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Downloaded from YTS.MX
Narrator: They say life is a competition.
Official YIFY movies site: YTS.MX
The fight to be first.
The survival of the fittest.
Winning.
Nobody wants to be a loser.
Now winning basically means
getting more of what you want in life
and as a mathematician, I can help with that.
Because there is a real science to success,
based on ideas
from some of the last century's most beautiful minds.
♪ Everyone's a winner baby That's the truth ♪
Narrator: From how you can analyse
and take advantage of your opponents...
You need to find a way to be as unpredictable as possible.
Narrator: ..to deciding whether to cheat or play fair.
You can put a good apple in a barrel of bad apples,
it's always going to turn bad.
Being more strategic will help you get ahead.
But if all of this sounds a bit selfish,
I'll also be showing you how co-operation can trump conflict.
And how everyone can be a winner.
Hello, Sherriff!
Hi, Hannah, how're you?
But you came here with nothing.
You see it contradicts all the economical predictions.
Whether it's happier relationships you're after,
a bargain, or a better world,
a look at the science of winning can help,
and reveal some surprising truths.
So join me.
You'll lose out if you don't.
Narrator: To get the best result
in any situation, maths can help.
Let's take just one example,
something as simple as ordering dinner.
Should you choose burger?
Or steak?
Now you absolutely cannot afford it,
but that steak does look incredibly tempting
and it's almost your birthday.
Surely you deserve a 25 pound splurge
every now and then.
Narrator: First of all ask yourself,
what do you really want?
Steak or savings?
Well, you need to decide what winning means for you.
And that might change when your mates arrive.
Let's imagine that everybody has exactly the same choice,
burger or steak,
but you know that your friends are notoriously frugal.
So if they all go for the burger,
and you split the bill evenly,
you could end up getting that tasty steak for a lot less.
Narrator: The 25 pound hit from your steak
combined with the 5 pounds for their burgers
means everyone pays 10 pounds each.
Which frankly, for you, is an amazing bargain.
But hold on.
The waiter's coming over
and he's heading towards your friend
who you know loves a rib eye.
Is she thinking what you're thinking?
Narrator: And what about the others?
And so begins a frankly very British game
of silent guessing and calculating.
If she goes for the steak as well as you,
then you're shelling out 15 pounds each.
But if he goes for the steak too
then that's 20 pounds a head,
which is far more than you can possibly afford.
But is it really fair that your best friend,
who always does the generous thing,
ends up spending 20 pounds for a measly burger?
Narrator: So what's the real win here?
Well, it's complicated.
Do you prefer saving money,
a delicious dinner, or being fair to your friend?
Having been fleeced,
will she ever want to meet up again?
The key thing is that what you want can be scored.
And mathematicians like me give it a fancy name,
your expected utility.
Narrator: We express your preferences as values.
That capture just how much you instinctively want something
against the price.
And then factor in other stuff,
like risk, in this case that your dear friend
might ditch you for busting her budget.
Looks like steak pipped friendship this time.
So there you go.
If you can figure out everyone's preferences,
and you know what you want,
then the key question becomes at the least cost to yourself
and without having any control over other people's actions,
how do you get what you want?
Well, thankfully mathematics
can help you find a winning strategy too.
Narrator: Whatever decisions we make, having a good strategy
means the difference between knowing what you want
and getting it.
It was the mid-20th century maths genius, John von Neumann,
who more than anyone else
turned our winning instincts into a science.
Von Neumann established a completely new field of study
called game theory,
which was concerned with the mathematics
of both cooperation and of conflict,
how to avoid losing,
and more importantly, how to win.
His efforts culminated in this here,
a 'Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour'.
641 pages packed to the brim with formulas
which was once described
as one of the most influential
and least read books of the last century.
Narrator: Written with the economist Oskar Morganstern
and published in 1944,
it proved how we can all get ahead,
when one party's loss is the other's gain.
It's not for the mathematically faint hearted,
but at the core of the book
is a strategic principle
that's surprisingly intuitive and easily explained,
with some cold hard cash.
So you and me are here
and we're gonna have a go on those slot machines.
And I've got a nice bag or 2p coins
that you and I are going to share.
Now the polite way to do this
is just to let you help yourself,
after all, I trust you to play fair.
Narrator: But actually, I really shouldn't.
Von Neumann assumes, rightly so,
that we both want as many coins as we can get.
So what should I do?
Well, I should split this into two piles as evenly as possible,
and then let you decide which half you want.
Now given that you are watching me like a hawk,
the only way that I can guarantee
I don't lose out to you
is by me splitting, and you choosing.
Narrator: I don't get as many 2ps as I might like,
but I win by minimising
the maximum amount of fun at the fair
that I can lose to you.
This is known as the minmax theory
and as strategies go,
you can apply it to pretty much anything.
So if you've got two kids that are fighting over toys,
just get one of them to make two piles
and the other to pick which pile they prefer.
Or if you've got boring household chores.
You write two lists,
and your partner chooses which list.
It sounds pretty simple,
but you have to remember that your split
will take into account your preferences.
So you get to decide
if you think the utility of a huge pile of ironing
and doing all of the hoovering,
is equivalent to the utility unblocking the loo
and sorting out all of the bins.
Now strangely,
von Neumann didn't get into that particular conundrum
in his book,
but his proof that you can always minimise the losses
and maximise the gains,
while taking into account the preferences
of two warring parties, was hugely influential.
Narrator: Such an analytical approach to winning
gripped people's imagination.
And crucially, von Neumann took inspiration
from one rather unpredictable game.
Von Neumann was an exceptional mathematician
and, perhaps because of its strategic complexity,
he was particularly interested in poker.
He said that real life is about bluffing,
about little tactics of deception,
about asking yourself
what does the other man think I mean to do.
And that is what games are about in my theory.
Narrator: When it comes to winning big at poker,
there's one woman you need to know.
Man: Wow, this is bold.
A four bet to 4,100. Sick move.
Narrator: Liv Boeree is the European
top ranking female poker player.
Man: Really strong play by Liv Boeree,
she's clearly been eating her vitamins.
Vitamin B for bluff.
Narrator: I'm meeting Liv to find out how poker strategy
might help us get more of what we want in life.
These days the very best players
are very analytically-minded folks
who are comfortable working with maths
to sort of really get a solid understanding
of the theory behind the game.
And then the psychology is,
I like to think of it as the cherry on top.
OK, let's talk about the basics then,
what calculations are you making?
If I'm gonna bet chips,
if it's 30% of the time gonna be the best hand
and 70% of the time gonna be the worst,
well then I can multiply those numbers
against the chips that are involved
and that will be my expected value from a situation.
And that applies in many real life situations too.
Say I'm like running late for a flight,
and I have two options -
I can either go to the airport and try and make my flight
but run the risk
of then missing it
and losing the value of the flight
and having to buy a new one,
or I could stay home and do the sort of the safer bet
and call and pay the change fee.
Thinking rationally and quantifying things
is the very first step to thinking strategically.
Exactly, yeah.
It's very hard to build strategies
if you don't have a numerical idea
of the value of the outcomes of the different strategies.
Narrator: By evaluating both the chances
of something happening,
and the outcome when it does,
you have a better view of your best options.
But at this level, everyone is just as calculating.
To beat the optimal strategy,
you have to find an edge.
There's something that's called 'game theory optimal'
where, if you're playing this style,
then it means that you're unexploitable basically.
The best case that an opponent can do to counter it
is to also play game theory optimal, therefore,
you just sort of reach the same very high standard of play
and you're trying to not deviate from it at all.
And that's where sort of the more like creativity
and, I guess, the artistic side of the game comes in
where you can do these deviations from the optimal play
to exploit your opponent's weaknesses.
But they could be doing that to you as well.
Exactly.
So you need to find a way
to be as unpredictable as possible.
Narrator: Von Neumann's maths
proves that poker players must bluff, unpredictably,
to avoid exploitation by a savvy opponent.
It's an essential strategy,
and it can be applied elsewhere.
You know, if you're in a business negotiation,
what's the minimum amount you'll take?
There's a great opportunity to bluff
and give a high number,
because you're giving yourself the option for them
to pay you that high number.
Narrator: It might seem obvious,
but bluffing like this
is exactly what gives you the edge over others,
particularly if their loss is your gain.
Anything that's a competition,
then to make yourself unexploitable
will just put you at a huge advantage.
Narrator: So quantify everything folks,
and don't make yourself too easy to read.
In win-lose games,
your carefully calculated strategies
can only get you what you want
if your opponents are in the dark.
But what if you're involved in a conflict
where everyone could lose?
During the second half of the 20th century,
the biggest problem that game theorists had to contend with
was the Cold War.
The US and the Soviet Union
were facing off against each other
and, just as in poker, every strategy,
every move and counter-move, had to be analysed.
Except this time,
the stakes could not have been any higher.
Narrator: As an ally to the US,
Britain had to prepare for the worst.
In 1961, a top-secret facility
was set up here in rural Worcestershire.
Regional Seat of Government 9.
It's one of a network of bunkers,
from which the British Government
would have operated in the event of a Nuclear War.
The moment that the second world war ended
with such a devastating show of nuclear force,
the talk in the West began to focus
on trying to prevent a military face off
that would mean that nuclear bunkers like this one
would become a necessity.
Now the strategy that was on the table at the time
was referred to, somewhat euphemistically,
as preventative war.
The idea being that the Americans would launch
an unprovoked attack on the Soviet Union
before they had the chance to acquire the bomb.
Now yes, that would mean a quick hot war,
but it would at least avoid
a slow, expensive and far more dangerous Cold one.
Narrator: Preventative war
is an argument still used today, over North Korea,
and at the time,
it's supporters included Winston Churchill
and von Neumann himself.
In 1950, von Neumann remarked,
with the Russians
it's not a question of whether but of when.
If you say, "Why not bomb them tomorrow",
I say, "Why not today?"
And if you say, "Today at 5:00",
I say, "Why not 1:00"
You can see where this kind of reasoning
ends and it is perfectly rational.
If someone has to win,
better that it be us.
Narrator: Despite the impeccable logic,
America didn't attack Russia.
And then it was too late, because Russia got the bomb too.
By 1953 there was no outcome
in which only one side could win.
This demanded a new strategy,
something which became known as Mutual Assured Destruction,
or MAD for short.
Basically, the threat of you
using massively destructive weapons on your enemy
prevents your enemy from using those same weapons on you.
Once everybody is armed,
nobody has an incentive
to either initiate a conflict or to disarm.
And so nuclear war was avoided,
but places like this and a hugely expensive,
vast global nuclear arsenal
was the result.
Narrator: Compared to von Neumann's games,
in which one person's loss is the other's gain,
mutually assured destruction, strangely,
is something we come across far more, in real life.
Because most conflicts, whether at work,
with friends or family,
have the potential to end up in a stalemate.
So often, we choose strategies that mean no one wins.
To explain why,
I'd like to begin with a rather unusual detective story.
I'm looking at the Instagram page
of the rapper Ludacris.
Narrator: In 2015
he shared this picture with his millions of followers.
It had originally been posted on the Facebook page
of the police department, in Franklin County, Kentucky.
And it reads -
"Attention Drug Dealers.
"We offer a free service
"to help you eliminate your drug competition."
And then under a quite large marijuana leaf
there are a series of sections
where dealers can identify their competitors.
Narrator: You can fill out who your competition is,
where they live, their phone numbers,
even their hours of operation.
It might seem like a gimmick,
but the fact is Franklin County PD
were onto something.
I think I need to find out a bit more about this,
so I'm gonna call the Sheriff.
[ringing tone]
Hello, Sherriff.
Hi, Hannah. How are you?
I'm good, thank you.
Why would a dealer call in
and tip off one of their competitors?
Obviously if they eliminate it,
the more they get, the more business they do,
the more money, the more potential earnings
that they have, that they'll make.
And, if you get rid of your competition,
you're the only game in town.
Especially by having law enforcement do it.
This has really worked for you then as a tactic,
getting the criminals to do the dirty on each other.
Yes.
It's something that was very simple to do
and at the end of the day,
if we've got drug dealers turning in drug dealers,
that's a win.
Narrator: Police - one, drug dealers - nil.
Well, this was obviously a pretty good score
for Sherriff Melton.
Because what he did was force the local drug dealers
into the most famous conundrum in the history of winning.
It's called, appropriately enough,
the prisoner's dilemma,
and it demonstrates very clearly
the dangers of falling into a lose-lose situation
when acting in your own best interests.
Narrator: Think of it like this,
Imagine Sherriff Melton
has chucked a couple of shady looking characters
from his local beat into jail.
He's got evidence to charge them with possession
but can only get them for dealing
if they rat each other out.
So he puts them in two separate cells
and gives them both his clever flier.
Our suspects must now consider
whether they should both keep their traps shut
and only go away for one year each for possession,
both rat the other out for dealing,
and each get a three year sentence,
or hope that they alone grass the other up,
getting off scot free,
while their competition gets a whopping five years,
otherwise known as the sucker's payoff.
[laughter]
So what to do?
Well, this option is the best.
But there's a risk it could quickly turn sour
if one person decides to basically betray the other.
Good ol' Sherriff Melton knows these two are toe-rags
and they know it too,
so to avoid being screwed over,
the only stable solution for them is this.
They both must implicate the other.
A win for Sherriff Melton,
but lose-lose for them.
This unhappy scenario is called the Nash Equilibrium.
It's a beautifully simple proof,
that was published in 1950 by the mathematician John Nash,
when he was still in his early 20s.
It won him a Nobel Prize,
and it transformed the analysis of winning.
What Nash proved was that in a situation
with several possible outcomes like this one,
where people either can't
or won't cooperate with each other,
there is always a strategy which you and everyone else
is best off opting for.
Now in the case of the prisoner's dilemma,
paradoxically that strategy ends up with lose-lose.
Everybody wants to win by ratting out their competition,
and everyone wants to avoid the sucker's payoff.
And as a result, everyone ends up going to jail.
Narrator: Being uncooperative
can cost you more than you bargained for.
The reason Nash's proof matters so much
is because these kind of dilemmas
constantly appear in real life,
because of the way our individual interests
often clash with those of others and of society.
Whether you are a drug dealer
or just out for dinner with your mates,
no one wants to be the sucker, right?
Narrator: I remember the day I was arrested
and I was locked up for 48 hours.
I remember thinking,
"Oh, this is what happens."
Narrator: If ever there was an example
of Nash's theory in action,
it's in the controversial world of professional cycling.
The global hero at the time was Lance Armstrong.
We were really good friends.
I remember him saying, "I got caught with my hand
"in the cookie jar."
I knew what Lance was doing,
it was like, hang on a second.
Narrator: David is one of the highest profile riders
to talk candidly
about the use of performance enhancing drugs within cycling.
Tell me about the first time that you realised
that cycling, perhaps, wasn't squeaky clean.
In my very first pro race in February 1997,
it was when my room-mate was offered a cortisone pill,
they all carried around little medical bags.
It was omnipresent.
It was white noise is what I've always described it as.
Narrator: For four years, David trained and raced clean,
but the pressure to remain competitive took its toll.
Eventually, despite your initial resistance,
you did decide to give in.
Yeah, I think that is the term, I gave in.
I didn't decide to join them.
I gave in and thought,
"Well, I can't fight this any more."
I was an ethical person,
but over time I just went chtt-chtt-chtt, chipped away.
- It wears you down.
Well, it just, the environment you're in wears you down.
You can put a good apple in a barrel of bad apples,
it's always going to turn bad.
Narrator: It's a classic prisoner's dilemma.
In professional cycling,
riders compete to win.
If doping makes winning more likely,
then abiding by the rules risks the sucker's payoff.
And so the rational thing to do is cheat
because a faster field, and a doping arms race,
has become the new norm.
This dilemma unites all competitive sport,
though it's a lose-lose scenario if everyone cheats,
nonetheless for individuals,
cheating can give you the edge
if you can get away with it.
The fundamental reason I was there
was because I wanted to win, I was very ambitious.
If the goals you want to achieve
are being achieved by the people who are cheating,
why don't I do it?
Narrator: David was the reigning world time-trial champion
when he was caught in 2004,
receiving a two year ban.
But after his punishment,
he returned to racing clean.
Reporter: David Millar, comes up,
hits the line, best time 31:15,
Millar is back.
[cheering]
Every time I won from then on in,
it was to prove a point, that it's possible to win clean.
- And you're appealing because you are clean.
- Because we are clean.
It actually became a valuable asset
to be clean and win races.
It goes back to that whole barrel of apples,
make sure it's a barrel of good apples
with one bad apple, that's easier to control.
These guys will never have to encounter it,
because we have an anti-doping culture
in professional cycling now.
Narrator: David's experience illustrates the profound tension
between individual drive to succeed,
and the greater good.
Our winning instincts can be both our greatest asset
and deeply destructive.
This is something that's relevant to all of us.
If you think about it,
how many times have you been in a situation
where you didn't want to upset the balance of things
for fear that you might end up missing out?
Maybe you have had a job
where you ended up staying later and later at work
just because everybody else was doing it,
and you didn't want to look like you were lazy.
Or maybe you have failed to call someone out
for a racist or a sexist comment,
just because you didn't want to look bad,
you didn't want to make the fuss.
Or maybe you have waited and waited
to tell someone that you love them,
just because if you said it first
and it wasn't reciprocated,
you'd end up feeling heartbroken.
Now all of these situations
are real life examples of Nash Equilibria.
Narrator: Win-wins, it turns out,
are often really hard to achieve.
And we can see the consequences
of our failure to cooperate everywhere.
In many situations in life,
egotistical behaviour
is not only morally problematic
but it is also strategically unwise.
I think a nice domestic example is washing dishes,
no-one loves it, OK.
It is a little bit annoying, you know,
and we all know that it's better for someone else to do it.
But if you are living in a shared house,
the problem begins when all the players
decide to adopt my strategy
and then no one is washes dishes,
the outcome is a tower of dirty plates
and it is not good.
When you are taking into account only your personal good,
and all your thinking is self-centred,
and you don't care at all about other players,
the result may be a total disaster.
Narrator: It's so easy to disregard
the small impact we might make,
just by ditching stuff for someone else to deal with.
But many small acts of selfishness
can have huge consequences.
It's a phenomenon known as The Tragedy of the Commons.
For example the damage to the atmosphere,
the destruction of ocean eco-systems.
Rainforest logging,
these issues are far more important
and it is really hard to tackle with them
even with rules and regulations.
Narrator: Arguably, the challenge for government
is to create rules that align
the interests of individuals and society
to find those win-wins.
But like the rest of us,
our leaders have their own
political and economic goals to pursue
meaning there will always be the temptation
for some to put their own short-term interests first.
[indistinctive chattering]
So in the real conflicts we all face,
can we ever justify being uncooperative?
Definitely, I'd argue, on occasion.
Because some people really don't know
what's good for them.
[children yelling]
I'd like to suggest we take
a potentially very unstable situation.
Taking two small argumentative children on holiday
to demonstrate some strategies that can ensure you win,
in a domestic stand-off.
[crying and yelling]
The first thing absolutely not to do
is to make a non-credible threat.
[tyres screeching]
Right, that's it!
Holiday's cancelled.
Turning the car around! We're going home!
Narrator: The kids quickly work out that you won't do this
as it harms you just as much as them.
Everybody wants a holiday.
So try a far more credible threat instead.
If you don't shut up,
we're gonna be spending the first day of the holiday
visiting an art gallery.
As long as they know you really like art galleries,
and you know they really hate them,
this one is a much better strategy.
Narrator: Even better, try a grand gesture,
called pre-commitment.
If one of you starts arguing again,
you're gonna go to bed at 6:00 all week,
and the other one can stay up as late as they like.
This one is quite a serious pre-commitment,
because you are risking not being able
to pack them off to bed like normal
but you'll just have to hope
that the prospect of them missing out
is enough for them to be smart, and stay quiet.
Narrator: In order to get what you want,
any adversary has to believe
you have the credibility and commitment
to go through with your threats.
But in the end,
no matter how winning your tactics,
there's one thing
that's incredibly difficult to deal with.
[children yelling] It's not fair!
Narrator: In any kind of interaction
our sense of what is and isn't fair
is incredibly powerful.
And in some circumstances,
it can actually make us deliberately lose.
To explore this apparently quite irrational way
of getting what we want,
Haim and I are going to play something called
the Ultimatum Game,
and the rules are very simple.
Two players, one is called the proposer
and the other one is called the responder.
The proposer gets a sum of money,
for example, 100 pounds.
Is that what you've got in there?
Yes, yes, yes. And the proposer have to decide
how to split this money
and the responder must decide whether to accept or reject.
If the responder rejects the split,
both players will end up with nothing.
It's a one-shot game, take it or leave it offer.
OK, well the fairest thing to do obviously to say is 50-50.
50-50, of course.
I could get an extra ten pounds by saying 60-40.
Easily, I think.
However I decide,
I mean I do genuinely get some of the money?
Yes, yes, yes, yes, yes. Real money, a real game.
Everything is real.
Narrator: Now to make some offers
to a series of unsuspecting volunteers.
I think I'm going to split it 70-30.
- I get the 70. - You get the 70.
Yes.
Well, obviously it's really unfair.
- But I'm going to accept it.
- But you have to decide. - Yeah, I'm gonna accept it.
You accept, OK. 30 pounds.
I'm going to check it.
No, don't check it, I am a mathematician.
- Thank you. - Thank you.
Narrator: So unfair offer number one works in my favour.
What is your decision?
OK, I'm going to go for 80 pounds to me,
and 20 pounds to you.
Yes or no, it's a take it or leave it offer.
- No, leave it. - No, leave it.
But hang on, you came here with nothing.
I did, but I feel like if you were like 50 pounds for you
and 50 pounds for me, I'd be fine with that,
I would have said deal.
We both came here with nothing,
so we both should have left with something
and an equal amount would have been better
than an unequal amount.
- Wow. - OK.
You see, it contradicts all the economical predictions. Yes?
Economics say one is better than none,
20 is for sure better than none.
Yeah.
Narrator: Economics says Said here should accept,
but I'm denied.
Next...
- Hi. - Hi.
Hello.
I quite like money,
so 90 pounds to me,
and ten pounds to you.
Um...
You know what, psht, why not?
I'll take 10 pounds.
You have 10 pounds, it is yours.
Thank you very much.
Hannah, you are now such a rich person.
Thank you very much.
Are you happy with your decision?
- It's pretty unfair, but.. - Pretty unfair, eh?
I'm a realist
and I like ten pounds at least in my pocket,
so I'm at least ten pounds richer so...
- So ten is better than none. - Yeah.
Narrator: A man after my own logical heart.
After three offers, I've bagged 160 pounds
of a possible 240 pounds.
So why did I not clean up?
The 20-80 split,
not taking 20 pounds seems bonkers to me.
You know that 20,
it is approximate the world average of the split
that people refuse to take.
People seem to show an unwillingness
to accept unfairness and they are prepared to pay...
- Even 80-20? - Yes.
I mean, they're basically being irrational, right?
People usually behave rationally from their point of view.
So it is really hard to define what it rational,
what it not.
For example Said, yes, he paid 20 pounds,
but to teach you a lesson,
20 pounds, it seems to me a low price,
you see, nothing almost.
Yeah, well.
It was an expensive lesson for me as well.
For you. Yes. But not for him.
Narrator: It might seem like an irrational way
to get what we want,
but what we're looking at here is the long game.
The act of sacrificing a small win,
to punish someone,
means they may well be less selfish with us
and others, in the future.
It's a perfectly rational way
to secure greater collective success.
But most creatures on earth aren't rational.
So why do we see co-operative, even altruistic behaviour,
in the animal kingdom,
that seems to benefit others more than the individual?
Surely this contradicts the theory of evolution,
based as it is on the struggle for life
and the survival of the fittest.
When I learned about evolution at school,
I was under the impression
that it was all about competition,
that every animal was necessarily out for itself,
and the fitter you are,
the more likely you are to win fights for mates,
for food and for territory.
If you can ace those conflicts,
the more likely you are to pass on your genes
and win at the game of life.
It has been said that nothing in biology
makes sense except in the light of evolution.
And evolution has been based on conflict.
It is a struggle for existence.
In animal behaviour,
there exist many examples
where animals fight within a species,
but where they fight according almost to rules,
where they seem to restrain themselves
and don't escalate the conflict too much.
Narrator: You could try to explain
individuals avoiding violence
as being for the benefit of the group,
but that's not quite how evolution works.
If there is a single individual ready to escalate the conflict
and all others are going to run away
when they see that things become serious
then this individual will win everything,
will have many offsprings,
the offsprings will win this trait
of escalating a conflict
and this trait will become more and more frequent.
Narrator: In this scenario,
aggressive behaviour will always win out,
so there has to be an alternative explanation.
It only began to emerge in the early 1970s,
when British biologist John Maynard Smith
was given a manuscript to review
written by an unknown American called George Price.
Now Price wasn't a mathematician,
or a biologist, or a game theorist,
but he had read von Neumann,
and he'd written about Cold War games
and the uses of deterrence.
His paper, titled
'Antlers, Intraspecific Combat, and Altruism',
suggested that things like giant deer antlers
weren't actually for maiming your rivals at all.
Instead they were clever strategic accessories
that would help you limit conflict
and avoid the destructive effects of fighting.
Just like nuclear missiles,
antlers are the kind of weapon
that you could parade in front of your enemy,
hopefully without ever having to actually use them.
Narrator: Maynard Smith was struck by this,
and together with Price created a simple game
to explore how such 'limited war' strategies
could evolve.
And he called it the 'hawk-dove' game.
Narrator: Picture an imaginary species of bird
that only has two inherited behavioural strategies.
One is aggressive or 'Hawkish'
And the other more cooperative or 'Doveish'.
If two hawks clash over something like food,
their strategy means total war.
They'll fight, risking injury
and no guarantee of food either.
Now if a hawk and dove meet,
the dove initially stands up for itself,
but then scarpers.
Finally if doves meet, they'll share.
In each interaction,
both birds receive a score.
And if these are added up over time,
it reveals which behaviours are most likely
to benefit individuals
and so survive down the generations.
On the face of it
if everyone was displaying dove-like behaviour,
it looks like it could work,
as well we being generally nice for everyone.
But unfortunately that's unstable,
because just one meany hawk could come along
and immediately have the upper hand on everybody.
And if that hawkish behaviour really took off,
that too would be unstable,
because of the constant risk, and cost of violence.
Now, what the maths shows
is that a stable population is possible
but only if you have one third hawks
and two thirds doves.
Now those exact numbers might change slightly
if you tweak the payoffs,
but the key point here
is that this was mathematical proof
that there was a strategic advantage
to avoiding conflict.
Narrator: Evolution, it turned out,
is not simply a winner-takes-all kind of game.
And so scientists took
to this new evolutionary form of game theory.
The reason?
To find the ultimate
long-term winning strategy for us all.
It was an ingenious American political scientist,
called Robert Axelrod,
who around 1980 took the next big step.
Axelrod invited economists,
mathematicians, political scientists,
psychologists and sociologists,
all of whom had written theoretical papers
on cooperation and the prisoner's dilemma,
to compete in a computer tournament.
Narrator: The challenge was to design a computer programme
that would play the best combination
of attacking and more cooperative behaviour.
It was a bold move
considering the golden age
of popular computer games and coding
was still in its infancy.
Researchers from around the world
mailed in their computer programmes by post.
It was all to see which of their electronic beasts,
some of which were a lot more cooperative than others,
would emerge the winner.
Narrator: 14 programmes were to play 200 rounds
of the prisoner's dilemma against themselves
and one another.
As you'd expect,
cooperating with your opponent scores well.
But you could get a much higher payoff
by attacking a co-operator all of the time.
But attack an attacker,
and your score will suffer.
And so the tournament ran,
with some players doing better than others.
One strategy for example, was nicknamed The Grudger.
It would cooperate until it was attacked,
at which point it would get the hump
and then never cooperate again for the rest of the game.
Narrator: After competing against everyone else,
The Grudger crawled in in 7th place.
The surprise winner, with 504 points,
was written in just four lines of code
and was easily the simplest programme
that had been submitted.
It was called Tit for Tat.
It would start off by cooperating
and then would just copy whatever the opponent did
in the previous round.
So if the opponent either attacked or cooperated,
Tit for Tat would respond in kind.
Narrator: Tit for Tat's behaviour
over the course of the competition
is basically you scratch my back,
I'll scratch yours.
So was this the winning strategy everyone was looking for?
Well, no.
Because unlike in real life,
these computer programmes, including Tit for Tat,
could play endlessly
without ever making mistakes.
Imagine I decided to use Tit for Tat as my new strategy
for winning at life.
So I would cooperate by default, lovely,
and only retaliate if someone was really mean to me,
just to teach them a lesson.
But what if, idiotically,
I sort of accidentally was a bit mean to someone.
Say, I just bumped into them...
Oh, sorry.
Narrator: If they're also playing Tit for Tat,
they'll have to shove me back,
formally known as defecting.
And then I'd have to do the same, as would he.
We'll defect forever.
Hm, not great, is it?
But some scientists weren't quite ready
to give up on tit for tat just yet.
Karl Sigmund and his student Martin Nowak
started experimenting
with a new kind of evolutionary tournament
but this time, as in the natural world,
competing strategies could evolve and make mistakes.
Narrator: Using computer simulations,
they watched strategies like tit for tat emerge,
and compete, over thousands of generations.
After the first 50 or 100 rounds,
it seemed as if everyone was a defector.
Everyone? Not quite.
There was one little minority
playing something like tit for tat,
and this little minority very slowly increased
and became more and more frequent
and was actually defeating the defectors.
Narrator: The key was to let natural selection
find the winning strategy.
If you wait still longer then you will see
that another more generous form of tit for tat
is going to evolve and to take over.
And here it comes.
Generous tit for tat.
Narrator: This strategy
will always cooperate first.
Ooh, sorry.
Narrator: But when facing defection...
..around one out of every three times,
it'll just ignore it and cooperate regardless.
Of all the possible strategies,
and despite its forgiving ways,
generous tit for tat consistently came out on top.
For me it is still
one of the fondest remembrances
of my scientific life.
There was no master programme behind it,
no design for forgiveness, so to speak.
It came out all by itself.
A purely mathematical simulation
had revealed that winning strategies,
in the long run,
tend to be generous, hopeful and forgiving.
Now this basic moral code just emerged,
perhaps you could even take this as proof
of the existence and advantage of goodness.
Narrator: So why, then, don't we live in a wonderful,
generous and forgiving utopia?
The simulations pointed to an answer.
Over generations of stability,
the main strategy becomes total cooperation.
But this is fragile,
because hawkish defectors can rapidly take over
and do their worst.
And yet slowly,
thanks to strategies like tit for tat,
cooperation emerges again and again.
Despite its fragility, there is hope,
because ultimately, cooperation can't be suppressed.
Thanks to things like altruism, kindness and reciprocity,
it re-emerges time after time.
And these aren't just codes
that are divined by priests or philosophers,
they have pure mathematics
and evolution itself behind them.
Narrator: So where does that leave you and me?
Well, I want you to try something out,
starting tonight.
Now this could work for any kind of relationship,
but let's imagine that it's your partner.
What I want you to do is to co-operate,
but copy their previous move.
So if they come home one day with a big bunch of flowers,
you should get to work on your own romantic gesture.
But if they come home one night
much drunker and later than they promised,
you get to do something equivalent.
But every now and then,
you should forgive one of their slip ups,
because nobody's perfect
and you're gonna mess up too, at some point.
So, there you have it.
Strategies for a happier life and a better world,
all thanks to maths.
I call that a win.
Captioned by Ai-Media ai-media.tv
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