All language subtitles for The Rise of ISIS PBS Frontline (2014) EN Sub

>> Tonight on Frontline...
>> Allahu Akbar!

>> If you threaten America,
you will find no safe haven.

>> As the United States, with
a coalition of other countries,

wage a new war on terror,
Frontline investigates how ISIS

gained such a dangerous
stronghold.

>> It goes from being nothing to
being the most powerful active

group within 12 months.
It's extraordinary what happens.

>> Tonight, from the ashes of
Al Qaeda...

>> ISIS builds enough strength,
and the monster grows.

>> Correspondent Martin Smith
uncovers the early warnings.

>> ISIS didn't become the group
that it is today until they went

to Syria.
>> The missteps...

>> The intelligence analysis
continued to point to what could

happen.
>> The view was, "This is Iraq's

problem, let them deal with it."
>> And the ancient tribal

hatreds that fuel...
>> These are not Muslims, and

frankly, they're barely human
beings.

>> "The Rise of ISIS."

>> Frontline is made possible
by contributions to your PBS

station from viewers like you.
Thank you.

And by the Corporation for
Public Broadcasting.

Major support for Frontline is
provided by the John D. and

Catherine T. MacArthur
Foundation, committed to

building a more just, verdant
and peaceful world.

More information is available at
macfound.org.

Additional support is provided
by the Park Foundation,

dedicated to heightening public
awareness of critical issues.

The Ford Foundation, working
with visionaries on the front

lines of social change
worldwide.

At FordFoundation.org.
The Wyncote Foundation.

And by the Frontline Journalism
Fund, with major support from

Jon and Jo Ann Hagler, and
additional support from

Millicent Bell through the
Millicent and Eugene Bell

Foundation.

>> The last American combat
brigade has begun leaving the

country.
>> MARTIN SMITH: It was late

2011 when American troops
finally left Iraq.

>> For U.S. soldiers, the war
in Iraq has come to an end.

>> SMITH: After eight long
years, the war seemed like it

was over.
>> The last U.S. soldier is out

of Iraq.
>> SMITH: Iraq's leaders said

they were ready to go it alone.
>> History in the making.

>> SMITH: Prime Minister Nouri
al Maliki flew to Washington to

mark the occasion.

>> It was a moment of optimism.
There was a sense of pride...

>> All right, everybody.
>> ...that the occupying forces

really left.
And a lot of Iraqis, Sunnis

and Shias, were responding
positively to that.

>> Today, I'm proud to welcome
Prime Minister Maliki.

>> Both sides presented it as a
victory.

Maliki presented it as a great
accomplishment-- Iraq would

stand on its own two feet.
President Obama talked about

this new democratic Iraq.
>> What we have now achieved is

an Iraq that is self-governing,
that is inclusive,

and that has enormous potential.
>> SMITH: President Obama gives

a very rosy picture of where
things are.

What'd you think?
>> As somebody who voted for

President Obama, I was deeply
disappointed because I knew

those words were going to go
back and haunt him.

>> Thank you very much,
everybody.

>> It was at that trip,
actually, when things started to

go astray.

>> SMITH: What happened was that
while he was in Washington,

Maliki received a phone call
from Baghdad about a terrorist

plot implicating his vice
president, Tariq al-Hashemi, the

most senior Sunni politician in
the Shia-led government.

It accused Hashemi's bodyguards
of planning an attack on Shia

targets.
>> We were at the Blair House.

I recall Maliki.
He was fiddling with his phone.

He said, "Well, some guards
of Tariq al-Hashemi,

the vice president, have been
monitoring our compound.

And they have been arrested."
>> SMITH: Maliki relayed the

news to President Obama.
>> l think the President's

response was, "Well, every
country has its own rules,

its own law, and the rule of law
should be applied."

>> SMITH: How did Maliki
interpret what the president

told him?
>> I think he interpreted this

may be some support of any
future actions.

>> The response he got from the
president was that this is an

internal Iraqi affair.
And that, to Maliki, was a

green light in terms of what he
can do with the Sunnis, because

the United States is not going
to stand in his way.

>> SMITH: Maliki returned to
Baghdad, and then just one day

after the last American soldiers
left Iraq...

>> Maliki immediately orders
that Hashemi be arrested.

>> And it took a lot of people
by surprise.

I think that was a departure
point.

It showed Maliki is really
independent from the Americans..

>> SMITH: Before he could be
arrested, Hashemi fled.

He was tried in absentia
and sentenced to death.

We interviewed him in Doha,
the capital of Qatar.

>> SMITH: Was it possible that
your bodyguards were involved

in any kind of...
>> No way.

>> SMITH: Some of your
bodyguards appeared on

television.
>> Yes.

I do have plenty of reports
of the way that my guards had

been treated, unfortunately.
When they just receive brutal

torturing, in fact.

>> We'll never know what is true
because they were held in the

Baghdad Brigade headquarters
in the green zone.

It's been clearly documented
over time that torture happened

there.
It's been documented by Iraq's

human rights ministry and the
Red Cross.

There's no doubt torture
happened there.

>> SMITH: So the confessions
were likely the result of

torture?
>> Mm-hmm.

>> SMITH: Hashemi and his
bodyguards would just be

Maliki's first targets.
>> Hundreds of Sunnis had been

arrested after the American
leaving of the country.

Thousands, in fact.
>> SMITH: In 2012, thousands of

Sunnis suspected of subversion
were held for months or longer

without charges ever being
filed.

>> So everyone talk to Maliki
that this is not the way of

dealing with the people.
This is a discrimination,

in fact.
But he is not listening to

anyone.
>> SMITH: Many Sunnis didn't

even make it to jail.
>> The Shia militia were very,

very violent.
There were many, many instances

in Baghdad and in many
other parts of Iraq of Sunnis

turning up with a bullet in the
back of their head and their

hands bound behind them.
This was common.

This was a daily, daily
occurrence.

>> SMITH: In the first year
after the departure of the

Americans, hundreds of Sunnis
turned up dead in the streets of

Baghdad.
>> The thing to understand about

Maliki is that when he looks at
Iraq's Sunni minority, he sees,

you know, Al Qaeda, he sees the
Baathists, he sees military

coups, he sees plots against
him, he sees a population which

despises him and wants to come
back into power.

>> This is a man who many of his
close relatives were secretly

arrested and tortured by
Saddam's regime.

He's capable.
And yet if I could use one word

to describe Nouri al-Maliki,
it's "paranoia."

>> He had a deep fear that
ultimately, the Baathists

were gonna go after him and
that he was gonna be targeted

and that he would lose power,
and it would be the ghost

of Saddam Hussein again.
I think that's what he

worried about.

>> SMITH: Maliki also enraged
the tribesmen of the Sunni

Awakening.
These were the tribesmen who,

in exchange for American money
and promises of political

inclusion in a new Iraq,
had helped defeat Al Qaeda

years earlier.
>> I think that he was

suspicious of them really,
of this force.

They were not sustained
or maintained as a potential

force that the government
might need later on.

>> And then the other key thing
was that Sunni leaders in the

army and Sunni leaders in the
police began to be sidelined,

and people with a strong Shia
sectarian bent replaced them.

And that meant that a lot
of people felt they were being

excluded, and that was true--
they were.

(gunfire)
>> SMITH: Meanwhile, Al Qaeda

in Iraq, the group that would
become ISIS, was camped in

Iraq's western deserts.
It was not much of a force.

The Surge and the Sunni
Awakening had severely reduced

it.
>> Remember, by the time

the Americans left Iraq,
the insurgency was broken.

The Sunni insurgency,
it was broken.

It was on its last legs.
Al-Qaeda had been decimated.

>> SMITH: What remained, though,
were the most battle-hardened

Al Qaeda militants, a few
embittered tribesmen, and some

remnants of Saddam's Baathist
military hoping to regain power.

>> This is a collection of very
hardened killers.

These are the guys that the
United States didn't manage

to kill during the war then.
>> These are mostly young men

who were in prison,
some of them under Maliki.

Some of them were in
U.S. prisons.

Mr. Baghdadi, the head of ISIS,
was in Camp Bucca.

>> SMITH: After he was released
from Bucca, the American-run

prison, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi
would, in time, become head of

Al Qaeda in Iraq, directing
ambushes on Iraqi forces and

suicide bombings.
But he had greater ambitions.

In the summer of 2011, he sent
a few men into Syria to join

the rebels fighting the Shia
government of Bashar al-Assad.

(chanting)
(explosion)

For Baghdadi, the Syrian war was
a gift.

>> Suddenly, you have a complete
breakdown of the state in Syria.

You have this vast, open space
between the two countries.

And so these guys, they're
suddenly able to find life.

>> ISIS didn't become the group
that it is today until they went

to Syria.
Syria is what made ISIS ISIS.

>> We don't know how many
Al Qaeda in Iraq guys move from

Iraq to Syria in the 2011, 2012
timeframe.

But once they move into Syria,
all of a sudden, they're able

to operate once again.
All of a sudden, they're able

to recruit once again.
Their message gains traction

with the Sunnis of Syria who are
looking to wage a civil war

against the Shia government.
(explosion)

>> SMITH: Al Qaeda was joining
the fight along with dozens of

other Syrian Sunni rebel groups,
but it quickly became a major

force.
>> Baghdadi sends a bunch of

guys into Syria.
It goes from being nothing

to being the most powerful
active group.

They're running operations
all over the country

within, like, 12 months.
It's extraordinary what happens.

Takes off like fire.

>> SMITH: Back in Iraq, Maliki's
purges of Sunnis continued.

And Maliki upped the ante in
December 2012, when his police

rounded up the bodyguards of
another prominent Sunni leader,

finance minister Rafi al-Essawi.
>> Rafi al-Essawi,

everybody loves the guy.
I mean, he's greatly respected.

I've seen no evidence that
suggested that his bodyguards

were doing anything bad.
To the contrary.

And so when his bodyguards
are arrested, that I think is

the real blow to the Sunni
community, because everybody

knows Rafi al-Essawi
is a peaceful man.

>> SMITH: So you were sitting
inside the finance ministry.

>> Yeah, they attacked the
office and they took 16 of my

bodyguards.
These are almost ten years

they are with me.
I'm sure that they are against

terrorism, all of them, almost,
they are my close relatives.

>> SMITH: After the arrest
warrant is issued for Rafi

al-Essawi...
>> I called Maliki up.

I said, "What are you doing?
What the hell's going on?"

He's a colleague of ours.
He was with us yesterday

in the cabinet.
And now some police people

have gone to arrest him?
This is absolutely unacceptable.

>> Hundreds of thousands of
people were very upset because

they feel that this is a story
of dignity.

No Sunni is exempted.
People started to prepare for a

big demonstration in Fallujah
and Ramadi.

So I called them, I said
to them, "I'll join the

demonstration."

>> Anyone, Maliki and the gangs
of the militias of Maliki,

can arrest anyone.

>> I went there.
They are protesting for their

rights.
And they have legitimate

demands for releasing the
innocent people in the prisons,

some of these in detention
center for two, three,

six years without trials.
They are telling us of,

in one month or twice
in a month, three months,

raids in their community
and collecting just young people

like that.
Collecting people.

>> They were not fully
integrated into the security

forces as was promised,
so they felt, again,

completely marginalized.
The idea that it's just

terrorists, Maliki is trying
to cultivate that impression.

No.
The average man in the street,

woman in the street, Sunni,
perceived it exactly that same

way.
>> (chanting)

>> SMITH: Officials in the White
House saw what was happening.

Obama's ambassador to Iraq had
warned that Maliki needed to be

contained.
>> This was a constant warning

that I had made and that others
had made before me, that Maliki

was a problem.
On the other hand, the

president and the country had
taken the position, "Iraq was

a mistake, we've ended our war
in Iraq.

If we see things we don't like,
we'll do calls from the vice

president, just like we do
with 150 other countries

that have similar situations."
>> The Obama administration

certainly did tell Prime
Minister Maliki and other Iraqis

that they wanted to see them
play by the democratic rules,

that they thought it was a
mistake for them to go after

their political rivals in this
fashion.

But they did it in private.
They didn't do it in public.

And they certainly never
imposed any kind of a cost.

>> You gotta continue to put
pressure on them to do the right

thing.
I think everybody just kept

their fingers crossed that
ultimately, Maliki would somehow

step down or be replaced and
that Iraq would be in a better

place.
>> No, I don't think that's

accurate.
We were engaged with all of

Iraq's communities, we were
engaged with Prime Minister

Maliki, and we were seeking to
manage this and press Iraqi

leaders to move in a more
inclusive direction.

But by definition, our
leverage, in order to affect

political outcomes inside a very
complicated society like Iraq's,

has inherent limits.
And at the end of the day,

it's going to be Iraqi leaders
who have to make these

determinations to work together.
>> (chanting)

>> SMITH: As weeks went by,
the demonstrations grew.

In Ramadi, protesters camped
out on the main road between

Baghdad and Jordan, a vital
trucking artery.

In other Sunni cities and
towns-- Fallujah, Mosul,

Tikrit, -- other protests halted
traffic and commerce.

With youth unemployment
running as high as 40%,

young men were free to gather.
And support poured in from

around the Sunni Arab world
to pay for tents, meals

and transportation.
One of the principal funders was

a wealthy Iraqi businessman
living in Jordan, a man with

ties to the Baathist regime
of Saddam Hussein.

>> SMITH: How much money did you
spend in support of those

protests?
>> (translated): All that the

demonstrations needed.
>> SMITH: And how much was that?

>> (translated): All that was
needed.

I don't know.
Whatever was needed.

>> SMITH: Khanjar also paid for
the establishment of pro-Sunni

TV stations.

>> (translated): We encouraged
channels like Baghdad,

Al-Rafidain and Fallujah
to defend our people.

>> (shouting in Arabic)
>> (translated): Maliki is the

cause of all of this.
He has a problem with the

Sunnis.
This is the revolution of the

tribes.
I am proud of it

and I support it.
>> (chanting): Allahu Akbar!

>> SMITH: 60 miles away
in Baghdad, Iraq's Shia

were organizing their own
demonstrations.

Here and in other Shia cities
throughout Iraq's south,

people encouraged Maliki.
>> (chanting)

>> They were supporting him.
He was popular in the streets,

he was popular in Najaf,
he was popular in Basra,

he was popular in Babil,
popular in Baghdad.

And when he moved against
Sunnis, he found himself getting

more popular.
So there was no real

disincentive at that point
to discontinue doing what he was

doing.

(explosion)
>> SMITH: Back in Syria,

Al Qaeda was steadily gaining
ground.

In its early months, the group
relied on donations from wealthy

Sunnis in the region.
>> The Saudis, the Kuwaitis, the

Emiratis, all of the gulf states
and a whole variety of other

countries began to provide
support to a whole variety of

Sunni opposition groups, and
they weren't terribly careful

about which groups got the aid.
>> SMITH: And soon, Al Qaeda

needed fewer donations.
As they gained territory,

they became self-sustaining,
robbing banks, running

extortion rackets, seizing
Syrian transportation routes

and Syrian oil fields.
>> Allahu Akbar!

>> They were very smart.
They understood, "If we can

control those oil wells, we'll
be able to sell the oil on the

black market and get cash."
And they went about that

in a very conscientious way,
field by field.

>> SMITH: In this Al Qaeda
video, they are shown planning

and then executing an attack on
a major Syrian power station.

(gunfire)

>> SMITH: U.S. Ambassador
to Syria Robert Ford had urged

the administration to quickly
provide aid to pro-Western

Syrian rebels.
Otherwise, he warned,

Al Qaeda would dominate.
>> I think there was certainly

warnings from people at my level
that in a large, ungoverned

space, having Al Qaeda or
Al Qaeda-affiliated groups able

to operate freely would be as
much a risk to the United States

as Somalia, Yemen and
Afghanistan were.

And in each of those places,
the Americans had to act.

>> SMITH: But in Syria, the
president chose not to send

arms.
>> I think the president's

concern-- and I respect his
decision-- but I think

his concern was that ultimately,
if we provide those kinds of

weapons, we couldn't be sure
whose hands they might

ultimately wind up in.
>> SMITH: You respect his

decision.
He was the commander-in-chief.

But you think he was wrong?
>> I think we made the wrong

decision in not providing
assistance to the rebels.

>> I think President Obama has
a fundamental belief that any

military action or aiding local
fighters will lead to, almost

inexorably, 150,000 troops on
the ground like Iraq, or 500,000

like Vietnam.
Slippery slope, down the drain,

huge disaster for America.
I think he believes that,

sincerely.
I think he's absolutely wrong.

>> SMITH: You were getting
advice from Ambassador Ford,

Ambassador Jeffrey in Iraq
that we needed to get involved

in the Syrian situation, or the
Al Qaeda elements that were

operating there were going to
dominate and become a much more

serious issue.
>> Well, let's step back here.

I think in the rear-view
mirror, people suggest that

it was about ISIL.
In those conversations in 2012,

it was very much about, "What
can we do to effect change as

it relates to Bashar al-Assad?"
>> SMITH: Correct, but the

urgency increased as Al Qaeda-
linked rebels gained more and

more power and money.
>> Absolutely, and again,

it's a complicated picture.
The president was willing to get

engaged in support for the
opposition in Syria, but he

wanted to make clear that we
understood there were limits

as to how we could solve this
problem with our military,

and that we had to be very
deliberate and careful when it

comes to something like
providing military assistance

to an opposition group.
>> SMITH: Throughout 2012,

the president held off.
Without U.S. arms, the more

moderate Syrian rebels
struggled.

Al Qaeda, meanwhile, was ready
to expand back into Iraq.

(explosions)
In a campaign called "destroying

the walls," they launched a
series of attacks on Iraqi

prisons.
ISIS's ranks swelled

with newly freed inmates.
Then in March 2013, a few of

Al Qaeda's black flags began to
appear in the midst of the

protests in Ramadi.
they started calling

themselves the
Islamic State in Iraq and

al Sham-- ISIS.
their presence stoked

Maliki's worst fears.
>> That was a turning point,

really.
That was a turning point

in the government attitude
toward these demonstrations.

"We told you so.
These are infiltrated."

This is the black flag
of Al Qaeda.

>> SMITH: Then in April 2013,
at a Sunni protest camp in the

town of Hawija, there was a
confrontation.

>> The facts were a little
unclear.

You have some provocateurs,
there's a police officer

who's killed-- maybe by Al
Qaeda, maybe not-- and Maliki

responds massively and with
enormous force.

>> No one thought that the Iraqi
army can attack demonstrators in

Hawija.
They are demonstrating

for months at that time,
peaceful, calling for the

rights.
So when they brought

their tanks and the heavy
vehicles of the army and the

security forces of the ministry
of interior and attacked,

they killed the people
in a very criminal model.

>> It's unclear how many people
were killed.

The estimates that I've heard
from people who saw the bodies

was that there were hundreds.
Hundreds and hundreds of bodies.

>> And at that point, ISIS, they
were arguing, "You're not gonna

get anywhere with peaceful
protests.

You need to have muscle.
You need to use some measure

of violence."
And they started to gain more

traction with that argument.

>> SMITH: So these are people,
young men who sat in those

protests in Ramadi and Hawija
who decided to take up weapons

and join with ISIS?
>> They tried to...

They voted for a new government
in Baghdad in 2010.

Their representatives, like
Hashemi and Essawi, fellow Sunni

Arabs, were purged.
They were humiliated.

They tried to form a region.
They tried to exercise

civil disobedience.
They were attacked with Maliki's

forces.
And so now they've taken up

arms.
>> Allahu Akbar!

>> It's been called the
revolution, it's been called the

insurgency.
Whatever you want to call it,

it was back.
>> If you take Iraq's Sunni

community, its leadership,
it's full of reasonable people.

It's full of secular, educated,
very moderate people.

But they look around
and they say, "Where do we go?

The only people who are gonna
protect us are these really

hard guys, and we may not like
them, but we need them because

otherwise, there's nothing.
Nobody's gonna protect us.

And the Americans aren't here
anymore."

>> SMITH: Years earlier,
the Sunni leadership had warned

American officials what would
happen if Maliki reneged on the

promises of power sharing he'd
made to Iraq's Sunnis.

>> The message back was, "If we
are backed into a corner again,

we will rise up.
And this time,

we will not stop.
We will take Baghdad.

We will burn it
or we will die trying."

(gunfire)
>> SMITH: Three months after

Hawija, ISIS mounted a
spectacular attack right on the

outskirts of Baghdad, releasing
500 inmates from Abu Ghraib

prison.
>> Abu Ghraib is only seven

or eight miles from
Baghdad Airport.

It's 12 or 14 miles to the city.
So it was very clear that

ISIS-led Sunnis, basically, were
encroaching and making major,

major gains in Anbar Province.
>> It was a huge propaganda win

for the Islamic State of Iraq
and Syria.

It was basically the prison
bust-out was a statement of

purpose that, "We're here.
What started after

Hawija, in terms of the
bombings, the spike in violence,

we're orchestrating this, and
hell is coming."

>> SMITH: ISIS began bringing
more reinforcements over the

Syrian border.
It became clear the Iraqi army

could not stop their advance.
In Baghdad, the leadership was

worried.
>> I spoke with Maliki.

I said, "Listen, let's admit it.
You cannot do it.

We cannot do it.
Our military is dysfunctioning.

And we have an option.
If our democratic system

is threatened, we can go and ask
our American friends for help."

>> SMITH: In November 2013,
Maliki would set out hat in hand

to Washington.
>> The message was really,

"We are under threat.
We don't have control over our

border with Syria."
And in terms of weapons,

Hellfire missiles, you see,
we run out of them.

And we warned about the
seriousness of the situation,

the existential threat that this
country is facing.

>> SMITH: But getting American
aid beyond Hellfire missiles was

going to be a hard sell, in
spite of the fact that U.S.

intelligence and defense
officials were also increasingly

alarmed about ISIS.
>> The American intelligence

community was saying that this
group, the Islamic State in Iraq

and Syria, was becoming
increasingly potent.

They were expanding their
footprint in Syria.

They were expanding their
operations in Iraq.

There were months of these kinds
of warning signals about the

growth and expansion of ISIS.
>> I think the intelligence

analysis continued to point to
the implications of what was

happening in Syria and what
could happen in Iraq.

You know, this was not something
that people were not being made

aware of in terms of the
implications.

>> SMITH: The administration did
agree to some small increases in

military aid.
>> I want to welcome back Prime

Minister Maliki to the White
House.

But despite the warnings, the
president was not ready

to give more.
Maliki was not seen as a

trustworthy partner.

>> SMITH: He was hat-in-hand,
asking for more weapons, but the

president did not appear to be
tough on Maliki at that point,

publicly.
Can you tell me that it was

different behind closed doors?
>> Yeah, privately.

We said that, "You need not only
our security assistance, you

need a political program that
all Iraqis can get behind."

>> SMITH: And what did he say?
>> He would commit to do certain

things, but there was never the
sustained follow-through that

was going to be necessary to
really have an inclusive Iraqi

political culture.
>> SMITH: What leverage could

you use with him at that point?
>> Well, we obviously had

significant relationships with
Iraq.

But at the end of the day,
it's up to the Iraqi political

leadership to govern in an
inclusive fashion.

We couldn't do it for them when
we had troops in Iraq.

We couldn't do it for them when
we didn't.

>> Thank you.
>> SMITH: And after that visit,

things got much worse.
>> Got much worse.

>> (chanting)
>> SMITH: In December 2013,

Maliki would strike once again,
this time against a hardline

Sunni parliamentarian, Ahmed
al-Alwani.

>> Ahmed al-Alwani was a Sunni
politician, a member of

parliament.
He'd give angry speeches

against Maliki's government.

>> And Maliki decides that he's
had enough and the Iraqi forces

stage a raid on his house.
(gunfire)

Alwani's brother is there.
The brother is killed.

Ahmed al-Alwani, the member of
parliament, is taken away,

but nobody has seen him since.
(gunshots)

>> SMITH: After that arrest,
Maliki sent the army into Ramadi

to tear down the year-old
protest camp.

(gunshots)
Maliki's move would prove

disastrous.
>> That provokes a Sunni

uprising.
(rapid gunfire)

>> The Sunni Arab population of
Anbar rose up and said, "Okay,

we're sick and tired of you.
You're oppressing us.

Get the troops out of our
cities."

>> And the Islamic State takes
advantage of that to move inside

these cities.
And from there, you have chapter

one of the Iraq War of 2014
begin.

(gunfire)
>> What happened here is that by

virtue of the Shias not opening
it up and allowing the Sunnis to

participate, that they created
the monster that has led to

ISIS.
>> SMITH: So they created the

monster that they feared.
>> Exactly.

>> SMITH: The fighting lasted
only a few days.

In the end, the Iraqi army
was no match.

(rapid gunfire)
(loud chanting)

>> SMITH: You would think this
would set off real alarm bells

in Washington.
I mean, now you have them taking

over a city just a few miles
outside of Baghdad.

>> The ISIS attacks on Ramadi
and Fallujah certainly did set

off some alarm bells in
Washington, at least in

certain quarters.
But the top-level leadership

continued to do virtually
nothing.

>> SMITH: Presumably Biden gets
on the phone to Maliki?

Or, I mean, what happens?
>> Some phone calls were made.

No question about that.
But of course, the Iraqis had

never seen the Obama
administration actually take any

action either to help them or to
hurt them if they didn't do what

the United States wanted.

>> SMITH: In Iraq's north, ISIS
was eyeing another target:

Mosul, Iraq's second largest
city.

Months before they attacked, a
Kurdish intelligence official

gave Iraqi Foreign Minister
Zebari a warning.

>> "Tell Maliki I have very,
very serious concerns.

The terrorists have established
themselves.

They have encamped themselves
in the western desert near the

Syrian borders.
And really, they are planning to

formally militarily overrun
Mosul."

>> SMITH: You took this message
to...

>> I took this message to him.
It was a clear message of

warning.
And he didn't take it.

>> SMITH: The White House, too,
was warned.

>> The administration not only
was warned by everybody back in

January, it actually announced
that it was going to intensify

its support against ISIS with
the Iraqi armed forces.

And it did almost nothing.
>> SMITH: Ambassador Jeffrey

says that the Obama
administration said it was going

to speed military assistance,
but it did, in his words,

"almost nothing."
>> That's just not true.

I mean, if you go back and you
look at the record of what we

were providing to the Iraqis,
there was a steady increase,

whether you're talking about
Hellfire missiles, the Apaches,

they were held up by Congress.
We sought the expedition of that

delivery to the Iraqis.
>> Hellfire missiles started to

come.
They increased the intelligence

capacity, but it was really not
enough, to be honest with you.

I mean, the United States could
have done more.

>> SMITH: Then on June 6, 2014,
ISIS sent several suicide car

bombs into downtown Mosul.
(explosions)

(sirens blaring)
>> SMITH: ...along with ISIS

fighters in pickup trucks.
In some neighborhoods, they were

warmly welcomed.

(rapid gunfire)
>> SMITH: The Iraqi army, on the

other hand, was seen as a Shia
militia.

With no local support, the army
had deserted by June 10 with

barely a fight.
>> They didn't know how to

respond.
They didn't want to respond.

You know, these were people
that didn't want to do any

actual work.
They were fat cats, I call them.

They were people who were
earning good money to basically

sit at a desk and smoke
cigarettes and drink good

liquor all day.
>> SMITH: In the end, it took

only 800 ISIS militants, with
the help of local Baathist

military cadres, to secure a
city of 1.8 million people.

Even ISIS was surprised.
>> The original intelligence was

that ISIS did not come to invade
Mosul.

They didn't come to take
it over.

They came to break a bunch
of people out of prison.

But what happens?
They roll into the city and the

entire Iraqi army collapses.
And they make some adjustments

very quickly, on the spur of the
moment, and decide, "Wow, we're

not gonna just get the prison,
we're gonna get the whole city."

Then they just keep on rollin'.

>> SMITH: For ISIS, the spoils
included tons of U.S.-made

military equipment.
>> I don't think bin Laden

could've ever dreamt that
elements even more radical than

his own Al Qaeda would be armed
with American M1-A1 tanks or

155-millimeter artillery or
up-armored Humvees or MRAPs.

>> SMITH: From Mosul, ISIS
rapidly advanced down the Tigris

and captured Qayyarah, al
Shirqat, Hawijah and Tikrit,

the hometown of Saddam Hussein.

In Tikrit, ISIS was easily able
to round up several hundred

Iraqi soldiers.
ISIS recorded their execution.

>> SMITH: What did you think
when you saw these mass

executions taking place?
>> These guys are crazy.

But there's a method to their
madness.

>> SMITH: And what is that
method?

>> Control.
I mean, this is one of the

first terrorist groups saying,
"You know what?

We're not gonna hit and run.
And we're not gonna participate

in politics as you know it.
We actually want to kill

everyone who disagree with us,
we want to control the piece

of land, and whatever cost it
is, we're gonna do it."

>> Al Qaeda was an underground
organization.

It could hurt.
It could maim.

It could terrorize people, bomb,
blow up.

We know their tactics.
But ISIS has a different

strategy.
They have a plan.

They have a strategy to
establish a state, an Islamic

emirate.
>> SMITH: On June 29, ISIS

declared a caliphate, an Islamic
nation representing the world's

Muslim faithful-- an entity that
recognizes no political borders.

>> As you can see, this is the
so-called border.

We don't recognize it and we
will never recognize it.

>> SMITH: For this ISIS
propaganda video, militants

bulldozed the Syrian-Iraq
border.

An ISIS recruit from Chile
is calling on Muslims everywhere

to join them.
>> We will break the barrier of

Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, all the
countries.

This is the first barrier of
many barriers we will break.

>> By declaring the Khalifah,
they did something nobody else

has done.
>> SMITH: The caliphate.

>> The caliphate.
The implication of this in the

minds of the traditional Salafi
believers is that they have a

religious obligation to pledge
loyalty.

>> SMITH: Salafis being hardcore
Islamist fundamentalists?

>> I would say the traditional
religious fundamentalists.

Due to their faith in that
particular sect, they have an

obligation to respond to a
caliph if he calls them.

Now I know not all Salafis will
do that.

But even if one percent of the
Salafis do that, you're talking

about tens of thousands
of people now in Nigeria and

Saudi Arabia, in Jordan, in
every Muslim country, Sunni

country.

>> We have chosen to depict ISIS
as a successor, or a partner, to

Al Qaeda.
It's actually not.

Islamic State is a
state-building enterprise.

They're trying to create a real
state, not some post-modern

virtual Al-Qaeda-style thing
that only exists in your head.

They're trying to create
something that looks like a real

state.
It's a very different model.

>> SMITH: On July 4, ISIS
made another extraordinary move.

In their newly occupied Mosul,
the leader of ISIS, Abu Bakr

al-Baghdadi, ascended the pulpit
of the Great Mosque.

>> Baghdadi gave a sermon in
Mosul.

Bin Laden never did that.
Zawahiri never did that.

>> In an Arab city in broad
daylight, an Arab city that used

to be under control of American
troops?

It's a very ostentatious move
and one that's likely to attract

more support.

>> SMITH: After Baghdadi's
sermon, thousands more jihadists

flocked to Syria and Iraq.
>> Virtually every country in

the world, you have young,
disaffected youth, both men and

women, who have little hope in
their life, who want to be a

part of something special, want
to be a part of something

successful, and they now see
ISIL taking over vast swaths of

both Syria and Iraq, succeeding
like no one else has succeeded.

This is the Al Qaeda that Osama
bin Laden only dreamed of

building.
>> SMITH: And unlike Bin Laden's

Al Qaeda, ISIS fighters operate
under the command of experienced

military officers.
Several of the top leadership

positions, are now being held by
ba'athist from Saddam's army

>> What you call ISIS, behind
them sit the Baath party and

the former regime.
And the Baathists are pretty key

to that structure.
I think without the Baathists,

it becomes very difficult
to pursue ISIS's agenda.

You lack a lot of the
administrative capability and a

lot of the military skills.
>> They know how to emplace

artillery.
They know how to use tanks.

They know how to set up
defensive positions.

They know how to go on the
offensive.

(rapid gunfire)
>> SMITH: ISIS military strength

was evident when in August,
fighters moved into Kurdish

territory.
The Kurdish Peshmerga, reputed

to be Iraq's fiercest fighting
force, were easily overrun by

ISIS fighters armed with
captured American weapons.

minorities in northern Iraq
-- Christians, Shabaks,

Turkmen-- faced a stark choice:
convert or die. Or flee to Kurdn

Tens of thousands of Yazidis
fled their homes.

Meanwhile, a column of ISIS
fighters was

approaching Erbil...
>> ISIS is advancing closer to

Erbil.
>> SMITH: ...Kurdistans's

capital.
>> There are some 40 American

military advisors there. Uniteda
special relationship with

Kurdistan.
>> There's a U.S. consulate

in Erbil...
>> Kurdistan is the silver

lining of Iraq.
A trillion dollars' worth of

global energy companies: Total,
Chevron, Exxon and Gazprom Neft

are invested in Kurdistan.
>> SMITH: It was the threat to

Erbil that prompted the U.S.
administration to finally

intervene.
>> The trigger was the threat to

U.S. facilities in Erbil.
That was the start of the

air campaign.

>> SMITH: But the U.S. signaled
to Iraqis that more assistance

would come only if Maliki
resigned.

A week later, Maliki stepped
aside and the U.S. airstrikes

stepped up.
(explosions)

ISIS responded by releasing this
video.

>> This is James Wright Foley,
an American citizen of your

country.
>> SMITH: It was just one of

many horrific videos they
proudly shared.

>> They knew how to use the
social media.

They knew how to promote
themselves as the only reliable

global jihadi movement.
>> The fighting has just begun.

>> And you have thousands of
foreign fighters who truly

believe in this criminal
behavior.

>> This kind of bloodlust is
psychosis.

There's no other word for it.
It's not...

I mean there's no political
program that justifies it.

I think killing is as important
to ISIS as securing

the caliphate.
But killing first.

>> My fellow Americans, tonight
I want to speak to you about

what the United States will do
with our friends and allies to

degrade and ultimately destroy
the terrorist group known as

ISIL.
>> SMITH: Is ISIS a threat to

the United States?
>> ISIS is a threat to the

United States.
In the near term, ISIS is an

immediate threat to our
interests in the Middle East.

There is nothing that
would lead us to believe that

they would do anything but
ethnically cleanse the region

and absolutely create a
Sunni-Shia civil war.

(rapid gunfire)
Long-term, if they achieve the

Islamic State that they've
declared, then absolutely it

will be a threat, initially to
Europe, probably, and ultimately

to us.

>> SMITH: A week after the
president announced expanding

airstrikes into Syria, ISIS
besieged the Syrian town of

Kobani, right on the Turkish
border.

(rapid gunfire)
The U.S. is trying to coordinate

military help from over 20
countries.

But as U.S.-led coalition
airstrikes bombed ISIS positions

in Kobani, the Turkish army
watched from just across the

border, refusing to participate.
>> It's a regional issue.

Turkey is a very obvious
example, which way is Turkey

going now, you know?
It comes down to the

sectarianism of the area.
So it's an issue which Iran and

Saudi Arabia have to address,
as well.

All those countries really
have to get together to say,

"Are we prepared to at least
shelve our differences and find

a way that we can sort out this
dreadful mess that has emerged

in Syria and Iraq?"
>> SMITH: Our interventions into

this part of the world have not
gone well in the past.

So there's a lot of people
who are going to say,

"Look, I mean, I just don't see
these guys as an immediate,

imminent threat to the United
States.

I don't think any good is going
to come by us trying to go in

there and manage this."
>> I'd say they're right.

We're not gonna do this by
ourselves and we're not gonna do

this for the region.
We're not gonna have large U.S.

forces on the ground to do this.
The only way that you're going

to solve this problem is if you
get the countries and

governments of the region
invested in it.

>> SMITH: Today, ISIS is in
control of large parts of Syria

and Iraq.
The U.S. is hoping that Iraq's

new prime minister, Haider al-
Abadi, a Shiite, can get Iraq's

Sunni tribesmen to once again
turn against ISIS.

Without their trust and support,
the Iraqi forces cannot win.

>> Without that trust between
the Shia and the Sunni in Iraq,

without that trust between the
leaders of the Sunnis and the

leaders of the Shia groups in
Iraq, I think you're gonna

create a vacuum that no one will
benefit from that vacuum but the

extremists.
>> SMITH: Are you an optimist at

this point?
>> No, I'm not an optimist.

I mean, I'm 41 years in the
military and I've spent, as I

said, it seems to me, seven or
eight of the last 12 years

working these very issues in and
around Iraq or Afghanistan and

wherever else.
This is the right campaign plan,

but I'm pragmatic and every
campaign's assumptions have to

be revisited as the campaign
evolves.

And some of these assumptions
are actually, I've no doubt, are

going to be challenged.
>> This morning, the committee

receives testimony from the
secretary of defense and the

chairman of the Joint Chiefs of
Staff.

>> SMITH: In recent testimony,
General Dempsey stated that the

president may have to reconsider
his pledge not to send in U.S.

troops.
>> My view at this point is that

this coalition is the
appropriate way forward.

I believe that will prove true.
But if it fails to be true and

if there are threats to the
United States, then I, of

course, would go back to the
president and make a

recommendation that may include
the use of U.S. military ground

forces.
>> SMITH: If General Dempsey

does come to the point where
he says we need to introduce

boots on the ground, will the
president reconsider?

>> The president's view is that
we do not need to do this with

U.S. combat forces on the
ground.

>> SMITH: I take that as a no?
>> That's a no.

Obviously...
>> SMITH: Even if Dempsey comes

forward and says, "That's what
we need"?

>> Again, no, in terms of how we
are looking at the strategy.

I can't anticipate every
hypothetical scenario.

But in terms of the strategy
itself, the president is very

confident and comfortable with a
limiting principle as it relates

to combat forces on the ground.
>> SMITH: ISIS is now in

control of most of Iraq's
Anbar province.

American military advisors,
are coordinating the war

just outside Baghdad.
>> For more on "The Rise of

ISIS," visit our website.
>> Islamic State is a

state-building enterprise.
They're trying to create a real

state.
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