All language subtitles for NUCLEAR NIGHTMARES (Fully Closed Captioned).en

(airplane engine rumbling)

- [Ustinov] At any
moment, the armed forces

of East and West
are ready for war.

(aircraft engine whining)

- Transmission rotary switch?

- Cable.

- How about slot PLCA
selector switches?

- Zero-seven.

- [Ustinov] Should our
grudging peace ever falter,

today's warriors can
stage a battle far worse

than anything our bloodstained
world has ever seen.

(aircraft engine roaring)

(tanks rumbling)

After all, it takes
less than a minute

to launch the missiles
that could bring

our civilization to
a catastrophic end.

- Bravo.

- Charlie?
- Charlie.

- [Ustinov] The missiles
must never be unleashed;

we can all agree on that.

So we'd better
search out the roots

that might lead to nuclear war.

- U-turn commit time.

- Three, two, one: mark.

(missile roars)

(missiles hissing)

- The long range missiles

of the opposing sides can
dispatch nuclear warheads

to 10,000 different targets.

Unless mutual terror or good
sense keep them in check,

they may rise out of holes
all across our northern lands

and come bursting from the sea.

(missile rumbling)

(missile rumbling)
And where would
these missiles go?

And where would
these missiles go?

Well...the obvious targets
are where people are.

In cities.

So the city dwellers
have become the hostages

of the threat and counter-
threat of nuclear war.

And our nuclear nightmares begin

with the destruction of
lively and lovely cities

like Paris, an emblem
of civilization itself,

and heaven knows where
the nightmares end.

A single nuclear
bomb, easily spared

from out of the huge
arsenal of these things,

could lay the whole of
central Paris to waste

in an explosion much
greater than that

of Nagasaki or Hiroshima.

(slides clicking)

(slides clicking)

(slides clicking)

(slides clicking)

(slides clicking)

The cosmic lunacy which
produces such horror

is not, as you might
expect, the affliction

of irredeemably wicked men.

No, it's palliative,
carefully worked out

and considered
government policy.

In the meanwhile, military
accountants are working out

how big a bang they
can get for a buck,

how much rubble for a ruble.

Our dreams might be untroubled
if this mutual terror

had really managed to
abolish war altogether,

but unfortunately the
mutual nervousness

causes the armed
forces of all sides

to jostle and probe each other

and to shadow box within sight

of their potential adversaries.

(aircraft humming)

Although the crew
of a Soviet bomber

acknowledges a point scored
by the western interceptor,

the sparring would
scarcely be keener

if war had already begun.

(aircraft whooshing)

A British aircraft
and a Russian warship;

Today they shoot
only with cameras.

(camera clicking)

(camera clicking)

While the western
submarine hunters

play catch as catch can,
for the Soviet boats

it's follow the leader.

(helicopter whirring)

A helicopter from
the cruiser Leningrad

teases the American admiral
who's sizing them up

at unusually close quarters.

(helicopter whirring)

Only the law of the high seas

restrains this unfriendly game,

and also, I trust, a healthy
fear of the consequences

if encounters should
ever become conflict.

Will the Americans refrain
from meeting taunt with taunt?

Ah no, you see; they stage
their little fly past, too.

(helicopter whirring)

And it's in the
same forceful spirit

that a United States helicopter

patrols the border
of East Germany,

the frontline ally
of the Soviet Union.

The white posts mark the
end of the western world

and the army pilot has
been specially coached

to fly within a
few feet of them.

(helicopter whirring)

It doesn't look like the most
dangerous place on Earth,

but all the outlandish firepower

that's concentrated here -
Russian, American, and British -

could touch off a nuclear
volcano at any time.

(helicopter whirring)

The East German fences,
set back a little

from the border, delineate
in suitably ugly fashion

the geopolitical rift that
runs right across Europe.

(helicopter whirring)

If I negligently drop
my keys over here

I couldn't just run
down and pick them up

because they will have fallen

into the other side of the
world into East Germany;

I might as well throw
them into the ocean.

And this is how close
the American cavalry is

to this demarcation line

at this observation
post called Alpha.

In front of here and behind
great armies lie in wait

for the war that
must never happen.

The new European war
which could so easily

get out of hand
involving not only

thousands of tanks and planes,

but eventually thousands
of nuclear weapons.

And this sinister
arsenal is dedicated

to the perpetuation
of the ugly rift...

across which young
men in good health

watch each other so warily.

- What's that you've
seen over there?

Our mission here is
basically to overwatch

the East German border.

It is to observe, record,
and report all actions,

whether it's an East
German patrol walking past

or walking right
along the border

or whether it's a work
force on the border.

My personal feelings
are that I like it here.

If there's any place in
Europe that I want to be,

it's right here on the border.

(birds chirping)

- [Ustinov] Europe has
a grim reputation

for turning its pleasant
hills into battlefields.

If that ever happens again,

these troops will
take the first shot.

(birds chirping)

It's been all quiet
on the Central Front

for most of the past 30 years.

But all along the
rift, the West Germans,

the British, and other troops

of the North Atlantic
Alliance, NATO,

face powerful opponents
from the Soviet Union

and Eastern Europe.

(vehicle idling)

In this sector where
the East German border

juts nearest to the
Rhine, it's the Americans

who stand at what soldiers
call the "Sharp End"

as the West's most forward
defenders in case of trouble.

(vehicle idling)

- It's...kinda strange
lookin' out there

and have them
lookin' back at you,

wonderin' what they're thinking
and...

what they're
doing and everything.

They've got a job
just like we do.

- I don't know,
there's times I'd like

to talk to them, but we can't...

I don't know...

They just sit around and
watch us when they see us.

They go hide from us and stuff.

- I have talked to a few
of the East German guards.

Most of 'em are just
soldiers like we are.

(men chattering)

- You got that right?
- Got it.

- [Ustinov] The Americans are
crack troops, all set to jump

into their battle tanks
and oppose any breach

of the fateful frontier.

(birds chirping)

- We're always ready
for a surprise attack.

I have a unit that's always
positioned on the border.

It's always manned; it
can respond within

less than 15 minutes.

And all they have to
do is call back here

and the rest of us will
respond very quickly.

(tank idling)

I've got 250 different
combat systems here.

They consist of tanks
for my cavalry troops

and my tank company.

Scout vehicles mounted with
the Dragon weapon systems.

Ammunition trucks, jeeps,
command and control vehicles.

We pack one heck of a big punch,

much larger punch
than any other unit

in the United States Army.

(tank rumbling)

- So, these are 155
millimeter Howitzers.

They're capable of indirect
fire support for the squadron.

We have different types of
munitions, high explosive.

We have the rounds that
will lay minefields

and drop bomblets and
they're also dual capable.

They have a nuclear capability.

(tank roaring)

I think that the nuclear
weapon is a great deterrent

in the political scene today.

I think that you can
see in the newspaper

and in the news how much
it plays an important part

in everything that is
done with governments.

I think that us knowing
that the other side has them

and them knowing
that we have them

is a deterrent that
is possibly one

that will keep us
from another wartime.

(loud click)

- [Ustinov] Apart from the guns
that can fire nuclear shells,

bombs of much greater power can
be delivered out of the sky.

Supersonic strike aircraft,
stationed in England

for instance, are fully
prepared for that dismal task.

(aircraft engine idling)

The crew can take
their nuclear weapons

to destinations
anywhere in Europe,

on the battlefield
or far beyond it.

(aircraft engine idling)

The leaders of
NATO see themselves

increasingly outnumbered
in planes and tanks.

They doubt their ability to win

a war in Europe
by ordinary means.

(ladder clattering)

So, as their current statement
of strategy declares,

if NATO's conventional forces
were in danger of defeat,

selective and limited
use of nuclear weapons

could not be deferred.

(aircraft engine idling)

(aircraft roaring)

But to postpone for
as long as possible

any need to "go
nuclear" as they say,

NATO looks to its conventional
forces in Germany.

The snag is, of course,
is that the Russians

have nuclear weapons, too.

So aircraft specially
built for fighting tanks

might seem a more prudent
defense than atomic artillery.

(aircraft rumbling)

The fighting men who
profit from technology

are liable to perish by it, too.

Even non-nuclear weapons
are now so powerful

that any war in Europe would
be a competition in slaughter,

swift and terrible
to contemplate.

(helicopter rumbling)

Who would want to meet
a helicopter gun ship

Who would want to meet
a helicopter gun ship
leaping up before him?

leaping up before him?

(helicopter whirring)

It's chockfull of gadgets
for dealing out death.

(helicopter whirring)

The predictable
violence of modern war

drives the generals and their
headquarters underground.

The command bunkers are dotted

all around Europe
in unlikely places.

For instance, at an
American football stadium

just west of the Rhine.

Beneath the terraces,
the staff officers

secure themselves
against chemical weapons

and nuclear fallout.

So it would, as
it were, be a fight

between one team of
moles and another.

(door slams)

(indistinct chatter &
control room sounds)

They're sending
off strike aircraft

to help the ground troops.

Thank goodness it's
only an exercise.

- In the event there is
a war here in Europe,

the primary mission
of ATOC Sembach

will be to task and
coordinate offensive support,

air support, for the U.S.
and German Army Corps

within the central region.

- Four oscar nine zero
two is airborne, 1232.

- Roger that, sir. Juliet
charlie here at the ATOC.

- One fox six zero two romeo.

He was successful on target
number three victor 901.

- Five two three will
also file the full profile.

- [Ustinov] If the
battle is going badly

and if the political
leaders of the West consent,

the commanders can replace
their ordinary weapons

with nuclear bombs...

a contingency that is
familiar to scholars of war.

- A nuclear war could
arise in the first place

from a Soviet attack
on Western Europe.

And indeed...NATO defenses
quite deliberately

have this nuclear risk built
in as part of the deterrent.

It is made clear
to the Soviet Union

that we cannot defend
ourselves...for very long

without initiating the
use of nuclear weapons.

Initially, hopefully on
a small and local scale,

but with every possibility
that this would escalate

to ultimately a major
nuclear exchange

in which the territory of
the Soviet Union itself

should be at risk.

Well, this is quite deliberate.

It is part of the
deterrent posture.

- If NATO fires any nuclear
weapon, however small,

then the Russians will
almost certainly respond

with nuclear weapons because

their nuclear weapons by and
large are rather vulnerable

and therefore have to
be used very early on

in a nuclear or even
conventional war.

And therefore, the risk
of escalation is enormous;

I would say inevitable,
and the escalation

would be very rapid.

And this would certainly lead

to the total destruction
of both sides.

- The buildup in the
Eastern side of Europe

is a serious one...both in
the purely conventional field

and in the nuclear field.

Perhaps one of the most
serious aspects of it

is that it doesn't
seem to stop...in spite

of the fact that you've
had in the last decade

a very tangible improvement
of political relations.

The Soviet military effort
has not been affected by it.

- On the surface it does appear

that there's an
enormous preponderance

of Soviet forces in Europe...
and one of the arguments,

of course, advanced
is that these forces

are too large for
defensive purposes.

That of course is a statement
from the Western side

and it doesn't really
take into account

Soviet prescriptions.

The Soviet argument
is that they have

a large and legitimate
defensive task

to carry out in
Europe as a whole.

They have the defense of
their own alliance system

and of course their
own perimeter.

Europe is very large,
north, central and south.

And they must also face
a complexity of problems.

From the Soviet point of view,

they have not to deal
only with a NATO alliance,

but there's always been the
problem of the local adversary,

something with which we
have not had to deal.

So therefore, from
the Soviet side

they would argue that their
forces are tailored exactly

to discharge its defensive task.

(tanks rumbling)

- [Ustinov] But it's the powerful
attack of those Soviet

missiles and of armies

much stronger than
their own that perturbs

the generals of NATO.

(tanks rumbling)

They picture the Russian tanks
bursting across the border

and charging through
West Germany,

unstoppable by
conventional forces.

It's not at all obvious
how such an attack

could be in the Soviet interest,

yet among the Western allies
the troubling vision persists.

(tanks rumbling)

The NATO general on
the Central Front

happens, himself,
to be a German.

And in this nightmare, he
might then see his own country

turned into a
radioactive battleground

in the desperate bid to
make the invaders go home

before they reached the Rhine.

(tank rumbling &
water splashing)

Just let the unwholesome
brew of tanks and bombs

work on your imagination and
you may feel it closing in;

the first of our
nuclear nightmares.

To me, one possible sequence
of events seems all too clear.

They had to try and stop
the advance somehow,

you understand that I hope.

This is the last of
the coffee, I'm afraid.

Who would've thought
that the fallout

would keep us down
here for so long.

Now...there's something
that I want you to believe.

Nobody actually intended your
families to die like that,

or your school friends
for that matter.

The German general in
question, well...he was...

Put yourself in his shoes
if you will for a moment.

He was always opposed to
the use of nuclear weapons.

In fact he said, "Do
you want me to be tried

like a war criminal like
others were before me?"

But, on the first
day...Soviet armor

had advanced 40 miles
into West Germany.

On the second day, 80 miles.

And it was then that the
American supreme commander

told the German general,
"We are going to stop

this war with nuclear weapons.

Your chancellor and
my president

are in full
agreement about this."

"So it's come to this,"
said the German general.

"Well, at least, thank God,
it won't be my decision."

"Oh, but it will my friend.

We want you to
select the targets."

"There must be some other way...

If I could swing the
Netherland corps around

onto the flank..."
but the subordinates

were getting impatient,

although the British
general was stiff lipped.

"There's quite a lot
of blood flowing up here.

Although we've managed
to nudge his armor

into a nuclear fire
zone quite effectively,

put in a good word for us.

There's a good chap."

A nuclear fire zone
including villages,

farms, people, civilians.

The American
commander was adamant.

"We are going to accomplish
eight nuclear strikes

on armored spearheads
of your choice

and we are going to send
eight missions in the rear

in Czechoslovakia
and East Germany."

You see, the
Americans calculated

that they could smash
the Soviet armor

at the same time saving
New York and Chicago,

not Cologne and
Munich unfortunately.

You remember the
postcard I showed you

of Cologne cathedral. A
very beautiful one, it was.

A German corps commander,
almost surrounded,

added his voice to the rest.

(speaking in German)

"Why am I being abandoned like
von Paulus in Stalingrad?

Where are the nuclear weapons?"

So, at length, the
German general consented.

"Very well, although may my
tongue rot for saying so."

"Oh, you know.

You know the
targets in any case."

And so...the Germans and the
Americans were in full accord

and on the morning
of the third day,

the first bombs lit up the
skyline like a false dawn.

Although as the German
general had said all along,

why on Earth would
the Russians back down

when they're winning?

And of course, when the
Russians didn't back down...

there was no logical
time or place

for the nuclear
exchanges to cease.

Would there be any European
cities exempt from devastation?

Well some nations believed
that the possession

of a nuclear force of
their own makes them safer

and that the hostage cities
could in some sense hit back.

The French, for instance,
hope that the possession

of such a nuclear
force exempts Paris,

makes it immune from
the nuclear epidemic.

But have things changed so much

since the Élysée Palace
here was occupied

by Louis XV's mistress,
Madame de Pompadour,

whose contemporary,
Voltaire, wrote so scathingly

about the heroic
butchery of war?

Well, I wonder what
Voltaire might have thought

of the president of
the French Republic

who now lives in the Élysée,
controlling from his basement

enough nuclear power
to carry destruction

thousands of miles away.

In the most elegant
of headquarters,

he has enough power
at his beck and call

to make the war of the
Austrian Succession

seem like an outing,
like a picnic.

(button clicks)

(button clicks)

And because an enemy
might have similar power,

France puts her command
posts underground, too.

(phone buttons clicking)

You don't have to
be a superpower to
build nuclear bombs,

but you'd be
well-advised to assemble

the computerized
paraphernalia of modern war,

as France has done, and
guard your bombs with care.

(key clattering into hole
& lock clicking)

(lock clicking)

(door opens)

A nuclear weapon,
author of nightmares,

and, so the French
hope, a discouragement

and, so the French
hope, a discouragement
to potential enemies.

to potential enemies.

It's hard to grasp that
the gleaming object

has so much death in it to be
scattered indiscriminately

by heat, blast, fire,
and atomic radiation.

(footsteps)

But we'd deceive
ourselves if we didn't see

that the French are
really rather proud

of the standing attached to
the possession of the bomb.

After all, who isn't?

(airplane engine accelerating)

Their supersonic bombers
represent only one

of the methods that
the French employ

for fighting or threatening
to fight a nuclear war.

They have ballistic missiles,
too, entirely homemade,

here going by road
under plain cover

to a base in the
south of the country.

(trucks rumbling)

The missiles a la
maison are capable

of hurling H-bombs as far
as Moscow, for instance,

or over any lesser distance.

The key that could do it
makes an unusual halter.

- Bonjour.
- Bonjour.

(speaking in French)

- The weapons are meant to deter

any nuclear attack
and warn all comers

that the French won't be
walked over next time.

(speaking in French)

They could also help to
shield Western Europe...

so the French spare
no expense in keeping

their missiles up to scratch.

But they don't want all
the rest of the world

joining the nuclear club.

(speaking in French)

Their tour de force
you'll find at rest.

The submarines that
skulk under the sea,

each carrying 16 missiles.

They could easily
obliterate the chief cities

of any enemy.

(speaking in French)

But if the French think they
need them, why not everyone?

Why not Brazilian
missiles and submarines

or Korean nuclear bombers?

(water splashing)

The United States first made
the bomb for fear of Hitler.

Then Russia fearing
the Americans.

Next came the British,
their nuclear submarines

and bombers now loyally
assigned to NATO.

Then France, firmly
asserting her independence.

The Chinese, who followed,
think that nuclear war

is bound to come.

Inevitably perhaps, it
was India's bomb next.

By all accounts, Israel
now possesses the bomb

and perhaps South Africa, too,

while Pakistan is
striving to follow suit.

So the bomb is proliferating
through the hotter regions

of the world, despite
all the efforts

of the diplomats to prevent it.

Will the seven or eight
who have it so far

soon be 18 and then 80?

There's a new form of
racism which suggests

that nuclear weapons
are respectable,

but only for rich,
predominantly white countries.

After all, it's rather
grand to be a superpower.

You can continue to
improve your weapons

while preaching
piously about peace.

If you are a smaller
nation with only a very few

nuclear weapons, then I'm
afraid this is irresponsible,

nuclear weapons, then I'm
afraid this is irresponsible,
if not criminal.

if not criminal.

Well, whether there is
or not any wisdom at all

in this hypocrisy,
proliferation would seem

to point a second way
towards a holocaust,

this time through the less
affluent parts of the world.

And the greatest
danger of all lies here

in the narrow streets
of the Middle East

where modern technology
serves ancient bitterness.

(indistinct chatter)

The global bazaar for
nuclear merchandise

is not easy to
police and anyone can

equip himself for making bombs.

- We and the Soviets...

have set a very bad example
to the rest of the world in

essentially demonstrating
that nuclear weapons...

are the main instrument
of our foreign policy.

And essentially are
the main support

of our status as a superpower.

That being the case,
it's awfully difficult

to convince anybody
else not to have them.

- All these countries
that are interested

in the acquisition
of nuclear weapons

have generally hostile neighbors

and you have what you call
"odd couples" in country A

and country B, and you
have some examples.

For example, in South
Asia, that are very hostile

and are both interested
in nuclear weapons.

It's quite clear that
if country A decides

to acquire nuclear weapons,

country B will
follow the example.

And so very dangerous
nuclear arms threats

would be triggered.

- I was astounded that the
United States governement

has declassified so
much information,

it's available at places here
like the Library of Congress,

that a single competent
individual could easily

design fission bombs
and I think carry them

through to construction.

There's no doubt in my
mind that a small group

of motivated organized
people, even perhaps people

not very highly
technically trained

such as terrorists, could
conceive and bring to fruition,

a nuclear weapons
construction project.

- Any country to date

that has decided
to develop a bomb,

a crude, maybe
crude fission bomb,

has been successful
on the first try.

So looking in the future,

I don't expect to see
countries actually detonate

their first weapon.

I think that they will
know whether or not

they are in a position
to have a weapon.

Clearly the collected
wisdom of the world

is that Israelis,
Israel has a bomb,

but they've never tested it.

And I think that's what you're
going to see in the future.

- [Ustinov] Spies and nuclear
experts seem to agree

it's at Dimona that
Israel makes her bombs.

Even though the signs
would have it otherwise.

(truck rumbling past)

The plant itself has been kept
from prying eyes for years.

But won't Israel's
nuclear efforts

simply spur her enemies
along the same road?

The holy city of Christians,
Jews, and Muslims;

the order is strictly
alphabetical.

It has been the focal
point for conflict

for thousands of years.

Jerusalem is at this
time in Israeli hands,

but you can look north
towards the Soviet Union,

with its Muslim minorities
and affiliations,

east towards a patchwork
of Muslim states,

patient yet unforgiving,

south towards Mecca, the
power of religion and of oil,

and west towards America,
Israel's powerful friend.

It is hard to see how an
eventual nuclear anarchy

can be avoided in this area.

Already in very few
years several states

could have bombs of their own,

to say nothing of
certain minority groups.

Even with a bomb smaller
than that of Hiroshima,

maddened men could
be responsible

for hundreds and
thousands of deaths,

a tragedy which would be
attributable to man's folly,

or here, to the wrath of God.

I don't suppose we'll
ever really know

who blew up Jerusalem.

Nowadays it seems as long ago

as the fall of
Babylon, doesn't it?

At the time it
perplexed and alarmed

the Israeli prime minister
and horrified him,

as it did everyone else.

Oh I wish people wouldn't
cut up newspapers.

You know they're relics
for students of history,

even for amateurs like
myself who are trying

to...imagine how this war began.

Oh talking about amateurs,
the Israeli Secret Service

was very active at the
time that the amateurs

first got hold of the bomb.

Just after those first
two...hideous explosions...

bungled explosions at
Belfast and at Lisbon,

the Israelis...where is it?

Oh yes...an Israeli
government spokesman said,

"We warned the British
and Portuguese authorities

that nuclear weapons
were now circulating

among unofficial groups."

Well, Israel's own problems
were about to start

on that Sunday, or...

No, it must've been the Monday

when two El Al airliners
were shot down by missiles

and Ben Gurion Airport
was subsequently closed.

The secretary of
state remonstrated,

"The Soviets are supplying
Middle Eastern countries

with surface to air missiles

of unnecessary sophistication."

And the Israelis
immediately plunged

into the Lebanon for
the umpteenth time.

But now, to report
catastrophic losses

to their prime minister
and the fact that they

had lost control of the air.

"There will be a time
for mourning later,"

said the Israeli prime
minister to the Knesset.

He didn't know
how much mourning.

Or on the Wednesday,
a small nuclear device

blew up the ancient
walled city of Jerusalem

with its predominantly
Arabic population

and all its holy places.

While the news of
this act of folly

was still reverberating
around the world,

it could be supposed that
the Israeli prime minister

was saying, "How
do we retaliate?

Who do I hit?"

But, his advisors were
as baffled as he.

The next day on television
the Palestinian leader,

in tears, said "Why should
we destroy our national home?

The place that
we have cherished

and suffered for so long.

We are not mad!"

But of course there
were those that did

claim responsibility
for this hideous act...

...various groups.

The Lisbon Red
Heroes, Dark December,

others too numerous and
too psychotic to mention.

The American and the
Soviet fleets converged

on the coast while their
governments remained in contact,

attempting to, as they said,
"defuse" the Middle East.

The Israeli prime
minister protested...

"The superpowers
are trying to take

even our tragedies
out of our hands...

...and what's this you tell me
about Saudi Arabian bombers

on Amman Airfield?

I want an Entebbe-like raid!

I want you to seize all the
nuclear devices they have."

But...the commanders were
blown out of the air.

The prime minister
saw the net closing.

"What?

The Libyans have agreed
to give nuclear bombs

to the Lebanese?

The Pakistanis have already
done so to the Syrians?"

Trembling for his cities,
the Israeli prime minister

authorized nuclear strikes
against Amman, Damascus.

"Yes, and Beirut!" he cried.

And so...on the eve of
sabbath in that subcontinent

of prophets, cataclysms
began to rival...

the Book of Revelations.

And since the
superpowers were unable

to disentangle
themselves, the madness

eventually engulfed us all.

The Americans and the
Russians are at pains

to avoid war by
mishap, and for this

they employ military
intelligence,

high speed communication,
and very complicated systems

of what they call
command and control.

Any loss of control
would automatically

entail a third route
into a nuclear war.

These controls are, of course,
very highly guarded secrets.

But what is fairly obvious is
that the systems themselves

would come under
immediate attack

in the event of hostilities.

And here, Fylingdales Moor
in the north of England,

would probably be hit in
the first few minutes.

Why?

Because it has become
one of the nostrils

of the American high command,

endlessly sniffing the
air for signs of danger.

And inside those round
objects are radars

which warn of the approach
of ballistic missiles.

Meanwhile, high above the
Earth, there are satellites

looking out for the first
glow of rocket engines.

And it's in the frozen
north that the other

early warning outposts stand.

That's because the
missile flight paths

between the superpowers
would mainly pass this way.

The giant radars never rest in
Greenland or here in Alaska.

(wind howling)

The military planners believe,
or pretend to believe,

that a missile
attack might burst

upon the United
States at any time.

In that event, they'd have
less than half an hour's notice

before the nuclear warheads
arrived at their targets.

(machine humming &
footsteps down ladder)

So the news from the big radars

goes straight to Colorado
and the chief defenders

of a continent who
man their headquarters

at Cheyenne Mountain
day and night;

the North American
Air Defense Command,

usually known as NORAD.

(vehicle engine rumbling)

Because they're so vital
for command and control,

the NORAD staff put 1400 feet
of granite between themselves

and the fragile world outside.

(phone rings)

And NORAD's computers
would announce

any massive attack,
where it's coming from...

and what's more to the
point, where the missiles

can be expected to fall.

- The detection would
be almost instantaneous.

The reliability is very high.

The warning time, of
course, would depend

on where the missile
was launched from

since it's a matter of
flight time of the missile.

And the same way
with a submarine.

The warning time
then would depend

on where the submarine
was when it launched.

Attacks upon the sensors
could make us blind and deaf...

but we have overlapping
and redundant systems

and to knock them all out
would be a sizable effort,

and to do so would be
considered an act of war.

- [Ustinov] Even in peacetime
the radar outposts

have plenty to do,
reporting to NORAD

on all the satellites
that circle the Earth.

Most of them have
war-like functions

and some could make mischief.

The watchers see the
superpowers using spacecraft

more and more for military
command and control.

They rely on them for
spying, for early warning,

for their world-wide
communications.

They are tempting
targets indeed.

(machine clicking loudly)

And from time to
time NORAD spots

anti-satellite
devices under test.

- 10382, the kernel set is 485.
(machine clicking loudly)

- Every medium that
man has entered before

he has found ultimately some
way to conduct warfare in it.

Now, whether or not
there's going to be warfare

in space I think is more a
matter for mankind to decide.

- [Ustinov] For those
of us still stranded

on this planet, the
chain of command comes

to its bitter end with
the missile crews.

On the windy plains
of North Dakota

they never know that
the president's order

won't come today to fire
their missiles in anger.

But how can anyone make certain

that they'll never
shoot without authority

and yet never fail to shoot
if their nation requires it?

When the crews
change their shifts,

the brother officers are
cool and punctilious.

- You ready to brief our status?

- Okay.

LCB status is normal.

- Very good.

Communications status?

- The radios are
all operational.

- Okay.

Launch switches?

Check the launch
switch first over here.

- Launch switch...

- [Ustinov] The new
commander won't take charge

of the missiles until he's given

the control capsule a
thorough inspection.

There must be no funny
business down here

with our world at stake.

- [Officer] It's good.

- Okay.

Did you check the keys already?

- Yeah.

- Okay, you want check our locks
and make sure they're on?

(locks rattling)

Well, there's your lock.
- Okay.

- You guys have a good one.
- Okay, have a good one.

- Safe trip back.

- Take care.
- See you tomorrow.

- Well, let's go on
our inspections.

- [Ustinov] On these young men
falls direct responsibility

for 30 H-bombs, the warheads
of 10 Minuteman missiles

of intercontinental range.

(machine beeping)

Once the missiles have gone,
they can't be called back.

- This is the missile
launch checklist.

Step one, launch
keys inserted.

(seatbelts clattering)

- [Ustinov] Even here, presumably
safe from all intruders,

the keys that can unlock
death for millions of people

are not left lying around.

And to launch the missiles,
two are not enough.

- Inserted commander.
- Inserted deputy.

- The four key system
is a system used

to ensure the correct
launch and authorized launch

of the Minuteman missile force.

Four keys is the
minimum amount required

to launch any Minuteman missile.

Two keys are in each
capsule, one for the deputy

and one for myself,
the commander.

When we turn our keys together,

we constitute one launch vote.

Our one launch vote combined
with the one launch vote

of another launch control center

to which we are
electrically connected

allows the four key
system to come into effect

and constitutes an
authorized launch command.

In the event an unauthorized
command is sent,

we have what we call an
inhibit launch command

which is used to cancel
out the unauthorized order.

- Enable.

(indistinct conversation)

- Depress illuminated.

- [Radio] Charlie,
Bravo, Echo.

- Launcher, this is
Alpha and we need

a key turn in five seconds.

- [Radio] Bravo.

Charlie, Delta, Echo.

- Okay launch
switch, hands on keys.

- Hands on.

- Three, two, one, mark.

(key clicks)

- Key turn.

(machine buzzing)

I have one gone,
two is missile away.

Four is gone.

- In order to
become a missileer,

you have to be very
carefully screened.

Any person who exhibits
unstable behavior

such as a heavy drinking problem

or develops a serious
marital problem

or something more personal,
he would be removed from duty.

Only the most mentally
fit and prepared people

are permitted to pull
missile alert duty

and SAC bomber duty.

- [Ustinov] The missiles
and bombers of SAC,

Strategic Air Command,
are controlled

from an underground command
post here at Omaha, Nebraska.

Launching the missiles
usually requires proper orders

relayed from the
highest in the land,

but the SAC command
post may not be buried

deep enough to
escape destruction.

Indeed, attacks on
key headquarters

might leave the superpower
like a beheaded dragon

unable to strike back.

An unusual aircraft tries
to avoid that outcome.

(plane roaring)

Anticipating the
chaos of nuclear war,

the generals of SAC take turns
in providing another channel

of command in the comparative
safety of the air.

It has a codename,
Looking Glass.

- This airborne command
post, which has been flying,

or an airplane similar to
this, for the past 17 years,

offers our commander in
chief and the national

command authorities a method
to maintain connectivity

or communications with
all the organizations

that we are responsible for

within the Strategic
Air Command.

We will never be
caught unawares.

We'll always be able to
maintain communications

between the national
command authorities

and the Strategic
Air Command forces.

Aboard several of our airplanes,

including this
particular airplane,

we have the ability to
launch the Minuteman missiles

if in fact circumstances
on the ground

would prevent them
from being launched

under execution orders

from the national
command authorities.

(buttons clicking
& computers humming)

(paper rustling)

(buttons clicking
& computers humming)

- The reasoning is
straightforward.

In this Looking Glass,
stranger far than Alice's,

we see a disturbing sight;
the pilots looking down

on ruination, on
incinerated cities,

military targets crushed.

An airborne general
awaiting orders

from the senior surviving
member of the government.

Orders to wreak similar
havoc on the enemy.

It is very images of
horror such as these

that the superpowers seek
to deter each other,

but the very fact of the
existence of headquarters

in the sky like these
acknowledges the frailty

of other elements in
command and control.

And the frailest of all these
elements are human beings.

(indistinct conversation)

- [Ustinov] Looking Glass
itself might lack authority

if no word came
from the president,

so he too has an
emergency command post,

a jumbo jet with the
improbable name of "Kneecap."

It can whisk the president
and his military chiefs

out of harm's way IF they make
it to the airfield in time.

- The command system,

because it depends upon
fragile communication assets

and a very few people,
is extremely vulnerable

itself to attack.

So, a first strike
on a command system

gives the probability
of seriously degrading

the military capability of
the force that is attacked.

Modern command systems
understand that fact.

Given all this, in
the midst of a crisis

in which military commanders
believe that a war

can no longer be avoided
because the preparations

have gone too far, there
would be extreme pressures

to go the full
way and to get in,

if not the first attack,

certainly to establish
basic military plans

and bring their forces right
up to the actual brink of war.

(bootsteps marching
in snow)

- [Ustinov] The same knotty
issues of command and control

beset the Soviet Union's
strategic rocket force.

(footsteps down stairs)

Anyone who might find
himself at the receiving end

of a Russian missile
would naturally hope

their precautions against
any unauthorized launch

are at least as strict
as the Americans.

But Soviet missile officers,

like their American
counterparts,

know that in a nuclear
war their systems

of command and control
would be targets

of the highest priority.

(machines humming)

They're quite aware that
communications can fail,

headquarters can be
atomized, political leaders

and generals can perish.

(switch popping)

(platform rumbling)

Soviet anxieties mirror
those of the United States.

The need to avoid
being caught unawares

in a surprise attack,
to be sure of getting

the big missiles away before
the chain of command snaps.

But how do they
arrange these matters

on the other side of
the balance of terror?

- I don't know if there is a
difference in vulnerability

between the United States
and the Soviet Union,

but there certainly
is a difference

in their style of operation

with respect to
command and control.

The difference has to
do with the basic nature

of these two societies.

The United States is a
highly decentralized society

and so are its military forces.

A great deal of dependence
upon the initiative

of low level commanders
under actual operations

of military forces.

Soviet Union is a highly
centralized society

and so are its military forces.

They have gone to
extraordinary effort

as far as we can tell to
maintain that central authority,

even to the point of trading
off against the vulnerability

of their actual force elements.

(water churning &
seagulls squawking)

- [Ustinov] The
trickiest of all forces

to control are the
submarines, whose missiles

are the superpower's
last resort.

But in time of war, will the
commands ever reach them?

The American sailors casting off

from Holy Loch in
Scotland won't see

daylight again for two months.

And communicating with
submarines under water

is difficult enough
in peacetime.

- [John] I really do not know
what kind of orders

the United States missile
submarines operate under.

However, we can realize
that the vulnerability

of their communication
links require that

a great deal of
authority be vested

in the submarine
commander and the officers

and men serving underneath him.

In circumstances in
which it became apparent

that the United States had
been attacked massively

and their communication
links had been broken

and could not be reestablished,
the submarine commander

would have to decide whether
to execute the missions

for which he had been prepared

despite the lack of
formal authority to do so,

or whether he
should fail to do so

and possibly degrade the
retaliatory capability

of the United States.

I don't think it's
predictable in advance

how a submarine commander
would resolve this problem,

but everybody recognizes
that there are circumstances

in which he would
virtually have to do so

and some of them
undoubtedly would.

(water churning)

I think the same logic does
apply to the Soviet submarines,

but I personally believe
that they do not operate

under quite the
extension of authority

that is characteristic of
the United States force.

Indeed I believe
that's why there are

observable operational
restrictions on
Soviet submarines.

At any given time they have
many fewer of them at sea

and they do not
operate quite as far

from the Soviet Union as
the United States submarines

do from the United States.

I simply believe they've solved

the problem in a different way.

They are willing to accept
some greater vulnerability

of their submarines
in order to achieve

tighter operational control.

- I know very little
about submarines,

but I imagine that their crews

are as cramped and as isolated
as we are here...cut off.

I'm thinking in
particular of the captain

of a Soviet submarine selected
for a long range mission

in the Pacific because
of his proven loyalty

to the party, and also because
of his quality as a seaman.

Now, he had lost touch
with his base for days.

His second in command told him

nothing from the
shore transmitter,

nothing from the
emergency aircraft.

The captain addressed the crew:

"Comrades...perhaps
our Mother Russia

has been burnt to
a cinder already

and we're the only
ones left to avenge her.

But my orders are specific.

I must have proof that
nuclear war has broken out

before I take any initiative.

We should surface,
sample the atmosphere,

listen for news broadcasts."

But...

there were three
unidentified ships

bearing down on him already.

"Three destroyers,
Comrade Captain,

and a possible submarine."

"If they sink us we shall
have the proof we need,"

grunted the captain.

"And if I launch my
missiles the chances are

"they'll sink us anyway."

"But why should they
provoke us like this

if they have not attacked
the Soviet Union?"

"Oh...we provoke each
other all the time

in this war of nerves;
that's nothing."

"But Comrade Captain,
(speaking in foreign language)?

The emergency aircraft?"

The captain took his decision.

"I will launch two missiles.

In this way if it's
a terrible mistake

the party chairman
can always say

to the American president:
"That stupid captain,

we've punished him.

We apologize about
Denver and San Diego."

"If it isn't a mistake we
shall have done our duty

in part at least."

"But...

we would never
start a war ourselves!"

cried the second in command.

"Remember what
the admiral said!"

The crew cheered quietly.

"There are certain circles
in Washington eager

to destroy us.

Are two missiles sufficient?"

"Two missiles..."
said the captain.

"Proceed."

And so he remained poised
on a balance of error,

not knowing whether he
had started a nuclear war

or merely stoked fires
that were raging already.

(alarm blaring)
(men chattering)

(alarm blaring)
(engines racing)

When bomber crews scramble
it certainly sounds like

the end of the world.

(alarms blaring)

Memories of the Japanese
surprise attack on Pearl Harbor

nearly 40 years ago still
haunt American strategies,

so they always keep a
hundred aircraft on alert,

laden with nuclear weapons.

Otherwise a sudden
strike by missiles

might annihilate the entire
bomber force on the ground.

So, if the warning comes, the
crews scurry into the air.

An attack of that sort
would be yet another way

for a nuclear war to start.

One superpower or the
other coming to believe

it can or must strike first,

the aim being to cripple
the other's nuclear forces

embodied in bombers,
missiles and submarines.

Any of them sooner or later

could well be
vulnerable to attack.

(aircraft roaring)

(aircraft screeching)

Even if the somewhat elderly
B-52s get airborne in time,

won't they just be shot down

before they reach their targets?

- Not all manned bombers
are necessarily vulnerable.

They have become
increasingly vulnerable

as time goes on
because, for example,

the Soviet Union has developed
an anti-aircraft system

that essentially layers
the air above the ground

and addresses each layer
with a different weapon.

Therefore, they sort of have
covered the entire range

in which a bomber could fly
with a different kind of weapon

and that seems to be
reasonably lethal.

On the other hand, a
bomber has ways to confuse

the radars, for example,
of the anti-aircraft system

and thereby be able to
penetrate with less danger

and threat than one
would normally expect.

The best way, of course,
to do that is avoid

the defenses and that's where
the cruise missile comes in.

(vehicles humming)

The cruise missile can be
launched from the bomber

and travel very near the ground

where it would probably
hide in the clutter,

in the noise that the
ground generates on a radar.

Therefore, be able to
penetrate much more easily

than a large bomber like a B-52.

Then the bomber does
not have to approach

the dangerous areas
that are defended

and therefore its
survivability is increased.

(missile rumbling)

The equation of survivability
versus penetrability

goes back and forth.

You devise a new
weapon and for awhile

you have the ability to
penetrate and hit a target.

The other fellow
who is interested in
defending the target

eventually defines a
counter measure to that.

Then of course you come
around and you define

a new weapon that takes
care of that countermeasure.

And it's this
measure-countermeasure situation

that you are really encountering
in military operations,

in bombing or in
anything like that.

So, it is perhaps
misleading to say that

the bomber is
inexorably vulnerable

and will be eliminated
from the face of the Earth.

- [Ustinov] The superpowers
wouldn't trust their destinies

to just one method of
hitting each other.

That's why scattered
across the countryside

the intercontinental
missiles stand

in their buried launchers.

The Americans have a thousand.

But would they survive
in a nuclear battle?

Would the airborne commander
in his Looking Glass aircraft

have anything left to launch?

Once through the
looking glass we find

the garden of intercontinental
ballistic missiles.

And if the order should come
from Strategic Air Command

or from the Looking
Glass aircraft,

then the massive lid
on which I'm standing

would be thrown aside
and the Minuteman missile

would come roaring out.

This is a silo in the military

rather than in the
agricultural sense

and there are over
a hundred of them

in the farmland in this
part of North Dakota.

(mechanism rumbling)

But each Minuteman
has three separate

nuclear warheads
concealed in its nose,

each aimed at a
different target.

And now that the big
Russian missiles, too,

have several re-entry
vehicles apiece,

swarms of powerful
and accurate warheads

might in theory rain
down on the silos

and destroy most of
the Minuteman force.

(rocket roars)

If the duel of missile
against missile

becomes plausible, the
side that shoots first

might gravely weaken the other,

unless of course the
victim hurriedly launches

his own missiles
before they're hit.

- [Kosta] Missiles are being
tested now from test sites

into the Pacific Ocean
or the Atlantic Ocean

and the same thing is the
case in the Soviet Union.

Neither country, I believe,
have tested missiles

from operational silos
with operational crews

over the trajectory they're
going to follow in time of war.

Therefore we don't really
know what's going to happen

if you try to launch

a thousand missiles
over half an hour

and send them all cross-targeted

against a thousand silos.

This kind of extremely
complex process

that obviously
like all technical

and technological processes
will have bugs in it,

has never been tested, has
never been rehearsed even.

Therefore, it seems to me to say

with any degree of
certainty that indeed

the missile is going to
perform as we expected,

is simply not true.

- I certainly believe the
Soviet Union has taken advantage

of Minuteman
vulnerability in the past

through the development

of their large,
heavy, SS-18 missiles.

I certainly think they
will take advantage

of it in the future.

of it in the future.
As a matter of fact, I think
it's their number one goal

As a matter of fact, I think
it's their number one goal

to be able to launch
first strikes,

wiping out 90% of our
Minuteman III-IVs.

I don't think they'll
do it dramatically

or cause any great
public concern,

but over a period of time
through the mid-1980s

they will take advantage of our
Minuteman III vulnerability.

- The Soviet Union may
within two or three years

have enough accurate
re-entry vehicles

technically to destroy 90%
of the Minuteman silos.

That doesn't mean that they
can destroy the missiles.

They could launched before
they were destroyed.

It doesn't mean that
the Soviet Union

would do what they are
technically capable of doing.

They would use more missiles,
more re-entry vehicles

than they would destroy.

They would still have to
face the submarine launched

ballistic missiles and the
air-launched cruise missiles.

It makes no sense for the
Soviet Union to destroy

only a small component of
the U.S. strategic force.

- One of the first
things the president

has to decide when he's elected

and takes that oath of office,

what will he do if he is
told with no question,

no lack of confirmation
that there is

a 500,000 missile attack
on our Minuteman field?

He shouldn't have to say,
"Gee, I never thought of that.

Let's form a committee."
And as soon as he takes office,

he'd better make up his
mind what he's going to do.

If he's done that,
either he's going to launch

or he's not going to launch.

If he's not going to
launch then clearly

the missiles are at risk.

If he decides that
he will launch

before the adversaries'
missiles arrive,

then they're no longer at risk

and I would think that if
he's made such a decision

and it's understood,
that is part

of the overall deterrence.

- If the worst
came to the worst,

what would actually happen?

Well, this question exercises
well-informed experts

and well-informed computers
both here in Washington

and elsewhere, and they
fight imaginary wars

and try to assess how many
people would be killed

and what damage would
be done on both sides.

And these activities
are called "war games."

Any number can play.

(buttons clicking)

The outcome is always disastrous

with tens or hundreds
of millions of dead.

Yet nowadays the war
games of the superpowers

often commence with one
team making a hopeful strike

at the other's nuclear forces.

The simple idea of
avoiding a nuclear war

by deterrence is being
eroded by notions

on fighting and winning quickly

without suffering
unduly in the process;

a question of a judicial
selection of targets.

- If our enemy is
really the Soviet state

and its leaders, murdering...

murdering Soviet
children is not,

to my mind, where our
strategy ought to be.

Also, I think it's militarily
and politically foolish,

but it's not the kind
of promise of damage

that the Soviets should
find most deterring.

The kind of damage they
would find most deterring

is loss of their military power,

loss of their ability to control
their country politically.

But we can not even
begin to think hard

about what kind of target
sets we should strike for that

unless we at the
same time recognize

that we have to be able
to limit the damage

they can do to us, because
no matter how intelligent

a set of targeting
suggestions I can give you

for our forces, if
the Soviets can kill

a hundred or 120 million
Americans within a few days

of the beginning
of World War Three,

any reasonable American
president who isn't drunk,

drugged, or just insane,
would not be able to exercise

offensive strategic options

because of what
they could do to us

we would be self-deterred.

We have to have a
strategy from which

we are not self-deterred.

- The Soviet argument
about deterrence is this:

very simply, that
if deterrence fails

then you go over to
limiting the damage

upon your own country.

And indeed in military
preparation terms

you take all measures
to minimize that,

even if it should
include striking first

at a potential enemy.

(water splashing loudly)

- [Ustinov] But are Russia's own
forces any safer from attack?

The missile submarines
after the bombers

and land based missiles
are the third main branch

of the superpower's
nuclear forces.

They're intended
always to survive

for the final revenge,
but every Soviet submarine

leaving its base at
Murmansk, attracts attention

from the submarine
hunters of the West.

(aircraft rumbling)

If it's bound for the Atlantic,

it passes under the eyes of
the Norwegian air force.

(aircraft humming)

And they're just the first
of its uninvited escorts,

these watchful men of Norway.

In keeping track of
Soviet submarines,

the allies in NATO
use all the skills

and resources they can command.

Could their superior technology

put the missile submarine
fatally at risk?

(speaking in Norwegian)

The submarine is not well
hidden even if it dives.

When the Norwegians alert
their British colleagues,

a Nimrod aircraft will
pick up the trail.

In the Bible, Nimrod
was the mighty hunter.

(aircraft rumbling)

It's mainly concerned that
the large Soviet fleet

of ordinary submarines
might one day run riot

through the shipping
in the Atlantic,

which prompts this diligence.

(cannister clattering)

The submarine can't avoid
making a noise as it travels.

If they're searching for it
in the right patch of sea,

it'll give away its
position when the RAF men

sow their sound
detectors in the water.

(big splash)

As the readings come in by
radio, they have contact.

So the Russian
submarine finds itself

in a chase that's
disconcertingly realistic.

(buttons clicking)

- Buoys are in the water then

and submarines are
somewhere to the north

of the line of buoys.

And we're expecting them to do--

- [Ustinov] The submarine will
try to shake off its pursuers,

but a string of secret and
ultrasensitive sound detectors

lies in ambush across its path,

all the way from
Britain to Greenland.

(aircraft roaring)

This pursuit
engages the interest

of the United States Navy,

with their clever
airborne instruments.

(aircraft humming)

They track it relentlessly.

This is what passes
for peace in our time.

(aircraft rumbling)

- Sir, here's the tape
you've been waiting for.

The three o'clock...
let's see what's on it.

- All right.

- [Ustinov] And when
the fliers return

to their carrier, a computer
devours their recording.

- Okay, Lieutenant Sandberg.

- [Ustinov] The machine
refreshes its knowledge

of the submarines at sea.

It can always recall
their last positions,

so the Russian
submariners can never feel

safely out of sight
of the western Navy.

At the start of a war many
could be promptly sunk

and they might include some
of the missile carrying boats,

which form an essential part

of the Soviet nuclear deterrent.

The executioner could
be another submarine;

an attack submarine
or hunter-killer.

The American Navy has
fearsome craft of this sort

and they can hound their
prey wherever it goes.

(water churning)

For the coup de grâce
they can strike

with anti-submarine missiles
and homing torpedoes.

(apparatus humming)

American arms control
officials have argued

that these thorough
going systems

of anti-submarine
warfare could well sap

the Russians' confidence
in the submarine branch

of their deterrent.

So, just as the West
abhors the growing power

and accuracy of Soviet
intercontinental missiles,

Soviet leaders may be alarmed

by increasing Western ingenuity.

An ominous interplay
because sooner

than any hope of victory,
it is fear of defeat

that might impel that
fatal first blow.

(water splashing)

- I've no doubt at all

that the political
administration of
the United States

and the political administration
in the Soviet Union

have, in academic terms,

no wish at all to have
a nuclear world war.

I'm convinced of that.

But the technology will
make it almost inevitable

that the politicians
decide to do it

in order to stop the other side,

which they trust very
little, in doing it to them.

And it's this reason
which is so dangerous

for world security.

- Anybody who can count
up to five will tell you

that that building over
there is the Pentagon.

Well, tabloid newspapers
like nothing better

on fallow days than
to publish pictures

of cats and dogs
in perfect harmony

playing innocently together.

It seems to prove that
instinctive antagonisms

can be countered with
a little patience.

Superpowers also have
instinctive antagonisms

by virtue of their size,
their influence, their power,

and they adopt
aggressive postures

before any calmer
counsel can prevail.

Well, how can harmony be
brought to superpowers?

First of all, it's
essential for them

to understand each
other's point of view.

You are seeing the world there

from the point of
view of the West.

I over here from my
surrounded position see it

from the point of view
of the Soviet Union

and I seem to sense from
here, from being surrounded,

I seem to sense your agressions.

I seem to sense your
paranoia even and your fear.

Why? Because of your troops and
listening stations in Alaska.

Throughout the Arctic
Circle, down Europe,

cross Turkey, Iran,
where a hole was driven

into the hedge
only the other day

with characteristic
outcry, Afghanistan,

where the hole was punctured
in the other direction,

China with its offer
to the United States

to compensate for the lost
listening posts in Iran,

and back to Alaska again.

And there is nothing in history
to reassure me from here.

After all, they
remember only too well

that in 1917 feeble
expeditionary forces

from the United States,
Britain, and France

landed in order to attempt to
thwart the 1917 revolution.

They did nothing
in point of fact

but give the Red Army
its first battle honors

and its first experience
against foreign troops.

You may remember how exercised
the United States was

when there were Soviet
missiles on Cuba.

Well, what would be the
position of the United States

and of the entire
West, I wonder,

if there were Soviet troops
and listening devices

all along the Canadian border,
all along the Mexican border,

and throughout the Caribbean?

We must remember and
remember solemnly

that a cornered animal
and a cornered man

are the least open to appeal.

There comes a moment when
the terrible lucidity

of desperation takes over and
then...there is no way back.

Of course the historians,
or whatever historians

there are left,
will always find it

extremely difficult to
decide whether it was

on the pecan pie or
the blueberry tart

that the American president
so nearly choked himself

when he first got the news
of the missile attack.

And what is perhaps
even more difficult

to attribute is the blame
for the end of the world

as we knew it.

As the president himself said
when he recovered his breath,

"Maybe we shouldn't
have gone on alert."

Well, on day one
Washington asked Moscow

to stop fighting the Chinese
and also asked Peking

to stop fighting the Russians.

But on day two, the
Chinese suddenly announced

that the Americans
were now their allies.

"The path to peace lies
through the tunnel

of nuclear confrontation,"
they proclaimed.

The Americans denied this.

The American president said,
"As far as we're concerned

both sides are Communists."

On day three the
Russians set in motion

a huge civil defense exercise.

"That is scary..." said the
Americans and put their bombers

on generated alert.

"The Americans are war
mongering" said the Russians

and sent their
submarines out to sea.

In an effort to bring
down the temperature,

the American president
left his command center

and ostentatiously
undertook all sorts

of civilian duties
and ended the day

with a civilian supper
which was interrupted.

"I want an immediate
decision to execute,"

said the secretary of defense.

"To execute?"

"He has to shoot, to
launch, to get the missiles

off the ground where
they can't be dug out."

"Those aren't cans of caviar
they're sending over, sir.

NORAD predicts 2,000
warheads aimed specifically

at our nuclear bases,
at our missile bases

and our bomber bases.

The general stakes
his life on that data."

"Well I...it wasn't
the general's life

I was thinking
about specifically,"

said the president, "Although
I gotta believe him."

"Can we just hit
their missiles?"

"You'd just be wasting
your force on empty silos."

"That's what we can do
to him if we hurry."

The secretary of state spoke up.

"If you should choose
to do nothing, sir,

"you'd certainly
have my support.

I realize that millions
of us are going to be killed,

but if we retaliate, why,
that's the end of everything."

"No!" said the
secretary of defense.

"He's gambling on
our holding back."

Well, if the president was
listening to these arguments,

he showed no sign of it.

"We hit their silos
and they hit our...

ah, no, they hit our
silos, we hit their cities,

and they hit our cities...

I guess the bullet's
left the rifle, huh?"

"Now, all you have to
say is Tripoli, sir,"

said the defense secretary.

"Yeah...

Tripoli."

"Execute, you have the word
of the commander in chief."

"Do the people know
what's happening?"

said the president as he
was hurried to safety.

"Oh yes, sir, they're getting
it all on television."

- [Narrator] One, go to
a public fallout shelter.

Know where the nearest one is

to your office, your home,
your children's school.

(ominous tone)

If you decided to
take shelter at home,

know how to improvise and
improve your protection there.

(water jet gushing)

- Everybody wants to
avoid the big war,

of course they do, but how?

For as long as
anyone can remember,

Switzerland here has been
the main talking shop

for peace and disarmament.

And here in Geneva at the
Palace of the Nations,

the negotiators now talk
of nuclear submarines

and napalm where
they once talked

of battleships and bayonets.

And in their embassies,
in their villas,

in their hotels, the
negotiators struggle through

glaciers of talk and
mountain ranges of paper

with exemplary patience.

What drives them on?

It is the hope
that among all this

there may be the magic
words, the magic few pages

which will save
millions of lives.

I wish I could report
that our Swiss hosts

have the greatest confidence
in these negotiations,

but they are by nature
a cautious people

and they have hedged their
bets in quite an expensive way.

Like the Chinese who
have covered their land

with a rabbit warren
of protective tunnels,

the Swiss are resolved
that they will survive

any nuclear holocaust which
happens to drift this way.

(water gushing)

Switzerland, owing to
her special status,

is hardly likely to be the
object of direct attack

from any quarter, but
whereas bombs may recognize

neutrality, fallout
has no such scruples.

(wind blowing &
indistinct noises)

Every man not
assigned to the army

is forced to serve in
Switzerland's civil defense

and the men in the very
sinister suits behind me,

well they could be
engineers, factory workers,

or clerks practicing here in
Geneva's civil defense school.

By law every new house
built in Switzerland

has to have, purpose built
in the very foundations,

a shelter as a protection
against nuclear war,

but...be warned.

This nation of fine
hotels and boarding houses

makes no special provision
for foreign tourists,

nor indeed for the foreign
negotiators in Geneva,

should their missions fail.

(shovels scraping)

The local government has a
larger and stronger shelter

from which it would continue
to administer the canton

in the event of...
fallout drifting across

from France, Germany, or Italy,

or a few misguided missiles
actually falling on Swiss soil.

Oh yes, I always suspected
that the last survivor

would be a bureaucrat.

But actually, the
Swiss are more active

and more determined
in civil defense

than any of the
countries engaged

in the nuclear confrontation
whose populations

are asked to trust
the nuclear strategy

of their governments,
enshrined, of course,

in the principle of deterrence.

- Deterrence has worked
so far because of the fact

that no aggressor
could contemplate

starting a nuclear war
and gaining any advantage.

Any aggressor would
be faced with the fact

that for him to start
a nuclear exchange

would mean national suicide.

It's also worked because
both sides recognize

that they have the
retaliatory forces

that provide that
deterrent and, therefore,

they don't have to start
an exchange out of fear...

out of fear that their
deterrent would be destroyed.

Now as long as those
factors continue to exist,

deterrence will
continue to exist,

and that, of course,
is one of the purposes

of arms control, to
preserve that situation

of strategic stability.

- We have, most of
the time since the end

of World War II, have
had nuclear superiority,

so the Soviet Union
did not dare attack us.

I think today we have
what we would call

rough equivalence or parity.

The Soviet Union
would not attack,

but if we allow them
through treaties

or through our own
decisions of cutting back

our forces unilaterally, to
achieve nuclear superiority

then deterrence will break down

and there is the
possibility of an attack

by the Soviet Union.

- In the next five years

I think it's possible to
state almost statistically

that a risk of nuclear
war is quite considerable,

precisely because of
the imbalance in forces

and the different
perceptions of both sides.

If we can get
through to the 1990s

then I think the
danger would recede.

- I believe that the incentive

for all nuclear weapon states,

in particular...the
two major powers...

to find a way of regulating
their competition

in the nuclear
field, that incentive

remains very powerful.
I would expect that

in the messy world
of the future,

with possibly other nuclear
weapons states around,

that incentive will
grow even further.

And so, the two major
countries responsible

for the maintenance of
deterrence...will, I think...

find it almost inevitable
that they should sit down,

they should try in
dialogue and in agreements

to regulate this relationship.

- Perhaps every 5 or 10
years it should be required

that all world leaders
attend a multi-megaton blast

in the atmosphere.

I think if they
were to, let's say,

strip down to their
skivvies to feel the heat

at a distance of
some 20 or 30 miles...

they would appreciate
a little better

the enormity of the
power which they have

at their disposal
and I think that once

they realize this and
continue to realize it

the way I think our
present world leaders do,

then I think we can
count on the deterrence

for a very long time.

- People talk about disarming,
destroying nuclear weapons.

I think that is not
the way to do it.

I think there will
be too much suspicion

that the other guy will hide

some missiles, hide some
bombs, and thereby acquire...

supremacy of some
kind when you disarm.

So my belief is let's stop
the technological arms race.

Let's not make any new weapons.

Let's leave what we have alone

and gradually even
stoop proof testing it,

so those missiles
will rot or corrode

or whatever will you
have it in the silos

and the submarines will
become less and less safe

to dive under the sea.

And that kind of a
obsolescence...

will make it less
and less tempting...

to use or even to
threaten to use

these arsenals in time
of political crisis.

- [Ustinov] May the missiles
then pass uneventfully

from decrepit silos
in distant fields

to decent exposure
in famous museums.

And here in future times
the visitor will, perhaps,

pause to wonder at
our unromantic age

when great nations spoke
plainly to one another

only in the language of
mutual extermination.

But it's for the sake
of those new generations

that I trust we'll
allow no other fears

ever to surpass our
fear of nuclear war,

and think no effort of mind
and heart too troublesome

or too risky if
the alternative is

that our nuclear
nightmares come to pass.

(indistinct chatter)