All language subtitles for The Secret History of ISIS PBS Frontline 1080p HDTV 2016 EN_Subtitles01.ENG

>> Multiple attacks have
occurred in or around Paris.

>> NARRATOR: ISIS.

They are the world's most
feared terrorist group.

>> Condemning today's
bombings in Baghdad...

>> NARRATOR: Tonight, the story
of where they came from.

>> We created chaos.

We abandoned that chaos.

We created ISIS.

>> NARRATOR: How they waged
war for more than a decade.

>> The invasion toppled the
government, but Zarqawi ripped

the country in half.

>> These people are really
prepared to fight the world

and demonstrate that in an
act of horrific violence.

>> NARRATOR: The failures
of two American presidents.

>> The United States government
made decisions that seemed

to make sense at the time,
but without those series of

decisions, there
would be no ISIS.

>> NARRATOR: Tonight, "The
Secret History of ISIS."

>> Frontline is made possible
by contributions to your PBS

station from viewers like you.

Thank you.

And by the Corporation
for Public Broadcasting.

Major support for Frontline is
provided by the John D. and

Catherine T. MacArthur
Foundation, committed to

building a more just,
verdant and peaceful world.

More information is
available at macfound.org.

Additional support is provided
by the Park Foundation,

dedicated to heightening
public awareness of critical

issues.

The John and Helen Glessner
Family Trust, supporting

trustworthy journalism
that informs and inspires.

The Ford Foundation, working
with visionaries on the front

lines of social change worldwide,
at fordfoundation.org.

The Wyncote Foundation.

And by the Frontline
Journalism Fund, with major

support from Jon
and Jo Ann Hagler.

>> The guerrilla army that
roared east to take over...

>> NARRATOR: It was early 2014.

>> ISIS has seized
many Iraqi cities.

>> NARRATOR: They seemed
to come out of nowhere.

>> In northern Iraq, a number
of districts have been taken

over by fighters.

>> Militants have swallowed up

territory, and they're
pushing toward Baghdad.

>> NARRATOR: The terror group
ISIS started capturing key

territory in Iraq.

>> The jolting gong was when
they swept into western Iraq

and took control of a
third of western Iraq.

The banks that were robbed and

stripped, the assets that were
stripped in that entire area

was huge.

And that was, as I said, the
jolting gong that said, "Wait a

minute, how could this happen?"

>> Deep concern about ISIS
pushing into Baghdad.

>> ISIS has been seizing
territory in Iraq.

>> They were able to swiftly
take over huge areas of Iraq.

It was shocking how the army
didn't even fight, didn't even

put a fight.

>> And taking over Mosul,
the second largest city...

>> I think Washington was
stunned when the second largest

city in Iraq, a city of two
million people, fell in a day.

To a terrorist organization
that we had not imagined was

in the first order of
terrorist organizations.

>> NARRATOR: But these
fighters were not new.

They had been at war for more
than a decade, ever since the

American invasion of Iraq.

They have used beheadings,
suicide bombings, and mass

killings to implement
a violent plan.

A plan designed and
carried out by this man:

Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,
the founder of ISIS.

>> NARRATOR: The secret history

of ISIS began at the CIA
in the aftermath of 9/11.

There was an urgent question
about Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

>> I was an analyst working on

the team that was charged with
evaluating whether or not

al-Qaeda and Iraq had conspired
together to conduct 9/11

attacks.

>> NARRATOR: At the agency's
Counterterrorism Center,

analyst Nada Bakos was tasked
with learning everything she

could about Zarqawi.

>> On the team, as an analyst,

the big question was whether or

not Zarqawi was part of
al-Qaeda at the time.

>> NARRATOR: Bakos began by
piecing together Zarqawi's life.

>> Zarqawi grew up in Zarqa,
Jordan, which was also near

a Palestinian refugee camp.

He was a tough kid in
a tough neighborhood.

>> NARRATOR: Poor and angry, it
didn't take long for Zarqawi

to get into trouble.

>> He was a thug.

He was in and out of prison.

He was a petty criminal.

It was rumored that he
had worked as a pimp.

>> He was into drugs.

He was into tattoos.

You know, his friends in Zarqa

used to call him the "green man"

because of all the tattoos
that he had on his body.

>> NARRATOR: Behind bars,
Zarqawi would undergo

a transformation.

>> In this prison, al-Jafr
Prison, they allowed him to

share cell block with other
radical fighters or people

who wanted to launch Jihad.

>> In prison, he really came

into his own, because he managed

to dominate the other prisoners.

He managed to establish
himself as a leader.

He took his religion
more and more seriously.

>> Zarqawi at the time was the

muscle of the movement in jail,

and he roughed a lot of people
up during his time in jail.

>> NARRATOR: As the "green man"

became more religious, he knew

his tattoos would be
viewed as sinful.

A razor blade was
smuggled into the prison.

>> It was brutal.

He had them actually...
the skin taken off.

>> It's like he's shedding his
old life, and this tattoo

was a reminder of who he was,
and he had to get rid of that

to almost purify himself.

>> NARRATOR: After five
years, Zarqawi was released.

>> Zarqawi became a leader
among the jihadists in prison,

and came out of prison in
Jordan a jihadist firebrand.

Had reimagined himself as a
mujahid, or holy warrior,

dedicated to the establishment
of the Islamic empire.

>> NARRATOR: In his quest
to become a holy warrior,

Zarqawi left Jordan.

The CIA tracked him to
Kandahar, Afghanistan.

Zarqawi hoped to meet
Osama bin Laden.

>> When he does go to Kandahar

to try to meet with bin
Laden, he's rejected.

At his point, Zarqawi is so low

on the totem pole, and it's
just something that was just

beneath him.

>> Neither Osama bin Laden nor
his deputy Ayman al-Zawahiri

were terribly
impressed with him.

He seemed and acted like a thug.

He was not very sophisticated.

In fact, they considered him a

rather poor recruit to al-Qaeda.

>> NARRATOR: Zarqawi would leave

Kandahar determined to continue

jihad, and to prove
bin Laden wrong.

In 2002, he saw his chance.

As President Bush signaled
Saddam Hussein had to go,

Zarqawi moved to a terrorist
camp in northern Iraq.

It set off alarm
bells at the CIA.

CIA operations officer Sam
Faddis, who ran a kill/capture

team, was assigned the case.

>> Headquarters is extremely,
extremely interested.

I mean, the number one
time-sensitive priority,

as of June '02, when I left
headquarters, was go collect on

this Islamic extremist enclave
along the Iran/Iraq border.

>> NARRATOR: It didn't take
long for Faddis to find Zarqawi

and learn what was
going on in the camp.

>> We literally had guys that
were working for us that were

inside the camp.

They're working on chemical
and biological weapons.

They were doing a lot of work
with cyanide-based things.

>> NARRATOR: At CIA
headquarters, it was a threat

they could not ignore if
American troops were to invade

Iraq.

>> If we took Saddam out,
Zarqawi was going to cause

a lot of problems.

He was someone who we would
have wanted dead if we had the

opportunity and the
wherewithal to do it.

>> NARRATOR: And Sam Faddis
had a plan to do just that.

>> I mean, a handful of aircraft

tomorrow, with the specificity

that we have in their locations,
will end this threat.

And we will finish these guys.

>> This seemed like the perfect

moment-- we know where they are,
we know what they're up to.

This seemed like the right time

to target them and
to go after them.

>> NARRATOR: The attack plan
was fast-tracked from the CIA

to the White House.

But as America prepared to
take out Saddam Hussein, the

president was told that hitting

Zarqawi could cause a problem.

>> I remember there were
discussions about attacking

various camps that we thought
bad guys were hanging out in,

and I think the one you're
referring to, we made a judgment

that, "Let's not start the
war before we're ready."

>> NARRATOR: When news of
the decision reached CIA

headquarters, there
was frustration.

>> (laughs): Oh!

I couldn't believe it.

We have a prime opportunity to

take out a jihadist that we know

poses a threat to our allies,

in addition to American
forces, once they invade.

>> There was nobody on that team

who felt like Washington had
made the right decision.

There's another country
getting up, ready to go up in

flames.

We're giving them
time and space.

This will turn out very badly.

We need to get them, get
rid of them right now.

>> NARRATOR: But as Vice-
President Dick Cheney headed to

the CIA, he was preparing to do
something else with Zarqawi:

use him to connect bin Laden
and Saddam Hussein to make

the case for war.

>> Vice-President Cheney
came to the CIA asking lots

of questions.

He wanted to know not only, "Is
there a connection between

Saddam Hussein and bin Laden?",
but, "We want there to be

a connection between the two."

>> NARRATOR: The CIA officers
believed there was no evidence

of a connection.

>> No, never.

We never found any indication
that Zarqawi was in Baghdad

working for Saddam or
linked up with Saddam.

>> NARRATOR: The vice-president

and his chief of staff,
Scooter Libby, pushed back.

>> It was pretty intense.

We were lined up on one side
of the table, Vice-President

Cheney and Scooter Libby
were on the other side.

And they walked in with a lot
of questions and being very

skeptical as to the intelligence
that we had been gathering

up to that point.

>> NARRATOR: Cheney seemed to
want Zarqawi to be the link

between Saddam Hussein
and Osama bin Laden.

>> The vice-president's
frustrated.

His questions are all about
Zarqawi, his connection to

Saddam, and whether or not
they had discussed 9/11,

and if Saddam had participated.

>> NARRATOR: Bakos says the
vice-president didn't like

the answer.

>> We tried to explain over and
over again that it would be

impossible for him logically
to be working with Saddam.

>> There was no connection
between al-Qaeda and Saddam

Hussein and Iraq
that we could find.

Zarqawi's the kind of guy Saddam

would kill without a
moment's thought.

>> And the response to that was
met with skepticism, lots of

questions, and a lot
more frustration.

>> NARRATOR: But at the White

House, the allegations
would not go away.

They would appear again as Colin

Powell prepared for a speech at

the United Nations designed to

convince the public
to support the war.

>> The speech supposedly had

been prepared in the
White House in the NSC.

But when we were given what had

been prepared, it was totally
inadequate, and we couldn't

track anything in it.

And when I asked Condi Rice, the

National Security Advisor, where

did this come from, it turns out

the vice-president's
office had written it.

>> NARRATOR: Powell would turn
to the CIA to vet the speech.

>> We had a copy of the speech
that was sent over from the

White House that Powell was
preparing, and one of our senior

analysts was working on it,
editing, working on the language

to ensure that it
reflected our analysis.

>> The speech that will be heard

round the world at
the Security Council.

>> Powell will try to make the

link between Iraq and al-Qaeda.

>> NARRATOR: Just days later,
Powell arrived at the United

Nations.

>> We have come to another
critical moment on the way

to a new war with Iraq.

>> Walking into that room is
always a daunting experience,

but I had been there before.

And we had projectors and all
sorts of technology to help us

make the case.

>> In this chamber of the United

Nations today, the
Secretary of State...

>> There in the center of
attention, Secretary of State

Colin Powell and George Tenet,
the director of the CIA...

>> I think he was very nervous.

Powell doesn't like to read
speeches; he likes to have

a few note cards and then
do his Powell thing.

But this one he read from
the text, every word.

>> My purpose today is to
provide you with additional

information.

>> NARRATOR: At the
Counterterrorism Center,

Bakos was watching carefully
to see what Powell would say

about Zarqawi, bin Laden,
and Saddam Hussein.

>> We're sitting in our room
at CTC watching the television

with a copy of the
speech in our hand.

>> What I want to bring to
your attention today is the

potentially much more sinister
nexus between Iraq and the

al-Qaeda terrorist network.

>> When he got to our portion,
it went off our script fairly

quickly.

And we were looking around
at each other saying,

"Where's he at, where's he at?"

We're flipping through pages.

And so, you know, right away,
we could tell that this wasn't

reflecting the language
that we had used.

>> NARRATOR: Powell used Zarqawi

to make the connection between
bin Laden and Saddam Hussein.

>> Iraq today harbors a deadly

terrorist network headed by Abu

Musab al-Zarqawi, an associate

collaborator of Osama bin Laden

and his al-Qaeda lieutenants.

>> It drew conclusions in
language we would not use.

So we were very, very, very
careful about describing the

relationship as we saw it,
and it seemed to overinflate

and not reflect our analysis.

>> How did that happen, Nada?

>> Within the process of how it

went, you know, where it
went back to the White House

and who worked on it after that,

I don't know how it was
changed, or by who.

>> NARRATOR: Powell now says the

speech was approved by CIA chief

George Tenet, but he doesn't
remember the details about

Zarqawi.

>> Why did he make
it into the speech?

>> I don't remember.

Zarqawi was not anything
uppermost in my mind.

It was not a significant
part of the speech for me.

It was almost a
passing reference.

>> NARRATOR: But it was more
than a passing reference.

Seven minutes of Powell's
speech were devoted to Zarqawi.

His name is mentioned 21 times.

Powell transformed Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi in the eyes of the

world.

>> From his terrorist network
in Iraq, Zarqawi can direct

his network in the
Middle East and beyond.

>> I can't even imagine what
that did for Zarqawi's ego,

to be, you know, here he is,
his name is spoken at the U.N.

Now he's showing bin Laden and
al-Qaeda who he really is,

right?

He's become this iconic person
without ever really doing

anything.

>> NARRATOR: In the days that
followed the speech, Zarqawi

disappeared.

>> Rapid series of 40 explosions

lit up Baghdad in the
early morning hours.

>> Military officials have been

using the term "shock and awe"

to describe the
assault on Iraq.

>> NARRATOR: Zarqawi watched
the American "Shock and Awe"

campaign, and as the occupation
began, Zarqawi waited for an

opportunity.

Before long, the man George W.

Bush picked to run Iraq, L.
Paul Bremer, gave him one.

>> And those who were on high
before, in particular the

Baathists... >>
NARRATOR: He promised

to purge the Iraqi government.

>> ...will be removed
from office.

>> NARRATOR: He also issued an

order that disbanded the
entire Iraqi military.

>> You had something on the
order of 250,000 Iraqi men,

military age, all trained
in using weapons.

Suddenly, they were
all out of a job.

>> NARRATOR: The powerful
message: Saddam and his

Sunni-controlled army
were no longer in charge.

>> Army was the central
instrument of Saddam's

repression of the
Kurds and the Shia.

I think the decision not to
recall Saddam's Army, from a

political point of view, is the

single most important correct
decision that we made in the

14 months we were there.

>> NARRATOR: But on the ground,

the American military commanders
could feel the effects.

>> The effect, frankly,
was devastating.

I think that's where the seeds
of what became the Sunni

insurgency were largely planted.

>> We had, you know, long lines
of soldiers demanding money,

demanding to be rehired.

There was that whole sense
of, you know, militaries,

defeated militaries should
be treated with respect,

and that's not what happened.

>> Week after week after week,
the big demonstrations got

larger and larger.

There was enormous concern
because the demonstrations

were out of hand.

There were actually killings.

>> They feel like they're going
to go by the wayside, that

they're going to be not only
the minority population,

but treated as if they don't ma.

So they were easy targets
for Zarqawi to recruit.

>> NARRATOR: Now Abu Musab
al-Zarqawi had his opportunity.

(explosion)

In the weeks that followed,
the insurgency began.

(explosions)

>> When these sorts of attacks

began, nobody was quite clear,

I think, where they were coming
from, who was behind them,

and how sustainable they were.

>> There has been another
spasm of violence in Iraq.

>> A car bomb killed at
least five Iraqis...

>> NARRATOR: In Washington,
they insisted everything

was under control.

>> There's an absence of
authority, a vacuum of

authority for most people.

>> I picked up a newspaper today
and I couldn't believe it.

I read eight headlines that
talked about chaos, violence,

unrest, and it just was Henny
Penny, "The sky is falling!"

I've never seen
anything like it.

It's just unbelievable how
people can take that away

from what is happening
in that country.

>> Willful denial is
one way of putting it.

I mean, I remember, you know,
thinking at the beginning,

this is really, really strange.

It's one thing to analyze the
situation and then spin it;

it's another thing to then
start to believe your spin.

(explosion)

>> NARRATOR: In August,
the biggest bombing yet.

>> A massive explosion to
the Jordanian Embassy...

>> Morning mayhem in Baghdad...

>> Terrorists exploded a truck
outside the compound...

>> This Iraqi runs in, and
I said, "What happened?"

And he said, "It was hit
by a suicide bomber."

I think that was the first one.

To think that after that, there

would be hundreds and hundreds

and hundreds of suicide bombers,

thousands, even, it's amazing.

>> The bloodshed in Iraq...
>> NARRATOR: It was Zarqawi's

first major attack.

>> The capital's worst day since

Saddam Hussein was toppled.

>> NARRATOR: Then, less than
two weeks later, a bomb at the

United Nations headquarters.

>> Zarqawi had a strategy.

He's just trying to leave it so

that it's only the United States

military left, and it's a
black and white conflict.

And this will enable him then to

rally considerably more support
to himself and to his cause.

>> 40 people have died
today in a series...

>> The immediate effect of that

was the U.N. left and all the
NGOs were gone within a few

weeks, all of them.

And so it essentially
left the Americans alone.

That was it.

It's just you.

It turned Baghdad into a kind of

eerie militarized ghost town.

>> A U.S. vehicle was on patrol
when it came under attack.

>> Violence has returned
with a vengeance.

Last night, two more
soldiers killed...

>> The most deadly was a car
bombing that killed at least

11 people.

>> NARRATOR: In Washington,
Bakos and other analysts sifted

the evidence from the bombings.

Soon, President George W. Bush
received a briefing document

written by Bakos, but
without her name attached.

It outlined Zarqawi's
role in the bombings.

>> I wrote a Presidential Daily

Brief based on intelligence that

we had received that Zarqawi was
responsible for some of the

major initial attacks in 2003,
that he was still there, and

that he was looking
to foment civil war.

>> NARRATOR: The information
made its way to Scooter Libby

in the vice-president's office.

(phone dialing)

Bakos says she was at
her desk at the CIA.

Her private phone rang.

>> I received a phone call
at my desk, to my own line,

from Scooter Libby's office.

To call an individual analyst

is only about pressuring them--
intimidation.

We write these anonymously when
they go to the White House;

our names are not
attached to the brief.

And I immediately told him I
couldn't discuss any of this

and hung up.

>> NARRATOR: At the vice-
president's office, they weren't

done with Bakos.

She and her supervisor were
summoned for a face-to-face

meeting.

>> We were there because they
wanted to figure out how they

could poke holes
in the analysis.

>> NARRATOR: The questions
centered around Bakos's

conclusion that there was
an organized insurgency

led by Zarqawi.

>> There was a lot of
consternation in the

administration using the term
"insurgents" because it would

look as if the Iraqis weren't
embracing what we were doing.

Insurgency implies that
they're fighting against us.

>> Certainly in the fall
of 2003, the United States

was in denial that an
insurgency was brewing.

In fact, that terminology
was almost outlawed.

No one could use it.

>> NARRATOR: We wanted to ask

the vice-president and his chief

of staff about these matters,
but neither would agree to be

interviewed.

>> Four car bombs went off
almost simultaneously.

>> The attacks came during
the busy Baghdad commute.

>> At least 35 people have
been killed in a huge car bomb

attack in Baghdad.

>> NARRATOR: In Iraq, with
America's top leaders in denial,

Zarqawi was free to
raise the stakes.

>> I think the senior leadership

of the Bush Administration
was slow to realize: A, that

there was an insurgency.

And B, that there was an
evil genius behind it.

And C, that that evil
genius was Zarqawi.

>> NARRATOR: Zarqawi would now

send a message to the
American people.

>> Zarqawi already had captured
people's attention from the

succession of suicide bombings.

Now he cultivated a different

means to do so, and with someone

like Nicholas Berg, I think very

tragically, he found exactly
the kind of person he wanted:

an American, a do-gooder,
who was also Jewish.

>> NARRATOR: That's
Zarqawi in the middle.

>> If you watch it really
closely, it's a Zarqawi show.

He's standing there, he's
reading in his guttural voice,

he's reading this document.

>> Then he's finished reading,
and I'll never forget this.

He finishes reading, and he just

hands the script to an aide,
who kind of takes it.

It was just like a CEO handing
his briefcase to his aide.

And then he pulls
out the machete.

>> Allahu Akbar!

>> (screaming)

>> It's the only beheading video

I've ever watched, the first
and last, because it was so

horrifying.

You can hear all the noises of

the poor man's death and Zarqawi

standing over the mutilated body

delivering his message
to the world.

>> The fact that Zarqawi was
killing people personally made

him far more appealing to the
20-something Sunni in Saudi

Arabia or Iraq or even in
Europe, the foreign fighter

kind of guy that you want to
go join if you're one of those

young disaffected Sunnis.

>> NARRATOR: Finally, Zarqawi
had the full attention of the

Bush administration.

The American government placed

a $25 million bounty on Zarqawi.

>> But it basically puts the
same price on his head that

Osama bin Laden has on his, and

it basically elevates him now to

enemy number one for
the United States.

>> NARRATOR: Bin Laden had
once rejected Zarqawi.

Now he couldn't ignore him.

>> It's shortly after that
the relationship changes.

Zarqawi is the new start-up,
and bin Laden wants to invest.

He wants Zarqawi to use
the al-Qaeda brand.

So since al-Qaeda hadn't done
anything since 9/11, this was

a perfect opportunity for bin
Laden to get back in the game.

>> NARRATOR: For Zarqawi, it
was the seal of approval.

And in a letter to bin
Laden obtained by American

intelligence, he outlined
what he planned to do next.

>> "As the decisive moment
approaches, we feel that our

body has begun to spread
into the security vacuum."

>> What Zarqawi says in the
letter is, "We have one choice,

and that is to start a sectarian
war and basically to set

all of Iraq on fire, and to
draw in the whole world."

>> "If we succeed in dragging

them into the arena of sectarian

war, it will become possible to

awaken the inattentive Sunnis."

>> "We're going to foment a
civil war, and this will cause

the Shia to overreact.

They are going to go after the
minority Sunni population,

and then the Sunnis are going
to have to turn to us,

the jihadists, to defend them."

(explosion)

>> NARRATOR: Now Zarqawi acted.

(explosion)

He initiated unprecedented
unrestrained violence against

the Shia.

(explosion)

(siren blaring)

>> 170 people died in that
weekend truck bombing...

>> Daily life in Iraq:

the kidnappings and thousands
of killings every month.

>> These killings have
created a climate of fear.

>> A wave of sectarian killing
across Iraq left at least...

>> NARRATOR: Zarqawi was
becoming known by a new name:

the sheikh of the slaughterers.

>> A suicide car
bombing killed 12.

>> Once he pivoted to Shia,
Baghdad was just hammered with

huge car bombs, but also
just daily assassinations...

...of families, of neighbors.

Then you started having
those torture cells,

the beheading videos...

The invasion toppled the
government, but Zarqawi

ripped the country in half.

>> God, the horrible, horrible

years in Iraq, when there were,

you know, hundreds and hundreds
of car bombs and suicide

bombings, it was
incredible what they did.

I mean, it was murderous, it was

psychopathic, it was horrific,

but it was really extraordinary.

>> NARRATOR: For Osama bin
Laden, the violence against

fellow Muslims was too much.

Bin Laden's top deputy, Ayman
al-Zawahiri, dispatched

this letter to Zarqawi.

>> "Many of your Muslim admirers

are wondering about your
attacks on the Shia.

The sharpness of this
questioning increases when the

attacks are on one
of their mosques."

>> So the response from al-Qaeda

was, "Stop doing
what you're doing.

Killing Shia and other Muslims
aren't going to achieve the

objective that we need.

This isn't the path that we want

you to take, and we're
telling you to stop."

>> "My opinion is that this
matter won't be acceptable to

the Muslim populace however much

you have tried to explain it,
and the aversion to this will

continue."

>> 170 people died in that
weekend truck bombing...

>> NARRATOR: But
Zarqawi disagreed.

His plan for a Sunni resurgence
relied on brutal sectarian

violence.

>> Attacks are constant
and often grisly.

>> NARRATOR: And he would
respond to Zawahiri and bin

Laden with one
devastating attack.

He blew up an important Shia
shrine: the golden dome

in Samarra.

>> Samarra was the straw that
broke the camel's back for the

sectarian war.

He just took down the biggest
revered shrine in Iraq.

And immediately, it was within

12 hours that everything
in Iraq changed.

It wasn't it went from good
to bad; it went from horrible

to unbelievably horrible.

>> NARRATOR: It was
all-out civil war.

Tens of thousands would die.

>> And that set off a cycle of

violence between Sunni and Shia
that al-Qaeda tried to fuel

as much as they possibly could,

Zarqawi directing it, of
course, very capably.

>> Zarqawi achieved what
he wanted to achieve.

He had fomented anger and fear
and frustration enough that

populations felt pitted
against each other.

>> NARRATOR: As the civil war
raged, Zarqawi decided to do

something bold: he would
reveal his face on camera.

>> He understood the
power of the Internet.

It showed him using an
American automatic weapon.

(gunshots)

Not necessarily using it
correctly, but he did use it in

a way that I think established
his flair for publicity.

>> It's propaganda.

It's recruitment.

It shows what their
intention is.

He's wanting other
people to join him.

He's building his
army at this point.

>> NARRATOR: In the video,
Zarqawi made a surprising

proclamation.

He would create an "Islamic
state," the first step toward a

global caliphate.

>> He was never content just
to be the thug from Zarqa, and

he wasn't content just to be the
guy who beheaded Nick Berg.

He wanted to rule a caliphate.

>> NARRATOR: It was something

bin Laden hadn't yet pushed for.

>> Al-Qaeda saw that time as a
long way off, and Zarqawi was

very, very much more impatient.

He said, "This we can do now."

>> Allahu Akbar!

>> NARRATOR: For Zarqawi, the
creation of the caliphate

would be the fulfillment
of a prophecy.

>> That religious vision
promises the return of God's

kingdom on earth, the
reestablishment of the early

Islamic empire, the empowerment
of Sunni Muslims around the

world.

That the reestablished caliphate

will eventually take over the
entire globe, and then the

entire world will come
crashing to an end.

>> The lead aircraft is going to

engage it here momentarily with

a 500-pound bomb on the target.

>> NARRATOR: The next video the
world would see of Zarqawi

was very different.

(explosion)

In 2006, the U.S. military
received a tip and bombed

Zarqawi's hideout.

>> The terrorist whose
forces set off so many...

>> NARRATOR: Zarqawi was dead.

But his call for an Islamic
state would live on.

>> Abu Musab al-Zarqawi,
the notorious leader of

al-Qaeda in Iraq, is dead.

>> Zarqawi's death is a
severe blow to al-Qaeda.

It's a victory in the
global war on terror.

>> NARRATOR: President Bush
seized the initiative.

He ordered a surge of American
troops into Iraq to stop the

bloodshed.

>> Troops both Iraqi and
American will try to slow down

the killing among Sunni Arabs.

>> The surge began, but the
president stands increasingly

alone.

>> The White House is
calling its Iraq plan...

>> NARRATOR: General David
Petraeus was the commander.

>> The priority had to be on
securing the Iraqi population,

and that this could only be
done by living with the people.

So we went back into the
neighborhoods in Baghdad and

other areas that were threatened
by this ever-spiraling

Sunni/Shia cycle of violence.

>> $10,000, $20,000,
$30,000, $40,000.

>> NARRATOR: Helped by hundreds

of millions of dollars, Petraeus

made an alliance with the Sunni

tribes that had once
worked with Zarqawi.

>> The hierarchy in society
chopped off too many heads

there, taken too many wives
from the local population,

had upset the power structures.

Guys from the tribes started
to turn against al-Qaeda

and looked to the U.S.
military for support.

>> NARRATOR: One by one,
American special forces

and former Sunni militants
killed Zarqawi's followers.

>> Al-Qaeda in Iraq
had been eviscerated.

There were probably 37
individuals that survived that

onslaught that we created
in '07 and '08 that were

really al-Qaeda.

>> The definition of destruction
is that you are rendered

incapable of performing your
mission without reconstitution.

So they're flat on their face,

and they're down, and we had
our boot on their neck.

>> NARRATOR: What was left
of Zarqawi's group would go

underground for three years.

("Hail to the Chief" playing)

>> NARRATOR: By 2009, the war
in Iraq was the responsibility

of a new president.

>> President Obama was elected

on a promise to get the United

States out of Iraq, and he
was determined to do that.

>> NARRATOR: And early in his
presidency, he announced his

plan in front of
thousands of Marines.

>> I've come to speak to you
about how the war in Iraq

will end.

The situation in
Iraq has improved.

Al-Qaeda in Iraq has been dealt
a serious blow by our troops

and Iraq security forces.

>> NARRATOR: For Barack
Obama, it was time to move on

from Iraq.

>> I intend to remove all U.S.

troops from Iraq by
the end of 2011.

(applause)

>> The last U.S. troops
are now leaving Iraq.

>> They're packing up and ready

to hand over the remaining...
>> After almost nine years

of war and thousands
of lives lost...

>> We disengaged not only
militarily at the end of 2011,

we disengaged politically.

The war was over.

We were out.

Let the chips fall
where they may.

Well, I don't think we thought

through exactly how many chips

were going to fall and what the

consequences of that would be.

>> NARRATOR: Once the Americans
were gone, what was left of

Zarqawi's group, isolated in
northwestern Iraq, began to

rebuild.

They had a new leader: Zarqawi's

successor, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

>> I mean, he really is a
chip off the old block,

in terms of Zarqawi.

He has the same sort of
sensibilities, the same flair

for publicity, the same obsession
with widespread violence.

>> They are part of
a similar ideology.

They believe in political Islam.

They have a view
of the caliphate.

Baghdadi had a Ph.D.

He was a soccer player.

>> NARRATOR: Abu Bakr
al-Baghdadi's journey from

religious scholar to jihadist

leader started back in the early

days of the American occupation.

As the U.S. Army conducted mass

sweeps of the Sunni population,
Baghdadi was put into an

American prison.

>> For a number of people who
had spent time in these jails,

they spoke about them as
jihadi training camps.

So through being in jail
together, people created new

networks.

>> NARRATOR: They were known
as "jihadi universities."

Baghdadi learned
Zarqawi's methods.

>> He is able to network with
other committed jihadists,

capable jihadists that were
attached to major organizations

like al-Qaeda in Iraq, and he
begins to network with these

men, many of whom he would
rise with through the ranks of

al-Qaeda in Iraq, later
the Islamic State.

>> NARRATOR: After his release,
Baghdadi moved up inside

Zarqawi's organization.

>> He very wisely played up the

idea that his tribe had direct

links to the Prophet Mohammed.

And this was very important for
establishing his legitimacy

as a leader.

>> NARRATOR: In audio
recordings, Baghdadi would use

his religious authority to
justify acts of terror.

>> NARRATOR: And after Zarqawi's
death, it was Baghdadi who

eventually seized control.

>> Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi was
much more assertive and much

cleverer and much more ruthless

than anyone had thought, and so

was able to eliminate rivals,
was able to get success.

And success of course is a
great attracter of support.

>> NARRATOR: As the group's new
leader, Baghdadi worked to

rebuild, and in keeping with
Zarqawi's strategy, he looked

for a state in chaos to exploit.

>> Protests continue against
the rule of President...

>> Across the country,
thousands of people took...

>> NARRATOR: He saw one
across the border in Syria.

>> And a new wave of protests
against Bashar al-Assad...

>> NARRATOR: Civil
unrest was breaking out.

>> It was an ideal set of
circumstances for Abu Bakr

al-Baghdadi to capitalize on.

>> (chanting)

>> NARRATOR: Protests against

Syrian president Bashar al-Assad
had been met with force.

(gunfire)

>> There were peaceful
demonstrations.

These were put down violently,

and that then sparked
this cycle of violence.

>> NARRATOR: As the unrest grew,

Baghdadi secretly sent agents
into Syria to help fuel civil

war.

>> He wanted to establish
the caliphate now.

He wanted to take over towns,
villages, and then cities.

The border between Iraq and
Syria could disappear if his

organization controlled
both sides of the border.

>> NARRATOR: In Damascus,
Baghdadi's men used the bloody

methods of Zarqawi's insurgency
to announce their presence.

>> I was sitting in my
ambassador's residence

in the upstairs den, reading,
when the two bombs went off.

Immediately, from my time in
Iraq, knew those are car bombs.

That's not a normal
sound here in Damascus.

>> NARRATOR: Ambassador Ford

dispatched a reconnaissance
team to the site.

>> We got a sense of how big
the holes were and what

had happened.

The way the car bombs were
delivered, crashing through

gates with a follow-on car,
was exactly what we had seen

the al-Qaeda organization
do in Iraq, and so it had

the fingerprints of al-Qaeda.

>> The wave of car bombings that

convulsed Damascus showed that

tactics that been successfully
employed in Iraq had now been

successfully exported to Syria.

>> NARRATOR: Zarqawi's
organization had not only

survived, it was growing and
starting to capture territory.

>> Two back-to-back explosions
hit the capital Damascus

early on Friday.

>> Authorities said at least
40 people were killed...

>> NARRATOR: Back in Washington,
at the State Department,

Ambassador Ford was worried.

He wanted to offer military aid

to Syrian rebels who
were seen as moderates.

>> My team, working in our
little offices and cubicles

downstairs, began to think we
would have to help those more

moderate secular elements
compete for recruits.

Otherwise, they over time
would be overwhelmed.

>> NARRATOR: But first, the
White House would have

to sign off.

Ford had three important
allies in the administration:

CIA Director David Petraeus,
Secretary of State Hillary

Clinton, and Defense
Secretary Leon Panetta.

They made the case
to the president.

>> You did have people inside
the administration who said,

"We need to get involved here.

We need to help this
opposition force.

We need to find those who
represent values that we can

live with and provide
them arms and training."

>> The only way we were going to

get credibility with those that
were fighting on the streets

and dying was to be able to
provide the weapons they needed

in order to confront Assad,
and that's why I supported

Petraeus's recommendations
and why we recommended that.

>> NARRATOR: Despite the
recommendation of his senior

advisors, the president
was reluctant.

>> ...for us to think that
somehow there is some simple

solution I think is a mistake.

>> That wasn't something
President Obama wanted to do.

He didn't think it would be
effective, he didn't want to

necessarily get involved in
somebody else's civil war.

He came to office not to get
involved in the Middle East,

but to get us out
of the Middle East.

>> Breaking news right now...
>> NARRATOR: In Syria, the

slaughter of the moderate rebels
by the government forces of

Assad continued.

>> It is one of the deadliest

days in the uprising in Syria.

>> NARRATOR: The barrel
bombings, neighborhood after

neighborhood.

(explosions)

(gunfire)

>> They wanted our help.

You know, I think it's fair
to say we didn't do much.

We did almost nothing
to help them.

Therefore, they're gone.

I mean, they're gone,
they're finished.

I mean, as a significant
force, they're finished.

>> NARRATOR: Nearly a year
later, the president changed his

mind.

He authorized light weapons
for the moderate rebels.

But it was too late.

Meanwhile, Baghdadi's
forces grew even stronger.

>> And the consequences are
exactly what the CIA and the

Pentagon and the State
Department predicted, which was

that if the United States isn't

shaping the opposition to Assad,

radical Sunni groups that look
a lot like al-Qaeda will do

that.

And they did.

>> NARRATOR: By 2013, Baghdadi's

army captured whole
sections of Syria.

>> The civil war in Syria
gave him an opportunity.

The civil war in Syria
gave them a platform.

Now it's not a few dozen
hiding in the western desert;

now there's thousands and
thousands of foreign fighters

that's coming from everywhere.

5,000 from Western Europe, 6,000
from Tunisia, almost 5,000

from the former Soviet Union,
people coming from everywhere.

>> NARRATOR: Baghdadi finally
had what Zarqawi promised:

a state.

He called it ISIS and
established its headquarters in

Raqqa, provoking a final
break with al-Qaeda.

>> Al-Baghdadi's success in
carving out this Islamic state

and putting Raqqa as its
centerpiece, as its capital,

is a reflection, again, of a
strategy that Zarqawi pursues.

>> NARRATOR: And inside its
territory, ISIS would rule

through violence and fear.

>> I get a steady diet of these
videos that they put out,

so it's, you know, today,
they stoned to death a man,

you know, because they suspected
him for being gay, or they

stoned to death a woman, or
they put a man in a car and

exploded it, or they skinned
somebody alive, or they

crucified somebody, or they
beheaded somebody, every day.

>> NARRATOR: In Washington,
they were struggling to find

a successful strategy
to deal with Syria.

The new secretary of defense,
Chuck Hagel, attended meeting

after meeting, hoping
one would emerge.

>> In those meetings, there
were too many people there.

I'd go into these meetings
and every chair was filled

in the Situation Room.

You'd have 30 people
in there sometimes.

What were they doing in there?

And everybody had
a chance to talk.

We rarely got to a conclusion
or a decision, and too many

people talking, and I think that

always leads to an
ineffective process.

>> NARRATOR: The president
himself resisted authorizing

military intervention.

>> The notion that the way
to solve every one of these

problems is to deploy our
military, that hasn't been true

in the past and it
won't be true now.

>> NARRATOR: The threat
of ISIS seemed distant.

>> President Obama doesn't see
this emerging group as an

existential threat.

He doesn't even see it as
equivalent to al-Qaeda

in any real way.

"Don't inflate these guys into
something that they're not.

Don't make them
eight-foot giants."

>> NARRATOR: We asked the
White House for an interview;

they declined.

Back in Raqqa, Baghdadi was
pursuing a new opportunity:

the expansion of ISIS into Iraq.

>> At this very time that
al-Baghdadi is building

his organization in Syria,
the Baghdad government, the

Shia government of al-Maliki,
starts virtually assaulting

the Sunni homeland.

>> NARRATOR: In the years since

American troops had left, Iraq's

prime minister Nuri al-Maliki, a

Shia, had initiated a crackdown
on the Sunni population.

>> The Sunni Arab tribes in Iraq

had become disillusioned with
the Shia-dominated government

in Baghdad.

So there was widespread
disaffection among the tribes.

They began to engage in a series

of protests against the regime.

(gunfire)

>> And these protests are
violently crushed, and in such

an environment, that enabled
Islamic State of Iraq to rise

up out of the ashes and sing
"We will protect Sunnis"

from Maliki.

>> NARRATOR: It was the moment

Baghdadi had been waiting for.

>> Where have the Sunnis to go?

There's only one
place they can go.

It is that residual of the
insurgency that is now run by

al-Baghdadi.

>> NARRATOR: In early 2014,
Baghdadi's forces began

the campaign to take Iraq.

>> The Iraqi army, which was

built at the incredible expense,

I don't even know what the final

price tag was-- $30 billion?--

largely by the Americans, paid
for by the American taxpayer,

you know, all their equipment,

everything, it all came apart.

>> NARRATOR: In no time at all,
they rolled over Fallujah,

Ramadi, then the biggest prize
yet: Iraq's second largest

city-- Mosul.

>> (man chanting)

>> NARRATOR: On July 4, 2014,
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi ascended

the steps of Mosul's
great mosque.

>> Baghdadi never shows his
face, but the one occasion that

he did was after the
capture of Mosul.

>> He wasn't somebody hiding
in a cave, somebody you never

saw, released secret videos
from unknown locations.

He was in a mosque giving a
speech and talking about

the Islamic state.

>> NARRATOR: From the pulpit,
Baghdadi finally fulfilled

Zarqawi's dream.

He made it official, declaring
himself the caliph: the ruler

of the global caliphate.

>> Baghdadi addresses the
assembled audience and proclaims

himself the caliph and the
ruler of Muslims worldwide.

He proclaims the victory of
Zarqawi's political project

nearly a decade earlier.

They now control a swath of
territory containing some five

million people, they have a
war chest of some two billion

dollars.

It's a remarkable success for
an organization that was

soundly defeated in 2009.

>> NARRATOR: Baghdadi had
turned Zarqawi's vision into a

terrifying reality.

>> On the eve of 9/11, we have

400 pledged members, you know,
people who pledged allegiance

to Osama bin Laden.

But now they have countries.

They have armies.

They have tanks.

They have missiles.

They have stuff that Osama bin

Laden did not dream to have
in his wildest dreams.

>> The United States of America

is meeting them with
strength and resolve.

I ordered our military to take
targeted action against ISIL.

>> NARRATOR: In the nearly two

years since Baghdadi's sermon,

the Islamic State has come under
assault from the Americans,

the Iraqis, the Russians, the
Iranians, and many others.

They have lost territory, but
ISIS has already gone global.

>> Gunfight inside the
parliament building.

>> Canada's capital is stunned.

>> Copenhagen, Denmark,
a scene of terror...

>> NARRATOR: ISIS
conducted or inspired...

>> Horrible scene in
northeastern Egypt tonight.

>> NARRATOR: ...more than 90
attacks around the world...

>> Multiple attacks have
occurred in or around Paris.

>> NARRATOR: ...and have more

than 40 affiliated terror
groups in 16 countries.

>> Massacre in San
Bernardino today.

>> The attack left at
least 14 people dead...

>> NARRATOR: They have promised

that the worst is yet to come.

>> From what investigators say

was an ISIS suicide
bomb attack in Turkey.

>> Now Belgian officials say
34 people were killed and 187

were wounded in two explosions.

>> And after today's horror,
the question is, how many more

terrorists are ready to strike?

>> Go to pbs.org/frontline for
more on how ISIS has spread

beyond Syria and Iraq.

Read extended interviews
with Colin Powell...

>> We made a judgment.

>> ...and Nada Bakos.

>> I can't even imagine what
that did for Zarkawi's ego.

>> Explore the Frontline archive

of reporting on the ISIS threat.

And connect to the Frontline
community on Facebook and

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And if stories like this matter
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