won, from then on, it was to prove a point,
that it was possible to win clean.
And you were appealing because you were clean? Because we were clean.
It actually became a valuable asset to be clean and win races.
It goes back to that whole barrel of apples,
make sure it is a barrel of good apples with one bad apple.
That's easier to control.
These guys will never have to encounter it because we have
an anti-doping culture in professional cycling now.
David's experience illustrates the profound tension between individual
drive to succeed and the greater good.
Our winning instincts can be both our greatest asset
and deeply destructive.
This is something that is relevant to all of us.
If you think about it, how many times have you been in a situation
where you didn't want to upset the balance of things
for fear that you might end up missing out?
Maybe you have had a job where you ended up staying later
and later at work just because everybody else was doing it,
and you didn't want to look like you were lazy.
Or maybe you have failed to call someone out for a racist or sexist
comment just because you didn't want to look bad,
you didn't want to make the fuss.
Or maybe, you have waited and waited to tell someone that you love them,
just because if you said it first, and it wasn't reciprocated,
you'd end up feeling heartbroken.
Now, all of these situations are real-life examples
of Nash equilibrium.
So, what can be done about these traps which are, admittedly,
very logical?
How can we break out of them and secure that elusive win-win?
Well, I would like to show you one option,
with the help of my favourite ever game show.
So I have invited some people along to a screening
of its dramatic climax.
You each have a golden ball with the word "split"
written inside. You each have a golden ball with the word "steal".
If you both choose the split ball,
you split today's jackpot of £100,150.
If one of you splits and one of you steals,
whoever chooses the steal ball will go home with today's jackpot.
If you both choose the steal ball, you go home with nothing.
I am going to split this.
I am very, very happy to go home with 50,000.
You're genuinely going to split with me? If I stole off you,
every single person there would run over and lynch me.
There's no way I could...
Everyone who knew me would just be disgusted if I stole.
Sarah, I can look you straight in the eye and tell you,
I am going to split. Promise? I swear down to you.
I AM going to split.
Sarah, Steve, choose either the split or the steal ball now.
Hold it up.
We're going home with 50 grand each.
I promise you that.
Split or steal?
SHOUTING AND GROANING
You never know what's coming in this game.
Trust me, that never gets any less painful to watch!
I think we can all agree that was pretty incredible.
I'm just really shocked that she would do such a thing.
What would you have done in that situation, though?
To be honest, I would actually have stolen as well.
There you are, slight contradiction!
She seemed to be reeling him in really well
to say, "Are you sure you're going to split?
"Do you promise me you are going to split?"
As soon as she knew that, she could've equally thought,
I'm going to split as well and we're both going to leave with some money.
Well, if you thought that was interesting.
I want to show you another clip which might be
one of my favourite things of all time.
That's the only introduction I'm going to give you.
Nick, Ibrahim.
Ibrahim, I want you to trust me.
100%, I'm going to pick the steal ball.
Sorry, you are going... I'm going to choose the steal ball.
I want you to do split,
and I promise you that I will split the money with you.
After you've took the steal?
Yes. You're going to take steal, I'm going to take split.
Yes. So you take the money...
And I will split it with you. After the show. Yes.
CHUCKLING
APPLAUSE
Why don't we just both pick split?
I'm not going to pick split, I'm going to steal, Ibrahim.
Honestly, 100% I'm going to steal.
If you do split, then I will split the money.
I can't see myself doing that. OK, well, I'm going to steal, so we are going to leave with nothing.
You are walking away with no money because you're an idiot.
That's not true. You're an idiot. That's what you are.
You're an idiot. Nick, choose split or steal.
Ibrahim, choose split or steal. Now, please.
Split or steal?
Yes, congratulations!
You have both split and each receive £6,800.
I would have split it. Why did you put me through that?!
Why would you do that to me?!
Let's take a moment to recap what just happened.
By promising he will steal upfront,
Nick removes two possible outcomes to the game.
This means Ibrahim can only steal and be guaranteed nothing,
or split, handing the cash to Nick in the hope that he will share it.
Nick knows Ibrahim wants the cash,
so despite his ultimatum, he also splits.
It's a win-win,
thanks to a brilliant way of forcing cooperation.
I am delighted that we are joined today by Nick from that video.
Wow! Thank you. Nick, that was pretty amazing.
How did it come about, you appearing on Golden Balls?
So, when I initially saw it,
I thought it was a bit horrendous as a game show
because what happened basically is you are rewarded for shafting
people. And I just wanted to prove that if you trust someone, actually,
more often than not, people will come through for you.
That was the motivation behind it.
Was there any point when you were worried
that he wouldn't go with you, that he wouldn't go for split?
If he didn't split, then he'd lost everything,
so you can either be stupid or REALLY stupid -
and when I say really stupid,
you'd rather have nothing than see somebody get something.
You just had one clear strategy you just needed to stick to.
I tried to sort of remove the dilemma.
Forced him into a position?
Yes. If you had won the money,
would you have split it with him outside of the game?
Yes. I REALLY would have done.
It was about proving that if you trust people,
sometimes they don't always shaft you,
and that was the philosophy of why I wanted to do it.
Were you expecting it to get that much attention?
No, nobody could have foreseen that.
Harvard University teach it in economics.
UCL teach it... As do I! Yes! Bath University do.
I've been asked to go to New York to talk about it.
President Obama's economist has included me in his book,
it's just a bit insane, really.
Yeah, wow. You did break the prisoner's dilemma.
It's safe to conclude that having a strategic genius
and all-round lovely man like Nick take control
can be a real win for all.
So, like him, look for strategies to force cooperation.
Strong leadership, incentives or shared morals and values
underpin equilibria that work in everyone's favour.
But they are hard won
and we don't need to look far to see the terrible consequences
of our failure to cooperate.
There are many situations in life,
egotistical behaviour is not only morally problematic but it is also
strategically unwise.
I think a nice domestic example is washing dishes.
No-one loves it, OK.
It is a little bit annoying, you know.
And we all know that it is better for someone else to do it.
But if you're living in a shared house,
the problem begins when all the players decide to adopt my strategy
and then NO-ONE is washing the dishes.
The outcome is a tower of dirty plates, and it is not good.
When you are taking into account only your personal good
and all your thinking is self-centred,
you don't care at all about other players,
the result may be a total disaster.
It's so easy to disregard the small impact we might make
just by ditching stuff for someone else to deal with.
But many small acts of selfishness can have huge consequences.
It's a phenomenon known as the tragedy of the commons.
For example, the damage to the atmosphere.
The destruction of ocean ecosystems, rainforest loggings,
these issues are far more important.
And it is really hard to tackle with them,
even with rules and regulations.
Arguably, the challenge for government
is to create rules that align the interests of individuals and society
to find those win-wins.
But like the rest of us,
our leaders have their own political and economic goals to pursue,
meaning there will always be the temptation for some to put their own
short-term interests first.
So, in the real conflicts we all face,
can we ever justify being uncooperative?
Definitely, I would argue - on occasion.
Because some people really don't know what's good for them.
I'd like to suggest we take a potentially very unstable situation,
taking two small argumentative children on holiday,
to demonstrate some strategies that can ensure you win
in a domestic stand-off.
The first thing absolutely NOT to do is to make a non-credible threat.
Right, that's it. Holiday's cancelled.
I'm turning the car around, we're going home.
The kids quickly work out that you won't do this,
as it harms you just as much as them. Everybody wants a holiday.
So try a far more credible threat instead.
If you don't shut up, we're going to be spending the first day of the
holiday visiting an art gallery.
As long as they know you REALLY like art galleries
and you know they really hate them, this one is a much better strategy.
Even better, try a grand gesture called pre-commitment.
If one of you starts arguing again, one of you is going to go to bed
at six o'clock all week
and the other one can stay up as late as they like.
This one is quite a serious pre-commitment
because you are risking not being able to pack them off to bed
like normal, but you would just have to hope that the prospect
of them missing out is enough for them to be smart and stay quiet.
In order to get what you want,
any adversary has to believe you have the credibility and commitment
to go through with your threats.
But, in the end, no matter how winning your tactics,
there is one thing that is incredibly difficult to deal with.
KIDS: It's not fair!
In any kind of interaction,
our sense of what is and isn't fair is incredibly powerful.
And in some circumstances, it can actually make us deliberately lose.
To explore this apparently quite irrational way of getting what
we want, Haim and I are going to play something
called the ultimatum game, and the rules are very simple.
Two players, one is called the proposer
and the other is called the respondent.
The proposer gets a sum of money, for example £100.
Is that what you've got in there? Yes, yes, yes.
And the proposer has to decide how to split the money.
And the responder,
the responder must decide whether to accept or to reject.
If the responder rejects the split,
both players will end up with nothing.
And it is one short game. Take it or leave it offer.
OK. The fairest thing to do obviously is to say 50-50.
50-50, of course.
I could get an extra £10 by saying 60-40.
Easily, I think. However I decide...
I mean, I do genuinely get some of the money.
Yes, yes, yes, real money. A real game. Everything is real.
Now to make some offers to a series of unsuspecting volunteers.
I think I'm going to split it 70-30.
I get the 70.
Yes. Well, obviously it is really unfair, but I'm going to accept it.
You have to decide. I'm going to accept it.
OK. £30.
OK. Are you going to check it?
I'll check it, I'm a mathematician.
Thank you. Thank you.
So, unfair offer number one works in my favour.
What is your decision? OK, I'm going to go for
£80 to me and £20 to you.
Yes or no, take it or leave it offer.
Leave it. No. But hang on, you came here with nothing.
I did, but I feel like if you were like, "£50 for you,
"£50 for me," I'd be fine with that.
I would've said deal. We both came here with nothing so we both should
have left with something, and an equal amount would've been better
than an unequal amount.
Wow. Goodness. OK.
You see, it contradicts all the economic predictions, yes?
Economics says one is better than none -
20 is for sure better than none.
Economics says Sayed here should accept,
but I am denied. Next?
Hi. Hi. Hello.
I quite like money.
So £90 to me and £10 to you.
You know what? Why not, I'll take £10.
You have £10.
It is yours. Thank you very much.
Hannah, you are now such a rich person!
Thank you very much. Are you happy with your decision?
It's pretty unfair, but... Pretty unfair.
I am a realist and I like £10 at least in my pocket,
so I am at least £10 richer, so... £10 is better than none.
Yes. A man after my own logical heart.
After three offers, I've bagged £160 of a possible 240.
So why did I not clean up?
The 20-80 split,
not taking the £20 seems bonkers to me.
The 20, it is approximately the world average of the split
that people refuse to take.
People seem to show an unwillingness to accept unfairness and they are
prepared to pay. Even at 80-20?
They are basically being irrational, right?
People usually behave rationally from their point of view,
so it is really hard to define what is rational, you know,
what is not. For example, Sayed,
yes, he paid £20, but to teach you a lesson,
£20, it seems to me a low price, you see? Nothing, almost.
Well, it was an expensive lesson for me.
For you, but not for him.
It might seem like an irrational way to get what we want, but what we're
looking at here is the long game.
The act of sacrificing a small win to punish someone means
they may well be less selfish with us and others in the future.
It's a perfectly rational way to secure greater collective success.
But most creatures on earth AREN'T rational
so why do we see cooperative,
even altruistic behaviour in the animal kingdom,
that seems to benefit others more than the individual?
Surely this contradicts the theory of evolution,
based as it is on the struggle for life
and the survival of the fittest?
When I learned about evolution at school,
I was under the impression that it was all about competition.
That every animal was necessarily out for itself
and the fitter you are,
the more likely you are to win fights for mates,
for food and for territory.
If you can ace THOSE conflicts, the more likely you are to pass on your
genes and win at the game of life.
It has been said that nothing in biology makes sense
except in the light of evolution,
and evolution has been based on conflict.
It is a struggle for existence.
In animal behaviour, there exists many examples
where animals fight between
the species, but where they fight, according almost to rules,
where they seem to restrain themselves
and don't escalate the conflict too much.
You could try to explain individuals avoiding violence as being for the
benefit of the group, but that's not quite how evolution works.
If there is a single individual ready to escalate the conflict,
and all others are going to run away,
when they see that things become serious,
then this individual will win everything,
will have many offsprings.
The offspring will win his trait of escalating a conflict
and this trait will become more and more frequent.
In this scenario, aggressive behaviour will always win out.
So there has to be an alternative explanation.
It only began to emerge in the early 1970s, when British biologist John
Maynard Smith was given a manuscript to review, written by an unknown
American called George Price.
Now, Price wasn't a mathematician or a biologist or a game theorist,
but he had read von Neumann
and he had written about Cold War games and the uses
of deterrence. His paper, titled Antlers, Intraspecific Combat,
And Altruism, suggested that things like giant deer antlers weren't
they were clever strategic accessories
that would help you limit conflict
and avoid the destructive effects of fighting.
It's just like nuclear missiles,
antlers are the kind of weapon that you could
parade in front of your enemy,
hopefully without ever having to actually use them.
Maynard Smith was struck by this
and, together with Price, created a simple
game to explore how such limited war strategies could evolve.
And he called it the Hawk-Dove Game.
Picture an imaginary species of bird that only has two inherited
behavioural strategies.
One is aggressive, or hawkish,
and the other more cooperative, or dovish.
If two hawks clash over something like food,
their strategy means total war.
They will fight, risking injury and no guarantee of food either.
Now, if a hawk and a dove meet,
the dove initially stands up for itself, but then scarpers.
Finally, if doves meet, they'll share.
In each interaction, both birds receive a score.
And if these are added up over time, it reveals which behaviours are most
likely to benefit individuals, and so survive down the generations.
On the face of it,
if everyone was displaying dovelike behaviour,
it looks like it could work,
as well as being genuinely nice for everyone.
But, unfortunately,
that's unstable because just one meanie hawk could come along and
immediately have the upper hand on everybody.
And if that hawkish behaviour really took off,
that too would be unstable,
because of the constant risk and cost of violence.
Now, what the maths shows is that a stable population is possible,
but only if you have one-third hawks and two-thirds doves.
Now, those exact numbers might change slightly
if you tweak the payoff,
but the key point here is that this was mathematical proof that there
was a strategic advantage to avoiding conflict.
Evolution, it turned out,
is not simply a winner-takes-all kind of game.
And so, scientists took to this new evolutionary form of game theory.
The reason? To find the ultimate long-term winning strategy
for us all.
It was an ingenious American political scientist
called Robert Axelrod
who, around 1980, took the next big step.
Axelrod invited economists, mathematicians,
political scientists,
psychologists and sociologists,
all of whom had written theoretical papers on co-operation and the
prisoner's dilemma, to compete in a computer tournament.
The challenge was to design a computer program
that would play the best combination
of attacking and more cooperative behaviour.
It was a bold move, considering the golden age of popular computer games
and coding was still in its infancy.
Researchers from around the world
mailed in their computer programs via post.
It was all to see which of their electronic beasts,
some of which were a lot more cooperative than others,
would emerge the winner.
14 programs were to play 200 rounds of the prisoner's dilemma
against themselves and one another.
As you would expect, cooperating with your opponent scores well.
But you could get a much higher payoff
by attacking a co-operator all of the time.
But attack an attacker, and your score will suffer.
BEEPING
And so, the tournament ran,
with some players doing better than others.
One strategy, for example, was nicknamed "the grudger".
It would co-operate until it was attacked,
at which point it would get the hump
and never co-operate again for the rest of the game.
After competing against everyone else,
the grudger crawled in in seventh place.
The surprise winner, with 504 points,
was written in just four lines of code,
and was easily the simplest program that had been submitted.
It was called tit-for-tat.
It would start off by cooperating
and then would just copy whatever the opponent did
in the previous round - so if the opponent either attacked or
cooperated, tit-for-tat would respond in kind.
Tit-for-tat's behaviour over the course of the competition
is basically, "You scratch my back, I'll scratch yours".
So was this the winning strategy everyone was looking for?
Well, no.
Because, unlike in real life, these computer programs,
including tit-for-tat, could play endlessly,
without ever making mistakes.
Imagine if I decided to use tit-for-tat as my new strategy
for winning at life. So I would co-operate by default - lovely -
and only retaliate if someone was really mean to me,
just to teach them a lesson.
But what if, idiotically,
I sort of accidentally was a bit mean to someone?
Say I just bumped into them.
Oh, sorry.
If they are also playing tit-for-tat,
they'll have to shove me back - formerly known as defecting.
And then I'd have to do the same, as would he.
We'll defect for ever.
Hmm. Not great, is it?
But some scientists weren't quite ready to give up on tit-for-tat
just yet. Karl Sigmund and his student Martin Nowak
started experimenting
with a new kind of evolutionary tournament, but this time,
as in the natural world,
competing strategies could evolve and make mistakes.
Using computer simulations, they watched strategies like tit-for-tat emerge
and compete over thousands of generations.
After the first 50 or 100 rounds,
it seemed as if everyone was a defector.
Everyone? Not quite.
There was one little minority playing something like tit-for-tat,
and this little minority very slowly increased
and became more and more frequent,
and was actually defeating the defectors.
The key was to let natural selection find the winning strategy.
If you wait still longer, then you will see that another,
more generous form of tit-for-tat is going to evolve and to take over.
And here it comes, generous tit-for-tat.
This strategy will always co-operate first.
But when facing defection...
..around one out of every three times, it will just ignore it
and co-operate, regardless.
Of all the possible strategies, and despite its forgiving ways,
generous tit-for-tat consistently came out on top.
For me it is still...
..one of the fondest remembrances of my scientific life.
There was no master program behind it,
no design for forgiveness, so to speak.
It came out all by itself.
A purely mathematical simulation had revealed that winning strategies,
in the long run, tend to be generous, hopeful and forgiving.
Now, this basic moral code just emerged.
Perhaps you could even take this as proof of the existence and advantage
of goodness.
So why, then, don't we live
in a wonderful, generous and forgiving utopia?
The simulations pointed to an answer.
Over generations of stability,
the main strategy becomes total cooperation.
But this is fragile because hawkish defectors can rapidly take over...
..and do their worst.
And yet slowly, thanks to strategies like tit-for-tat,
cooperation emerges again and again.
Despite its fragility, there is hope.
Because ultimately cooperation can't be suppressed.
Thanks to things like altruism, kindness and reciprocity,
it re-emerges time after time.
And these aren't just codes that are divined by priests and philosophers.
They have pure mathematics and evolution itself behind them.
So where does that leave you and me?
Well, I wanted to try something out.
Starting tonight.
Now, this could work for any kind of relationship, but let's imagine
that it is your partner. What I want you to do is to co-operate,
but copy their previous move, so if they come home one day
with a big bunch of flowers,
you should get to work on your own romantic gesture.
But if they come home one night much drunker and later
than they promised, you get to do something equivalent.
But every now and then, you should forgive one of their slip-ups
because nobody's perfect, and
you are going to mess up, too, at some point.
So, there you have it.
Strategies for a happier life and a better world, all thanks to maths.
I call that a win.
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