All language subtitles for KGB.The.Sword.and.the.Shield.3of3.Putin.and.Co.1080p.HDTV.x264.AC3.MVGroup.org_track3_[eng]

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Original subtitles

NARRATOR: For the past century, Russian history has also been

the history of its security services.

They were used by the Soviet state to crush dissent.

Millions suffered at their hands.

But, while many things may have changed in today's Russia,

its security network is arguably stronger than ever.

And the reason behind that is the rise

of a lowly lieutenant colonel to president of this vast country.

MAN: I know the KGB better than anyone else

because I was part of the inside circle.

This is the story of the KGB

told by its veterans

and its victims.

In the summer of 1991, secret orders were sent out from KGB headquarters

to field officers throughout the Soviet Union.

The chairman of the KGB, Vladimir Kryuchkov,

had ordered 250,000 pairs of handcuffs

and 300,000 arrest warrants,

and cancelled all KGB leave.

Citizens of Moscow knew nothing of all this

until the tanks were on the streets.

The announcement didn't reveal

that President Gorbachev was under house arrest

in his dacha in the Crimea.

He managed to record a brief message to the Soviet people

and aides smuggled it out.

KGB hardliners believed that Gorbachev brought it all on himself,

introducing Western-style reform.

The KGB was committed to saving the Soviet Union.

Indeed, that's one of the reasons why the head of the KGB

was part of a coup against Gorbachev in August 1991.

As tanks closed in around the White House, Russia's parliament,

the people realised that their government was under threat,

and thousands came out onto the streets.

Crowds put their bodies in the way of tanks and trucks,

determined to stop the putsch.

(HORN HONKS, PROTESTERS SHOUT)

Tank crews were reluctant to hurt the protestors.

They had to choose -

fire on your own people or switch sides.

The standoff continued through the night.

No-one knew which way it was going to go.

(PROTESTERS WHISTLE)

The following morning,

when Boris Yeltsin stepped onto a tank, the crowd cheered.

A simple handshake effectively determined the coup was over.

President Gorbachev returned to Moscow,

having steadfastly refused to negotiate with the coup leaders,

who'd held him and his family captive.

The cadre of coup leaders became known as the August Kings.

They were all arrested, except Boris Pugo,

who killed himself to avoid capture.

WOMAN: The putsch in 1991 failed

because the people preparing it were incompetent.

They hadn't made contact with the army,

they didn't have a clear plan

and also, I think they failed to account for the fact that, by 1991,

quite a lot of Russians weren't willing

to go back to the old Soviet times.

And the putschists seemed really like yesterday's men, you know -

they just wanted to dial back the clock.

The leaders of the coup were, in large part,

the old guard of the Soviet Union,

who'd watched, with despair, the reforms.

But they had no new ideas to offer, they had no new policies

and had their coup succeeded,

I think it would have been a recipe for disaster.

(CROWD CHEERS)

The last gasp of the old guard

was symbolised by the toppling of Felix Dzerzhinsky

from his place of honour in Lubyanka Square.

(HORN HONKS)

The founder of Lenin's security service was carted away face down

to the delight of a celebrating crowd.

(PEOPLE SHOUT, HORN HONKS)

But President Mikhail Gorbachev

was no longer the man of the moment either.

Boris Yeltsin had taken the initiative

and captured the public imagination.

(LAUGHTER, APPLAUSE)

The dissolution of the Soviet Union was the end of Gorbachev's empire

and Boris Yeltsin, President of Russia,

was ruthless in dispatching him.

Having dissolved the old KGB and split it into several parts,

Yeltsin now had control of the security apparatus.

MAN: His idea of reform was superficial.

The idea was just to split the agency.

So, you have a monster,

you just split it into different parts

and that gives you some sort of control.

LAUCHLAN: He can't forget that this is a great threat to his position.

So he breaks it up into its component parts -

foreign intelligence, domestic intelligence,

border guard, signals intelligence, communications, and so forth.

He also sacks large numbers of its staff,

weeding out people who are probably hostile towards him.

Yeltsin turned his attention to the domestic agenda.

He saw the need to raise living standards.

And, from January 1992, he came up with a big idea.

He announced that state-owned industries

would be handed back to the people.

Everyone would be given shares.

Large-scale privatisation was intended to give citizens

a personal stake in the Russian economy.

But the public had no experience of a private economy,

so many of these shares were snapped up for pennies

by a few entrepreneurs.

There are lots of people saying, "Everything's falling apart.

"No-one knows what's going on.

"This is a great opportunity

"to basically embezzle huge amounts of money from official funds,

"stick them in secret accounts that no-one else has access to.

"And so, when the system does fall apart,

"me and my friends are going to be rich."

Soon, Moscow had almost 100 billionaires,

while most Russians struggled to survive.

There's not many people who are making large amounts of money in the mid-'90s

who aren't in some way or other involved in organised crime.

The Yeltsin years were marked

by a dramatic rise in violence and corruption.

Russia became notorious as the Wild East.

Mafias of every description took control of business.

Those they didn't own outright were forced to pay protection money.

Inevitably, the people cried out for an end to the chaos.

The internal security service, rebranded under Yeltsin

as the Federal Service of the Russian Federation, the FSB,

now stepped into the breach.

Former KGB officers start taking over businesses in the mid-1990s.

It's a means of employing the security apparatus

to restore law and order, they would say.

But, at the same time, it means that they themselves

move into the business of organised crime.

LAUCHLAN: In the 1990s, there's a booming industry of security.

Former KGB officials flourish in this sphere.

They go into banking security, bodyguards,

high level oligarchs, working out their own security apparatus.

And so a lot of KGB officers make a great deal of success of the 1990s.

MAN: At the end of the Soviet Union,

when there was a realisation in the KGB

that they were the only people with access

to foreign currency, effective networks,

means of getting things done

and this was the time to leverage this into personal fortune.

Because all of the vast reserves of foreign currency

that were at the KGB's disposal overseas

could now be turned into making money.

One lieutenant colonel from the former KGB

was well placed to capitalise on these recent developments.

Vladimir Putin returned to his home city of Leningrad

and landed a job in City Hall.

He was kept on what's called the active reserve,

where you sort of stay within the service

but you actually get a job outside.

And, in short order, he ended up at the mayor's office,

where, because he spoke foreign languages and so forth,

he became an adviser on international affairs.

And in some ways, that was the making of him

because he caught the eye of the mayor, Sobchak.

Anatoly Sobchak was a rising star,

a man many saw as a future president.

GALEOTTI: And he basically became Sobchak's fixer.

Fixer, bagman - he was the guy who liaised

with the powerful local organised crime syndicates.

He was the guy who basically kept things working.

Putin was typical of a whole generation of KGB officers

who used their power in the past to become very rich.

And they were then in a position by the late 1990s and early 2000s

to retake a political role as well.

Later, in what was now St Petersburg,

Putin became friends with Boris Berezovsky,

one of a number of oligarchs

who'd made vast fortunes when the Soviet Union collapsed.

MAN: Russia at that time was in a really bad situation

in terms of food supplies.

And people would stand in lines to buy bread and everyday stuff.

But in St Petersburg things were OK.

And Yeltsin called Sobchak,

who was the mayor of St Petersburg at the time,

and said, "How come you have everything

"and we have problems around the country?"

And Sobchak said, "Well, you know, we're on the Baltic sea,

"Bay of Finland, I mean,

"and we have a very good, nice guy who handles all this stuff."

"What's his name?" "Well, Putin." "Well, let him come to Moscow."

And when he came to Moscow, again, you know, he ended up working

for some of the most corrupt figures within the Russian government

as their loyal henchman.

And that's how he rose.

Putin's friend, Berezovsky, was highly influential in Moscow.

He funded Yeltsin's re-election and later claimed that it was he

who suggested that Putin might be effective as head of the FSB.

Yeltsin duly appointed him in July 1998.

Putin's command of Russia's security service

marks the return of intolerance.

Internal critics were again viewed as enemies,

plotting with the West to bring down the state.

Prominent among those critics was Galina Starovoitova.

An outspoken Russian MP, she tried twice to pass a bill

that would exclude Communist Party officials

and, crucially, former employees of the security services

from taking political office.

Galina Starovoitova was one of the first Russian MPs

to act differently from other politicians.

She was human, she talked like other Russians,

she wasn't seeking to make money for herself.

And she was mysteriously murdered in the stairway

of her St Petersburg apartment building.

It's a very usual way, I would say a kind of tradition,

for the Russian law enforcement to investigate only the low level.

Like, you have a high-profile killing,

you just investigate the people who actually physically did that,

but you never try to investigate the whole chain to find masterminds.

There is nothing to connect Starovoitova's murder

with Vladimir Putin.

But, if her legislation had become law,

he could never have migrated from the security services

into political office.

This impediment removed,

Putin used his security service

to get President Yeltsin out of a tight spot.

The Attorney General, Yuri Skuratov, was preparing a corruption case

against the very highest state officials.

Putin used FSB surveillance

to catch Skuratov having sex with two prostitutes

and broadcast the footage on national television.

Skuratov tearfully resigned

and his allegations about corrupt politicians were silenced.

It would not be long before Putin was promoted to Prime Minister.

From the beginning,

Prime Minister Putin painted a picture of Russia under siege,

both from external enemies and from separatist extremists within.

Just one month after he took office,

four apartment blocks in major Russian cities were bombed.

The outrage was attributed to Chechen rebels.

But former KGB investigator Mikhail Trepashkin believes

Putin was well placed to take advantage.

No rigorous investigation has been undertaken into these bombings,

so all kind of accusations have floated around,

it's got a lot of people killed who have made these accusations too.

But we haven't got to the bottom of that mystery.

Whoever was behind these atrocities,

they convinced the Russian people once again

that their country was under siege and they needed a strong leader.

Within three months of these bombings,

Boris Yeltsin conferred the office of President on Vladimir Putin.

In the eight years between the collapse of the Soviet Union

and Putin taking the highest public office,

a new class of political figure had arisen - the Siloviki.

It was peopled by well-connected former KGB officers,

who had climbed over the old guard and assumed authority.

With Putin in the top job and these like-minded figures in support,

the Siloviki had become a formidable force.

With Putin in charge, well, actually, the KGB took over.

This is really a unique situation.

Well, in the old Soviet days,

the Soviet system was built on three pillars -

the Communist Party, the security services

and the military industrial complex.

With the collapse of the USSR, number one now is KGB,

with the president of the country

a former KGB officer from St Petersburg - I mean Mr Putin.

LAUCHLAN: When he found out that he was going to be made president,

just in the December of '99,

he gave a speech at the Lubyanka to the gathered KGB officers.

There's a round of applause and laughter afterward in the room,

but it's not entirely clear whether he was joking or not.

As an early demonstration of his authority,

Putin set about crushing Chechnya.

The West had been urging restraint.

But, after the apartment bombings, the gloves were off.

This new offensive was much better planned and executed

than Yeltsin's previous campaigns.

The enemy was no longer the Chechens -

this was the beginning of a war on terror.

Putin had boots on the ground there for the next 10 years.

SOLDATOV: Officially, the Second Chechen War was not a war -

it was a counter-terrorism operation.

And the thing is that when you have a counter-terrorism operation,

the primary role is, by definition,

given to the security services, not to the military.

Colonel Evgeny Petrushin served in the Second Chechen War.

He led an Alpha unit of Spetsnaz, or special forces.

They were established under the KGB

specifically for counter-terrorism operations.

Chechen fighters were no match for the Russian military.

Grozny was virtually razed to the ground.

But, in October 2002, the militants took the fight to Moscow.

(SIREN WAILS)

They attacked a theatre,

taking the cast, orchestra, and the entire audience hostage.

The gunmen demanded an end to the Chechen War,

which had been triggered by the apartment bombings three years before.

They threatened to blow up the theatre with 850 hostages inside.

A Russian journalist, Anna Politkovskaya,

was allowed in to try and negotiate terms.

Day and night, live images were beamed around the world.

Hostages made brief calls on their cell phones.

When two captives were executed,

the FSB were standing by, ready to mount an assault.

The terrorists had laid explosives round the theatre

and the women among them wore suicide vests.

The security forces had devised a strategy to minimise loss of life.

Before Colonel Petrushin and his FSB special forces crew went in,

anaesthetic gas, 1,000 times more potent than morphine,

had been piped into the building.

The idea was to subdue everyone inside.

After a brief firefight, all the terrorists were reported dead.

But evacuating and reviving the hostages proved difficult.

It was even made more challenging for the medics

because no-one would tell them which gas had been used.

The government says 130 hostages died.

But a public investigation set the figure at 174.

As he had promised in 1999, Putin now had justification

to crush the Chechen resistance for a generation.

He sent in his elite forces.

SOLDATOV: Special operation forces of the FSB,

they played much more important role because they were better trained.

Colonel Petrushin was dispatched for a second tour in Chechnya.

But, just like the apartment bombings,

the trigger for the new onslaught in Grozny, the theatre siege,

may not have been quite as it seemed.

Colonel Mikhail Trepashkin also finds it suspicious

that all the hostage takers were shot dead.

LAUCHLAN: What could they gain from keeping any of them alive?

A complicated trial, more chance for propaganda from the Chechen cause.

It's very inconvenient to have celebrity terrorists,

and that's the last thing they want.

An independent enquiry was launched into the theatre siege.

Of the six investigators involved,

one died in a hail of bullets in Moscow,

a second was poisoned,

and a third was murdered in her apartment building.

Mikhail Trepashkin was also one of the six.

He served four years in prison on trumped-up charges.

Still the most vocal of the surviving three,

he may be living on borrowed time.

(APPLAUSE)

In Putin's Russia,

anyone who raises their head above the parapet is in grave danger.

In 2003, the billionaire oligarchs

who had underwritten his ascent to the presidency

were summoned to St Catherine's Hall in the Kremlin.

Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the wealthiest of all the oligarchs,

took the opportunity to raise concerns about state corruption.

Putin was visibly angry,

and criticised Khodorkovsky's oil empire, Yukos.

Khodorkovsky was arrested soon after

and served a total of 10 years, mostly in a Siberian prison camp.

His business was seized,

and the oligarchs were left in no doubt who runs the country.

Journalists have also tried to hold the state to account.

Between the criminal world and the security services,

they stand little chance.

LAUCHLAN: They warn them before.

Then, when those warnings aren't heeded, they kill them.

And the murders are not there just to remove them,

though that is a factor -

it's there to send a message to the less bold journalists

that this is what faces you if you're as brave as that.

Yuri Shchekochikhin, who exposed KGB corruption

and vigorously opposed the Chechen War,

died in what can only be described as suspicious circumstances.

KALUGIN: In Russia, to be a real, free journalist

is a very risky business, it's a really risky life.

Another journalist, Anna Politkovskaya,

who had tried to negotiate a resolution to the theatre siege,

ignored warnings.

She championed human rights for minorities

and campaigned against the Chechen War.

She too was silenced brutally.

She died on Vladimir Putin's birthday.

No-one can say who ordered her execution.

Shchekochikhin and Politkovskaya both worked for Novaya Gazeta.

It's one of the last major independent newspapers in Russia -

most of the media is owned or controlled by the State.

Six of Novaya Gazeta's correspondents have met untimely deaths

in the era of the FSB,

yet no-one can say with certainty who was behind their deaths.

Mikhail Trepashkin is still alive,

but some inside the FSB wished otherwise.

He left the organisation in 1997

and has been a constant critic of corruption in the service ever since.

Some of his former colleagues still serving

secretly admire his stance,

and they've stayed his execution more than once.

In 1998, Colonel Alexander Litvinenko dropped by uninvited.

Litvinenko had been ordered to kill Trepashkin

but instead, he too rebelled.

Together with other FSB rebels, they held a press conference.

To no-one's surprise, the authorities moved against the rebels,

first arresting the spokesman, Litvinenko.

The runaway colonel was denounced as a traitor

and quite literally became a target of special forces.

Litvinenko's fatal error may have been

writing about Vladimir Putin's personal life.

KALUGIN: Putin and Litvinenko both were graduates of the KGB,

they knew each other.

And Litvinenko knew some parts of Putin's private life.

He would... He made them public.

And I warned him over the phone, calling from Washington,

I said "Alexander, you should not talk about Putin's private life

"because you may be in trouble.

"You do not understand who you are dealing with."

Six months later, Litvinenko was dead, poisoned by polonium.

The poison attack was a warning to others -

if you step out of line, there is no safe refuge.

Radioactive polonium destroyed Alexander Litvinenko

over 22 agonising days.

GILES: It's always supposed to have been part of the popular folklore

of the Soviet and ex-Soviet intelligence agencies

that defectors are dealt with

in the most painful and ruthless manner possible.

We hear the stories from the defectors during the 1980s

of how they would be shown videos

of traitors being fed feet-first into a furnace while still alive

in order to teach a lesson to everybody else.

No-one can be certain of those stories,

but the British public inquiry concluded that Litvinenko's murder

was probably approved by Nikolai Patrushev

and also President Putin.

It named the killers, Andrey Lugovoy and Dmitry Kovtun,

but Russia has always refused their extradition.

Viktor Yushchenko is one of the few who drank from the poisoned chalice

but lived to tell the tale.

CROWD: (CHANTS) Yushchenko! Yushchenko!

In the Autumn of 2004, these streets were thronging with his supporters

as he ran for President of Ukraine.

He hoped he might lead his country into NATO and the EU.

Yushchenko! Yushchenko!

Late one Sunday in September,

he was summoned to the deputy head of the Ukraine security service,

formerly the KGB.

After a short and rather frosty meeting,

they sat down for a meal together.

Yushchenko was driven home with a searing headache.

His wife was immediately alarmed.

Hours later, wracked with pain,

Yushchenko was rushed to a local clinic.

But, after exhaustive tests,

doctors still didn't know what was wrong.

Gravely concerned, the senior consultant advised him

to urgently seek specialist treatment abroad.

Yushchenko was flown by air ambulance to Austria.

The dioxin concentration in his body was 50,000 times higher than normal.

That last supper was obviously suspect,

but the entire catering crew evaded questioning.

Victor Yushchenko is lucky to be alive.

He went on to be President of Ukraine.

But his West-leaning policies were stymied.

Putin would never accept the NATO alliance on his doorstep,

not least because

he had his eye on Crimea.

Crimea was strategically valuable.

It had a Black Sea coastline

and until 1991 had been part of the Soviet Union.

The Tatars had enjoyed nation status under the government of Ukraine

but, in 2014, heavily armed men

in combat fatigues, but without insignia,

appeared on the streets.

These were Russian security service units,

together with Russians who'd settled in Ukraine,

asserting Russian authority.

Putin had annexed Crimea.

One year after the annexation of Crimea,

a protest march was organised in Moscow

by opposition leader Boris Nemtsov.

On the eve of the March,

Nemtsov was murdered within sight of the Kremlin.

He was shot four times,

in the head, heart, liver and stomach.

All the CCTV cameras in the area were switched off for maintenance.

The killers would need very high security clearance

to contrive a blackout so close to the Kremlin walls.

GILES: Russia is no longer concerned about its denials being plausible.

Russia no longer cares whether it is believed.

The Novichok poisoning of the Skripals

in Salisbury, England, is a striking example.

In 2018, two men, quickly identified as officers in the GRU,

a military branch of Russian security services,

were captured repeatedly on CCTV

in the vicinity of Sergei Skripal's home.

When named as suspects,

they claimed to have an interest in Salisbury Cathedral.

There doesn't seem to have been any effort put into

making these two individuals' cover story plausible.

In fact, if you look at what they are saying

about their movements in Salisbury,

it's almost as if they hadn't been shown the CCTV photographs

and their movements during that day that have already been established.

Because they're saying things that are completely incompatible

with what's already known.

Russian security services seem

to operate with impunity at home and abroad.

But there are limits.

A Lubyanka conversation was recounted to Oleg Kalugin

about his own survival.

KALUGIN: And he asked him, "How come Kalugin is still alive?"

And that Russian guy,

a top official, number three man in the Soviet KGB in the old days,

he said, and I quote,

"Had he lived in Europe, in Asia or elsewhere,

"He would have been dead a long time ago.

"But he lives in America. Sorry."

FSB assassins don't set foot on American soil,

and Russia is no match for America in economic terms.

But they do compete aggressively in other ways,

and they can do real damage in the virtual world.

A lot of people think that having a GDP the size of Spain is a huge disadvantage,

but this is one of those cases

where it doesn't matter how big it is, it's what you do with it.

If Russia is determined to use its national resources

to confront what it sees as its adversaries,

whether those adversaries are aware of it or not,

then it can do, it can exercise power,

it can create headaches for those countries that it's targeting.

The internet is an inexpensive weapon, with global penetration.

Russia has found that it can exploit the hyperconnectivity of the internet

and the speed at which conspiracy theories flourish

to set societies and target countries against each other.

The use of hackers, the use of the internet as a weapon,

weaponising social media,

all of these things are carried out by the FSB,

but through very informal networks,

because these informal networks are completely decentralised

and completely deniable.

Names including Cozy Bear, Office Monkey and Fancy Bear

have emerged as persistent cyber threats to US national security.

They have penetrated major institutions in the EU,

installing malware in banks, hospitals, power stations

and military facilities,

as well as diplomatic organisations and governments.

All have been associated with Russian intelligence.

There is no direct link back to who provided the orders,

because that is simply not how the Russian system works.

You will not be able to find a piece of paper that says,

"Yes, go and hack the US election."

Interference in the Brexit debate in Britain

and the US election process

are still under investigation.

No obtainable evidence can prove

that Russian interference changed any votes.

But James Clapper, the former Director of US National Intelligence,

said, "It stretches credulity

"to think that the Russians didn't turn the election."

Russia was sowing social discord

by pushing the extremist narratives at both ends,

setting off disputes, and seeing what would happen.

If you conduct an operation

with some very ambitious target, such as regime change,

but you fail at that and instead just stir the pot a little,

and weaken your adversary, disrupt its social cohesion,

weaken its societal resilience,

weaken its government, trust in authority, etc,

then that is still a bonus, as far as Russia is concerned.

Because, in their zero-sum view of security,

if you weaken your adversary even by a little,

that makes yourself, in relative terms, stronger.

This thinking, espoused long ago

by the founder of Lenin's security service, Iron Felix Dzerzhinsky,

has had a resurgence under Putin,

and his statue has been quietly restored

and now stands in a Moscow sculpture park.

APPLEBAUM: In order to understand today's Russia,

very important to understand the KGB mentality.

Because Putin, and the people around him, really,

a whole class of people who rule Russia, still have that mentality.

Any threat, any challenge, can never be considered loyal opposition,

you know, loyal criticism, people who want to make Russia better.

Any challenge is, by definition, treason.

Under Vladimir Putin, the KGB, or FSB as it's now called,

rules Russia with an iron rod directly from the Kremlin.

To challenge its authority,

even from apparent safety abroad,

means risking your life.

Over a century has passed

since Lenin established the organisation

as a temporary measure to defend the revolution.

But the KGB has even managed to outlive communism itself.

Today, Russia is no longer a state with a security service -

instead, the security service has a state.

Captions by Red Bee Media (c) SBS Australia 2021

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