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[music]
27 million dead. It is not a number. It
is the weight of a world that no longer
exists.
As the western world remembers D-Day,
the tanks in the North African desert
and the bombs on London, there is a
different, more colossal, more cruel,
more decisive war that occurred in the
east. This is the history of the Red
Army. The story of how the Soviet Union
with colossal mistakes, with millions of
sacrifices, with generals learning under
the heaviest fire ever seen, stopped,
turned, and finally destroyed the
Vermacht, the deadliest war machine
Europe had ever produced.
In 1918, revolutionary Russia had no
army. It had militias of armed workers,
mutinous sailors, and the scattered
ghost of what was once the Imperial
Army. Vifan Lenin and his commisar for
military affairs, Leon Trosky, needed to
build a fighting force from scratch in
the midst of the bloodiest civil war
that country had ever witnessed. The
solution was brutal and pragmatic.
Recruit tens of thousands of former
officers of the Tsarist army, the
so-called military specialists, [music]
and keep them under political
surveillance through the system of
commisars. Each unit had a military
commander and a political officer whose
signature was needed to validate any
significant orders. It was a system of
institutionalized distrust. It worked
because it had to work. The Civil War of
1918 to 1921 forged the Soviet military
mentality in a way that would [music]
persist for decades. Armored trains
carrying reserves from one front to
another, moving entire units along
interior lines to plug gaps, created
what would become known as echelon
warfare. Some infantry divisions changed
fronts up to five times over the course
of the conflict. This experience
generated a deep understanding of the
need for strategic reserves staggered in
depth, [music] a lesson the Red Army
would never forget. But the Civil War
also taught something else. Civil War
commander Mikail Nikolivich Tukachevski
and theorist Vladimir K. Triandilov came
to a conclusion that would change the
history of military art. Modern armies
were too large to be defeated in a
single catastrophic battle. You needed
to dismantle the enemy with successive
offensive operations, each followed by a
quick exploitation to the rear before
the defender could reorganize.
From that principle was born what the
Soviets would call the operational art
and within it operation in depth. It
wasn't just attacking. It was to attack
simultaneously at multiple depths
[music] neutralizing all enemy defenses
at the same time employing tanks,
artillery, aviation, and infantry
mechanized in a coordinated dance that
prevented the defender from creating a
firm front. In the 1930s, as the world
looked the other way, the Red Army
became the most advanced mechanized
warfare laboratory on the planet. By
1936, the Soviet Union had formed its
first two mechanized corpses, 3 years
before Germany created its first Panza
divisions. That year's interim campaign
regulations codified [music]
concepts that German theorists were just
beginning to articulate. The Soviet
arsenal included thousands of tanks
Production had reached 3,000 armored
vehicles per year since 1933.
The large-scale exercises tested the
combined use of airborne armored and
motorized infantry forces for
operational [music]
penetrations of 100 km or more. There
was a problem named Ysef Visarionovich
Stalin.
Stalin's paranoid obsession with
absolute control led him in 1937 to
unleash a purge of the officer corps
that rivals any military disaster in
history. Tukachevski, the genius who had
conceived Operation Deep, was arrested
on May 27th, 1937.
On June 12th, he was executed along with
the commander of two military districts
and six highranking colleagues. The
figures for what followed are almost
inconceivable. The commanders of the
country's 16 military districts were
purged. 90% of the deputy commanders,
chiefs [music] of staff and section
chiefs, 80% of the commanders of core
and divisions. 91% of regimental
commanders, their deputies and their
chiefs of staff. In total, between
34,000 and 54,700
officers were dismissed, [music]
imprisoned, or executed. Of the five
marshals of the Soviet Union, three were
shot. Military historian David Glance in
his analysis of this period concludes
that the purges not only eliminated the
intellectual elite of the army, but
created a climate where any show of
independent judgment could cost one's
life. Young officers with no combat
experience were suddenly elevated to
division commands. Students of the 1938
course of the Voroselof Academy, among
them future luminaries such as AM
Vasileski and MV Zakarov, graduated
hastily to fill vacancies that no one
wanted to fill. The army that existed in
1941 was, in the words of one
contemporary analysis, magnificent but
hollow. It had the formal structure of a
powerful force. I didn't have the brain
to operate on her. Between 1938 and
1941, the Red Army fought three
conflicts that revealed everything that
was wrong and at the same time gave
glimpses of what could become. At Lake
Cassan in 1938, Soviet forces clashed
[music] with Japanese troops for weeks
before winning a costly and poorly
coordinated engagement. The losses were
disproportionate to the results
obtained. Less than a year later on the
Kkin Gaul River in remote [music] outer
Mongolia, an officer who had survived
the purges, Geoji Constantinovich Jukov,
was given command of the Soviet forces
with instructions to resolve the problem
with the Japanese. What Jukov did on
August 20th, 1939 was a masterclass. He
secretly concentrated 57,000 men, 498
tanks, and 385 armored vehicles. He
staged a classic envelopment attack
while a territorial division attacked
headon to lock on to the enemy. Within
hours, the Japanese forces [music] were
locked in. The assault on August 27th to
break the siege failed. On September
15th, Japan signed a ceasefire
agreement. Zhukov had carried out almost
perfectly the principles of operation
depth that Tukachevsky had articulated.
Japanese casualties reached 61,000
killed, wounded, and captured. But the
real revelation came that same winter.
In November 1939, Stalin ordered the
invasion of Finland after failed
negotiations.
What followed was a catastrophe. The Red
Army, deprived of its best commanders
and doctrine by the purges, blindly
attacked the defenses of the Manahheim
line. The 44th Rifle Division was almost
entirely destroyed in the forests of Su
Musalmi. His men, [music]
illequipped for Arctic combat, froze in
their positions as Finnish skiers
methodically encircled and dismembered
them. The commander of the division was
shot. Dozens of officers replaced.
[music]
Soviet forces suffered 131,476
killed and missing before the situation
was reorganized enough to break through
Finnish defenses [music] in February
1940. Timoshenko took command in the
northwest. He trained his troops hard.
He organized specialized raiding groups.
He concentrated the artillery. On
February 12th, 1940, [music]
an entirely different attack, more
precise, more coordinated, more
concentrated, penetrated the Manahheim
line. In March, the Fins signed the
armistice. The outside world and
particularly the German high command saw
only the initial disaster.
Historian Carl Van notes that Finnish
reports of Soviet improvement in the
second phase of the Winter War reached
German intelligence and were ignored.
Hitler and the OKH drew the conclusion
they wanted. The Red Army was incapable
of defending itself. It was the most
expensive miscalculation in military
history.
On August 23rd, 1939, Yokim von
Ribbentrop landed in Moscow. Within
hours, representatives of two regimes
that had proclaimed each other mortal
enemies for a decade signed the Molotov
Ribbentrop Pact. Publicly, it was a
non-aggression agreement. In its secret
clauses, it divided Eastern Europe into
spheres of influence with a coldness
that would have scandalized any diplomat
of the previous century. Why did Stalin
sign? The short answer is that he
distrusted everyone equally. The Munich
conference of 1938 where France and
Britain handed over the Czechoslovak
Sudatan land to Hitler without even
inviting the Soviets to the table was an
unmistakable signal to Moscow.
Westerners would sacrifice the Soviet
Union if it would buy peace for them.
Stalin apparently calculated that if
Hitler attacked the West first, the
resulting war would last for years,
[music] giving him time to rebuild his
army torn apart by the purges. What he
did not foresee was the speed of the
French collapse. When France fell in 6
weeks in May and June 1940, Stalin
suddenly found himself facing a Germany
that controlled all of Western Europe
and his own army was still recovering.
The pact had given the Soviet Union time
but not enough. And it had bought
territory, parts of Poland, the Baltic
states, Bessabia that was now becoming a
trap. The defenses of the former Polish
Soviet border had been dismantled in
order to build new positions in the
newly acquired territories.
Those new defenses were incomplete. The
army was ahead, exposed in positions it
could not defend. In the spring of 1941,
the world's two most powerful armies
were staring at each other across a
border they both knew would not last. On
the German side, 152 divisions,
including 19 armored and 14 motorized
infantry, organized into three army
groups, approximately 3,350
tanks, 7,146
artillery pieces and 2,770
aircraft. An officer corps with two
years of blitzkrieg in Poland and France
accustomed to victory trained in
decentralized initiative taking with
doctrines of mechanized penetration that
had proven effective against the best
armies in Western Europe. But the
Germans also had hidden limitations. The
Veyt was not a fully motorized force.
More than 600,000 horses were taking
part in the initial invasion, dragging
artillery and supplies. Infantry units
marched on foot as in 1914.
German logisticians estimated that the
army had enough fuel to advance between
500 and 800 km from the border. After
that, it would need a pause to resupply.
The Soviet railway system used a
different gauge than the European one,
which meant that German trains could not
use captured lines without converting
them.
General France Halder, the German chief
of staff, presented [music] these
figures with almost preient precision in
November 1940.
They ignored them on the Soviet side. On
paper, a formidable army. In reality, an
organism in transition convulsed by
simultaneous reorganizations, massive
changes of command, and incomplete
defensive deployments. The 29 new
mechanized core approved in February
1941 had not received their equipment.
Many of them had less than 40% of their
tanks authorized. The fourth mechanized
core, considered the most powerful in
the Soviet army, had 979 tanks,
including 414 of the modern KV and T34.
But most of the mechanized core had
mixtures of obsolete vehicles, trucks
requisitioned from civilian companies
that could not operate in the field and
crews that had barely been with their
machines for weeks. And yet the T-34 was
in almost every technical respect
superior to any German tank deployed in
June 1941.
Its 45 mm sloped armor withtood most
German anti-tank guns. Its 76.2 [music]
2 mm high gun speed pierced the armor of
the Panzer 3s and fours at normal combat
ranges. The German 37 mm guns that
equipped most of the infantry could not
penetrate their frontal armor. The 47.5
ton KV1 heavy tank was directly
invulnerable to almost all German
weapons except the Luftwaffer's famous
88 mm anti-aircraft guns. If the Red
Army had had four more years to prepare,
the picture would have been radically
different. He did not have them.
At 3:00 a.m. on June 22nd, 1941, 30
Luftwaffer bomber crews crossed the
Soviet border at high altitude. In
groups of three, they struck 10 major
Soviet air bases at exactly 3:15, at the
exact moment when a brief artillery
preparation signaled the start of the
ground war. When the sun rose, 500
bombers, 270 dive bombers, and 480
fighters attacked 66 Soviet airfields.
The Red Air Force lost more than 1,200
aircraft on the first morning of the
war, most of them destroyed on the
ground before their pilots could take
off. Soviet communications collapsed
within hours. The civilian telephone
network on which much of the army
depended was destroyed by the air
strikes and the overwhelming mass of
emergency reports. German sabotage
units, the Brandenburgers, infiltrated
in Soviet uniforms, cut telephone lines,
captured key bridges, and wreaked havoc
in the rear. On the Western Front,
General Dmitri Pavof, commander of the
Western Front, lost control of his
forces in the early hours. His armies
from the Beer Listo sector, the 3rd and
10th, were caught in a trap as German
Panzer groups engulfed them from the
north and south. By June 26th, General
Pav sent Moscow the desperate message.
Up to 1,000 tanks of the Third Panza
group are enveloping Minsk from the
northwest. There is no way to resist
them. It was not an exaggeration. It was
the reality. By the end of June, the
second and third Panza [music] groups
had closed their pincers around a huge
pocket west of Minsk, containing most of
the [music] 10th, 3rd, and 13th armies
of the Western Front. More than 417,000
Soviet soldiers had been killed or
captured. The Western Front, as an
organized force, had ceased to exist.
Pav was executed shortly thereafter. But
even in this unprecedented chaos, there
were signs of things to come.
In the south, General Mikail Kaponos,
commander of the southwest front, had
been in close contact with the border
guards in the previous days and alerted
his units when the Germans were masked
on [music] the border. His front was
blessed with eight mechanized core. None
were completely equipped. None were
fully trained. But General Constantine
Roosovski, commander of the 9inth
Mechanized Corps with obsolete T-26
tanks, made a decision that illustrated
the birth of a new capability. Instead
of attacking according to impossible
orders, he established [music]
defensive positions and ambushed the
main column of the 13th Panza Division
advancing towards Rivo.
For the first time in the war, the
German army encountered massive Soviet
artillery fire and suffered severe
casualties.
The fierce battle for the southwestern
Soviet flank delayed army group south by
at least a week, buying crucial time
that would allow the partial evacuation
of Soviet industry to the eurals.
On June 24th, 1941, Stalin signed the
order that created the evacuation
council. Under the leadership of Nikolai
and with Alexe Kosigin as his deputy,
the Soviet state undertook one of the
most extraordinary logistical feats of
the 20th century. Entire factories with
their machines, their engineers, their
workers, and their families were
dismantled and loaded onto trains
leaving for the Eurals and Siberia. The
Zaparosia metallurgical plant in the
Donbass required 8,000 railway wagons
just to be moved to Magnetosk.
In the Leningrad area, where the German
advance was so rapid that only 92
factories could be relocated before the
city was surrounded. A former tank plant
was converted into the complex known as
the Tankerrad in Chelabinsk, which by
the end of 1941 was already producing
more than 500 KV heavy tanks. By
December 12th, 1941, 523 enterprises and
564,248
workers with their families [music] had
been evacuated from the Moscow region in
100,334
railway wagons. The Soviet Union claimed
to have moved a total of 1,910
large factories, including 824 armament
related factories [music] to the Vular,
Siberia, and Central Asia on nearly
30,000 trains carrying 1.5 million rail
loads between July and December 1941.
Machinery arrived at its destinations on
a confusing and staggered [music]
schedule, sometimes with only a fraction
of the skilled workers. They were often
unloaded into newly erected unheated
wooden buildings in the middle of the
Siberian winter. Workers worked under
electric lights hung on trees
supplemented by bonfires while outside
temperatures dropped well below zero.
Some factories were producing again
within weeks. Others took more than a
year. The result was that despite the
initial collapse, the Soviet Union
produced approximately 6,590
tanks in 1941.
twothirds of them, the modern T34 and
KV. Comparatively, Germany produced
5,200.
The USSR also produced twice as many
fighter aircraft as Germany that year,
twice as many guns and 11 times as many
mortars. An entirely new war machine was
being born in the bowels of the Eurals,
literally built on snow and sacrifice.
When General Holder noted in his diary
on July 3rd, 1941 that the Russian
campaign has been won in the space of
two weeks, it was a statement that at
that time, at the precise [music]
moment, it seemed backed up by the
facts. All three frontline guns on the
Western Front had been destroyed. The
Germans were on the Neper and the West
Deina, less than 400 km from Moscow.
What Halda did not know was that on the
other side of the Neper were waiting
five armies that Marshall Boudeni had
begun to assemble since [music] the end
of May. These armies were not frontline
formations, the 21st, the 21st, [music]
the 22, the 16th. They were poorly
equipped formations, many of them
composed of reserveists [music]
called up urgently with poor
communications, insufficient anti-tank
artillery, and staffs that barely knew
their own units. However, they were
something the Germans had not
anticipated. [music] New meat for the
mill.
Stalin put Marshall Timoshenko in
command of the Western Front on July
1st. In the days that followed, the
Germans found crossing the Deniper to be
much more difficult than crossing the
Deina. Soviet counteroffensives were
crude, [music] poorly coordinated, and
costly. But they existed. The German
Panza divisions, which had advanced 700
km in two weeks, suddenly found
themselves locked into a fierce defense
to [music] which they were not
accustomed.
On July 18th, Gudderians Panza group had
captured the heights of Elnia, 82 km
southeast of Smolinsk. Their tanks had
[music] reached the logistical limit of
their initial advance. German tankists
could [music] see in the distance the
domes of the city's churches which maps
described as the gateway to Moscow. No
fuel, no ammunition. The divisions were
reduced to companies. The companies in
platoon. The commander of the 18th Panza
division wrote a note that captured the
mood. We need to reduce our casualties
if we do not intend to earn ourselves to
death. On July 23rd, Jukov coordinated
the first genuinely organized
counteroffensive of the war. Four
operational groups attacking
simultaneously from the north, east, and
south against Army Group Center east of
Smolinsk. The attacks were
uncoordinated, costly, and largely
tactically unsuccessful, but they were
continuous. For the first time in the
war, Army Group Center [music] had to
stop to defend. On July 30th, Fura
Directive number 34 ordered Army Group
Center to go on [music] the defensive
and prepare its forces for future
operations.
It was the first time the Germans had
issued such an order since the
Blitzkrieg had begun in 1939.
While Timoshenka was holding back Army
Group Center near Smealinsk, the biggest
disaster of the entire war was unfolding
to the south. Marshall Semon Budeni,
commander of the Southwest Directorate,
had orders to hold Kiev at all costs.
Stalin was convinced that the main
German offensive would eventually come
toward Moscow and that the southward
movement was a distraction. Zhukov, on
one of the few occasions when he dared
to directly contradict the dictator,
warned in August 1941 that Kiev was a
trap. Army Group South was being
reinforced for a huge pinser. The
warning cost Jukov the post of chief of
[music] staff. Zhukov himself asked to
be transferred to the command of the
reserve front. The premonition was
fulfilled with chilling accuracy.
Gderrion turned his Panza group south
behind the lines of the southwest front.
Klest did the same from the south. On
September 14th, 1941, the two groups
joined east of Kiev. In the following
weeks, four Soviet armies were destroyed
within the encirclement. The 5th, 37th,
26th, and 21st, a total of 43 divisions
with 452,720
men and 3,867
guns and mortars. General Kerponos, who
had warned of the danger and asked
permission to withdraw, was killed
during an attempt to break [music] the
siege. The German figure of 665,000
prisoners probably tripled the number of
actual captives, but it approximates
well the total Soviet losses in the
operation. And yet, even in Kiev, the
Germans paid a price. They had diverted
their energy and resources from the main
axis of advance.
Time lost in the south. Almost two
critical months could not recover. The
Russian winter was approaching. The road
to Moscow was intact, but the clock was
ticking against the invaders.
Operation Typhoon, the last German
attempt to capture Moscow in 1941, began
on October 2nd. Three Panza groups,
regrouped and partially resupplied,
pounded the Soviet lines along a 350 km
front. What followed was one of the most
dramatic moments of the entire war. In
the first days, the pockets of Viasma
and Brians gobbled up more than 650,000
Soviet soldiers in Moscow. On October
13th, Stalin ordered the evacuation of
most government and party offices to
Quebe.
The announcement of this evacuation
combined with rumors about the fighting
in Viasma produced on October 16th and
17th a situation close to panic in the
capital. Only the radio announcement
that Stalin remained in the city quelled
the chaos. Zukov [music] was sent from
Leningrad to take command of the western
front. He found that there were
virtually no forces to defend the road
to Moscow. The desperate battle in the
Viasma pocket led by General Lucin won
crucial days as fresh units arrived from
Siberia.
General Katakov and his fourth tank
brigade, equipped with the new T34s,
used tactics for the first time that
would become characteristics of the
Soviet army. Ambushes from the forest,
attacks from the flanks, controlled
withdrawals that drew the German panzas
into prepared anti-tank lines. near
Matsensk on October 6th. Katukov
inflicted such damage on the battle
group of Gdderian's fourth Panza
Division that a special investigation
was opened in the German general staff.
By November, the ground had frozen,
restoring German mobility and Boach
launched his final onslaught.
The third Panza army arrived at Clean on
November 24th. A bridge over the Moscow
Vulga Canal was crossed, placing German
tanks within 35 km of the Kremlin.
German officials claimed that they could
see the city's towers through their
binoculars. It was the closest point the
Vermacht would ever reach. On December
4th, temperatures dropped [music] to
-15° C. German tank engines would not
start without being preheated for hours.
Soldiers without adequate winter
equipment suffered from massive
frostbite. The infantry divisions had
lost more than 50% of their fighting
strength in two months. At the same
time, Stalin had quietly amassed three
new armies. The first shock, the 20th,
and the 10th, fresh, well equipped, and
equipped with skis, which were waiting
in the Stavka's reserve. The soldiers
came from the cold, hardened Siberian
military districts, prepared for the
winter war that the Germans feared. At
3:00 a.m. on December 5th, 1941, when
the temperature was minus5° C and
[music] snow covered a meter deep, the
Kinan front launched the counter
offensive. The next day, the Western
Front added its own attacks from
positions north and south of Dimmitro.
The nature of combat changed overnight.
Soviet skiers and cavalry battalions
penetrated between the villages that
German units needed to survive. The T34s
advanced on roads that German tanks
could not use. In the north, the first
shock army drove the [music] seventh
Panza division from its bridge head over
the Moscow Vulgar Canal. In the south,
General Belellov's cavalry cut off the
supply route of Gdderian's second Panza
army. Within 10 days, Army Group Center
had been pushed 100 to 150 km westward.
Clint was released on December 15th.
Gderrion repeatedly requested
authorization to withdraw his army to
more defensive positions. The OKH had no
authority to grant it without Hitler's
consent. On December 25th, following a
final conflict with the new commander of
army group center Feld Mascal vonuga,
Gdderion was relieved of command. Hitler
assumed personal command of the army.
His fanatical resistance order has been
criticized by generations of German
military historians as another example
of amateur interference. But in this
case, most analysts conclude that the
order was correct. The Germans lacked
the resources and transportation to
build a new defensive line. Defending on
the spot, as hard as it was, allowed
them to at least keep the rudiments of
shelter and the supplies that would keep
them alive until reinforcements arrived.
What Stalin did not understand was that
the December victory was not the prelude
to the German defeat, but the end of his
own strategic offensive. He demanded
that his commanders extend the
counteroffensive in all directions
simultaneously
against army group north near Lenengrad
against army group center along its
entire front against army group south in
southern Russia. Jukov and Shaposnikov
warned that the available forces were
insufficient.
Stalin ignored the warnings. [music] The
counteroffensive spread. The cavalry
units penetrated hundreds of kilometers
into the German rear, but lacked [music]
the mass needed to explode. The second
shock army was sent through a breach
into the rear guard of the German
northern army near Lennengrad. He was
trapped, his men held out in nightmarish
conditions for months. In June 1942, the
commander who had been sent to rescue
them, General Vlassov, was captured. His
bitterness over abandonment led him to
collaborate with the Germans, an act
that Soviet historians meticulously
erased from the records for decades. By
the spring of 1942, the front line had
stabilized, fatigue was mutual, and both
sides were preparing [music] for the
summer.
In May 1942, Marshall Timoshenko planned
an ambitious offensive to recapture
Kharkiv. In theory, it was a coup to
dismantle German preparations for the
summer. In practice, it was a
catastrophe that illustrated all the
outstanding problems of the Red Army.
The plan was complex, depended on
simultaneous coordination between
multiple armies and radically
underestimated the German response
capacity.
Timoshenko concentrated 765,300
men and 923 tanks against the German 6th
Army. The May 12th attacks initially
surprised defenders. [music]
In the south, General Gorodnski's sixth
army advanced 60 km in 2 days. The
armored formations that were to exploit
the success remained in their areas of
concentration due to coordination
failures of the general staff. The
Germans responded masterfully. Hitler
authorized the transfer of Richtoven's
eighth air core from the Crimea and
allowed Kle to launch operation
Fredicus, a Pinsir attack from the south
against the Soviet left flank. Gafon
Schwepenberg's third motorized core with
four [music] Panza divisions cut off
communications from the Soviet advance.
On May 17th, the Soviet 6th and 57th
Armies as well as two tank core were
completely destroyed. The Germans
captured 239,036
prisoners. The defeat at Kharkiv
preceded the most ambitious German
offensive of the summer of 1942,
Operation Blue, which aimed at the oil
reserves of the Caucuses and control of
the Vular. Stalin, still convinced that
the real German target was Moscow, kept
his strategic reserves in the center
while the southern flank collapsed. By
the end of July, the Germans had reached
the Caucuses. The first Panza army
captured the small oil fields of MOP on
August 9th only to find them
systematically destroyed. Army Group B
was advancing eastward along the dawn.
And on the horizon, a city that no one
had paid much attention to began to take
on disproportionate importance for both
sides. Stalinrad.
In 1942, Stalinrad was an industrial
city of 600,000 [music]
inhabitants spread over 24 km on the
west bank of the Vular supplied
equipment, crucial military forces. But
what made it the epicenter of the war
was something simpler and more fateful,
[music] its name. For Hitler, capturing
the city that bore his enemy's name had
a symbolic value that surpassed any
strategic consideration.
For Stalin, losing it was unthinkable.
Both dictators made the same decision at
the same time for identical reasons.
This city could not be lost. General
Vasili Triov took command of the 62nd
Army inside Stalingrad in September
1942.
His operational instruction born of
desperation became doctrine. Embrace the
enemy. to keep one's own lines so close
to the Germans that German aviation and
heavy artillery could not be used
without destroying one's own troops.
Fight meter by meter, building by
building, floor by floor, in a war of
proximity where the German tactical
advantage was nullified. The battles for
the ruins of Stalingrad's industrial
complexes, the tractor factory, the Red
October steel mills, the Baricardi
munitions factory are some of the
fiercest in all of military history.
Regiments arriving in the city with
thousands of men dwindled to hundreds in
days. Palace's divisions rotated their
units between active combat within the
city and defensive positions on the
flank. German casualties were steadily
increasing. At the same time, the Stava
was executing something extraordinary.
The most meticulous planning operation
the Red Army had ever conducted. As the
world stared at the ruins of Stalingrad,
away from the spotlight, two Soviet
fronts quietly amassed massive forces on
either side of the German salient.
General Alexi Antonov and the Stavka
planners had identified the fundamental
weakness. The flanks of Palace's sixth
army were not protected by German
forces, but by the poorly equipped
Romanian third and fourth armies with
few effective anti-tank guns.
Operation Uranus would not seek to
penetrate the Germans. He would surround
them through his weaker allies.
On November 19th, 1942, at 7:30 a.m.,
General Nikolai Vatutin's southwestern
front launched the offensive. The
temperature was -18° C. The 26th and
first tank corps of Romanenko's fifth
tank army penetrated the sectors of the
Romanian third army in a matter of
hours. Three Romanian divisions totaling
27,000 prisoners were captured in the
first 3 days. The tank corps advanced up
to 70 km per day, evading the centers of
resistance. At dawn on November 22nd,
Lieutenant Colonel GN Philippov staged a
daring maneuver. He formed five T34
tanks and two companies of motorized
infantry in close column with all
headlights on and advanced toward the
north bridge at Kalish on the dawn as if
it were a German column returning from
operations. The German centuries let him
pass. The bridge was captured intact.
From the south, General Volsky's fourth
mechanized corps penetrated from the
positions of the Romanian Fourth Army.
On November 23rd, the 26th tank corps
and the fourth mechanized corps joined
near Sovetskcoy.
The German sixth army, 22 divisions,
330,000 men, was encircled.
What followed was one of the darkest
denums in modern military history. Reich
Marshall Guring promised Hitler that the
Luftvafa could supply the Sixth Army by
air to sustain 330,000 men. At least 600
tons per day were needed. The Luftvafa
never exceeded 300 tons on any day. Many
days he delivered less than 100. Soviet
General PSenov organized the first
Soviet systematic air defense system of
the war. concentric rings of
groundcontrolled interceptors and
anti-aircraft batteries. The slow J52s,
the unarmored German transport planes,
flew directly into these defenses. In
the most intense period of the airlift,
the German fourth air fleet lost 488
transport aircraft and converted
bombers, more than 265 J52s, a third of
Germany's complete inventory. Marshall
Fon Mannstein was given command of the
newly created Dawn Army Group with
orders to open a corridor into the
pocket. Operation Wintergitta began on
December 12th. Kchner's 57th Panza Corps
equipped with the newly reinforced Sixth
Panza Division advanced for 8 days
coming within 50 km of the Stalinrad
perimeter. He was arrested by
Malinowski's second guard army. On
January 31st, 1943, the newly promoted
Feld Mascal Friedrich Powus capitulated
to the Soviet 64th Army. On February
2nd, all organized resistance ceased
from 330,000 men captured inside the
pocket. Approximately 91,000 marched
into Soviet captivity. Only 5,000 would
ever return to Germany. The Sixth Army
had ceased to exist. The victory at
Stalingrad demonstrated that the Red
Army was capable of planning and
executing strategic operations on a
scale that the Germans had not
anticipated.
But the weeks that followed also
revealed that old problems persisted.
Stalin's tendency to demand offensives
on too many fronts simultaneously and
the army's inability to sustain deep
exploitations without becoming
overextended.
In February and March 1943, as the Red
Army attempted to exploit Stalingrad
toward a general collapse of Army Group
South, Mannstein executed a masterful
counteroffensive that recaptured Karkov
and halted the Soviet advance on the
Donets River. Soviet units exhausted
after months of offensive operations
lacked the fuel, ammunition, and
reinforcements to withstand the blow of
the SS armor. Lipstandata Dasich Totenov
that Manstein had expertly concentrated.
But from the ashes of Soviet failure in
the spring of 1943, something new was
born. The map of the front with its
peculiar curvature had created a salient
that the Germans could only look at as
an opportunity. The Kursk Bulge, a
pocket 250 km from north to south and
160 from east to west, which pointed
west like a fist. The perfect trap. The
Germans began to plan. The Soviets,
perfectly informed, thanks to their
intelligence service, which included
sources within the German headquarters
itself, prepared to receive them.
By the summer of 1943, the fundamental
strategic decision in the Soviet general
staff was the most counterintuitive of
the war, not to attack. Zhukov and
Vasilevki convinced Stalin that the Red
Army must absorb the coming German
offensive, destroy its offensive
potential, and only then launch its own
counteroffensives.
It was not easy. Stalin had ended two
consecutive winters with the feeling
that victory was within reach and that
he had escaped due to timing errors. But
the logic was irrefutable.
If the Germans were going to attack at
Kusk, let them attack. The Red Army
built in the Kursk salient the most
elaborate defensive network Europe had
ever seen. Eight successive defensive
belts, each made up of minefields up to
3,200 per km of front. anti-tank
positions in depth and concentrated
artillery. Each rifle company had at
least three artillery pieces, nine
anti-tank guns, a self-propelled tank or
gun, and a platoon of combat engineers
within its position defensive. Artillery
fire control exercises were repeated
daily. All the whites were registered.
Every meter of telephone cable was
checked and retested. The battle began
on July 5th, 1943.
Half an hour before the Germans planned
to open their own artillery, Soviet
artillery launched a preemptive counter
blockade. The effect was mixed. German
gunners surprised in the open suffered
badly, but in other sectors, the
concentration positions of the assault
troops were not hit. In the north,
General Mod's 9inth Army attacked the
fronts of Rokosovski's 13th and 70th
armies. In 6 days, with massive support
from Stooka bombers, it only penetrated
between 8 and 15 km inside the
multi-layered Soviet defenses.
Rokosovski counterattacked with the
second tank army. Soviet tank corps
closed the gap, launched counterattacks
from the flanks, and halted the German
advance. On July 12th, model had lost
about 400 tanks and 50,000 casualties.
In the south, Hoth's fourth Panza army
with the fearsome Tiger, Panther, and
Elephant penetrated deeper, up to 35 km.
But Vatin engaged Katakov's first tank
army in an active defense, burying
tanks, launching continuous
counterattacks from the flanks to tire
and degrade the German armor. On July
11th, General Rott Mistrov's Fifth
Guard's tank army arrived on the
battlefield after a 100 km march on
night marches. On July 12th, Brock
Mistrov launched his charge forward,
seeking to reduce the Tiger's technical
advantage by reducing it to short combat
distances where Soviet guns had a chance
to penetrate their armor. The attack was
costly. Rott Mistro lost as many as 400
of his 500 attacking tanks, but it
served its purpose. He pinned down the
second SS Panza Corps and fought it to a
halt by July 13th.
On the same day, July 10th, the Western
Allies had landed in Sicily. Hitler
ordered the withdrawal of the second SS
Panza Corps to be redeployed in Italy.
Manstein protested in vain. On the 18th
of July, the fourth Panzer Army began
its retreat to the initial positions.
For the first time in the war, a major
German offensive had failed to penetrate
Soviet defenses into operational depths.
On July 12th, 1943, while the Germans
were still fighting in the Ksk salient,
the Red Army launched Operation Coutus
against the German oral salient north of
the battlefield. General Bramian's 11th
Guard's army with 170,500
men, 648 tanks, and 3,100 artillery
pieces created a penetration on the
first day that Soviet tank core exploded
before the Germans could react. On
August 5th, General Riyalo's third
guard's tank army entered Orel. By
August 18th, the German salient had been
completely eliminated. Two weeks later,
without giving them time to reorganize,
the Vorones and Stepper fronts launched
Operation Rumiant south of the Kusk
salient. Katakov's first tank army and
Rot Mistrov's fifth guard's tank army
exploited the gap created by the
combined forces. Belgarod fell on August
5th. Kharkif was liberated on August
23rd. The moment the planners of the
German general staff were trying to
understand what had happened in the
north, the south exploded. When they
tried to stabilize the south, the north
moved again. It was the concept of the
successive offensive that Tukachevsky
had articulated in the 1920s and that
now with a mature army and sufficient
mass was beginning to function with
deadly precision. By the end of 1943,
the Red Army was crossing the Daniper at
40 crossing points, most of them
improvised. Soviet engineers built rafts
out of logs and drums of oil under
German fire. The vanguard units were
launched into the Daniper in any
available vessel. On November 6th, 1943,
Rebalco's tanks stormed from the small
bridge head of Lutees, north of Kiev,
and within 3 days had liberated the
capital of Ukraine.
The year 1944 was the year in which the
Red Army proved that it could not only
win battles, but sequence them. Stalin
planned five staggered offensives that
began in the north and worked southward
like a rising tide, preventing the
Germans from concentrating their
reserves at any point before the next
point was hit. In the north on January
14th, 1944, the Leningrad front attacked
from a bridge head at Oranian bomb that
had been secretly reinforced during
weeks of night infiltration.
The second shock army with five rifle
divisions, 600 guns, and several armored
units struck the flank of the German
18th Army, besieging the city. A day
later, the rest of the Leningrad front
joined. By February 20th, the siege of
Leningrad, which had lasted 872 days,
was over. The city that the Germans had
promised not to take but simply to
destroy, had survived. Its citizens had
paid a price that defies comprehension.
More than a million civilians died
during the siege, mostly from
starvation. The winter of 1941 to 1942
was the deadliest. As many as 100,000
people died in January 1942 in
Lenningrad alone. People would collapse
in the street and die before anyone
could help them. The ration of bread for
non-competent workers fell to 250 g per
day. For shop assistants, 125 g. In
Ukraine, the Soviet machine worked with
an efficiency that would have been
unimaginable 2 years earlier. Operation
Corsen Chevchenkovski enclosed two
German core, the 11th and 32nd, in a
pocket near the Daineer. General KV
executed an elaborate deception
operation, simulating the concentration
of the fifth guard's tank army in the
woods west of Kiraovagrad. As that army
moved silently 100 km north on January
24th, the fifth tank and the sixth tank
army closed the encirclement.
The German rescue counterattacks came
within 15 km of the pocket. They never
opened it.
On February 17th, General Stemerman gave
the order to break with the survivors.
At dawn, Soviet tanks and cosacs on
horseback cut off the fugitives. The
Soviets claimed 55,000 Germans killed or
wounded and 18,000 captured. On June
22nd, 1944,
the exact third anniversary of the
German invasion of the Soviet Union, the
operation that many military historians
consider the greatest defeat in the
history of the German army began, not in
Stalingrad, in Bellarus.
Operation Bration was an exercise in
strategic deception and operational
concentration on a scale that the
Germans had not thought possible. While
the German armor watched south,
convinced that the next offensive would
come against Army Group north of
Ukraine, where all German intelligence
pointed to a huge Soviet concentration,
the Stafka had quietly moved the Fifth
Guard's tank army, the Eighth Guard's
Army, and several other frontline
formations from the south into Bellarus
undetected by German intelligence. Feld
Mascal Bush's army group center had 63
divisions defending a front of nearly
600 km. Only four divisions were
available as operational reserves behind
that line. Many units of these so-called
reserves were engaged in antipartisan
operations in the rear. The defensive
systems consisted of a cordon of
trenches with no real depth. Hitler had
designated several cities as fortresses.
Vitbsk, Orcha, Mgalev, Boruisk that were
to hold out indefinitely, though none
had the garrisons, supplies, or defenses
to do so. On the night of June 19th to
20th, Soviet partisans launched a
coordinated wave of attacks on railroad
tracks throughout the rear of Army Group
Center. More than 10,000 sabotage points
were activated simultaneously.
The supply, withdrawal, and
reinforcement lines were paralyzed. On
June 23rd, the armies of four Soviet
fronts attacked at five points
simultaneously. By June 25th, the German
53rd Army Corps was locked up in Vitbsk
with 35,000 men. By 27th June, the First
Guard's tank corps and the 9inth tank
corps had crossed the Berisena and were
beginning to converge on Minsk from the
north and south respectively. The German
Fourth Army, more than 100,000 men, was
enclosed east of Minsk. On July 3rd, the
29th Guards Tank Brigade entered Minsk
from the northwest, while the fourth
Guards Tank Brigade entered Minsk from
the northeast. That same afternoon,
elements of the First Guards Tank Corps
arrived from the south. The city fell in
one morning with no meaningful defense
organized. Within 12 days, Army Group
Center had lost 25 divisions and more
than 300,000 men. In the following
weeks, it would lose more than 100,000
additional pesos. Operation Braton cost
the Germans 400,000 casualties, while
the Red Army suffered approximately
180,000 dead and missing, and more than
500,000 wounded and non-combat
casualties. The operation as a whole
destroyed 28 of the 34 divisions of the
Third Panza Army, the fourth and ninth
armies of Army Group Center, and the
largest defeat in the history of the
German army.
Hoover Institution, Wikipedia.
On July 17th, 1944, 50,000 German
prisoners captured in Minsk were paraded
through the streets of Moscow. It was
not a show of cruelty. It was a
statement. The Soviet Union was telling
the world that the war had changed
direction permanently. While Bagraton
destroyed the center of the German
front, the Red Army executed two
additional offensives that extended the
collapse to the ends of German
controlled territory. In the north,
Operation Lavandir launched three armies
of Marshall Konev's tanks into southern
Poland. Katakov's first guard's tank
army, Reebalo's third guard's tank army,
and Leoshenko's fourth tank army entered
army group north of Ukraine and within
days had crossed the Vistula,
establishing bridge heads on Polish
soil. By July 29th, advanced units of
the First Guards tank army had crossed
the Vistula south of Sandom. In the
south on August 20th, Ukraine's second
and third fronts executed operation
Ayasi Kishenev. In a move that perfectly
reflected Soviet doctrine, they
selectively attacked the weaker Allied
armies of the Vemarked the Romanian
forces. Three Romanian divisions were
disbanded in the first hours. General
Kravchenko's sixth guard's tank army
exploded to the south without
significant resistance.
4 days later on August 23rd, 1944, King
Michael of Romania arrested Marshall
Antonescu and proclaimed Romania's
withdrawal from the Axis. Within hours,
Romanian units that had been fighting
alongside the Germans, began to
surrender to the Soviets. Within days,
they were fighting their former allies.
The German sixth army, the same army
number that had been destroyed at
Stalingrad, was trapped in Kishv's
pocket. By September 5th, its last
elements had been destroyed or captured.
Total axis losses exceeded 400,000 men.
The Red Army advanced into the Balkans
with a speed that turned entire
countries into theaters of operations in
weeks. Bulgaria declared war on Germany
on September 8th. On October 20th, the
Yugoslav partisans and the Third
Ukrainian army entered Belgrade
together. By the end of 1944, the Soviet
army was dominant throughout Eastern
Europe and part of the Balkans.
On January 12th, 1945, exactly 8 days
ahead of schedule, accelerated at the
request of the Western Allies who were
being pushed back by the Arden's
offensive, KV's Ukrainian First Front
attacked from the Sandomir's bridge
head. Artillery preparation was an
instrument of precision, not of brute
destruction. The advanced battalions
first occupied the German frontline
positions with specific supporting
artillery. When the main bombardment
began, it did so with an elaborate
sequence designed to fool the defenders.
First massive fire, then a silence of
several minutes that induced the Germans
to come out of their bunkers to occupy
their firing positions. Then another
bombardment that trapped them in the
open field. At 1400 hours on the first
day, the third guard's rebalo and fourth
Leoshenko guards tank armies were
exploding through the attacking infantry
divisions into the German device. By the
end of the first day, the front had
penetrated 35 km wide and 20 km deep. On
January 14th, Zhukov's Bellarusian first
front attacked from the Magnusu bridge
head. The combined German armies of
Bus's 9inth Army found themselves
crushed under concentrations of up to
250 guns per kilometer of penetration
front. By January 18th, KV was 5 days
away ahead of its program. By January
19th, the former Avitz death camp was
liberated, revealing to the world
something that many already knew, but
whose full scope no one could yet
comprehend.
The fighting of the summer of 1939 to
January 1945 on the Eastern Front had
produced casualties that define the
limits of human language to describe
destruction. Only between the Ukrainian
first and the Bellarian first in
operation Vistulara Oda did the Germans
effectively lose the 9inth army and the
fourth Panza army. Naring and vonalkan
groups, what was left of entire armies,
traversed 400 kilometers of Soviet
controlled territory in a desperate
retreat toward the Oda. By January 31st,
units of Bogdanov's second guard's tank
army had reached the Oda River near
Kustrin. Only 60 km separated these
troops from Berlin, only 60 km, and then
Stalin stopped the advance. For decades,
the official Soviet explanation for this
halt was logistical. Zhukov's right
flank was exposed, supply lines
overextended, troops exhausted after 700
km of advance in 3 weeks. All this was
true. But perhaps there was another
reason. On February 4th, 1945,
the Yaltta conference began. Stalin,
Roosevelt, and Churchill met in Crimea
to decide the postwar world. Among the
most important agreements, a protocol
signed in London in September 1944 had
divided Germany into occupation zones.
The Soviet Union would receive Berlin
and Eastern Germany regardless of who
took the city. That agreement was
confirmed at Yalttar, but Austria, the
Osmark that Hitler had annexed in 1938,
was not included in that protocol.
Austria was technically an undivided
territory. Stalin was the kind of chess
player who never let a piece slip away
without claiming it.
On February 17th, just days after Yaltta
concluded, Stalin issued instructions
ordering the Ukrainian second and third
fronts to prepare an offensive toward
Vienna. The best tank armies, including
Kravchenko's sixth guards tank, were
redirected south instead of west. On
March 6th, 1945, Hitler launched his
last major offensive north of Lake
Balaton in Hungary. 10 Panza divisions,
including the elite 6th SS Panza army of
Dietrich, fresh from the Arden. The
offensive penetrated deep into the
Soviet front on the first day. Tolbukin
begged the Stavka to allow him to commit
the reserves designated for his own
offensive. The Stavka categorically
refused. The front was folded. It didn't
break. By March 15th, the German
offensive had expired. The next day, the
Soviet armies that had absorbed the
heaviest blow turned and launched their
own onslaught. Within days, the sixth SS
Panzer army was retreating faster than
it had advanced. On April 13th,
Kravchenko's tanks entered Vienna.
Austria would be occupied by the Red
Army. Stalin's objective had been
accomplished. The next day, April 14th,
Soviet artillery opened the preliminary
bombardment along the Oda and the nicer.
Berlin was waiting. On April 16th, 1945,
at 3:00 a.m., 143 anti-aircraft search
lights illuminated the German front in
front of Zhukov's positions at the
Kustrin bridge head. Zhukov's plan was
ambitious, to use light to dazzle the
defenders as his infantry advanced. The
plan failed. Dust and smoke from the
preliminary bombardment blocked the
light. The German soldiers were not
dazzled. They were simply pointing at
the light to see where to shoot from.
The attackers advanced towards their own
search lights. Chuikov's eighth army of
the guards got stuck on the CEO heights,
a line of hills that dominated the only
direct road to Berlin. Zhukov, watching
from an advanced command post, lost his
patience. He prematurely committed his
tank armies, which were caught in the
tangle of artillery and supply vehicles
of the rifle divisions. Nine German
divisions held underground, had
succeeded in slowing down all the most
powerful machinery that the Red Army had
ever concentrated on a single front. It
was not until April 20th that Jukov's
forces had penetrated the German Fourth
Defensive Belt and begun the advance
into the eastern suburbs of Berlin.
Meanwhile, to the south, KV was
progressing better. His artillery had
executed a more carefully calibrated
preparation. On the first day, his
forces had crossed the na and penetrated
1.5 km into the second defensive belt.
On April 20th, the third guard's tank
army took the OKH headquarters at Zosan,
30 km from the center of Berlin. Stalin
watched and decided to encourage
competition. In telephone conversations
with Zhukov and KV on April 17th, he
blurred the dividing line between his
two fronts in the vicinity of Berlin.
The first to arrive would take the
prize. On April 24th, Triov's 8th
Guard's army and Katakov's first guard's
tank army joined with the vanguards of
Rebelo's Third Guard's tank army and
Luchinsk's 28th Army southeast of
Berlin. The German 9th Army was
enclosed, the city, too. On April 29th,
the first elements of the 79th Rifle
Corps of the Third Shock Army began the
symbolic assault on the Reichstar. On
April 30th, scouts from the 150th Rifle
Division, waved the Red Standard over
the building. Hitler committed suicide
that same day. On May 2nd, Artillery
General Helmouth Vidling, commander of
the Berlin Garrison, surrendered the
last defenders of the city. The battle
of Berlin [music] had lasted 17 days. It
had cost the Red Army 361,367
sick leave 81,116
of them irreoverable.
The Vermacht lost 458,080
dead and 479,298
prisoners.
The magnitude of the Soviet contribution
to the defeat of Nazism is difficult to
communicate with numbers, but numbers
are all we have. The Eastern Front
absorbed approximately 75 to 80% of
German military power throughout the
entire war. At the most critical moments
of 1941 and 1942, when Britain and the
United States were just beginning to
mobilize, the Soviet Union sustained the
ground war effort against Germany
virtually alone. The Red Army fought the
largest number of battles against the
largest concentrations of the German
army during the entire conflict. Total
Soviet military casualties are estimated
at approximately 8.7 million killed in
combat with an additional 1 to2 million
killed in German captivity.
Soviet civilian casualties directly
caused by the war, massacres,
starvation, conflict related diseases
are estimated at an additional 14 to 17
million. The exact figures will always
vary depending on the methodology and
sources. The commonly cited total figure
of 27 million Soviet dead is a widely
accepted estimate that attempts to
encompass all categories of losses. In
terms of equipment, the Red Army [music]
destroyed or captured according to
estimates by the German general staff's
own estimates 75% of all German
divisions consumed in the war. The
Vermacht suffered losses on the Eastern
Front that increased [music] every year.
1941 saw the greatest German advances
with the lowest relative costs. 1942 was
more costly. 1943 was the year when the
Germans began to lose more than they
could replace. 1944 was the collapse.
1945 was the apocalypse.
What the Vermacht general staff
documented internally and which its
postwar memoirs tried to downplay was
that the Red Army by 1944 and 1945 was
by any objective operational measure a
firstass army. Their commanders, Zhukov,
KV, Rousosovski, Vasilvki, Malininovski,
Tolbukin, Bagram, Vatutin, had learned
under the heaviest fire in human
history, and had survived and grown
precisely because the cost of error was
death, their own or their soldiers, or
boths. War economist Harold James
observed that the Allies bought the
German defeat in Soviet blood and paid
in a can of spam. It's not a perfect
metaphor, but it captures a truth. The
Anglo-American lend lease was crucial in
equipping the Red Army, especially the
49,000 trucks that finally enabled the
deep exploitative logistics that Soviet
doctrine had always demanded, but never
before been able to execute. But the
price in lives was Soviet. The
transformation of the Red Army between
1941 and 1945 is one of the most
remarkable phenomena in military
history. It began as an army decapitated
by purges, caught institutionally
surprised, caught in transition between
doctrines with commanders terrified to
take initiative with communications that
were collapsed under the first shock and
with logistics that could not sustain
the operations that their doctrine
demanded.
Four years later, it was the most
experienced army in the history of
mechanized warfare. Its commanders had
learned to coordinate artillery, armor,
infantry, and aviation in combined
operations on a scale that no other army
had attempted. Their staffs could move
multiple armies in complex
replenishments without enemy
intelligence detecting it. Their
strategic deception operations, the
Masquerovka, were executed with a
sophistication that repeatedly left the
German OKH believing that the attack
would come in the wrong sector. The
price of that learning is incalculable.
Each year of the war, the Red Army
perfected its techniques while paying
with millions of lives. The soldiers
[music] who survived the disasters of
1941 were veterans who had learned with
their blood the lessons that no manual
could teach. The officers who survived
the purges and the first months of the
war had demonstrated under the most
demanding conditions that they were
capable of thinking under extreme
[music] pressure. There is a moment in
the historical record that sums up this
transformation better than any other. It
is June 23rd, 1944, the exact
anniversary of the German invasion. When
2.5 million Soviet soldiers attacked
Army Group Center along 360 mi of front,
the Germans did not see it coming,
although they had been in their
positions for weeks. The deception had
been perfect. The concentration had been
perfect. The execution was in its first
hours perfect. By the time the Germans
understood what was happening, it was
over. That army of 1944 was
unrecognizable compared to that of 1941.
And yet, it was the same army, he had
learned, at a price that no nation
should have to pay for any reason.
Chapter 26.
The last campaign. Manuria. On August
9th, 1945, just 3 months after the
German surrender, the Red Army executed
its last campaign of World War II, the
invasion of Japanese controlled Manuria.
Marshall Vasileski coordinated three
Soviet fronts totaling 90 divisions,
5,000 tanks, and 4,000 aircraft. The
Japanese Quantum Army had 31 infantry
divisions and 12 independent brigades,
but most had been created in the spring
of 1945 with men who had previously been
exempt from service or deemed unfit, and
many were garrison divisions without
significant artillery or anti-tank
capability.
Japanese intelligence had concluded that
the mountainous and inhospitable terrain
of Manuria's flanks would make any
Soviet attack from those directions
impracticable. It was the same mistake
that Army Group Center [music] planners
had made regarding the swamps of
Bellarus 2 months earlier.
General Kravchenko's sixth guard's tank
army crossed the border in the early
dark [music] hours of August 9th and
within 3 days had covered 450 km
crossing the passes of the great king
and range which the Japanese had been
ruled out as impracticable for armor
before Japan understood the threat. Lend
lease's advances had included the
American Sherman ships whose narrower
tracks proved inadequate for the marshy
passages. The T-34s and BT7s took the
lead. By August 15th, Emperor Hirohito
announced the surrender. The Manurian
campaign, which many expected to last
months, was resolved in 11 days of
effective combat. Soviet casualties were
2,31 killed and 24,425
wounded. the Japanese much higher.
Although the imperial capitulation ended
the organized combat before the
encirclements could be completed. The
Manurion campaign was also a laboratory.
Vasilfki reorganized his tank armies
with an experimental structure that
integrated more motorized infantry and
artillery support than any previous
formation. The Sixth Guard's tank army
included 25 armored and 44 motorized
battalions with 1,09 tanks and
self-propelled guns. It was the
structure that the Red Army would study
for its postwar period. More mass, more
balance, more sustaining capacity. The
Red Army's last bullet of World War II
was fired in the Kurill Archipelos in
the weeks following the Japanese
surrender on September 2nd. Soviet and
Japanese soldiers fought on islands that
both knew no longer had any strategic
significance. [music]
It was the inertia of war, which is the
most difficult force to stop that exists
in human nature.
When the war ended in May 1945, the
Soviet Union was the most militarily
powerful state on the face of the earth.
His army had destroyed the Vermacht. It
had occupied half of Europe. He had
liberated or conquered depending on
one's perspective entire nations. He had
shown that the doctrine of operation
depth that Tukachevsky had articulated
in the 1930s was correct and that a
sufficiently large, sufficiently
capable, and sufficiently determined
army could annihilate any force that
opposed it on the ground. And he had 26
million dead. Each medium-sized Soviet
city had lost between 15 and 25% of its
population.
Collective farms operated with 71% of
their 1941 staff. Women, the elderly,
and children sustained the economy while
their sons and husbands died on the
fronts in Poland, Germany, and Austria.
The Red Army returned home, not to the
easy celebration, but to the brutal work
of rebuilding a literally destroyed
country. Many veterans returned to find
that their families had not survived.
The cities in the western part of the
country, Kiev, Minsk, Leningrad,
Stalingrad were ruins. In some regions,
there were no men of working age left.
The memory of that war was imprinted in
the collective DNA of the Soviet nation.
May 9th, Victory Day, became the holiest
holiday on the calendar, not as a
celebration, but as mourning. In Russian
families, everyone can name their dead
in that war. Grandparents,
great-grandparents, uncles who never
returned. The memory of that sacrifice
is the foundation stone on which
everything that came after was built for
better and for worse.
There is an image that persisted in the
Soviet popular imagination. The
photograph of the anonymous soldier who
nails the red banner over the ruins of
the Reichag in Berlin. It didn't matter
if he had been the first or the 10th to
do so, if the photograph was recreated
or authentic, if the soldier had one or
two watches on his wrist, a detail that
the Soviet sensors would correct,
erasing the evidence of looting. What
mattered was the gesture, the flag over
the city that had sent its armies to
destroy them. That gesture cost 27
million lives. Let's not forget that.
Never.
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