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Hey,
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hey, hey.
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Heat. Heat.
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It was in July 1943 that the Russian
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city of Kursk bore witness to the
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largest tank battle in history. The
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outcome of the battle was crucial. It
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put an end to Hitler's offensive power
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on the Eastern Front.
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At Kursk, the Soviet army would draw the
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German forces into a deliberate battle
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of attrition designed to grind down
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Hitler's last remaining attacking
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strength in the east.
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The German staff officers could see the
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danger, but the furer was blind to it.
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On the 10th of May 1943, the architect
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of Germany's tank forces, General Heinsk
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Goden became engaged in a heated
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conversation with Adolf Hitler regarding
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Hitler's decision to attack at Kursk.
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Gdderion is reported to have asked, "How
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many people do [music] you think even
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know where Kursk is? It is a matter of
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profound indifference to the world
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whether we hold Kursk or not. Why do we
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want to attack in the east at all this
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year?
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To this Hitler replied, you're quite
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right. Whenever I think of this attack,
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my stomach turns over.
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Gderian strongly advised Hitler [music]
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to remain on the defensive, but Hitler
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was determined. He would go ahead with
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the attack.
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Gderrion was not alone in his
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apprehension. Almost to a man, Hitler's
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generals had advised him to adopt a
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defensive posture on the Eastern Front
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during 1943.
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The last two years had cost them dearly,
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and they needed a chance to rest and
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regroup. Hitler's decision to attack
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would seriously damage his forces and
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remove any hope the Germans had of
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regaining the initiative in the eastern
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theater. By draining away the German
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tank strength, the short but intensive
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battle of Kursk would tip the scales of
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World War II decisively in the favor of
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Soviet Russia.
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On the 1st of September 1939, Hitler's
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forces smashed through the Polish
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frontier.
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This prompted Britain and France to
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officially declare war on Germany 2 days
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later.
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Hitler hoped to avoid this outcome as he
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never expected the western governments
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to go to war over Poland.
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Poland was obliterated in a matter of
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weeks when Hitler used the blitz creek
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tactic to gain control of the country.
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Before Hitler could continue advancing
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eastwards, he knew he would first have
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to deal with his enemies in the west. By
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May 1940, the German troops turned their
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offensive [music] westwards.
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The war with the west was drastically
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different to that with Poland as the
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forces facing the Germans were modern
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and well equipped. However, the British
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and French armies were still relying on
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tactics used during the First World War
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and were totally unprepared for the
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superior skills and strategy of the
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Germans.
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Within weeks, Hitler took control of
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Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, and
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France. The British managed to escape
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across the channel at Dunkirk, but were
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in no position to fight back.
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Full of confidence after the great
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victories of 1939 and 1940, Hitler
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pushed ahead with his plans to invade
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Soviet Russia in 1941.
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He held a deep contempt for the Soviet
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Union and boasted that we just have to
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kick in the door and the whole rotten
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edifice will come crashing down.
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The gains made during the invasion of
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Russia in June 1941 confirmed Hitler's
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optimism as a disorganized and poorly
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led Red Army retreated in complete
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confusion.
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However, the first winter in Russia gave
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the German soldiers a sharp taste of
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what lay in store for them.
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battered but unbowed, the German forces
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just managed to avoid total collapse.
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For the next 18 months, the front lines
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seessawared back and forth as both sides
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wrestled for control of the towns and
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cities. The southern region in
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particular saw some of the biggest and
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most damaging battles for both sides.
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Ferocious battles for Sevastapole, Kiev,
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Rosstov, and Stalingrad consumed vast
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amounts of men and materials as control
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of the towns and cities swayed from side
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to side.
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In February 1943, the total defeat at
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Stalingrad was a disaster for the
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Germans. But a switch to the strategic
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defensive might just have brought enough
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time to regain the initiative in 1944.
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But Hitler was adamant. He would attack.
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By mid 1943, [music]
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the focus of attention would once more
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be in the south of Russia, where the
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Germans were to make one more attempt to
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gain the decisive edge. This was to be
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the last great gamble in the east, a
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high noon for Hitler and his hopes for
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victory.
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Confident after the stunning victories
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over Poland in 1939 and the Western
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Allies in 1940, Hitler pushed ahead with
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his ultimate goal of defeating Soviet
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Russia in 1941.
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His generals had advised him to wait for
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German forces were not strong enough at
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this stage of the war. They needed more
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time to prepare. Hitler instead mounted
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the biggest land invasion in history.
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Like his previous campaigns, Hitler
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expected quick victory and the mobile
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warfare tactic was employed once again.
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By the winter of 1941, however, it was
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apparent that the war in Russia would be
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difficult and take far longer than
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anticipated.
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The Russians launched a massive
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counteroffensive during this first
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winter and almost succeeded in defeating
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the Germans. Hitler himself issued the
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order to stand fast and hold the ground
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already won. The success of this policy
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convinced Hitler that he knew better
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than his generals. But when it was
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repeated, the policy of holding on was
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to prove disastrous.
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The crushing defeat of the German sixth
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army at Stalenrad affected Hitler deeply
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as it came as a direct result of his
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refusal to allow a withdrawal.
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Now he planned the Kursk offensive to
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regain the initiative and save his
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reputation.
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Unlike Hitler, the ruthless dictator of
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the USSR had no formal military
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experience. A politician first and
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foremost, he was prepared to do almost
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anything to maintain his position of
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power.
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Stalin was responsible for the purges of
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the Red Army in 1937, which severely
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hampered their fighting capabilities in
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the early stages of the German invasion.
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The loss of so many commanders prevented
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the Red Army from fighting cohesively.
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Nevertheless, Stalin knew how to
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manipulate people and situations to his
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own advantage.
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Once the German invasion began, he
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quickly rallied the population behind
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him. Despite the fact that he had been
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systematically killing countless numbers
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of his own people, he played on their
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love of mother Russia. and even within
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the army. He ensured that the power of
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the political commisa was limited during
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these crucial early stages. He was
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astute enough however to listen to his
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generals and took their advice many
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times. He put the brilliance of
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commanders like Zukov and Kf to good
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use. Playing one against the other to
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ensure maximum results.
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Quick to take the glory for any
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successes and ruthless enough to ensure
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his troops and people would not dare to
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question him, he saw his nation through
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to ultimate victory over the Nazi
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invaders.
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By the spring of 1943, the German army
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and German nation were still in deep
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shock over the defeat at Stalingrad.
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This defeat was their first major
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reverse of the war, and the famed
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tenacity of the Russian soldier had been
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decisively proved.
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The Russian offensive launched
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immediately after Stalingrad presented
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the very real danger that the German
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army would be pushed back even further.
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Honey,
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[screaming]
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fast reactions from von Mannstein
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and the effective use of the fighting
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capabilities of the German army. forces
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finally halted the Russian attack.
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The stunning victory at Karkov achieved
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against the odds became known as von
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manstein's miracle. The desperate men of
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Army Group South had at last contained
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the Soviet advance.
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Further north, Army Group Center had
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held fast and halted the Russian
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advances near Orel.
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In between these two areas, the Soviet
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advances had created a huge enemy bulge
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which held large amounts of Soviet men
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and materials. In the middle of the
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bulge lay the town of Kursk.
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Keen to capitalize on the victory at
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Kov, Hitler wanted to regain the
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initiative in the east, von Mannstein
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drew up a plan that provided for a
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similar action to Karkov, where the
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German army had first given up ground
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and had then quickly counterattacked
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when the Russian lines of supply became
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overstretched.
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Characteristically, Hitler rejected the
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withdrawal phase of the plan, but
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approved the attacks towards Kursk.
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This part of the plan was developed by
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Colonel General Zeitzler who gave it the
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final draft cenamed Zitadel.
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The plan was to advance from the north
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and south [music] towards Kursk and trap
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the Soviets in a huge pocket. This
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pocket could then be systematically
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destroyed.
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To make the plan work, however, the
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attack would have to be launched quickly
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before the Russians had time to prepare
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defenses. The initial plan had May as
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the start date, but various delays
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forced the start date back to July, by
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which time the Russians had prepared
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defensive positions that would present
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the Germans with formidable obstacles.
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The Russian victory at Stalingrad had
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shown that the mighty German army could
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be defeated.
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The seemingly endless resources of
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Russia in both men and machines could
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and would be sacrificed to ensure the
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ultimate goal was achieved.
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The Russian offensive launched after
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Stalingrad had been intended to build on
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the recent successes. But what was not
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expected was the ability of the German
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soldier to recover quickly.
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The Russians suffered a surprise defeat
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at Karkov in March 1943, just one month
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after the surrender at Stalingrad.
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Stalin was keen to advance further, but
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Zukov and others persuaded Stalin that a
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defensive posture was more suitable at
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this stage of the war.
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The Russians were also fully aware of
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the German plans as they had been
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receiving information from the Lucy spy
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ring. This reliable source was fed from
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00:15:24,480 --> 00:15:27,440
Bletchley Park in England. The
279
00:15:27,440 --> 00:15:28,959
scientists [music] working at this top
280
00:15:28,959 --> 00:15:31,279
secret location had broken the secret
281
00:15:31,279 --> 00:15:33,440
German enigma code at the start of the
282
00:15:33,440 --> 00:15:35,519
war and had been watching developments
283
00:15:35,519 --> 00:15:38,399
very closely [music] ever since. They
284
00:15:38,399 --> 00:15:40,959
passed information to the Soviets via an
285
00:15:40,959 --> 00:15:43,360
intricate web of contacts situated in
286
00:15:43,360 --> 00:15:44,959
Switzerland.
287
00:15:44,959 --> 00:15:46,560
Although the Russians never knew the
288
00:15:46,560 --> 00:15:48,880
true source of the information, they
289
00:15:48,880 --> 00:15:51,600
came to rely upon its accuracy.
290
00:15:51,600 --> 00:15:53,279
They were therefore given the dates of
291
00:15:53,279 --> 00:15:56,000
the planned German attacks in advance
292
00:15:56,000 --> 00:15:58,880
and began to prepare accordingly.
293
00:15:58,880 --> 00:16:01,600
Massive defensive belts were constructed
294
00:16:01,600 --> 00:16:03,360
with the sole purpose of the destruction
295
00:16:03,360 --> 00:16:06,800
of German armor and men. Zukov, the
296
00:16:06,800 --> 00:16:09,440
master tactician, also gathered strong
297
00:16:09,440 --> 00:16:11,279
reserves that would be unleashed when
298
00:16:11,279 --> 00:16:14,399
the time was right. This well-prepared
299
00:16:14,399 --> 00:16:16,639
trap would be the launch pad for the
300
00:16:16,639 --> 00:16:21,160
defeat of Germany in the east.
301
00:16:38,720 --> 00:16:41,519
Gyorgi Zukov gained his first military
302
00:16:41,519 --> 00:16:43,600
experience under the Tsarist army during
303
00:16:43,600 --> 00:16:44,781
World War I.
304
00:16:44,781 --> 00:16:45,120
>> [music]
305
00:16:45,120 --> 00:16:47,920
>> He actually changed sides during the war
306
00:16:47,920 --> 00:16:49,839
and joined the communists during the
307
00:16:49,839 --> 00:16:52,480
revolution in 1917.
308
00:16:52,480 --> 00:16:54,720
Zukov served in various positions after
309
00:16:54,720 --> 00:16:57,040
the war and became an early expert in
310
00:16:57,040 --> 00:16:59,839
the use of armor. He managed to escape
311
00:16:59,839 --> 00:17:03,120
the purges of 1937 that cost so many
312
00:17:03,120 --> 00:17:06,720
their lives. His first real success came
313
00:17:06,720 --> 00:17:09,439
against Japan at Khalkkin Gaul during
314
00:17:09,439 --> 00:17:12,480
1939 and he then played his part in the
315
00:17:12,480 --> 00:17:15,280
successful defense of Lenengrad. He was
316
00:17:15,280 --> 00:17:17,039
given the responsibility for the defense
317
00:17:17,039 --> 00:17:20,559
of Stalingrad in late 1942 when he
318
00:17:20,559 --> 00:17:23,120
planned and executed the first major
319
00:17:23,120 --> 00:17:27,240
defeat [music] of the German army.
320
00:17:30,559 --> 00:17:32,720
Zukov was a quick-tempered man who
321
00:17:32,720 --> 00:17:34,562
intensely disliked those who failed
322
00:17:34,562 --> 00:17:38,200
[music] in their duty.
323
00:17:41,039 --> 00:17:43,520
Constantin Rokosovvski was one of the
324
00:17:43,520 --> 00:17:45,760
Soviet advisers during the Spanish Civil
325
00:17:45,760 --> 00:17:48,559
War. He was also caught up in the purges
326
00:17:48,559 --> 00:17:50,320
of 1937.
327
00:17:50,320 --> 00:17:53,200
He escaped death but did spend a period
328
00:17:53,200 --> 00:17:55,679
in prison. He was called back into
329
00:17:55,679 --> 00:17:57,440
service to help in the defense of Moscow
330
00:17:57,440 --> 00:18:00,559
in 1941 and also had the control of the
331
00:18:00,559 --> 00:18:03,840
dawn front during the stalingrad battle.
332
00:18:03,840 --> 00:18:06,000
He was in command of the central front
333
00:18:06,000 --> 00:18:09,880
during the battle of Kursk.
334
00:18:12,559 --> 00:18:15,039
Pavlra Mistrov was also an early
335
00:18:15,039 --> 00:18:18,000
advocate of tank warfare. He first had
336
00:18:18,000 --> 00:18:19,840
command of the Russian seventh tank
337
00:18:19,840 --> 00:18:21,919
corps and was involved in the fighting
338
00:18:21,919 --> 00:18:24,160
around Rosstov and Stalingrad where he
339
00:18:24,160 --> 00:18:26,799
formed his tactical ideas.
340
00:18:26,799 --> 00:18:28,960
It was Rott Mistrov who first suggested
341
00:18:28,960 --> 00:18:31,120
the use of complete armoronly
342
00:18:31,120 --> 00:18:34,559
formations. This tactic was adopted and
343
00:18:34,559 --> 00:18:36,240
he subsequently gained command of the
344
00:18:36,240 --> 00:18:39,200
fifth guard's tank army. A very able
345
00:18:39,200 --> 00:18:41,200
commander, Rott Mistrov had the
346
00:18:41,200 --> 00:18:43,440
appearance of a quiet school teacher,
347
00:18:43,440 --> 00:18:46,000
but the mind and determination of a
348
00:18:46,000 --> 00:18:49,880
brilliant military tactician.
349
00:18:50,880 --> 00:18:54,640
Ivan Confv, born in 1897, served the Zar
350
00:18:54,640 --> 00:18:58,240
during the First World War as an NCO. By
351
00:18:58,240 --> 00:19:01,200
1917, he had become a communist and
352
00:19:01,200 --> 00:19:03,120
joined the Russian Revolution, serving
353
00:19:03,120 --> 00:19:05,520
as a political commisar.
354
00:19:05,520 --> 00:19:07,840
He then joined the Red Army and
355
00:19:07,840 --> 00:19:10,160
graduated successfully from the Fritary
356
00:19:10,160 --> 00:19:11,679
Academy.
357
00:19:11,679 --> 00:19:14,559
In August 1941, he served in the
358
00:19:14,559 --> 00:19:17,039
Transcaucasian military district inside
359
00:19:17,039 --> 00:19:21,120
the Smalins sector. In October 1941, he
360
00:19:21,120 --> 00:19:23,440
became commander of the Khalin front and
361
00:19:23,440 --> 00:19:25,039
helped to resist the German drive
362
00:19:25,039 --> 00:19:27,440
towards Moscow.
363
00:19:27,440 --> 00:19:29,440
Conv made a name for himself as an
364
00:19:29,440 --> 00:19:31,360
aggressive and highly competent
365
00:19:31,360 --> 00:19:34,160
commander regarded by many as second
366
00:19:34,160 --> 00:19:37,360
only to Zukov. He was the perfect man to
367
00:19:37,360 --> 00:19:39,679
command the step front during the Kursk
368
00:19:39,679 --> 00:19:42,679
offensive.
369
00:19:56,160 --> 00:19:58,960
Kurt Zeitzler served as an infantryman
370
00:19:58,960 --> 00:20:01,760
during World War I and continued his
371
00:20:01,760 --> 00:20:03,600
military career during the interwar
372
00:20:03,600 --> 00:20:07,280
years. In 1934, he transferred to the
373
00:20:07,280 --> 00:20:09,600
newly created tank section, which was
374
00:20:09,600 --> 00:20:11,360
one of a number of changes brought in
375
00:20:11,360 --> 00:20:14,960
under Hitler. By 1939, he had risen to
376
00:20:14,960 --> 00:20:17,520
the rank of colonel, his forte being
377
00:20:17,520 --> 00:20:21,120
organization and mechanized warfare. He
378
00:20:21,120 --> 00:20:23,280
held various staff positions during the
379
00:20:23,280 --> 00:20:26,720
first two years of the war and by 1942
380
00:20:26,720 --> 00:20:28,559
he was serving in the west under von
381
00:20:28,559 --> 00:20:31,280
runstead. He played a significant role
382
00:20:31,280 --> 00:20:33,600
in the allied defeat at DEP during that
383
00:20:33,600 --> 00:20:35,760
year bringing him to the attention of
384
00:20:35,760 --> 00:20:38,640
Hitler. A month after DEP, he was
385
00:20:38,640 --> 00:20:41,120
promoted to general and became the chief
386
00:20:41,120 --> 00:20:45,039
of staff. His approach to older generals
387
00:20:45,039 --> 00:20:46,799
sometimes caused him problems with
388
00:20:46,799 --> 00:20:49,120
fellow officers, for he always spoke his
389
00:20:49,120 --> 00:20:51,679
mind, even clashing with Hitler on a
390
00:20:51,679 --> 00:20:53,679
number of occasions.
391
00:20:53,679 --> 00:20:55,760
He tried in vain to make Hitler see
392
00:20:55,760 --> 00:20:58,080
sense at Stalingrad.
393
00:20:58,080 --> 00:21:00,080
It was Zeitler who drew up the plans for
394
00:21:00,080 --> 00:21:02,400
the Kursk offensive and its Pinsir
395
00:21:02,400 --> 00:21:04,000
attacks.
396
00:21:04,000 --> 00:21:05,440
Although some of the other generals
397
00:21:05,440 --> 00:21:07,919
voiced their concerns, Zeitler pushed
398
00:21:07,919 --> 00:21:10,400
enthusiastically for the plan which was
399
00:21:10,400 --> 00:21:12,880
finally approved by Hitler. Its
400
00:21:12,880 --> 00:21:15,520
consequences would prove disastrous for
401
00:21:15,520 --> 00:21:17,840
Germany.
402
00:21:17,840 --> 00:21:20,400
Eric von Mannstein, the commander of
403
00:21:20,400 --> 00:21:22,960
Army Group South, is acknowledged as one
404
00:21:22,960 --> 00:21:24,720
of the most able German commanders of
405
00:21:24,720 --> 00:21:27,440
the Second World War. His military
406
00:21:27,440 --> 00:21:29,840
experience dated back to World War I
407
00:21:29,840 --> 00:21:31,440
where he fought on the western and
408
00:21:31,440 --> 00:21:34,159
eastern fronts. Before the end of the
409
00:21:34,159 --> 00:21:37,200
war, he had reached the rank of captain.
410
00:21:37,200 --> 00:21:39,120
By the time Hitler came to power in
411
00:21:39,120 --> 00:21:41,919
1933, von Mannstein was a left tenant
412
00:21:41,919 --> 00:21:44,480
colonel with the German general staff.
413
00:21:44,480 --> 00:21:46,240
Further promotions followed until the
414
00:21:46,240 --> 00:21:48,480
outbreak of World War II when he held
415
00:21:48,480 --> 00:21:51,280
the rank of left tenant general. Before
416
00:21:51,280 --> 00:21:53,039
the start of the war, he had been
417
00:21:53,039 --> 00:21:54,720
responsible for suggesting the use of
418
00:21:54,720 --> 00:21:57,200
the assault gun that was to become known
419
00:21:57,200 --> 00:21:59,679
as the Stern Gushuts, a machine that was
420
00:21:59,679 --> 00:22:02,159
to play a significant part in Germany's
421
00:22:02,159 --> 00:22:04,320
conduct of the war.
422
00:22:04,320 --> 00:22:06,320
He was closely involved in planning the
423
00:22:06,320 --> 00:22:08,880
various opening campaigns. The
424
00:22:08,880 --> 00:22:10,480
successful plan for the attacks in the
425
00:22:10,480 --> 00:22:13,120
West in 1940 are also thought to be the
426
00:22:13,120 --> 00:22:15,360
brainchild of von Mannstein, although
427
00:22:15,360 --> 00:22:18,960
Hitler later claimed them as his own.
428
00:22:18,960 --> 00:22:21,120
Von Mannstein had a gift for determining
429
00:22:21,120 --> 00:22:23,600
the enemy's intentions and identifying
430
00:22:23,600 --> 00:22:25,039
their weaknesses. [music]
431
00:22:25,039 --> 00:22:27,200
He held various field commands from the
432
00:22:27,200 --> 00:22:30,240
start of the war with Russia in 1941 and
433
00:22:30,240 --> 00:22:32,400
successes included the defeat of the
434
00:22:32,400 --> 00:22:34,720
fortress of Sevastapole.
435
00:22:34,720 --> 00:22:37,200
However, the longer the war in Russia
436
00:22:37,200 --> 00:22:40,159
dragged on, the more Hitler and vonstein
437
00:22:40,159 --> 00:22:42,799
differed over its execution.
438
00:22:42,799 --> 00:22:44,559
Hitler was obsessed with holding
439
00:22:44,559 --> 00:22:47,039
positions to the last man and von
440
00:22:47,039 --> 00:22:48,799
Mannstein tried in vain to change
441
00:22:48,799 --> 00:22:52,159
Hitler's tactical reasoning.
442
00:22:52,159 --> 00:22:55,840
By the start of July 1943, von Mannstein
443
00:22:55,840 --> 00:22:58,000
was in overall command of Army Group
444
00:22:58,000 --> 00:23:00,320
South, which played the major role in
445
00:23:00,320 --> 00:23:05,080
the execution of Plan Zitadel.
446
00:23:07,919 --> 00:23:10,320
Herman Hoth, born on the 12th of April
447
00:23:10,320 --> 00:23:14,159
1895, served in the first world war. He
448
00:23:14,159 --> 00:23:17,600
remained in the German army and by 1936,
449
00:23:17,600 --> 00:23:20,320
Hoth was a divisional commander.
450
00:23:20,320 --> 00:23:22,640
He commanded the 15th Panza Corps during
451
00:23:22,640 --> 00:23:25,200
the invasion of Poland and on the 27th
452
00:23:25,200 --> 00:23:28,159
of October 1939 was awarded with the
453
00:23:28,159 --> 00:23:31,039
Rutroys for his service.
454
00:23:31,039 --> 00:23:33,280
Hoth went on to lead the 15th Panza
455
00:23:33,280 --> 00:23:34,960
through the successful French campaign
456
00:23:34,960 --> 00:23:36,799
of 1940.
457
00:23:36,799 --> 00:23:39,440
He then led Panza Group three, later
458
00:23:39,440 --> 00:23:41,919
renamed the Third Panza Army towards
459
00:23:41,919 --> 00:23:44,559
Leningrad and onto Moscow, where he
460
00:23:44,559 --> 00:23:47,520
almost succeeded in his mission.
461
00:23:47,520 --> 00:23:50,559
By 1942, Hoth was commander of the
462
00:23:50,559 --> 00:23:52,799
fourth Panzer Army and in action at
463
00:23:52,799 --> 00:23:55,679
Stalingrad. His mission was to get the
464
00:23:55,679 --> 00:23:58,400
trapped Sixth Army out of the city, but
465
00:23:58,400 --> 00:24:00,960
the task was virtually impossible and he
466
00:24:00,960 --> 00:24:04,559
failed. Hoth and his fourth Panza army
467
00:24:04,559 --> 00:24:06,559
went on to be involved at the heart of
468
00:24:06,559 --> 00:24:10,200
fighting at Kursk.
469
00:24:19,356 --> 00:24:21,376
[music]
470
00:24:30,400 --> 00:24:33,039
Army Group Center under Fonluga also
471
00:24:33,039 --> 00:24:35,039
played a significant role in the plans
472
00:24:35,039 --> 00:24:38,240
for Kursk. To the north of the salient,
473
00:24:38,240 --> 00:24:40,320
Fonluga's army group would serve in the
474
00:24:40,320 --> 00:24:42,720
ninth army that would provide one of the
475
00:24:42,720 --> 00:24:45,200
two great pincers designed to snuff out
476
00:24:45,200 --> 00:24:48,919
the Soviet salient.
477
00:24:56,080 --> 00:24:58,240
Valter Modell also gained his early
478
00:24:58,240 --> 00:25:00,480
experiences during World War I,
479
00:25:00,480 --> 00:25:03,200
attaining the rank of captain. Like von
480
00:25:03,200 --> 00:25:05,600
Mannstein, he had served in the interwar
481
00:25:05,600 --> 00:25:08,159
German army in various staff and field
482
00:25:08,159 --> 00:25:10,320
postings, including a stint as a
483
00:25:10,320 --> 00:25:13,600
lecturer on tactics and history. He
484
00:25:13,600 --> 00:25:15,520
continued in various posts in the early
485
00:25:15,520 --> 00:25:19,200
stages of World War II, and by mid 1940
486
00:25:19,200 --> 00:25:21,520
held the rank of Lieutenant General when
487
00:25:21,520 --> 00:25:23,279
he was also given command of the Third
488
00:25:23,279 --> 00:25:26,000
Panza Division. Although he was an
489
00:25:26,000 --> 00:25:28,240
infantry man through and through, he
490
00:25:28,240 --> 00:25:30,159
quickly made it his job to explore the
491
00:25:30,159 --> 00:25:32,559
potential of tank warfare.
492
00:25:32,559 --> 00:25:34,320
Modell constantly visited the front
493
00:25:34,320 --> 00:25:36,799
lines and always took a keen interest in
494
00:25:36,799 --> 00:25:39,279
the welfare of his men.
495
00:25:39,279 --> 00:25:41,279
His division was involved in the Titanic
496
00:25:41,279 --> 00:25:43,679
encirclement at Kiev and also the
497
00:25:43,679 --> 00:25:46,240
attacks towards Moscow.
498
00:25:46,240 --> 00:25:48,320
Modell firmly believed in the concept of
499
00:25:48,320 --> 00:25:51,039
lightning war and his successes did not
500
00:25:51,039 --> 00:25:53,919
go unnoticed by Hitler. By the start of
501
00:25:53,919 --> 00:25:56,559
1942, he was in command of the 9inth
502
00:25:56,559 --> 00:25:59,760
Army with the rank of colonel general.
503
00:25:59,760 --> 00:26:01,520
He was given the task of attacking in
504
00:26:01,520 --> 00:26:04,080
the reeerv sector in southern Russia.
505
00:26:04,080 --> 00:26:06,000
The bloody battles here would last for
506
00:26:06,000 --> 00:26:10,320
almost a year. By spring 1943, his 9inth
507
00:26:10,320 --> 00:26:12,640
army was well placed to take part in the
508
00:26:12,640 --> 00:26:16,039
Kursk offensive.
509
00:26:18,568 --> 00:26:20,588
[music]
510
00:26:26,480 --> 00:26:28,880
Hitler knew just how vital the coming
511
00:26:28,880 --> 00:26:31,039
battle would be and placed a great deal
512
00:26:31,039 --> 00:26:33,039
of faith in the new tanks developed for
513
00:26:33,039 --> 00:26:36,159
the offensive. General Heins Gudderion
514
00:26:36,159 --> 00:26:38,640
had been recalled and appointed to a new
515
00:26:38,640 --> 00:26:40,960
position of inspector general of the
516
00:26:40,960 --> 00:26:43,520
armored forces especially for the Kursk
517
00:26:43,520 --> 00:26:46,520
battle.
518
00:27:00,400 --> 00:27:03,440
The purges of 1937 upon the army by
519
00:27:03,440 --> 00:27:06,159
Stalin had left a weak and poorly led
520
00:27:06,159 --> 00:27:08,400
force.
521
00:27:08,400 --> 00:27:10,960
Around the start of 1941, however, the
522
00:27:10,960 --> 00:27:14,400
army was undergoing a reorganization.
523
00:27:14,400 --> 00:27:15,919
When the Germans launched their attack
524
00:27:15,919 --> 00:27:18,080
in June of that year, they caught the
525
00:27:18,080 --> 00:27:21,640
Red Army offguard.
526
00:27:29,679 --> 00:27:32,159
The initial advances by the Germans cut
527
00:27:32,159 --> 00:27:34,799
deep into the Russian rear areas. In
528
00:27:34,799 --> 00:27:36,720
many cases, the Germans found themselves
529
00:27:36,720 --> 00:27:39,600
advancing eastwards and also defending
530
00:27:39,600 --> 00:27:41,840
westwards as the retreating Russians
531
00:27:41,840 --> 00:27:45,200
caught up with them.
532
00:27:51,679 --> 00:27:53,440
There appeared to be no effective
533
00:27:53,440 --> 00:27:56,159
organization or control over the mass of
534
00:27:56,159 --> 00:27:59,279
Russian soldiers in the early stages.
535
00:27:59,279 --> 00:28:02,000
As the first winter set in, however, the
536
00:28:02,000 --> 00:28:04,240
first signs appeared that things were
537
00:28:04,240 --> 00:28:08,159
not going to go Hitler's way.
538
00:28:08,159 --> 00:28:10,000
Better adapted to the climate and
539
00:28:10,000 --> 00:28:12,640
countryside, the Russian army quickly
540
00:28:12,640 --> 00:28:14,720
launched their first offensive that
541
00:28:14,720 --> 00:28:16,559
almost succeeded in overrunning the
542
00:28:16,559 --> 00:28:19,520
German army. The main drawback for the
543
00:28:19,520 --> 00:28:21,760
Red Army was the constant interference
544
00:28:21,760 --> 00:28:24,880
by political commisa who instilled fear
545
00:28:24,880 --> 00:28:28,600
into every soldier.
546
00:28:28,799 --> 00:28:30,799
Often commanders were reluctant to take
547
00:28:30,799 --> 00:28:32,799
key decisions without clear instructions
548
00:28:32,799 --> 00:28:35,200
from much higher up.
549
00:28:35,200 --> 00:28:37,360
This directly affected the course of the
550
00:28:37,360 --> 00:28:39,520
fighting and may have contributed to
551
00:28:39,520 --> 00:28:43,480
some of the Red Army's defeats.
552
00:28:44,720 --> 00:28:47,039
>> The Russian soldier was also dealing
553
00:28:47,039 --> 00:28:49,200
with new tactics being employed by the
554
00:28:49,200 --> 00:28:51,600
Germans. What was more, the Red Army
555
00:28:51,600 --> 00:28:54,159
suffered many problems of supply and the
556
00:28:54,159 --> 00:28:56,480
loss of vital industrial regions and the
557
00:28:56,480 --> 00:28:59,039
relocation of factories further east hit
558
00:28:59,039 --> 00:29:01,360
production hard.
559
00:29:01,360 --> 00:29:03,679
As the war progressed, the Red Army
560
00:29:03,679 --> 00:29:05,840
became better equipped and more able to
561
00:29:05,840 --> 00:29:07,760
cope with the superior skills of the
562
00:29:07,760 --> 00:29:11,080
German army.
563
00:29:16,880 --> 00:29:19,200
The Red Army's sheer weight of numbers
564
00:29:19,200 --> 00:29:22,000
of both men and materials was beginning
565
00:29:22,000 --> 00:29:24,720
to turn the tide in their favor by mid
566
00:29:24,720 --> 00:29:27,720
1943.
567
00:29:45,520 --> 00:29:47,600
The Russian soldier had the backup of
568
00:29:47,600 --> 00:29:50,399
plentiful tanks and planes, and they did
569
00:29:50,399 --> 00:29:52,240
not appear in the bewildering array of
570
00:29:52,240 --> 00:29:55,919
different types used by the German army.
571
00:29:55,919 --> 00:29:58,240
The most widely used battle tank was the
572
00:29:58,240 --> 00:30:00,080
T34.
573
00:30:00,080 --> 00:30:02,159
This tank made its battlefield debut in
574
00:30:02,159 --> 00:30:05,120
1941, soon after the Germans poured over
575
00:30:05,120 --> 00:30:07,840
the Russian border. The Germans have no
576
00:30:07,840 --> 00:30:10,480
prior knowledge of the T-34, and they
577
00:30:10,480 --> 00:30:13,200
quickly learned to respect it. The
578
00:30:13,200 --> 00:30:16,000
T-34's design, which remained largely
579
00:30:16,000 --> 00:30:18,559
unchanged throughout the war, was simple
580
00:30:18,559 --> 00:30:21,840
and crude, but highly practical. It had
581
00:30:21,840 --> 00:30:24,320
excellent sloping armor which although
582
00:30:24,320 --> 00:30:27,200
only 45 mm thick increased its
583
00:30:27,200 --> 00:30:30,240
protective capabilities.
584
00:30:30,240 --> 00:30:32,720
It had wide tracks that were well suited
585
00:30:32,720 --> 00:30:34,480
to the Russian countryside and the worst
586
00:30:34,480 --> 00:30:37,279
of the Russian winter. The armaments on
587
00:30:37,279 --> 00:30:40,399
the version used at Kursk were a 76 mm
588
00:30:40,399 --> 00:30:43,039
dualpurpose main gun backed up with
589
00:30:43,039 --> 00:30:47,120
three 7.62 mm machine guns.
590
00:30:47,120 --> 00:30:49,440
It was powered by a very reliable diesel
591
00:30:49,440 --> 00:30:53,200
engine and gave a top speed of 33 mph.
592
00:30:53,200 --> 00:30:55,919
It weighed around 26 tons and had a
593
00:30:55,919 --> 00:30:59,559
fiveman crew.
594
00:31:00,080 --> 00:31:02,240
The downside was the poorly designed
595
00:31:02,240 --> 00:31:05,360
turret that had to be traversed by hand.
596
00:31:05,360 --> 00:31:07,200
It was also very cramped with
597
00:31:07,200 --> 00:31:11,480
rudimentary radio communications.
598
00:31:15,200 --> 00:31:19,919
Fighting alongside the T-34 was the KV1.
599
00:31:19,919 --> 00:31:22,159
This was a heavier tank weighing in at
600
00:31:22,159 --> 00:31:24,960
over 43 tons, which also had a five-man
601
00:31:24,960 --> 00:31:26,480
crew.
602
00:31:26,480 --> 00:31:28,640
The reliable diesel engine produced a
603
00:31:28,640 --> 00:31:31,600
top speed of 22 mph.
604
00:31:31,600 --> 00:31:35,120
The armor protection was 110 mm thick,
605
00:31:35,120 --> 00:31:38,720
and like the T-34, its main gun was a 76
606
00:31:38,720 --> 00:31:42,640
mm weapon backed up with three 7.62 mm
607
00:31:42,640 --> 00:31:45,760
machine guns.
608
00:31:45,760 --> 00:31:47,840
It carried more than adequate ammunition
609
00:31:47,840 --> 00:31:51,120
supplies and had excellent suspension.
610
00:31:51,120 --> 00:31:53,600
Unfortunately, it also had a poorly
611
00:31:53,600 --> 00:31:56,000
designed turret and complex gun sighting
612
00:31:56,000 --> 00:31:58,720
mechanism. The crews that manned them
613
00:31:58,720 --> 00:32:01,200
were poorly trained, and these faults
614
00:32:01,200 --> 00:32:03,679
conspired to ensure that the KV1 would
615
00:32:03,679 --> 00:32:06,240
never have the impact of its more famous
616
00:32:06,240 --> 00:32:09,240
stablemate.
617
00:32:12,080 --> 00:32:14,559
Kursk is famed for its large tank
618
00:32:14,559 --> 00:32:17,200
battle, but equally as ferocious was the
619
00:32:17,200 --> 00:32:20,480
aerial war that raged overhead.
620
00:32:20,480 --> 00:32:22,480
Like their tank forces, the Russians
621
00:32:22,480 --> 00:32:24,559
used a few simple designs for their
622
00:32:24,559 --> 00:32:26,640
aircraft that were practical and
623
00:32:26,640 --> 00:32:29,840
produced in large numbers. The IL2 was
624
00:32:29,840 --> 00:32:32,159
one of these. It would see a great deal
625
00:32:32,159 --> 00:32:35,279
of action around Kursk.
626
00:32:35,279 --> 00:32:37,679
Over 36,000 of these aircraft were
627
00:32:37,679 --> 00:32:40,720
manufactured before the end of the war.
628
00:32:40,720 --> 00:32:43,600
The IL2 was a ground attack plane and
629
00:32:43,600 --> 00:32:45,440
was an excellent performer at low
630
00:32:45,440 --> 00:32:48,159
levels.
631
00:32:48,159 --> 00:32:51,919
Top speed was around 250 mph.
632
00:32:51,919 --> 00:32:54,720
The main armaments were two 37 mm
633
00:32:54,720 --> 00:32:58,799
cannons and two 7.62 mm machine guns,
634
00:32:58,799 --> 00:33:00,960
plus one rear-facing machine gun for
635
00:33:00,960 --> 00:33:03,362
added protection. It could also carry
636
00:33:03,362 --> 00:33:08,600
[music] up to 600 kg of bombs.
637
00:33:10,240 --> 00:33:12,320
As it was best suited to low-level
638
00:33:12,320 --> 00:33:14,559
attacks, the construction allowed for a
639
00:33:14,559 --> 00:33:16,480
certain amount of armor protection to be
640
00:33:16,480 --> 00:33:19,600
included. The main areas protected were
641
00:33:19,600 --> 00:33:23,840
the underside, cockpit, and fuel tanks.
642
00:33:23,840 --> 00:33:26,880
From its introduction in 1941, the plane
643
00:33:26,880 --> 00:33:29,039
was involved in most of the fighting on
644
00:33:29,039 --> 00:33:31,200
the Eastern Front.
645
00:33:31,200 --> 00:33:32,880
Although the Red Air Force pilots could
646
00:33:32,880 --> 00:33:34,799
not match the skills of the Luftvafa
647
00:33:34,799 --> 00:33:38,000
aces, this plane and its pilots did play
648
00:33:38,000 --> 00:33:40,640
a significant part in the defeat of the
649
00:33:40,640 --> 00:33:43,880
Third Reich.
650
00:33:53,798 --> 00:33:55,200
[music]
651
00:33:55,200 --> 00:33:57,279
The Nazi propaganda machine had
652
00:33:57,279 --> 00:34:00,480
described the Russians as subhuman.
653
00:34:00,480 --> 00:34:02,399
The German army advanced into Russia
654
00:34:02,399 --> 00:34:03,600
with the belief that they were up
655
00:34:03,600 --> 00:34:06,399
against an incapable army, poorly led
656
00:34:06,399 --> 00:34:10,039
and badly equipped.
657
00:34:10,320 --> 00:34:12,320
The first 6 months of the war produced
658
00:34:12,320 --> 00:34:14,800
evidence that this was indeed the case.
659
00:34:14,800 --> 00:34:18,720
However, as 1942 began, the Red Army
660
00:34:18,720 --> 00:34:21,440
started to show its true abilities. Its
661
00:34:21,440 --> 00:34:23,280
men were able to cope with the extreme
662
00:34:23,280 --> 00:34:25,440
weather fluctuations, sustaining
663
00:34:25,440 --> 00:34:27,839
themselves on meager rations and living
664
00:34:27,839 --> 00:34:30,399
off the land. They had excellent
665
00:34:30,399 --> 00:34:32,800
defensive skills, something that the
666
00:34:32,800 --> 00:34:35,839
Germans quickly learned to their cost.
667
00:34:35,839 --> 00:34:37,599
They also had simple but highly
668
00:34:37,599 --> 00:34:39,760
effective equipment that was designed
669
00:34:39,760 --> 00:34:42,560
for the punishing weather. The Russian
670
00:34:42,560 --> 00:34:45,280
Achilles heel was their poor leadership
671
00:34:45,280 --> 00:34:48,560
and fear of their political masters. The
672
00:34:48,560 --> 00:34:50,560
tactics employed paid no heed to the
673
00:34:50,560 --> 00:34:53,679
cost in human lives, and penal squads
674
00:34:53,679 --> 00:34:56,079
and summary executions were widely used
675
00:34:56,079 --> 00:34:58,960
in an attempt to gain objectives.
676
00:34:58,960 --> 00:35:01,440
The overriding motivation of many of the
677
00:35:01,440 --> 00:35:04,800
men was their love of mother Russia.
678
00:35:04,800 --> 00:35:06,800
Despite all of the hardships and demands
679
00:35:06,800 --> 00:35:09,359
placed upon them, their resilience and
680
00:35:09,359 --> 00:35:11,920
determination would see them through to
681
00:35:11,920 --> 00:35:15,074
victory. [cheering and screaming]
682
00:35:30,320 --> 00:35:33,520
The German army of World War II was
683
00:35:33,520 --> 00:35:35,359
arguably one of the most efficient the
684
00:35:35,359 --> 00:35:38,880
modern world has seen. Superbly led by
685
00:35:38,880 --> 00:35:41,760
capable leaders such as Gudderion, RML,
686
00:35:41,760 --> 00:35:44,640
Modell, and Vonmanstein, they achieved
687
00:35:44,640 --> 00:35:46,800
victory after victory in the first years
688
00:35:46,800 --> 00:35:50,119
of the war.
689
00:35:58,000 --> 00:36:00,320
The army was extremely professional and
690
00:36:00,320 --> 00:36:03,640
very aggressive.
691
00:36:11,520 --> 00:36:13,839
Expert training saw the vermark employ
692
00:36:13,839 --> 00:36:16,400
new and farthinking tactics with
693
00:36:16,400 --> 00:36:19,119
devastating results. These tactics
694
00:36:19,119 --> 00:36:21,359
helped them defeat numerically superior
695
00:36:21,359 --> 00:36:23,920
enemy forces and secure almost
696
00:36:23,920 --> 00:36:27,200
impossible objectives. For 2 years,
697
00:36:27,200 --> 00:36:29,440
their combined tactics and training
698
00:36:29,440 --> 00:36:32,160
would take them from Poland to the
699
00:36:32,160 --> 00:36:34,480
shores of France
700
00:36:34,480 --> 00:36:36,800
and then onto the banks of the Vular at
701
00:36:36,800 --> 00:36:39,599
Stalingrad, defeating every enemy along
702
00:36:39,599 --> 00:36:42,839
the way.
703
00:37:00,640 --> 00:37:02,800
A major problem was that the Vermachar
704
00:37:02,800 --> 00:37:05,040
had to contend with incessant infighting
705
00:37:05,040 --> 00:37:07,599
at higher levels. This sometimes
706
00:37:07,599 --> 00:37:10,160
resulted in unclear objectives, most
707
00:37:10,160 --> 00:37:13,200
notably during the war with Russia.
708
00:37:13,200 --> 00:37:15,520
Without doubt, being led by a dictator
709
00:37:15,520 --> 00:37:17,280
such as Hitler, whose military
710
00:37:17,280 --> 00:37:19,599
experience and abilities were limited,
711
00:37:19,599 --> 00:37:22,079
also had its effect on the final outcome
712
00:37:22,079 --> 00:37:24,480
of the war.
713
00:37:24,480 --> 00:37:26,480
Masters at the art of counterattack and
714
00:37:26,480 --> 00:37:29,040
equally adept in attack or defense, the
715
00:37:29,040 --> 00:37:31,119
German army was however a worthy
716
00:37:31,119 --> 00:37:34,320
opponent to any foe. Despite an ever
717
00:37:34,320 --> 00:37:36,480
decreasing supply of resources and
718
00:37:36,480 --> 00:37:38,800
multiplying difficulties, they remained
719
00:37:38,800 --> 00:37:42,240
resolute and focused on their tasks.
720
00:37:42,240 --> 00:37:44,320
The heavy defeat at Stalingrad had
721
00:37:44,320 --> 00:37:46,400
deeply affected them and the fact that
722
00:37:46,400 --> 00:37:48,480
they quickly recovered and managed a
723
00:37:48,480 --> 00:37:50,880
stunning victory at Kov is evidence of
724
00:37:50,880 --> 00:37:54,119
their capabilities.
725
00:38:07,440 --> 00:38:10,079
Contrary to popular belief, by the start
726
00:38:10,079 --> 00:38:13,920
of July 1943, the German army was far
727
00:38:13,920 --> 00:38:17,240
from defeated.
728
00:38:39,359 --> 00:38:42,000
The arrival of the formidable T34 onto
729
00:38:42,000 --> 00:38:44,160
the battlefield caused the Germans to
730
00:38:44,160 --> 00:38:46,400
revive some of their pre-war plans for
731
00:38:46,400 --> 00:38:49,440
heavier tanks. One of the results was
732
00:38:49,440 --> 00:38:51,359
arguably the best tank of [music] World
733
00:38:51,359 --> 00:38:53,119
War II.
734
00:38:53,119 --> 00:38:56,480
The Panzer Mark 5 or Panther weighed in
735
00:38:56,480 --> 00:39:00,079
at 45 tons. It had a five-man crew
736
00:39:00,079 --> 00:39:04,480
protected by 120 mm sloped armor.
737
00:39:04,480 --> 00:39:07,839
This tank was armed with a superb 75 mm
738
00:39:07,839 --> 00:39:13,119
L70 main gun with two 7.92 mm MG34
739
00:39:13,119 --> 00:39:16,000
machine guns as backup. It could produce
740
00:39:16,000 --> 00:39:20,040
a top speed of 30 mph.
741
00:39:21,520 --> 00:39:23,599
It was rushed through production to
742
00:39:23,599 --> 00:39:25,280
ensure that it was ready for the Kursk
743
00:39:25,280 --> 00:39:26,800
offensive.
744
00:39:26,800 --> 00:39:29,359
Hitler placed great hopes on the Panther
745
00:39:29,359 --> 00:39:31,520
and delayed the start of the battle to
746
00:39:31,520 --> 00:39:33,839
allow for its production.
747
00:39:33,839 --> 00:39:35,599
The early models were plagued with
748
00:39:35,599 --> 00:39:37,359
mechanical breakdowns that would have
749
00:39:37,359 --> 00:39:39,200
serious consequences for the troops at
750
00:39:39,200 --> 00:39:41,920
Kursk. But once the design problems were
751
00:39:41,920 --> 00:39:44,960
rectified, the Panther tank became an
752
00:39:44,960 --> 00:39:48,440
excellent weapon.
753
00:39:55,119 --> 00:39:57,920
The Panza Mark 6, better known as the
754
00:39:57,920 --> 00:40:00,640
Tiger 1, was designed to put the Germans
755
00:40:00,640 --> 00:40:03,599
ahead of the Russians in tank design.
756
00:40:03,599 --> 00:40:05,599
The result was a machine that weighed in
757
00:40:05,599 --> 00:40:09,920
at a huge 55 tons. Its fiveman crew was
758
00:40:09,920 --> 00:40:15,320
well protected by 110 mm thick armor.
759
00:40:18,079 --> 00:40:20,640
Unlike the Panther, the Tiger 1 had the
760
00:40:20,640 --> 00:40:23,119
more conventional flatsided armor that
761
00:40:23,119 --> 00:40:25,359
wasn't as effective as sloped armor, but
762
00:40:25,359 --> 00:40:27,520
it was so thick that it was virtually
763
00:40:27,520 --> 00:40:29,280
impervious to any weapon on the
764
00:40:29,280 --> 00:40:32,280
battlefield.
765
00:40:32,720 --> 00:40:34,960
The Tiger's main armament was the
766
00:40:34,960 --> 00:40:38,400
phenomenal 88 mm gun, capable of
767
00:40:38,400 --> 00:40:39,599
destroying anything it [music] came
768
00:40:39,599 --> 00:40:43,599
across at ranges up to 2,000 m.
769
00:40:43,599 --> 00:40:45,599
The close support weapons were the
770
00:40:45,599 --> 00:40:49,839
standard two MG34 machine guns. The 21 L
771
00:40:49,839 --> 00:40:52,160
engine produced a [music] top speed of
772
00:40:52,160 --> 00:40:55,720
24 mph.
773
00:40:59,599 --> 00:41:01,518
The first large-scale deployment of
774
00:41:01,518 --> 00:41:04,000
[music] the Tiger tank was at Kursk when
775
00:41:04,000 --> 00:41:06,880
approximately a hundred were used.
776
00:41:06,880 --> 00:41:08,640
They were placed mainly with the elite
777
00:41:08,640 --> 00:41:10,880
formations of the Vaffan SS and the
778
00:41:10,880 --> 00:41:13,680
Gross Deutsland Division. The Tiger
779
00:41:13,680 --> 00:41:15,839
would quickly earn a fearsome reputation
780
00:41:15,839 --> 00:41:17,599
and would play its part in helping the
781
00:41:17,599 --> 00:41:19,599
Germans smash through the extensive
782
00:41:19,599 --> 00:41:24,359
Russian defenses during Zitadel.
783
00:41:29,359 --> 00:41:32,240
This heavy tank destroyer appeared after
784
00:41:32,240 --> 00:41:34,400
Ferdinand Porsche's design for the Tiger
785
00:41:34,400 --> 00:41:37,839
1 was turned down. The Porsche firm was
786
00:41:37,839 --> 00:41:39,680
so confident that their design would be
787
00:41:39,680 --> 00:41:41,680
chosen that they had begun to produce
788
00:41:41,680 --> 00:41:44,160
their version, but production stopped
789
00:41:44,160 --> 00:41:46,720
when Hitler's decision was announced.
790
00:41:46,720 --> 00:41:48,720
Rather than waste those that had already
791
00:41:48,720 --> 00:41:52,240
been constructed, they were put to use.
792
00:41:52,240 --> 00:41:54,240
Hitler had also ordered the design of an
793
00:41:54,240 --> 00:41:55,839
assault weapon that could mount the
794
00:41:55,839 --> 00:42:00,319
longer L71 version of the 88 mm gun. The
795
00:42:00,319 --> 00:42:03,599
Tiger 1 was incapable of doing this, so
796
00:42:03,599 --> 00:42:06,720
the 90 Porsche chassis were chosen. The
797
00:42:06,720 --> 00:42:09,359
resulting weapon, Ferdinand, weighed in
798
00:42:09,359 --> 00:42:12,480
at a colossal 68 tons and required a
799
00:42:12,480 --> 00:42:14,960
crew of six men. The armor protection
800
00:42:14,960 --> 00:42:18,000
was provided by 200 mm of steel plate.
801
00:42:18,000 --> 00:42:23,319
The top speed was only 12 mph.
802
00:42:24,560 --> 00:42:26,480
The Ferdinand was rushed through the
803
00:42:26,480 --> 00:42:28,640
production stage with very serious
804
00:42:28,640 --> 00:42:30,880
consequences for the crews manning them
805
00:42:30,880 --> 00:42:32,720
and the infantry who were relying on
806
00:42:32,720 --> 00:42:35,119
them during the fighting.
807
00:42:35,119 --> 00:42:37,359
During the design stage, the need for a
808
00:42:37,359 --> 00:42:39,680
close quarter defense machine gun was
809
00:42:39,680 --> 00:42:42,079
overlooked. The suspension was not
810
00:42:42,079 --> 00:42:43,760
adequate to support the weight of the
811
00:42:43,760 --> 00:42:45,760
tank destroyer with the result that the
812
00:42:45,760 --> 00:42:48,960
vehicle easily bogged down. These flaws
813
00:42:48,960 --> 00:42:51,040
helped to ensure that the battlefield
814
00:42:51,040 --> 00:42:54,560
debut of the Ferdinand was a failure. 40
815
00:42:54,560 --> 00:42:56,480
of the 80 machines which took part in
816
00:42:56,480 --> 00:42:59,359
the battle were lost to the enemy within
817
00:42:59,359 --> 00:43:03,160
the first 3 days.
818
00:43:05,040 --> 00:43:07,040
One other important new development made
819
00:43:07,040 --> 00:43:08,880
its arrival known during the Kursk
820
00:43:08,880 --> 00:43:11,680
offensive. The Stooka dive bomber had
821
00:43:11,680 --> 00:43:13,440
played its part in the early victories
822
00:43:13,440 --> 00:43:15,440
of the German army. It became an
823
00:43:15,440 --> 00:43:17,520
excellent psychological weapon and
824
00:43:17,520 --> 00:43:20,720
instilled terror again and again.
825
00:43:20,720 --> 00:43:23,520
However, as the war progressed, this
826
00:43:23,520 --> 00:43:26,160
slow aircraft was quickly outclassed by
827
00:43:26,160 --> 00:43:29,440
the faster enemy planes. The Stooka had
828
00:43:29,440 --> 00:43:31,440
undergone a few modifications since its
829
00:43:31,440 --> 00:43:35,480
first introduction in 1937.
830
00:43:36,800 --> 00:43:38,640
The standard version available in early
831
00:43:38,640 --> 00:43:42,640
1943 could reach a speed of around 255
832
00:43:42,640 --> 00:43:44,319
mph.
833
00:43:44,319 --> 00:43:47,599
The armament was two 7.92 mm machine
834
00:43:47,599 --> 00:43:50,240
guns situated on the wings with a
835
00:43:50,240 --> 00:43:53,280
further rear-facing machine gun. It
836
00:43:53,280 --> 00:43:57,520
could carry up to 1,800 kg of bombs.
837
00:43:57,520 --> 00:44:00,079
The Stooker was widely used and during
838
00:44:00,079 --> 00:44:03,440
March of 1943, testing took place on a
839
00:44:03,440 --> 00:44:08,480
new anti-tank version. Two 37 mm flack
840
00:44:08,480 --> 00:44:10,480
cannons were fitted to the underside of
841
00:44:10,480 --> 00:44:15,319
the plane in place of the bomb load.
842
00:44:15,760 --> 00:44:18,160
It was soon found that this weapon was
843
00:44:18,160 --> 00:44:20,079
very accurate and effective for
844
00:44:20,079 --> 00:44:22,640
destroying enemy tanks. Although the
845
00:44:22,640 --> 00:44:25,119
pilots had to go into a shallow dive and
846
00:44:25,119 --> 00:44:27,599
get within close range of their targets,
847
00:44:27,599 --> 00:44:29,599
making them vulnerable to anti-aircraft
848
00:44:29,599 --> 00:44:31,280
fire.
849
00:44:31,280 --> 00:44:33,280
The use of this new weapon became the
850
00:44:33,280 --> 00:44:35,200
responsibility of some of Germany's best
851
00:44:35,200 --> 00:44:38,000
known pilots. Among them, Hans Olrich
852
00:44:38,000 --> 00:44:40,480
Rudell, an accomplished airman who held
853
00:44:40,480 --> 00:44:43,040
Germany's highest award for bravery.
854
00:44:43,040 --> 00:44:45,760
Rudel and the pilots like him put the
855
00:44:45,760 --> 00:44:48,880
new tank busting variant to good use and
856
00:44:48,880 --> 00:44:50,560
quickly chockked up a high number of
857
00:44:50,560 --> 00:44:54,280
enemy tank kills.
858
00:45:07,760 --> 00:45:10,000
The restrictions imposed on Germany
859
00:45:10,000 --> 00:45:12,400
after the First World War included a
860
00:45:12,400 --> 00:45:15,359
limit on the size of her army. Although
861
00:45:15,359 --> 00:45:17,200
painful for the Germans, this
862
00:45:17,200 --> 00:45:18,720
restriction would have noticeable
863
00:45:18,720 --> 00:45:20,720
benefits when war finally broke out
864
00:45:20,720 --> 00:45:23,440
again. The selection process was
865
00:45:23,440 --> 00:45:25,760
rigorous and only the best candidates
866
00:45:25,760 --> 00:45:28,960
were chosen. As the political situation
867
00:45:28,960 --> 00:45:31,920
changed and the army expanded, these
868
00:45:31,920 --> 00:45:34,640
carefully chosen men moved up the ranks
869
00:45:34,640 --> 00:45:36,640
and passed their skills down to many
870
00:45:36,640 --> 00:45:39,241
others. Another
871
00:45:39,241 --> 00:45:40,400
[music]
872
00:45:40,400 --> 00:45:42,400
result of the inter war restrictions was
873
00:45:42,400 --> 00:45:44,480
that even the most junior soldier was
874
00:45:44,480 --> 00:45:45,839
trained to take the place of his
875
00:45:45,839 --> 00:45:48,720
superior. With some brilliant tacticians
876
00:45:48,720 --> 00:45:50,960
and military minds leading them and
877
00:45:50,960 --> 00:45:53,119
supplied with good equipment, the German
878
00:45:53,119 --> 00:45:56,480
army of 1939 was a truly formidable
879
00:45:56,480 --> 00:45:59,480
opponent.
880
00:46:04,400 --> 00:46:06,400
unleashed into Poland in September of
881
00:46:06,400 --> 00:46:08,800
that year. The skills learned were put
882
00:46:08,800 --> 00:46:11,920
to good use. Quick, decisive campaigns
883
00:46:11,920 --> 00:46:13,920
followed one after the other over the
884
00:46:13,920 --> 00:46:16,960
next 18 months. The average German
885
00:46:16,960 --> 00:46:18,560
soldier that crossed the Russian border
886
00:46:18,560 --> 00:46:22,319
in June 1941 was a well-trained, battle
887
00:46:22,319 --> 00:46:25,760
experienced and very capable man.
888
00:46:25,760 --> 00:46:28,319
Determined and professional, the German
889
00:46:28,319 --> 00:46:30,720
soldier of World War II would prove his
890
00:46:30,720 --> 00:46:35,160
ability again and again.
891
00:46:47,520 --> 00:46:50,720
April 1943 saw the German army in
892
00:46:50,720 --> 00:46:53,040
desperate need of recuperation after
893
00:46:53,040 --> 00:46:56,000
their recent victory at Kov. The Russian
894
00:46:56,000 --> 00:46:57,839
army was also in danger of outrunning
895
00:46:57,839 --> 00:47:01,119
its own extended supply lines. These two
896
00:47:01,119 --> 00:47:03,440
factors resulted in a period of relative
897
00:47:03,440 --> 00:47:06,160
quiet over the Kursk region. But as
898
00:47:06,160 --> 00:47:08,800
German intentions became clear, the
899
00:47:08,800 --> 00:47:10,942
Russians began an intensive program of
900
00:47:10,942 --> 00:47:12,640
[music] defensive measures that were
901
00:47:12,640 --> 00:47:14,800
designed to trap and blunt the German
902
00:47:14,800 --> 00:47:18,079
armor. Thousands of anti-tank guns were
903
00:47:18,079 --> 00:47:20,160
built into defensive lines in great
904
00:47:20,160 --> 00:47:22,720
depth, and millions of anti-tank mines
905
00:47:22,720 --> 00:47:25,119
were laid.
906
00:47:25,119 --> 00:47:27,520
Both sides prepared for the coming clash
907
00:47:27,520 --> 00:47:31,280
throughout May and June 1943.
908
00:47:31,280 --> 00:47:34,319
Expectations were high. Both believed
909
00:47:34,319 --> 00:47:36,240
that they could achieve a decisive
910
00:47:36,240 --> 00:47:38,960
victory. But the commanders of both
911
00:47:38,960 --> 00:47:41,520
sides were apprehensive.
912
00:47:41,520 --> 00:47:43,520
They could sense the importance of the
913
00:47:43,520 --> 00:47:46,160
forthcoming clash and could see how its
914
00:47:46,160 --> 00:47:48,800
outcome would affect the future course
915
00:47:48,800 --> 00:47:52,119
of the war.64020
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