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These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:00:03,440 --> 00:00:05,760 They say life is a competition. 2 00:00:08,320 --> 00:00:10,400 The fight to be first. 3 00:00:12,600 --> 00:00:15,120 The survival of the fittest. 4 00:00:16,960 --> 00:00:17,960 Winning. 5 00:00:19,800 --> 00:00:23,200 Nobody wants to be a loser. 6 00:00:23,200 --> 00:00:27,280 Now, winning basically means getting more of what you want in life, 7 00:00:27,280 --> 00:00:29,960 and, as a mathematician, I can help with that. 8 00:00:29,960 --> 00:00:33,240 Because there is a real science to success, 9 00:00:33,240 --> 00:00:37,640 based on ideas from some of the last century's most beautiful minds. 10 00:00:37,640 --> 00:00:42,320 # Everyone's a winner, baby That's the truth. # 11 00:00:42,320 --> 00:00:47,080 From how you can analyse and take advantage of your opponents... 12 00:00:47,080 --> 00:00:50,400 You need to find a way to be as unpredictable as possible. 13 00:00:51,720 --> 00:00:55,160 ..to deciding whether to cheat or play fair... 14 00:00:55,160 --> 00:00:57,600 You can put a good apple in a barrel of bad apples, 15 00:00:57,600 --> 00:00:59,600 it's always going to turn bad. 16 00:00:59,600 --> 00:01:03,160 ..being more strategic will help you get ahead. 17 00:01:04,240 --> 00:01:07,280 But if all of this sounds a bit selfish, 18 00:01:07,280 --> 00:01:12,000 I'll also be showing you how cooperation can trump conflict, 19 00:01:12,000 --> 00:01:14,920 and how everyone can be a winner. 20 00:01:14,920 --> 00:01:17,640 Hello, Sheriff. Hi, Hannah. How are you? 21 00:01:17,640 --> 00:01:20,960 You are walking away with no money because you are an idiot. No. You're an idiot. 22 00:01:22,920 --> 00:01:27,080 Whether it is happier relationships you are after, a bargain, 23 00:01:27,080 --> 00:01:29,040 or a better world, 24 00:01:29,040 --> 00:01:32,240 a look at the science of winning can help 25 00:01:32,240 --> 00:01:34,880 and reveal some surprising truths. 26 00:01:36,280 --> 00:01:39,000 So join me. You'll lose out if you don't. 27 00:01:52,120 --> 00:01:57,160 To get the best result in any situation, maths can help. 28 00:01:57,240 --> 00:01:59,640 Let's take just one example. 29 00:01:59,640 --> 00:02:02,800 Something as simple as ordering dinner. 30 00:02:02,800 --> 00:02:06,360 Should you choose burger or steak? 31 00:02:09,080 --> 00:02:11,880 Now, you absolutely cannot afford it, 32 00:02:11,880 --> 00:02:15,000 but that steak does look incredibly tempting. 33 00:02:15,000 --> 00:02:17,080 And it's almost your birthday, 34 00:02:17,080 --> 00:02:21,720 surely you deserve a £25 splurge every now and then? 35 00:02:21,720 --> 00:02:26,760 First of all, ask yourself, what do you really want - 36 00:02:26,880 --> 00:02:29,320 steak or savings? 37 00:02:30,360 --> 00:02:34,360 Well, you need to decide what winning means for you. 38 00:02:34,360 --> 00:02:37,600 And that might change when your mates arrive. 39 00:02:39,760 --> 00:02:43,440 Let's imagine that everybody has exactly the same choice. 40 00:02:43,440 --> 00:02:45,600 Burger or steak. 41 00:02:45,600 --> 00:02:49,520 But you know that your friends are notoriously frugal, so 42 00:02:49,520 --> 00:02:53,320 if they all go for the burger and you split the bill evenly, 43 00:02:53,320 --> 00:02:57,880 you could end up getting that tasty steak for a lot less. 44 00:02:58,800 --> 00:03:01,240 The £25 hit from your steak 45 00:03:01,240 --> 00:03:05,080 combined with the £5 for their burgers means 46 00:03:05,080 --> 00:03:07,320 everyone pays £10 each, 47 00:03:07,320 --> 00:03:10,680 which frankly, for you, is an amazing bargain. 48 00:03:12,040 --> 00:03:16,280 But hold on. The waiter is coming over and is heading towards 49 00:03:16,280 --> 00:03:18,960 your friend, who you know loves a rib eye. 50 00:03:18,960 --> 00:03:21,520 Is she thinking what you're thinking? 51 00:03:21,520 --> 00:03:23,800 And what about the others? 52 00:03:23,800 --> 00:03:28,840 And so begins a frankly very British game of silent guessing and 53 00:03:29,360 --> 00:03:32,480 calculating. If she goes for the steak as well as you, 54 00:03:32,480 --> 00:03:35,600 then you're shelling out £15 each, 55 00:03:35,600 --> 00:03:40,040 but if he goes for the steak too, then that's £20 a head, 56 00:03:40,040 --> 00:03:43,880 which is far more than you can possibly afford. 57 00:03:43,880 --> 00:03:46,520 But is it really fair that your best friend, 58 00:03:46,520 --> 00:03:49,280 who always does the generous thing, 59 00:03:49,280 --> 00:03:53,280 ends up spending £20 for a measly burger? 60 00:03:54,960 --> 00:03:57,600 So what is the real win here? 61 00:03:57,600 --> 00:03:59,840 Well, it's complicated. 62 00:03:59,840 --> 00:04:02,600 Do you prefer saving money, 63 00:04:02,600 --> 00:04:07,280 a delicious dinner, or being fair to your friend? 64 00:04:07,280 --> 00:04:10,680 Having been fleeced, will she ever want to meet up again? 65 00:04:12,080 --> 00:04:16,040 The key thing is that what you want can be scored, 66 00:04:16,040 --> 00:04:20,680 and mathematicians like me give it a fancy name - your expected utility. 67 00:04:20,680 --> 00:04:23,600 We express your preferences 68 00:04:23,600 --> 00:04:26,800 as values that capture just how much 69 00:04:26,800 --> 00:04:29,840 you instinctively want something, 70 00:04:29,840 --> 00:04:34,840 against the price, and then factor in other stuff, like risk. 71 00:04:35,120 --> 00:04:37,560 In this case, that your dear friend 72 00:04:37,560 --> 00:04:40,520 might ditch you for busting her budget. 73 00:04:42,600 --> 00:04:45,400 Looks like steak pipped friendship this time. 74 00:04:47,600 --> 00:04:49,200 So there you go. 75 00:04:49,200 --> 00:04:51,920 If you can figure out everyone's preferences 76 00:04:51,920 --> 00:04:53,720 and you know what YOU want, 77 00:04:53,720 --> 00:04:58,040 then the key question becomes, at the lowest cost to yourself, 78 00:04:58,040 --> 00:05:01,960 without having any control over other people's actions, 79 00:05:01,960 --> 00:05:04,480 how do you get what YOU want? 80 00:05:07,760 --> 00:05:10,160 Well, thankfully, mathematics can 81 00:05:10,160 --> 00:05:12,920 help you find a winning strategy, too. 82 00:05:12,920 --> 00:05:15,920 Whatever decisions we make, 83 00:05:15,920 --> 00:05:18,600 having a good strategy means the difference 84 00:05:18,600 --> 00:05:21,480 between knowing what you want and getting it. 85 00:05:23,080 --> 00:05:27,320 It was the mid-20th-century maths genius John von Neumann 86 00:05:27,320 --> 00:05:29,240 who, more than anyone else, 87 00:05:29,240 --> 00:05:32,360 turned our winning instincts into a science. 88 00:05:35,040 --> 00:05:39,400 Von Neumann established a completely new field of study, 89 00:05:39,400 --> 00:05:43,520 called Game Theory, which was concerned with the mathematics 90 00:05:43,520 --> 00:05:46,440 of both cooperation and of conflict. 91 00:05:46,440 --> 00:05:50,520 How to avoid losing and, more importantly, how to win. 92 00:05:50,520 --> 00:05:53,120 His efforts culminated in this here. 93 00:05:53,120 --> 00:05:57,720 A Theory Of Games And Economic Behaviour, 641 pages, 94 00:05:57,720 --> 00:06:00,400 packed to the brim with formulas, 95 00:06:00,400 --> 00:06:04,560 which was once described as one of the most-influential 96 00:06:04,560 --> 00:06:07,960 and least-read books of the last century. 97 00:06:09,600 --> 00:06:14,600 Written with the economist Oskar Morgenstern and published in 1944, 98 00:06:15,040 --> 00:06:17,800 it proved how we can all get ahead 99 00:06:17,800 --> 00:06:21,280 when one party's loss is the other's gain. 100 00:06:23,880 --> 00:06:26,800 It's not for the mathematically faint-hearted, 101 00:06:26,800 --> 00:06:30,320 but at the core of the book is a strategic principle 102 00:06:30,320 --> 00:06:33,080 that is surprisingly intuitive. 103 00:06:33,080 --> 00:06:36,760 And easily explained with some cold, hard cash. 104 00:06:38,200 --> 00:06:40,000 So, you and me are here. 105 00:06:40,000 --> 00:06:42,320 I'm going to have a go on those slot machines 106 00:06:42,320 --> 00:06:44,800 and I have got a nice bag of 2p coins 107 00:06:44,800 --> 00:06:47,200 that you and I are going to share. 108 00:06:47,200 --> 00:06:51,320 Now, the polite way to do this is just to let you help yourself. 109 00:06:51,320 --> 00:06:54,480 After all, I trust you to play fair. 110 00:06:55,680 --> 00:06:58,280 But actually, I really shouldn't. 111 00:06:58,280 --> 00:07:01,120 Von Neumann assumes, rightly so, 112 00:07:01,120 --> 00:07:04,360 that we both want as many coins as we can get. 113 00:07:04,360 --> 00:07:07,040 So, what SHOULD I do? 114 00:07:07,040 --> 00:07:12,080 Well, I should split this into two piles, as evenly as possible, 115 00:07:12,640 --> 00:07:15,680 and then let you decide which half you want. 116 00:07:15,680 --> 00:07:19,640 Given that you're watching me like a hawk, the only way I can guarantee 117 00:07:19,640 --> 00:07:23,440 I don't lose out to you is by me splitting and you choosing. 118 00:07:28,400 --> 00:07:33,080 I don't get as many 2ps as I might like, but I win by minimising the 119 00:07:33,080 --> 00:07:37,360 maximum amount of fun at the fair that I can lose to you. 120 00:07:39,440 --> 00:07:41,720 This is known 121 00:07:41,720 --> 00:07:45,560 as the min-max theory, and as strategies go, 122 00:07:45,560 --> 00:07:47,720 you can apply it to pretty much anything. 123 00:07:47,720 --> 00:07:50,720 So, if you have got two kids that are fighting over toys, 124 00:07:50,720 --> 00:07:52,920 just get one of them to make two piles 125 00:07:52,920 --> 00:07:56,600 and the other one to pick which pile they prefer, 126 00:07:56,600 --> 00:08:01,240 or if you've got boring household chores, you write two lists, 127 00:08:01,240 --> 00:08:03,520 and your partner chooses which list. 128 00:08:06,960 --> 00:08:08,520 It sounds pretty simple, 129 00:08:08,520 --> 00:08:13,120 but you have to remember that your split will take into account 130 00:08:13,120 --> 00:08:16,560 your preferences, so you get to decide if you think 131 00:08:16,560 --> 00:08:19,640 the utility of a huge pile of ironing and doing 132 00:08:19,640 --> 00:08:22,600 all of the hoovering is the equivalent of 133 00:08:22,600 --> 00:08:26,840 the utility of unblocking the loo, and sorting out all of the bins. 134 00:08:26,840 --> 00:08:31,480 Now, strangely, Von Neumann didn't get into that particular conundrum 135 00:08:31,480 --> 00:08:35,480 in his book, but his proof that you can always minimise the losses 136 00:08:35,480 --> 00:08:39,000 and maximise the gains, while taking into account 137 00:08:39,000 --> 00:08:43,880 the preferences of two warring parties was hugely influential. 138 00:08:46,120 --> 00:08:48,760 Such an analytical approach to winning 139 00:08:48,760 --> 00:08:51,000 gripped people's imagination. 140 00:08:52,640 --> 00:08:55,920 And crucially, Von Neumann took inspiration 141 00:08:55,920 --> 00:08:58,520 from one rather unpredictable game. 142 00:09:00,880 --> 00:09:04,440 Von Neumann was an exceptional mathematician. 143 00:09:04,440 --> 00:09:07,000 And perhaps because of its strategic complexity, 144 00:09:07,000 --> 00:09:10,320 he was particularly interested in poker. 145 00:09:10,320 --> 00:09:13,840 He said that real life is about bluffing, 146 00:09:13,840 --> 00:09:16,760 about little tactics of deception, 147 00:09:16,760 --> 00:09:21,760 about asking yourself, what does the other man think I mean to do? 148 00:09:22,160 --> 00:09:26,200 "And that is what games are about in my theory." 149 00:09:29,280 --> 00:09:32,040 When it comes to winning big at poker, 150 00:09:32,040 --> 00:09:34,600 there's one woman you need to know. 151 00:09:34,600 --> 00:09:39,600 Wow! This is bold. Four bet of 4,100. 152 00:09:40,200 --> 00:09:43,960 Sick move. Liv Boeree is the European top-ranking 153 00:09:43,960 --> 00:09:45,680 female poker player. 154 00:09:45,680 --> 00:09:47,720 Really strong play by Liv Boeree, 155 00:09:47,720 --> 00:09:50,000 she's clearly been eating her vitamins. 156 00:09:50,000 --> 00:09:52,320 Vitamin B - for bluff. 157 00:10:06,840 --> 00:10:10,960 I'm meeting Liv to find out how poker strategy might help us 158 00:10:10,960 --> 00:10:13,920 get more of what we want in life. 159 00:10:15,320 --> 00:10:19,680 These days, the very best players are very analytically minded folks 160 00:10:19,680 --> 00:10:22,240 who are comfortable working with maths, 161 00:10:22,240 --> 00:10:25,040 to sort of really get a solid understanding 162 00:10:25,040 --> 00:10:28,320 of the theory behind the game. And then the psychology is, 163 00:10:28,320 --> 00:10:30,560 I like to think of it as the cherry on top. 164 00:10:30,560 --> 00:10:32,480 OK, let's talk about the basics, then. 165 00:10:32,480 --> 00:10:34,960 What calculations are you making? 166 00:10:36,560 --> 00:10:39,480 Um, if I'm going to bet chips, if it's 30% of the time 167 00:10:39,480 --> 00:10:42,720 I'm going to be the best hand, and 70% of the time I'm going to be 168 00:10:42,720 --> 00:10:44,600 the worst, then I can multiply those 169 00:10:44,600 --> 00:10:48,840 numbers against the chips that are involved, and that'll be my expected 170 00:10:48,840 --> 00:10:50,840 value from a situation. 171 00:10:50,840 --> 00:10:54,480 And that applies in many real-life situations, too. 172 00:10:54,480 --> 00:10:57,000 Say I am running late for a flight. 173 00:10:57,000 --> 00:10:58,480 I have two options. I can either... 174 00:10:59,600 --> 00:11:02,440 ..go to the airport and try to make my flight but run the risk 175 00:11:02,440 --> 00:11:04,880 of then missing it and losing the value of the flight, 176 00:11:04,880 --> 00:11:06,520 and having to buy a new one, 177 00:11:06,520 --> 00:11:09,360 or I can stay home and do the sort of safer bet, 178 00:11:09,360 --> 00:11:11,400 and call and pay the change fee. 179 00:11:11,400 --> 00:11:14,480 Thinking rationally and quantifying things is the very first step to 180 00:11:14,480 --> 00:11:16,320 thinking strategically. Exactly. Yes. 181 00:11:16,320 --> 00:11:19,360 It's very hard to build strategies 182 00:11:19,360 --> 00:11:23,800 if you don't have a numerical idea of the value of the outcomes 183 00:11:23,800 --> 00:11:25,760 of different strategies. 184 00:11:30,280 --> 00:11:33,560 By evaluating both the chances of something happening 185 00:11:33,560 --> 00:11:35,760 and the outcome when it does, 186 00:11:35,760 --> 00:11:38,840 you have a better view of your best options. 187 00:11:41,200 --> 00:11:45,880 But at this level, everyone is just as calculating. 188 00:11:45,880 --> 00:11:49,720 To beat the optimal strategy, you have to find an edge. 189 00:11:53,040 --> 00:11:56,360 There something that's called game theory optimal, where, 190 00:11:56,360 --> 00:12:00,560 if you're playing this style, then it means that you are unexploitable, 191 00:12:00,560 --> 00:12:05,360 basically. The best case that an opponent can do to counter it 192 00:12:05,360 --> 00:12:08,040 is to also play game theory optimal, 193 00:12:08,040 --> 00:12:12,320 therefore you just sort of reach the same very high standard of play, 194 00:12:12,320 --> 00:12:16,160 and you're trying to not deviate from it at all. 195 00:12:16,160 --> 00:12:18,960 And that's where sort of the more, like, creativity 196 00:12:18,960 --> 00:12:21,880 and, I guess, the artistic side of the game comes in, 197 00:12:21,880 --> 00:12:25,120 where you can do these deviations from the optimal play 198 00:12:25,120 --> 00:12:27,160 to exploit your opponent's weaknesses. 199 00:12:27,160 --> 00:12:29,000 But they could be doing that to you as well. 200 00:12:29,000 --> 00:12:34,040 Exactly. So you need to find a way to be as unpredictable as possible. 201 00:12:35,560 --> 00:12:39,080 Von Neumann's maths proves that poker players must bluff, 202 00:12:39,080 --> 00:12:40,760 unpredictably, 203 00:12:40,760 --> 00:12:44,440 to avoid exploitation by a savvy opponent. 204 00:12:44,440 --> 00:12:49,400 It is an essential strategy and it can be applied elsewhere. 205 00:12:49,560 --> 00:12:52,360 You know, if you're in a business negotiation, 206 00:12:52,360 --> 00:12:54,320 what is the minimum amount you will take? 207 00:12:54,320 --> 00:12:58,000 There's a great opportunity to bluff and give a high number because 208 00:12:58,000 --> 00:13:00,040 you're giving yourself the option 209 00:13:00,040 --> 00:13:02,040 for them to pay you that high number. 210 00:13:02,040 --> 00:13:05,080 It might seem obvious, but bluffing like this 211 00:13:05,080 --> 00:13:08,200 is exactly what gives you the edge over others. 212 00:13:08,200 --> 00:13:11,360 Particularly if their loss is your gain. 213 00:13:12,920 --> 00:13:15,920 Anything that is a competition, to make yourself unexploitable 214 00:13:15,920 --> 00:13:18,040 will just put you at a huge advantage. 215 00:13:20,280 --> 00:13:22,600 So quantify everything, folks. 216 00:13:22,600 --> 00:13:26,280 And don't make yourself too easy to read. 217 00:13:26,280 --> 00:13:29,920 In win-lose games your carefully calculated strategies 218 00:13:29,920 --> 00:13:34,880 can only get you what you want if your opponents are in the dark. 219 00:13:43,000 --> 00:13:47,480 But what if you're involved in a conflict where everyone could lose? 220 00:13:51,200 --> 00:13:53,880 During the second half of the 20th century, 221 00:13:53,880 --> 00:13:57,400 the biggest problem that game theorists has had to contend with 222 00:13:57,400 --> 00:14:00,160 was the Cold War. The US and the Soviet Union 223 00:14:00,160 --> 00:14:03,640 were facing off against each other, and just as in poker, 224 00:14:03,640 --> 00:14:08,680 every strategy, every move and countermove had to be analysed. 225 00:14:09,400 --> 00:14:13,880 Except, this time, the stakes could not have been higher. 226 00:14:17,240 --> 00:14:21,640 As an ally to the US, Britain had to prepare for the worst. 227 00:14:23,640 --> 00:14:28,640 In 1961, a top-secret facility was set up here in rural Worcestershire, 228 00:14:29,400 --> 00:14:32,080 Regional Seat of Government 9. 229 00:14:33,640 --> 00:14:35,360 It is one of a network of bunkers 230 00:14:35,360 --> 00:14:37,560 from which the British Government would 231 00:14:37,560 --> 00:14:40,760 have operated in the event of a nuclear war. 232 00:14:45,880 --> 00:14:48,560 The moment that the Second World War 233 00:14:48,560 --> 00:14:52,600 ended with such a devastating show of nuclear force, 234 00:14:52,600 --> 00:14:56,160 the talk in the West began to focus on trying to prevent 235 00:14:56,160 --> 00:15:00,280 a military face-off that would mean that nuclear bunkers like this one 236 00:15:00,280 --> 00:15:02,280 would become a necessity. 237 00:15:02,280 --> 00:15:06,920 Now, the strategy that was on the table at the time was referred to, 238 00:15:06,920 --> 00:15:10,960 somewhat euphemistically, as preventative war. 239 00:15:10,960 --> 00:15:15,240 The idea being that the Americans would launch an unprovoked attack 240 00:15:15,240 --> 00:15:20,320 on the Soviet Union before they had the chance to acquire the bomb. 241 00:15:24,880 --> 00:15:27,720 But it would at least avoid a slow, 242 00:15:27,720 --> 00:15:31,520 expensive and far more dangerous cold one. 243 00:15:34,040 --> 00:15:38,800 Preventative war is an argument still used today over North Korea 244 00:15:38,800 --> 00:15:43,040 and at the time, its supporters included Winston Churchill 245 00:15:43,040 --> 00:15:44,920 and von Neumann himself. 246 00:15:48,120 --> 00:15:52,760 In 1950, von Neumann remarked, "With the Russians, 247 00:15:52,760 --> 00:15:56,480 "it's not a question of whether, but of when. 248 00:15:56,480 --> 00:16:00,480 "If you say, 'Why not bomb them tomorrow?' I say, 'Why not today?' 249 00:16:00,480 --> 00:16:03,240 "And if you say, 'Today at five o'clock,' 250 00:16:03,240 --> 00:16:05,480 "I say, 'Why not one o'clock?'" 251 00:16:05,480 --> 00:16:08,560 You can see where this kind of reasoning ends, 252 00:16:08,560 --> 00:16:10,640 and it is perfectly rational. 253 00:16:10,640 --> 00:16:14,640 If someone has to win, better that it be us. 254 00:16:18,040 --> 00:16:23,040 Despite the impeccable logic, America didn't attack Russia. 255 00:16:23,600 --> 00:16:26,640 And then it was too late because Russia got the bomb, too. 256 00:16:27,920 --> 00:16:32,920 By 1953, there was no outcome in which only one side could win. 257 00:16:35,360 --> 00:16:37,960 This demanded a new strategy. 258 00:16:37,960 --> 00:16:40,120 Something which became known as 259 00:16:40,120 --> 00:16:44,680 mutually assured destruction, or MAD for short. Basically, 260 00:16:44,680 --> 00:16:49,360 the threat of you using massively destructive weapons on your enemy 261 00:16:49,360 --> 00:16:53,440 prevents your enemy from using those same weapons on you. 262 00:16:53,440 --> 00:16:55,280 Once everybody is armed, 263 00:16:55,280 --> 00:17:00,320 nobody has an incentive to either initiate a conflict or to disarm. 264 00:17:01,720 --> 00:17:06,600 And so, nuclear war was avoided, but places like this 265 00:17:06,600 --> 00:17:11,520 and a hugely expensive, vast global nuclear arsenal, was the result. 266 00:17:16,880 --> 00:17:19,120 Compared to von Neumann's games, 267 00:17:19,120 --> 00:17:22,120 in which one person's loss is the other's gain, 268 00:17:22,120 --> 00:17:25,080 mutually assured destruction, strangely, 269 00:17:25,080 --> 00:17:28,480 is something we come across far more in real life. 270 00:17:29,960 --> 00:17:33,600 Because most conflicts, whether at work, with friends or family 271 00:17:33,600 --> 00:17:37,320 have the potential to end up in a stalemate. 272 00:17:40,840 --> 00:17:45,880 So often we choose strategies that mean no-one wins. 273 00:17:51,920 --> 00:17:53,280 To explain why, 274 00:17:53,280 --> 00:17:57,000 I'd like to begin with a rather unusual detective story. 275 00:18:00,480 --> 00:18:05,200 I'm looking at the Instagram page of the rapper Ludacris. 276 00:18:05,200 --> 00:18:10,200 In 2015, he shared this picture with his millions of followers. 277 00:18:10,200 --> 00:18:13,200 It had originally been posted on the Facebook page of the police 278 00:18:13,200 --> 00:18:16,920 department in Franklin County, Kentucky. 279 00:18:16,920 --> 00:18:19,600 And it reads... "Attention, drug dealers. 280 00:18:20,800 --> 00:18:25,840 "We offer a free service to help you eliminate your drug competition." 281 00:18:26,920 --> 00:18:30,360 And then under a quite large marijuana leaf, 282 00:18:30,360 --> 00:18:33,360 there are a series of sections where dealers 283 00:18:33,360 --> 00:18:35,800 can identify their competitors. 284 00:18:35,800 --> 00:18:40,320 You can fill out who your competition is, where they live, 285 00:18:40,320 --> 00:18:43,680 their phone numbers, even their hours of operation. 286 00:18:47,080 --> 00:18:49,880 It might seem like a gimmick, but the fact is, 287 00:18:49,880 --> 00:18:53,120 Franklin County PD were onto something. 288 00:18:54,320 --> 00:18:56,440 I think I need to find out a bit more about this, 289 00:18:56,440 --> 00:18:57,920 so I'm going to call the sheriff. 290 00:18:57,920 --> 00:18:59,960 RINGING TONE 291 00:18:59,960 --> 00:19:01,680 Hello, Sheriff. 292 00:19:01,680 --> 00:19:04,280 Hi, Hannah. How are you? I'm good, thank you. 293 00:19:04,280 --> 00:19:09,080 Why would a dealer call in and tip off one of their competitors? 294 00:19:10,320 --> 00:19:12,160 Obviously, if they eliminate it, 295 00:19:12,160 --> 00:19:14,560 the more they get, the more business they do, 296 00:19:14,560 --> 00:19:17,560 the more money, the potential earning that they have, 297 00:19:17,560 --> 00:19:20,160 that they will make. And it helps you get rid of your competition, 298 00:19:20,160 --> 00:19:21,600 you're the only game in town. 299 00:19:21,600 --> 00:19:23,880 Especially by having law enforcement do it. 300 00:19:23,880 --> 00:19:26,280 Does this really work for you, then, as a tactic, 301 00:19:26,280 --> 00:19:29,280 getting the criminals to do the dirty on each other? 302 00:19:29,280 --> 00:19:32,280 Yes. It's something that was very simple to do 303 00:19:32,280 --> 00:19:35,600 and, at the end of the day, if we have got drug dealers 304 00:19:35,600 --> 00:19:38,000 turning in drug dealers, that is a win. 305 00:19:38,000 --> 00:19:40,640 Police 1, drug dealers 0. 306 00:19:40,640 --> 00:19:43,480 Wow. This was obviously a pretty good score 307 00:19:43,480 --> 00:19:47,360 for Sheriff Melton because what he did was force 308 00:19:47,360 --> 00:19:51,840 the local drug dealers into the most famous conundrum in 309 00:19:51,840 --> 00:19:54,040 the history of winning. 310 00:19:54,040 --> 00:19:57,680 It is called, appropriately enough, the prisoner's dilemma, 311 00:19:57,680 --> 00:20:01,240 and it demonstrates very clearly the dangers 312 00:20:01,240 --> 00:20:04,240 of falling into a lose-lose situation 313 00:20:04,240 --> 00:20:07,200 when acting in your own best interests. 314 00:20:07,200 --> 00:20:09,200 Think of it like this. 315 00:20:09,200 --> 00:20:13,280 Imagine Sheriff Melton has chucked a couple of shady looking characters 316 00:20:13,280 --> 00:20:15,480 from his local beat into jail. 317 00:20:16,880 --> 00:20:20,200 He has got evidence to charge them with possession, 318 00:20:20,200 --> 00:20:24,920 but can only get them for dealing if they rat each other out. 319 00:20:24,920 --> 00:20:28,200 So, he puts them in two separate cells 320 00:20:28,200 --> 00:20:31,520 and gives them both his clever flyer. 321 00:20:33,240 --> 00:20:36,680 Our suspects must now consider whether they should 322 00:20:36,680 --> 00:20:39,120 both keep their traps shut and only 323 00:20:39,120 --> 00:20:41,960 go away for one year each for possession... 324 00:20:43,200 --> 00:20:45,800 ..both rat the other out for dealing 325 00:20:45,800 --> 00:20:48,520 and each get a three-year sentence... 326 00:20:50,720 --> 00:20:54,000 ..or hope that they alone grass the other up, 327 00:20:54,000 --> 00:20:57,800 getting off scot-free while their competition gets 328 00:20:57,800 --> 00:21:02,360 a whopping five years - otherwise known as the sucker's payoff. 329 00:21:06,360 --> 00:21:07,720 So, what to do? 330 00:21:08,880 --> 00:21:11,240 Well, this option is the best. 331 00:21:12,800 --> 00:21:17,640 But there's a risk it could quickly turn sour if one person decides 332 00:21:17,640 --> 00:21:19,840 to basically betray the other. 333 00:21:22,400 --> 00:21:25,720 Good old Sheriff Melton knows these two are toerags, 334 00:21:25,720 --> 00:21:27,640 and they know it too. 335 00:21:27,640 --> 00:21:30,120 So, to avoid being screwed over, 336 00:21:30,120 --> 00:21:33,200 the only stable solution for them is this. 337 00:21:34,960 --> 00:21:37,640 They both must implicate the other. 338 00:21:37,640 --> 00:21:41,600 A win for Sheriff Melton, but lose-lose for them. 339 00:21:43,360 --> 00:21:47,240 This unhappy scenario is called the Nash equilibrium. 340 00:21:49,960 --> 00:21:54,200 It's a beautifully simple proof that was published in 1950 by the 341 00:21:54,200 --> 00:21:58,160 mathematician John Nash, when he was still in his early 20s. 342 00:22:00,200 --> 00:22:05,240 It won him a Nobel Prize, and it transformed the analysis of winning. 343 00:22:06,640 --> 00:22:08,840 What Nash proved was that in a situation 344 00:22:08,840 --> 00:22:11,720 with several possible outcomes, like this one, 345 00:22:11,720 --> 00:22:15,760 where people either can't or won't cooperate with each other, 346 00:22:15,760 --> 00:22:18,480 there is always a strategy 347 00:22:18,480 --> 00:22:23,160 which you and everyone else is best off opting for. 348 00:22:23,160 --> 00:22:26,000 Now, in the case of the prisoner's dilemma, 349 00:22:26,000 --> 00:22:30,360 paradoxically that strategy ends up with lose-lose. 350 00:22:30,360 --> 00:22:34,080 Everybody wants to win by ratting out their competition, 351 00:22:34,080 --> 00:22:37,840 and everyone wants to avoid the sucker's payoff. 352 00:22:37,840 --> 00:22:42,400 And as a result, everyone ends up going to jail. 353 00:22:44,400 --> 00:22:48,560 Being uncooperative can cost you more than you bargained for. 354 00:22:50,840 --> 00:22:53,360 The reason Nash's proof matters so much 355 00:22:53,360 --> 00:22:55,520 is because these kind of dilemmas 356 00:22:55,520 --> 00:23:00,520 constantly appear in real life because of the way our individual 357 00:23:00,840 --> 00:23:05,360 interests often clash with those of others and of society. 358 00:23:05,360 --> 00:23:10,360 Whether you are a drug dealer, or just out for dinner with your mates, 359 00:23:10,720 --> 00:23:13,880 no-one wants to be the sucker, right? 360 00:23:18,760 --> 00:23:23,680 I remember the day I was arrested, then I was locked up for 48 hours. 361 00:23:23,760 --> 00:23:25,640 I remember thinking... 362 00:23:25,640 --> 00:23:29,360 "Oh, THIS is what happens." 363 00:23:29,360 --> 00:23:33,280 If ever there was an example of Nash's theory in action, 364 00:23:33,280 --> 00:23:37,000 it is in the controversial world of professional cycling. 365 00:23:38,160 --> 00:23:40,360 The global hero at the time was Lance Armstrong. 366 00:23:40,360 --> 00:23:42,360 We were really good friends. 367 00:23:42,360 --> 00:23:45,760 I remember him saying, "I got caught with my hand in the cookie jar". 368 00:23:45,760 --> 00:23:47,320 I knew what Lance was doing. 369 00:23:47,320 --> 00:23:50,600 It was like... Hang on a second. 370 00:24:07,360 --> 00:24:11,080 David is one of the highest profile riders to talk candidly 371 00:24:11,080 --> 00:24:14,560 about the use of performance-enhancing drugs within cycling. 372 00:24:16,360 --> 00:24:19,480 Tell me about the first time that you realised that cycling 373 00:24:19,480 --> 00:24:21,360 perhaps wasn't squeaky-clean. 374 00:24:21,360 --> 00:24:26,400 Um, my very first pro race in February, 1997. 375 00:24:27,440 --> 00:24:30,200 My roommate was offered a cortisone pill. 376 00:24:30,200 --> 00:24:33,680 We all carried around medical bags and it was omnipresent. 377 00:24:33,680 --> 00:24:37,240 It was white noise, is what I've always described it as. 378 00:24:37,240 --> 00:24:40,160 For four years, David trained and raced clean, 379 00:24:40,160 --> 00:24:44,760 but the pressure to remain competitive took its toll. 380 00:24:44,760 --> 00:24:48,120 Eventually, despite your initial resistance, 381 00:24:48,120 --> 00:24:49,920 you did decide to give in. 382 00:24:49,920 --> 00:24:53,480 Yeah. I think that is the term - I gave in. 383 00:24:53,480 --> 00:24:58,440 I didn't decide to join them, I gave in and thought, "Well, you know, 384 00:24:58,440 --> 00:25:01,560 "I can't fight this any more". 385 00:25:01,560 --> 00:25:05,000 I was an ethical person, but over time I just went... 386 00:25:05,000 --> 00:25:06,880 It wears you down? 387 00:25:06,880 --> 00:25:10,080 Well, just...the environment you are in wears you down. 388 00:25:10,080 --> 00:25:12,800 You can put a good apple in a barrel of bad apples, 389 00:25:12,800 --> 00:25:14,720 it's always going to turn bad. 390 00:25:20,040 --> 00:25:22,360 It's a classic prisoner's dilemma. 391 00:25:24,520 --> 00:25:28,040 In professional cycling, riders compete to win. 392 00:25:29,720 --> 00:25:32,400 If doping makes winning more likely, 393 00:25:32,400 --> 00:25:35,600 then abiding by the rules risks the sucker's payoff... 394 00:25:37,720 --> 00:25:41,520 ..and so the rational thing to do is cheat. 395 00:25:41,520 --> 00:25:46,520 Because a faster field and a doping arms race has become the new norm. 396 00:25:48,520 --> 00:25:52,000 This dilemma unites all competitive sport. 397 00:25:52,000 --> 00:25:55,840 Though it is a lose-lose scenario if everyone cheats, nonetheless, 398 00:25:55,840 --> 00:25:59,840 for individuals, cheating can give you the edge, 399 00:25:59,840 --> 00:26:02,080 IF you can get away with it. 400 00:26:02,080 --> 00:26:06,040 The fundamental reason I was there was because I wanted to win. 401 00:26:06,040 --> 00:26:08,440 I was very ambitious. If the goals you want to achieve 402 00:26:08,440 --> 00:26:12,040 are being achieved by the people who are cheating, why don't I do it? 403 00:26:12,040 --> 00:26:15,240 David was the reigning world time-trial champion 404 00:26:15,240 --> 00:26:19,560 when he was caught in 2004, receiving a two-year ban. 405 00:26:19,560 --> 00:26:24,000 But after his punishment, he returned to racing clean. 406 00:26:24,000 --> 00:26:28,680 David Millar comes up, hits the line. Best time, 31:15. 407 00:26:28,680 --> 00:26:30,080 Millar is back. 408 00:26:33,040 --> 00:26:35,800 Every time I won, from then on, it was to prove a point, 409 00:26:35,800 --> 00:26:37,560 that it was possible to win clean. 410 00:26:37,560 --> 00:26:39,960 And you were appealing because you were clean? Because we were clean. 411 00:26:39,960 --> 00:26:44,160 It actually became a valuable asset to be clean and win races. 412 00:26:44,160 --> 00:26:46,560 It goes back to that whole barrel of apples, 413 00:26:46,560 --> 00:26:49,120 make sure it is a barrel of good apples with one bad apple. 414 00:26:49,120 --> 00:26:50,920 That's easier to control. 415 00:26:50,920 --> 00:26:53,280 These guys will never have to encounter it because we have 416 00:26:53,280 --> 00:26:55,480 an anti-doping culture in professional cycling now. 417 00:26:57,920 --> 00:27:02,240 David's experience illustrates the profound tension between individual 418 00:27:02,240 --> 00:27:06,280 drive to succeed and the greater good. 419 00:27:06,280 --> 00:27:09,880 Our winning instincts can be both our greatest asset 420 00:27:09,880 --> 00:27:11,720 and deeply destructive. 421 00:27:16,240 --> 00:27:19,240 This is something that is relevant to all of us. 422 00:27:20,280 --> 00:27:23,760 If you think about it, how many times have you been in a situation 423 00:27:23,760 --> 00:27:26,400 where you didn't want to upset the balance of things 424 00:27:26,400 --> 00:27:29,040 for fear that you might end up missing out? 425 00:27:29,040 --> 00:27:32,560 Maybe you have had a job where you ended up staying later 426 00:27:32,560 --> 00:27:36,480 and later at work just because everybody else was doing it, 427 00:27:36,480 --> 00:27:38,800 and you didn't want to look like you were lazy. 428 00:27:38,800 --> 00:27:43,760 Or maybe you have failed to call someone out for a racist or sexist 429 00:27:44,280 --> 00:27:46,800 comment just because you didn't want to look bad, 430 00:27:46,800 --> 00:27:48,920 you didn't want to make the fuss. 431 00:27:48,920 --> 00:27:54,000 Or maybe, you have waited and waited to tell someone that you love them, 432 00:27:54,440 --> 00:27:58,600 just because if you said it first, and it wasn't reciprocated, 433 00:27:58,600 --> 00:28:00,920 you'd end up feeling heartbroken. 434 00:28:00,920 --> 00:28:04,880 Now, all of these situations are real-life examples 435 00:28:04,880 --> 00:28:07,080 of Nash equilibrium. 436 00:28:08,240 --> 00:28:12,440 So, what can be done about these traps which are, admittedly, 437 00:28:12,440 --> 00:28:13,880 very logical? 438 00:28:13,880 --> 00:28:17,520 How can we break out of them and secure that elusive win-win? 439 00:28:22,320 --> 00:28:25,000 Well, I would like to show you one option, 440 00:28:25,000 --> 00:28:27,600 with the help of my favourite ever game show. 441 00:28:28,920 --> 00:28:32,240 So I have invited some people along to a screening 442 00:28:32,240 --> 00:28:34,000 of its dramatic climax. 443 00:28:38,760 --> 00:28:42,080 You each have a golden ball with the word "split" 444 00:28:42,080 --> 00:28:46,200 written inside. You each have a golden ball with the word "steal". 445 00:28:46,200 --> 00:28:49,840 If you both choose the split ball, 446 00:28:49,840 --> 00:28:53,600 you split today's jackpot of £100,150. 447 00:28:53,600 --> 00:28:56,560 If one of you splits and one of you steals, 448 00:28:56,560 --> 00:29:01,560 whoever chooses the steal ball will go home with today's jackpot. 449 00:29:02,120 --> 00:29:07,160 If you both choose the steal ball, you go home with nothing. 450 00:29:07,720 --> 00:29:09,680 I am going to split this. 451 00:29:09,680 --> 00:29:13,080 I am very, very happy to go home with 50,000. 452 00:29:13,080 --> 00:29:15,400 You're genuinely going to split with me? If I stole off you, 453 00:29:15,400 --> 00:29:18,240 every single person there would run over and lynch me. 454 00:29:18,240 --> 00:29:19,920 There's no way I could... 455 00:29:19,920 --> 00:29:23,600 Everyone who knew me would just be disgusted if I stole. 456 00:29:23,600 --> 00:29:26,440 Sarah, I can look you straight in the eye and tell you, 457 00:29:26,440 --> 00:29:29,480 I am going to split. Promise? I swear down to you. 458 00:29:29,480 --> 00:29:30,920 I AM going to split. 459 00:29:30,920 --> 00:29:35,720 Sarah, Steve, choose either the split or the steal ball now. 460 00:29:37,200 --> 00:29:39,240 Hold it up. 461 00:29:39,240 --> 00:29:40,600 We're going home with 50 grand each. 462 00:29:40,600 --> 00:29:42,040 I promise you that. 463 00:29:42,040 --> 00:29:43,160 Split or steal? 464 00:29:46,360 --> 00:29:48,720 SHOUTING AND GROANING 465 00:29:50,720 --> 00:29:53,240 You never know what's coming in this game. 466 00:29:54,760 --> 00:29:57,880 Trust me, that never gets any less painful to watch! 467 00:29:59,320 --> 00:30:02,360 I think we can all agree that was pretty incredible. 468 00:30:02,360 --> 00:30:05,080 I'm just really shocked that she would do such a thing. 469 00:30:05,080 --> 00:30:07,360 What would you have done in that situation, though? 470 00:30:07,360 --> 00:30:09,560 To be honest, I would actually have stolen as well. 471 00:30:09,560 --> 00:30:12,120 There you are, slight contradiction! 472 00:30:13,440 --> 00:30:16,440 She seemed to be reeling him in really well 473 00:30:16,440 --> 00:30:18,840 to say, "Are you sure you're going to split? 474 00:30:18,840 --> 00:30:21,080 "Do you promise me you are going to split?" 475 00:30:21,080 --> 00:30:23,760 As soon as she knew that, she could've equally thought, 476 00:30:23,760 --> 00:30:26,720 I'm going to split as well and we're both going to leave with some money. 477 00:30:26,720 --> 00:30:28,800 Well, if you thought that was interesting. 478 00:30:28,800 --> 00:30:31,800 I want to show you another clip which might be 479 00:30:31,800 --> 00:30:34,440 one of my favourite things of all time. 480 00:30:34,440 --> 00:30:36,960 That's the only introduction I'm going to give you. 481 00:30:39,200 --> 00:30:40,720 Nick, Ibrahim. 482 00:30:42,360 --> 00:30:44,840 Ibrahim, I want you to trust me. 483 00:30:44,840 --> 00:30:48,200 100%, I'm going to pick the steal ball. 484 00:30:48,200 --> 00:30:51,440 Sorry, you are going... I'm going to choose the steal ball. 485 00:30:51,440 --> 00:30:52,760 I want you to do split, 486 00:30:52,760 --> 00:30:55,200 and I promise you that I will split the money with you. 487 00:30:55,200 --> 00:30:56,840 After you've took the steal? 488 00:30:56,840 --> 00:31:00,240 Yes. You're going to take steal, I'm going to take split. 489 00:31:00,240 --> 00:31:02,040 Yes. So you take the money... 490 00:31:02,040 --> 00:31:04,600 And I will split it with you. After the show. Yes. 491 00:31:04,600 --> 00:31:06,360 CHUCKLING 492 00:31:06,360 --> 00:31:09,280 APPLAUSE 493 00:31:09,280 --> 00:31:11,320 Why don't we just both pick split? 494 00:31:11,320 --> 00:31:13,840 I'm not going to pick split, I'm going to steal, Ibrahim. 495 00:31:13,840 --> 00:31:15,320 Honestly, 100% I'm going to steal. 496 00:31:15,320 --> 00:31:17,840 If you do split, then I will split the money. 497 00:31:17,840 --> 00:31:21,280 I can't see myself doing that. OK, well, I'm going to steal, so we are going to leave with nothing. 498 00:31:21,280 --> 00:31:24,040 You are walking away with no money because you're an idiot. 499 00:31:24,040 --> 00:31:26,680 That's not true. You're an idiot. That's what you are. 500 00:31:26,680 --> 00:31:30,360 You're an idiot. Nick, choose split or steal. 501 00:31:30,360 --> 00:31:33,240 Ibrahim, choose split or steal. Now, please. 502 00:31:36,680 --> 00:31:38,840 Split or steal? 503 00:31:42,240 --> 00:31:44,040 Yes, congratulations! 504 00:31:44,040 --> 00:31:47,760 You have both split and each receive £6,800. 505 00:31:47,760 --> 00:31:50,160 I would have split it. Why did you put me through that?! 506 00:31:50,160 --> 00:31:52,640 Why would you do that to me?! 507 00:31:55,600 --> 00:31:59,400 Let's take a moment to recap what just happened. 508 00:31:59,400 --> 00:32:02,080 By promising he will steal upfront, 509 00:32:02,080 --> 00:32:05,240 Nick removes two possible outcomes to the game. 510 00:32:06,520 --> 00:32:11,280 This means Ibrahim can only steal and be guaranteed nothing, 511 00:32:11,280 --> 00:32:15,920 or split, handing the cash to Nick in the hope that he will share it. 512 00:32:17,000 --> 00:32:20,000 Nick knows Ibrahim wants the cash, 513 00:32:20,000 --> 00:32:23,360 so despite his ultimatum, he also splits. 514 00:32:24,960 --> 00:32:26,280 It's a win-win, 515 00:32:26,280 --> 00:32:30,120 thanks to a brilliant way of forcing cooperation. 516 00:32:34,080 --> 00:32:38,400 I am delighted that we are joined today by Nick from that video. 517 00:32:43,240 --> 00:32:46,120 Wow! Thank you. Nick, that was pretty amazing. 518 00:32:46,120 --> 00:32:48,920 How did it come about, you appearing on Golden Balls? 519 00:32:48,920 --> 00:32:51,000 So, when I initially saw it, 520 00:32:51,000 --> 00:32:53,720 I thought it was a bit horrendous as a game show 521 00:32:53,720 --> 00:32:57,600 because what happened basically is you are rewarded for shafting 522 00:32:57,600 --> 00:33:01,920 people. And I just wanted to prove that if you trust someone, actually, 523 00:33:01,920 --> 00:33:04,960 more often than not, people will come through for you. 524 00:33:04,960 --> 00:33:06,520 That was the motivation behind it. 525 00:33:06,520 --> 00:33:09,320 Was there any point when you were worried 526 00:33:09,320 --> 00:33:13,120 that he wouldn't go with you, that he wouldn't go for split? 527 00:33:13,120 --> 00:33:18,000 If he didn't split, then he'd lost everything, 528 00:33:18,000 --> 00:33:21,400 so you can either be stupid or REALLY stupid - 529 00:33:21,400 --> 00:33:23,440 and when I say really stupid, 530 00:33:23,440 --> 00:33:25,880 you'd rather have nothing than see somebody get something. 531 00:33:25,880 --> 00:33:28,320 You just had one clear strategy you just needed to stick to. 532 00:33:28,320 --> 00:33:30,240 I tried to sort of remove the dilemma. 533 00:33:30,240 --> 00:33:31,680 Forced him into a position? 534 00:33:31,680 --> 00:33:33,640 Yes. If you had won the money, 535 00:33:33,640 --> 00:33:36,240 would you have split it with him outside of the game? 536 00:33:36,240 --> 00:33:38,520 Yes. I REALLY would have done. 537 00:33:38,520 --> 00:33:40,840 It was about proving that if you trust people, 538 00:33:40,840 --> 00:33:42,760 sometimes they don't always shaft you, 539 00:33:42,760 --> 00:33:45,200 and that was the philosophy of why I wanted to do it. 540 00:33:45,200 --> 00:33:47,600 Were you expecting it to get that much attention? 541 00:33:47,600 --> 00:33:49,640 No, nobody could have foreseen that. 542 00:33:49,640 --> 00:33:53,560 Harvard University teach it in economics. 543 00:33:53,560 --> 00:33:57,360 UCL teach it... As do I! Yes! Bath University do. 544 00:33:57,360 --> 00:33:59,680 I've been asked to go to New York to talk about it. 545 00:33:59,680 --> 00:34:02,520 President Obama's economist has included me in his book, 546 00:34:02,520 --> 00:34:04,600 it's just a bit insane, really. 547 00:34:04,600 --> 00:34:07,720 Yeah, wow. You did break the prisoner's dilemma. 548 00:34:10,200 --> 00:34:13,680 It's safe to conclude that having a strategic genius 549 00:34:13,680 --> 00:34:17,560 and all-round lovely man like Nick take control 550 00:34:17,560 --> 00:34:19,600 can be a real win for all. 551 00:34:20,880 --> 00:34:25,200 So, like him, look for strategies to force cooperation. 552 00:34:28,880 --> 00:34:33,080 Strong leadership, incentives or shared morals and values 553 00:34:33,080 --> 00:34:36,960 underpin equilibria that work in everyone's favour. 554 00:34:38,640 --> 00:34:40,720 But they are hard won 555 00:34:40,720 --> 00:34:44,040 and we don't need to look far to see the terrible consequences 556 00:34:44,040 --> 00:34:46,520 of our failure to cooperate. 557 00:34:48,480 --> 00:34:50,840 There are many situations in life, 558 00:34:50,840 --> 00:34:55,800 egotistical behaviour is not only morally problematic but it is also 559 00:34:56,320 --> 00:34:58,440 strategically unwise. 560 00:35:12,520 --> 00:35:16,080 I think a nice domestic example is washing dishes. 561 00:35:16,080 --> 00:35:17,920 No-one loves it, OK. 562 00:35:17,920 --> 00:35:21,280 It is a little bit annoying, you know. 563 00:35:21,280 --> 00:35:24,720 And we all know that it is better for someone else to do it. 564 00:35:24,720 --> 00:35:27,240 But if you're living in a shared house, 565 00:35:27,240 --> 00:35:32,240 the problem begins when all the players decide to adopt my strategy 566 00:35:33,160 --> 00:35:36,560 and then NO-ONE is washing the dishes. 567 00:35:36,560 --> 00:35:41,560 The outcome is a tower of dirty plates, and it is not good. 568 00:35:42,480 --> 00:35:47,240 When you are taking into account only your personal good 569 00:35:47,240 --> 00:35:50,440 and all your thinking is self-centred, 570 00:35:50,440 --> 00:35:53,720 you don't care at all about other players, 571 00:35:53,720 --> 00:35:57,520 the result may be a total disaster. 572 00:35:57,520 --> 00:36:01,920 It's so easy to disregard the small impact we might make 573 00:36:01,920 --> 00:36:05,240 just by ditching stuff for someone else to deal with. 574 00:36:06,600 --> 00:36:11,640 But many small acts of selfishness can have huge consequences. 575 00:36:11,880 --> 00:36:16,920 It's a phenomenon known as the tragedy of the commons. 576 00:36:17,160 --> 00:36:20,920 For example, the damage to the atmosphere. 577 00:36:20,920 --> 00:36:25,800 The destruction of ocean ecosystems, rainforest loggings, 578 00:36:25,800 --> 00:36:29,200 these issues are far more important. 579 00:36:29,200 --> 00:36:32,760 And it is really hard to tackle with them, 580 00:36:32,760 --> 00:36:35,720 even with rules and regulations. 581 00:36:36,960 --> 00:36:39,520 Arguably, the challenge for government 582 00:36:39,520 --> 00:36:44,560 is to create rules that align the interests of individuals and society 583 00:36:44,960 --> 00:36:47,160 to find those win-wins. 584 00:36:49,240 --> 00:36:51,440 But like the rest of us, 585 00:36:51,440 --> 00:36:56,480 our leaders have their own political and economic goals to pursue, 586 00:36:56,600 --> 00:37:01,200 meaning there will always be the temptation for some to put their own 587 00:37:01,200 --> 00:37:03,800 short-term interests first. 588 00:37:09,960 --> 00:37:13,400 So, in the real conflicts we all face, 589 00:37:13,400 --> 00:37:16,040 can we ever justify being uncooperative? 590 00:37:21,240 --> 00:37:24,160 Definitely, I would argue - on occasion. 591 00:37:25,560 --> 00:37:29,000 Because some people really don't know what's good for them. 592 00:37:33,720 --> 00:37:38,760 I'd like to suggest we take a potentially very unstable situation, 593 00:37:39,320 --> 00:37:44,320 taking two small argumentative children on holiday, 594 00:37:44,760 --> 00:37:48,720 to demonstrate some strategies that can ensure you win 595 00:37:48,720 --> 00:37:50,800 in a domestic stand-off. 596 00:37:54,320 --> 00:37:59,040 The first thing absolutely NOT to do is to make a non-credible threat. 597 00:38:00,520 --> 00:38:03,080 Right, that's it. Holiday's cancelled. 598 00:38:03,080 --> 00:38:05,360 I'm turning the car around, we're going home. 599 00:38:07,960 --> 00:38:11,520 The kids quickly work out that you won't do this, 600 00:38:11,520 --> 00:38:16,560 as it harms you just as much as them. Everybody wants a holiday. 601 00:38:20,640 --> 00:38:24,160 So try a far more credible threat instead. 602 00:38:25,440 --> 00:38:28,880 If you don't shut up, we're going to be spending the first day of the 603 00:38:28,880 --> 00:38:31,200 holiday visiting an art gallery. 604 00:38:35,880 --> 00:38:39,160 As long as they know you REALLY like art galleries 605 00:38:39,160 --> 00:38:43,600 and you know they really hate them, this one is a much better strategy. 606 00:38:51,960 --> 00:38:56,600 Even better, try a grand gesture called pre-commitment. 607 00:38:56,600 --> 00:39:00,240 If one of you starts arguing again, one of you is going to go to bed 608 00:39:00,240 --> 00:39:01,680 at six o'clock all week 609 00:39:01,680 --> 00:39:04,440 and the other one can stay up as late as they like. 610 00:39:07,560 --> 00:39:09,720 This one is quite a serious pre-commitment 611 00:39:09,720 --> 00:39:12,680 because you are risking not being able to pack them off to bed 612 00:39:12,680 --> 00:39:16,280 like normal, but you would just have to hope that the prospect 613 00:39:16,280 --> 00:39:20,440 of them missing out is enough for them to be smart and stay quiet. 614 00:39:25,040 --> 00:39:27,000 In order to get what you want, 615 00:39:27,000 --> 00:39:32,040 any adversary has to believe you have the credibility and commitment 616 00:39:32,320 --> 00:39:34,400 to go through with your threats. 617 00:39:38,840 --> 00:39:42,720 But, in the end, no matter how winning your tactics, 618 00:39:42,720 --> 00:39:46,520 there is one thing that is incredibly difficult to deal with. 619 00:39:46,520 --> 00:39:50,480 KIDS: It's not fair! 620 00:40:01,600 --> 00:40:03,480 In any kind of interaction, 621 00:40:03,480 --> 00:40:07,800 our sense of what is and isn't fair is incredibly powerful. 622 00:40:10,080 --> 00:40:14,800 And in some circumstances, it can actually make us deliberately lose. 623 00:40:17,000 --> 00:40:20,720 To explore this apparently quite irrational way of getting what 624 00:40:20,720 --> 00:40:23,320 we want, Haim and I are going to play something 625 00:40:23,320 --> 00:40:27,000 called the ultimatum game, and the rules are very simple. 626 00:40:28,840 --> 00:40:31,400 Two players, one is called the proposer 627 00:40:31,400 --> 00:40:34,800 and the other is called the respondent. 628 00:40:34,800 --> 00:40:38,160 The proposer gets a sum of money, for example £100. 629 00:40:38,160 --> 00:40:40,800 Is that what you've got in there? Yes, yes, yes. 630 00:40:40,800 --> 00:40:44,880 And the proposer has to decide how to split the money. 631 00:40:44,880 --> 00:40:46,520 And the responder, 632 00:40:46,520 --> 00:40:51,520 the responder must decide whether to accept or to reject. 633 00:40:51,520 --> 00:40:54,280 If the responder rejects the split, 634 00:40:54,280 --> 00:40:57,280 both players will end up with nothing. 635 00:40:57,280 --> 00:41:00,520 And it is one short game. Take it or leave it offer. 636 00:41:00,520 --> 00:41:03,920 OK. The fairest thing to do obviously is to say 50-50. 637 00:41:03,920 --> 00:41:05,800 50-50, of course. 638 00:41:05,800 --> 00:41:09,040 I could get an extra £10 by saying 60-40. 639 00:41:09,040 --> 00:41:11,880 Easily, I think. However I decide... 640 00:41:11,880 --> 00:41:14,800 I mean, I do genuinely get some of the money. 641 00:41:14,800 --> 00:41:18,120 Yes, yes, yes, real money. A real game. Everything is real. 642 00:41:19,360 --> 00:41:23,360 Now to make some offers to a series of unsuspecting volunteers. 643 00:41:24,440 --> 00:41:28,720 I think I'm going to split it 70-30. 644 00:41:28,720 --> 00:41:30,440 I get the 70. 645 00:41:30,440 --> 00:41:33,720 Yes. Well, obviously it is really unfair, but I'm going to accept it. 646 00:41:33,720 --> 00:41:36,440 You have to decide. I'm going to accept it. 647 00:41:36,440 --> 00:41:38,000 OK. £30. 648 00:41:38,000 --> 00:41:39,680 OK. Are you going to check it? 649 00:41:39,680 --> 00:41:41,640 I'll check it, I'm a mathematician. 650 00:41:41,640 --> 00:41:43,560 Thank you. Thank you. 651 00:41:43,560 --> 00:41:47,400 So, unfair offer number one works in my favour. 652 00:41:47,400 --> 00:41:51,680 What is your decision? OK, I'm going to go for 653 00:41:51,680 --> 00:41:54,080 £80 to me and £20 to you. 654 00:41:54,080 --> 00:41:56,360 Yes or no, take it or leave it offer. 655 00:41:56,360 --> 00:41:59,160 Leave it. No. But hang on, you came here with nothing. 656 00:41:59,160 --> 00:42:01,840 I did, but I feel like if you were like, "£50 for you, 657 00:42:01,840 --> 00:42:03,760 "£50 for me," I'd be fine with that. 658 00:42:03,760 --> 00:42:06,840 I would've said deal. We both came here with nothing so we both should 659 00:42:06,840 --> 00:42:09,960 have left with something, and an equal amount would've been better 660 00:42:09,960 --> 00:42:11,400 than an unequal amount. 661 00:42:11,400 --> 00:42:13,200 Wow. Goodness. OK. 662 00:42:13,200 --> 00:42:17,680 You see, it contradicts all the economic predictions, yes? 663 00:42:17,680 --> 00:42:20,360 Economics says one is better than none - 664 00:42:20,360 --> 00:42:22,600 20 is for sure better than none. 665 00:42:22,600 --> 00:42:26,600 Economics says Sayed here should accept, 666 00:42:26,600 --> 00:42:28,720 but I am denied. Next? 667 00:42:29,840 --> 00:42:32,400 Hi. Hi. Hello. 668 00:42:32,400 --> 00:42:34,040 I quite like money. 669 00:42:34,040 --> 00:42:38,440 So £90 to me and £10 to you. 670 00:42:40,840 --> 00:42:43,480 You know what? Why not, I'll take £10. 671 00:42:43,480 --> 00:42:45,040 You have £10. 672 00:42:45,040 --> 00:42:47,600 It is yours. Thank you very much. 673 00:42:47,600 --> 00:42:50,080 Hannah, you are now such a rich person! 674 00:42:50,080 --> 00:42:52,640 Thank you very much. Are you happy with your decision? 675 00:42:52,640 --> 00:42:54,880 It's pretty unfair, but... Pretty unfair. 676 00:42:54,880 --> 00:42:58,200 I am a realist and I like £10 at least in my pocket, 677 00:42:58,200 --> 00:43:01,600 so I am at least £10 richer, so... £10 is better than none. 678 00:43:01,600 --> 00:43:05,120 Yes. A man after my own logical heart. 679 00:43:07,560 --> 00:43:12,560 After three offers, I've bagged £160 of a possible 240. 680 00:43:14,520 --> 00:43:16,960 So why did I not clean up? 681 00:43:16,960 --> 00:43:20,000 The 20-80 split, 682 00:43:20,000 --> 00:43:23,720 not taking the £20 seems bonkers to me. 683 00:43:23,720 --> 00:43:28,200 The 20, it is approximately the world average of the split 684 00:43:28,200 --> 00:43:30,440 that people refuse to take. 685 00:43:30,440 --> 00:43:35,440 People seem to show an unwillingness to accept unfairness and they are 686 00:43:35,680 --> 00:43:37,520 prepared to pay. Even at 80-20? 687 00:43:37,520 --> 00:43:40,160 They are basically being irrational, right? 688 00:43:40,160 --> 00:43:45,120 People usually behave rationally from their point of view, 689 00:43:45,120 --> 00:43:48,720 so it is really hard to define what is rational, you know, 690 00:43:48,720 --> 00:43:51,040 what is not. For example, Sayed, 691 00:43:51,040 --> 00:43:55,600 yes, he paid £20, but to teach you a lesson, 692 00:43:55,600 --> 00:44:00,600 £20, it seems to me a low price, you see? Nothing, almost. 693 00:44:00,680 --> 00:44:03,880 Well, it was an expensive lesson for me. 694 00:44:03,880 --> 00:44:05,560 For you, but not for him. 695 00:44:07,360 --> 00:44:11,600 It might seem like an irrational way to get what we want, but what we're 696 00:44:11,600 --> 00:44:13,760 looking at here is the long game. 697 00:44:16,120 --> 00:44:20,720 The act of sacrificing a small win to punish someone means 698 00:44:20,720 --> 00:44:25,480 they may well be less selfish with us and others in the future. 699 00:44:26,840 --> 00:44:31,880 It's a perfectly rational way to secure greater collective success. 700 00:44:42,080 --> 00:44:45,680 But most creatures on earth AREN'T rational 701 00:44:45,680 --> 00:44:48,280 so why do we see cooperative, 702 00:44:48,280 --> 00:44:51,920 even altruistic behaviour in the animal kingdom, 703 00:44:51,920 --> 00:44:55,400 that seems to benefit others more than the individual? 704 00:44:57,240 --> 00:45:01,240 Surely this contradicts the theory of evolution, 705 00:45:01,240 --> 00:45:04,160 based as it is on the struggle for life 706 00:45:04,160 --> 00:45:06,720 and the survival of the fittest? 707 00:45:09,320 --> 00:45:11,560 When I learned about evolution at school, 708 00:45:11,560 --> 00:45:15,160 I was under the impression that it was all about competition. 709 00:45:15,160 --> 00:45:18,880 That every animal was necessarily out for itself 710 00:45:18,880 --> 00:45:20,720 and the fitter you are, 711 00:45:20,720 --> 00:45:23,920 the more likely you are to win fights for mates, 712 00:45:23,920 --> 00:45:26,360 for food and for territory. 713 00:45:26,360 --> 00:45:30,840 If you can ace THOSE conflicts, the more likely you are to pass on your 714 00:45:30,840 --> 00:45:33,800 genes and win at the game of life. 715 00:45:35,320 --> 00:45:39,080 It has been said that nothing in biology makes sense 716 00:45:39,080 --> 00:45:41,600 except in the light of evolution, 717 00:45:41,600 --> 00:45:44,640 and evolution has been based on conflict. 718 00:45:44,640 --> 00:45:47,680 It is a struggle for existence. 719 00:46:04,560 --> 00:46:08,000 In animal behaviour, there exists many examples 720 00:46:08,000 --> 00:46:10,680 where animals fight between 721 00:46:10,680 --> 00:46:15,160 the species, but where they fight, according almost to rules, 722 00:46:15,160 --> 00:46:17,800 where they seem to restrain themselves 723 00:46:17,800 --> 00:46:21,200 and don't escalate the conflict too much. 724 00:46:22,200 --> 00:46:26,840 You could try to explain individuals avoiding violence as being for the 725 00:46:26,840 --> 00:46:30,880 benefit of the group, but that's not quite how evolution works. 726 00:46:32,160 --> 00:46:36,480 If there is a single individual ready to escalate the conflict, 727 00:46:36,480 --> 00:46:38,880 and all others are going to run away, 728 00:46:38,880 --> 00:46:41,640 when they see that things become serious, 729 00:46:41,640 --> 00:46:43,920 then this individual will win everything, 730 00:46:43,920 --> 00:46:45,400 will have many offsprings. 731 00:46:45,400 --> 00:46:49,080 The offspring will win his trait of escalating a conflict 732 00:46:49,080 --> 00:46:52,360 and this trait will become more and more frequent. 733 00:46:54,080 --> 00:46:59,000 In this scenario, aggressive behaviour will always win out. 734 00:46:59,000 --> 00:47:01,520 So there has to be an alternative explanation. 735 00:47:02,560 --> 00:47:07,600 It only began to emerge in the early 1970s, when British biologist John 736 00:47:08,160 --> 00:47:12,880 Maynard Smith was given a manuscript to review, written by an unknown 737 00:47:12,880 --> 00:47:15,000 American called George Price. 738 00:47:16,280 --> 00:47:20,920 Now, Price wasn't a mathematician or a biologist or a game theorist, 739 00:47:20,920 --> 00:47:23,080 but he had read von Neumann 740 00:47:23,080 --> 00:47:27,120 and he had written about Cold War games and the uses 741 00:47:27,120 --> 00:47:32,120 of deterrence. His paper, titled Antlers, Intraspecific Combat, 742 00:47:33,160 --> 00:47:38,120 And Altruism, suggested that things like giant deer antlers weren't 743 00:47:42,520 --> 00:47:45,720 they were clever strategic accessories 744 00:47:45,720 --> 00:47:48,400 that would help you limit conflict 745 00:47:48,400 --> 00:47:53,040 and avoid the destructive effects of fighting. 746 00:47:53,040 --> 00:47:55,640 It's just like nuclear missiles, 747 00:47:55,640 --> 00:47:58,960 antlers are the kind of weapon that you could 748 00:47:58,960 --> 00:48:01,400 parade in front of your enemy, 749 00:48:01,400 --> 00:48:04,000 hopefully without ever having to actually use them. 750 00:48:05,880 --> 00:48:08,000 Maynard Smith was struck by this 751 00:48:08,000 --> 00:48:10,520 and, together with Price, created a simple 752 00:48:10,520 --> 00:48:15,600 game to explore how such limited war strategies could evolve. 753 00:48:17,080 --> 00:48:19,440 And he called it the Hawk-Dove Game. 754 00:48:20,480 --> 00:48:24,720 Picture an imaginary species of bird that only has two inherited 755 00:48:24,720 --> 00:48:27,160 behavioural strategies. 756 00:48:27,160 --> 00:48:30,440 One is aggressive, or hawkish, 757 00:48:30,440 --> 00:48:34,200 and the other more cooperative, or dovish. 758 00:48:34,200 --> 00:48:37,600 If two hawks clash over something like food, 759 00:48:37,600 --> 00:48:40,200 their strategy means total war. 760 00:48:40,200 --> 00:48:45,040 They will fight, risking injury and no guarantee of food either. 761 00:48:46,760 --> 00:48:48,920 Now, if a hawk and a dove meet, 762 00:48:48,920 --> 00:48:53,080 the dove initially stands up for itself, but then scarpers. 763 00:48:54,800 --> 00:48:58,040 Finally, if doves meet, they'll share. 764 00:48:59,520 --> 00:49:03,320 In each interaction, both birds receive a score. 765 00:49:04,960 --> 00:49:09,080 And if these are added up over time, it reveals which behaviours are most 766 00:49:09,080 --> 00:49:14,080 likely to benefit individuals, and so survive down the generations. 767 00:49:17,040 --> 00:49:18,680 On the face of it, 768 00:49:18,680 --> 00:49:20,800 if everyone was displaying dovelike behaviour, 769 00:49:20,800 --> 00:49:22,160 it looks like it could work, 770 00:49:22,160 --> 00:49:25,120 as well as being genuinely nice for everyone. 771 00:49:25,120 --> 00:49:26,920 But, unfortunately, 772 00:49:26,920 --> 00:49:30,840 that's unstable because just one meanie hawk could come along and 773 00:49:30,840 --> 00:49:33,400 immediately have the upper hand on everybody. 774 00:49:33,400 --> 00:49:35,800 And if that hawkish behaviour really took off, 775 00:49:35,800 --> 00:49:37,400 that too would be unstable, 776 00:49:37,400 --> 00:49:41,840 because of the constant risk and cost of violence. 777 00:49:41,840 --> 00:49:46,840 Now, what the maths shows is that a stable population is possible, 778 00:49:47,440 --> 00:49:52,480 but only if you have one-third hawks and two-thirds doves. 779 00:49:53,200 --> 00:49:55,560 Now, those exact numbers might change slightly 780 00:49:55,560 --> 00:49:57,160 if you tweak the payoff, 781 00:49:57,160 --> 00:50:02,200 but the key point here is that this was mathematical proof that there 782 00:50:02,640 --> 00:50:07,000 was a strategic advantage to avoiding conflict. 783 00:50:07,000 --> 00:50:09,160 Evolution, it turned out, 784 00:50:09,160 --> 00:50:12,880 is not simply a winner-takes-all kind of game. 785 00:50:14,240 --> 00:50:19,200 And so, scientists took to this new evolutionary form of game theory. 786 00:50:20,200 --> 00:50:24,560 The reason? To find the ultimate long-term winning strategy 787 00:50:24,560 --> 00:50:26,440 for us all. 788 00:50:36,080 --> 00:50:39,440 It was an ingenious American political scientist 789 00:50:39,440 --> 00:50:41,120 called Robert Axelrod 790 00:50:41,120 --> 00:50:43,880 who, around 1980, took the next big step. 791 00:50:45,760 --> 00:50:49,560 Axelrod invited economists, mathematicians, 792 00:50:49,560 --> 00:50:51,560 political scientists, 793 00:50:51,560 --> 00:50:54,440 psychologists and sociologists, 794 00:50:54,440 --> 00:50:58,800 all of whom had written theoretical papers on co-operation and the 795 00:50:58,800 --> 00:51:02,880 prisoner's dilemma, to compete in a computer tournament. 796 00:51:05,000 --> 00:51:07,560 The challenge was to design a computer program 797 00:51:07,560 --> 00:51:09,880 that would play the best combination 798 00:51:09,880 --> 00:51:12,720 of attacking and more cooperative behaviour. 799 00:51:15,560 --> 00:51:19,480 It was a bold move, considering the golden age of popular computer games 800 00:51:19,480 --> 00:51:21,640 and coding was still in its infancy. 801 00:51:24,640 --> 00:51:26,760 Researchers from around the world 802 00:51:26,760 --> 00:51:29,680 mailed in their computer programs via post. 803 00:51:29,680 --> 00:51:32,840 It was all to see which of their electronic beasts, 804 00:51:32,840 --> 00:51:35,320 some of which were a lot more cooperative than others, 805 00:51:35,320 --> 00:51:37,000 would emerge the winner. 806 00:51:39,440 --> 00:51:43,160 14 programs were to play 200 rounds of the prisoner's dilemma 807 00:51:43,160 --> 00:51:45,880 against themselves and one another. 808 00:51:48,320 --> 00:51:52,040 As you would expect, cooperating with your opponent scores well. 809 00:51:55,840 --> 00:51:58,280 But you could get a much higher payoff 810 00:51:58,280 --> 00:52:01,480 by attacking a co-operator all of the time. 811 00:52:02,720 --> 00:52:05,840 But attack an attacker, and your score will suffer. 812 00:52:05,840 --> 00:52:08,360 BEEPING 813 00:52:10,560 --> 00:52:12,560 And so, the tournament ran, 814 00:52:12,560 --> 00:52:15,600 with some players doing better than others. 815 00:52:16,960 --> 00:52:20,680 One strategy, for example, was nicknamed "the grudger". 816 00:52:20,680 --> 00:52:23,080 It would co-operate until it was attacked, 817 00:52:23,080 --> 00:52:24,960 at which point it would get the hump 818 00:52:24,960 --> 00:52:27,840 and never co-operate again for the rest of the game. 819 00:52:29,920 --> 00:52:32,080 After competing against everyone else, 820 00:52:32,080 --> 00:52:34,920 the grudger crawled in in seventh place. 821 00:52:36,360 --> 00:52:39,120 The surprise winner, with 504 points, 822 00:52:39,120 --> 00:52:41,440 was written in just four lines of code, 823 00:52:41,440 --> 00:52:45,320 and was easily the simplest program that had been submitted. 824 00:52:45,320 --> 00:52:47,640 It was called tit-for-tat. 825 00:52:47,640 --> 00:52:49,720 It would start off by cooperating 826 00:52:49,720 --> 00:52:52,960 and then would just copy whatever the opponent did 827 00:52:52,960 --> 00:52:56,720 in the previous round - so if the opponent either attacked or 828 00:52:56,720 --> 00:53:00,520 cooperated, tit-for-tat would respond in kind. 829 00:53:03,560 --> 00:53:06,640 Tit-for-tat's behaviour over the course of the competition 830 00:53:06,640 --> 00:53:10,080 is basically, "You scratch my back, I'll scratch yours". 831 00:53:12,480 --> 00:53:15,720 So was this the winning strategy everyone was looking for? 832 00:53:16,960 --> 00:53:18,360 Well, no. 833 00:53:19,480 --> 00:53:22,880 Because, unlike in real life, these computer programs, 834 00:53:22,880 --> 00:53:26,360 including tit-for-tat, could play endlessly, 835 00:53:26,360 --> 00:53:28,680 without ever making mistakes. 836 00:53:32,800 --> 00:53:36,400 Imagine if I decided to use tit-for-tat as my new strategy 837 00:53:36,400 --> 00:53:41,440 for winning at life. So I would co-operate by default - lovely - 838 00:53:41,920 --> 00:53:44,720 and only retaliate if someone was really mean to me, 839 00:53:44,720 --> 00:53:46,560 just to teach them a lesson. 840 00:53:46,560 --> 00:53:49,360 But what if, idiotically, 841 00:53:49,360 --> 00:53:53,360 I sort of accidentally was a bit mean to someone? 842 00:53:53,360 --> 00:53:56,200 Say I just bumped into them. 843 00:53:56,200 --> 00:53:57,880 Oh, sorry. 844 00:53:57,880 --> 00:54:00,520 If they are also playing tit-for-tat, 845 00:54:00,520 --> 00:54:04,360 they'll have to shove me back - formerly known as defecting. 846 00:54:06,400 --> 00:54:09,800 And then I'd have to do the same, as would he. 847 00:54:09,800 --> 00:54:12,080 We'll defect for ever. 848 00:54:14,880 --> 00:54:16,880 Hmm. Not great, is it? 849 00:54:16,880 --> 00:54:20,880 But some scientists weren't quite ready to give up on tit-for-tat 850 00:54:20,880 --> 00:54:24,160 just yet. Karl Sigmund and his student Martin Nowak 851 00:54:24,160 --> 00:54:25,880 started experimenting 852 00:54:25,880 --> 00:54:30,320 with a new kind of evolutionary tournament, but this time, 853 00:54:30,320 --> 00:54:31,960 as in the natural world, 854 00:54:31,960 --> 00:54:35,720 competing strategies could evolve and make mistakes. 855 00:54:37,520 --> 00:54:42,400 Using computer simulations, they watched strategies like tit-for-tat emerge 856 00:54:42,400 --> 00:54:45,680 and compete over thousands of generations. 857 00:54:48,120 --> 00:54:51,240 After the first 50 or 100 rounds, 858 00:54:51,240 --> 00:54:54,920 it seemed as if everyone was a defector. 859 00:54:54,920 --> 00:54:56,680 Everyone? Not quite. 860 00:54:56,680 --> 00:55:00,920 There was one little minority playing something like tit-for-tat, 861 00:55:00,920 --> 00:55:05,280 and this little minority very slowly increased 862 00:55:05,280 --> 00:55:07,520 and became more and more frequent, 863 00:55:07,520 --> 00:55:11,400 and was actually defeating the defectors. 864 00:55:11,400 --> 00:55:16,440 The key was to let natural selection find the winning strategy. 865 00:55:16,680 --> 00:55:21,080 If you wait still longer, then you will see that another, 866 00:55:21,080 --> 00:55:26,080 more generous form of tit-for-tat is going to evolve and to take over. 867 00:55:26,720 --> 00:55:30,000 And here it comes, generous tit-for-tat. 868 00:55:31,320 --> 00:55:34,800 This strategy will always co-operate first. 869 00:55:37,240 --> 00:55:39,600 But when facing defection... 870 00:55:45,120 --> 00:55:48,960 ..around one out of every three times, it will just ignore it 871 00:55:48,960 --> 00:55:51,080 and co-operate, regardless. 872 00:55:53,840 --> 00:55:58,560 Of all the possible strategies, and despite its forgiving ways, 873 00:55:58,560 --> 00:56:02,200 generous tit-for-tat consistently came out on top. 874 00:56:03,840 --> 00:56:05,560 For me it is still... 875 00:56:06,840 --> 00:56:11,920 ..one of the fondest remembrances of my scientific life. 876 00:56:12,640 --> 00:56:15,800 There was no master program behind it, 877 00:56:15,800 --> 00:56:19,320 no design for forgiveness, so to speak. 878 00:56:19,320 --> 00:56:22,120 It came out all by itself. 879 00:56:22,120 --> 00:56:27,120 A purely mathematical simulation had revealed that winning strategies, 880 00:56:27,600 --> 00:56:32,480 in the long run, tend to be generous, hopeful and forgiving. 881 00:56:32,480 --> 00:56:37,320 Now, this basic moral code just emerged. 882 00:56:37,320 --> 00:56:42,360 Perhaps you could even take this as proof of the existence and advantage 883 00:56:42,440 --> 00:56:44,080 of goodness. 884 00:56:44,080 --> 00:56:46,320 So why, then, don't we live 885 00:56:46,320 --> 00:56:50,200 in a wonderful, generous and forgiving utopia? 886 00:56:51,520 --> 00:56:55,400 The simulations pointed to an answer. 887 00:56:55,400 --> 00:56:57,680 Over generations of stability, 888 00:56:57,680 --> 00:57:01,000 the main strategy becomes total cooperation. 889 00:57:02,200 --> 00:57:07,160 But this is fragile because hawkish defectors can rapidly take over... 890 00:57:08,760 --> 00:57:10,600 ..and do their worst. 891 00:57:13,000 --> 00:57:17,040 And yet slowly, thanks to strategies like tit-for-tat, 892 00:57:17,040 --> 00:57:20,160 cooperation emerges again and again. 893 00:57:22,640 --> 00:57:25,720 Despite its fragility, there is hope. 894 00:57:25,720 --> 00:57:29,360 Because ultimately cooperation can't be suppressed. 895 00:57:29,360 --> 00:57:33,560 Thanks to things like altruism, kindness and reciprocity, 896 00:57:33,560 --> 00:57:36,640 it re-emerges time after time. 897 00:57:36,640 --> 00:57:41,640 And these aren't just codes that are divined by priests and philosophers. 898 00:57:41,920 --> 00:57:46,360 They have pure mathematics and evolution itself behind them. 899 00:57:58,800 --> 00:58:02,200 So where does that leave you and me? 900 00:58:03,520 --> 00:58:06,080 Well, I wanted to try something out. 901 00:58:06,080 --> 00:58:08,120 Starting tonight. 902 00:58:08,120 --> 00:58:11,240 Now, this could work for any kind of relationship, but let's imagine 903 00:58:11,240 --> 00:58:15,360 that it is your partner. What I want you to do is to co-operate, 904 00:58:15,360 --> 00:58:18,800 but copy their previous move, so if they come home one day 905 00:58:18,800 --> 00:58:20,640 with a big bunch of flowers, 906 00:58:20,640 --> 00:58:23,160 you should get to work on your own romantic gesture. 907 00:58:23,160 --> 00:58:27,040 But if they come home one night much drunker and later 908 00:58:27,040 --> 00:58:30,840 than they promised, you get to do something equivalent. 909 00:58:30,840 --> 00:58:34,840 But every now and then, you should forgive one of their slip-ups 910 00:58:34,840 --> 00:58:36,480 because nobody's perfect, and 911 00:58:36,480 --> 00:58:38,680 you are going to mess up, too, at some point. 912 00:58:40,920 --> 00:58:42,800 So, there you have it. 913 00:58:42,800 --> 00:58:47,840 Strategies for a happier life and a better world, all thanks to maths. 914 00:58:48,920 --> 00:58:51,160 I call that a win. 78353

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