All language subtitles for Soviet.Storm.WWII.in.the.East.Series.2.6of9.The.Secret.War.1080p.WEB-DL.h264.AC3.MVGroup.Forum_[eng]

When Hitler invaded
the Soviet Union in 1941,

Stalin s spy network
was thrown into disarray.

But Soviet intelligence soon
began to fight back

Originally produced
for Russian television in 2011,

this is the story
of Russia s Great Patriotic War

and the Red Army s long road
from defeat to victory.

21st June, 1941. Moscow.

An express train from Berlin
arrived at the Byelorussky
Terminal.

On board was Mikhail Vorontsov,
naval attaché at the Soviet
Embassy in Berlin.

He was taking no chances
with his briefcase.

Two days before, Vorontsov had
received a high priority
telegram

from Moscow ordering
his immediate return.

An escort arrived to meet him
on the platform

an official from the
Commissariat of Foreign Affairs,

accompanied by two officers
of the NKVD secret police.

A government car pulled up
outside. Vorontsov was ushered
onto the back seat,

between the two policemen. He
could relax for the first time
since leaving Berlin.

His precious briefcase
was now someone else s concern.

Mikhail Alexandrovich Vorontsov
fought with the Bolsheviks in
the Russian Civil War,

before joining the Naval
Academy. After graduation he was
sent to the Far East,

where he rose to become Deputy
Chief of Staff of the Pacific
Fleet.

In 1939 he was sent to Berlin
as the Soviet naval attaché.

The driver stopped outside the
Spasskaya Tower, the entrance to
the Kremlin.

Ten minutes later, Mikhail
Vorontsov entered Stalin s
office.

Amongst the documents
he d brought from Berlin,

was a copy of a message he d
been given by the Swedish naval
attaché.

The document was headed:
Official enquiry from Berlin,

regarding the routes of Swedish
ships and aircraft in the Baltic
Sea,

after 22nd June 1941, to avoid
engaging them during war with
the USSR .

Soviet intelligence work
was carried out both legally,

by agents travelling under
Soviet passports, and illegally,

by agents with forged documents.

Foreign intelligence work was
carried out by networks known as
"residencies".

Each member of a residency,
whether working legally or
illegally,

had a specialised role: One
agent recruited and managed
local agents;

another was responsible
for radio communications;

another acted as courier of
secret or stolen documents;

and the Resident himself oversaw
all the group s operations.

In the early 1920s Soviet
intelligence began to establish
legal

and illegal residencies
across Europe. After 1933,

and Hitler s rise to
power in Germany,

it became clear which country
posed the greatest threat to the
Soviet Union.

Therefore many Soviet agents
were reassigned to Nazi Germany,

to gather information on the
country s military potential,
and its intentions.

After war broke out in 1939,

the number of illegal Soviet
residencies in Germany increased
by 50%.

Similar networks were active in
Belgium, the UK, the
Netherlands,

Switzerland, France, Japan,
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia.

Military intelligence
residencies worked legally in
many of the same countries.

Each agent had a cover job
at the Soviet embassy

or with some other
Soviet delegation.

The agent might be a diplomatic
official, a chauffeur or a
technical expert.

In June 1941, the Military
Intelligence Central Office
employed 914 people abroad,

316 of whom worked
as part of legal residencies,

and 598 of whom were
illegal agents.

Even Stalin knew most of these
men only by their codenames.

He himself had enough experience
of working in the underground

to know that the more times
an agent s name was mentioned,

the greater the danger he faced.

From the autumn of 1940, an
increasing number of reports
began to warn

about the buildup of German
forces along the Nazi-Soviet
frontier in Poland.

Soviet military intelligence
desperately sought the answer to
the questions:

would Hitler attack,
and if so, when?

The incoming reports offered
many different dates for a
German invasion of the USSR.

Initially it was supposed to
take place in March or April
1941.

Then new reports said it had
been postponed to the summer,

but depended on
Britain s surrender.

Then there was fresh information
that it had been postponed until
1942.

The situation was further
complicated by the fact that
only one person knew

Hitler s exact intentions
Adolf Hitler himself.

He only signed the order
authorising Operation
Barbarossa,

the invasion of the Soviet
Union, on 10th June 1941

twelve days before
it was launched.

On 18th June, Moscow began to
receive reports from agents on
the frontier

that German military units were
preparing for something big.

It was clearly no longer a
matter of months or weeks, but
of days.

But despite the growing
warnings, Soviet intelligence
failed to produce anything,

even Vorontsov s
Swedish telegram,

that could persuade Stalin
that war was imminent.

In just a few weeks,
Vorontsov would be promoted

to Chief of Staff of Naval
Intelligence, and by September
he would be its Commander.

It was a job he would hold
for more than 10 years.

But he would inherit an
intelligence service rendered
blind and deaf

by the sudden German invasion.
Operation Barbarossa had begun,

and despite all the warnings,
the Soviet Union was not
prepared...

In the first days of the war,
all Soviet legal residencies in
Germany,

in the countries of her allies,
and in countries occupied by the
Axis,

were terminated, and all embassy
workers were deported back to
the Soviet Union.

Soviet military intelligence
lost contact with its agents in
11 European countries.

The agents themselves
remained at large.

But if they couldn t contact
Moscow, they were of little use.

A similar situation occurred
with intelligence networks that

had been established along the
frontiers. As the Germany army
swept forwards,

contact with most of these
agents was lost until the end of
the war.

Soviet agents working abroad did
not have access to enough radio
sets

or skilled operators. The radio
equipment they did have was
bulky and unreliable.

There was even
a shortage of radio batteries.

The range of these radio sets
was no more than 600 miles,

which meant their signal could
only reach the western Soviet
Union.

It wasn t strong enough to reach
Moscow, let alone Kuybyshev,

where military intelligence
headquarters had been moved to.

The codes and encryption keys
used by Soviet intelligence

at the start of the war were
complex and difficult to work
with.

It took a long time to encode
and decode even the simplest
message.

Radio transmissions could also
be picked up by German
counter-intelligence,

who patrolled the cities
with direction finding equipment

to locate illegal transmitters.

Direction finding used
directional antennae to
establish the source of a radio
signal.

By the mid 1930s, it was in use
by most counter-intelligence
services.

Three vans, equipped with
mobile directional antennae,

would patrol a city looking
for unusual radio transmissions.

They would triangulate their
findings to pinpoint the exact
location

of the radio transmitter.

Once the exact building was
identified, police units would
surround it,

force their way in,
and arrest the operator.

German counter-espionage
made it almost impossible

for Soviet agents to communicate
directly with Moscow.

Communications with most Soviet
prewar agents with only
re-establish in 1945

as the red army advance
to Eastern Europe.

Improvised lines of
communication, often using
couriers,

were used to deliver
the most important information.

But while couriers could move
across Europe with ease in
peacetime,

during the war, it
was another matter.

They not only ran the risk of
being arrested by the Gestapo,

but also of being killed in
attacks on ships, trains and
roads.

In Japan and China,
Soviet agents remained active.

A few illegal residencies
continued to operate

in occupied France,
Belgium, and Holland.

Soviet intelligence remained
highly effective in the USA, the
UK,

and in neutral Sweden
and Switzerland.

July, 1941, Stockholm, 3 weeks
into the German-Soviet war.

From the outside, the fish
warehouse near the docks of the
Swedish capital

looked like any other
building in the area.

But this one harboured a secret.
It was the home of the code and
cipher department

of the General Staff
of the Swedish armed forces.

Allan Nyblad,
a Swedish War Ministry courier,

was considered a
master of his trade.

The General Staff trusted him
with their most urgent and
important papers.

He was a stickler for the rules,
only ever handing his package

to the exact person to whom it
was addressed. It annoyed a lot
people,

but the War Minister had been
impressed by his punctilious
courier.

What none of the Swedish
authorities knew...

was that Nyblad was a secret
Communist and Soviet agent.

To make it easier for the
couriers to get around town,

their bicycles carried
special license plates.

This meant they wouldn t be
stopped by the local police.

One day, after receiving a
package addressed to the General
Staff,

Allan Nyblod set off on his bike
through quiet Stockholm streets,

but then took an unexpected turn
down a deserted alley, and
dismounted.

After checking the coast was
clear, he took off his special
license plate...

and replaced it with
an ordinary one.

He arrived at a two-storey
house... and went in.

Semyon Starostin worked
officially for a Russian tourist
agency

he also worked for Soviet
military intelligence.

Semyon Kuzmich Starostin,
codenamed Kent,

joined Soviet military
intelligence in 1937, and was
sent to Scandinavia in 1939.

His cover-story included a job
as director of the Russian
tourist agency

"Intourist" in Sweden,
Norway and Denmark,

as well as a representative of
Aeroflot, the Soviet state
airline.

In November 1941, he returned to
the USSR when one of his agents
was captured.

When all the documents
had been photographed,

Starostin put the papers
in a new envelope.

Rubber stamps from numerous
Swedish institutions were at his
disposal.

Thanks to Kent, Moscow received
daily reports on enemy movements

along the entire Eastern Front
because the Swedes were
listening in on the Germans...

and had broken their codes.

In 1940, Sweden had suspected
Germany of planning to occupy
the country.

Stockholm set out
to uncover Hitler s intentions.

Swedish maths professor Arne
Beurling, working alone with
just pad and pencil,

was able to crack German
military and diplomatic ciphers
in just 2 weeks.

It allowed the Swedes to
intercept and decode German
cable traffic,

and what the Swedes saw...
now also went to Moscow.

In January 1942, Nyblad was
picked up by the Swedes

and sentenced to 12 years
hard labour. But by then,

Moscow had information on how
the Swedes had broken the German
encryption.

In June, when the Germans were
tipped off that the Swedes were
listening in,

Soviet cryptographers were able
to decipher the new German codes
themselves.

18th October, 1941.
Tokyo. The Japanese empire

and the Soviet Union observed an
uneasy peace. But tension
remained high.

At dawn, Japanese
counter-espionage launched an
operation

to smash an illegal
Soviet spy network.

One of the men they arrested
that morning was Richard Sorge,
the group s resident.

As he was led away under heavy
guard, a thorough search was
made of his flat.

The Japanese found incriminating
documents, cameras and a
Photostat copying machine.

When they searched the house of
Max Klausen, the group s radio
operator,

they found his transmitter
and his codebooks.

Richard Sorge, also known by
codenames Sonter, Schwartz,
Ramsay and Inson,

was born in Tsarist Russia but
as a boy moved with his family
to Germany.

After fighting for Germany
in the First World War,

Sorge became an ardent Communist
and moved to Moscow.

There he was recruited
by Soviet military intelligence,

and sent back to Germany
to build a cover story

as a journalist and
a Nazi sympathiser.

It served him well
until October 1941,

when he was arrested by the
Japanese. They hanged him 3
years later.

In 1964 he was posthumously
awarded the state s highest
award,

the title "Hero of
the Soviet Union".

Sorge s network included
32 Japanese agents, 4 Germans,

2 Yugoslavians, and one Briton.

They included German radio
operator Bruno Wendt and his
successor Max Klausen;

Manchester Guardian
journalist Gunter Stein;

Yugoslavian journalist Branko
Vukelic; Japanese journalist
Miyagi Yotoku;

And Japanese journalist Hotsumi
Ozaki, an advisor to the
Japanese prime minister.

Another valuable source
for the group was Eugen Ott,

German ambassador to Japan,
and confidante of Richard Sorge.

Sorge s arrest and the
dismantling of his Tokyo network

was a bitter blow to
Soviet intelligence.

He had been an invaluable source
on Japanese and German
intentions in the Far East.

Sorge s greatest coup had been
to establish that Japan did not
intend

to attack the Soviet Union
in 1941, as Stalin feared.

He sent a telegram from
Tokyo in September.

According to the Secretary
of the Cabinet Ozaki,

the Japanese government has
decided to take no action
against the USSR this year,

but armed forces will remain
stationed in Manchuria for a
possible attack next spring,

if the USSR is defeated by
Germany. After 15th September,

the Soviet Far East can be
considered safe from the threat
of a Japanese attack.

This vital information came as
the Germans made their final
push on Moscow.

It allowed the Stavka High
Command to rush 32 divisions

from Siberia and the Far East
to help defend the capital.

On 5th December 1941, these
divisions spearheaded a massive
counter-attack

that threw the Germans back
from the gates of Moscow.

It was a crucial victory, which
owed much to Richard Sorge.

Soviet military intelligence
also had its eyes and ears in
Washington.

From there too, news reached
Moscow about Japanese intentions
in 1941.

Lev Sergeev worked at the Soviet
embassy as the military
attaché s driver.

He was also an intelligence
agent, codenamed Moris. All that
summer,

he sent messages to Moscow
stating that Japan had no plans
to attack the USSR.

16th July 1941,
Moris to Moscow:

The attitude of Japan toward
the USSR is wait and observe

February 1942, Berlin.

The Head of the German military
intelligence service, the
Abwehr,

was a man named Admiral Wilhelm
Canaris. That spring, he was in
low spirits.

Hitler blamed Canaris for not
providing accurate information

on the size of Soviet reserves,
and for allowing the Wehrmacht

to be caught off-guard by the
Soviet counter-attack that
winter.

This, and the weather, was how
German generals explained their
failure.

Admiral Wilhelm Canaris became
head of the Abwehr in 1933.

He was a dedicated
anti-communist,

which is why he initially gave
his support to Hitler and the
Nazis.

But by 1938 he d become
convinced that Hitler would lead
Germany to ruin.

He began to actively conspire
against the Fuehrer,

and in 1942 established a secret
line of communication to British
intelligence.

The SS had its suspicions
about Canaris,

and he was dismissed
from his post in February 1944.

He was arrested following the
July Bomb Plot against Hitler,

and hanged in a concentration
camp, one month before the end
of the war.

As an anti-Communist, Canaris
still had a vested interest

in the war against
the Soviet Union.

But the Abwehr failed to provide
the Army High Command with an
accurate estimate

of Soviet military strength in
the run up to the German
invasion.

They also failed to place any
agents within the Soviet High
Command.

The NKVD was extremely adept
at exposing enemy agents.

Numerous Soviet prisoners-of-war
were recruited

as spies by the Abwehr and
smuggled back across the lines.

But almost all of them
disappeared into the vast
Russian hinterland.

Some turned themselves in, some
were picked up by the NKVD,
others simply went home.

Very few of these agents made it
back, and their reports
contained little of value.

Canaris s mood improved in
December 1941, when he received

an unexpected report from the
Intelligence Chief of Army Group
Centre:

There exists in Moscow an
underground anti-soviet
organization

called "The Throne".

It is attempting to spread
anti-Soviet feeling amongst the
people.

The leaders are Sadovski, a
royalist and poet, and his wife,

a former lady in waiting to the
Tsarina. One of its members,
Demyanov,

the grandson of a Cossack chief
and former noble, risked his
life crossing

the front line to tell us about
the existence of "The Throne .

During his interrogation,
Demyanov claimed to have been in
contact

with German intelligence since
1940. His contact had been a man
named Stoltz.

After his story was rigorously
vetted, Demyanov was given a
codename,

Max, and sent back
to the Soviet Union.

Max s mission was to organise
underground anti-soviet cells in
major cities,

to orchestrate a campaign of
sabotage, and to establish a
network

for gathering information about
the movement of Red Army forces.

Most importantly, Max was to use
his contacts in the Soviet
General Staff

and the Ministry of Transport to
find out about military
movements by rail.

At the end of the war, Richard
Kauder, an officer of the
Abwehr,

was captured by the Americans.
During one of his
interrogations,

he told them that in 1942 and
43, Max supplied valuable
information

that was often passed on
to the Wehrmacht High Command.

The Germans believed
that Demyanov had infiltrated

the Soviet General Staff
as a junior signals officer.

Kauder further claimed that the
"The Throne" had set up several
cells

in Moscow and Gorky, which
communicated directly with the
Abwehr in Berlin.

They did this using three
transmitters supplied to them by
the Germans.

And all of this under the noses
of the famed Soviet
counter-espionage services.

The Germans did not discover
until after the war that this
underground,

anti-soviet organization had
been created by the NKVD.

Soviet intelligence had
meticulously created plausible
anti-Soviet agents,

which they then used to
infiltrate the Abwehr.

These agents then fed
the enemy misinformation.

It was called
"Operation Monastery".

Since the 1930s, the poet Boris
Sadovski had been used by the
NKVD as bait,

to trick opponents of the regime
into revealing their
"anti-Soviet" sentiments.

On three occasions, the secret
police had arrested his
associates,

but the poet himself
always remained free.

Alexander Demyanov was a former
noble who became an NKVD agent
in 1929.

He successfully infiltrated
German intelligence in 1942,

and even received specialist
training from the Abwehr.

He was later awarded
the Order of the Red Star

for his exceptional service
in Operation Monastery.

Meanwhile, German intelligence
continued its attempts to
recruit Soviet prisoners of war.

From the spring of 1942,
Canaris s agents brought him
regular reports

about the progress made with
former soldiers of the Red Army.

German intelligence
was well-versed in techniques

for turning Soviet citizens
against Stalin and Soviet
Communism.

The Admiral hoped that these
recruits would provide valuable
intelligence.

But he would be
disappointed once again.

October, 1942. Poltava
occupied Ukraine.

At the Intelligence school
of Abwehr Group 102,

former Soviet soldiers
were listening to a lecture

on how to gather military
secrets whilst operating behind
enemy lines.

The door opened, and the head
of the school walked in.

What no one in the Abwehr
knew was that Pyotr Pryadko,

former depot commander
of the Soviet 5th Army,

had infiltrated German military
intelligence under the orders of
the NKVD.

All the information he was
giving them was in fact
misinformation prepared in
Moscow.

Pryadko s role in Abwehr Group
102 was to forge papers for the
students.

He always made small mistakes
that would ensure the agent

was arrested when his papers
were properly examined.

His misinformation also
succeeded in compromising
several

high-ranking German intelligence
officers, who were dismissed
from their posts.

Pryadko sent back information on
101 agents working for the
Gemans,

and 24 members of the Abwehr.

In December 1942, he
rejoined the Red Army.

He was subsequently awarded the
Order of the Red Banner for his
courage and heroism.

Over the course of the war, the
Abwehr was infiltrated by
hundreds of Soviet agents.

They gathered information
about the enemy,

and planted false information
about the Red Army and its
intentions.

They had effectively succeeded
in turning Germany s own
intelligence services

into its High Command s biggest
source of enemy
misinformation...

13th September 1943, Paris.

A car carrying two passengers
drove up to a pharmacist s shop
on Rome Street.

One man left the
car and went in.

After a few moments,
the other man went in too.

The man on the run
was Leopold Trepper,

a Soviet agent who d agreed to
work for the Germans two weeks
before.

But now he d given
his Abwehr handlers the slip.

The furious Germans launched
a city-wide manhunt.

As early as 1938, Trepper had
established a powerful Soviet
intelligence network

across Belgium, the Netherlands,
France, and Italy. It had about
300 members,

and Trepper was its head until
his arrest by the Abwehr in
November 1942.

Through his group, the Soviets
also received intelligence from
Rudolph Rössler.

Rudolph Rössler, codename Lucy,
was one of the most valuable
agents

of the Second World War. A
German refugee living in
Switzerland,

he began working for Soviet
intelligence for ideological
reasons.

He supplied the Soviets
with vital information

about the German Kursk
offensive of 1943.

Rössler s own source, codenamed
Woerter, remains a mystery.

At the Nuremberg Trials, Alfred
Jodl, of the German Armed Forces
High Command,

said that information about the
Kursk offensive reached Moscow

before it reached his own desk.

After the war Rössler continued
to feed the USSR information
gathered in West Germany,

leading to his arrest
and a year in a Swiss prison.

He died soon after
his release in 1958.

After Trepper s arrest,
German counter-intelligence

succeeded in shutting down
most of his networks.

In Berlin, they referred to
Soviet radio operators as
"pianists".

Trepper s network involved
at least ten "pianists",

hence the nickname
the Red Orchestra.

German counter-intelligence
was able to force some

of the Red Orchestra s former
radio operators, including
Trepper himself,

to start feeding
misinformation to Moscow.

Admiral Canaris had
made a breakthrough.

The Soviets did not only believe
the misinformation they asked
for more.

After his escape, Trepper, with
the help of French Communists,

managed to get word to Moscow
that his network had been
compromised.

The information coming in
from its former radio operators

was finally seen
for what it was.

November, 1944.

Two Soviet agents were
conducting round-the-clock
surveillance

on the Norwegian coast.

Twelve hours later, a staff
officer entered the office

of the Chief of Naval
Intelligence, Mikhail Vorontsov.

The Tirpitz was one of the few
remaining threats posed by the
German navy.

She had played little direct
part in the war so far,

but her presence in Norway
threatened the Arctic convoys to
the Soviet Union,

and tied down a significant
number of British warships.

The sister-ship of the Bismarck,
she might still prove a
formidable adversary.

On 12th November 1944,
British Lancaster bombers

carrying 5-ton Tallboy bombs
set off for the Norwegian fjord
of Tromso.

The Germans had no warning of
the raid the Luftwaffe was
nowhere to be seen.

Two of the huge bombs hit
the port-side of the Tirpitz,

blowing a massive hole
in the ship s hull.

As water poured in, she took on
a heavy list, and capsized.

The destruction of the
Tirpitz at Tromso

cost the lives of 1,000
of her 1,700-man crew.

It was a final nail
in the coffin of Hitler s navy.

Since the summer of 1941, the
Soviets had had their spies in
Norway,

including units gathering
intelligence for the Soviet
Northern Fleet.

They also recruited agents
from the local population,

and worked with the
Norwegian Resistance.

Some Norwegian agents were sent
to a Soviet training camp near
Murmansk,

where they were given basic
instruction in radio
communications

and intelligence gathering.

The agents were then sent back
to Norway by submarine.

After nightfall, they would be
landed on a secluded stretch of
coastline.

Groups would also be resupplied,
and finally extracted, by
submarine.

The agents orders were to
observe German fortifications,
troop movements,

and military supply depots.

They were also ordered to find
German warships hidden in the
Norwegian fjords,

and transmit this information
back to Murmansk.

Soviet and British air forces
were able to use this
intelligence

to make raids against valuable
German targets in Norway and
Finland.

Following Germany s surrender in
May 1945, for most, the
celebrations could begin.

But there was not let up for the
secret services. It was clear
that in Washington,

and London, the rise of Soviet
power aroused great mistrust.

Mutual suspicion came to the
fore now the common enemy had
been defeated.

In April 1945, the British Prime
Minister, Winston Churchill,

ordered his military staff to
investigate the feasibility of
an attack

against the Soviet Union,
codenamed Operation Unthinkable.

The study was conducted by the
British Armed Forces Joint
Planning Staff.

Their report envisaged a
scenario in which 47 British and
American divisions,

fighting alongside Polish
forces, and 12 re-armed German
divisions,

launched a surprise attack
against the Red Army in
Northwest Europe.

The Planning Staff
concluded that Britain

would have to commit
to a long and costly war,

and that even so, the prospect
of success was "extremely
doubtful".

In his comments on the plan,
Churchill stated that it was

a precautionary measure for a
highly hypothetical situation .

On 18th May 1945 the Soviet
Military attaché in London,

Major General Ivan Skliarov,
passed information

on the top-secret
Operation Unthinkable to Moscow.

Skliarov s source was Agent X
- whose identity to this day
remains a mystery.

Over the next few weeks, this
same agent was able to pass
Skliarov

more details about
Operation Unthinkable,

including the size of British
and American forces involved.

In June 1945, Marshal Zhukov
received details of the plan,

and immediately regrouped Soviet
forces in eastern Germany.

He issued orders for the Red
Army to strengthen its defences,

and to closely observe
the western Allied forces.

Churchill knew British and
American forces were outnumbered
by the Red Army.

More importantly, he knew that
there was neither the public

nor political will for
such a war in 1945.

The Americans were more
interested in getting Soviet
help

in the war against Japan.

Operation Unthinkable
remained... just that.

In July 1945, during the Potsdam
Conference, American President
Harry Truman,

as agreed with the British Prime
Minister, mentioned to Stalin

that the US had developed "a new
weapon of unusually destructive
force".

Truman was surprised by the
reaction of the Soviet leader.

A few minutes later, as they
waited outside for their cars,

Churchill asked Truman
how it had gone.

He never asked a question ,
replied the President.

The British and American
leaders assumed simply

that Stalin had failed to
understand the significance of
what he was being told.

But they were mistaken.
Since 1942, Soviet intelligence

had been gathering information
on the Allies atomic bomb
programme.

More than 10 agents were feeding
information to the Soviets.

Thanks to their efforts, the
USSR tested its first atomic
bomb as early as 1949.

In February 1945, in a letter to
Truman s predecessor President
Roosevelt,

Joseph Stalin had even hinted at
the effectiveness of Soviet
intelligence.

As to my informers, I assure
you they are all very honest and
modest people,

who carry out their duties
carefully and without giving
offence.

These people have proven
themselves by their deeds many
times .