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Zulu
There is a number that requires no
context or explanation, 330,000.
That is the number of soldiers that the
6th German Army had with them when they
crossed the Don River in the summer of
1942 marching toward a city on the banks
of the Volga that bore the name of the
man Adolf Hitler hated the most. 330,000
soldiers with 3 years of consecutive
victories etched into their bodies, men
who had crossed all of Europe without
knowing defeat, who had destroyed entire
armies and captured hundreds of
thousands of prisoners in encirclement
maneuvers that history books still study
with awe.
The forging of a war machine, origin and
doctrine of the 6th Army. The 6th Army
was formally established in October 1939
just weeks after the end of the Polish
campaign.
It did not emerge from nowhere. It was
the reorganization of the 10th Army,
which had fought on that first front of
the war, transferred to the west on
October 10th, 1939
and renamed under the command of General
der Infanterie Walter von Reichenau.
But to understand what this army really
was, what made it different from any
other formation of its size in the world
at that time, it is necessary to go even
further back to the very nature of the
doctrine [music] that animated it and to
the men that doctrine had produced.
Germany had gone from having an army of
100,000 men, the limit imposed by the
Treaty of Versailles in 1919, to
deploying millions of soldiers in less
than a decade.
This transformation was logistical and
industrial, but also and above all
doctrinal.
The army that Versailles had left alive,
the Reichswehr of 100,000 men, was
paradoxically the laboratory where the
ideas that would transform it were
incubated. Deprived of the possibility
of having tanks, military aviation, and
heavy artillery, the officers of the
Reichswehr spent the 1920s studying.
They studied the war they had just lost,
sought the reasons for the German
collapse in 1918, analyzed the armored
experiments of the British and the
French, and arrived at conclusions that
their European rivals took decades to
assimilate.
But there was something even more
fundamental, something that is often
omitted when describing the German army
of that era, the Auftragstaktik, the
mission tactic.
Its history is older than the 20th
century. Its roots lie in the Prussian
military reforms of the first half of
the 19th century, in the thought of
Clausewitz, and in the operational
practice of Marshall Helmuth von Moltke
the Elder during the wars of German
unification.
Auftragstaktik started from a premise
that its rivals found difficult to
accept, the battlefield is inherently
chaotic and unpredictable, and any
detailed plan begins to degrade the
moment contact is made with the enemy.
Consequently, the solution was not to
plan in greater detail, but to train
officers at all levels to act with
initiative within the framework of the
overall objectives assigned.
In the German army of 1939 to 1942, a
battalion commander who identified an
opportunity on the battlefield had not
only the authority, but the obligation
to act on it without waiting for orders
from above.
They were assigned a goal, take that
village, cross that river, neutralize
that battery, not a method. Initiative
was a cardinal virtue.
A commander who awaited detailed
instructions when the situation changed
was considered a failure, regardless of
their rank. A commander who acted
without orders, but correctly identified
the superior objective and contributed
to its achievement was [music] praised,
even if they had violated the letter of
the plan.
This culture produced middle commanders
capable of [music] making quick and
correct decisions under pressure, which
made German units move with a speed and
coordination that their enemies took
years to understand and even longer to
imitate.
The training system that produced these
officers was equally demanding. The
Kriegsakademie, the war academy,
selected its candidates through a series
of tests that lasted months and
evaluated not only tactical and
operational knowledge, but the ability
to reason under pressure, clarity in
written expression, geographical and
logistical understanding, and
independent judgment.
The selected officers spent years
learning to write concise orders, to
analyze complex tactical situations, and
to understand the perspective of both
higher and lower levels simultaneously.
The result was a core of professional
officers whose technical competence was
in the period 1939 to 1942
unparalleled in the world.
The Sixth Army absorbed this philosophy
from its birth under von Reichenau.
Walter von Reichenau was born in 1884 in
Karlsruhe, the son of a Prussian
general.
He was a man who embodied the
contradictions of the German officer of
that era, a brilliant strategist, a
convinced military technocrat, a
rigorous athlete, running marathons and
practicing extreme sports at an age when
his colleagues played chess in the
officers casino, and at the same time
one of the most ideologically committed
officers to the Nazi regime within the
high command.
Unlike most of his aristocratic peers,
von Reichenau had actively cultivated
his relationship with Hitler since the
early 1930s and had served as an
intermediary between the party and the
army during the rise to power. His
ideology was documented in the Scharfer
Befehl, the Order of Severity, which he
issued on October 10th, 1941 for the
Sixth Army, instructing his men on what
he described as the duty to exterminate
the Jewish Asiatic threat and to
consider Soviet political commissars as
representatives of a subhumanity that
did not deserve the protection of the
laws of war.
The document was distributed on the
Eastern Front at Hitler's request, who
presented it as a model for the other
army commanders.
It was one of the first official
documents in which a field commander
articulated genocide as part of the
ordinary military mission.
The Sixth Army units delivered captured
Jews and commissars to the
Einsatzgruppen and the Feldgendarmerie,
as occurred in the Kiev region in
September 1941, including the massacre
at Babi Yar, where more than 33,000
people were killed in two days.
But his tactical influence on the Sixth
Army was equally real and profound. He
established a culture of initiative at
the intermediate command level, of rapid
decision-making, of sustained aggression
that would persist long after he left
command.
The officers of the Sixth Army learned
that slowness was a vice and audacity a
virtue, that the momentum of combat was
an asset lost the moment the advance was
stopped, and that uncertainty was never
an excuse for inaction.
That culture would take the Sixth Army
from Poland to Kiev, and from Kiev to
the banks of the Volga.
It would also be, in the decisive hours
of the Stalingrad encirclement, the
culture that Paulus did not embody and
that his army urgently needed. The
organizational structure that the Sixth
Army would have at its peak was
generally composed of four army corps,
the Eighth Army Corps, the Eleventh Army
Corps, the Fourteenth [music] Panzer
Corps, and the Fifty-first Army Corps.
The most powerful corps in terms of
maneuverability was the Fourteenth
Panzer Corps, led by General der
Panzertruppe Hans Valentin Hube, which
grouped the armored and motorized
divisions, the Third Motorized Infantry
Division, the Sixtieth Motorized
Infantry Division, the Ninety-fourth
Infantry Division, the Sixteenth Panzer
Division, and eventually fractions of
the Fourteenth and Twenty-fourth.
These formations were sharp edge of the
army, capable of advancing 40 or 50 km
in a day across open terrain, bypassing
enemy positions, and sowing chaos in the
rear.
The infantry corps provided the mass and
sustained combat capability, securing
terrain, reducing defensive positions,
eliminating pockets left by the armored
cavalry behind them.
This was further complemented by
integration with the Luftwaffe,
particularly with the 8th Fliegerkorps
under General Leutnant Martin Fiebig,
which assigned two 87 Stuka dive bombers
and fighter bombers for close air
support to ground units with speed and
effectiveness that no other army in the
world had been able to perfect. The
Stuka pilots supporting the 6th Army
during the years of victories brought
vertical warfare to the battlefield,
attacking enemy artillery, destroying
bridges over rivers, and disrupting
armored concentrations before they
reached the front.
The communication system coordinating
those attacks with Luftwaffe liaison
officers embedded in the headquarters of
the ground corps was the invisible
backbone of that combined power.
All of this, the doctrine, the men, the
structure, the integration with
aviation, was what made the 6th Army
unprecedented in German military
history, and at that time in world
military history.
It was a war machine fine-tuned by three
years of real combat, by victories that
confirmed the validity of its founding
principles, and by the accumulated
experience of hundreds of thousands of
men who had learned to function together
under fire.
That accumulated experience, that
capital of tactical competence and
institutional cohesion,
was an asset that could not be
manufactured in a factory or delivered
through replacement reinforcements.
It could only be earned in combat, and
once lost, it could not be recovered.
Barbarossa, the 6th Army on the Eastern
Front.
On June 22nd, 1941, along a front of
more than 3,000 km, Germany launched the
most ambitious operation in its military
history, the invasion of the Soviet
Union.
For this campaign, the Sixth Army was
assigned to the Southern Army Group
under the command of General Field
Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt.
Its mission was to advance from Southern
Poland and Ukraine toward the Donbas and
the Caucasus, the industrial and
oil-rich regions that Hitler considered
essential to sustain the German war
machine in the long term.
What they found upon crossing the Soviet
border was not what many had expected,
though not for the reasons one might
assume. The Red Army of 1941 was in a
state of deep crisis. Stalin's purges
between 1937 and 1938 had literally
decapitated its officer corps. Thousands
of generals, colonels, and experienced
commanders had been executed or sent to
forced labor camps.
The units that faced the Germans in the
early days of Barbarossa were often
poorly led, poorly communicated, and in
tactically inadequate positions.
The results were catastrophic for the
Soviets. The Sixth Army, along with
armored units from the First Panzer
Group under the command of Ewald von
Kleist, participated in a series of
encirclement battles that rank among the
largest in military history.
In the Battle of Kiev in September 1941,
the forces of Army Group South closed a
giant pocket around four entire Soviet
armies from the Southwestern Front
commanded by General Polkovnik Mikhail
Kirponos.
The number of prisoners captured
exceeded 600,000 men. There is no
comparable precedent in the documented
history of modern warfare.
The Sixth Army was an integral part of
this maneuver. Its infantry divisions
closed the flanks of the encirclement,
withstood desperate Soviet [music]
breakout attempts from both inside and
outside, and held the pressure for weeks
in an open plain terrain crisscrossed
with rivers and ravines that offered
little natural cover.
"I don't know how many there were," an
infantry officer from the Sixth Army who
served during that period would recall
decades later.
"Endless columns for days. They marched
westward with almost no one guarding
them because we simply didn't have
enough soldiers to escort them all."
But the triumph at Kiev was also, though
no one saw it that way at the time, a
trap.
Germany was winning battles of epic
proportions while time was running out.
The 1941 campaign had begun in June with
the expectation of a victory within
weeks.
By October, the Red Army had suffered
losses that would have destroyed any
other army on the planet, and yet it
still existed. It was still receiving
reinforcements from the Urals and
Siberia. It was still fighting.
Winter arrived.
The German advance came to a halt at the
gates of Moscow.
For the Sixth Army, that first Soviet
winter was a test unlike anything that
had come before.
The men who had crossed Western Europe
in a glorious summer now found
themselves in temperatures of 40° below
zero without proper winter gear holding
defensive positions against Soviet
counterattacks that came at night in the
silence of the snowfall.
German logistics, designed for a short
war, groaned under the weight of a
campaign that wouldn't end.
"The cold was unlike anything I had
imagined," wrote a soldier of the Sixth
Army in a letter that didn't reach its
destination until after the war.
"It's not that it was cold and that was
it. It was that the cold changed
everything. Rifles jammed, engines
wouldn't start, my feet stopped hurting
because I couldn't feel them anymore.
I knew that was worse, not better."
And yet, the Sixth Army survived that
winter. It absorbed the losses, held its
lines, and entered the spring of 1942
still as a functional and combative
force.
Many German units on the Eastern Front
were so decimated during that first
winter that they had to be disbanded or
reformed practically from scratch.
The Sixth Army arrived battered but
structurally intact. Its chain of
command functioned. Its elite divisions
maintained their cohesion. Its
operational capacity was real.
And yet, the Sixth Army survived that
winter. It absorbed the losses, held its
lines, and entered the spring of 1942
still as a functional and combative
force.
Many German units on the Eastern Front
were so decimated during that first
winter that they had to be disbanded or
reformed practically from scratch.
The Sixth Army arrived battered but
structurally intact.
>> [music]
>> Its chain of command functioned. Its
elite divisions maintained their
cohesion.
Its operational capacity was real.
The man and the army, Friedrich Paulus
takes [music] command.
On January 12th, 1942, something
happened that would change the fate of
the Sixth Army in ways no one could have
foreseen at the time.
General Field Marshal Walter von
Reichenau suffered a collapse while on
his morning run in Poltava. The doctors
diagnosed him with a massive cerebral
embolism.
He was flown to Leipzig where he died on
January 17th.
The man who replaced him at the helm of
the Sixth Army was his former chief of
staff, General der Panzertruppe
Friedrich Wilhelm Ernst Paulus.
The choice of Paulus was neither
accidental nor improvised.
>> [music]
>> Von Reichenau himself had suggested him
to Hitler shortly before his death,
convinced that his former collaborator
was the most capable of the available
candidates. Halder himself, chief of
staff of the OKH, had supported Paulus's
candidacy during the January 1942
crisis. When Paulus had helped maintain
the coherence of command in the most
pressured sectors [music] of the Eastern
Front during the Soviet counteroffensive
that winter, he had the backing of the
system. He had the trust of the men who
held the power within the German High
Command. What he did not have, and what
no one within that system seemed to
value enough at that moment, was the
experience of leading in actual combat
at the operational level.
Friedrich Paulus was born on September
23rd, 1890 in Guxhagen, a small town in
what is now the state of Hesse.
He was the son of Friedrich August
Paulus, a school treasurer with no noble
pretensions, and Bertha Lindena.
He came from a non-aristocratic family,
a detail relevant in an army where the
prefix von opened doors, although his
movements and demeanor gave him a
distinction that led many to mistake him
for an aristocrat.
He had attempted to join the Imperial
Navy as a cadet without success, and
briefly studied law at the University of
Marburg before finally finding his way
in the 111th Infantry Regiment of Baden
in 1910 as a cadet officer.
He married Elena Rosetti Solescu in
1912, a descendant of a Romanian
aristocratic family, whose social
presence and ambition reinforced in him
an awareness of his position. He fought
in World War I as a junior officer on
the Western and Eastern fronts and in
the Balkans with mountain hunter units.
He ended that war with the rank of
captain [music] and a solid reputation
as a meticulous officer with
organizational brilliance.
During the Weimar period, he was
selected for the small group of officers
who would remain in the 100,000 man
Reichswehr, which itself was a
certificate of professional quality.
Within that restricted framework, he
perfected the skills that would define
him, analyzing complex situations,
drafting precise orders, and
understanding logistics deeply, as well
as the relationships between the various
elements of combined arms.
In the 1930s, with the rearmament of
Germany, [music] Paulus rapidly rose
through the ranks of the General Staff.
In 1935, he was appointed Chief of Staff
of Guderian's Panzergruppe,
participating from that position in the
development of the tactical principles
of the German armored force.
In 1938, he was promoted to
Generalmajor. In 1939 and 1940, as
Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the
OKH, he participated in the planning of
the first military campaigns, Poland,
Norway, France, and the initial
preparation for Barbarossa.
His war game maps were legendary in
their accuracy. His Lagebeurteilungen,
situation assessments, were models of
the genre. The men who worked for him
respected him with an admiration that
bordered on religious awe for someone
who seemed to have eliminated human
error from the military planning
equation.
What those same men noticed with less
enthusiasm, though they rarely voiced
it, was the difference between planning
an operation and conducting it.
Paulus had never commanded a unit larger
than a battalion in actual combat before
receiving the Sixth Army. His direct
command experience was that of a company
and battalion officer in World War I.
Everything he had done after that had
been in the realm of the General Staff,
where the primary virtue was the
precision of analysis and where the
consequences of an erroneous judgment
could be corrected on paper before they
cost lives.
In field command, the consequence of a
wrong assessment was measured in dead
men before the next dawn.
His arrival at the command of the Sixth
Army on January 20th, 1942, coincided
with one of the most difficult moments
for the German forces on the Eastern
Front.
The Soviet counteroffensive of winter
1941 to 1942, launched in December by
Marshal Zhukov, had pushed the forces of
Army Group Center to the west and
created pockets of German units holding
out in isolated towns.
The sector of Army Group South, where
the Sixth Army operated, was relatively
more stable, but the pressure was real.
Paulus inherited an army battered by the
first Soviet winter with divisions that
had suffered losses of between 30 and
50% [music] in men and equipment and
with a logistics chain still creaking
under the weight of a campaign that no
one had designed to last more than 3
months.
In that difficult context, Paulus
demonstrated the virtues that made him a
solid commander under ordinary
conditions. He reorganized the army's
sectors efficiently, ensured that the
chain of command continued to function
in the most pressured sectors, and
maintained the cohesion of the units
during the tactical retreat that the
harsh winter forced to be carried out at
several points.
General der Artillerie Walter von
Seydlitz-Kurzbach, [music] commander of
the 51st Army Corps and one of the most
respected officers of the 6th, valued
Paulus as an organizer and planner. What
he questioned, privately in letters to
other generals that would become
historical documents, was Paulus's
tendency to seek perfection in planning
at the [music] expense of tactical
opportunity and his inability to make
decisions when the situation was
ambiguous. This inability to improvise
was the flip side of the same coin that
made Paulus a brilliant organizer. A
general staff works under the premise
that there is enough time to analyze
before acting. A field commander works
under the opposite premise that time is
never enough and acting with incomplete
information is better than not acting at
all.
Paulus had not internalized this second
premise.
The Auftragstaktik, which animated the
German army, was a doctrine of
initiative. Paulus was a man of
procedure.
The system had promoted him precisely
because he was exceptional within the
system.
What the system had not measured was
whether he was exceptional outside of
it. The death of von Reichenau, the man
who had been his mentor, his sponsor,
and his support in the high command, was
a blow that Paulus never publicly
acknowledged, but that his subordinates
perceived. Reichenau was the type of
commander who could have balanced
Paulus' strengths with the tactical
aggression he lacked, who could have
acted as a counterweight to Hitler in
moments when the Führer imposed damaging
operational decisions.
With Reichenau dead just 3 days after
Paulus took command, the new commander
of the 6th Army was left alone without
the network of personal relationships
and institutional authority that might
have given him room to maneuver.
The nervous tick in his left eye, which
his subordinates would learn to
interpret as a barometer of the pressure
he was under, began to appear during the
following months in moments of greatest
operational tension.
By the summer of 1942, it was visible to
anyone who looked at him for more than a
few minutes. It didn't incapacitate him,
but it was the outward symptom of an
internal tension that the man could not
or would not verbalize.
His first major test in command came in
May 1942.
Marshal Semyon Timoshenko launched the
Kharkov offensive with 640,000 soldiers,
1,200 tanks, and about 1,000 planes
using as a base the salient formed in
Barvenkovo in January.
The Soviet objective was to encircle the
4th Panzer Army and the 6th Army
executing an enveloping maneuver from
the salient to the north and south.
During the first days, the pressure on
the left flank of [music] the 6th was
intense.
Paulus coordinated with the 1st Panzer
Army of General Field Marshal Ewald von
Kleist for a pincer [music] response.
While the 8th Corps of the 6th Army
maintained pressure on the salient from
the north, the 1st Panzer Army attacked
from the south closing the encirclement
in Barvenkovo on May 22nd. Two Soviet
armies were trapped. [music] The number
of prisoners captured exceeded 240,000
men.
Paulus received the Knight's Cross of
the Iron Cross for that operation. It
seemed that the man had found his
measure in his army and his profession.
What the success at Barvenkovo did not
show, because the conditions did not put
it to the test, was how Paulus would
respond when the circumstances were
adverse, when the information was
incomplete, when orders from above were
wrong, and the time to analyze them had
run out.
Those conditions would arrive in
November 1942 within a Soviet
encirclement in the ruins of a city on
the banks of the Volga, [music]
and Paulus's responses to those
conditions would seal the fate of
330,000
men.
Operation Blue and the advance toward
the Volga.
In the summer of 1942, Hitler designed
the great German offensive in the south,
Operation Blue, Fall Blau.
The goal was twofold and ambitious to
the point of recklessness, to capture
the oil fields of the Caucasus and cut
off Soviet supply lines via the Volga
River.
Army Group South was split into two
groups. Army Group A would advance
toward the Caucasus, while Army Group B,
which included the Sixth Army and the
Fourth Panzer Army, would advance east
and southeast.
On June 28th, 1942, Operation Blue began
with an attack toward Voronezh.
The bulk of the Sixth Army did not
advance until 2 days later, with the
Second Hungarian Army and First Panzer
Army protecting its left and right
flanks, respectively.
The first days confirmed the hopes.
>> [music]
>> The Soviet front in southern Russia was
collapsing.
Timoshenko's forces were retreating
instead of holding fixed positions,
learning the bitter lesson of 1941.
The encirclement pockets that had
characterized the first year of the
campaign were becoming more difficult to
execute, but the advance was real.
On July 23rd, Rostov-on-Don fell. This
success led to the issuance of Führer
Directive Number 45, which changed the
execution order of Operation Blue with
consequences that some generals
immediately interpreted as a symptom of
overextension, it was ordered that Army
Group A advance toward the Caucasus
without waiting for Army Group B to
secure the Volga.
Both objectives would be taken
simultaneously.
And in the same document, the Sixth Army
was assigned a task that the directive
presented as secondary, but that would
become the center of gravity for the
entire war. Advance solely toward
Stalingrad and take the city.
Stalingrad,
an industrial city on the banks of the
Volga, stretching more than 50 km along
the western riverbank, with enormous
factories manufacturing T-34 tanks and
heavy armament, even while shells rained
down on its roofs.
A working-class city, functional without
the architectural beauty of Kiev or the
vastness of Kharkov,
but it had the river.
And it had Stalin's name. And these two
[music] factors made it the place where
the war would change direction forever.
The rapid advance of the Sixth Army
toward the Volga had created an exposed
[music] left flank of more than 560 km
to Voronezh, protected by the Second
Hungarian Army, the Eighth Italian Army,
and the Third Romanian Army. On the
right [music] flank, the Fourth Romanian
Army. These troops, with inferior
material capabilities and lacking modern
anti-tank defenses, would determine the
future of the Sixth Army in the months
to come.
No one in the German High Command wanted
to see it, or perhaps no one had the
courage to say it out loud.
On August 23rd, the vanguard of the 16th
Panzer Division sighted the Volga. On
the same day, the Fourth Luftflotte, the
Fourth Air Fleet of General Oberst
Wolfram Freiherr von Richthofen, bombed
[music] Stalingrad with approximately
600 aircraft. The civilian death toll
from this bombing exceeded 40,000. The
city was burning, and the Sixth Army was
preparing to enter.
The Rattenkrieg, the rats' war in the
ruins.
No one who has studied the first days of
the Sixth Army's assault on Stalingrad
can fail to notice the gap between
expectations and reality.
The initial combats in August 1942
seemed to confirm what prior experience
had promised. The Soviets were giving
ground in the suburbs, fragmenting under
the combined pressure of infantry and
aviation, and the city appeared destined
to fall within weeks.
General Paulus calculated that organized
resistance would soon collapse.
General Field Marshal von Weichs,
commander of Army Group B, shared this
optimism. Even in the OKW, the reports
of the advance were read as the final
phase of an operation that followed the
logic of all the previous ones. It was
not to be. Stalingrad was not France. It
was not Belgium. [music] It wasn't even
the Ukrainian steppe, where the large
encirclement pockets had worked with
clockwork precision. Stalingrad was an
industrial city of Soviet construction
from the 1920s and 1930s. Reinforced
concrete buildings of four and
five-story structures designed not for
aesthetics, but for resistance to the
climate and industrial weight, metal
structures hundreds of meters long with
steel and concrete walls, stone barns
with 1-m thick walls, industrial
drainage canals that cut the terrain
into sectors of close combat. The city
didn't have the wide avenues or open
spaces that made tanks and artillery
decisive in open fields.
It was a labyrinth.
And in a labyrinth, Auftragstaktik and
Blitzkrieg lost their most fundamental
advantage, speed.
On September 13th, 1942, General
Lieutenant Vasily Ivanovich Chuikov took
command of the 62nd Army from Nikita
Khrushchev and Andrei Yeremenko with an
order that left no room for
interpretation, "Defend Stalingrad to
the death."
Chuikov, 42 years old, had been in the
Red Army since he was 15 when he
enlisted as a volunteer in the Red Guard
in 1918 during the Civil War. He had
fought in the Winter War of 1939 to 1940
as an army commander and that
experience, in many ways a fiasco for
Soviet forces, had shaped his
understanding of what it meant to fight
in conditions of reduced visibility,
restricted terrain, and the tactical
superiority of the adversary.
He was explosive in demeanor, prone to
expelling subordinates who did not act
with the speed he demanded, and had an
intuitive grasp of what set urban combat
apart from any other form of warfare.
Chuikov understood something his
adversaries took weeks [music] to
accept. The only way to survive inside
Stalingrad was to not leave space
between their own lines and the German
ones.
The standard distance between enemy
lines in conventional combat, typically
between 300 and 500 m, was the distance
needed by German artillery to fire
safely without hitting their own
positions,
>> [music]
>> and the distance needed by Stukas to
identify targets and attack them without
risking hitting friendly troops.
If Soviet defenders got close enough to
the attackers, that artillery and
aviation lost their utility.
Bombing the enemy meant bombing
themselves. Chuikov called this hugging
the enemy.
His men practiced it with a ferocity
that was beyond any manual of tactics.
The practical implementation of this
tactic transformed the battlefield into
something the Germans had never
encountered. Soviet sapper units turned
every building into an independent
fortress. They would demolish internal
staircases to prevent vertical movement,
block doors with rubble, open loopholes
in separating walls between apartments
to create fire networks covering
hallways and inner courtyards.
>> [music]
>> Snipers operated from positions in the
upper floors and basements
simultaneously,
>> [music]
>> keeping German attackers in a state of
constant alertness that wore down
concentration and consumed the soldiers'
psychological energy with an
effectiveness [music]
no frontal assault could match.
German assault engineers, the Pioniere,
who entered a building never knew if it
was completely clear or if there were
still Soviet soldiers alive on the floor
below, on the roof, or behind the wall
they had just crossed. On September
13th, 1942, the 71st, 76th, [music]
and 295th German infantry divisions
advanced toward the city center,
defended at the time by around 20,000 of
Chuikov's men.
The 71st division reached the city
center and captured the main railway
station.
However, a counterattack by the 13th
Guards Rifle Division under General
Major Alexander Rodimtsev, which had
crossed the Volga on barges under German
fire the previous night, preserved the
central dock, the vital point for
maintaining the flow of reinforcements
and supplies from the eastern riverbank.
Of that Soviet division, only 320 men
out of the initial 10,000 survived the
entire battle. [music]
But the dock was held.
Control of the Volga was the heart of
the Soviet defensive strategy. The
eastern bank of the river remained in
Soviet hands throughout the battle, and
from that bank came night after night
the reinforcements, ammunition, food,
and medical supplies that kept the 62nd
Army alive. The ferries crossed under
fire from German artillery and aviation.
Many sank. Those that made it unloaded
under fire and returned with the
wounded.
The river in September and October was
at temperatures that killed anyone who
fell into the water within minutes.
The barges navigated between the blocks
of ice that [music] began to form in
November. The logistical bridge over the
Volga was fragile, intermittent, and
costly in lives, but it was never
entirely broken.
The 6th Army bled in September and
October.
The divisions that had entered the
battle with thousands of men each were
reduced to skeletal remains, but often
more lethal because the survivors were
the most experienced and adapted to the
specific type of combat in the city.
The figures from the 14th Panzer Corps
are revealing. By the end of September,
the 16th Panzer Division, one of the
elite units of the 6th that had reached
the Volga in August, had fewer than
2,000 effective combatants.
The 24th Panzer Division, another of the
jewels of the 6th, had lost more than
60% of its officers since the beginning
of the fighting in the city.
Some regiments were fighting with fewer
than 100 effective soldiers, the
equivalent of a nominal company.
The factories that named the combat
sectors became the epicenters of the
most brutal battles. The Dzerzhinsky
Tractor Factory, with its steel and
concrete halls 800 m long, its assembly
pits several meters deep, and its
overhead cranes still hanging over the
shattered battlefield, was the scene of
fighting that lasted weeks and was
literally measured in meters per day.
The Barrikady Gun Factory, where the
Soviets had been producing artillery
until days before the Germans arrived,
was a complex of industrial buildings
that the defenders had converted into a
fortress of concrete and steel that
required an enormous effort to be taken
room by room.
The Red October Steel Factory [music]
in the northern sector was a
conglomerate of smelting furnaces,
warehouses, and administrative buildings
that changed hands in some sectors
several times a day.
"Inside the factory it was different,"
wrote a German corporal who served in
the fighting for Barrikady.
"Outside there was sky, even if it was
gray. Inside there was only darkness,
cement dust, and the noise, always
[music] the noise. The shots inside
those spaces sounded different, drier,
closer.
You'd go deaf after a while and fight in
silence, looking at shadows."
On October 14th, 1942, Paulus launched
what would be the most concentrated
assault of the entire battle.
Five full divisions, the 14th Panzer
Division, the 305th and 389th Infantry
Divisions, the 100th Jaeger Division,
and the 60th Motorized Infantry
Division, with more than 90,000 men and
300 tanks concentrated on a front of 4
km with massive support from the
Luftwaffe, which carried out over 3,000
combat sorties on the most intensive
days.
The objective was the Dzerzhinsky
Tractor Factory and the surrounding
industrial area. In the first hours, the
overwhelming weight of the strike
shattered several Soviet battalions. The
14th Panzer Division broke the lines of
the 37th Guards Division and advanced
northeast, reaching the edge of the
factory and splitting the 62nd Army into
two sectors.
For a moment, it seemed the resistance
would finally collapse.
The 138th Siberian Rifle Division
arrived, crossing the Volga on rafts
during the nights of October 15th and
16th under continuous German fire, with
water temperatures close to freezing.
Every man who crossed that river knew
that the chances of their barge being
sunk before reaching the shore were real
and calculable. They crossed anyway.
This division and the fresh units that
followed in the days after injected
exactly the kind of resistance capacity
needed to prevent the sector from
collapsing. The Germans took the
Dzerzhinsky Tractor Factory. They took
most of Barrikady. They occupied half of
the Red October Factory, but the 62nd
Army survived.
By the end of October 1942, the state of
the 6th Army was that of a force that
had gained nearly all the available
ground and consumed an irreplaceable
portion of its combat potential in the
process.
It controlled 90% of the city, but that
percentage represented destroyed
buildings, useless rubble, and terrain
that had no operational value. The
remaining 10% in Soviet hands was a
narrow strip along the Volga riverbank
with a depth in some sectors of only 200
or 300 m.
But that strip led to the Volga, and as
long as it led to the Volga,
reinforcements would continue to arrive.
"We were no longer an army," recalled
one of the survivors of those weeks with
the flat voice of someone who had
learned to speak of such things without
letting the tremor show.
"We were small groups, four men here,
eight there. Each building was a
separate world. You didn't know what was
happening 50 m from you. You heard shots
and didn't know if they were yours or
the enemy's.
Sometimes it didn't matter to know."
On November 11th, 1942, the last German
attempt to take the city before the
winter came was the assault on the
coastal strip in the southern sector,
where the forces of the 71st Infantry
Division attempted to push the remnants
of the 62nd Army toward the river in the
central dock sector. They managed to
advance to within 300 m of the Volga at
some points,
but they never reached the water.
And the men who attempted this final
advance had already been fighting for
weeks with a tenth of the personnel they
had started the campaign with.
At that very moment, hundreds of
kilometers to the north and south of the
Volga, the Red Army was finishing the
secret concentration of the forces that
would make all of this irrelevant.
>> [music]
>> The time the Sixth Army had spent inside
the city, every day of urban combat,
every decimated battalion, every [music]
tank lost in the hallways of a factory
that was worth no tank, had also been
the time that Vasilevsky and Zhukov
needed to prepare what was to come on
November 19th.
The trap [music] closes, Operation
Uranus.
On September 13th, 1942, while the Sixth
Army began to push into Stalingrad, a
different plan was presented to Stalin
in Moscow.
Not a reinforcement of the city's
defense, but the encirclement of the
attacker.
Its authors were General Georgy Zhukov
and General Polkovnik Alexander
Vasilevsky, Chief of the Soviet General
Staff.
The concept was brutally elegant.
Instead of trying to defeat the Sixth
Army inside Stalingrad, the idea was to
surround it from the outside. The flanks
of the Sixth Army were protected by Axis
ally units whose commanders knew better
than anyone their own vulnerability.
Romanian General of Army Petre
Dumitrescu, in command of the Third
Romanian Army on the northern flank, had
repeatedly requested additional
anti-tank weapons from the Germans.
Heeresgruppe B sent him 67.5 cm Pak
97/38
anti-tank guns. Dumitrescu [music]
replied that it was not enough. It
wasn't. The Soviets knew this. The
maskirovka, deception and camouflage,
was carried out with a meticulousness
the Germans had not seen before.
For weeks, large masses of infantry,
tanks, and artillery were secretly
concentrated to the north and south of
Stalingrad in the sectors defended by
the Romanians.
>> [music]
>> The movements were carried out only at
night. Trains advanced without lights.
Oberst Reinhard Gehlen, head of
intelligence for Fremde Heere Ost,
Foreign Armies East, had detected signs
of concentration on the Don bridges in
front of the Third Romanian Army, but
dismissed the threat as limited.
The nine panzer divisions that OKH kept
as a strategic reserve were not sent
south. They stayed in front of the Rzhev
salient, where Gehlen believed the main
strike would occur.
On November 19th, 1942, at 7:30 a.m.,
with temperatures several degrees below
zero and thick fog limiting visibility
to 200 m, the Southwestern and Don
Fronts initiated an 80-minute artillery
preparation.
About 3,500 Soviet guns opened fire. The
fog and snow prevented forward observers
from adjusting the fire, so the
artillery simply fired on known or
estimated positions.
The damage to the third Romanian army
was real, but not devastating. What
destroyed them was what came after.
The Fifth Tank Army of Lieutenant
General Prokofy Romanenko advanced in
four assault groups. The 47th Guards
Rifle Division supported by 64 tanks
destroyed the 14th Romanian Infantry
Division.
The 50th Guards Rifle Division with 74
tanks [music] collapsed the Fifth
Romanian Infantry Division. By noon, the
tank brigades of the First Tank Corps
and the 26th Tank Corps were flowing
through the holes in the Romanian front.
The sudden appearance of nearly 200
tanks caused the complete collapse of
the 14th Romanian Infantry Division. The
center of the Romanian army
disintegrated. On November 20th, the
Stalingrad Front launched its own arm of
the encirclement from the south with the
51st Army of Major General Nikolai
Trufanov and the 57th Army of Major
General Fyodor Tolbukhin attacking the
right flank of the Fourth Panzer Army.
The weak Romanian divisions of the Sixth
Corps quickly collapsed.
Tolbukhin committed the Fourth
Mechanized Corps of Major General Vasily
Volsky, which advanced westward against
minimal resistance.
On November 22nd, Lieutenant Colonel
Georgy N. Filippov led a column of five
T-34 tanks, two motorized rifle
companies in trucks, five armored
vehicles, and three captured German
vehicles toward the pontoon bridge over
the Don at Berezovsky, northwest of
Kalach.
Pretending to be a German column,
Filippov reached the bridge before dawn.
The guards, a military police unit, an
8.8 cm anti-aircraft gun, and personnel
from an engineering school did not
recognize the deception until the Soviet
soldiers were already on the bridge. The
8.8 cm gun destroyed [music]
two T-34 tanks before being neutralized.
The bridge was captured intact. Filippov
established a defensive perimeter and
waited for 11 hours alone with his small
force until reinforcements arrived. He
was awarded the title of Hero of the
Soviet Union.
On November 23rd, 1942, the Soviet
encirclement arms closed to the east
[music] of Kalach.
The Sixth Army, 330,000 men in 22
divisions, along with troops from other
corps and Axis allied units, was
completely surrounded.
It was the first time in history that a
complete German field army had been
trapped.
More than 30,000 Axis soldiers escaped
to the south before the pincers fully
closed. Inside the Kessel,
the cauldron, as the Germans called the
pocket, about 284,000 men remained.
The paper fortress, the encirclement,
and the airlift.
The initial reaction inside the Kessel
was one of disbelief.
Many officers and soldiers did not
immediately understand the magnitude of
what had happened. Communications were
confused, reports contradictory,
but those who understood right away, the
commanders of the more veteran
divisions, the staff officers who knew
the maps and the numbers,
felt something that very few described
in their diaries with the correct word.
The word was despair.
"When I realized the encirclement was
real, that it was not a temporary
movement of the enemy, but a closed
trap, I stared at the map for a long
time," wrote a lieutenant colonel whose
name did not survive the war.
"I didn't think about Germany. I didn't
think about my family.
I thought about the men who were
sleeping 100 m from where I was
standing, who still didn't know what I
already knew."
Paulus immediately requested permission
to attempt a breakout to the west before
the encirclement was consolidated. On
the night of November 23rd at 11:45
p.m., he sent a radio signal to OKW
requesting freedom of action, the
euphemism for permission to break out of
the encirclement. Hitler's response the
next day was unequivocal. The Sixth Army
would stay in position, be supplied by
airlift, and wait for von Manstein to
break the encirclement from the outside.
The promise of the airlift had an
involuntary architect, Reichsmarschall
Hermann Göring, commander of the
Luftwaffe, who had assured Hitler that
his air force could supply the Sixth by
air.
He did so without consulting technical
experts, basing it on the precedent of
the Demyansk encirclement the previous
winter, where the Luftwaffe had supplied
six trapped divisions, 96,000 men, with
an average of 300 tons per day for 3
months.
But the comparison was flawed. The Sixth
Army was more than three times larger
than the force trapped at Demyansk. Its
headquarters calculated that it would
need at least 750 tons per day to
operate.
Generalleutnant Martin Fiebig, commander
of the Eighth Fliegerkorps, had already
told Paulus on November 21st that the
Luftwaffe did not have the means to
supply the Sixth Army by air.
When the airlift began on November 24th,
Fiebig only had 25 operational Ju 52
transports in theater, each capable of
carrying about 2 tons.
The first day of the airlift delivered
86 tons. The first 5 days totaled 269
tons. The temperatures in the Stalingrad
area during November and December of
1942 ranged between 0 and -10 degrees
[music] Celsius during the day, dropping
to -35 during the coldest nights.
The Pitomnik airfield inside the Kessel
began receiving flights. Tatsinskaya,
237 km away, was designated as the main
base for the airlift. The army inside
the Kessel began to ration itself. The
daily bread rations were reduced first
to 400 g, then to 200. The 25,000 horses
of the artillery units,
>> [music]
>> which the soldiers needed to move the
pieces across the snowy terrain, were
sacrificed for food.
When the horses were gone, whatever
could be found was eaten.
Of the 58,000 Soviet auxiliaries, the
Hiwis, prisoners who had agreed to serve
as labor and logistical support for the
German army, more than 19,000 remained
inside the Kessel, and some fought
alongside the German units.
The 3,500
Soviet prisoners the Germans held in two
detention camps inside the Kessel
survived in even worse conditions. Of
that total, it is estimated that fewer
than 20 survived.
On December 9th, 1942, General Kurt
Zeitzler, newly appointed Chief of Staff
of OKH, began consuming the same daily
rations of calories as the soldiers
trapped in Stalingrad in an attempt to
persuade Hitler of the urgency of the
situation. He visibly lost weight in
days.
Hitler did not change his position.
The attempted rescue, Wintergewitter.
Field Marshal Erich von Manstein arrived
in Novocherkassk on November 26th and
activated Heeresgruppe Don. He had few
forces available, but those arriving
were of first-rate quality. Generalmajor
Erhard Raus brought the 6th Panzer
Division from France with 150
operational tanks.
>> [music]
>> The 23rd Panzer Division arrived from
the Caucasus, though with reduced
resources.
The 17th Panzer Division with only 57
tanks was promised, but took time to
arrive.
On December 12th, 1942 at 6:30 a.m.,
Hoth launched Operation Wintergewitter,
winter storm.
The sky was clear. Visibility was
excellent. The 6th Panzer Division with
141 tanks was the Schwerpunkt, the
spearhead pushing north along the
railway line. The first day was
encouraging. Hoth advanced about 20 km
and shattered Soviet rifle divisions.
The Luftwaffe was able to provide close
air support with Stuka sorties.
But starting on December 13th, General
Major Vasily Volsky committed the fourth
mechanized core to defensive positions
around Verkhnekumsky. What followed was
a five-day battle that consumed the time
von Manstein didn't have.
The fourth mechanized core suffered
enormous losses, more than 5,500
casualties and around 70 tanks, but its
resistance was brilliant.
It allowed the second guards army of
Lieutenant General Rodion Malinovsky to
reach the Myshkova River and form a
solid defensive line with five fresh
rifle divisions.
On December 19th, the sixth Panzer
division finally crossed the Myshkova
and captured an intact bridge at
Vasilyevka.
It was 48 [music] km from the southern
perimeter of the Kessel.
This was the closest the rescue would
get. Von Manstein sent a radio message
to Paulus that same night instructing
him to initiate the breakout southward.
The code name was Donnerschlag, thunder.
General Hans Valentin Huber had at least
60 operational Panzers and had started
to concentrate the 14th Panzer Corps at
the southwestern corner of the Kessel.
The distance to cover was about 50 km.
It was risky, but it was possible.
Paulus did not order the breakout. The
decision, or non-decision, of Paulus
during those hours is one of the most
studied debates in the military history
of World War II.
His defenders point out that Hitler had
expressly denied authorization for a
retreat.
His critics argue that at that moment
von Manstein was implicitly giving him
permission and that there were German
commanders who in similar situations
acted without waiting for formal
approval from Hitler.
General der Artillerie Walter von
Seydlitz-Kurzbach, commander of the 51st
Army Corps inside the Kessel, had
attempted to force the issue on November
23rd by issuing his own orders for
preparing a breakout.
Paulus tolerated this act of
insubordination without consequences.
What Paulus did believe, with a
sincerity that his later memoirs did not
conceal, was that the Sixth Army did not
have the fuel or the fighting capacity
to survive a 50-km advance in open
terrain during the winter, abandoning
all its heavy equipment.
He thought that most of the men who
survived the breakout attempt would
reach the other side without equipment,
without organization, and without the
possibility of being reorganized into a
fighting force.
He may have been right.
But not attempting it meant that
everyone would die.
By December 23rd, von Manstein
recognized the reality.
The Sixth Panzer Division was withdrawn
from the Mishkova Salient to support the
Chir Front, which was collapsing under
the impact of Operation Little Saturn.
On December 24th, the Red Army launched
its Kotelnikovo Offensive with the
Second Guards Army and the Seventh Tank
Corps of General Rodmistrov.
Hoth's forces, already decimated,
withdrew. Kotelnikovo was captured on
December 29th. There would be no rescue.
Little Saturn and the [music] collapse
of the flanks.
While Wintergewitter advanced and failed
at the Mishkova, another element of the
Soviet plan was unfolding on the
northern flank. Operation Little Saturn,
a scaled-down version of the original
Operation Saturn that the [music] Stavka
planners had designed, launched on
December 16th, 1942,
two Soviet armies against the Eighth
Italian Army of General Italo Gariboldi,
which was defending a 125-km
sector along the Don. The Eighth Italian
Army consisted of 10 infantry divisions
in three corps, the Second, 35th, and
Alpine Corps, along with the 298th
German Infantry Division.
The only armor available as a reserve
for the Italians was a provisional
formation called the 27th Panzer
Division, which was little more than a
regimental-sized battle group with 65
mostly obsolete tanks.
Vatutin began the operation at 8:00 a.m.
on December 16th with a 90-minute
artillery preparation, which was
practically ineffective due to the dense
fog.
The first day did not produce a decisive
breakthrough, but on the second day,
December 17th, the 17th Tank Corps was
introduced into the gap between the
Italian divisions Cosseria and Ravenna.
The defense broke. The 25th Tank Corps
of General Pavlov and the 24th Tank
Corps of General Vasily Badanow poured
into the open space. On December 24th,
the 24th Tank Corps of Badanow with 58
operational tanks under a sky that
German Stukas had been relentlessly
attacking for days, reached the
Tatsinskaya airfield. The airfield was
filled with nearly 200 transport
aircraft. Luftwaffe personnel were
completely caught by surprise. The first
Soviet shells triggered panic. The
planes began taking off in emergency
conditions, some without cleared
runways. More than 50 aircraft were
destroyed on the ground. The supply
depots accumulated for the airlift
caught fire. The airlift to Stalingrad
was severely damaged. Badanow reported
his position to Vatutin. He had
completed his mission, but his tanks
were out of fuel and ammunition.
Vatutin had no means to resupply him
immediately.
On December 25th, General Hermann
Balck's 11th Panzer Division surrounded
Badanow's Corps and began systematically
destroying it. On the night of December
27th to 28th, Badanow made an
unauthorized breakout and reached the
Soviet lines with nine tanks and around
900 men.
The collapse of the 8th Italian Army and
the loss of Tatsinskaya dismantled the
last external support for the 6th
[music] Army.
Von Manstein organized emergency
defensive lines along the Donets with
what was left available.
But for the Sixth Army inside the
Kessel, [music] the message was clear.
There would be no rescue. There would be
no corridor.
Only the cold, the hunger, and the time
they had left remained.
Operation Ring, the final blow.
The New Year of 1943 arrived in the
Kessel of Stalingrad with temperatures
regularly dropping to minus 20° C during
the day and minus 35 at night.
The daily bread ration was reduced to 80
g on December 30th. The army had 103
operational tanks and 35 assault guns by
mid-December, [music]
but the fuel necessary to move them ran
out faster than it could arrive.
On January 7th, 1943, General Polkovnik
Konstantin Rokossovsky, now in command
of the Don Front, which had taken on the
responsibility of the encirclement, sent
an ultimatum to Paulus through special
emissaries.
The terms were specific: normal rations,
medical treatment for the wounded and
sick, repatriation to any country after
the war.
Paulus rejected the offer. Hitler's
orders were equally specific: resist to
the death.
On January 10th, 1943, at 8:05 a.m.,
Rokossovsky initiated Operation Ring,
Koltso.
General Polkovnik Nikolai Voronov, Chief
of Artillery for the Red Army and Stavka
representative, had concentrated 500
guns and howitzers plus 450 multiple
rocket launchers in a 12-km wide attack
sector.
It was the highest artillery density
achieved by the Red Army up until that
point in the war.
Unlike previous operations, the sky was
clear and visibility was excellent.
Soviet forward observers were able to
adjust fire with precision.
The 55-minute bombardment that opened
Operation Ring destroyed German
positions across the entire western
front of the Kessel, especially in the
sector of the 44th Infantry Division.
The five rifle divisions of the 65th
Army under General Batov advanced
against the 44th Division. The Germans
resisted position by position, sometimes
engaging in hand-to-hand combat. Four
German battalions were destroyed,
[music]
but Hube's panzer reserves arrived in
time to contain the most dangerous
advances, and the Western Front held on
that first day.
January 11th was different. Hauptmann
Rudolf Haen, with four tanks, awaited
the advance of the 57th Guards Tank
Regiment
>> [music]
>> with its British-made Churchill tanks.
In a fight lasting minutes, Haen
destroyed 18 of the 21 Churchills before
the attack was contained.
It was the kind of tactical action the
6th Army could still produce, but Hube
lost 30 of his 46 tanks and 11 of his 18
heavy anti-tank guns in just the first 2
days of Operation Ring.
On January 16th, the 51st Guards Rifle
Division captured the Pitomnik airfield.
The 6th Army lost its main airfield. The
Luftwaffe was forced to withdraw its
escort fighters. Transport flights
continued unprotected toward the
secondary airfield of Gumrak.
On January 23rd, Gumrak also fell.
The last German flight left the Kessel
at 10:45 that morning.
From that moment, resupply depended
exclusively on air drops, most of which
[music] fell on Soviet-controlled
territory.
Rokossovsky paused on January 17th to
replenish ammunition and reorganize his
units.
The Don Front had suffered approximately
26,000 casualties in 1 week of fighting
and lost half of its tanks.
The pause cost the Soviet offensive some
momentum, but the final outcome was not
in doubt.
On January 21st, the offensive resumed.
Four rifle divisions from the 65th Army
and all available artillery struck the
German line around Baburkin.
The 44th Infantry Division, already
reduced to a third of its strength,
could not hold.
The western front of the Kessel began to
collapse. On January 26th, 1943 at 11:00
a.m., the 21st Army under Major General
Chistyakov broke through the remnants
[music]
of the 8th Army Corps and linked up with
the 62nd Army of Chuikov at Mamayev
Kurgan. The Kessel was split in two.
Strecker's 11th Army Corps was isolated
in the north in the ruins of the tractor
factory in Barrikady. The bulk of what
remained of the 6th Army, including
Paulus and his staff, was trapped in the
southern pocket around the Univermag
stores in the city center.
On January 30th, 1943, the 10th
anniversary of Hitler's rise to power,
Friedrich Paulus was promoted to
Generalfeldmarschall by radio. It was
simultaneously an honor and an implicit
order of suicide. No German field
marshal had ever been captured.
Paulus told a subordinate who recorded
his words, "I have no intention of
shooting myself because of this Bohemian
corporal," referring to Hitler. He chose
surrender.
The end, surrender and captivity.
The morning of January 31st, 1943, the
Univermag warehouse building in the
southern center of Stalingrad was the
last headquarters of Friedrich Paulus.
In the basement of [music] this
building, among mattresses, scattered
papers, and the sour smell of the
wounded, the newly promoted
Generalfeldmarschall awaited the end.
Soldiers from the 38th Motorized Rifle
Brigade of the 64th Army under General
Mikhail Shumilov surrounded the
building. At 7:15 a.m., Paulus and his
staff emerged into the open and
surrendered.
In the northern part of the Kessel,
General Karl Strecker initially refused
to surrender.
His 11th Army Corps, about 50,000 men
scattered across the remains of seven
divisions entrenched in the ruins of the
tractor factory in Barrikady, held out
for two more days.
On February 1st, 1943 at 8:30 a.m. the
Don Front launched the final assault
with the 65th and 66th armies preceded
by a 90-minute artillery bombardment.
The 16th Air Army bombed the German
positions with all available capacity.
The northern and western fronts of the
pocket were shattered. About 4,000
Germans were killed or wounded in the
final assault. More than 20,000 were
captured. Strecker's subordinates
initiated surrender talks without his
authorization. On February 2nd, 1943 at
7:00 a.m. Strecker finally agreed to
surrender. At 9:20 a.m. Heeresgruppe Don
received the last message from
Stalingrad.
The resistance had ended. The 6th Army
no longer existed. Of the 284,000 men
trapped in the Kessel on November 23rd,
approximately 150,000 had died during
the encirclement from combat, cold,
hunger, or disease.
The Soviets claim to have captured
91,000 prisoners. Other estimates
suggest the number may have reached
107,800
including about 700 Croats and
approximately 3,000 Romanians.
Of those prisoners, most died in the
following months during the marches to
the camps [music] and in the conditions
of the camps themselves.
Many were sent to Pokrovsky Camp number
127 near Saratov. Of 8,007 prisoners
sent there, 1,526
died on the way [music] and another
4,663
in the first 6 weeks after arrival.
Others were sent to Beketovka Camp
number 108 where they were employed in
clearing the battlefield rubble.
The officers were distributed into three
camps: [music] Oranki number 74,
Yelabuga number 97, and Krasnogorsk
number 27
>> [music]
>> where they were interrogated and some
processed for war crimes.
Some disabled prisoners were released in
1947 and 1948. Most were not released
until after Stalin's death in 1953.
Only about 6,000 of the prisoners
captured [music] at Stalingrad ever
returned to Germany.
The last group returned in 1955, 12
years after the surrender.
"I was no longer afraid of dying." wrote
a German soldier on a piece of paper
found many years later among the ruins
of the city. "I was afraid of dying
alone with no one knowing my name."
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