All language subtitles for American.Experience.S37E07.Kissinger.Part.2.1080p.WEB.h264-BAE[EZTVx.to]_track3_[eng]

♪ ♪

JOHN FARRELL:
Richard Nixon is

(guests applauding)

In the meantime,
behind the scenes...

...this fella Daniel Ellsberg
has leaked

the secret history
of the Vietnam War

to "The New York Times."

And on the same Sunday
where there's the picture

of Tricia Nixon being married,

there's this story
about the Pentagon Papers.

REPORTER: Daniel Ellsberg,
ex-Pentagon employee,

made history by leaking
to "The New York Times"

the Pentagon Papers,

a top-secret study
of Vietnam policy.

HEDRICK SMITH:
Pentagon Papers were
7,000 pages of secret history

of the war in Vietnam

commissioned by Robert McNamara,
the former secretary of defense,

who became disillusioned
with the war,

and wanted a full record

of how we got into it
and how it went wrong.

FARRELL:
Nixon reads his newspaper
and his daily briefings,

and pfft, doesn't care about it.

Most of the Pentagon Papers
are about Johnson and Kennedy.

They're not about him.

NIXON: Hello.
SECRETARY: Mr. President,

I have Dr. Kissinger
calling you.
NIXON: Okay.

FARRELL:
But for some reason,

Henry Kissinger reads this story
in "The New York Times"

and goes ballistic.

KISSINGER:
It's, it's treasonable.

There's no question
it's actionable.

I'm absolutely certain
that this violates

all sorts of security laws.

NIXON:
What, what do we do about it?

Kissinger is convinced
that Daniel Ellsberg,

if he had access
to the Pentagon Papers,

has access to what's going on
in Cambodia,

and he's obsessed

that Ellsberg's next step
is to release information

about the secret bombing
campaign in Cambodia.

Ten years in prison
is very cheap

if they could contribute
to ending this war.

FARRELL:
Ellsberg was
a Kissinger protégé,

and so, Kissinger is worried
that the finger

eventually is going
to come back at him.

GREG GRANDIN:
Kissinger describes Ellsberg
as unhinged.

KISSINGER:
Of course, that son of a bitch,
I know him well-- he was a...

NIXON: You know him?
KISSINGER: Oh, well.

From early '69 on,
he just went off his rocker.

Just totally wild.

And he's moved into
a more and more intransigent,

radical position.

So, it's Kissinger that
gins up Nixon about Ellsberg.

NIXON: Let's get the son
of a bitch into jail.

KISSINGER:
We've got to get him.

We've got to get him.

Kissinger's frantic
self-protective reaction

to the exposure
of the Pentagon Papers

drives Nixon to a place
which eventually

becomes the first step
towards Watergate.

(phone ringing)

♪ ♪

♪ ♪

(explosions pounding)

♪ ♪

(explosions pounding)

(shouting)

♪ ♪

WINSTON LORD:
From the very beginning
of Nixon's administration,

Kissinger was running

all the major elements
of foreign policy.

The three major, immediate
objectives were all

with communist countries: China,
Russia, and Vietnam.

The broad strategy was to know

where you want to go
over the long run,

to see how the pieces fit.

So, what you did
with one country,

how it would affect
another country?

And I think Kissinger felt
you had to reconcile

the just with the possible.

♪ ♪

ROBERT BRIGHAM:
Vietnam, to Kissinger
and to Nixon,

was a thorn in their side.

They wanted it off page one

so they could get
to all the kind of things

that Nixon had on his very
expansive and aggressive

foreign policy plate.

You couldn't do those
until you had

the Vietnam question settled.

JEREMI SURI:
The United States seemed
hemmed in in Vietnam.

We seemed unable to do
anything right.

a lot of power
in taking the initiative.

He was willing to take risks

and he was able
to manufacture opportunities

where they did not exist before.

♪ ♪

NIALL FERGUSON:
Before they came to power,

both Richard Nixon
and Henry Kissinger thought,

"What might be done with China?"

I think it took

the two of them spending
time together,

contemplating the great
chessboard

of the Cold War,

to realize that,
if we could only establish

some communications with China,

that could be helpful
in a number of ways.

It could help you
with the Vietnam problem,

but it could also help you

with the Soviets.

We had, for the last
few decades,

assumed that communism was
a seamless whole.

Well, suddenly, not so much.

In the late '60s, you started
to see friction and then clashes

between the Soviets and
the Chinese along border areas.
(shouting)

HAASS:
And you had people
in the intelligence community

saying, "Hey,

"rather than being
on the same team,

"these guys are
on different teams.

There's actually a split."

Which we began to call
the Sino-Soviet split.

FILM NARRATOR:
A disputed frontier between

the dragon and the bear.

FERGUSON:
A war broke out,

a border dispute
between the Soviet Union

and the People's Republic
of China.

(people shouting)

More importantly,
there was an ideological battle

for leadership
of the communist world.

This was the setting

within which Richard Nixon
and Henry Kissinger

developed perhaps
the boldest ploy

in all of Cold War statecraft.

(band playing)

(applauding and cheering)

FAREED ZAKARIA:
Mao's China was

probably the most closed country
in the world.

There were very few people
who went in there.

So, it really was

this place on the moon.

Nobody really knew what was
going on inside.

to one of the lowest standards
of living in the world.

Wretched poverty enforced

by the draconian measures
of communist rule.

JIANYING ZHA:
I was born in late 1959,

ten years after the communists
took over China.

(crowd cheering and applauding)

Mao was our Red Sun,
was the savior of China.

(exclaiming)

ZHA:
We were schooled

on all this anti-Western
propaganda.

(explosion pounds)

I grew up seeing
this famous Korean War movies

called "Heroic Children."

(speaking Chinese)

And in it,
you see American soldiers

played by Chinese actors

with fake noses
and white powder.

And they were incredibly
ridiculous creatures who would

be mowed down
by Chinese machine guns.

(explosion roars)

So that was

the very cartoonish picture
of Americans

that we had in our head.

(band playing
"The Stars and Stripes Forever")

(crowd cheering and applauding)

LORD:
As we came into office, one
week after his inauguration...

Do you,
Richard Milhous Nixon...

LORD:
...Nixon sent a memo
to Kissinger and said,

"Get in touch with the Chinese,
see what we can do."

One week,
and you could see his priority.

FERGUSON:
This is where the story gets

the most cloak
and the most dagger.

The process of trying to get
in touch with Beijing

started almost immediately
in 1969,

but it was extremely difficult,

because the Chinese
were extremely hard to get to.

The Chinese had no diplomatic
representatives

anywhere in the world.

Even having an address

where you could confidentially
and reliably

communicate with the Chinese
didn't exist.

So, what they had to do
is find discreet intermediaries

who could play that role.

FERGUSON:
Of all countries,

it turned out to be Pakistan

that made the connection happen.

REPORTER:
Today's highlight is
the new ambassador from Pakistan

and his family.

LORD:
And what would happen is
that the Chinese would send

a secret message,
which would end up

with the Pakistani ambassador
in Washington,

who would call on Kissinger
with the message.

In January 1971,

we had sent a message,

and we hadn't heard back
for months,

and indeed,
we got quite nervous.

FERGUSON:
Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai,
the Chinese premier,

were great believers
in the subtle approach, and so,

the faintest of signals
was sent out from Beijing

to the effect
that there might possibly be

a conversation worth having.

(crowd cheering)

THOMAS SCHWARTZ:
April of 1971,

in Japan,
an American Ping-Pong team

was playing in, in international
Ping-Pong matches,

and one of the participants
in that

was the People's Republic
of China.

ORVILLE SCHELL:
What happened was,
there was a young,

sort of a hippie
Ping-Pong player,

with long hair,
and tie-dyed shirts,

and he got on the wrong bus--

it was the Chinese bus--

and met their star player.

And they kind of
got to be friends.

And on the basis of that,
I think Zhou Enlai saw

a little flash of light.

♪ ♪

SCHWARTZ:
One of the coaches
from the People's Republic

approached the Americans about
the possibility of them coming

to China to play exhibition.

This was an extraordinary moment

and received incredible coverage

in the American media.

of the visit
by the first U.S. group

ever invited
by the Chinese communists.

Today, Premier Zhou Enlai
met the visiting players.

He told them their visit
opens a new door.

FERGUSON:
It was a signal that, yes,

there was an opportunity

to send an American
representative to Beijing.

The question was,
who would that be?

Secrecy was crucial,
and that meant that Nixon

could only really entrust it
to the one person

who already knew that this
was his cherished goal,

and that was Henry Kissinger.

KISSINGER:
I knew nothing about China.

That's a great qualification
for a secret mission,

but it happens to be true.
(audience chuckling)

I had the same thought
in the '50s

that everyone else had,
that, that the Chinese

were revolutionary near-madmen.

♪ ♪

LORD:
We had to set up
what the cover story would be.

So we go on a public trip
to four countries.

And we stop, of course,
in Pakistan.

Henry's cover was going to be
that he's got a stomachache.

NEWS ANCHOR:
Presidential adviser
Henry Kissinger

is staying an extra day
in Pakistan

because of an upset stomach.

LORD:
You know, and at 2:00 a.m.,

we're driven to the Islamabad
airport by the defense minister.

The four of us get on the plane.

And so here we are,
flying toward Beijing.

None of the world
knows where we are.

We were exhilarated and anxious,
I mean,

this was a gamble--
this was no sure thing.

♪ ♪

We land at a military airport
in Beijing,

and of course,
we drove in automobiles

where the curtains were down,
nobody could see us.

FERGUSON:
Kissinger was deeply impressed
by Zhou Enlai,

the Chinese premier,

and this was one of the great
meetings of minds

that happened in his career.

KISSINGER:
He was a man of extraordinary
intelligence,

one of the most intelligent
people I've ever met.

He had an extraordinarily
expressive face.

He understood English,
though he did not admit it,

so his face registered
while you talked to him.

SCHELL:
The driving force was hopes

that if we could pull China
more into our orbit,

we could resolve
the Vietnam War.

Most of the military equipment
going to North Vietnam

was coming through China.

JOHN NEGROPONTE:
I remember him telling
Zhou Enlai,

"We don't want to wake up in the
morning in the second term

reading battlefield reports
from Vietnam."

One term was enough.

LORD:
The Chinese had two major goals.

One was to balance
the Soviet Union,

which was increasingly
threatening them,

and the other was coming out
of diplomatic isolation.

The key issue, of course,
we had to get around

was the Taiwan issue.

SCHWARTZ:
And so Kissinger made it clear
to the Chinese

that the United States
would withdraw

some of its forces from Taiwan

if the Vietnam War
came to an end.

(talking in background)

SCHWARTZ:
Toward the end of the talks,
it was finally raised

that President Nixon
would come to China.

SCHELL:
I think Kissinger
did have a recognition

something big had happened.

After all, he had gotten
to the top of China.

And he had, in effect,

triggered an invitation
for Nixon himself.

♪ ♪

DAVID KISSINGER:
I do remember how jubilant
he was

when he returned from
his secret trip.

I had never seen him
like that before.

SCHWARTZ:
Kissinger briefs Nixon,

and Nixon schedules
a national television speech.

Good evening.

SCHWARTZ:
The secrecy was such

that people thought
it was about Vietnam.

It hit the nation on a Sunday
night as a complete surprise.

NIXON:
I have taken this action

because of my profound
conviction

that all nations will gain

from a reduction of tensions
and a better relationship

between the United States and
the People's Republic of China.

TOM JARRIEL: Details of Henry
Kissinger's secret trip,

which led to that announcement,

which makes most detective story
fiction seem bland.

REPORTER:
Henry, can you just tell us,

do you feel encouraged
as a result

of your trip to Peking?

I think we,
we made some progress.

JARRIEL:
The Taiwanese ambassador
was visibly upset.

JAMES SHEN:
I got a 20 minutes' notice

last night--
I couldn't believe it.

We think it's not the kind
of thing a friend and an ally

should do to another.

(crowd cheering and applauding)

REPORTER:
Observers may argue over
whether Dr. Henry Kissinger

is a secret swinger or a square
masquerading as one,

but there's no doubt he is the
deputy president on this trip.

The brilliant,
elusive intellectual,

who has structured the substance
of the top-level talks,

will be at the president's side
throughout.

(no dialogue)

ZHA:
We heard this official
announcement

that Nixon was coming to China.

I still remember rounds
of school briefings

to prepare,
in case you should encounter

any Americans on the street.

The correct attitude is
not too arrogant

and not too obsequious.

(band playing)

And I remember,
when Nixon actually landed,

somehow, I had a sense this was

a super-important moment
that's going to,

in some ways, change your life.

REPORTER:
The first American president
ever to do so

steps onto Chinese soil.

(band playing)

SCHELL:
The meetings with Mao Zedong
took place

in an area adjacent
to the Forbidden City

called Zhongnanhai.

And that's where Mao held court.

REPORTER:
The fact that Chairman Mao
arranged an immediate meeting

with the American chief of state
in his home

is considered significant
by diplomatic observers.

SCHELL:
Just to be there was to be

in the most forbidden,
inaccessible place on Earth.

I think it must have been
quite exhilarating.

KISSINGER: It's one of those
few experiences

you have when you are an adult

which have some of the quality
of childhood about them,

that everything is totally new.

LORD:
We were used

to these elegant Mandarin
discourses by Zhou Enlai.

What we got from Mao
was laconic phrases, allegories,

either that were brilliant,

and we stupid Westerners
couldn't understand,

or he was slightly senile.
(chuckles)

ZHA:
Mao was a great performer.

He says a Chinese phrase.

He said, "The wind and, and rain
are coming,

so the swallows are busy."

Kissinger's reaction was,

"Oh, that was so deep,
it would take me several days

to fully grasp that."

But in fact, it's a very

tacky, trite Chinese,
you know, sort of saying.

Kissinger ate it right up.

REPORTER:
Zhou and Nixon sit down
for conversations

which last
for more than 30 hours.

The result is
the Shanghai Communiqué.

ZAKARIA:
You can see the mastery
of Kissinger's diplomacy

by looking at what's called
the Shanghai Communiqué,

which is, how do you get
around the problem

that the United States basically
thinks Taiwan is the real China?

SCHELL:
So what did they do to put
the Taiwan question aside?

They agreed
on this very guileful solution

where the United States...

And there's a word in Chinese,

they said was "ren shi dao."

"We, we acknowledge,"

"we take note of the fact"

that China says
Taiwan is part of China.

(talking in background)

(chuckles):
It's masterful in
its obfuscation and vagueness,

but it somehow
satisfied everyone.

♪ ♪

FERGUSON:
It was a dream come true
for Richard Nixon himself

and also for Henry Kissinger.

This was good news

after an unremitting diet
of bad news

over Vietnam and over Cambodia.

It felt as though they were
changing the subject

of the American conversation.

SPIRO AGNEW:
We have witnessed,

through the miracle
of satellite television,

the sights and sounds
of a society

that has been closed to
Americans for over two decades.

SAM HOSKINSON:
The opening to China was
maybe, in the 20th century,

the most strategic move that
any president has ever made.

It was the height
of the Cold War,

China and the Soviet Union
were allies,

and we peeled off China--
it was that simple.

ZHA:
I think to see the realpolitik
played out

was very sobering.

The whole thing was part
of a geopolitical game

to balance the Soviet Union.

Nixon and Kissinger
had no interest

in helping improve

the political situation
in China.

They had no thoughts,
not a iota of thoughts,

about human rights.

At one level,

how could I expect
anything more?

ALVANDI:
I think it's a mistake to see
Kissinger's realpolitik

as an absence of morality.

What he sees as the moral good

is the preservation
of American security.

Where I think we begin to enter

into a moral gray area
for Kissinger

is, what means are acceptable

in order to achieve that end?

And I think
he had very few limits.

FERGUSON:
Every president,
every national security adviser,

takes decisions
in which there are priorities

accorded to countries

and in which evils are ranked

not just according
to their moral magnitude,

but, more importantly, according
to their strategic magnitude.

♪ ♪

KISSINGER:
The East Pakistan crisis erupted

at the time that Pakistan

was our only channel
of communication to China.

We were in the process
of arranging my secret trip

in the precise period
that West Pakistan

was trying to put down
the uprising in East Pakistan.

FERGUSON:
The partition of British India
had produced

a strange situation
in which there were

essentially
two parts to Pakistan.

What we know today as Pakistan
was West Pakistan.

What we know today as Bangladesh
was East Pakistan.

RAAD RAHMAN:
East Pakistan and West Pakistan
did not

share a language,

they did not share culture,
they did not share history.

It's a complete recipe
for conflict.

(protesters shouting)

SCHWARTZ:
In 1970,

the residents of East Pakistan
voted overwhelmingly

for a different government
from the West Pakistanis.

(shouting)

ROGER MORRIS:
The eastern portion is beginning

to revolt against the authority

of the West Pakistani
government.

It's got its own
elected parliament,

its own elected leadership,
a man named Mujib,

and it's on the verge
of civil war.

(chanting, cheering)

ALVANDI:
Yahya Khan is the channel

through which
Nixon and Kissinger

are communicating with China,

and it's absolutely vital
that he remain in power.

President Yahya Khan of Pakistan

flies to East Pakistan tomorrow

to try to talk his opposition

into obeying
the central government.

(protesters shouting)

W. SCOTT BUTCHER:
In Dhaka, I was the junior
political officer.

At 1:26 in the morning
of the 26th of March,

all hell broke loose.

The West Pakistani military
were unleashed

with a vengeance.

Automatic weapons
right outside of our bedroom.

♪ ♪

MORRIS:
The Pakistanis murdered

large numbers of the opposition
politicians

in their beds at night, killed
their families,

wantonly killing
innocent civilians.

RAHMAN:
The Pakistani army went
into Dhaka University

and just rounded up academics,
including my uncles,

and disappeared them.

(people shouting in background)

HOSKINSON:
I mean, what was happening was

genocide before our very eyes.

(people calling in background)

KISSINGER:
We are in the process
of attempting

to negotiate a ceasefire
in the Dhaka area

in order to be able
to evacuate the Americans.

GARY BASS:
The Nixon administration

had lots of information

about what's happening.

They're getting
real-time reporting

from the U.S. consulate
in Dhaka.

These Foreign Service officers

have seen that kind of violence
before,

and they're saying,

"This is in a completely
different category.

We've never seen
anything like this."

ALVANDI:
There's enormous pressure
on Nixon and Kissinger

to cut aid and military support
for Pakistan.

But they choose not to do that.

BUTCHER:
We were absolutely mortified
that our government

was not responding
in what was a,

a humanitarian disaster
inflicted by a government

that we supported.

So, a number of us,
especially younger officers,

felt that we needed to send in
this, an expression of dissent.

"Our government has failed
to denounce

"the suppression of democracy.

"Our government has failed
to denounce atrocities.

"Our government has evidenced

what many will consider
moral bankruptcy."

NIXON:
We've been in touch,

of course,
with the Pakistanis

through messages we've sent
to President Yahya.

And incidentally,
he's been very forthcoming.

Well, we can't be blamed for it.

There are many, many areas
of the world

that, that we just can't,

we can't be responsible for.

HOSKINSON:
I was shocked by the lack

of reaction
from Kissinger and Nixon.

They seemed, uh,
unaffected by it,

except in, in the sense
that they wanted it to go away.

RAHMAN:
As far as Kissinger
was concerned,

these lives in South Asia,
they just didn't matter.

We've never recovered the bodies
of my uncles.

SCHWARTZ:
There could have been
an arms cutoff,

there could have been stronger
measures taken against Pakistan

which were not taken.

BARBARA KEYS:
Ultimately, it comes down

to Kissinger's assessment

that what matters is China,

and what happens
in East Pakistan

is almost a footnote relative
to these larger objectives.

KISSINGER:
There are governments in power

that may not meet
all our criteria

for democratic principles,

but the alternative to which

are likely to be positively
hostile to our interests.

To manipulate
the domestic politics

of another country

is always
an extremely complicated matter.

And you can start a process
which you cannot control,

and you may not know
how to do it.

♪ ♪

JUAN GABRIEL VALDÉS:
My first encounter

with the "great man"

was when there was a luncheon
at our residence.

My father was
foreign affairs minister.

And in this luncheon,
there was a big debate,

and Kissinger says, "Look, I
don't care about Latin America.

"I don't care
about your development.

"History doesn't go
through the South.

"History comes
from Russia to Japan

"to Europe
and to the United States.

The South has no importance."

♪ ♪

(bell ringing)

KEYS:
Kissinger called Chile

"a dagger pointed
at the heart of Antarctica."

He did not think
that Latin America

was important.

He, in fact, said, "Latin
America is not important."

VALDÉS:
Chile was probably the country

that first had a stable
democracy in the region.

We had a democracy even
before some European countries.

Salvador Allende was a person
who had represented

the hopes of the poor in Chile
for decades.

And poor people felt
that he was their leader.

(people chanting)

PETER KORNBLUH:
Allende was head
of the Socialist Party.

He believed in the need
for social change,

redistribution of wealth,

and that this could be done
through the, the ballot box.

ARIEL DORFMAN:
There is a sense in Kissinger

that Allende's example

could proliferate all over
the continent.

And he considers that one must
stop the contagion.

Allende made no secret
of his determination

to bring about
a revolutionary transformation.

FERGUSON:
Nobody wanted another Cuba.

And so, when any left-wing
leader showed signs

of coming to power
in a Latin American country,

the red lights started flashing

on the dashboard
in the Situation Room.

♪ ♪

KEYS:
In the Cold War,
every inch of territory matters.

It's a zero-sum game.

Any victory for the communists
is a loss

for the United States.

KORNBLUH:
And so, all eyes were on Chile

on September 4, 1970,
as this election took place.

(people talking in background)

♪ ♪

KEYS:
The presidential election
in Chile in 1970

is a three-way race
in which Salvador Allende wins

36.6% of the vote.

(people cheering,
car horns honking)

DORFMAN:
But this must be ratified
by Congress.

So, there is a chance for
those who are against Allende

to try to find a way to stop
Allende from becoming president.

KORNBLUH:
Kissinger talks
to C.I.A. director Richard Helms

on the phone and basically says,

"We cannot let Chile
go down the drain."

And Helms says, "I'm with you."

And they start to plot out
how they're going

to keep Allende

from actually being inaugurated
as president.

(chanting):
Allende! Allende!

KEYS:
Kissinger says, "I don't see
why we should

"let a country go communist

"just because
of the irresponsibility

of its own people."

(crowd clamoring)

KORNBLUH:
President Nixon called in
to Richard Helms and Kissinger

to the Oval Office,

and Helms took handwritten notes
on Nixon's orders.

"Save Chile.

"Don't tell the ambassador.

"Make the economy scream.

48-hour game plan."

KEYS:
Nixon authorizes two tracks,

and then Kissinger
carries these out.

Track one is essentially
an attempt

to bribe the Chilean members
of Congress

from ratifying Allende.

Track two
is what becomes infamous.

It is an effort to help
the Chilean military

institute a coup
against Allende.

VALDÉS:
The Chilean "consultants"

that the C.I.A. had
and Kissinger had at the time

recommended the kidnapping

of the commander-in-chief
of the armed forces.

That meant General Schneider.

KORNBLUH:
General René Schneider,

head of the Chilean
armed forces,

was pro-constitution.

He was the principal obstacle
to any coup plot

involving the military,

and so he had to be removed,
neutralized, eliminated.

(teletype machine clacking)

VALDÉS:
They sent machine guns

through the pouch
of the American embassy

and $30,000 for the general

who was in charge of Santiago.

KORNBLUH:
On October 22,

General Schneider
got into his car.

The car drove
three or four blocks.

It was intercepted
by several other vehicles

filled with thugs.

One thug got out
with a sledgehammer

and started
smashing in the windows.

VALDÉS:
General Schneider had a, a gun,

and he tried to defend himself,
and they killed him.

KORNBLUH:
Henry Kissinger...

(phone ringing)
...gets on the phone
with Richard Nixon

as General René Schneider
lies dying

in a military hospital,

and he says,

"The first step of the coup plot
took place,

"but, such an incompetent bunch,
these Chilean military officers,

that the rest of the plot
is not going forward."

(crowd murmuring)

(bell ringing)

VALDÉS:
The shock

that this murder produced
in Chilean society,

instead of weakening Allende,

gave an enormous strength
to the election of Allende.

(crowd chanting)

Allende, therefore,
was proclaimed president

ten days later.

(crowd cheering and applauding)

KEYS:
Kissinger does not give up.

He wants Allende out of there.

So there's an American effort
to undermine his government.

And that includes cutting off
loans and aid,

funding opposition parties,
opposition media,

and fomenting strikes.

VALDÉS:
The first thing that Nixon said

after the election of Allende
was,

"Make the economy scream."

In fact, the economy screamed.

A country becomes tense,
becomes polarized,

and then you have a society
which was a healthy society

in political terms

that becomes absolutely
out of control.

(people shouting,
weapons firing)

REPORTER:
Army, navy, air force,
and national police

staged the coup
that ends 46 years

of democratic rule in Chile.

The military moves in,
the palace is surrounded.

KORNBLUH:
September 11, 1973,

the Chilean military undertook
a very violent coup.

They launched rocket attacks,

bombarding the Moneda Palace.

(explosions pound)

ALLENDE (in Spanish on radio):

He began talking on the radio.

ALLENDE (speaking Spanish):

to leave the palace.

When they were leaving
the palace,

one of the doctors of Allende

decided that he would come back

to where
the office of the president was,

and he saw Allende sitting

with a machine gun here,
and he shot himself.

KEYS:
There is no direct evidence

that Nixon and Kissinger
knew about that coup in advance,

and there's no evidence
that they helped plan it.

But they were thrilled
that Allende was gone,

and they immediately threw
U.S. support behind Pinochet.

(band playing)

VALDÉS:
Augusto Pinochet

was the commander-in-chief
of the army

at the moment
in which the coup happened.

(shouts in Spanish)

VALDÉS:
Pinochet came late
to the conspiracy

to organize a coup,
and in order to persuade

those who had been
from the first moment

in favor of the coup,

he had to be more brutal
than them when he took power.

♪ ♪

KYLE BURKE:
Pinochet began rounding up

leftists and suspected
subversives,

including
the national soccer stadium,

and began the process
of executing many of them.

Many were tortured
for information.

Many more were tortured simply
for the purpose

of instilling the Chilean
population with fear.

VALDÉS:
There were thousands of people
killed,

thousands of people tortured,

thousands of people
who had to live abroad forever.

I would say
that it is incomparable

to any other event
in, in our history.

KORNBLUH:
After the coup,
Nixon seems preoccupied

that the United States
might be exposed,

and Kissinger says,
we didn't do it.

I mean, we helped them
"create the conditions

as best as possible."

KEYS:
You would think that as
a refugee from Nazi Germany,

that Kissinger would be
deeply committed to democracy.

But he seemed to think
that it was not a problem at all

to have dictators
be on the side of the U.S.

in the struggle
against communism.

And in cases like Chile,

he was clearly willing
to subvert democracy.

The argument that Kissinger
makes is

that everything that he is doing
is in the service

of the best outcome
for the world.

He's thinking
about the global chessboard.

And the fact that there
are gonna be people suffering,

dying on the ground,

that to him is
a necessary consequence

of pursuing policies
that are going

to result in global stability.

♪ ♪

REPORTER:
Russia puts on its annual
May Day show of strength

in these just-released films
from Moscow.

FERGUSON:
The Soviet Union
at the beginning

of the Nixon administration

had good reason to think that
they were winning the Cold War.

♪ ♪

The United States
was bogged down in Vietnam,

but that wasn't
its only problem.

With every passing year,

the Soviets built
more nuclear weapons

until they achieved parity,

and then overtook
the United States

in terms of the size
of their nuclear arsenal.

SURI:
From 1945, from Hiroshima,

until the early '70s,

it's a breakneck race to build
more nuclear weapons.

This was a very
unstable situation,

(explosion roars)

KISSINGER:
When the decision of peace
and war involves

the survival of tens of millions
of people,

you're no longer playing
power politics

in the traditional sense.

To conduct
confrontation politics

when the stakes
are going to be determined

by nuclear weapons

is the height
of irresponsibility.

This is what we mean
by "détente."

(people exclaiming)

FERGUSON:
"Détente" is a French word

that really just meant
improving relations.

It was about buying some time,

reducing the risk
of World War III,

and trying to recover

from what was becoming

the insolvable problem
of Vietnam.

(crowd talking in background)

CAROLYN EISENBERG:
Kissinger definitely saw

a role for the Soviet Union
in the resolution of Vietnam,

and he is very clear

that he's interested in getting
help from them

in bringing this to a close.

the possibility
of a summit meeting,

and the Soviets would say,
"Nyet."

This changed
with the opening to China.

KISSINGER:
When we opened to China,

the Soviets suddenly realized
that we had

a bigger canvas to paint on
than they had calculated.

And in that sense,
there was leverage.

SMITH:
The Soviets who are looking
at the world stage

are saying, "Wait a minute.

"We've just been outflanked.

"And if we don't get into talks
with the Americans

"and strike a deal that makes us
an equal superpower,

the Chinese
are gonna replace us."

Good evening.

President Nixon has announced
that he'll be going

to Moscow next May

for a summit conference
with Soviet leaders.

It'll be the first trip
to the Soviet Union

by an American president
since Franklin Roosevelt

journeyed to Yalta in
the waning days of World War II.

♪ ♪

NEGROPONTE:
Kissinger and Nixon

accepted an invitation
to stay in the Kremlin.

I mean,

whether you, as president
of the United States,

would have wanted
everything you did...

(chuckling):
...in your guest room
bugged and photographed,

I don't know.

But that's, that's what Henry
agreed to do.

So they stayed in the Kremlin.

ALVANDI:
The Soviet leadership had
installed Leonid Brezhnev.

Not the sharpest knife
in the drawer

intellectually, let's put it
that way.

SMITH:
Brezhnev is a classic
Communist Party apparatchik

who has risen to the top

by being very careful at playing
all sides against each other.

He's not a thug,

but he's not very far
from a thug.
(chuckling)

♪ ♪

FERGUSON:
The most surreal moment
in their relationship

must have been when Brezhnev
treated Kissinger to a visit

to his hunting lodge.

Henry Kissinger
was not the kind of person

who goes shooting wild boar
as a recreational pastime.

KISSINGER:
They put out the food.

You sit in a tower

and shoot these poor bastards

as they come by to feed.

When he had killed
about three boars

and God knows what else,
he unpacked a picnic and said,

"Look, I want
to talk to you privately."

And he said, "Look,
you and me are partners.

You and me are going
to run the world."

NEGROPONTE:
I participated in the meeting
with Brezhnev

at his dacha.

It was an evening devoted
to Vietnam.

LORD:
The meeting was just three
or four top Soviet leaders,

including Brezhnev,

took turns lambasting Nixon

about his Vietnam policy,

all of which was to show Hanoi
how tough they were.

And I remember Nixon leaning
over to Kissinger saying,

you know, "Jesus Christ,
we gotta get out of here."

(chuckling):
At that point, Brezhnev says,

"Well, now we're going upstairs
for dinner."

(people talking in background)

LORD:
The whole mood changed,

everyone got half-drunk.

And then, toward
the end of that dinner,

Brezhnev says to Nixon,
"I think Kissinger should go off

and negotiate with my people
on, on the SALT agreement."

FERGUSON:
SALT was the first treaty
ever negotiated

to limit the growth

of what were euphemistically
called "strategic arms."

♪ ♪

NEGROPONTE:
We go back to Moscow.

We needed
to Xerox the SALT treaty,

because it was being signed.

And suddenly, the Xerox machine
wouldn't work anymore.

And so Henry goes
to the Xerox machine,

he grabs the treaty, he
holds it up to the chandelier.

And he says, "General Antonov"--
Antonov was our KGB minder.

(laughing):
He said, "General Antonov,

can I have six copies of this,
please?"

(laughs)

REPORTER:
SALT I was signed.

One of the results was the
anti-ballistic missile treaty

and agreement to shelve
the elaborate and expensive

anti-ballistic missile apparatus
in the U.S.

and the Soviet Union.

FERGUSON:
The first SALT agreement

was not a trivial achievement.

Of course,
it didn't stop the Soviets

building nuclear warheads,

but I think, from Kissinger's
point of view,

you'd created a new basis
for the relationship,

and you'd at least created
a mode within which

arms limitation
could be achieved.

♪ ♪

SMITH:
The psychological impact
was powerful.

Powerful because
we're acknowledging

we're vulnerable to each other,
and we're saying,

"Hey, this is crazy
to keep spending money this way

and threatening each other."

♪ ♪

My recollection is,

they let Nixon go
on Soviet television,

which was unheard of--
we couldn't believe it.

NIXON:
Dobry vecher.

I deeply appreciate
this opportunity

your government has given me
to speak directly

with the people
of the Soviet Union,

to bring you a message
of friendship

from all the people
of the United States.

SCHWARTZ:
The SALT agreement at the time

was seen almost as the end
of the Cold War.

To many Americans,
the idea that the Soviets

and the Americans could
actually meet

and negotiate about their arms

signaled that we were not headed

toward nuclear destruction.

They weren't two enemies

on either sides
of the barricades anymore.

But détente did not end
the Vietnam War.

The Vietnamese Communist Party
was not going to abandon

the idea of reunifying Vietnam
simply because Moscow said so.

I think Nixon and Kissinger
and a lot of other people

saw the North Vietnamese
as being linked to

and run by the Russians and the
Chinese, and they weren't.

They were running the war
themselves

for their own national mission.

♪ ♪

REPORTER:
This was the 17th
private meeting

and the fourth time
in the last two months

that Kissinger has met secretly
with Le Duc Tho and Xuan Thuy.

He left the meeting grim-faced
and solemn,

without answering questions,

giving no indication
of what happened inside.

FERGUSON:
The pace of negotiations
with the North Vietnamese

picked up in 1971-72.

A big question was what exactly
Kissinger was playing for.

Was he playing
for the long-term survival

of South Vietnam?

Or was he playing
for a decent interval,

a respectable amount of time

that South Vietnam
would survive,

long enough for, say,
Richard Nixon to get re-elected?

(cheering and applauding)

REPORTER:
Mr. Nixon is running
for a second term,

but as he does,

what happens in the war
is his responsibility.

CROWD:
Four more years!

FERGUSON:
Nixon and Kissinger could
sometimes sound as if they

were focused on getting
through the '72 election,

and after that,
the fate of South Vietnam

would really not be
their problem.

NEGROPONTE:
If you read some of the tapes,

there's one place where
Nixon and Kissinger are talking,

and Kissinger says to Nixon,

"Well, Mr. President,
if Saigon collapses

"before the election,
you really have a problem.

But if it collapses afterwards,
it doesn't really matter."

KISSINGER: The, the question is
now, how can we maneuver it

so that it can look like a
settlement by Election Day,

but that the process
is still open?

If we can get that done,

then we can screw them after
Election Day, if necessary.

LORD:
The North Vietnamese worried
about Nixon getting re-elected.

Their latest offensive had been

blunted by
our military response.

They thought Nixon
might be anxious

for a settlement
before the election.

The breakthrough came in
early October

when Le Duc Tho handed us a
counter-proposal

(speaking indistinctly)

LORD:
As soon as Le Duc Tho read out
his proposal to us,

we called for a break
in the negotiations,

and Henry and I went outside
in the Paris garden,

and we shook hands

and smiled at each other
and said, "We've done it!"

♪ ♪

SCHWARTZ:
Kissinger was overjoyed.

And he was absolutely convinced
that the October Agreement

was the real achievement
for American diplomacy.

NEGROPONTE:
Kissinger went back
to Washington,

and, on the 26th of October,

had a famous press conference

where he said peace was at hand.

REPORTER:
Months of secret meetings,

days of persistent rumors,
reached their climax

as presidential adviser Henry
Kissinger met with reporters.

We believe
that peace is at hand.

SCHWARTZ:
What he overlooked, of course,

was whether he could get
the South Vietnamese to agree.

LORD:
Henry and I were
quite optimistic

that, with some nudging
and reassurance

about support in the future,

that President Thieu
would be so pleased

that we'd get him aboard.

But we went in there,
and we ran into a buzzsaw.

REPORTER:
The Saigon government-controlled
radio

says any separate agreement

between North Vietnam
and the United States

will not concern South Vietnam
in any way.

SCHWARTZ: There were about
100,000 North Vietnamese troops

in South Vietnam at the time,

and the South Vietnamese
government wanted them out.

But the agreement

did not insist
that North Vietnamese troops

withdraw from South Vietnam.

EISENBERG:
The South Vietnamese government
blows up.

They're absolutely furious.

And they make that clear
immediately,

that they, this is
completely unacceptable,

it's a sellout.

NEGROPONTE:
We excluded them entirely

from the negotiation
of their own fate.

I mean, this is a negotiation

about the future
of South Vietnam.

REPORTER:
Henry Kissinger confirming
Radio Hanoi's claim

that October 31 had been
tentatively agreed upon

as the date for signing
a Vietnam ceasefire.

But Kissinger went on to say
Saigon's President Thieu

declined to go along until
more guarantees were given.

SCHWARTZ:
I think he believed that we had

such leverage
on the South Vietnamese,

and that they didn't
really have a choice.

(band playing
"Hail to the Chief")

REPORTER:
Richard Nixon,
re-elected president

by one of the largest margins
in history.

The mandate he sought he got.

(crowd cheering and applauding,
music ends)

LORD:
After the election,

we re-engaged the North
Vietnamese in negotiations.

And not only did
we not make progress,

but they began to, to slip back

on some of the concessions
they had made.

KISSINGER:
I was extremely depressed,

because things had reached
the point where we were so close

to a settlement,
and the thing blew up again.

I warned Hanoi
that we would do something.

I didn't tell them what,

because I didn't know
what we were going to do.

BRIGHAM:
Kissinger said repeatedly,
"This raggedy-ass

"fourth-rate country has
a breaking point.

I'm going to find it."

KISSINGER:
Nixon was of the view

that something shocking
had to be done.

And I think Nixon turned out
to be right.

SCHWARTZ:
Nixon and Kissinger decide
on a massive bombing campaign:

the so-called Christmas bombing.

(explosions pounding)

NEWS ANCHOR:
North Vietnam has gone
through another day

of the most intense bombing

in the history
of the Indochina war.

REPORTER:
North Vietnamese officials
claim

that thousands of civilians
have been killed

or wounded,

and that large sections of Hanoi
have been wiped out.

(people calling,
crying in background)

EISENBERG:
The Christmas bombing inflicted
tremendous damage

not only to their soldiers,
but to civilians.

It was just inflicting
as much damage as you could.

LORD:
A lot of people said,
"Oh, this was heartless

and lots of innocent people
were killed."

Now, I'm sure there
was some collateral damage.

But basically,
we did hit military targets.

♪ ♪

BRIGHAM:
Kissinger believed
the Christmas bombings

actually drove Hanoi
back to the bargaining table.

Good morning from New York.

Peace is not only at hand,
it is here.

KISSINGER:
There is to be issued
a new order

on the ceasefire,
which is to go into effect

roughly 36 hours
from now,

and which we hope, and expect,

will be implemented
fully.

♪ ♪

LIEN-HANG NGUYEN:
The Paris agreement
to end the war

and restore the peace
failed to do either.

It did not end the war,
it did not end the fighting,

and it did not bring about
peace and stability to Vietnam.

All that it achieved
was allowing the United States

to withdraw militarily
from Vietnam.

Kissinger knew full well

that the fighting would resume

even before the ink would dry
on the piece of paper.

FARRELL:
Nixon and Kissinger
definitely knew

the deal they signed
in January 1973 would condemn

South Vietnam to eventual
defeat.

(band playing
"Hail to the Chief")
(crowd cheering and applauding)

(band pauses)
ANNOUNCER:
Ladies and gentlemen,

the president
of the United States.

(band resumes,
crowd cheering and applauding)

NIXON:
We stand on the threshold

of a new era of peace
in the world.

(crowd cheers and applauds)

MORRIS:
1972 was a landslide victory.

But Watergate, of course,

begins to sink Nixon
despite the massive re-election

and begins to erode
that landslide support

almost immediately.

FARRELL:
There's this tick-tick-ticking

coming from closets and file
cabinets in the White House,

because a bunch of ding-dongs
had been caught burglarizing

the Democratic National
Committee headquarters.

NEWS ANCHOR:
The Watergate bugging case
involves a bizarre break-in

at the Democratic Party
headquarters in which two men

connected with the Nixon
re-election campaign

were arrested.

FARRELL:
From that point on,

everything else goes
on back burners,

while Nixon focuses
almost exclusively

on dealing with this threat
to his presidency.

FERGUSON:
When he came under attack
for Watergate,

Richard Nixon hoped
that his way out

was yet more foreign policy
success.

And if Kissinger
could deliver success,

somehow, Nixon could extricate
himself from the scandal.

SCHWARTZ:
This was the moment
when Nixon decides

to appoint Kissinger
to secretary of state.

NEWS ANCHOR:
The Senate today
approved the nomination

of Henry Kissinger
as secretary of state.

So a country boy
from Fürth, Germany,

becomes the first American
secretary of state

ever born in another country.

♪ ♪

KISSINGER: By the time I became
secretary of state,

the executive authority
of the president

was eroding at an alarming rate.

One of my jobs was
to give the impression

that we were capable
of a purposeful foreign policy

in this miasma of a president

who was on the verge
of being indicted or impeached.

♪ ♪

MORRIS:
If you're going to have a crisis
in which you face

the possibility of impeachment,

Kissinger is the one firm thing.

He becomes
the indispensable man.

FILM NARRATOR:
October 6, 1973.

A surprise attack
on the holiest of days.

FERGUSON:
With the outbreak
of the Yom Kippur War,

Kissinger faced the most
complex problem of his career.

♪ ♪

SCHWARTZ:
The Yom Kippur War
began with an attack

by the Egyptian army
crossing the Suez Canal

and the Syrian army
attacking in the Golan Heights.

(firing)

SALIM YAQUB:
The Israelis had an inkling
that something might occur.

But they did not realize
how effective

the Egyptian and Syrian assaults
would be.

my assistant secretary
woke me up and said,

"There's some trouble
on the Suez Canal,

"and if you get on the phone
right away,

you can get it under control."

HOSKINSON:
We're in the Situation Room
with the secretary of defense,

and the director of C.I.A.,

and everybody's wringing
their hands,

including me, on the back bench.

Henry, chairing the meeting,
says,

"There's an opportunity here."

Henry always was looking
for the opportunity.

LORD:
He immediately saw
that we could use this,

if we'd play our cards right,
to begin negotiations

between Israel
and some of its neighbors,

and also to begin to displace
Soviet influence

in that region.

(guns firing,
explosions pounding)

YAQUB:
There was panic
inside the Israeli government.

The Israelis were running short
of ammunition,

and so they appealed desperately

for resupply
from the United States.

Kissinger wanted to ensure
that Israel got the upper hand.

KISSINGER:
We were trying to prevent

a military victory
achieved by Soviet arms.

So, we started an airlift

and put an overwhelming amount
of arms.

REPORTER:
Now the counter-offensive
has begun.

The Israelis claim to have
knocked out

most of the bridges the
Egyptians laid across the canal.

YAQUB:
By the middle of October,

the momentum had shifted
in favor of Israel.

LORD:
The Israelis had struck back

and they had surrounded
the Egyptian army.

Kissinger knew that if we
could freeze that moment,

you might have a psychological
impetus on both sides

to finally talk to each other.

WILLIAM QUANDT:
Kissinger said to the Israelis,

"You're in a very strong
position right now,

"but don't overdo it.

"Take your win,

and then we get serious
about the diplomacy."

♪ ♪

FERGUSON:
Kissinger gets a ceasefire
just in time

for the Egyptian position
not to collapse.

He can then embark
on a negotiation.

♪ ♪

YAQUB:
You get this phenomenon
that becomes

known as "shuttle diplomacy."

Kissinger is going
back and forth

between various
Middle Eastern capitals

to meet separately
with Middle East leaders.

LORD:
He knew

you could only make progress
if you talked to each side,

understood its needs,

that it wouldn't work
just through cables.

This was too emotional,
too precarious.

You had to go in person
to Sadat,

and go in person to Golda Meir,

and then go back to the other
and explain

where they were willing
to move ahead

and where they really
had a need to dig in.

SCHWARTZ:
They negotiated with Kissinger.

They didn't negotiate
with each other.

And Kissinger frequently used
American guarantees

to get the parties to agree.

DICK CAVETT:
Were you ever so tired,
you couldn't remember

whether you were talking
to Sadat or Barbara Walters?

That distinction I never lost.
(Cavett murmurs)

(audience laughs)
But...

There's one thing
that keeps you going,

which is that you know
there's nothing more important

you could possibly be doing.

And that has
an exhilarating effect.

SURI:
Kissinger literally spends
most of two years

going from Damascus to Cairo
to Tel Aviv and Jerusalem,

meeting with one leader
after another,

cajoling them,
negotiating at a detailed level.

And as he himself says,
it's literally

a Middle Eastern bazaar.

ANWAR SADAT:
Henry, when I met him
for the first time

in November '73,
I found him quite acquainted

with the minute detail
of all the dimensions.

For that, we, we didn't spend
except one hour,

and after that,
we felt that we are friends

since years and years before.

(people talking in background)

ALVANDI:
The massive achievement
for Kissinger

was Sadat's decision

to essentially throw the Soviets
out of Egypt

and to take Egypt, the most
important, biggest Arab state,

essentially out of the conflict

and into friendship with
the United States,

and eventually,
a few years later,

into peace
with Israel.

Now, that came at the expense

of the Palestinian question.

He left this issue
of the Palestinians

to kind of fester away,
unaddressed.

KISSINGER:
Whatever you solve in
foreign policy is not final.

It is simply an admissions
ticket for some other crisis.

NEWS ANCHOR:
Good evening.

The news is dominated tonight
by one explosive story.

REPORTER:
The White House mounted
an elaborate cover-up operation

in the Watergate affair.

JEB MAGRUDER:
And there was, of course,
the projects

including wiretap, tapping,

electronic surveillance,
and photography.

NEWS ANCHOR:
The number-two man in
the Nixon re-election campaign

today admitted his own guilt

in the planning and cover-up
of Watergate.

REPORTER:
Sources say there is no question

that the president knew
of the cover-up operation,

which may be the most
damning accusation of all.

KEYS:
As the Watergate scandal
dragged on,

it seemed like the president
and his closest aides

were being drawn into the mire.

And Americans were relieved
to see

that at least Kissinger
was untainted

by the scandal.

GRANDIN:
He survived Watergate largely

because he was seen as the only
adult in the room.

♪ ♪

FERGUSON:
This was the height
of Kissinger's fame.

This was when he was, like,
a kind of

diplomatic version of Superman.

KEYS:
Kissinger was the most admired
man in the United States.

He was tremendously popular.

ELIZABETH BECKER:
The world was so happy

that the United States was
finally getting out of Vietnam

that Henry Kissinger received
the Nobel Peace Prize.

But his Vietnamese colleague,
Le Duc Tho,

said, "This is not
the end of the war,

and I'm not accepting
the peace prize."

In Oslo,

several thousand Norwegian
students demonstrated today

against the awarding
of the Nobel Peace Prize

to Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger.

(chanting in Norwegian)

DAVID KISSINGER:
I was on the playground,

and some kid came up to me
and said,

"You know, my parents don't
think your father

should have won the Nobel
Peace Prize."

And I apparently replied,

"That's okay,
neither does my mother."

(audience applauding)

KISSINGER:
That's the most important goal

any administration can
set itself,

is to work for a world
in which the award

will become irrelevant,

because peace will have
become so normal.

DAVID KISSINGER: Of course,
he was deeply honored,

but I think it also presented

a huge headache for him,

because he knew
that it would not be

well received
by President Nixon.

FARRELL:
Knowing Richard Nixon,
it must have driven him crazy

that Kissinger was the one
awarded the peace prize.

He managed to keep his jealousy
under control,

to a great extent,

in part because he needed
Kissinger more and more.

SCHWARTZ:
The relationship
between Nixon and Kissinger

begins to reverse--
there is a way

in which Nixon now is almost
pleading

for reassurance and support from
Kissinger.

NIXON:
I've even been considering
the possibility of,

frankly, just kind of throwing
myself on the sword and...

(Nixon and Kissinger
talking at once)

NIXON:
...and letting Agnew take
over, what the hell?

KISSINGER:
That is out of the question,

with all due respect,
Mr. President.

That cannot be considered.

You have saved this country,
Mr. President.

The history books will show that

when no one will know
what Watergate means.

FERGUSON:
Henry Kissinger often said to me
that there was

a Shakespearean quality
to Richard Nixon's presidency.

The culmination of the tragedy

is Nixon's final, agonized
decision to resign.

FARRELL:
One day, Kissinger goes over
to the White House,

and they talk, and there's
this moment where Nixon says,

"Henry, I'm not a praying man,
but pray with me."

And you have this amazing scene
of the two of them

on their knees, praying,
in the White House.

DAVID KISSINGER:
I remember him coming home
that night,

and the sense of sorrow
and compassion

that he had for Nixon
at that moment.

KISSINGER:
The human problem of a man

who had spent all of his life

trying to become president,

whose personality really did not
lend itself to politics--

he didn't like to meet
new people,

he didn't like to give
direct orders--

he made himself
do all these things,

and everything collapsed on him.

(crowd applauding)

♪ ♪

WARREN BURGER:
...and repeat after me:
I, Gerald R. Ford,

do solemnly swear...

I, Gerald R. Ford,
do solemnly swear...

...that I will support and
defend the constitution...

FERGUSON:
Gerald Ford was as different

in personal, temperamental terms
from Richard Nixon

as it's possible to imagine.

...against all enemies,
foreign and domestic.

FERGUSON:
And yet,

when Ford became president,

one of the very first decisions
that he took

was to keep Kissinger on
in both roles,

national security adviser
and secretary of state.

Somebody said
that as soon as Nixon was gone,

Kissinger would lose
his Teflon position

and become the lightning rod
in turn.

And so it proved.

Good evening to all of you
from California.

FERGUSON:
Within a relatively short time
of Nixon's departure,

the attacks on Kissinger began.

Dr. Kissinger is quoted
as saying

that he thinks
of the United States as Athens

and the Soviet Union as Sparta.

The day of the U.S. is past

and today is the day
of the Soviet Union.

But peace does not come
from weakness or from retreat.

DAVID KISSINGER:
My father had played
such a dominant role

for six years that in the nature
of American politics,

it's almost inevitable
that you become a focal point,

and that the, uh,

the worm turns.

♪ ♪

JOHN PILGER:
At 7:30 a.m.
on April the 17th, 1975,

the war in Cambodia was over.

It was a unique war,
for no country has ever

experienced
such concentrated bombing.

On this, perhaps the most gentle
and graceful land

in all of Asia,

President Nixon
and Mr. Kissinger

unleashed 100,000 tons of bombs,

the equivalent
of five Hiroshimas.

Then, out of the forest,
came the victors,

the Khmer Rouge,

whose power had grown out of
all proportion to their numbers.

KHATHARYA UM:
The Khmer Rouge was essentially

an insignificant movement
up until 1970.

And the question is,

how is it that this relatively
marginal force were able

to seize power in five years?

The bombing did not create
the Khmer Rouge,

but it was
a powerful recruitment tool.

♪ ♪

PILGER:
The horror began
almost immediately.

Phnom Penh, a city of
two-and-a-half million people,

was forcibly emptied
within hours of their coming.

SOPHAL EAR:
Within 24 hours,

they announced that the city
would have to be evacuated.

They emptied the hospitals
while people

were still in the middle
of surgery.

And that was just
the beginning of the killing.

PILGER:
The Khmer Rouge interrogated
and then exterminated

anyone they suspected
of opposing them.

♪ ♪

UM:
I have yet to find anyone
who have not

been affected by a loss.

We have a Khmer word,
which is baksbat.

It's the broken spirit.

It's, like, when the spirit
has been so broken under fear,

under terror,

that it doesn't recover.

MORRIS:
I think the tragedy
of Cambodia

is directly attributable

to the policies
of Kissinger and Nixon.

There's no question

that our continued bombing
of the countryside,

which was savage and relentless,

led to the rise
of the Khmer Rouge.

LORD:
The North Vietnamese,

they had bases in not only
Cambodia, but Laos.

They were coming over, killing
American troops

So they spread the war
to these countries.

We did not spread it.

DAVID FROST:
You say in your book...
(Kissinger murmurs)

FROST:
...that you considered
bombing North Vietnam,

so that you had the alternative

of bombing North Vietnam
and not embroiling Cambodia.

And...
Cambodia was embroiled!

It is an absurdity to say
that a country can occupy

a part of another country,
kill your people,

and that then you are violating
its neutrality

when you respond
against the foreign troops

that are
on that neutral territory.

I, I...
It is total hypocrisy!

EAR: They were all supposed
to be well-intended decisions.

My father, who died, my oldest
brother, who's still missing

to this day, are they
the victims of geopolitics

and of decisions
made with good intentions,

but that led to disaster?

Yes, absolutely.

UM:
Sometime it makes me wonder

about the hierarchy
of suffering,

and the unequal value

that's attributed
to people's lives.

Some lives are worth more
than others, right?

Some countries
are worth sacrificing

in order
that others can prosper.

♪ ♪

NEWS ANCHOR:
Good evening.

The fighting is over

for American ground soldiers
in Vietnam.

REPORTER:
The extraction
of the last combat soldiers

is a slow process.

While the men wait,
they happily donate

some of their leftover
ammunition

to their South Vietnamese
replacements.

It is now their war.

BURKE:
Ultimately,
when the United States

extricated itself
from the Vietnam War,

the South Vietnamese government

hobbled along for two years.

So great was the South
Vietnamese entire dependence

upon the United States

that in no way, shape, or form

could it stand on its own.

CHARLES TRAN VAN LAM:
I'm still hopeful

that the United States

will respond positively

to our request for aid.

that if that aid
is not approved,

the collapse of your country
is inevitable.

Do you share
that assessment?

(stammering)

I still think that the aid
will be forthcoming.

♪ ♪

DAVID KISSINGER:
If my father had one regret
that he often expressed to me,

it was that Congress prevented
the United States

from having
an ongoing military role

after the peace accords.

He believed that there was
a path for at least preventing

the human catastrophe

that occurred in Vietnam
after we withdrew,

and that we failed to do that.

KISSINGER:
We consider we have
a moral obligation

to the tens of thousands
of people who worked with us,

relying on us for 15 years,

and we are positive
that the American people

will fulfill
that obligation.

Thank you,
Mr. Secretary.

(planes roar overhead)

BURKE:
When the North Vietnamese

began the final assault
in April of 1975,

the regime basically disappeared
overnight.

REPORTER:
Saigon, April the 30th, 8:00.

The last American helicopter
on the roof

of the American embassy
prepares to lift off

the last of the evacuees

fleeing before the advancing
communist armies.

(car horns honking)

MORRIS:
I felt great anger

at the United States government.

We had deceived and misled
not only ourselves,

but we had deceived and misled
a whole people in South Vietnam.

♪ ♪

There was a chance,
given his talents,

that Henry alone might have been
able to end that war

much, much earlier.

That he did not, I find that,
like the rest of the war,

rather unforgivable.

HANG:
At the end of the day,

when Kissinger was alone
with his own thoughts,

I think he would've admitted
to himself

that South Vietnam did not have

the ability to defend itself.

I think all of the allegations,

to say that Congress
lost the will to fight,

that the American people lost
the will to fight,

that the media misreported
that war,

was a way for him

to assuage his guilt.

KISSINGER:
The collapse of South Vietnam
and the evacuation of Saigon

was, without doubt,

the saddest moment
of my governmental experience.

I am unreconstructed
in my conviction

that Vietnam did not have
to fall,

that we did that to ourselves.

(crowd cheering)

LAKE:
He was not a monster.

But he was wrong,

and the result was millions
of people,

not just American soldiers,
55,000-plus,

but millions of Indochinese--

Laos, Cambodia,
South Vietnam, North Vietnam--

died as a result
of this horrendous,

horrendous mistaken effort.

(crowd cheering and applauding)

REPORTER:
With 272 electoral votes,

James Earl Carter is the next
president of the United States.

(cheers and applause continue)

KISSINGER:
Our new president
and secretary of state deserve

the understanding and
the support of all Americans.

I expect to lead

a happy and full life

once I leave the government.

(audience laughs)

KEYS:
One of Kissinger's
most impressive achievements

was staying famous for 50 years.

GILDA RADNER:
Secwetary of State

Dr. Henwy Kissinger.
(audience laughs)

Have you any final words
for the Amewican pubwic?

No.
(audience laughs)

He institutes this kind of

remarkable self-levitation feat,

where he stays in the public eye

for nearly half a century.

Partly because
he devotes his entire life

to foreign policy.

He's advising leaders.

You know,
I'm here as a private citizen.

I'm here
as a private citizen.

KISSINGER:
I'm now speaking
of my personal view,

not necessarily
Governor Reagan's.

KEYS:
He's giving speeches,

going to conferences.

He's a ubiquitous presence
on television.

He was always invited to opine
on whatever crisis

is happening at the moment.

KISSINGER:
I think that the warning
of the president

that a continuation
of repression

could harm U.S.-Chinese
relations was correct.

KEYS:
He publishes hundreds
of articles and op-eds,

and many books,

putting out his own version
of history.

HOST:
Dr. Kissinger has a new book
hitting bookstores tomorrow.

ZAKARIA:
If you looked at his schedule
on any given day,

it was packed with meetings,

breakfasts, lunches,
TV interviews.

He stayed in the game
because he loved

international relations.

And he loved power.

FERGUSON:
Throughout the long years
out of government,

Henry Kissinger fought

to uphold his reputation
against all comers.

WILLIAM F. BUCKLEY:
If an Allende were to come to
power tomorrow, you would not

feel that you could
recommend such action

as you thought appropriate
in 1970?

No, I'm not saying that.

FERGUSON:
No criticism went unanswered.

CHRISTOPHER HITCHENS:
The statement "Henry Kissinger
is a war criminal"

is not a piece of rhetoric,
it's not a metaphor,

it's a job description.

And it might feature
on an indictment.

MAN:
I want to know how
you would amend

your testimony today.

Uh, why should I amend
my testimony?

(audience chuckles)

ALVANDI:
He was determined

that he would be the one
to write his own history.

But it really was
a double-edged sword,

because he kind of made himself
a big target,

and in many ways
became a kind of scapegoat

for all the failures
of American foreign policy.

PROTESTERS (chanting):
Arrest Henry Kissinger
for war crimes!

Arrest Henry Kissinger
for war crimes!

LORD:
When people attack Kissinger

by saying, "You're dealing
with tyrants,"

or, "You're ignoring
human rights,"

they, they don't remember

the agonizing choices
that had to be made.

After all,
preserving civilization

is a human right, as well.

KISSINGER:
The average person thinks

that morality can be applied
as directly

to the conduct of states
to each other

as it can to human relations.

That is not always the case,

because sometimes statesmen

have to choose among evils.

MORRIS:
I think he thought
whatever he was sacrificing

of American values,

he was doing so
for American interests.

My view of that is
that the sacrifice of, of values

was intrinsically
a sacrifice of interests.

BEN RHODES:
One of the sources of strength
that the United States has

is the story that we've been
telling around the world,

which is a story about freedom

and equality of peoples
and nations.

Yeah, I think Kissinger's theory
was,

it's the credibility of being
willing to use power,

being willing to kill a lot
of people,

to send a message
to other potential adversaries,

"This is what happens

if you challenge the will
of the United States."

I think the fundamental problem
with that is,

it just obliterates
the credibility

of the story that we tell.

DAVID KISSINGER:
My father was a realist,

but it was realism
in the cause of principles

that he believed in deeply.

He was not just trying
to advance the power

of the United States

in some kind
of Darwinian struggle.

He was advancing the strength of
the United States, in his mind,

because America was
the last, best hope of humanity,

and he had experienced that
personally.

♪ ♪

The final days of his life
were deeply revealing.

He was transported back
to the trauma of his childhood.

He was right back there.

He was speaking German.

He was afraid
that pogroms were at the door.

He was showing
the deep-seated injury

that he had experienced
as a child.

But there was also
a tremendously moving

final hallucination.

♪ ♪

He was lying in a bed
looking out on this garden

that he loved in Connecticut,

and he imagined
that his brother,

who had died a couple of years
earlier, was outside

building a platform.

It wasn't clear whether this
was some kind of train stop,

or a platform for my father
to ascend onto,

but it seemed to give him
a great deal of peace.
(audience cheers and whistles)

KISSINGER:
At an early age,

I have seen what can happen
to a society

that is based on hatred

and strength and distrust,

and that I experienced then

what America means
to other people:

its hope and its idealism.

♪ ♪

♪ ♪

ANNOUNCER:
"American Experience: Kissinger"

is available with PBS Passport
and on Amazon Prime Video.

♪ ♪

♪ ♪