All language subtitles for VIETNAM WAR 1955-1975 - Full Documentary

In 1954, the First Indochina War between
French colonial forces and Ho Chi Minh’s

communist revolutionaries comes to an end
after the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu.

In the following Geneva Accords, the US, France,
Britain, the Soviet Union and China agree to

divide Vietnam into two temporary states along the
17th Parallel – the communist Democratic Republic

of Vietnam in the North led by Ho Chi Minh, and
non-communist State of Vietnam in the south led

by former Emperor Bao Dai. The country is supposed
to be reunified after elections planned for 1956.

The deal is less than Ho Chi Minh hoped. He fought
for a single unified Vietnamese state but his

Chinese and Soviet supporters pressure him into
accepting compromise, since they want to prevent

further US intervention in Asia. For France, the
deal lets them end an unpopular war and quietly

leave the region. So, the Geneva Accords
serve the major powers, but don’t solve the

fundamental concerns of Vietnamese nationalists.
Although the US takes an active role in the talks,

it publicly downplayed its involvement as
a mere “interested nation”. Washington is

concerned about concessions to the Communists,
and it had militarily supported France during

the Indochina War. Although the US decided
against armed intervention at Dien Bien Phu,

CIA pilots flew supplies into the besieged
base. But now with the French on their way out,

President Eisenhower increases support to the
State of Vietnam, free from European colonial

overtones. Despite the planned elections, the US
starts a “nation-building” program in the south.

Washington supports the South for one major
reason: fear of communist expansion. For the US,

Ho Chi Minh is a puppet of Soviet
Communism. If Vietnam falls,

Laos, Cambodia, India, Burma, Thailand, the rest
of Southeast Asia and maybe even Australia could

follow like tumbling dominoes.
As French administrators leave,

the US identifies Bao Dai’s Prime Minister,
Ngo Dinh Diem, as the most viable alternative

to Ho Chi Minh. Although Diem lacks charisma,
he’s an anti-French, a Catholic nationalist,

and fervently anti-communist. The US hopes
that under their guidance, he can introduce

democratic reforms and stop communism’s spread.
But not everyone is enthusiastic for Diem or the

State of Vietnam. General Matthew Ridgway,
former US commander in Korea and World War

II , strongly opposes the US commitment.
He worries the US will become bogged down

in another ideological struggle in Asia, which
firepower alone will not solve. Diem’s democratic

credentials aren’t very reassuring either.
In October 1955, Diem removes Bao Dai in a

referendum, creating the Republic of Vietnam in
the south. He supposedly wins 98.91 percent of

the vote, raising some eyebrows in Washington.
But his recent ability to suppress communists,

as well as criminal syndicates and militant
religious sects, leads to US approval.

Around the same time, military advisors
arrive with CIA representatives in tow.

The US now pours resources into
South Vietnam. In the late 1950s,

the US provides a quarter of a billion dollars
per year – around 2.75 billion today . But little

goes to building South Vietnam’s economic base.
80 percent goes to the military, especially the

Army of the Republic of Vietnam, the ARVN.
With these forces Diem tightens his control.

In 1956, Diem replaces traditional village chiefs
with Saigon officials. Many village leaders

are thought to harbour communist sympathies,
but their removal leads to rural discontent.

Re-education programmes and slow
land reform do not help matters.

There is also a security clamp down. By 1958,

Saigon has arrested 25,000 people and 90 percent
of the communist parties' important members in

the south. Diem’s Decree 10/59 outlaws
most opposition and refuses to recognise

communist resistance against the French. A
Saigon newspaper carries his declaration:

“[The Indochinese Communist Party]
pursued Communist objectives,

and sought to turn Vietnam into a colony and the
Vietnamese into the slaves of Red imperialism.

They are Communists, traitors, and agents
of Russia and China.” (Gettleman 274/275)

Diem’s security forces, often minority
Catholics, also target middle-class

intellectuals and Buddhists, who they
see as centres of political opposition.

Diem makes it clear he will not honour the 1956
unification referendum as promised by the Geneva

Accords, because he claims no free election can
happen in the communist north. The US approves,

but largely because they expect Ho Chi
Minh to easily win. Instead, Eisenhower

invites Diem to Washington to show support:
“[Diem is] an example for people everywhere who

hate tyranny and love freedom.” (Lawrence TVW 59)
Meanwhile, in the North, frustration is building.

Ho Chi Minh officially forbids southern Communists
from committing violence, and instead concentrates

on propaganda and building up the north.
Estimates vary, but while enacting land reforms,

northern government agents execute around 15,000
North Vietnamese as supposed “evil landlords and

subversive elements” . Ho’s Commander-in-chief,
General Vo Nguyen Giap later admits the crimes:

“We made too many deviations and executed
too many honest people... Worse still,

torture came to be regarded as a normal practice
during party reorganisation.” (Langer 52)

Ho now faces pressure to increase military
activity in the south. Some southern communist

groups are already ignoring his orders
for non-violence, and military leaders are

increasingly side-lining their own leader.
In 1959, the North officially supports a

“protracted armed struggle [to] overthrow the
US-Diem regime.” They infiltrate thousands of

fighters and weapons into south via the Ho Chi
Minh trail in neighbouring Laos and Cambodia.

In 1960, Vietnamese nationalists form the
National Liberation Front. Initially a broad

organisation of communists and non-communists,
it closely cooperates with the communist People’s

Liberation Armed Forces. Collectively,
they become known as the Viet Cong, a

short form of the words ‘Vietnamese Communist’ in
Vietnamese. The name is used by Saigon newspapers

to differentiate the southern insurgency
groups from the Northern regular People’s

Army of Vietnam. But practically, the northern
communist party controls both organizations.

Despite this, most of the NLFs members are native
southern Vietnamese re-infiltrated from the north.

Despite their basic equipment, writer Le Ly
Hayslip, who grew up in rural southern Vietnam,

claims the Viet Cong had an important advantage
over the urban and Catholic dominated ARVN:

“In contrast to [the AVRN], the Viet Cong were,
for the most part, our neighbors... They did

not insult us... because they had been raised
exactly like us... Where the Republicans came

into a village overburdened with American
equipment designed for a different war,

the Viet Cong made do with what they had and
seldom wasted their best ammunition – the goodwill

of the people.” (Hayslip in Ruane)
As the Viet Cong expands,

they step up their sabotage
campaign. Edward Lansdale,

a US intelligence officer and counterinsurgency
pioneer, delivers a stark warning to Washington:

“[ARVN] in critical condition... [Viet
Cong] have started to steal the country

and expect to be done in 1961.” (Anderson 35)
Lansdale’s solution is to provide more support

to Diem. For others in the administration,
faith in Diem is plummeting, but there is

simply no one else to replace him. However, a
new US president means a new Vietnam policy.

John F. Kennedy takes office in 1961 at a volatile
time. Just prior to his inauguration, the Soviet

Union announces to support all groups fighting
“wars of national liberation”, so Kennedy delivers

a strong message during his inauguration:
[ORIGINAL AUDIO]

“Let every nation know, whether it wishes
us well or ill, that we shall pay any price,

bear any burden, meet any hardship, support any
friend, oppose any foe, to assure the survival

and success of liberty.” (Lawrence TVW 68)
Kennedy develops a new “flexible response”

doctrine, where conventional and covert forces
can be more widely used instead of just nuclear

deterrence. His goal is not necessarily to
defeat North Vietnam, but to ensure South

Vietnam can resist the growing insurgency
and, eventually, take over its own security.

He also brings a new team into the Oval
Office, including his so-called ‘Wise Men’:

advisors with backgrounds in the military and
government, as well as business, finance and

academia. Perhaps the most influential is Robert
McNamara. As a manager at the Ford Motor Company,

his meticulous data-driven management approach
was praised with saving the company. Kennedy now

asks McNamara to bring the same number-crunching
to national security as Secretary of Defence.

Kennedy’s ‘Wise Men’ encourage him to send more
military advisors to Vietnam. By 1962, there are

11,300 of them – more than ten times as many as
under Eisenhower. The Geneva Agreement forbids any

state from sending military personnel to either
Vietnamese government, so advisors operate on

technicalities. Officially non-combat personnel,
they received personal weapons when in Vietnam

and can theoretically only act in self-defence.
Some are training staff attached to ARVN, others

are special forces personnel that are technically
‘civilian contractors’. Throughout the 1960s,

many also function as helicopter pilots
ferrying ARVN troops. As their number grows,

the US sets up camps and barracks across South
Vietnam, especially helicopter bases. Although

ARVN continues to do most of the fighting – often
with surplus US World War II weapons - advisors

join patrols and occasionally become casualties.
To manage this force, Kennedy establishes the

Military Advisory Command, Vietnam – MACV .
From 1962, MACV focuses on so-called “strategic

hamlets” - specially fortified villages
designed to keep out Communist influence.

The Americans entice locals into physically and
ideologically secure villages with promises of

material benefits and better services. By
September 1962, 4.3 million villagers live

in around 3,000 strategic hamlets. This,
combined with counterinsurgency, covert

patrols and increased airstrikes against the Viet
Cong boost US optimism. But even with increased

American firepower, the Viet Cong strike back.
American helicopters become valuable targets,

as US Lt. Col Archie Clapp recalls in 1962:
“The helicopter flight... land[ed] troops in

their encircling positions... Eight of the 22
helicopters... were hit at least once... Why,

we wanted to know, were we subjected to his
heavy opposition when we were landing on the

heel of an airstrike? We concluded that it was
not in spite of, but because of the airstrike.

When the airstrike started, the VC grabbed
their guns and headed out of town... [to] the

intended helicopter landing sites.” (Langer 66)
In January 1963 the Viet Cong gain their most

significant victory yet. Around 350 guerillas
defeat a much larger ARVN force at Ap Bac,

including repelling flamethrowing armoured
personnel carriers and shooting down five

helicopters. US advisors are surprised the Viet
Cong stand their ground against air attacks,

armoured vehicles and napalm. Meanwhile, despite
their training, equipment and support, the ARVN

show poor leadership, and little will to fight.
There is more bad news for the US throughout

1963 as religious tensions spike in Saigon.
The South Vietnamese government continues to

suppress Buddhists , overseen by Diem’s brother
and sister-in-law. Around 75 percent of South

Vietnamese are nominally or culturally Buddhist,
but the government pressures city populations,

especially army officers, to convert, as
Buddhist Giac Duc recalls in spring 1963:

“There was tremendous pressure to become Catholic
so you could get ahead, and we began hearing

about a lot of secret conversions...
I was incensed by what was going on,

and I felt it was dangerous...” (Langer 69)
The issue dramatically hits headlines on June 11,

when Buddhist monk Thich Quang Duc burns himself
to death on a busy Saigon intersection. After US

protest, Diem promises to introduce reforms, but
his forces continue to raid Buddhist pagodas. To

the US, Diem’s government is now on its last legs.
In August 1963, the US learns of plans for a coup

against Diem by army officers. Historians debate
the level of US involvement, but they certainly

don’t prevent the coup. Instead, US officials
inform the plotters they support South Vietnam,

not a specific leader. On November 1, South
Vietnamese generals depose the government.

They execute Diem and his brother in the back
of an Armored Personnel Carrier – an act which

likely was not planned. This concerns the
US, but they hope the military government

will more aggressively take on the Viet Cong.
Soon after, another surprise killing shocks the

world. On November 22, 1963 President Kennedy is
assassinated in Dallas. By the time of his death,

16,000 advisors are in Vietnam and 100
have been killed. His Vice President,

Lyndon B. Johnson will now lead the war effort.
Johnson always wanted to be president – but not

a ‘war president’. His passion is domestic reforms
he calls the ‘Great Society’. He sees Vietnam as

a distraction, in both time and resources,
from pressing issues at home. But 1964 is

an election year, and Johnson’s Republican
rivals will take advantage of any apparent

weakness against international communism. He later
explains – in his trademark colourful language:

“... I knew that if we let Communist aggression
succeed in taking over South Vietnam, there would

follow … an endless national debate... that would
shatter my Presidency... I knew that Harry Truman

and Dean Acheson lost their effectiveness from the
day that the Communists took over China... And I

knew that all [their] problems, taken together,
were chickenshit compared with what might happen

if we lost Vietnam.” (Kearns in Ruane 100/101)
So, Johnson keeps Kennedy’s advisors and largely

follows their advice on Vietnam. Despite
wanting to keep US involvement limited,

he often agrees to their demands for further
escalation. In December 1963, with the strategic

hamlet programme crumbling under corruption
and poor management, McNamara predicts a

South Vietnamese collapse in 2-3 months.
Johnson considers airstrikes or ground

troops but wants to put off the decision
until after the coming election. Instead,

he sends more advisors along with a new
commander, General William Westmoreland,

who prefers firepower and active operations
to pacification and civilian programmes.

US covert actions are not new – they've been
happening across Vietnam since 1961. But the

US always maintains plausible deniability,
like using Taiwanese pilots to parachute

South Vietnamese groups into the North. By 1964,
one such operation is Operational Plan 34 Alpha,

or OPLAN 34A, which consists of commando
raids along the North Vietnamese coast.

Although the personnel may be South
Vietnamese, Thai, Laotian, or Taiwanese,

the raids are planned by MACV’s Studies and
Observations Group. A benign, bureaucratic name

for the US special forces and covert command.
The US Navy also carry out their own covert

operations known as DESOTO patrols. US destroyers
with electronic surveillance equipment try to

detect North Vietnamese communications and radar
emissions. From a North Vietnamese perspective,

the destroyers – supported by aircraft carriers -
are likely motherships for the OPLAN raiders. This

is not true, but both OPLAN and DESOTO missions
often take place in the same general area and

although technically separate, DESOTO patrols
provided intelligence for the coastal raids.

In July and August 1964, American destroyer
USS Maddox operates around the Gulf of Tonkin

on a DESOTO mission. What was planned to be an
uneventful cruise would soon result in one of

Vietnam’s greatest controversies.
On the night of July 30 and 31,

1964 OPLAN patrol boats bombard coastal
North Vietnamese military installations.

On August 1, the Maddox enters the area. Its
cruise is designed to be unprovocative and

remain outside North Vietnamese waters. But the
Maddox is as close as 14 kilometers to the shore,

which North Vietnam considers within their
territory, unlike the US interpretation.

The North Vietnamese navy assumes the American
destroyer is responsible for the previous

night’s bombardment. On August 2, three Vietnamese
torpedo boats head for the Maddox. The destroyer

fires warning shots, then targets the boats.
The North Vietnamese launch their torpedoes

but they miss. During the battle, the Maddox
fires around 260 5- and 3-inch shells – but

scores only one hit. The encounter increases
tension among the inexperienced American crew.

On August 4, the Maddox re-enters the gulf
together with destroyer USS Turner Joy. The

night is moonless and visibility is poor. The
captains have been told to expect further attack

and soon encounter unknown radar contacts. At
2134hrs, the Maddox opens fire, the Turner Joy

joins soon after. Sonarmen on both ships report
multiple enemy torpedoes in the water. Crewmen

also report seeing their wakes, and enemy ships.
As both US ships fire, they claim they’ve damaged

and sunk enemy vessels. By 2230 the Maddox makes
evasive manoeuvres, while the Turner Joy drops

depth charges and attempts to ram an enemy.
After two hours the battle is over,

but not because the radar contacts disappear.
Commander Herbert Ogier realises the number

of supposed contacts and torpedoes is reaching
ridiculous proportions. He begins to wonder if

the contacts are real and if the Maddox and Turner
Joy have just fired over 300 shells at nothing.

Nevertheless, reports of a North
Vietnamese attack are already on

their way to Washington. Only on August 5, when no
one finds any debris of the destroyed enemy ships,

does Captain Herrick on the Maddox send
a sceptical report - but it’s not a total

denial an attack took place. Captain Barnhart
of the Turner Joy still insists the attack

happened. The Joint Chiefs of Staff urgently
request information to give the President.

As messages flurry across the Pacific,
both sides prioritise supposed torpedo

and ship sightings. In the following days, both
captains say an attack took place, although not

as large as they thought. Meanwhile, McNamara
relies heavily on intercepted North Vietnamese

navy messages seemingly planning the attack.
Johnson then orders retaliatory airstrikes

at coastal bases in Vinh on August 5.
In the raid, North Vietnamese defences

shoot down two US planes and kill 1 pilot.
On August 10, Johnson signs the Gulf of Tonkin

Resolution allowing further retaliation.
It’s not a declaration of war but says

the president can “repel any armed attack
against the forces of the United States and

to prevent further aggression”. (Tovy 67)
The US Congress overwhelmingly passes the

resolution and during the discussions, members
condemn the unprovoked nature of the attack in

international waters. Johnson doesn’t tell
Congress about OPLAN or DESOTO. Instead,

McNamara claims the Maddox was on a routine patrol
through the area, and would continue to do so.

[ORIGINAL AUDIO – SECRETARY McNAMARA: The
destroyer was carrying out a mission, a patrol in

those waters, in international waters, when it was
attacked, it replied to the attack, it continued

to carry out its mission today and will do so for
the remainder of this week in the same waters.

The President has asked that the destroyer force
be doubled and a CAP – a combat air patrol – be

available at all times on call to it and as I
think you know he has issued instructions that

in the event of further attack upon our vessels
in international waters, we are to respond with

the objective of destroying the attackers.”
Following the crisis, Johnson’s approval

rating remains high and in November,
he wins a landslide election. Still,

he promises to keep ground troops out of Vietnam.
So, what actually happened in the Gulf of Tonkin?

There was certainly an attack on August 2,
since North Vietnam confirmed it. But there

was no attack on August 4. Instead, the
incident was likely the result of radar

anomalies caused by weather, crew stress,
miscommunication, and poor visibility.

According to the Maddox logs, they identified 25
probable torpedoes during the second incident.

But the North Vietnamese navy only has
12 torpedo boats, 3 of which were damaged

after the first attack - and each boat only
carries two torpedoes . The destroyers’ own

frequent change in direction probably sounded like
multiple incoming torpedoes to Maddox’s sonarmen.

Furthermore, if an attack did take place, the
North Vietnamese would likely confirm it for

propaganda value, but they deny it ever
happened. McNamara’s intercepted messages

are probably poorly translated and refer to
the recovery of ships damaged on August 2nd.

Some historians have suggested the US deliberately
faked the attack as a provocation for war. This

issue is still debated, but most historians
conclude it’s unlikely. It is possible some

evidence was misrepresented, and Johnson knew the
full details of the second incident by the time

he went to Congress , but he had already made
public declarations about the attack and his

intention to respond, even if in a limited way.
[ORIGINAL AUDIO – PRESIDENT JOHNSON]: The

determination all Americans to carry
out our full commitment to the people

and the government of South Vietnam will be
re-doubled by this outrage, yet our response,

for the present, will be limited and fitting.”
So Johnson has gotten a congressional resolution,

but he’s reluctant to use it. US planners draw up
bombing lists for targets in North Vietnam, but

they don’t use them right away. Instead, US planes
secretly bomb the Ho Chi Minh Trail in Laos.

This changes in early 1965. On February 7, Viet
Cong troops attack American advisors at Camp

Holloway, killing 8 Americans and destroying
or damaging 25 aircraft . On February 10,

a northern bomb attack at another
barracks kills 23 more, angering Johnson:

“We have kept our gun over the mantel and our
shells in the cupboard for a long time now. And

what was the result? They are killing our boys
while they sleep in the night.” (Langer 101)

On February 24, US aircraft attack North
Vietnamese targets between the 17th and

19th Parallel. This soon develops
into Operation Rolling Thunder,

a sustained bombing campaign designed to
boost South Vietnamese morale and pressure

North Vietnam into abandoning the Viet Cong.
But although the US effort is primarily from

the air, they need regular ground
troops to protect US airbases,

like the one at Da Nang. On March 8 1965, two
marine battalions land to provide security. Their

presence only provokes more Viet Cong attacks.
Bombing also does little to stop Viet Cong

activities. North Vietnam increases infiltrations,
and regular army troops occasionally cross the

17th Parallel. The Soviet Union and China,
who have mostly stayed out of the war,

now send anti-aircraft weapons to the North.
Meanwhile the southern government remains in

turmoil. Since Diem’s death there have been
five governments of ineffective military

leaders. US Assistant Secretary of Defence
William Bundy describes the latest ruling

generals Nguyen Van Thieu and Nguyen Cao Ky
as “absolutely the bottom of the barrel”.

Westmoreland also concludes the ARVN can’t hold
the line. If the goal is to save South Vietnam,

more American troops are needed. By
July, Westmoreland gets his boots

on the ground. Johnson agrees to send
50,000 troops for offensive operations.

So why did the US get further and further
into the Vietnam conflict? The fear of

Communist expansion is perhaps the primary
cause. South Vietnam was not democratic,

but American leaders felt it needed to be
a bulwark against Communism – this is made

crystal clear in a secret US memorandum in 1965:
“U.S. objective in South Vietnam is not to ‘help

friend’ but to contain China.” (Thee 119)
There are other reasons as well. Abandoning

a nation the US had publicly pledged to
support would be a global humiliation , and

a personal one for Johnson. With Kennedy’s
legacy looming large over his presidency,

he felt compelled to follow his commitment
– although some historians suggest Kennedy

considered withdrawal before his assassination.
The Americans also expect to win. Many in the

administration fell communist success until 1965
is not due to their strength, but to US restraint

and the weakness of France and South Vietnam. Now
Johnson had “removed the gun from the mantel” this

would, or so they thought, soon change.
There were also racial overtones. Many

American commanders had little regard for
the fighting ability of the Vietnamese. This

was largely due to their disappointment with
the ARVN, whose poor fighting quality some US

commanders then expected from all Vietnamese.
Meanwhile, Johnson’s advisors, especially

McNamara, place great faith in the military
superiority of US firepower, and believe this

power combined with his analytical approach could
produce results with mathematical efficiency.

There’s little discussion about
what to do if things go wrong.

That’s not to say everyone in the administration
is confident of success. Undersecretary of State

George Ball consistently denies victory is
possible, while others understand the Viet

Cong has a strength equal – if not superior
– to US firepower. In 1964, David Nes, Deputy

Chief of Mission in Saigon, tells Washington:
“…the Viet Cong represents a grass roots movement

which is disciplined, ideologically
dedicated, easily identifiable with

the desires of the peasantry and of
course ruthless.” (Lawrence TVW 84)

The American GIs arriving in Vietnam would soon
find out just how ruthless the war would become.

In 1965, tens of thousands of US troops are
heading for war in Vietnam. Backed up by B-52

bombers, helicopters and napalm, many expect the
Viet Cong guerillas to crumble in the face of

unstoppable US firepower. Instead, in the jungles
and swamps of Vietnam, the Americans discover

combat is an exhausting slog in which casualties
are high and they rarely get to fire first.

In summer 1965, 50,000 US troops arrived in
South Vietnam as part of Military Assistance

Command Vietnam, MACV. The USA hopes American
troops and airpower will be enough to compel

North Vietnam to abandon its support of the Viet
Cong insurgency working to undermine the South

Vietnamese government. Still, the US approach will
be gradual and mostly from the air. By late 1964,

the US has already been secretly bombing North
Vietnamese supply lines in neighbouring Laos,

and in 1965 North Vietnam is hit as
part of Operation Rolling Thunder.

Still, the US mostly hits secondary targets –
not Hanoi – in order to force North Vietnam to

negotiate an agreement beneficial to the South.
In this sense, US President Lyndon B Johnson is

not aiming for traditional territorial or total
victory, but the prevention of a North Vietnamese

victory over his allies in the South.
North Vietnam claims no negotiations

can take place while foreign
troops remain in South Vietnam.

And so, it seems combat, not compromise, will
be the status quo in Vietnam. US General WIlliam

Westmoreland needs to develop a strategy
to push the North out of South Vietnam at

a low cost for the US - politically
and militarily. This is a challenge,

since political considerations mean his ground war
must be confined almost entirely to South Vietnam.

Johnson rules out any kind of conventional
invasion of North Vietnam as it will likely

provoke Chinese intervention, as it did during
the Korean War. The President also cutting the

Ho Chi Minh trail in Laos and Cambodia since
he wants to limit ground operations. This,

though, will make it harder for
Westmoreland to isolate the battlefield.

The American debate settles on two possible
strategies in South Vietnam: conventional

combat operations, or counterinsurgency focused
on small unit operations and the political

pacification of the South Vietnamese public.
Although the counterinsurgency approach has

its supporters, Westmoreland believes it
requires more troops and gives the Viet Cong

the initiative. Instead, he hopes to make use of
the US advantages in mobility and firepower in a

strategy of annihilation. He plans to take
the fight to the Viet Cong, eliminate them

in large unit set piece battles, and cause such
heavy casualties North Vietnam cannot maintain the

insurgency. It’s a rapid attritional strategy.
To achieve their goals, US troops will not

need to hold ground, but will carry out
“search and destroy” operations at will.

[ORIGINAL AUDIO US MARINE COMMENTATES SEARCH]
“... This is going to be a methodical search,

house by house, village by village, as we
move north... This small group of huts here

houses some of the Vietnamese families.
We’re looking mostly today for military

age men that may possibly be VC. So far all we
can see are women and children and old men...”

It’s a plan with an institutional shift in the
Department of Defense. Under Secretary Robert

McNamara, the DoD adopts new statistical and
quantitative management methods borrowed from

the world of business. Everything about the war
is quantified to assess progress and identify

when North Vietnam reaches the critical “tipping
point” when it can no longer sustain the struggle.

Analysts and officers count everything from bomb
tonnage to tent pegs, but the most important

metric is the ‘body count’ of North Vietnamese
and Viet Cong killed in US operations. Since the

US won’t judge progress by territory captured in
the same way as many traditional wars, the body

count will form the basis for analysing success.
The Pentagon therefore encourages US commanders

to aim for higher kill and capture counts as
a means of realising Westmoreland’s strategy.

The American kill count strategy expands the
original passive protective role of the US troops,

since now, they are to go on offensive patrols
and take the fight to the Viet Cong. And

they’ll be doing it with new firepower.
In an ideal search and destroy operation

US troops identify a Viet Cong formation via
intelligence and reconnaissance and then quickly

insert ground troops to pin the enemy down. As
the battle intensifies and draws in more enemy,

the US troops call-in airstrikes and
artillery to decisively eliminate them.

Similar operations had previously been carried
out by ARVN, but American commanders felt they

failed because the South Vietnamese
troops’ lack of fighting quality,

as opposed to a problem with the actual tactics.
To support their efforts, US forces receive new

tools, vehicles and weapons. From 1964,
US army troops receive the 5.56mm M16

rifle to replace the 7.62mm M14. The
change will not always prove popular,

but the US military claims the M16 is lighter,
more controllable in automatic and can be carried

with more ammunition – all important features
in jungle combat where ranges are shorter and

resupply harder . Coupled with the M60 machine gun
and M79 “Thumper” grenade launchers, US platoons

expect to bring heavy firepower against the
more lightly armed Viet Cong . Perhaps the most

important asset in a platoon is the radio, which
can call in support from fire bases or aircraft.

With much of South Vietnam consisting of
jungle-covered highlands or swampy deltas,

ground transport is slow to impossible.
Instead, a brown water navy of patrol

boats and hovercrafts navigate the rivers, while
a new generation of American military helicopters

provide unprecedented mobility. In particular,
the UH-1 Iroquois – or Huey – replaces the

cumbersome Shawnee to become the iconic vehicle
of the Vietnam War. Used for troop insertions,

extractions, medical evacuations, resupply and
fire support, around a third of the 36 million

helicopter sorties flown during the war are
made by Hueys. US jet aircraft, such as the

F-4 Phantom and A-4 Skyhawk, also arrive to
provide rapid close air support, including

with napalm and white phosphorous , while the
multi-minigun equipped AC-47 ‘Spooky’ gunship

can provide overhead cover for hours at a time.
US helicopters have an early impact on combat.

During the Battle of Ia Drang in November 1965,
air assault troops inflict heavy casualties on

North Vietnamese regulars entering from Cambodia.
Although the NVA launch some close-range assaults

at landing zones, US firepower pushes them back,
including the first tactical use of B-52 bombers.

Although most of the NVA escapes, the US 1st
Air Cavalry Division claim a 10:1 kill ratio,

seemingly confirming air assault
tactics and Westmoreland’s strategy.

At first, the helicopters also have
a psychological impact on North

Vietnamese troops, as North Vietnamese
soldier Nguyen Quang Sang remembers:

“...when helicopters spotted us, we had to
run for our lives. It was terrifying... Once,

when a helicopter dropped down especially
close... I even saw the face of the door

gunner. That was the first time I ever
saw an American. I’m still haunted by

it in my nightmares.” (Appy Patriots 216)
By the end of 1965, the US can claim to

have prevented a South Vietnamese collapse
and taken the fight to the enemy. But the

Viet Cong also adapt, and fight back.
The mauling at Ia Drang encourages the

North Vietnamese army and Viet Cong to
turn back to guerilla tactics. This is

partly due to practical considerations,
but also a nuanced understanding of the US

political situation. North Vietnamese General
Secretary Le Duan recognises US strength

in Vietnam is undermined by a lack of
political and public will back home:

“[We] can fight a protracted war, while the
US can’t... although the US can immediately

send 300,000 to 400,00 troops at once,
why must the US do it step by step?...

Because of fear of protracted war, and even
stronger opposition of the American people

and the world’s people...” (Ruane 110)
Instead, the Viet Cong will take the lead

in the south and employ strategies which had
worked against ARVN. In 1963 US General Frank

Osmanski summarized on Viet Cong tactics:
“VC non-explosive weapons include caltrops,

spike-traps, poisoned darts, and even
enraged water buffaloes. In a sense

their physical endurance, patience,
and ingenuity are also VC weapons,

for they have been known to live in dark tunnels
for weeks, to remain underwater for long periods

by breathing through hollow reeds, and to lie
in ambush for as long as 48 hours.” (Langer 75)

Sniping, mines and booby traps become the
principle means of Viet Cong attack. They

prioritize mines since they maim just as often
as they kill, draining US resources and morale.

The Viet Cong also become experts at launching
well-planned ambushes, often targeting officers

and radiomen to prevent air support being
called in. Most attacks are over in minutes.

These tactics are aided by simplified
logistics. A Viet Cong soldier carries

as less as five kilograms of equipment in combat,
compared to up to 40 for a US soldier. The North

Vietnamese can also draw on local supplies from
friendly or coerced villagers. Additionally,

they can blend into the local civilian
population and call on irregular supporters

who can perform labour, set mines, or collect
unexploded US ordnance for repurposing.

Vast networks of tunnels, some even under US
bases, allow for the VC to infiltrate and protect

their personnel and equipment from US firepower.
Parallel to the Viet Cong is the regular People’s

Army of Vietnam, also known as the North
Vietnamese Army, or NVA. Thanks to political

regimentation, propaganda and conscription,
the NVA quickly expands with new Soviet and

Chinese equipment. Soon NVA units can claim to
match US squad firepower with weapons like the

AK-47 automatic rifle, RPD machinegun, and rocket
propelled grenades. The Viet Cong are sometimes

armed with WWII-era weapons, but also receive
newer equipment via the Ho Chi Minh trail.

The Soviet Union and China also provide protection
against bombing, including engineering troops,

anti-aircraft systems and fighter jets, such as
MiG-21s . North Vietnamese fighter ace Luu Huy

Chao recalls one advantage he had over US pilots:
“Once I had shot down an F-4, I was no longer

scared of any type of American aircraft. The
psychological factor is very important in

any battle... part of my confidence came from
knowing that if I had to bail out I would be

landing in my own country.” (Appy Patriots 214)
The North Vietnamese approach is to attack only

when the situation favours them. As a result,
they often neutralise US technological advantages

through patience and surprise. In fact, although
helicopters dominate the news, the reality of

combat in Vietnam is decidedly low tech.
One reason for this is that helicopters

are expensive and valuable targets for the
Viet Cong. Once familiar with helicopters,

the North Vietnamese become skilled at shooting
them down or targeting them at vulnerable

moments. Their loud rotors make surprise
almost impossible, allowing for ambushes

at landing zones with RPGs or heavy machine guns:
“When the troops leaped from the lead choppers,

the entire tree line erupted with small
arms fire... A machine gun opened up from

the hillside north of the LZ, pouring lethal
fire into the helicopters... The rounds went

smashing into the plexiglass cockpits... One bird
rolled over like a great wounded bull elephant,

the rotor blades still whirring as they
chopped into the earth...” (Langer 126)

The US loses around 5,000 helicopters
during the war, about half to enemy action.

To reduce the risk, helicopters drop off US
troops at more secure locations for long,

sometimes multi-week patrols in the jungle
– known to the GIs as “humping the boonies”.

In these conditions, the Viet Cong are only one
adversary for the Americans. Wildlife, mosquitos,

disease, exhaustion and dehydration affect US
troops too. With only one percent of patrols

experiencing enemy contact, mines and booby
traps are perhaps the biggest concern. They

account for about a quarter of all casualties
, as one 19 year old US soldier reports:

“It’s an absurd combination of certainly and
uncertainty: the certainty that you’re walking

in mine fields, walking past things day after
day; the uncertainty of your every movement,

of which way to shift your weight,
of where to sit down.” (Appy WCW 171)

When there is contact, the Viet Cong almost
always trigger the engagement with a 1966

report suggesting the North Vietnamese initiate
around 79 percent of attacks. They also become

skilled at predicting air support response times
and withdrawing before it arrives, or attacking

so close that air support threatens US troops
as well. By 1968, around 15 to 20 percent of US

casualties are from friendly fire.
[ORIGINAL AUDIO – US SOLDIER]

“As you come into the village you always
get this sniper fire, never fails. And,

we invariably take casualties once in a while.
We return fire, and by the time we get to the

villages, these VC are gone, and it makes it
very difficult and very frustrating for us.”

US weapons also struggle in the jungle
environment, especially the M16 rifle. A US

study records 10.5 malfunctions per 1,000 rounds
fired in 1965. Overall, the M16’s lightweight

materials were sensitive to variations
in propellant and poor lubrication - and

many US soldiers who arrive early on had no prior
training with the M16 before arriving in Vietnam.

Eventually the Pentagon introduces modifications,
like rust resistant components, along with better

maintenance training. By 1968 the M16’s
malfunction rate declines to around 3.8

malfunctions per 1,000 rounds, with the
most serious ejection failures reduced

to 0.32. Still, its early reputation
persists, especially amongst Marines.

The M60 machine-gun also has its supporters
and detractors. When functioning, troops value

its versatility and morale-building firepower –
including when mounted on helicopters. But others

note its reliability quickly declines through wear
and tear, with few replacement parts available.

Its high rate of fire also requires riflemen
to carry heavy 7.62 ammunition and barrels.

Overall, this mixture of combat stress,
physical exhaustion, danger and inability to

fight back creates frustration among US soldiers:
“You go out on patrol maybe twenty times or more,

and nothin’, just nothin’. Then, the
twenty-first time, zap, zap, zap, you

get hit and Victor Charlie fades into the jungle
before you can close with him.” (Lawrence TVW 107)

US troops in Vietnam are also under many
additional stresses. Around a quarter are

draftees – essentially conscripts
- and their average age is only 19.

Few of the American newcomers transfer to
Vietnam as complete units, but instead arrive

as individuals or in small groups . High officer
turnover and the fact few experienced troops stay

beyond their contracted tour of duty means combat
experience is not retained and must be relearned.

The stresses of combat, an elusive enemy, and
peer pressure might partly explain – though not

excuse - how cases of American violence against
Vietnamese civilians become widespread. As the war

continues, civilians suffer increasing violence,
injury and property destruction, both intentional

and accidental, at the hands of US, ARVN and
allied troops. Hostility – or at least ambivalence

– from locals leads some US GIs to conclude
villagers support the Viet Cong. In many cases,

this is true - even a South Vietnamese government
report estimates 5 million of the 17 million

residents of South Vietnam support the insurgency.
This realisation undermines US soldiers' belief

in the war, and promotes indifference
to the plight of locals. Marine officer

Phillip Caputo is one who lost hope:
“...When we marched into the rice

paddies... we carried, along with our packs
and rifles, the implicit convictions that...

we were doing something altogether noble
and good. We kept the packs and rifles;

the convictions, we lost.” (Caputo)
US reprisals against locals may result

from anger at casualties, but also frustration
at their inability to hit back at the VC. The

State Department’s Daniel Ellsberg joins a
patrol in 1967 which destroys a civilian home:

“Their desire to burn the house was in
part the result of frustration and in

part reflected the fact that they honestly
didn’t know what might work.” (Appy 193)

South Vietnamese civilians also experience
violence from the Viet Cong. The escalation of the

war in 1965 weakens support for the VC, so they
resort to more coercion and political pressure to

get recruits, supplies, and intelligence. Civilian
contact with US or ARVN troops also results in

political accusations and denunciations. Le
Ly Hayslip , a South Vietnamese villager,

is attacked by the Viet Cong when her
loyalty was doubted. She concludes:

“After a while, our fear of the Viet
Cong... was almost as strong as our

fear of the republicans. If the republicans
were like elephants trampling our village,

the Viet Cong were like snakes who came at us
in the night. At least you can see an elephant

coming and get out of the way.” ( Langer 198/109)
The psychological impact and tactical reality on

the ground mean that by 1967 the war is a
stalemate. When US troops engage the enemy

on their terms, they cause high casualties, but
the nature of the fighting is taking its toll.

North Vietnam is also carrying out a strategy
of attrition, and arguably more successfully.

But Westmoreland doesn’t think North Vietnam
is winning – in public at least, he emphasizes

progress. By 1967 there are 485,600 US troops in
Vietnam, although Westmoreland wants even more.

[ORIGINAL AUDIO WESTMORELAND]
“Without question, the war is

not stalemated, we are making steady progress,
week by week, month by month. Needless to say,

we’ve got a long way to go but progress
is definitely being made... I think there

are sufficient men in Vietnam now to not lose the
war, but if we could reinforce our present forces,

I think we would accelerate our progress.”
Large scale search and destroy operations

in early 1967 seem to confirm Westmoreland’s
opinions. The US claims it kills 2,000 enemy

insurgents in Operations Cedar Falls and Junction
City, while Westmoreland states there were fewer

than 242,000 Viet Cong fighters left in the
country. The reality is not so clear cut.

MACV’s figures are almost entirely wrong.
By establishing body counts as the metric

for success, US commanders inflate the
figures – sometimes by double. Officers

eager to show progress or ability post high
estimates, or count civilian dead as Viet

Cong according to a blunt unspoken rule:
“if it’s dead and Vietnamese, it’s VC.”

The focus on quantifiable data means concepts that
aren’t easily quantified, like morale, ideological

support and opinions of locals, are sidelined, in
a “if it can’t be counted, it can’t be important”

mentality. But this attitude ignores vital
elements of warfare, especially counterinsurgency

operations, and applies clumsy numerical
values to complex socio-political issues.

The US approach is also based on their estimations
of North Vietnamese limits and capabilities. MACV

consistently underestimates how North Vietnam can
sustain high losses through its conceptualisation

of the conflict as a total people’s war
of revolutionary unification. The CIA,

who are critical of the statistical
methods, report as many as 600,000

enemy in South Vietnam in 1967 with 200,000
North Vietnamese entering draft age each year.

Additionally, US bombing has not brought
victory. Although Rolling Thunder destroys

59 percent of power stations and 75 percent
of oil storage in North Vietnam, this has

little impact on a majority agrarian society and
unmechanised military. Bombing is also expensive

and dangerous. More sophisticated anti-aircraft
weapons mean for every dollar of damage caused

by bombing in 1967, the US pays $9.50.
Instead, US bombing and pursuit of the

body count is having a negative impact
elsewhere. Americans are less likely to

support the war and international opinion is
also turning against the US. In Sweden, India,

and Japan, many people are publicly lauding
the North Vietnamese for their resistance.

In late 1967, Westmoreland and Johnson
embark on a public relations tour of the

US to convince the people of their successes
in Vietnam. Westmoreland tells the public:

“The ranks of the Viet Cong are thinning... The
end begins to come into view.” (Appy WCW 166)

The first months of 1968 will
prove him disastrously wrong.

At the end of 1967, the war in Vietnam is
a stalemate. While the US uses patrols and

firepower to seek out and destroy the enemy,
the Viet Cong insurgency carry out attritional

guerilla operations in South Vietnam – often
dictating where and when battles take place.

The result is high casualties for both sides and
no meaningful strategic breakthrough - although

US commander William Westmoreland sees it
differently. In late 1967, he tours the US

to tell the public his strategy is working, and
the North Vietnamese are reaching breaking point.

Although Westmoreland is overly optimistic,
there are fractures in the North Vietnamese

communist government. Some leaders – since
labelled ‘doves’ - are concerned about the

cost in lives and infrastructure and want Hanoi
to negotiate. They clash with more influential

‘hawks’, like General Secretary of the Communist
Party Le Duan, who want to intensify the war.

Meanwhile, North Vietnamese founder Ho Chi
Minh is becoming politically sidelined. He

has been chronically ill since at least 1964 and
has stepped down from many official duties . North

Vietnamese colonel and future dissident Bui
Tin suggests Ho’s ill health prevents him from

introducing democratic reforms, allowing the
Politburo and Le Duan to take further control.

By 1967 the Soviet Union replaces China as North
Vietnam’s main supplier of firearms and heavy

weapons. However, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev
favours diplomatic solutions to the conflict,

giving the North Vietnamese ‘doves’ a temporary
boost. To counter this, Le Duan and his supporters

arrest political opponents and journalists , often
on conspiracy charges. With his power base secure,

the hawks prepare for a new major offensive which
will see irregular and regular North Vietnamese

units attacking cities and towns across
South Vietnam during the Tet Lunar holiday.

North Vietnam hopes a surprise attack on urban
centers and military bases will topple the

Saigon government, destroy a major part of
the US and South Vietnamese ARVN forces and

pressure the US to end its support for the South.
Commanders understand the operation is risky,

therefore the bulk of the fighting is
assigned to the Viet Cong and not the

more valuable regular North Vietnamese
Army, more commonly known as the NVA.

From October 1967, military preparations begin
when North Vietnamese troops harass US border

positions, including the combat base at Khe Sanh.
Westmoreland believes North Vietnam is preparing

another Dien Bien Phu-style attack, but others
have since suggested that instead of repeating

1954, the North Vietnamese aim to draw US and
ARVN forces away from the major towns and cities.

US troops are relocated. Although North
Vietnamese forces suffer heavy losses,

Westmoreland reinforces Khe Sanh and thins
out defences around Saigon and other cities.

And so at the end of January 1968, both
North and South Vietnamese prepare for the

Lunar Holiday. Traditionally, this is a time
of ceasefire across Vietnam, but this year

Viet Cong and NVA troops infiltrate towns and
cities, sometimes disguised as festival goers.

Since it was common for farmers to enter
cities with their produce during Tet, the

presence of unknown individuals with cargo is not
especially suspicious, at least to the Vietnamese.

US Lt Colonel John E. Barr later recalled.
“I noted the unusual number of young men in

civilian clothes; unusual in that most
Vietnamese youths were either drafted

by the ARVN or off in the hills with the Viet
Cong... I was assured […] that it was customary

for local farmers to come into Hue to celebrate
the Tet holiday... I accepted his explanation—to

my subsequent regret.” (Shulimson 166)
US military intelligence does detect the movement

of North Vietnamese units but doesn’t understand
the scale of the coming offensive. In reality,

around 84,000 troops are waiting for
the signal to attack across the country.

At midnight on January 30, North Vietnam launches
the first coordinated attacks. Within hours,

five of the six major cities in South
Vietnam, 36 of 44 provincial capitals and

64 district capitals are under attack. Tuan
Van Ban, a lieutenant in the Northern 320th

Division attacks a US Marine base near Cam Lo:
“Around midnight we moved as close as possible

to the American perimeter. […]... First we fired
a flare. That was the signal to detonate the

dynamite that blasted holes in the perimeter...
Within seconds we blew a bugle and whistles to

signal our troops to advance. All four hundred
of us moved forward screaming, ‘Attack! Attack!

Attack!’” (Appy Patriots 302/303)
In Saigon, a group of around 20 Viet

Cong sappers blow a hole in the US Embassy
compound wall and attack the guards. Armed

with automatic weapons and rocket launchers, they
attempt to breach the main Chancellery building

but fail. US diplomat Barry Zorthian calls Colonel
George Jacobson who lives in the embassy compound:

“[George] said that the VC sappers had penetrated
his house and he could hear people downstairs.

There was shooting outside on his side of the
compound, shadowy figures floating around,

and occasional bursts of gunfire. As far as he
could tell the embassy was still secure. He had

a pistol and after we hung up he shot one of the
sappers coming up the stairs.” (Appy Patriots 290)

Jacobson kills the last Viet Cong sapper, ending
the attack. Other VC attempts to enter the Saigon

radio station and Presidential Palace also fail.
After the initial shock, the US and ARVN troops

quickly reorganise and stage an effective
defence in most places. US commanders are

impressed with ARVN, which stands its ground
despite low American expectations. Within days,

US and ARVN troops reverse most Viet Cong and NVA
gains, although this is not the case everywhere.

The old imperial capital of Hue boasts
beautiful architecture and nineteenth

century fortifications, but the city soon
finds itself central to much more modern war.

Hue had seen little fighting until 1968,
and almost considered itself a truce city

near the North-South border at the 17th Parallel.
Divided by the Perfume River into a south-eastern

modern city and north-western citadel, it
was home to an airfield, large university,

hospital and government buildings.
On January 30, ARVN commander Ngô

Quang Trưởng receives word an attack is
likely. He puts his troops on high alert,

but many are on leave for Tet. Still, he assumes
the NVA lack the strength to attack the city.

Little does he know, the NVA 4th, 5th and 6th
Regiments, supported by the Viet Cong, have

already surrounded Hue and infiltrated sappers and
assault troops. A North Vietnamese officer wrote:

“The enemy knew nothing of our strategy; by
the time our forces approached the city of Hue,

the enemy still had not taken any specific
defensive measures.” (Schulimson 214)

Their job is to open the city gates
and quickly capture around 200 targets,

the most important of which are the Mang Ca ARVN
headquarters, Tay Loc airfield, MACV Compound,

Landing Craft Utility loading ramp, radio
station, hospital and provincial headquarters.

At 02:33 am on January 31, a flare marks the start
of the attack. NVA sappers in ARVN uniforms kill

guards and let around 7500 troops into Hue.
Immediately, ARVN soldiers in the citadel

put up improvised defence, especially
the Black Panther Rangers. There is

heavy fighting across the area, but the ARVN
hold the Mang Ca and contest the airfield.

In the modern city, the small garrison at the MACV
Compound and nearby LCU loading ramp hold out, but

by daybreak the NVA controls around 60% of Hue.
ARVN commanders desperately call for

reinforcements as the full scale of the attack
becomes apparent. Some Airborne troops arrive at

Mang Ca, but grounds relief columns are badly
mauled by NVA troops on the citadel walls.

Marines from Task Force X-Ray are also on their
way to the city, including battalions from the

1st and 5th Marine Regiments. But as they approach
the modern city, the North Vietnamese ambush them:

“Enemy soldiers dug in close by on either side
of the road, behind walls and inside buildings

and on rooftops, let loose a withering
fusillade that struck against the sleepy

convoy with the force of a sledgehammer
crushing a cockroach: automatic weapons,

small-arms, rockets, recoilless rifles, mortars,
grenades. Everything. All at once.” (Ehrhart 243)

The US column needs the help of M48 tanks to push
through the 8 or 9 blocks to the MACV compound at

around 3.15 pm. Commanders immediately task
the Marines with crossing the Perfume River

to relieve the ARVN in the Citadel, but
the bridge is too weak for the tanks and

there is little fire support. Lieutenant
Colonel Marcus Gravel puts it this way:

“We proceeded to the MACV compound
then were gifted with the most

stupid idiotic mission...” (Shulimson 173)
Two American platoons make it across but come

under heavy fire from the citadel walls. Realising
the attack is useless, Gravel orders a withdrawal,

using commandeered vehicles to evacuate the
wounded. Around a third of a Marine company

is killed or wounded in the failed attack.
It now becomes clear the ARVN and US forces

are surrounded by mostly regular NVA
troops determined to hold their ground,

and the NVA is already preparing to create a
provisional government in Hue. For the US troops,

it will be a battle from the inside out.
The Marines first objectives are the modern

city’s provincial headquarters and prison –
about six blocks from the compound. To get

there they will also need to fight through the
university and hospital. But the first attempts

stall less than one block from the compound.
Meanwhile, the ARVN continues to contest the

citadel and eventually retakes the airfield,
allowing for some resupply. The LCU loading ramp

also allows for supplies and reinforcements
to be brought in by river. Otherwise,

Marine convoys known as Rough Riders run the
gauntlet of NVA fire as they enter the city.

The fighting now turns into a street-by-street,
house-by-house melee. The Marines’ area of

operations is around 11 blocks by 8 blocks wide
– not a huge area, but a complex one to fight

through. Commanders lack correctly scaled maps
while rules of engagement and poor weather prevent

air support. Marine William Ehrhart recalls:
“We had no experience at this kind of fighting,

and the on-the-job training cost us heavily.
A great many civilians must have died in the

fighting. If you saw or heard – or thought you
saw or heard – movement in the house next door,

you didn’t stop to knock; you just
tossed in a grenade.” (Ehrhart 246)

Both sides quickly find rockets to
be useful weapons, especially to blow

open walls and gain new points of entry.
Lieutenant Colonel Ernie Cheatham recalled

a two-hour firefight fought almost purely
with rockets at a range of just 50 meters.

“...hundreds and hundreds of rockets going out...
And the same thing coming back at us. But we had

more ammunition than they had.” (Shulimson 188)
Tanks are of limited use, except for as cover on

the ruined city streets. When used offensively,
they rush forward, fire a few rounds and retreat

before the inevitable onslaught of North
Vietnamese B-40 rockets. US troops find the

106mm recoilless rifle effective for demolitions
and urban fighting, especially when mounted

on the M50 “Ontos” light anti-tank vehicle.
By February 4, the Marines are making progress,

having captured the university and public
health building. In the attack on the Treasury,

the Marines use tear gas, which proves effective
since many NVA troops don’t have gasmask s.

Once the Treasury is cleared , the aim is
to attack towards the hospital, prison,

and provincial headquarters. Using teargas,
105mm howitzers, mortars and recoilless rifles,

Marines push the NVA out of the hospital and
prison in intense fighting. Meanwhile, another

Marine attack targets the stadium to the east of
the MACV compound. Already the NVA commander is

thinning his forces for potential withdrawal.
The US attack now focuses on the provincial

headquarters. Using the newly learned tactics,
Marines assault the building on February 6,

again using tear gas in a room-to-room struggle.
Some defenders slip away, and by the end of the

day, the Americans raise the US flag over the
headquarters – although they soon remove it due

to regulations that it must always be flown
with an accompanying South Vietnamese flag.

The Provincial Headquarters was initially
a symbolic target for the Marines – but it

proves much more important. It was the
headquarters of the 4th NVA Regiment,

which now begins to collapse. By February
7, resistance in the modern city is fading,

but the battle is still raging in the citadel.
The ARVN made some early progress in the citadel,

clearing out much of the northwestern corner of
the old city, and south of the Mang Ca. But on

February 6-7, the NVA counterattack, using
grappling hooks to scale the southwestern

wall and forcing ARVN troops back to the airfield.
Meanwhile, outside the city walls to the west, the

US 1st Cavalry Airmobile Division is struggling.
With the help of helicopter gunships, artillery,

and reinforcements from the now helicopter-borne
101st Airborne Division , they clash with NVA

forces in outskirt villages and only tentatively
cut North Vietnamese logistical routes.

From February 10, reinforcements from the 5th
Marines are helilifted into the citadel. On the

13th, they expect to launch an attack from ARVN
airborne positions to their south, but before they

even arrive, they come under heavy NVA attack :
“[within] fifteen minutes . . ., all Hell broke

loose. There was no Airborne
unit in the area and Company A

was up to their armpits in NVA.” (Shulimson 199)
The NVA, having tunnelled into the citadel walls,

stop the attack 75 meters behind its start
line. The next morning, the Marines try

again with massive supporting fire, including from
offshore ships. Their target is the Dong Ba Tower,

one of the citadel’s fortified gates. But the flat
trajectory of the naval gunfire mostly harmlessly

hits the exterior walls. The Marines bog down
after just 100 metres, pinned down by fire

from both the palace and outer citadel walls.
On February 15, more US reinforcements arrive,

as well as permission to fire into
the palace and surrounding area.

American shells partly collapse the tower,
and US troops push through ruined walls and

shattered fortifications. The Marines finally
capture Dong Ba after a six-hour firefight.

Meanwhile, the ARVN airborne and Marines
attack the palace itself but struggle to

take ground. Once again they use tear gas and
heavy fire support to pummel the NVA defenders.

On February 22, the fighting enters the heart of
the citadel, as the ARVN push towards the southern

wall. By this point, the 1st Cavalry have been
able to fully cut NVA supply lines, blocking the

infiltration and exfiltration of fighters.
The most significant development is a shift

in tactics. Both US and ARVN Marines launch night
attacks towards the last remaining NVA positions,

shaking up the established schedule of combat.
With some NVA troops sleeping away from frontline

positions, many are taken by surprise and
captured. Aided by better weather and air support,

the Marines and ARVN clear the palace and
reach the southern wall on February 24,

raising their flags on Hue’s flag tower.
Except for mopping up, the battle is over.

The Hue battle costs around 200 US KIA, mostly
Marines, and around 1,600 wounded. ARVN casualties

are about 450 killed and missing and 2,100
wounded. Gauging North Vietnamese casualties

is difficult, but estimates suggest between 2,500
to 5,000 killed with an unknown number wounded.

80% of buildings in the city are
damaged, and of a population of 140,000,

around 116,000 are homeless. Civilian deaths are
likely between 1,000 and 5,800 killed or missing.

The Americans also accuse the NVA of targeted
political killings in the city, with at least

3,000 bodies uncovered from hastily dug graves.
The North Vietnamese government argues these are

civilians killed in the fighting – often by
US firepower – but this is widely disputed.

With the battle of Hue over, one of the toughest
struggles of the Tet Offensive comes to an end.

The NVA and VC are unable to hold any of
their gains or trigger an uprising, but the

Tet Offensive still becomes seen as a US defeat.
Westmoreland is eager to present the offensive as

the final gamble of a near-defeated enemy.
He describes the damage and around 3,400

US and ARVN dead as superficial and claims
the North Vietnamese suffer 58,000 killed.

Others disagree. The fact North Vietnam was able
to launch such a sophisticated offensive at all,

indicates the US strategy in Vietnam is
failing. Far from being close to defeat,

North Vietnam delivered a shocking blow and
regained the initiative. In a secret memo,

General Harold K. Johnson wrote:
“We suffered a loss, there can be

no doubt about it.” (Langer 176)
The offensive also undermines the

Johnson administration. They had been preparing
both the public and media for imminent success,

and yet the Tet Offensive shows the war is far
from over. Photographs of the summary execution

of a Viet Cong fighter on the streets of
Saigon lead to further questions about

the regime US troops are fighting and dying for.
US public opposition to the war had been growing

before Tet but was by no means the majority, and
pro-war counterprotests were common. But after Tet

protests go beyond the usual anti-war, student or
counter-culture groups to include mothers, middle

class professionals, religious groups and Vietnam
veterans themselves – by February 1968, half of

Americans now believe intervention was a mistake.
Johnson’s advisors – his so-called Wise Men – also

turn against the war. Despite encouraging
escalation as recently as November 1967,

they now overwhelmingly call for
disengagement and negotiations :

“...McGeorge Bundy [said to the] President...
‘Look, this thing is hopeless, you’d better

begin to de-escalate and get out.’ And this
was the first time [the President] ever heard

anything of this kind, he could barely believe his
ears. I think he was very shocked.” (Ruane 124)

Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the
mastermind of US strategy in Vietnam, has already

reached this point. Throughout 1967 he became
privately sceptical of the US intervention, often

in opposition to the other Wise Men. In November,
he announced his resignation, effective in late

February 1968. His successor Clifford Clarke soon
concurs with McNamara’s assessment on Vietnam.

The result is a crisis of leadership
in Washington. Westmoreland requests

an additional 206,000 troops for Vietnam. Johnson
refuses, but the request is leaked to the media,

causing an uproar. Instead, with pressure
mounting, Johnson changes course.

On March 31 1968, Johnson announces he will limit
the bombing of North Vietnam started in 1965, and

open negotiations with the Northern government.
He then makes another dramatic announcement:

[ORIGINAL AUDIO JOHNSON]
“I shall not seek,

and I will not accept, the nomination of my
party for another term as your President.”

In reality, Johnson knows his legacy is in
ruins. He has already lost a democratic party

primary and the war costs $2 billion a month
– around 17 billion today. This leaves little

time or resources for his beloved domestic
reforms, and he is frank with his advisors:

“I don’t give a damn about the election.
I will be happy to keep doing what is

right and lose the election... I will have
overwhelming disapproval in the polls... I

will go down the drain.” (Anderson 69)
The North announces it is receptive

to talks, but makes it clear they want
to negotiate from a position of strength,

as the victor of the Tet offensive.
But who really won the Tet Offensive

on the ground? And why, if the US caused higher
casualties and denied North Vietnamese gains,

is the battle often viewed as a US defeat?
In reality, the Tet offensive is a disappointment

for Hanoi. It shows the cities of South Vietnam
are no closer to adopting the revolution and

there are no mass defections from ARVN. The
offensive also decimates the Viet Cong. It

suffers huge losses and exposes many of its
secret agents. It also shows the Viet Cong,

while skilled at ambushes and guerilla fighting,
are ineffective in urban operations or holding

ground. Some historians even suggest the Tet
Offensive was deliberately devised to reduce the

influence of the southern insurgency and bring it
under tighter North Vietnamese control – although

there is little solid evidence for this.
But in other ways, Tet is an unintended northern

success, since it creates political shockwaves in
the US, and lowers public support. The US public

is not prepared for how intense the Vietnam war
has become: instead Johnson has actively attempted

to insulate them from the conflict. Although
not a concrete objective of the Tet Offensive,

North Vietnamese strategists do recognise public
will as a US strategic vulnerability – one they

don’t suffer from themselves. The Tet
Offensive may be a US victory in the

so-called Kinetic Battlespace, but weakening the
US administration’s credibility at home and abroad

is a defeat in the Idea Battlespace.
The media, which had until this point

largely supported or believed
government statements on Vietnam,

now becomes more critical. V eteran news anchor
Walter Cronkite speaks for many when he asks:

“What the hell is going on? I thought we
were winning the war?” (Lawrence TVW 125)

Meanwhile, North Vietnamese ideologists weave
Tet losses into the long-standing methodology

of revolution. State control, propaganda, and
personal experience has long since conditioned

the North Vietnamese to expect high
casualties. As Le Duan declared:

“The North will not count
the cost.” (Lawrence TVW 91)

1968 is the US’s bloodiest year of the war, with
almost 17,000 fatalities. Through the summer,

the North launches more offensives – the
so-called Mini-Tet. It suffers high losses,

but so does the US, with around 400
a week dying in May. By late 1968

500,000 US troops are in Vietnam and as troop
numbers and casualties increase, more Americans

have direct or indirect experience of the
war, such as when a relative is sent overseas.

All this erodes American public will, a
significant factor in any war effort. As

Prussian military theorist Carl von Clausewitz
writes, an effective war effort needs equilibrium

between the Trinity – the State, the Army and the
People. After Tet, North Vietnam’s trinity remains

strong - because of government regimentation,
but also ideological convictions and nationalist

aspirations. Meanwhile, as the 1968 US
election looms, the US trinity is falling part.

By late 1968, the chaos of the Vietnam Wars spills
into the streets of America as violent protests,

political assassinations, and an energetic
anti-war movement grab headlines. Meanwhile,

low morale and drug abuse are causing discipline
issues for the US military in Vietnam.

Fresh presidential elections mean the potential
for change and possible withdrawal. But before

US troops can leave Vietnam, the war
will first expand across borders,

in the air, and to the streets of Hanoi.
The division on the streets is mirrored

in the White House. President Lyndon B.
Johnson has lost much of the support of

his own party and refuses to campaign for a
second term. Instead, he distances himself

from former advisors and party opposition. His
Vice President Hubert Humphrey leads a faction

critical of his Vietnam policies and both
Democrats and Republicans see de-escalation

in Vietnam as key to electoral success.
Johnson has overseen a shift in Vietnam policy.

He replaces General William Westmoreland,
US commander in Vietnam since 1965,

with General Creighton Abrams. Throughout late
1968, Abrams keeps up offensive pressure on the

North Vietnamese with operations like Toan
Thang II, which the US claims kills 25,000

enemy troops. However, Abrams also emphasises
pacification, defections, and selectively

targeting Viet Cong figures over big offensives.
Despite the changes, the Democrats are down in

the polls. Meanwhile, Republican candidate Richard
Nixon says he wants “peace with honor” in Vietnam,

but leaves the details deliberately vague.
[NIXON Original Audio]:

“First priority foreign policy objective of
our next administration will to be bringing

an honorable end to the war in Vietnam.”
By October, Nixon has a clear advantage

over Humphrey in the coming election. Despite
the differences between Johnson and Humphrey,

the President helps Humphrey’s
chances with an announcement:

[JOHNSON Original Audio]:
“I have now ordered that all air,

naval, and artillery bombardment of North
Vietnam cease as of 8 a.m., Washington time,

Friday morning. I have reached this decision
on the basis of the developments in the Paris

talks. And I have reached it in the belief
that this action can lead to progress toward

a peaceful settlement of the Vietnamese war.”
After 3 years and 50,000 North Vietnamese deaths,

the US will stop bombing North Vietnam and
open negotiations with the North and South

Vietnamese governments. The Democrats receive a
potentially decisive boost, but it doesn’t last.

Nixon’s team are in secret contact with South
Vietnam President Nguyễn Văn Thiệu and promise

him more support under a Republican
US government if he sabotages the

Democrats’ plan. Just before voting starts,
Thieu rejects Johnson’s deal, calling off

meaningful negotiations and undermining Humphrey.
On November 5, Nixon wins the closely contested

election. The Republicans
now head the US war effort.

Nixon’s priorities in 1969 are to end the
US commitment in Vietnam and stabilise

the international Cold War. However,
abandoning South Vietnam would endanger

US global prestige, so Nixon plans to
de-escalate and escalate in different areas.

Firstly, he will withdraw US troops to
reduce losses. Pacification will continue,

while the South Vietnamese ARVN
will do most of the fighting – a

policy known as ‘Vietnamisation’. The US
will pressure North Vietnam to negotiate

and accept US demands for Northern
troops to leave the south. For this,

Nixon will rely on international political
isolation and threats of overwhelming force.

Nixon develops the “mad man theory”,
which plays on his well-known reputation

as a fiery anti-communist. Using overt,
even nuclear threats, he hopes to coerce

North Vietnam, as he confides to an aide:
“I want the North Vietnamese to believe I’ve

reached the point where I might to anything to
stop the war. We’ll slip the word to them that,

‘for God’s sake, you know Nixon is obsessed
about Communism. We can’t restrain him when

he’s angry – and he has his hand on the nuclear
button’ - and Ho Chi Minh himself will be in Paris

in two days begging for peace.” (Anderson 87)
Nixon will use airpower to send his message,

and he secretly bombs North Vietnamese depots
and infrastructure in neighbouring Cambodia.

Secretary of State Henry Kissinger supports
Nixon’s approach. Both share a Realpolitik theory

and a preference for direct, individual action.
Kissinger develops plans for massive bombing of

North Vietnam , but also makes it clear to Nixon
coercion, not military victory, is the goal:

“In Saigon the tendency is to fight the war to
victory. It has to be kept in mind, but you and

I know it won’t happen – it's impossible.
Even General Abrams agreed.” (Daddis 57)

And pressure is mounting in North Vietnam. Some
leaders call for negotiations too, but militant

leaders like Le Duan believe more military
victories are essential to earning a good deal.

However, the Tet Offensive cost the North dearly.
North Vietnamese leaders estimate it will be three

years before they can mount another offensive. For
North Vietnamese civilians and soldiers, some of

whom have been fighting for over 10 years, the
high casualties and long war are taking a toll:

“It began to seem like an open pit. There
was even a kind of motto that the whole

generation of army-age North Vietnamese
adopted – they tattooed it on themselves

and they sang songs about it - ‘Born in the
North, to die in the South.’” (Lawrence 133)

The death of North Vietnamese founder Ho Chi
Minh, on 2 September 1969 is an additional blow,

although he had stepped back
from power years earlier.

Meanwhile, Nixon’s policies are having an
effect. A slow, but steady US troop withdrawal

is underway, from 475,000 in 1969 to 334,000 in
1970. This, along with reforming the draft system,

boosts his popularity and decreases protests.
Behind the scenes, Nixon encourages the CIA,

FBI and IRS to covertly monitor
anti-war movements and opponents.

As US troops withdraw, the ARVN takes up more
responsibility in defence. In fact, by 1970, the

South Vietnamese army is one of the strongest and
best equipped in the world – at least on paper.

Under Nixon, ARVN expands to one million men by
1971. Whereas previously they had surplus WW2

equipment, they are now equipped to US standards,
including over one million M16s and M60 machine

guns. Their air force becomes the fourth largest
in the world with more than 2,000 aircraft,

mostly Huey helicopters but also attack aircraft
like the A-1 Skyraider and A-37 Dragonfly.

But ARVN struggles to translate this material
strength into strategic potential. It remains

incredibly corrupt, with some officers filling
their units with fake “ghost soldiers” to draw

extra pay. There is also little technical
knowledge for the new equipment while the

expansion of the armed forces also
impacts the South Vietnamese economy,

which is already buckling under a refugee crisis.
Soldiers’ low pay – around 18 dollars a month in

1970 – contributes to around 120,000
ARVN troops deserting each year. ARVN

soldiers also struggle with a crisis of morale:
“[M]ost of the South Vietnamese soldiers knew that

some members of their family were on the other
side. When you shoot into an area, maybe your

own blood brother is there. And fighting against
Communism, what is that? Nobody understood. They

knew they were fighting against other Vietnamese
and the other Vietnamese were fighting against

foreigners. So in our hearts we had sympathy
for the other side.” (Appy Vietnam Oral 375)

Still, Vietnamisation is popular in the US,
and in early 1970 the ARVN is put to the test.

In neighbouring Cambodia, pro-US General Lon Nol
launches a coup against Prince Norodom Sihanouk.

Sihanouk was officially neutral in the Vietnam
War but did not prevent North Vietnamese forces

establishing bases in border regions. On April
30, 1970, at the apparent invitation of Lon Nol,

80,000 ARVN and US troops move into
Cambodia to wipe out Communist bases,

including the elusive Central Office for South
Vietnam – the so-called “bamboo Pentagon”

The operation, which is joined by Lon Nol’s
Cambodian forces, is partially successful,

with large amounts of weaponry captured.
However, the Viet Cong avoid major combat

and withdraw further into Cambodia, taking
the Central Office for South Vietnam with

them. The US-ARVN attack fails to capture any
major headquarters and has unintended impacts.

Firstly, it pushes North Vietnamese forces
into a closer relationship with Cambodian

communists of the Khmer Rouge – with devastating
long-term consequences for Cambodia. Secondly , it

reignites public opposition to the war in the
US, culminating in mass protests on college

campuses. At Kent State and Jackson State
universities, National Guard troops fire on

protestors, killing 6 and wounding 21.
In November, Nixon address the nation,

asking the so-called “Silent Majority” not
protesting the war to unite behind him. Overall,

his approval rates are still high, with 59%
supporting him according to some poll s, but there

is dissent within the government and Senate. Nixon
excluded key figures from planning for Cambodia,

and senators from both parties attempt to force
an end to the incursion through Congress. Senator

George McGovern gives an emotional address:
“Every Senator in this Chamber is partly

responsible for sending 50,000
young Americans to an early grave.

This Chamber reeks of blood.” (Daddis 166)
The amendment fails to pass, and Nixon and

Kissinger react by increasing covert surveillance
of opposition and critical colleagues,

and further centralising decision making
into Kissinger’s National Security Council.

But dissent and disenchantment are not
limited to the US home front. In Vietnam,

the discipline, combat efficiency
and morale of US troops also suffers.

Although ARVN is doing more fighting, US
troops are still seeing combat. But now

that it’s clear US troops will be withdrawn,
there is little motivation for them to fight

and die in Vietnam . In some cases, a lack of
direction leads to indiscipline. Desertions,

especially troops on leave, increases to 70 out
of 1,000 soldiers. For many soldiers, it becomes

harder to justify the loss of a comrade.
“I saw my buddy shot beside me. That’s

what made me desert. I could think of no good
reason why he should die, why I should die,

why any GIs should die in Vietnam.” (Longley 147)
To avoid casualties, some units conduct so-called

“search and evade” missions. They find
safe areas and make falsified reports or

deliberately avoid contact with the enemy.
As the number of US troops decrease,

those who remain lack purpose, and drug use
soars. By 1973 the Pentagon estimates 35%

of enlisted men try heroin with 20% addicted
during their tour. The men often use alcohol,

marijuana, and LSD, although usually away
from the frontline . However, some soldiers

use methamphetamines or cocaine to stay alert
on operations. General Abrams is frustrated:

“I’ve got white shirts all over the
place – psychologists, drug counsellors,

detox specialists, rehab people... Is this a
god-damned army or a mental hospital? Officers

are afraid to lead their men into battle,
and the men won’t follow. Jesus Christ! What

happened?” (Appy Vietnam Oral 395)
Some US troops even turn to

“fragging” - deliberately targeting their
own officers with fragmentation grenades.

Officers may be “fragged” for several
reasons, like ordering dangerous missions

or attempting to limit drug use, and the
Department of Defense records 788 incidents

between 1969 and 1972, with 86 deaths. Others
suggest the death toll may be much higher,

especially when mysterious deaths in the field
are taken into account. Some estimates run as high

as 1,000 US officers and NCOs killed in fragging
and shooting incidents, but the exact amount will

likely remain unknown. (Longley, Grunts)
Political and social divisions in the US

are also replicated in Vietnam. Commanders
vigorously suppress troops’ anti-war protests,

but racial tensions are harder to control.
Although soldiers of all races describe unity

in battle, friction boils over on bases. This is
especially true after the assassination of Martin

Luther King, who was a vocal critic of the war:
“We are taking young black men... and sending

them 8,000 miles away to guarantee liberties
in Southeast Asia which they had not found in

Southwest Georgia and East Harlem. So we have been
repeatedly faced with the cruel irony of watching

Negro and white boys on TV screens as they kill
and die together for a nation that has been unable

to seat them together in the same schools.”
(Ruane 118) (Riverside Church, 4 April 1967)

Following his death, American troops
riot on US Vietnam bases, killing 46.

Back in the US, some Vietnam veterans are
prominent in the protest movement. By 1971, 20,000

have joined Vietnam Veterans Against the War ,
including future Secretery of State John Kerry:

“Someone has to die so that President
Nixon won’t be, and these are his words,

‘the first President to lose a war.’ We are
asking Americans to think about that because

how do you ask a man to be the last man to die
in Vietnam? How do you ask a man to be the last

man to die for a mistake?” (Anderson 98)
By early 1971, the war seems to have been

fully Vietnamised. US troop levels are
at 157,000, and some US officials claim

pacification and targeting North Vietnamese
agents in the south is having an impact.

In February, commanders send ARVN across
the border into Laos in a pre-emptive

attack. Operation LAMSON 719 aims to capture a
North Vietnamese supply depot at Tchepone and

disrupt North Vietnamese offensives. Congressional
limits mean Nixon cannot send US ground troops,

although aircraft will provide support. But
after modest gains, the North Vietnamese

Army counterattacks the 15,000 strong ARVN
force. President Thieu orders a withdrawal,

triggering a chaotic rout back into Vietnam.
ARVN losses are up to 8,000 casualties,

with 150 vehicles abandoned, including tanks.
The defeat is underscored by ongoing domestic

troubles in the US. In March, US courts sentence
Lieutenant William Calley to life imprisonment

for his role in the 1968 My Lai Massacre ,
in which US troops deliberately murder around

500 South Vietnamese civilians, including 173
children. Opinion in the US is divided , with

one poll showing 65% of respondents are not
upset by Calley’s actions. Three days after

the conviction, Nixon orders Calley into
house arrest, and he is released in 1974. g

Next, in June 1971 , disgruntled Department of
Defense official Daniel Ellsberg leaks a bombshell

7,000-page document, called the ‘Pentagon
Papers’ to the media . It outlines chaotic US

decision making in Vietnam and concludes they were
influenced more by domestic political interests

than military or political realities in Vietnam.
The result is a decline in the US public’s support

for the war and for the South Vietnamese
government. A poll in mid-1971 shows 58% of

Americans now believe the war is morally
wrong, while 60% favour withdrawal even

if it leads to a South Vietnamese collapse.
So, Nixon and Kissinger revive negotiations with

the North. They still demand North Vietnam removes
troops from the south, but their priority is now

the release of American prisoners. Hanoi demands
an end to US bombing and support for Thieu.

Nixon attempts to isolate North Vietnam
politically by appealing to their allies,

including a breakthrough diplomatic mission to
China in February 1972. However, he comes away

disappointed, since China and the Soviet Union
have only limited influence over North Vietnam.

The North now feels another offensive could
bolster their bargaining power. On March 30, 1972,

they launch the Easter Offensive, with 122,000 NVA
troops attacking into the South from the North,

Cambodia and Laos. Now equipped with Soviet and
Chinese artillery and tanks, including T-54s,

the attacks make early progress against ARVN,
securing all of Quang Tri province. Their new

equipment makes a powerful impact:
[ORIGINAL AUDIO]

“I would like to go back to the night of May 10,
Sir. It’s been estimated we took 7,800 rounds of

different calibre indirect fire weapons. That's
a good number, sir, we took at least that many.

The prep lasted for approximately 10 hours sir.
It was from 1800 in the afternoon and it lasted

until 0400 in the morning. The first six hours of
the attack was artillery. 105 and 155. Then the

mortars started in... I wouldn’t want to guess how
many mortars tubes are around. But it was just so

intense it was unbelievable sir.”
ARVN hold out some locations,

but its US airpower including B-52s and Cobra
gunships, which largely stop the offensive.

Even so North Vietnam keeps some gains.
Nixon now becomes highly critical of

General Abrams command and pursues negotiations
with renewed urgency. A fresh US election is

looming, and with only 24,000 US troops
remaining in Vietnam, Nixon is eager to

finish the withdrawal and sign a deal.
There are two stumbling blocks in the

negotiations. The North wants President Thieu
removed from power , and the US wants North

Vietnamese troops out of South Vietnam.
Privately, however, Nixon and Kissinger

prioritise US voters’ concerns – like the return
of POWs . To maintain its global reputation,

Kissinger writes the US simply needs a “decent
interval” between US withdrawal and the

South’s seemingly inevitable collapse:
“We are ready to withdraw all of our

forces by a fixed date and let objective
realities shape the political future...

We want a decent interval.” (Anderson 96)
There is debate about whether the “decent

internal” was official policy, but many
senior US officials understand the South’s

chances of long-term survival are poor.
In October, both sides compromise,

although the US gives up more. The
North agrees to release US prisoners

and cooperate with Thieu within a National Council
of Reconciliation, while in exchange the US will

withdraw all its troops and recognise the
political legitimacy of the Provisional

Revolutionary Government – the political wing
of the Viet Cong. Decisively, the North will

not have to withdraw its military from the south.
However, President Thieu rejects the deal. Nixon

is outraged, although at least one National
Security Council staffer notices an irony:

“After having said for years that
[South Vietnam] was a sovereign,

independent government, we now resented it acting
that way by opposing what was from their point

of view... a poor agreement.” (Daddis 192)
Nixon, now backed up by an electoral victory,

tries to renegotiate with the North in
November, but they refuse. So, Nixon

resorts to force to break the deadlock, ordering
Operation Linebacker II . From December 18-29,

US bombers drop 36,000 tons of bombs on North
Vietnam, including Hanoi and Haiphong - more

than the entire total dropped from 1969 to 71.
The attacks kill 2,000 civilians in Hanoi alone,

and the North reopens negotiations on December 27.
Historians have debated whether this was really

due to the bombing, the damage of which was
relatively light thanks to war-time evacuation.

The attack also cost the US 27 aircraft
to North Vietnamese air defences . Some

historians suggest Thieu had already agreed
to return to negotiations before the bombing,

and the real intention was to show US strength to
China and the Soviet Union. US and international

media are generally critical of the attack, with
The New York Times calling it “war by tantrum”.

When negotiations resume on January 8, 1973
a conclusion comes surprisingly quickly. But

the new deal only differs cosmetically
from the October agreement. Importantly,

the final Paris Peace Accords signed on January
27 stipulate the North can still maintain forces

in the South and the US will withdraw within 60
days. In those final weeks, the US continues to

pump military equipment into the South, and
Nixon reassures Thieu if the North attacks,

the US will return. By March 30 1973, the final
contingent of 5,200 US troops leaves Vietnam for

good. American involvement in the Vietnam War has
come to an end, and South Vietnam stands alone.

Even so, all that remains of the US’s
eight-year involvement in Vietnam is a

small US marine detachment at the Saigon embassy.
Almost immediately both North and South Vietnam

violate the Paris Peace Accords. The North
still feels it has the military advantage,

while Southern President Nguyễn
Văn Thiệu refuses to deal with

Communists in a Council of Reconciliation.
Fighting also continues. South Vietnamese

ARVN forces move into contested zones,
although, the North avoids large scale

combat to avoid provoking a US return. However,
it does reequip its units with modern equipment

and heavy weapons and infiltrates more forces
into the South – in violation of the agreement.

A US return though, looks unlikely. Congress and
the public oppose President Nixon’s promise to

reintervene if necessary . Senators from both
parties pass legislation limiting Presidential

power, ordering an end to the bombing of
Cambodia and slashing funds to South Vietnam.

The Watergate Scandal – which reveals Nixon
illegally spied on rivals – further limits his

influence. Facing impeachment, Nixon resigns
in August 1974, but new President Gerald Ford

promises to continue to support South Vietnam.
[ORIGINAL AUDIO Nixon]

„Therefore, I shall resign the
Presidency effective at noon

tomorrow. Vice President Ford will be sworn
in as President at that hour in this office.”

The North now steps up military actions,
capturing Phuoc Long in December. The ARVN

response is lacklustre, so the North intensifies
operations in March 1975. They expect the new

Ho Chi Minh offensive to be victorious in
1976, but victory comes much, much sooner.

Following diversionary attacks, the North captures
Ban Me Thuot in a surprise raid. Thieu orders a

retreat from the Central Highlands towards Saigon,
but it soon becomes a rout. ARVN units collapse as

the NVA advances along the coast before swinging
towards Saigon. The ARVN hold out at Xuan Loc bu t

the NVA push them back after 12 days of fighting.
North Vietnamese forces now attack Saigon :

“There is a strange, sad giddiness in Saigon...
like the feeling one gets when the score is 56

to 0 late in the fourth quarter and your team
is the one with zero. You aren’t happy about

the thrashing your team got, but at this
point the most merciful thing is the for

the game to end.” (Harrison in Yancy 182)
There is no US military response, and Thieu

resigns on April 21. Instead, Ford prepares
for final evacuations. These become chaotic

scenes as thousands of South Vietnamese civilians
descend on the airport, which is under attack.

“[T]he airplane started to move with the door
still open. I was looking out the door and

saw people running around in all directions
shooting crazily into the air. They seemed

to be in a panic. People all around me on the
airplane started screaming and crying. Some of

them started praying very loudly.” (Langer 283)
The chaos shuts down the airport, so civilians

surge to the US Embassy and break in just as the
final helicopters depart. The US evacuates 1,000

Americans and 5,500 Vietnamese in two days.
[ORIGINAL AUDIO]

“Because to the Vietnamese people, all
the fighting, more than 25 years now. So,

now that we stop fighting, I am very happy,
very happy for all the young kids, same as me,

all the people who have been in the army.”
Shortly afterwards, North Vietnamese units

enter Saigon to little resistance. On
April 3 0, NVA tanks crash through the

gates of Thieu’s Presidential Palace and
the South Vietnamese government surrenders.

By May 3, the North clears the final areas of
the Mekong Delta and the war is over. In 1976,

the North announces a unified Socialist Republic
of Vietnam, with Saigon renamed Ho Chi Minh City.

For the US, their long involvement from
at least 1950 is over. For North Vietnam,

the struggle for independence arguably
started in 1858 against the French.

Until 1973, 2.7 million US personnel
served in South Vietnam. Of this number,

more than 58,000 are killed and
300,000 wounded. The cost of 1

trillion dollars in today’s value also led
to a growing economic crisis in the 1970s.

Counting Vietnamese casualties
is harder. Fighting and bombing

kills up to 2 million Vietnamese civilians, and
perhaps up to 1 million North Vietnamese military

personnel. The US estimates around 250,000
South Vietnamese military killed in action.

But the Vietnam War’s legacy goes further
than combat casualties. After victory,

Northern agents forcibly move some Vietnamese into
so-called “re-education camps” - perhaps 200,000,

though estimates vary. There are reports of
political executions of southern figures,

but their scale and frequency remain debated.
Vietnam does suffer great economic damage . Around

10% of South Vietnam’s agricultural land is
destroyed, including by US defoliants like Agent

Orange. Some also associate these herbicides
with an increased rate of cancer and birth

defects among both Vietnamese and US veterans.
Meanwhile, the North imposes a centralized

Communist ideology on the south, even
concerning some southern revolutionaries.

Not all within the Viet Cong’s Provisional
Revolutionary Government were Communist,

and some expected a more pluralistic system:
“Now, with total power in their hands,

they began to show their cards in the most
brutal fashion. They made it understand

that the Vietnam of the future would be a single
monolithic block, collectivist and totalitarian,

in which all the traditions and culture of
the South would be ground and molded by the

political machine of the conquerors.” (Ruane 160)
Economic restructuring and post-war tension with

China cause 2 million Vietnamese
to leave by 1979, including many

ethnic Chinese merchants. Many escape by
sea, becoming known as the ‘boat people’.

But the Vietnam War’s legacy goes beyond
the US and Vietnam. Both the US and North

Vietnam appeal to allies, both in Indochina
and beyond, and expand the war into Laos and

Cambodia to seize an all-important advantage.
The Vietnam War is often seen as an entirely

American intervention in a foreign land, and
Vietnamese still refer to the 1965-73 period

as ‘The American War’. American historians, and
popular culture mostly focus on US involvement

the war, but thousands of troops from other
countries also fought and died – on both sides.

When the US enters the Vietnam war in 1965,
President Lyndon Johnson hopes an international

coalition will join him. Not only will this
provide military resources, but also legitimise

US actions, both internationally and domestically.
He calls on members of SEATO - the South-East

Asian Treaty Organization – a kind of
Pacific version of NATO. South Vietnam,

like the other former French Indochinese colonies,
is barred from joining military alliances,

but SEATO claims responsibility for the
region anyway. However, few of SEATO’s

actual members are interested in joining the US.
France, having recently withdrawn from the region,

has no interest in returning, while Britain
claims it cannot intervene as a co-chair

of the 1954 Geneva Conference which established
North and South Vietnam. But the real reasons are

that the British public and governments are more
concerned about security in Malaya than Vietnam.

So President Johnson’s so-called Many Flags
Campaign does not rally many flags. However,

the Philippines and Thailand
do send troops, for a price.

The US grants the Philippines $80 million in
aid and agrees to cover the deployment costs

for a 2,300-strong engineering and civic support
group. Thailand also receives additional aid,

as well as deployment costs for sending
the Queen’s Cobras – a force of 2,000

troops that grows into a 12,000-strong division.
Thailand also allows US airbases in the country.

Although Filipino and Thai contributions are
modest – and potentially driven by economic

opportunism – some US allies
strongly support intervention.

In Australia, Prime Minister Robert Menzies
sees threats from both Indonesia and China.

He hopes Australian support for US Vietnam
policy will encourage the US to commit to

Pacific, and Australian, security.
Menzies “forward defence” policy

sends Australian advisors to South Vietnam in
1962 and introduces national service in 1964.

When US ground forces enter South Vietnam
in March 1965, Australians soon follow.

Initially, a single Australian battalion joins
the US 173rd Airborne Brigade, but cooperation

is difficult. Australian equipment, some of it
dating back to WWII, is lacking compared to the

Americans’, but there are other differences.
Australian troops, many with jungle experience,

prefer small unit actions, rather than US
operations which favour large scale deployment

and massive force. Australian doctrine often could
not rely on available fire support, so Australian

units expect to be more self-sufficient
and flexible. One US officer is impressed:

“Aussies used squads to make contact, and brought
in reinforcing elements to do the killing;

they planned in the belief that a platoon
on the battlefield could do anything,

including get out… I still maintain
the Australians understood the war

better than our guys ever would.” (Longley 100)
Eventually, the Australian presence grows into a

separate Australian Task Force with air support
and a small number of New Zealander artillery.

Operating in Phuoc Tuy Province, they rely on
methodical patrols, village pacification and

ambushes rather than US-style search and destroy.
On August 18 1966, one such patrol encountered a

force of 2,000 Viet Cong in a rubber plantation
at Long Tan. The VC kill several Australians in

the opening moments, and move to surround the
lightly equipped Australians. But D Company,

6 Battalion holds off VC assaults with the
aid of artillery, while Royal Australian

Air Force Hueys drop ammunition and medical
supplies. As torrential monsoon rain falls,

Armoured Personnel Carriers and reinforcements
fight through the Viet Cong to relieve D Company.

“I remember the deafening noise from small arms
and artillery, the torrential rain making positive

identification of friend or foe extremely hard,
my movement forward to 10 Platoon with the radio,

and when all seemed lost as the enemy
assembled for a final assault (which I

firmly believe would have been very difficult
for us to repulse) the arrival of our APCs.

The relief and joy that flooded us!” (AUS GOV 19)
The Viet Cong withdraw, and Australian follow-up

operations eliminate large VC units from the
province, although the wider VC infrastructure

remains in place. Australian jungle and
pacification experience from Malaya and Indonesia

and their different tactics are responsible
for the partial success . Unlike US bases,

which employ many Vietnamese civilians and
include ARVN personnel, the Australian Task

Force base is closed to Vietnamese. As
a result, VC informants among workers

and ARVN troops cannot accurately estimate
Australian strength or predict operations.

According to one statistic, VC units instigate
around three-quarters of combat against US troops,

but fire first in just 6.7% of encounters with
Australian troops. Two-thirds of one battalion’s

contacts resulted from their own ambushes of the
VC. All told 60,000 Australians serve in Vietnam.

But the second largest foreign contribution
to South Vietnam’s defence doesn’t come

from a SEATO member. South Korea
sends 320,000 troops to Vietnam,

with force levels peaking at 50,000 in 1969.
The contribution is presented as thanks for

US intervention in the Korean War, although
South Korea also gains extensive US economic

and military aid. The US modernises the South
Korean military, contributes to social welfare

and arranges deals with US companies. President
Johnson insists the deal is not “rewards for

mercenaries” but promotes long-term South Korean
security. Some historians suggest the agreement

kickstarts South Korea as a major world economy.
South Korean troops in Vietnam gain a reputation

for aggression and brutality, perhaps due to
strict, disciplinarian officers or personal

animosity to communism. Whatever its source, it
finds a use in Vietnam. Often fighting alongside

US forces, Korean soldiers are sometimes
given dangerous roles – like infiltrating

VC tunnels – or turned on suspected enemy
villages. In one raid, a US lieutenant recalls:

“Whatever else the Koreans did in
the village was their own business,

but with their reputation for brutality, we all
knew that the village would be loath to support

the Viet Cong so openly in the future…If we
got our kills, we could take full credit,

and if the ROKs became overzealous, we could plead
our lack of control over our allies.” (Kyle 100)

As the US withdraws from 1969 on, their
allies do the same. In the later war years,

allied troops experience many of the same
frustrations as US soldiers, especially an

inability to fundamentally destroy the enemy
and a poor relationship with the ARVN. Modest,

but growing protests in both Australia
and South Korea also encourage withdrawal.

By 1973, all allies are out of Vietnam.
US allies' losses are 4,400 South Koreans,

512 Australians, 351 Thai, 37 New Zealanders and
nine Filipinos killed. SEATO itself becomes a

casualty, as it is disbanded in 1977.
The US doesn’t only look for allies

abroad. Within Vietnam itself – especially
in its borders and mountainous areas – are

ethnic minorities willing to fight.
One of the best-known groups are

the Montagnards - an umbrella term for many
different highland ethnic groups. From 1961,

US special forces recruit Montagnards
into Civilian Irregular Defence Groups,

or CIDGs. Australian advisors, working within the
US 5th Special Forces Group, also provide tuition.

Montagnards are often Christian and have
their own ethnic identities, which makes them

suspicious to both the North and South Vietnamese
governments. Even so, US special forces recognise

them as capable, competent and self-reliant
fighters, as an American officer reports :

“To my surprise, I discovered that the CIDG troops
are not the band of unskilled, disorganized,

and disgruntled peasants I had envisioned. They
are, in fact, closely knit religious or ethnic

minority groups with a fierce loyalty to each
other and to those who will treat them with

respect and consideration...” (Kelly 86)
Initially the CIDGs provide local defence,

but US special forces extend their role to
mobile unconventional forces. Small teams of

US and Vietnamese special forces work beside
groups of Montagnards to conduct patrols and

ambushes . Montagnards use their local knowledge
as scouts, interpreters and interrogators to

provide intelligence and proactively hunt the VC.
Their methods evolve throughout the conflict,

including building special forces camps
for operations in enemy territory. These

so-called fighting camps are designed to
be functional and cheap and quick to build.

By using local materials and labour, each
only cost 10,000 US dollars. They also need

to be easily defendable by small garrisons of
CIDGs and special forces and use principles of

defence in depth with multiple layers of barbed
wire with mines and trip flares, machine guns,

mortars and earthen ramparts and bunkers.
But fighting camps are not merely fortresses

in enemy territory, they are used for proactive
operations including setting up ambushes:

“During my tour in Vietnam, I have seen a
steady improvement in the fighting spirit

and military proficiency of the CIDG...
The most notable example of this occurred

on 8 April 1967. Three platoons from Camp
Trung Dung, without US or VNSF present,

were deployed south and east of the camp in night
ambush position, when an NVA company attacked a

Regional Forces outpost... The CIDG platoons moved
to cut off the enemy withdrawal, killing forty-two

NVA and capturing 20 weapons.” (Kelly 104)
By late 1967, Special Forces and Montagnard

camps spread across South Vietnam, especially in
areas of high enemy activity. Included in this

are camps on stilts built along the Mekong
River, complete with floating landing pads.

Such camps provide CIDGs a degree of operational
flexibility impossible with conventional troops,

including airborne, river borne, and nighttime
operations . In many cases, CIDG forces locate

and pin the enemy while conventional forces
rush to the location. In some areas, CIDGs and

Special Forces provided 50% of MACV’s ground
intelligence . And as small secretive units,

they can be used in cross border incursions into
neutral Cambodia and Laos without major political

ramifications . Relations between US Green Berets
and Montagnards are good, especially since the

special forces live beside their allies
and learn from, as well as instruct, them.

But there were also failures. Relations with South
Vietnamese regular troops are poor, even resulting

in a Montagnard uprising in 1964. Some commanders
fail to fully understand or utilise unconventional

forces, either seeing them as simply a strategic
reserve or splitting up tightly knit groups . Even

so, the lessons learned in Vietnam would go
on influence modern special forces operations.

But it isn’t just the US and South Vietnamese
who benefit from alliances. In fact,

North Vietnam arguably gains the most
from foreign aid and cooperation.

Since the 1950s, the Soviet Union and China
send military aid to Ho Chi Minh’s forces. The

amount of aid fluctuates over time, as does the
main contributor. At first, China provides the

most arms, while the Soviet Union urges caution.
Once the US intervenes, though, the Soviet Union

increases support, including military advisors.
There are other factors at play as well. Both

China and the Soviet Union want to position
themselves as the leading Communist supporter

of revolutionary movements, a competition
made more intense by the growing Sino-Soviet

ideological split. But non-ideological strategic
concerns might be more important. China sees

Vietnam as an important buffer and economic
zone, while US preoccupation with Vietnam

gives the Soviet Union a freer hand in Europe.
Some historians argue China provides ‘quantity’

aid and the Soviet Union ‘quality’. Between
1956 and 1975, China gives economic grants

and moves huge amounts of small arms, artillery
and vehicles into North Vietnam. It also sends

around 320,000 Chinese engineering and
anti-aircraft troops to the North, where

they operate weapons and maintain communication
and transport lines. This frees up significant

manpower for the North Vietnamese regular army.
But Chinese supplies fluctuate throughout the

years, reflecting growing tension within
the Communist camp. In 1964, the Soviet

Union becomes a more reliable partner. They send
KGB and GRU agents to establish communications

and intelligence, although the most important
contribution is air defence, including modern

surface-to-air missiles and MiG-21 fighters
. US Air Force pilots, some of them veterans

of the Korean War, noticed the improvements
in North Vietnamese anti-air capabilities:

[ORIGINAL AUDIO John Madden]: [00:33] Last year,
they had plenty of AAA and some SAMs. But this

year, at least…Their defences are considerably
heavier this year than they were last year,

and the SAM threat has increased significantly.
[01:01] The MIGs are considerably more active

this year, their activity is two to
three times great than it was last year.”

And the USSR also benefits from this
agreement. Air defence forms a central

part of their Cold War nuclear strategy, and
Vietnam provides an ideal test environment for

their weapon systems . Captured and crashed
US equipment is sent to Moscow for analysis,

while Soviet intelligence provides technical
questions for PoW interrogation. Some American

PoWs also report the presence of Soviet officers.
On some rare occasions, Soviet troops participate

in combat as anti-aircraft
units, though in most cases

they train and direct North Vietnamese troops:
“We turned out to be not bad teachers. In total,

our regiment had fired 43 missiles and
downed 23 planes... When [a shot down

US pilot] was told [the crews were]
Vietnamese, he did not believe it.

He said that the job smelled Russian.” (Clines)
There are claims that Soviet pilots on training

flights with North Vietnamese students dogfight
US aircraft, but this area is understudied and

most evidence is anecdotal. North Korea
though, does send around 200 pilots to

support the North Vietnamese Airforce.
Other socialist nations also provide

support. Czechoslovakia, East Germany and
Bulgaria sent economic and military supplies,

while Communist Cuba also dispatches
advisors . Some US prisoners later claim

Cubans worked as prison guards and interrogators.
Despite public announcements about international

communist cooperation, relations between
North Vietnam and its allies are mixed. Hanoi

complains about unilateral Soviet intelligence
gathering in Vietnam, while Chinese relations,

already tense due to historical animosity, suffer
towards the end of the conflict - especially

after President Nixon’s 1972 visit to Beijing.
“The imperialists pursue a policy of detente with

some big countries to have a free hand... to bully
the small countries and stamp out the national

liberation movement... [China] shrinking from its
lofty international duties not only is detrimental

to revolutionary movement in the world
but will also bring unfathomable harm

to itself in the end.” (Thee 125)
Chinese military and economic aid

to Vietnam ends abruptly in 1975 after the
fall of Saigon. Long-term, this pushes the

new Socialist Republic of Vietnam closer to the
Soviet Union and further weakens relations with

China. Vietnamese nationalism, Chinese economic
decline and support for the genocidal regime

of Cambodian leader Pol Pot, eventually leads to
fresh conflict between China and Vietnam – turning

a former friend into Vietnam’s most dangerous foe.
Despite its name, the Vietnam War is not confined

to the territory of North or South Vietnam. As
the US and North Vietnamese escalate operations,

the war crosses borders, merges with
neighbouring conflicts and takes on

different forms – from CIA-directed secret
armies in Laos, to genocide in Cambodia.

The former French colonies of Laos and Cambodia
see some anti-French resistance in the 1950s,

but not on the scale of Vietnam. The 1954 Geneva
Accords proclaim the former colonies as neutral,

independent states free from foreign military
interference, but this doesn’t last long.

By the late 1950s, several factions share
power in the Laotian capital of Vientiane.

Prime Minister Prince Souvanna Phouma heads
a neutralist faction, while his half-brother

Prince Souphanouvong leads a leftist faction
including the communist Lao People's Party,

or Pathet Lao. Prince Boun Oum – a cousin of the
other princes - controls a right-wing faction.

In 1959, rightist repression of the Pathet
Lao results in a rural insurgency. In 1960,

neutralist leaders purge the government of
rightists and offer concessions to the Pathet Lao.

But on December 4 rightist general Phoumi Nosavan
launches a coup with US military assistance,

and captures Vientiane after a three-day artillery
barrage. The neutralists and Pathet Lao evacuate,

with the help of Soviet aircraft.
However, the rightist Royal Lao Army is

corrupt and inept, and loses ground to the Pathet
Lao and neutralists, especially in the Plain of

Jars – a flat area where road networks converge.
Initially, the US is more concerned with the

crisis in Laos than Vietnam. President Dwight
D. Eisenhower allows covert military training of

the Laotian Army as well as economic aid – more
per capita than any other country at the time.

In 1961, President Kennedy inherits the commitment
and explains to voters the role Laos plays in

the growing tensions in Vietnam.
[ORIGINAL AUDIO – John F. Kennedy]

"In this military advance the local
Communist forces, known as the Pathet Lao,

have had increasing support and direction
from outside. Soviet planes I regret to

say have been conspicuous in a large scale
airlift into the battle area. Over 101,000

sorties since last December 13th. Plus a
whole supporting set of combat specialists,

mainly from communist North Vietnam, and
heavier weapons have been provided from

outside. All with the clear object of destroying
by military action the agreed neutrality of Laos."

The failure of the CIA-directed April 1961
invasion of Cuba makes Kennedy skeptical of CIA

abilities, but he also rules of conventional
support for Laos. So, he expands the CIA’s

programme of training and resupply. To avoid
violating the Geneva Accords, military personnel

are officially civilians, including pilots
for Air America, the CIA’s covert airline.

But CIA operatives like Bill Lair
are unhappy with the Lao Army, as

one National Security Council Staffer complains:
“We discovered the Laotians were not Turks... they

would not stand up and fight.” (Castle 39)
So, the CIA looks to allies elsewhere.

Neighbouring Thailand is strongly anti-communist
and provides bases and special forces to support

US operations. Together they also look for allies
among different ethnic groups in Laos, especially

the highland Hmong. Ethnically and culturally
distinct from the lowland Lao, the Hmong are

fiercely independent. Although they’re not very
interested in ideological struggles, they do worry

about Vietnamese encroachment on their territory.
The US identifies Major General Vang Pao – the

only Hmong commander in the Laotian Army – as
a reliable partner, and starts training Hmong

fighters in secret. One of the first is Moua Thao:
“We walked by foot for three days to reach

Padong... and two airplanes came in and
dropped the guns and ammunition... They

issued the guns... ammunition... hand
grenades and 57mm recoilless cannons...

We received three days quick training...
Those guns were so new for Hmong people,

so we needed to learn how to keep
them, learn how to operate and clean

them in three days.” (EGUSD Oral History)
In their first clashes with the Pathet Lao,

who are now supported by North Vietnam, the Hmong
lose their base at Padang in June 1961. However,

the CIA are impressed with their fighting
spirit. The Agency ups its target to train

10,000 fighters in the so-called Armee
Clandestine – the “secret army” - to

contain the Pathet Lao in the Plain of Jars.
The Pathet Lao, though, continue to advance.

In April 1962, Nosavan loses his political base
at Nam Tha, and with it US confidence. Meanwhile,

the Hmong establish a new base at Long
Tieng. With Nosavan politically weakened,

an international treaty forms a fragile
coalition of all Laotian factions and

orders all foreign military to leave. The Soviet
Union does step back, but the North Vietnamese

ignore the request. The US moves its agents to
Thailand and continues covert support from there.

In 1963, the Laotian coalition falls apart and
fighting resumes. This time the Pathet Lao fight

their former allies in the neutralist faction.
As the Laotian government increasingly relies

on the Hmong and CIA support, the Pathet
Lao become dependent on North Vietnam.

By 1964, the Laotian Civil War is firmly connected
to the Vietnam conflict. North Vietnam establishes

a logistical highway to South Vietnam – the
Ho Chi Minh trail - through much of Laos,

with a major base at Tchepone. With the US
military getting more involved in Vietnam,

they hope the Hmong and others can tie up North
Vietnamese forces and interrupt the trail.

Bombing becomes vitally important
to government forces. Initially,

Thai and Laotian pilots in up-gunned T-28 trainers
provide close air support, but soon US pilots are

flying Laotian marked aircraft. Prince Souvanna
is concerned bombing undermines his sovereignty,

but the US pressures him to accept.
By December 1964, US command formalises

bombing in Laos as Operation Barrel Roll. American
Forward Air Observers, known as Ravens, arrive,

and the air force targets the Plain of Jars
with 2 missions a week in 1964, but 140 a

week by 1966. The Plain of Jars becomes one of
the most intensely bombed locations in history.

Despite the scale of US bombing
in Laos, it’s officially secret,

as is American fighting on the ground.
As the US shifts its focus to Vietnam, combat in

Laos falls into a seasonal cycle. The Hmong, using
airlifts, make gains in the wet season, while the

Pathet Lao and North Vietnamese, advance on the
roads in the dry season. The CIA tries to turn the

Hmong into a more offensive conventional force,
but internal disagreements and the personalities

of influential operatives slow progress.
One controversial agent, Anthony Poshepny,

becomes known for collecting Pathet Lao ears:
“I used to collect ears, you know. I had a big,

green, reinforced cellophane bag as you walked up
my steps. I’d tell my people to put ‘em in and...

send them to Vientiane with the report. Sent ‘em
only once or twice, and then the goddamn office

girls were sick for a week. Putrid when they
opened up the envelope, you know.” (Warner 252)

Ear collecting is soon discontinued.
Despite air support, the Laotian

government still suffer on the ground. Rampant
corruption inflates troop numbers, while some

commanders sell US equipment to Burmese opium
cartels, and take up drug-running themselves.

The CIA doesn’t do much about it, and the
opium often reaches US troops in Vietnam.

By 1968, the Pathet Lao and NVA are on the
offensive, seizing Nam Bac and overrunning

a secret US radar base at Phou Pha Tri. When
President Johnson ends the bombing of North

Vietnam in late 1968, he compensates by more
bombing in Laos, including with B-52 bombers.

The scale of such bombing is hard to hide, and
by 1969 the secret is out. The new US President,

Richard Nixon, defends US actions but also
announces his intention to withdraw from Vietnam.

Hmong forces therefore go on the offensive to
win a decisive victory before the US leaves the

region. In late summer, supported by massive
US bombing, they capture the Plain of Jars.

By February 1970, though the Pathet Lao recapture
the Plains. Meanwhile, conventional offensives

are draining Hmong manpower, so Thailand sends
its troops to help. South Vietnam also operates

across the border in 1971, but fails to cut the
Ho Chi Minh trail or help the Hmong. By late 1971,

Vang Pao’s Hmong army is breaking apart . It
has suffered 3,300 killed in the last two years,

and is starting to rely on teenage recruits.
US bombing prevents a Pathet Lao victory 1972

and following the 1973 Paris Accords, the
war in Laos officially ends with the war in

Vietnam. Unlike in Vietnam, major fighting
does stop as a new coalition government

including the Pathet Lao take power. However,
the North Vietnamese continue to attack the

Hmong, who no longer have US support:
“We helped the United States for 14 years,

now they [were] leaving us without looking
back. We didn’t know when the Communists came

what they were going to do to us. Are they
going to kill [us] or are they going to put

us in re-education camps?” (EGUSD Oral History)
By 1975, the Pathet Lao dominates the government,

abolishes the monarchy, and installs
Souphanouvong as Prime Minister. It’s

mostly a non-violent takeover, but they
do send 40,000 Laotians to re-education

camps and continue to attack the Hmong.
The Laotian Civil War kills up to 200,000

Lao civilians and military, about 10% of the
pre-war population. 728 Americans are killed,

mostly pilots and CIA personnel, while the Hmong
lose 30,000. Faced with threats of annihilation,

around 50,000 Hmong and other minorities
flee, with many settling in the US. Overall,

250,000 Laotians become refugees.
Throughout the war, the US drops

2.75 million tons of bombs on Laos – roughly
the same amount as dropped in Europe in WWII.

Up to one third fail to explode, and leftover
munitions remain a significant threat today.

Laos suffers terribly, but its neighbour Cambodia
arguably suffers most from conflict in Indochina,

as war makes way for genocide.
Like Laos, Cambodia is neutralised

by the 1954 Geneva Accords. New Cambodian Prime
Minister Prince Norodom Sihanouk benefits from

French concessions prior to the agreement, and
anti-colonial sentiment was low. As a result,

unlike in Laos, North Vietnamese insurgents leave.
Until the late 1960s, Sihanouk develops a mostly

neutralist stance. He rejects US
support, even breaking relations

in 1965, and maintains contact with North
Vietnam despite long-standing animosity:

“I have always adopted a realist attitude. Heaven
has made [Vietnam] our neighbor for eternity and

it was numbering in the [1960s], in the north
and south, nearly fifty million inhabitants,

about eight times more than Cambodia then. “Red”
or “blue” it was a very dangerous neighbor,

to be handled with care.” (Morris 39/40)
He also tries to balance internal divisions.

On the left, he’s opposed by the Khmer
People’s Revolutionary Party or Khmer Rouge,

led by Saloth Sar, later known as Pol Pot. But
their 5,000 poorly-armed rebels face 30,000

government troops. Originally the Khmer Rouge
is an urban movement, but government suppression

forces them into highland tribal areas where
political mobilization faces cultural barriers:

“Almost every night we would receive instruction
in politics. We would receive lectures about

communism and the revolution and world affairs.
They spoke to us in [the] Khmer [language],

and nobody understood a word of it.” (Padwe)
The Khmer Rouge receive little assistance

from North Vietnam, which is
aligning with the Soviet Union,

and is worried by the Khmer Rouge’s more radical,
Chinese-aligned Maoist ideology. More importantly,

North Vietnam prioritizes their own war and
as long as Sihanouk allows North Vietnamese

sanctuaries in Cambodia for attacks
into South Vietnam, Hanoi let him be.

But North Vietnamese troops in Cambodia do trigger
US action. In March 1969, President Nixon orders

the secret bombing of NVA troops in Cambodia,
and US officials falsify reports to cover it up.

Then, in March 1970, while Sihanouk is abroad,
pro-US General Lon Nol launches a coup,

announces a Khmer Republic, and requests US
support. Now exiled, Sihanouk heads up the Front

Uni National du Kampuchea – or FUNK – an anti-Lon
Nol coalition, that includes the Khmer Rouge.

The US doesn’t help Lon Nol’s
takeover, but benefits from it,

since Washington can now frame US actions in
Cambodia as helping an ally. In April 1970,

US and South Vietnamese troops launch a major
cross-border attack against North Vietnamese bases

in Cambodia. It’s a modest success, but causes
protests in the US against expanding the war.

Bombing, the coup, and the US invasion bring the
Khmer Rouge and North Vietnamese closer together,

with the NVA providing 10,000 troops.
Against a poorly motivated and corrupt

government army, the communists seize two-thirds
of the country by October 1970. But North

Vietnam does not want to see a victory – yet.
Ultimately, North Vietnam wants a Cambodian

communist regime it controls and it doesn’t
control FUNK. It tries to do so with Hanoi-trained

Cambodian agents, but this and its preference
for Sihanouk over the Khmer Rouge, leads to

tensions. These are made worse by historical
border disputes, Vietnamese nationalism,

and a patronizing attitude towards Cambodians
noted by Soviet Ambassador Ilya Shcherbakov:

“...at times the narrowly nationalistic approach
of the Vietnamese comrades to the solution of the

problems of Indochina is too obvious, and the
noticeable attempts by them of subordination of

the problems of Laos and Cambodia to the interests
of Vietnam results in the concealed discontent of

the Laotian and Cambodian friends.” (Morris 51)
As early as 1971, Khmer Rouge agents expel

and occasionally assassinate Vietnamese and
Hanoi-trained communist agents and solidify

their control by removing pro-Sihanouk figures
and denouncing his “feudal regime”. In early 1973,

they even attack NVA troops in border
sanctuaries. North Vietnam doesn’t react,

since it has just signed the Paris Peace Accords
and wants to focus on its final offensive against

South Vietnam, not fighting Cambodian Communists.
Meanwhile, despite withdrawing from South Vietnam,

the US massively steps up bombing in Cambodia,
triggering debate at home. The US Congress

receives letters of protest from US aircrew:
“I am an AC-130 gunship navigator fighting the

war in Cambodia on a day-to-day basis. I come
as close as one can get to observe the conflict

at hand. What I see is an absurd effort by my
Commander in Chief to preserve an unpopular,

corrupt, dictatorial government at
any expense. We have become once again

involved in a civil conflict and as a result
of our involvement have escalated the death

and destruction on a massive scale.” (Eisenberg)
Congress demands the bombing stop by August 15,

and slashes funding for US operations in
Indochina. Just before the deadline, US bombing

prevents a Khmer Rouge assault on Phnom Penh.
But without long-term US support, the Cambodian

government is vulnerable, especially since China
increases support for the Khmer Rouge in 1974.

In January 1975, the Khmer Rouge resume the
offensive, and besiege Phnom Penh. They capture

the city in April, and Lon Nol flees to the US .
Publicly, North Vietnam praises the Communist

victory in Cambodia victory, but privately
they worry. The Khmer Rouge have won without

direct North Vietnamese assistance, reducing
Hanoi’s influence over the new communist state.

Sihanouk officially becomes President of
Cambodia, but Pol Pot and his clique soon put him

under house arrest, and announce a new state of
Democratic Kampuchea and a revolutionary new era.

Pol Pot calls his program ‘Year Zero’: he
orders cities emptied as part of a hyper-Maoist

agricultural revolution. He denounces outside
influence and calls for a return of the ancient

Angkor kingdom as a simple agrarian state .
The Party violently represses intellectuals,

urban professionals, Buddhist priests, Muslim
tribespeople, and many ordinary Cambodians.

Starvation, overwork, and executions kill
up to 2.8 million people – around a third

the pre-war population, with many suffering
torture in specially established facilities.

[ORIGINAL AUDIO Ing Pech (S21 Survivor)]
"In the two years that I was here...

I would hear people use screaming when was working
here... the prisoners who were being tortured in

the building next door. And sometimes we'd hear
people being tortured with electricity and they

would fall over in shock. Sometimes I would
attach electrical wires to the testicles or to

the ears of the prisoner. Sometimes they would cut
people's stomachs open and take out their liver."

Publicly, North Vietnam applauds Cambodian
achievements in state propaganda:

“Liberated Cambodia is living in a new
and healthy atmosphere.” (Morris 93)

But tensions continue. In May 1975, Vietnamese
and Cambodian forces clash over disputed islands

in the Gulf of Thailand. Both sides play
down the violence and reconfirm pacts of

friendship in August. Hanoi still hopes a
pro-Vietnamese faction may emerge in Cambodia

and is reluctant to provoke China, which supports
Cambodia. Privately, however, Vietnamese leader

Le Duan confides in the Soviet ambassador:
“[Pol Pot’s clique are a] pro-Chinese sect

conducting a crude and severe policy...
These are bad people...” (Morris 96)

Militarily, Vietnam has a huge advantage, with
around 685,000 troops backed up 900 tanks and

300 aircraft. The Khmer Rouge barely has 70,000
troops with few tanks and virtually no aircraft.

Despite this, the Khmer Rouge launch
cross-border raids into Vietnam in April 1977,

killing 200 civilians. Le Duan believes
the raids are designed to provoke Vietnam

into hasty action and urges restraint.
Government propaganda continues to praise

Cambodia and hide the attacks from the public.
Vietnam finally responds in December 1977,

invading one province before withdrawing in
January. Pol Pot steps up internal purges of

suspected pro-Vietnamese figures, including
many experienced commanders. The Khmer

Rouge kills about half of the Cambodian
communists who secured victory in 1975.

Vietnam wants to start reconstruction,
demobilise its large army, and deal with

a growing economic crisis – which it cannot do
with a Chinese-supported Cambodia on its border.

Many Vietnamese nationalists also want an
Indochina dependent on and dominated by

Vietnam. While the Pathet Lao was relatively easy
to control, they see stronger anti-Vietnamese

sentiment in the Khmer Rouge as a problem.
In December 1978, Vietnam launches a full-scale

invasion with 150,000 troops. Advancing
from three directions, they rapidly

overwhelm Cambodian forces. Faced with more
purges, 30,000 Khmer Rouge soldiers desert,

with many supporting Vietnamese forces. On
January 7, 1979 Vietnam captures Phnom Penh,

and Pol Pot escapes to the western mountains.
Vietnam installs a pro-Hanoi government in

Cambodia. Prince Sihanouk flees abroad
and eventually establishes the Coalition

Government of Democratic Kampuchea, an
anti-Vietnamese coalition including both

non-communist guerillas and the Khmer Rouge. The
US, Thailand, and Britain support him, as they

all oppose Vietnamese control over Cambodia:
“Thus, to prevent Vietnamese hegemony over

Indochina, the United States, Thailand, and two
noncommunist Cambodian armies tied themselves

to a strange marriage of convenience with the
murderers of millions [- the Khmer Rouge -] and

People’s Republic of China.” (Clodfelter 285)
The Vietnamese occupation lasts until 1989 and

ends the Cambodian genocide. At least for some
Cambodians, the arrival of Vietnamese troops is

seen as a liberation from the Khmer Rouge.
[ORIGINAL AUDIO – MS. CHANTHOU BOUA]

"The Vietnamese are the only troops which fight
Pol Pot who is their first enemy. And also,

many people in the countryside and in the city
told me that the Vietnamese don't bother them.

They are allowed to do whatever they want
and sometimes they get on well with one

another and they help with one another with
their works. So, it's fine for everyone."

However, the Vietnamese invasion is not a
humanitarian mission. Instead, Vietnam’s primary

interests are their own nationalistic priorities.
Hanoi’s intervention in Cambodia is a gamble,

as it worsens already bad relations with
China. Vietnam is closer to the Soviet Union,

which has split from China, and moves away from a
Mao-inspired agricultural revolution. Territorial

disputes over the Paracel and Spratly Islands are
also a problem, and China fears Vietnam’s growing

population, self-confidence, and economic and
military potential as a regional power. Vietnam’s

occupation of Cambodia is the tipping point.
On February 17, 1979 the Sino-Vietnamese War

begins, also known in China as the “Self-defensive
counterattack against Vietnam” and in Vietnam as

the “War against Chinese expansionism.” In total,
around 120,000 Chinese troops cross into Vietnam,

opposed by 120,000 mostly irregular Vietnamese
troops. The Chinese capture Lang Son,

but run into strong resistance towards Hanoi.
After 17 days of fighting, China withdraws,

claiming it has punished Vietnam enough.
Both sides lose around 10,000 killed.

With the end of the Sino-Vietnamese War, Indochina
enjoys tentative peace. Vietnamese and Chinese

artillery duel across the border throughout the
80s, while Pol Pot continues a low-level Khmer

Rouge insurgency in Cambodia and Thailand. Only in
1998, with Pol Pot’s arrest and subsequent death,

does the Khmer Rouge finally disbands.
By this time, Vietnam has normalized

relations with the US, while new treaties turn
former battlefield foes into trade partners – and

perhaps even strategic allies.
[ORIGINAL AUDIO – DEPUTY U.S.

TRADE REPRESENTATIVE RICHARD FISHER]
"This would of course represent a historic

event, representing the final chapter in
the transformation of our relationship

from adversaries to trading partners."
Now, recent polls suggest around three quarters of

Vietnamese view the US favorably, although this
is somewhat unreciprocated, with only a third of

Americans feeling the same way towards Vietnam.
And so, although the war wounds between nations

may have diplomatically healed, the memories
of the Vietnam War – for some – remain vivid.

The Vietnam War, even in its first years,
has always caused heated debate, as it still

does today. Many struggle to understand how North
Vietnam could defeat the military might of the US,

while some claim the US wasn’t defeated at all.
Nixon felt his agreement provided “peace with

honor” and later claimed, “We had won the
war.” Critics though, point out the Peace

Agreement included major US concessions
while allowing the North to keep military

forces in the south. General Westmoreland
complained the deal amounted to surrendering

the field to the enemy and the de facto end
of South Vietnamese sovereignty. Secretary of

State Dean Rusk called it a “surrender”.
Others, like Nixon’s Secretary of State

Henry Kissinger, point out that Washington
didn’t really expect the South to last,

and the agreement was designed to cover a US
withdrawal with some semblance of respectability:

“we know the goddamned agreement will
probably not work, but we’ve got to be

in the position where if it doesn’t it will be
the result of the other side .” (Daddis 196)

At the very least, this was clearly
not a US victory but a strategic

defeat as historian Gregory Daddis concludes:
“True, the US withdrawal advanced as a matter of

policy rather than collapse. Yet judged on what it
left behind, one seems hard pressed to argue [the

US military] “won” its war.” (Daddis 204/205)
So why did the US fail in Vietnam? Debate also

rages on this question, with a person's position
often differing based on their professional role,

political background and beliefs, and
proximity to wartime decision making.

Some see the roots of US defeat in a failure
of execution in Vietnam. This viewpoint often

suggests US intervention in Vietnam had good
intentions, but practical problems, strategic

errors and poor judgement hindered operations.
Later in life Former Secretary of Defence Robert

McNamara outlined a long list of causes
for the US defeat, focusing on US hubris,

a lack of understanding of Vietnamese
history and over-reliance on military might.

General Westmoreland’s attritional strategy is
often criticised, especially its focus on “kill

counts”. Critics say this approach, although
gaining many tactical victories for the US,

failed to address the actual critical element
of the Vietnam struggle – the rival political

legitimacy of North and South Vietnam. US leaders
disregarded North Vietnam as merely a Sino-Soviet

puppet, whose forces could be systematically
destroyed as a hostile foreign force. But North

Vietnam was largely independent and represented
sincere and widespread nationalist aspirations:

“By wrongly attributing the conflict to external
sources, the United States drastically misjudged

its internal dynamics. By intervening in
what was essentially a local struggle,

it placed itself at the mercy
of local forces, a weak client,

and a determined adversary.” (Hopkins 102)
Some US offensive operations are also of

limited value and rarely developed the political
legitimacy of the Southern government. Even some

victories are counter-productive. For example, in
May 1969, the 101st Airborne Division stormed NVA

trenches on Hill 937 – better known as Hamburger
Hill . After seven days of intense fighting,

the 101st took the hill with 450 casualties, only
to abandon it to the NVA several days later . The

hill itself held little strategic value and
the battle came to typify wasteful US attacks.

Or as journalist Jonathan Schell wrote, “The
more we won, the more we lost.” (Daddis 206)

Regardless, some see consistent US tactical
victory as evidence the US did not lose the

Vietnam War - but others question this logic.
Firstly, although the US defeated every major

North Vietnamese offensive and performed
larger scale search and destroy missions,

most combat in Vietnam was small scale. 96% of
firefights involved less than 200 US soldiers,

and the North Vietnamese instigated around 75%
of all combat, giving them a distinct advantage.

There is no reliable data for who “won” these
countless small-scale actions, but the fact the

US never destroyed the North’s ability to launch
them weakens claims of US military victory.

And military victories are a
means to political victory,

not a means to an end themselves. As Prussian
military theorist Carl von Clausewitz claimed:

“war is the continuation of politics”, and
victory comes not from killing more of the enemy,

but using force to settle the political questions
over which the war is fought. US battlefield

successes did not prevent Northern political
victory, as a US negotiator in Hanoi recalled:

“You know you never beat us on the battlefield,”
I told my North Vietnamese Army counterpart...

“That may be so,” he replied, “but
it is also irrelevant.” (Langer 282)

But even those who accept this conclusion are
quick to point out the blame does not ultimately

rest with the common US soldier. Who ultimately
takes responsibility is another hot topic.

President Nixon blamed congress, while some
military leaders blamed the civilian government:

“In the end, we sent our sons to be maimed
and crippled and to die for naught because

the political leaders of this country
lost their will. There was no lack of

courage or skill on the battlefield.
The lack of fortitude was solely in the

corridors of power in Washington.” (Langer 333)
As early as 1967, military officers began to

complain they were fighting with “one armed
tied behind their backs”. President Johnson

refused to allow a conventional invasion
of North Vietnam, or Cambodia, and Laos,

where North Vietnamese forces operated freely .
Westmoreland understood cutting the Ho Chi Minh

trail in neighbouring countries was vital to
“isolating the battlefield” and did try to

strengthen border security, but it wasn’t enough.
But even when incursions into Cambodia and Laos

were allowed under Nixon, they achieved little.
Westmoreland and his supporters claim the source

of the attritional strategy was really President
Johnson’s civilian advisors, the so-called Wise

Men. They say figures like Robert McNamara,
McGeorge Bundy and Walt Rostow had a disastrous

influence by insisting military strategy fit into
new methods of quantitative analytics. It was

this they argue, not an obsession with firepower,
which prioritised kill counts and an attritional

strategy. Pacification efforts would require even
more troops and result in lower “kill counts”.

Some military figures, like Colonel Harry
Summers, while blaming civilian leaders,

also argue the Joint Chiefs of Staff
provided poor strategic planning and

failed to adequately brief presidents.
Another argument is that Vietnam was lost

not in the jungle, but on the streets of America.
Public dissent to the war certainly had an impact

in pressuring US leaders. Public support is
critical in any war, especially limited wars

in which national survival is not at stake.
It is undeniable public outrage helped end

US involvement, but where did it come from?
One common suggestion is that the US media

misrepresented the war to the public and gave
small scale tactical events strategic significance

through graphic reporting and media framing.
Most famously, the photo of Phan Thị Kim Phúc,

a South Vietnamese girl wounded by napalm, raised
serious questions about US methods . General

Westmoreland was especially critical of
reporting during the 1968 Tet offensive:

“... voluminous, lurid and distorted newspaper
and particularly television reporting of

the Tet offensive, had transformed a
devastating Communist military defeat

into a ‘psychological victory’.” (Jesser 91)
Critical US reports did increase after Tet, but

before Tet coverage was largely supportive. The
media often promoted optimistic government claims,

and some news editors suppressed negative stories
to maintain connections in the White House or

appeal to audiences. Within the Cold War context,
disloyalty was considered economic suicide.

But the media did play a role expanding
the credibility gap between government

claims and the reality in Vietnam, resulting in
more anti-war sentiment. However, it has been

debated how much the media created this dissent,
rather than reinforcing pre-existing opinions . By

the time media became more critical, public
opinion and civic and political leaders had

already shifted the conversation – and the
news marketplace . In this sense, instead

of developing anti-war sentiment, the media may
have simply followed it as a business decision.

Domestic news coverage of protests and political
revelations may have also been more influential

than television war coverage from Vietnam .
Covering protests publicised and normalised

them as a legitimate activity, while major stories
like the My Lai massacre and Pentagon Papers were

released by American domestic journalists and were
first exposed by ex-military figures. Initially,

no major news outlet would publish the My Lai
massacre reporting. Overall, viewership of

television network news was lower than commonly
believed and less than half of TV owners claimed

to watch it. Susan Carruthers, a professor
specialising in the media and war, concludes:

“...television may have confirmed the trend
towards disillusionment, but many academics are

adamant that television did not set it; indeed
it was, in fact, considerably to its rear.”

Regardless of its actual impact, the idea
the media lost the war became attractive

to post-Vietnam officers and affects
US media-military relations to this

day . Some highlight media figures such as
news anchor Walter Cronkite, or actress Jane

Fonda – who visited North Vietnam – as traitors
who undermined the US war effort. Others argue

their impact has been grossly overstated,
and instead they function as easy scapegoats

for deeper military and political failings.
But many of these arguments about US defeat

focus almost exclusively on the US itself. But
as the saying goes “The enemy also gets a vote.”

By 1975, revolutionary nationalist forces in
Vietnam had already fought a series of wars

over 30 years. They gained experience but also
the ideological conviction to see through the

struggle. Their experiences also taught North
Vietnamese leaders that strategic flexibility

was essential to defeat a more powerful enemy.
North Vietnam shifted regularly from conventional

to unconventional operations, navigated
the Sino-Soviet ideological split to their

advantage, and maintained public support
through regimentation and propaganda.

The North Vietnamese casualty rate was not
necessarily driven by US actions, but North

Vietnamese ones, as they generally dictated
the frequency and intensity of combat. Their

small-scale attritional attacks combined with
infrequent, but ambitious offensives were also

partially designed to weaken US public will. North
Vietnamese Commander-in-chief Vo Nguyen Giap,

who oversaw the victorious campaign against the
French in 1954, understood that public will was a

critical US strategic weakness – one which could
be targeted via the battlefields of Vietnam:

“The war was fought on many fronts. At that
time the most important one was American public

opinion... Westmoreland did not believe in human
beings, he believed in numbers... He believed

in weapons and material. Military power is not
the decisive factor in war. Human beings! Human

beings are the decisive factor.” (Langer 318)
South Vietnam also played a key role in the

outcome. Despite significant US support,
Thieu and his predecessors never seriously

worked to develop state legitimacy or create
a South Vietnamese identity. Its actions were

undermined by the Viet Cong, but corruption,
political favouritism and elitism meant ARVN

pacification efforts were ineffective at best,
and counterproductive at worst. Without a strong

rural political base from which to develop
the nation, South Vietnam was on shaky

ground even with massive US military support.
North Vietnamese political goals were proactive

and clearly identifiable for the Vietnamese
population. By contrast, the US’s were vague

and passive. By fighting to maintain the political
status quo, the US locked itself into a commitment

which would last as long as the North Vietnamese
were willing to oppose that status quo . Although

North Vietnamese morale began to suffer from
1968, it was much stronger than US public morale,

precisely because the stakes of victory or
defeat were higher and better understood.

The Vietnam War remains one of the most
controversial US military actions, and

its legacy continues to impact US foreign policy.
After the war, some claimed a so-called “Vietnam

Syndrome” would limit future US foreign
interventions. A 1975 survey suggested

only 36% of Americans believed the US should keep
commitments to other nations. But by the 1980s,

President Ronald Reagan reconceptualised the
war as a “noble cause” to restore US confidence.

The supposed end of the Cold War,
and US victories in Grenada, Haiti,

Panama and the Gulf War further diminished
post-Vietnam caution. By 1991, President Bush Sr

was confident enough to announce, “By God, we’ve
kicked the Vietnam syndrome once and for all.”

The cause of the US defeat was complex
and multi-faceted and not the doing of

any single group. Debates often also ignore an
effective and long developed North Vietnamese

strategy which withstood an unprecedented
military onslaught and may have continued

to do so even if the US had acted differently.
“If there is one general historical lesson to be

drawn from the American experience in Vietnam,
it is that local history and culture set real

limits on the effectiveness of external
force, no matter how great that force may

be. The United States had one failed war in
Vietnam, and for a great and wise nation, one

Vietnam War should be enough.” (Anderson TVW 128)
But these lessons may have become muddied. The

humiliation of the defeat has politicised
the debate as supporters of one argument

look to shift the blame to others –
whether it's the military, congress,

media or anti-war groups – or deny defeat
altogether. By failing to come to terms with

the reality of defeat, the possibility of making
similar mistakes in the future is left wide open.

Since you are watching this two plus
hour documentary about the Vietnam War,

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that’s nebula.tv/realtimehistory
Thank you for watching our Vietnam

War series. You can find links to the sources of
all parts of this series in the video description

below. If you want to learn more about the don’t
Indochina War that preceded the Vietnam War,

don’t forget to check out our hour long
documentary. If you are watching this

video on Patreon or Nebula, thank you
so much for the support, we couldn’t

do it without you. I am Jesse Alexander and
this is a production of Real Time History,

the only history channel that’s done
running through the jungle – for now.