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For the past century, Russian history
has also been the history of its security services.
They were used by the Soviet state to crush dissent.
Millions suffered at their hands.
But while many things may have changed in today's Russia,
its security network is arguably stronger than ever,
and the reason behind that
is the rise of a lowly, lieutenant-colonel
to president of this vast country.
I know the KGB better than anyone else
because I was part of the inside circle.
This is the story of the KGB,
told by its veterans
and its victims.
(LAUGHTER AND APPLAUSE)
(LAUGHTER AND APPLAUSE)
Such harmless jokes,
told openly in a Moscow comedy club today,
had to be shared very privately during the most repressive days
of the Soviet Union.
(STIRRING ORCHESTRAL MUSIC)
But the Soviets were projecting a very different image
through their propaganda.
Workers were shown striving together for common good.
(LIVELY ORCHESTRAL MUSIC)
In the 1920s and '30s, this view of a utopian society
also inspired communists in the West.
Some were even willing to collaborate with the Soviets,
against their own governments.
Nowhere would prove more important to Soviet intelligence
than a leafy English university town
just 80 kilometres north of the capital, London.
When the KGB looked at Cambridge,
I don't think they could believe their luck.
It was a very small establishment
where a very small number of people
were educated for all of the highest positions in British Government.
It was here, amongst what largely represented
the arrogant elite of the English class system,
that the Soviets recruited the most notorious spy ring in history...
..the Cambridge Five.
IAIN LAUCHLAN: So, this small group of people
were highly corruptible, highly recruitable.
Many of them were communists,
many of them had all kinds of vices which could be worked upon
and used against them in forms of blackmail.
Most of them were very eager as well to work for the Soviets.
They don't see, at this moment in time,
that they're lending help to a monstrous superpower.
They see themselves as helping out
a plucky, small, socialist state which is surrounded by enemies.
From 1940, these five Cambridge spies
began to leak details of an American project to build a superweapon -
something so powerful
that it would rock the world's military equilibrium.
So, when America detonated the world's first atomic bomb,
Stalin didn't flinch.
KGB spies were already supplying intelligence,
ensuring the Soviets would have their own bomb
in the shortest possible time.
MIKHAIL LYUBIMOV: There was a decision by Stalin
to concentrate on the atomic project,
and then there was this... the plans were made.
'Enormous', it was called.
Operation Enormous was run by
Stalin's security chief, Lavrentiy Beria.
Soon after the war,
the Soviets accelerated their own nuclear program.
The job of reverse-engineering fell to physicist Igor Kurchatov.
Each evening, Kurchatov would go to an office at the Lubyanka
to study papers gathered by spies in the West.
A team of secretaries transcribed and translated each new revelation.
Hard technical data was now supplied by scientist Klaus Fuchs,
a communist who had fled Nazi Germany in 1933.
He was a key contributor to the American bomb program
the Manhattan Project.
IAIN LAUCHLAN: Klaus Fuchs was committed to
helping the Soviets get the bomb,
more, in many ways, out of a sense of fairness
than out of a sense of loyalty to the Soviet state.
He didn't believe that this was a weapon
that should be possessed by the West alone.
In August 1949,
three trains raced across the Soviet Union,
towards the Kazakh Steppes, where the first test was planned.
One carried scientists and security personnel,
including Lavrentiy Beria.
Another carried soldiers.
And the last carried an atomic bomb -
almost an exact replica
of the American bomb which had destroyed Nagasaki.
IAIN LAUCHLAN: In the bunker in Kazakhstan,
while Beria and the scientists are waiting for the bomb to explode,
the scientists are nervously asking,
"What will happen if this doesn't work?"
And Beria jokes, "You'll all be shot."
Uh, they weren't quite clear whether he was joking or not.
They may well have been shot.
More likely, they would have ended up in a Gulag
and be working, still, on the atomic program.
The glory of the Soviet Union now rested on one moment.
It was 29th of August, 1949.
When the news broke, the West was in shock.
The question reverberated around the world -
how could they have caught up so quickly?
"Does Russia have the atomic bomb?
Please, please, please, excuse me...
And even today, disputes remain
as to whether it was the scientists or the spies
who played the major part.
Though Russian scientists would go on to develop their own nuclear weapons,
it was the NKVD's spy network
that first delivered the Soviet Union superpower status.
Fuchs was always revered by the KGB.
These unique pictures were taken in a Berlin cemetery
by the East German secret police in the 1980s.
They show one of the KGB's top spy masters, Aleksandr Feklisov,
honouring the grave
of the spy he ran,
whom he still regarded
as one of the Soviet Union's greatest heroes.
Foreign spies had put Russia on a par with the United States -
Stalin's highest ambition.
Stalin believed, first of all,
that the Soviet Union had to be feared and had to be powerful.
After that, he could focus on building houses
and raising the standard of living.
Military spending soared
while across the country, there were shortages of almost everything.
But the Russians could turn even nuclear war
into a joke about life's struggle as a Soviet citizen.
(LAUGHTER AND APPLAUSE)
Operation Enormous was a great success
for NKVD chief Lavrentiy Beria.
A handful of well-placed agents
had transformed the Soviet Union into a superpower.
('FUNERAL MARCH' BY CHOPIN PLAYS)
When Stalin died in 1953,
it seemed likely that his successor would be Lavrentiy Beria.
Under his stewardship,
the intelligence service had helped transform the Soviet Union
into a nation powerful enough to rival the American military might.
Every bit the leader,
Beria addressed the crowds at Stalin's funeral.
But he hadn't reckoned with the ambition of the man on his left -
Nikita Khrushchev,
another high-ranking party-official.
Within weeks, Khrushchev mounted a coup and assumed power,
much to Beria's surprise.
Beria was unaware that Khrushchev had garnered the support of the army -
the only force more powerful than his own.
It was a fatal oversight.
Khrushchev had him arrested on charges of working for the enemy.
What happened next remains a mystery.
IAIN LAUCHLAN: The official version, then, is that Beria
is put on trial and executed.
One of the strange things about this
is that there are no official arrest photos of Beria
in the archives that we've seen.
So, we have the word of Khrushchev to take for it
that Beria is put on trial in December of 1953, and executed then.
One way or another, Beria was now gone.
Khrushchev's next move
was to reduce the power of the security services at home,
reigning in its powers of suppression.
For those loyal servants inside the KGB, Khrushchev was a traitor.
For others, it was the welcome arrival
of a leader who appeared to believe in greater freedom.
Khrushchev set out to reposition the Communist Party
as the true defender of the people.
Despite orders from the top
to show more leniency towards political dissent,
the security forces soon found other, more discreet ways
to punish prisoners.
Both these men served time here for anti-Soviet activities,
but they had very different experiences.
Ivan Mamchur was here under Stalin, and then Khrushchev.
Zorian Popadiuk was here 30 years later.
The prison system was less draconian when Zorian Popadiuk was here.
But intimidation was still routine.
As if prison life here wasn't terrifying enough,
Mamchur was sent to the Kengir prison camp in Kazakhstan.
In 1954, prompted by Stalin and Beria's death the previous year
and the promise of reform under Khrushchev,
inmates here and at other camps
began to demand their basic rights.
When these simple requests were rejected,
the prisoners took over the camp.
After 40 days, Moscow finally sent in tanks and soldiers.
Six of the rebel leaders were executed.
But Khrushchev quickly realised the need for urgent reform.
Mamchur was released,
along with thousands of others impatient for a new era.
Khrushchev was bringing a lighter touch to domestic policy.
But on the world stage, he was highly confrontational.
The Cold War reached its height in 1962,
when the world was brought closer than ever to total destruction.
Ironically, it was the KGB
which would help pull it back from the brink.
Nikita Khrushchev knew, from his spies,
that America had secretly deployed nuclear weapons on mainland Europe,
directly targeting the Soviet Union.
Khrushchev met threat with counter-threat in America's backyard.
The Soviets placed their missiles on the Cuban territory.
And in the United States, they learned about it.
In a story untold until today,
a chance meeting between a KGB agent and a young woman
alerted Moscow that America was on to them.
I was, in some way, involved in that Cuban Missile Crisis.
He was a radio correspondent in New York at the time.
That was his cover.
I bumped into a young lady and I invited her to have a drink,
and then she told me that she has a lover.
"He's a US Air force reconnaissance pilot.
"He's now on a flight to Cuba."
I said, "Oh, really?
"Could you give me his schedule,
"so we'll meet in the meantime, then?
"While he's flying, we'll get together."
And she said, "OK," and she provided me with the schedule.
So, that was a simple intelligence operation.
Kalugin reported immediately to Moscow Centre.
Kennedy mounted a naval blockade of Cuba
and went public, warning the Soviets
that if any rocket was fired from Cuba,
US strikes would be swift and certain.
OLEG KALUGIN: For the first time in my life, I thought
maybe tomorrow, the day after tomorrow,
there'll be a major, you know, nuclear attack - I mean, mutual -
and we will all die.
At the height of the crisis,
the KGB's most important agent in Washington, Aleksandr Feklisov,
set up a secret communications channel
between the White House and Moscow Centre.
Kennedy has filtered, through this source, a compromise agreement
where they offer an honourable stand-down for the Soviet Union
to remove their nuclear weapons
and the Americans guarantee that they will not invade Cuba.
Kennedy also agreed
to withdraw American nuclear missiles from Turkey.
With time running out and both sides arming their warheads,
Feklisov raced back to the Soviet Embassy in Washington
to send news of the offer
from a secret communications room in the basement.
Moscow accepted Kennedy's terms.
Nuclear war was narrowly averted.
Aleksandr Feklisov lies in a Moscow cemetery.
Few who pass by will know that he played a vital role
in saving the world from nuclear war.
The Soviets had achieved stalemate with America
because their network of foreign spies
helped arm them and kept them informed.
The Cambridge Five moles
had all risen through the ranks of the British civil service.
One of them, Kim Philby,
was, by now, Chief of British intelligence in America.
He was actually training recruits to be deployed in Moscow,
only to betray them,
leading to their inevitable execution.
It simply didn't occur to his bosses in London
that one of their own kind could ever be a spy.
Philby's membership of the establishment,
its clubs, the right schools, the right institutions,
his family background,
he was "one of us".
This was key to his hiding in plain sight.
People also couldn't believe that he would be a spy
because it was so audacious.
He had a well-recorded past as a communist sympathiser.
He was so open about his previous flirtation with communism
that people didn't think it was possible.
When two of the five were at risk of exposure,
Philby was able to warn them and they defected to Moscow.
When he fell under suspicion himself,
he displayed extraordinary bravado,
holding a press conference in his mother's London home.
The last time I spoke to a communist,
knowing that he was a communist,
was some time in 1934.
A sheen of sweat is quite visible on his face.
He keeps using his tongue to lick his back teeth.
Any student of body language
could see this was a man squirming and lying
and, yet, at the same time,
the accent the smile, the charm, were all on full display.
MIKHAIL LYUBIMOV: Philby was not a traitor, of course.
He was an inspiration, a hero.
He was informing us a lot.
Mikhail Lyubimov, a KGB colonel and spymaster,
knew Kim Philby well.
Philby was a very nice man,
he was a dedicated old-time communist,
completely different from the communists
who were in the Soviet Union.
Philby failed to cast off suspicion
and in 1963, after a tip-off that he was about to be arrested,
he fled to Moscow.
But he'd been too used to the high life in the West.
Now he was in for a shock.
For him, life in Soviet Russia was mundane.
The first time I met Philby, he was, um....hmm...
..drunk.
And, unfortunately, that was his problem,
but he had nothing to do else
and he would drink and reminisces about the old days.
Luckily, former KGB general Oleg Kalugin
understood what Philby was going through.
He'd spent almost a decade himself spying in America.
When Kalugin became head of counter-intelligence in Moscow,
he had to find ways to keep his most illustrious spy onside.
I made several arrangements for him.
Among those arrangements,
Kalugin organised soirees to overcome Philby's loneliness.
Young Russian women were introduced.
Of course, some of the ladies would be instructed
to get in touch with him.
That really made him back to life again.
Once again enjoying his private life,
Philby would go on to serve the KGB as a trainer.
(APPLAUSE)
As late as 1981,
he was filmed briefing the East German secret police, the Stasi,
on his penetration of British intelligence.
He coolly outlines the routine tradecraft,
delivering classified documents to his Soviet handler.
(APPLAUSE)
But the valuable Cambridge network was now history.
It would be 20 years before Moscow had another source
the same calibre as Kim Philby.
Soviet intelligence had its fair share of high-stakes drama.
But espionage sometimes drifts into farce.
Colonel Mikhail Lyubimov recalls a seduction
that didn't quite go to plan.
The American girl,
who was considered to be a CIA girl...
..and, uh, I was put to live in the wonderful, posh hotel in Moscow
where she stayed too.
A tiny camera had been concealed in the wall,
behind an open-backed chair.
The footage would be used to blackmail the CIA operative.
And then we started making love,
and, uh, quite suddenly, a telephone rings,
just at the peak, I would say, of this wonderful session.
And my KGB man, he says,
"Move the chair, put away the chair."
When undressing, I put all my clothes on the chair
and the chair just closed the view of this wonderful scene.
The moment was lost and the woman escaped the trap.
(RUSSIAN DANCE MUSIC PLAYS)
If KGB agents themselves were compromised,
they'd been taught how to deal with it.
I taught my subordinates that if they are in trouble
or in a situation
when they are confronted with some documents or pictures,
tell the guys that..."Oh, wonderful!
"Could you give me copies and I'll give it to my friends?"
Disarm them by your willingness to accept that.
Don't feel scared. That's it.
Oleg Kalugin's boss at the Lubyanka, Yuri Andropov,
understood better than anyone
the KGB's power to exploit people's weaknesses.
He had been appointed by Khrushchev's successor, Leonid Brezhnev in 1967.
Andropov was determined to restore the KGB
to what he believed was its rightful place,
at the controls of Soviet society.
To cast the service in a better light,
Andropov commissioned movies and novels
featuring daring agents infiltrating Nazi high command.
All for the glory of Mother Russia.
At the same time as rebranding the service,
Andropov set about reversing many of the freedoms gained under Khrushchev.
He was a hardliner through and through.
ANNE APPLEBAUM: Andropov believed
that any element of dissent, anything,
could eventually lead to something much bigger.
In 1968, Czechoslovakia, an ally of the USSR,
seemed to be drifting away from Soviet-style communism.
The 'Prague Spring' gave rise to hopes for more freedom.
Hardliner Andropov used agent provocateurs
to plant arms caches as proof of a Western-backed conspiracy,
then used this as a pretext for invasion.
Oleg Kalugin received a secure cable in Washington.
By now, he'd risen to chief of KGB station there.
The message amounted to a diplomatic bombshell.
It said that "Tomorrow, the troops of the Warsaw Pact
"will enter Czechoslovakia
"to crush the counter-revolutionary, Western-sponsored..."
..you know, revolt.
"Please inform the Ambassador
"and prepare for potential troubles around the Embassy."
The Soviet ambassador was Anatoly Dobrynin,
a genial diplomat,
as popular with the Americans as he was at home.
I called the Ambassador and showed him the cable from Moscow.
I was really risking my reputational career.
I said, "Fools."
But the Ambassador's reaction was totally unexpected.
He said, "Idiots."
That was Ambassador Dobrynin's reaction
to Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.
(SHOUTING)
If the Americans had intercepted that cable,
Czech history might have taken a different turn.
Russian humour suggests that it wasn't only the Czechs
that yearned for more liberal times.
(LAUGHTER)
In August 1968,
Soviet forces crushed the reformist movement in Czechoslovakia.
OLEG KALUGIN: The Prague Spring was really a sad event.
Quite a few people were disgusted by the fact
that the Soviets viewed Czechoslovakia
as if it was part of the Soviet Union.
The invasion
and the suppression of the reformist movement in Czechoslovakia
asserted the Soviets' claim of dominance over Eastern Europe.
Everything concerning the Soviet Union
was now viewed through the prism of human rights.
In 1975, after international negotiations,
the Soviet Union agreed to sign up to a diplomatic agreement
called the Helsinki Accords,
which included respect for human rights.
Sceptic dissidents promptly founded the Helsinki Group,
to report to the West when the Soviets flouted the agreement.
Myroslav Marynovych was among the founders.
He remembers the intimidation he suffered at the hands of the KGB.
MYROSLAV MARYNOVYCH: As soon as I came out from the house...
(CAR ENGINE STARTS) ..the car
that was standing nearby
switched on the light
and I was going in the light of...of a car.
And I immediately understood the message.
"You are under control already."
They followed us everywhere.
When intimidation didn't stop him,
Marynovich was arrested
and sentenced to seven years at Perm-36,
one of the most notorious Siberian labour camps.
Amongst many activists there was Semyon Gluzman.
But KGB chief Andropov applied another method of repression,
more feared, even, than the Gulag.
One of the means he used to undermine dissidents
was to lock them up not into prisons but into psychiatric institutions
and this was done, um, partly from a PR point of view.
Andropov cared a great deal, from the very beginning to the end,
how it was perceived by the outside world
and wanted to tell people, "Look, we don't have political prisoners.
"We just have nutty people who, for their own...
"..because of their own mental illness,
"don't appreciate the greatness of our party.
At the Serbsky Psychiatric Institute in Moscow,
dissidents were diagnosed with an invented condition -
'sluggish schizophrenia'.
Sluggish schizophrenia is certainly
a very shameful episode
in the history of Soviet psychiatry,
as it is the psychiatrists themselves
that come up with this concept in the early 1960s.
Effectively, if someone didn't believe in Soviet values,
then they must be mad.
Gluzman was a psychiatrist himself,
and it was his denunciation of the practice
that got him sent to Perm-36 in the first place.
In Siberia, he was inspired by a fellow inmate
to write an expose of life for psychiatric patients.
The work had to be smuggled out one chapter at a time.
But the writing was already on the wall for the Soviet Union.
The number of dissidents was growing rapidly,
and the economy was stagnating.
IAN LAUCHLAN: The Soviet State was very good at the old technologies - coal, steel.
But with plastics, new chemicals, but particularly computers,
the Soviet Union was falling behind the West at an astonishing rate.
The last thing they needed
was to get sucked into a war they could ill afford.
Neighbouring Afghanistan had long been a client state of the USSR.
But in 1979, internal unrest made the Afghan communist regime
seem dangerously unstable.
To secure their influence,
the Soviets sent in the troops,
with KGB units and regular forces
taking on a guerilla army on its own territory.
(RAPID GUNFIRE)
The Soviet leadership made the basic mistake
of seeing its military superiority
as the key to its success in Afghanistan,
and it didn't think about the fact, though,
"Was it willing to pay the price of a long, drawn-out war?"
When the Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan
after 10 years of bitter war,
15,000 of their soldiers lay dead
and their economy was in tatters.
But at the height of the war, in 1985,
a spark of hope emerged
in the shape of President Mikhail Gorbachev.
He introduced reform, known as 'perestroika'.
ANNE APPLEBAUM: I think the security officials were the people
who understood the country the best.
They...actually, it's thought to have been the KGB
who were the leading voices in perestroika originally,
because they understood exactly how far behind the Soviet Union was
and how much it needed to do to catch up with the West.
Soon after Gorbachev took power,
the world suffered its greatest-ever nuclear disaster.
On the 26th of April, 1986,
Chernobyl's nuclear reactor suffered a power surge,
releasing lethal radiation.
Yet it was a catastrophe the KGB had tried to prevent.
As a consequence, the entire city of Pripyat,
less than 100 kilometres from Kiev,
had to be evacuated.
Andriy Kohut, director of the KGB archive in Kiev,
has uncovered alarming safety alerts
raised by KGB agents long before the catastrophe occurred.
After the meltdown,
neighbouring countries quickly detected a massive radiation leak.
Still, the Soviet authorities didn't warn their own population
and ordered the Kiev May Day celebrations
must go ahead as planned.
18 days elapsed
before President Gorbachev publicly acknowledged the disaster.
The true figures are wildly different.
The Chernobyl Museum in Kiev
commemorates the thousands affected by this entirely avoidable calamity,
many of them children.
Chernobyl had been a disaster for the Soviet Union.
Internally, the system was failing.
It seemed only a matter of time before it collapsed.
But in the war of spies, the KGB had just pulled off
the greatest single recruitment coup in its long history.
Something had gone terribly wrong
within the US intelligence community.
Our sources, our assets,
were being recalled to Moscow and being executed.
The KGB had a mole somewhere at the very top of the CIA.
No-one had a clue who he was.
The value of the information he provided - tremendous.
And they understood that the KGB
really could do tremendous things, yeah.
In line with protocol,
his name was only known by a very close circle inside the KGB.
I supervised hundreds of foreign assets
and I practically did not know a single name,
unless those who I recruited myself.
But otherwise, I didn't know name,
and if I would ask a name, there would be suspicion.
"Why does he want to know the name? That's suspicious."
You don't have to know the name. You have to know his codename.
Codenamed Nightmover,
the mole was causing immense damage,
with over 20 key Soviet assets working for the Americans
either imprisoned or executed.
Whoever he was, FBI investigators
knew he had to be stopped, and quickly.
DELL SPRY: The damage was incredible.
He gave up all of our technical programs
that we were running against the Russians.
But in addition to that,
he gave up information on, for example, our satellite programs.
He would get that information, pass it to the Russians.
Information on acoustic programs for our submarines,
he would pass that information to the Russians.
Anything that he could touch. Anything he could get his hands on.
Many agents fell under suspicion,
but not Aldrich Ames.
Since 1983, he had been senior counter-intelligence officer
in the CIA's Soviet Division.
Just like Kim Philby, he was hiding in plain sight.
But unlike Philby, Ames was no political idealist.
The Russians use an English acronym
to describe the motivations for any spy working for them.
MICE was the word -
for money, ideology, compromising material and ego.
And, clearly, money and ego
were the prime recruiting weapons
in the 1980s in the USA.
When at last he was questioned, 'Rick', as he was known,
passed two polygraph tests.
But his flashy lifestyle betrayed him.
DELL SPRY: All of a sudden, Rick is wearing Armani suits to work.
He's driving a Jaguar.
He's got, you know, Italian leather shoes.
And it just doesn't fit within a GS-13 salary.
The FBI examined Ames's life, looking for any scrap of evidence.
DELL SPRY: As unseemly as it sounds,
we dug through the man's trash.
Sifting through the rubbish from Ames's suburban home in Virginia,
one of the FBI team
found shredded remnants of a note
from Ames to his KGB handlers.
DELL SPRY: And he says, you know, "Guys, I think I've got something here."
There was an operational message telling the KGB,
"Either you guys didn't leave a signal or I just can't see it."
Now, armed with the evidence,
the FBI was closing in.
In 1994, nine years after his first contact with the KGB,
Ames's car was intercepted near his home.
DELL SPRY: I grabbed his arms, put them behind his back,
put the cuffs on him, told him he was under arrest for espionage.
Then we took off.
Unlike most of those he betrayed,
Ames's life was spared,
and he is now serving a life sentence with no possibility of parole.
After a lifetime battling America's enemies,
Dell Spry can't hide his admiration for his old adversaries, the KGB.
I did respect them.
I wanted to learn from the KGB - their tradecraft.
One lesson from the Ames case
was that the KGB's most valued tradecraft tool was its people.
You may have thousands of gadgets and high...high technology.
Humans are the ones who stand behind everything.
For 70 years, the KGB had been
a loyal servant to the Communist Party.
But in a post-Soviet era,
the security services would need a new champion.
He would arrive in the shape of
a little-known agent from St Petersburg,
and under his leadership,
the KGB would become more powerful than ever.
Captions by Red Bee Media (c) SBS Australia 2021
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