All language subtitles for Power Grid Blackout & Cyber Attack ...

This week, I went to a meeting in
Manhattan in the freezing cold.

But when I came out of that meeting, I
was frozen.

Not from the bitter temperatures, but
from fear.

I learned things that no one is talking
about.

Things that can change my life, your
life, and the lives of everyone you know

forever.

I started thinking about how fragile
life is and how ill -prepared we are for

this.

The story I'm about to tell you is about
the vulnerability of America's power

system, our grid.

And it's also about a series of forces
and individuals who instead of doing the

right thing for you and me are
interfering with the ability to protect

of life.

Who of us could ever envision a 9 -11
happening?

But the difference between 9 -11 and
what I'm about to tell you is that we

This can happen.

The question is not will it happen, but
when will it happen?

But Washington is doing little, if
anything, to prevent it.

And the consequences, those consequences
would be a million times worse than 9

-11.

One day you're enjoying the comforts of
life.

The next, everything is different.

Civilization as you know it is gone.

the death toll would be staggering.

Even a blue ribbon congressional
commission predicted a major catastrophe

mass American fatalities. And government
studies prove an electromagnetic pulse

would destroy all electronics and the
transformers that power everything,

anything, with an on -off switch.

Your hot water heater, your
refrigerator, your dialysis machine.

Hospitals closed, grocery shelves empty,
most of the food you have at home

spoiled. And forget about your bank
account. What you have in your pocket is

you can access.

The disaster that I'm talking about can
be unleashed naturally by an intense

solar flare or deliberately by an enemy
detonating a nuclear weapon

in the Earth's atmosphere.

Now, the Earth is exposed to an intense
solar flaring roughly every 150 years.

The last time it occurred was 1859.

Do the math. We're due.

Reports are that our grid has already
been penetrated by our enemies, leaving

behind software programs that can
compromise it.

Now, I'm not saying this to panic
anyone.

But everyone, including our enemies,
knows that an artificially created

electromagnetic pulse will shut down all
power, which risks our survival.

What's even more frightening is that
this can be prevented. But as with most

problems, greed, self -interest and
politicians who care more about their

election than the American people and a
total lack of leadership interfere.

with your safety.

Let's start with cyber.

Yes. You said that a cyber 9 -11 is not
an if, but a when.

What would a cyber 9 -11 look like, and
how soon could it happen?

It could happen imminently.

What would it look like? It could take
many forms, but let me just give one

may come to mind, which is what happens
when the electric grid goes down. We saw

that during Sandy, and you see how that
impacts everything from the ability to

heat homes, to the ability to pump
gasoline, to the ability to have

night, everything.

So when we look at the nation's critical
infrastructure and where it is

vulnerable, one of the vulnerabilities
is through the cyber and the networked

cyber world that we live in.

So we have been kind of...

Trying to get this word out, the
Secretary of Defense has, I have, the

General has, the Chair of the Joint
Chiefs has, saying, look, we shouldn't

until there is a 9 -11 in the cyber
world. There are things we can and

doing right now that, if not prevent,
would mitigate the extent of damage.

Defense has, I have, the Attorney
General has, the Chair of the Joint

has, saying, look, we shouldn't wait
until there is a 9 -11.

Chuck, right? I'd say, John, give us the
power grid. But the bottom line is

this. I can give you the takeaway
without the technology and the better

explanation John would give.

The bottom line is when the CME impacts
the Earth's magnetic field, we're going

to have a reaction. There's going to be
currents, electrical currents, developed

in our magnetosphere and ionosphere.
They will manifest themselves right on

Earth. We'll have current induced on the
ground that's going to find its way off

and into big conductors like the power
grid.

pipelines, railway lines and whatnot.

And the bad news is this, folks, and
it's the news there you'll see in that

bottom yellow box.

Perhaps the most vulnerable place in the
world is the United States, the

northeastern part of the North American
continent.

We have all the ingredients.

We have a very intricate power grid that
acts like a big antenna. Obviously, we

need that.

We have the higher latitudes.

The geology is critical. How the current
will flow to different types of rock

formations. Our position relative to
another big conductor, salt water, the

ocean, all come into play.

In the recent Lloyd's report, Chuck,
remember it said that the most

location in North America was the
corridor between Washington, D .C. and

York City.

Not what you want to hear.

That is the reality, though, and we
recognize, even with the moderate storms

get, that indeed it's those locations
that do get impacted.

The nuclear power plants in New Jersey
and Pennsylvania and up in New England

get impacted regularly.

Manageable. We just hope it is during
the big one.

Thank you very much.

I think people are the most, the
soldiers, the troops, I'm thinking the

response.

It's actually the carbon -based unit
that's got to show up and actually go on

out there and do the recovery and so on
and help his or her fellow citizens.

And that's where the long pole in the
tent is because I said I wasn't going

I talked to a battalion commander who
just got back from Iraq not long after I

did, and we were discussing EMP, and
he's a local battalion commander in the

state of Pennsylvania, certainly won't
mention his name, who said, I'm not even

going to go to the armory.

my men won't show up, I'll be home with
my family where I belong.

And that came from a highly decorated
Stryker Battalion commander.

And it really struck me then, this was
about a year ago, right around the time

of the NDU exercise, and that's the way
they're going to think. Unless you give

them some hope, give them some training,
they think they're going into an

overwhelming environment.

I don't care if it's the National Guard,
Army Reserve, General Purpose Forces,

or Soberny, you are going to go into an
overwhelming environment.

An unknown environment, if you start
training, make up scenarios, which

have been done a long time ago from the
DHS and so on, should have been done a

long time ago. The 2008 EMP Commission
report has been out for five years now.

What's been done?

That's what the troops need, the
response forces.

All right. To ignore this when we
haven't had a huge one for about 150

and they come about every 150 years on
average, is sort of like being Dutch and

saying, Sea level rise? What's sea level
rise?

Why would we want to build dikes?

Jim, can I ask you to elaborate? I think
it would be helpful both for the

audience and for the people watching to
elaborate on what specifically happens

in an EMP event in terms of in people's
lives

what would happen as a direct
consequence.

Well, the country has 18 critical
infrastructures.

food, water, etc.

17 of them depend on electricity.

So if the electric grid goes, nothing
else works.

Briefly, yeah, maybe you've got some,
you were out of the line of sight and

you've got a few days worth of propane
or

some way to store energy for a week or
two.

But quite quickly, you find out that you
can't get gasoline for your

generator because the pumps at the
neighborhood gas station don't work

they're on the electric grid.

And so food stops being delivered after
a few days.

Water, depending on how it's plugged in
and connected, may shut down

immediately.

And by the way, all but one military
base in the United States is on the

The exception is in California there's
one geothermal base

that operates pretty much entirely on
geothermal. Other than that, the

grid takes down the military bases.

Soldiers and sailors and marines and
airmen are as hungry and thirsty as the

rest of us.

You're used to saying, well, you know,
there's at least this residual

that can deal with this emergency and
that emergency. Not with EMP.

Because the transformers from this third
type of pulse I described, the

transformers are fried.

And the whole grid just doesn't work.

I think that it's something that...

Of course, no one's experienced it very
briefly with power outages, but

nobody has experienced anything like
this in human history.

And that's one of the things that makes
it so hard for people to deal with.

Very few of us like thinking about how
to deal with something that is so

horrible that...

It's just uncomfortable to cogitate
about it and work on it.

But we've got to force ourselves to do
that, or we leave

the grid vulnerable to this type of
total and complete

breakdown.

The 90 % casualties, I think, are a
perfectly reasonable assessment.

mention one other thing that people
might not have thought of,

Our enemies on the other side of the
earth like anniversaries.

And when this attack came against
Metcalf on April 16th, that was the

day of the Boston Marathon, but it
was...

The marathon was moved a couple of days
for various reasons, but 18th of April,

of course, is the distinctive date. That
was the beginning of the American

Revolution, Lexington and Concord.

It's a big holiday in Massachusetts,
maybe not much in the rest of the

anymore.

But you want to keep an eye on
anniversaries.

because they like doing things to us on
days that are important to us, they

think, and ones that are symbolic to
them.

And you also, I completely agree with
Senator Cruz's statement about the

ridiculousness of saying Rahani and the
rest of these guys are moderates because

they tweet or use Twitter or whatever.

Remember when Andropov came to power as
the head of the KGB,

the Soviet Union, the General Secretary.

The press was absolutely jammed day
after day after day with the fact that

drank scotch and liked to listen to
jazz, and that meant he was a moderate.

The head of the KGB ordered the Pope's
assassination on and on a moderate

because of the jazz and the scotch.

Are we and what steps are being taken to
protect America's power grids?

Insight now from Frank Gavney, former
Assistant Secretary of Defense for

Security Policy.

And we welcome you. Shouldn't
authorities have said something earlier

terrorism? Why was that kept a secret
for so long, Frank?

We've been treating as a dirty little
secret something that unfortunately our

enemies know all too well, Bill, and
that is that the electric grid that is

backbone of America's 21st century
society is exceedingly vulnerable.

at the one end of the spectrum to this
kind of very basic, fairly primitive

attack. And at the other end, and we
were just talking with Senator Ted Cruz

former Director of Central Intelligence
Jim Woolsey about this on Capitol Hill,

a nuclear weapon detonated in space that
could take down the entire grid,

possibly with just one blow. What is
missing?

from this equation at the moment i think
is a degree of transparency with the

american people about the dangers that
disposes to all of us possibly life

ending for millions many millions and
really even an existential threat to the

country as a whole

Homeland Security's stance is that it's
up to the individual utilities to

protect these power grids. What do you
think? Should they? Well, you know, you

have both sides pointing to the others,
the outfit that ought to take care of

this. The utilities that are dominant in
this space own...

what is it, 85 % or so of the power
generation capabilities in the United

States, they think it's the government's
responsibility if it's an attack.

They even think it's basically the
government's responsibility if something

that is absolutely positively going to
happen to us, Bill, takes place, namely

an intense solar flare.

exposes the Earth to this kind of
electromagnetic energy and takes down

and possibly everybody else's. The truth
of the matter is this is a national

problem. It has to be dealt with as a
national problem.

I think probably the electric utilities
and the ratepayers have a role to play,

but so does the government.

And if we don't get our hands around
this, we're looking at the destruction

our nation inevitably. The last time one
of these terrible solar storms happened

was 155 years ago. On average, they
happen... happen every 150 years. So

it's not the vandals who are doing this,
who are still at large by the way, then

this can happen through any number of
other means and we are inviting it if we

don't take steps which we know how to do
to protect the grid against this sort

of attack. Let's hope the fallout of
this is a call to action on all that.

Frank, always good to see you. A year
ago, the lights went out at the Super

in the third quarter for 34 minutes.

What if the power hadn't come back on?
Our power grid, essential to our way of

life, can be compromised naturally or
intentionally.

How can we stop it from happening?

With me, former CIA covert operative
Mike Baker and retired military

intelligence officer for the U .S. Air
Force and former NSA official Colonel

Cedric Layton. All right, good evening,
gentlemen. Mike, after discussing the

dangers on the grid after last week's
show, the website for practical...

BookPrepper .com, the gentleman that we
had on, literally crashed after so many

viewers logged on for more information.

Are the fears justified?

Well, they are.

And then what happens is people hear the
word prepper and everybody starts

rolling their eyes and they think of
compounds.

The problem is we're talking about the
world's largest and most complex power

generation and distribution system.

It's spread across the country at some 3
,000 utilities.

It's got an aging infrastructure.

The utilities, states already spend an
ungodly amount of money every year

to upgrade and improve the resiliency.

But by some estimates, you need to spend
twice as much per year. to make this

thing happen. You've got to worry about,
as you said, natural disasters. You've

got to worry about, you know,
cybersecurity issues. You've got to

physical terrorism on these things.

And frankly, you know, we're becoming
pretty squishy.

I mean, people go off the rails nowadays
if their favorite flavoring at the

coffee shop is not available.

And so you can imagine, you know, you
put the power down for three weeks and,

you know, you can pretty much put love
thy neighbor out the window. Colonel

Layton, let me go to you. Mike mentioned
something about, you know, cyber

threats. We've got this power grid and
we've got it. Some people refer to it as

balkanized, but we've got.

A zillion local power companies that are
in charge of their own area.

And then we have this organization
that's over it called NERC as

well as FERC.

But what is the government doing to make
sure that those local electric

companies comply with the requirements
and the advancements in technology to

prevent us from a cyber attack?

Well, Judge, basically what they're
doing is they're holding hearings and

a look at the way they're implementing
their regulations.

They have crafted some regulations.

They did a lot of work up through 2012.

But none of this stuff has been
promulgated in a way that actually makes

and in a way that actually can be used
by the utilities in a coherent fashion

from A through Z that you can be assured
that they will then protect their

consumers. So what we have here is
basically a haphazard approach.

a balkanized utility system, like you
said, but also a regulatory regime that

has not kept pace with the cyber threats
and any of the other threats that are

out there. But, Cedric, look, you are in
intelligence, and Michael, you as well,

and you're in the military, both of you.
I mean, how could the United States

government allow this to happen? How
could they not require those local

companies to comply, as opposed to
having a hearing after a hearing, when

can literally hack? into our grid?

Well, I think part of the issue, Judge,
is that they are really not quite sure

exactly what to do. And the other part
is that we don't have coherent

cybersecurity legislation from the
Congress.

And that has made a huge difference.
There's no direction from the executive

that really impacts what the utilities
are doing. There is direction when it

comes to government, but it doesn't
really affect the utility part.

You know what, Cedric? I got to tell you
that. Mike, go ahead.

No, I was just going to say, I mean, the
colonel's spot on, but it's not as if,

I will say this, it's not as if the
government isn't taking and hasn't been

taking for years, you know, very
physical steps to try to improve the

of the system and to try to deal with
this issue. They can't get a law passed

Congress. Michael, listen to me. They
can't get a law on a committee. Idaho

National Laboratory.

I mean, not too far from where I am is
the Idaho National Laboratory. They're

doing fantastic work in trying to deal
with the control and data systems, which

are an integral part and a real key part
of this in terms of whether it's

cybersecurity or just the problems that
we face from natural disaster. Frankly,

our biggest issues come from weather and
natural disaster concerns.

And then I'd argue that we're actually
looking at more potential damage in the

short and medium term from physical
terrorism as opposed to the

issue. All right. And so, but, you know,
Mike, you just said Idaho.

You know, I'm asking what the federal
government is doing because Idaho can't

control New Jersey with all due respect.

You know?

Well, no, again, my point being is that,
yes, the colonel's right in the sense

that we're talking about regulation.
We're talking about a very slow process

because the systems are in the hands of
the states for the most part. Well, not

the states, the power companies.

Let's question to you, Colonel.

The military is on the same power grid
as the rest of us. That's not too smart,

is it?

No, it's not. From an operational
standpoint, if you're going to be

something, if you're going to be an
adversary that's going to go after us,

are going to find our vulnerabilities.

And as Mike knows as well, what we're
going to do from a targeting perspective

is go after those weakest areas.

When you go after the weakest areas, you
pick things like the power grid to

actually find the vulnerabilities and to
lay us low. And that's exactly what

they're going to try to do. They're
going to try to create a situation where

are. without power for a long time over
large stretches of the country.

Colonel, real fast, because I have
another guest that we're coming up on.

Are we ready for this, Colonel?

No, no, we're not, Judge, not at all.
All right, Mike, are we ready?

Yes or no?

No. No, there's a long ways to go before
we're ready.

Fighting tirelessly to inform the
American people of the very genuine

an electromagnetic pulse attack.

This could be one of the most
catastrophic events we've ever seen and

ways would be even worse than a nuclear
weapon in a single city because it could

literally paralyze the whole country.

It's a scientific fact. Virtually every
physicist who's looked at it agrees it

is a real danger.

And we've learned recently that that
danger is compounded because the sun

routinely produces waves that if they
hit us at the right time and the right

strength, can basically create the
equivalent of an electromagnetic pulse

attack. And it's pretty clear that that
particular wave, if it hit today, with

the amount of smartphones and computers
and electronics in our car, etc., would

be a disastrous event that would cause
an enormous amount of damage and put us

in a very difficult situation. Solar
flare that could have caused a

electromagnetic pulse, or EMP, barely
missed Earth about two weeks ago,

according to a former member of the
Congressional EMP Threat Commission.

Peter Vincent Fry, who served on that
commission from 2001 to 2008, said that

the event, called a coronal mass
ejection, could have inflicted damage

comparable to the 1859 Carrington Flare,
which was so severe that it caused

telegraph lines in Europe and North
America to melt.

We are only one act of madness away from
a social cataclysm unlike anything our

country has ever known.

EMP is one of a small number of threats
that could hold at risk the continued

existence... of U .S. civil society.

I want to think of that as a hurricane
in space.

Just one violent active region on the
sun can cause essentially continent

perhaps even planetary scale impacts to
our critical infrastructure.

The likelihood of a severe geomagnetic
event capable of crippling our electric

grid is 100%.

Good afternoon. My name is Frank
Gaffney. I'm the president of the Center

Security Policy.

We are delighted to be sponsoring, on
short notice, but I think a very timely

and topical presentation by several of
the people who I think are most

knowledgeable about and certainly most
effective in communicating about

the threat that is known as
electromagnetic pulse, or EMP.

and the various ways in which that pulse
could afflict a nation like the United

States, either man -caused or naturally
occurring, and the repercussions of

such an affliction.

We're going to talk a bit about a very
important and somewhat unexpected,

but not unanticipated, development in
the past few days.

that bears directly upon the man -caused
piece of the problem, namely the

interception in Panama of a vessel, a
North Korean

operation that had in its hold

some weaponry that might bear directly
upon

the threat of man -caused nuclear
weapons.

We'll be going through them.

One of the nightmare scenarios the
Congressional EMP Commission had was the

possibility of a rogue state or
terrorist group, and they specifically

considered both Iran and North Korea
when examining this threat, making an

attack against the United States by
launching a primitive missile off of a

freighter near the U .S. coast.

What is an electromagnetic pulse?

Think of it as super lightning, except
its effects, instead of being on an

on a point, can be in an area. When you
detonate a nuclear weapon at high

altitude, at 30 kilometers or more, it
generates a super energetic radio wave

that will destroy electronics,
potentially across a continental -sized

the altitude is high enough.

But even at the relatively lower
altitudes, it basically can cause

destruction of the electric grid and all
the critical infrastructures that

depend upon that.

Communications, transportation, food,
and water, the things that sustain our

modern civilization and life itself,
would collapse in the aftermath of an

nuclear attack.

This can also be caused by the sun, by a
solar flare that can generate something

very similar to a nuclear EMP.

Now, why are we here today? Because of
our particular concerns about the North

Korean freighter that was intercepted in
Panama, the Chong Chong gang.

You know, this North Korean flag
freighter with the North Korean crew,

resisted. the boarding of it by the
Panamanian authorities, and the captain

attempted suicide rather than being
boarded, on preliminary examination, and

whole vessel hasn't been examined yet.
They've only examined one cargo hold,

20%, and have already found two SA -2
missiles.

These are admittedly old surfaced air
missiles, but they were designed to

both conventional and nuclear warheads.

They also have...

are high -altitude missiles.

They were used back in the 60s to take
down Gary Francis Powers during the U -2

incident. They can reach an altitude of
20 to 35 kilometers, so they can reach

the altitude for an EMP attack.

They've got a slant range of about 40
miles, which means you could take a

missile like this, put it in a
freighter, stand off the coast, outside

international territorial waters, and
put an EMP attack over some place like

York City or Baltimore.

The area of effect would reach 60 miles
inland.

and probably collapse the eastern
electric grid, which generates 70 % of

electric power of the United States,
which would have catastrophic

The Congressional EMP Commission
estimated that an attack like this,

current state of unpreparedness, could
kill up to 90 % of the American

population within a year from
starvation, disease, and societal

It's basically a high -tech means of
killing people the old -fashioned way.

purpose of the North Korean freighter
was to do an EMP attack or even that

were practicing this. In fact, they
probably weren't. But it's extremely

disturbing to find that we didn't even
know that a freighter of a rogue state

like North Korea, actually had nuclear
-capable missiles in its hold, two of

them, and there were other dismantled
parts within that hold, and we didn't

know about it. The Panamanians didn't
stop them because they had direct

knowledge of these missiles. They
stopped them because the Chongchon gang

history of carrying drugs and arms to
criminal organizations, and they

apparently thought that they were going
to find drugs aboard. Instead, they

found...

in effect, what could be a delivery
system for a weapon of mass destruction.

So it should give us pause that we have
this sort of activity going on in our

backyard, the Caribbean.

these visits by North Korea and by
Iranian freighters. The countries like

Venezuela, Nicaragua, and Cuba happen
all the time, and we don't know what's

going on. So it makes much more
plausible the nightmare scenario that

Commission raised, which is this idea of
a foreign -flagged vessel, a freighter,

rogue states or terrorists conducting a
nuclear EMP attack that would have

catastrophic consequences for the United
States.

I mean, everything was there except the
nuclear weapons on the missile.

Another thing I want to point out is,
and I'm amazed at how little reported

incident has been in the press.

You know, in fact, I only learned about
it myself this morning.

But on April 16th, an armed gang
attacked a

farm of Transformers in San Jose,
California with AK -47s and tried to

out. They damaged five of the
Transformers. This made the local press.

Didn't make much of the national news,
didn't make any as far as I can tell.

And initially the local sheriff reported
it as a sabotage attempt against these

transformers. Subsequently, the
reporting has toned it down that it was

vandalism with AK -47s. None of the
transformers were destroyed, but five of

them were damaged.

And this alone was sufficient to cause
them to put people on, to call for

reduced electrical use in the San Jose
area because of the damaged

Now, if you put this together with
what's been happening to our country,

know, massive cyber attacks against our
computer systems.

Now you've got an armed gang, you know,
of some sort that made this attempt

against these transformers, you know, a
physical sabotage attempt, and now a

freighter carrying nuclear -capable
missiles off of our coasts. You know,

the things the commission found that's
very important and that hasn't been

widely understood by people, but people
like R. James Woolsey in congressional

testimony have been trying to educate
policymakers to this fact, is that cyber

warfare, cyber warfare.

in the doctrines of countries like
Russia, China, North Korea, and Iran is

just about computer viruses.

Their doctrine includes physical attacks
like sabotage attempts against

transformers and critical parts and all
the way up to nuclear EMP attack. That

is considered part of cyber warfare
doctrine by these guys.

I think I would like to see the press,
instead of maybe cooperating with an

administration that seems to think the
war on terrorism is over, to ask...

Is there some larger significance to all
of these seemingly unconnected events,

these computer massive cyber attacks,
this recent attempt at sabotage, the

discovery of this freighter with these
missiles? Is it possible that dry runs

are being made for a larger operation,
for an all -out cyber offensive that

would include all of these elements,
computer viruses, sabotage against

freighters, finally an EMP nuclear
attack?

You know, we see these things happening
all around us, and yet nobody's asking

Jay Carney, you know, what does the
president think about the significance

these missiles and this freighter or
this attempt on these transformers in

California? A recent Lloyds of London
study, not looking at nuclear MP attack,

just looking at geographic storms, you
know, estimated that if only 10 to 20

transformers were destroyed, in the
Baltimore, Washington area, 10 to 20

Transformers, it would put 40 to 80
million Americans in blackout, possibly

two years, for two years, just from the
loss of 10 to 20 Transformers. These

guys with AK -47s tried to attack 10
Transformers.

I think we've got some questions here
for Janet Napolitano and others in the

Department of Homeland Security about
what are they going to do to protect.

the Transformers. I'll probably take up
more of my time. I'll leave others to

talk about what to do about it. It's a
very important groundwork, though,

Thank you very much. Thank you, Frank.

To talk a little bit more about the
specific threat that Peter has

described and that the EMP Commission
considered sufficiently serious

to recommend be addressed as a matter of
utmost importance to the nation.

From the South, we're very pleased to
have with us Dr.

Hank Cooper. Ambassador Cooper, among
many other distinguished roles in our

country's government, served as the
director of the Strategic Defense

under President George Herbert Walker
Bush.

He knows a lot about both missile
threats and the state

of our capabilities to both discern
them,

and to correct or counter them.

He is, as they say, a rocket scientist.

I'm very pleased to have him with us.

Thanks, Frank.

I want to add just a point or two to
what Peter said.

The Lloyds of London also, in reports I
saw, indicated that this particular

vessel earlier this year had made stops
in Russia and in China.

And in my mind, the whole incident
points to what I refer to as a cacophony

proliferation. And while we focused on
North Korea, North Korea and Iran are

colleagues cooperating on nuclear
testing and on ballistic missiles. And

both launch satellites, have launched in
the past year, satellites over the

South Pole.

which, if they were carrying a nuclear
weapon, were at just about the right

altitude to be detonated over the center
of the United States and potentially

knock out the entire electric grid.

So in the case of North Korea, perhaps
our historic approach to things might

deter them. Some might argue that.

But in the case of Iran, we know they're
ideologically committed.

to not only the destruction of Israel,
the little Satan, but also the United

States, the great Satan. And there's a
serious question as to whether or not

leaders of Iran would back away, and I'm
assuming others will talk more about

Iran, on the basis of being concerned
about nuclear retaliation, if they could

kill hundreds of millions of Americans,
which is what is at stake with this EMP

threat.

Next, we're very pleased to have with
us, though we weren't entirely sure he

going to be able to make it, but through
superhuman effort, as we expect from

him, Michael Del Rosso has indeed joined
our panel.

Michael is a man with a deep knowledge
of technology and information technology

in particular, having worked with
Fortune 500 companies in the past in

developing their capabilities and
understanding threats to their

information technology.

Among other distinctions, Michael Del
Rosso worked with Peter Pry on the EMP

Threat Commission, and he served
formally as the chairman of the

very important committee on

critical infrastructure protection.

of the Institute of Electrical and
Electronics Engineers in the USA.

He is a fellow, I'm delighted to say,
senior fellow of the Center for Security

Policy and also the Claremont Institute.

And we've asked Michael to just flesh
out, in addition to these various man

-induced electromagnetic pulse threats,
a naturally occurring phenomenon and

what it might in turn mean for our
critical infrastructure and our society.

Michael. Welcome.

Thank you.

of a coronal mass ejection where large
amounts of plasma, or the corona of the

sun, are ejected. And if they hit the
Earth's geomagnetic field, they produce

significant electromagnetic pulse.

And the first time this was observed on
a large scale was in 1859 in a storm

known as the Carrington event, which a
NASA report described as those who

witnessed this flare, that it
electrified transmission cables of

lines. fires in telegraph offices and
produce northern lights so bright that

people could read newspapers in the
middle of the night by the red and green

glows of the aurora borealis which moved
down toward the equator for days you

could send transmissions on telegraph
lines without the batteries connected

had to be removed otherwise they they
would catch fire if an event like that

happened today

it would probably bring down the entire
grid. In fact, just last July, there was

a coronal mass ejection of a similar
stature to the Carrington event that

the Earth by just one week.

It passed right through our orbit a week
after the planet went through it. And

if it actually hit us, we'd have a much
different conversation here right now.

There's been no less than five. Or no
conversation right now. This would be

dead.

There's been no less than five blue
ribbon commissions.

of the U .S. government that have looked
at this and deem it to be a credible

event.

Just two and a half years ago in
February, a number of colleagues all

co -submitted a petition to the Federal
Electric Regulatory Commission and the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, led by
Tom Popec, an engineer at the Foundation

for Resilient Societies. And we focused
on just one.

specific issue in that petition.

We said, hey, there is a 1990 NERC memo
that says if there was ever a prolonged

power outage from a geomagnetic storm,
that the backup power that keeps the

spent fuel at nuclear reactors from
overheating might not have the

maintain those cooling effects, and you
would end up seeing

the spent fuel, which is not in
containment, burst into flames and

great radiation disaster.

Well, a few weeks later, tragically,
that's exactly what happened in Japan.

earthquake took down the primary grid,
and a tsunami took down the backup

And the significant radiation leaks you
saw and the explosion that took the roof

off the Fukushima power plant, which was
just back in the news, that was not

the... power -generating reactors, which
suffered damage but were in significant

containment vessels of multiple feet of
concrete and steel, that was the

uncontained spent fuel.

Once the circulation, cooling water
ceased, it boiled off. The zirconium

encrusting of the uranium hexafluoride
fuel burst into flames.

It's an exothermic reaction. It's like a
thermite bomb. You can't extinguish it.

And you have appreciable radiation leaks
that... I've seen estimates that the

cost of it is north of $250 billion.

Now, meanwhile, the resiliency of adding
resiliency to those power backup

generators for tsunami is really an
insignificant amount.

And, in fact, there's monuments
throughout Japan on hillsides that are

old that warn don't build houses lower
than this. So with a little prudence,

someone might have said perhaps we
should make these a bit more resilient.

Likewise, if there was ever an
appreciable.

outage, which a geomagnetic storm would
produce, you'd have a very critical

situation at the 60 or so sites where
they spend fuel from the 104 operational

nuclear reactors are currently stored
without containment in the United

The cost estimates, there was a National
Academy of Science study, and it was

looking at the effects.

of a geomagnetic storm that was one
-tenth of a Carrington event, which the

time one occurred was 154 years ago.

And by the way, they think the period of
occurrence of this is anywhere from 150

to up to 300 or 500 years. So we're
actually in the window where the best

science available says you run a
probability of about a percent a year of

a similar event.

Well, they looked at a 1921 geomagnetic
storm for which we have more data.

that at the time took down all the
electric switching systems of the Penn

Central Railroad, amongst other things.
And they felt that in their estimates

that you would have an expense of up to
$2 trillion in the first year alone to

remediate the damage.

that would be caused by this, and you'd
have prolonged outages from four to ten

years. And you'd have tens of millions
of people without power. And you could

say you cannot have tens or hundreds of
millions of people without power for an

extended period of time without
expecting millions of deaths.

In fact, when Dr.

Graham testified, he was the chairman of
the EMP Commission and, in fact, was

President Ronald Reagan's science
advisor.

EMP lay down occurs and takes the grid
and the associated electronics down, in

the first 12 to 18 months from
probation, the lack of all the

that is electronic and electrical in
nature, you'd have hundreds of millions

deaths in the United States because you
wouldn't be able to sustain the

population.

So in the short run, just a threat from
a geomagnetic storm, which can occur

tomorrow, which is not based on any
human intent.

It's just a fact of nature. And as I
said, no less than five official

studies say it's a probable event. And
in fact, the recent Lloyds of London

study, Independent, said that it's
almost inevitable.

and that the outages would be
substantial, take years to repair.

Now, one of the things to note, too, is
that the reason why it would cause such

damage is because there's a North
American bulk transmission system across

United States that has from 500 to 1
,000, however you want to categorize

large transformers. The United States...

manufacturers less than 20 % of the
transformers that they need to support.

the ongoing maintenance and sustainment
of this bulk transmission grid. So over

80 % come from foreign sources. The lead
time is one to two years to get a

replacement transformer.

There's high -quality copper and steel
that needs to be manufactured at lead

times, and they weigh up to 400 tons. So
on a good day, it's a logistical

problem to replace them. A bad critical
transformer from something that the

National Academy of Sciences says would
cost trillions of dollars to repair.

replace over periods of years.

And it's inexcusable that the
maintainers of this infrastructure, let

the Department of Homeland Security,
which is statutorily responsible for

protecting the critical infrastructure,
has taken no action on this. We recently

had a stimulus package of $865 billion,
with a B, that included such...

efforts as building tunnels under
highways for turtles, but for a mere

of a percent, that money could have been
allocated if the people whose job it

was, the people who actually draw a
paycheck and are responsible for keeping

safe, did something about it. And these
people, as the public is aware, have

been giving all of these reports from
these five Blue Ribbon Commissions.

They've been giving specific
recommendations from the EMP Commission

Department of Homeland Security has, and
they've not acted on a single one of

them. And so right now there's
legislation that Representative Trent

introduced about a month ago, H .R.

2417, the SHIELD Act, that would start
the process of actually having,

empowering the FERC to take a look at
the national grid and to take the steps

necessary to secure it. And it's
inexcusable for a nation with the wealth

the economy that we have that the
insignificant funds necessary to protect

has been deemed inevitable are not being
expended to keep the population.

Michael,

thank you very much. You've given us the
perfect segue to our next speaker,

Peter Husey.

Turning now to news here in the United
States, Secretary of Homeland Security

Janet Napolitano has announced today
that she will be stepping down from her

position.

I'm just going to give you a brief
overview of where the effort stands in

to protect the nation from a nuclear
natural electromagnetic pulse

You know, we're meeting here today on
December 7, 2012, when the solar maximum

has commenced. Every 11 years, the
thermonuclear cauldron that is the sun

a phase of heightened activity, hurling
into space coronal mass ejections and

solar flares that could cause a
geomagnetic superstorm on Earth with

catastrophic consequences for the
inhabitants of our planet.

Most scientists estimate that a
superstorm like the 1859 Carrington

about once every century.

If so, we are now 53 years overdue for
another Carrington that would collapse

electric grids and the critical
infrastructures that sustain modern

and the lives of billions worldwide.

Our luck may hold through the solar
maximum, which shall last a year through

2013. No Carrington event or lesser
natural EMP catastrophe may visit us

yet.

But our survival will be due to luck.

not to prudence or wise policy.

We are living on borrowed time.

Reports are surfacing from sources
inside the Iranian Revolutionary Guard

there are two more previously unknown
underground facilities working on

weapons in Iran, that the program is
more advanced than previously estimated,

and that Iran is now in the process of
actually building nuclear warheads.

If these reports are even partially
true, Iran may be within...

months of executing a nuclear MP attack
against the United States.

When I left the CIA to work as
professional staff on the House Armed

Committee in 1995, one of my first jobs
was to help Congressman Roscoe Bartlett

educate policymakers and the public on
the EMP threat and on the necessity of

protecting our nation.

To me, the threat was so clear, the
consequences so grave, and the necessity

action so urgent that I thought we could
pass a bill.

and a year to protect the nation from
EMP, and then move on to other national

security issues.

Thirteen years later, at the end of
2008, when the EMP Commission delivered

final report and recommendations to the
Congress, I thought there was still time

to protect the nation. The solar maximum
was still four years distant.

Iran had not yet developed nuclear
weapons. Surely I thought the Congress

now enact legislation to protect the
critical infrastructures from EMP.

After all, historically, Congress has
promptly implemented the recommendations

of other congressional commissions, or
so I told myself in 2008.

Today in 2012, four years after the EMP
Commission presented its plan to

Congress, 17 years since embarking on
their crusade to make America safe from

EMP, we are still naked.

I have grown old witnessing Washington's
ignorance and inertia conspire to make

the people vulnerable to the greatest
threat to our civilization.

yet a threat that is easiest and least
costly of solution.

As of December 2012, the National
Electric Grid and other critical

infrastructures are still unprotected
from EMP.

Not a single recommendation of the
Congressional EMP Commission to

harden the critical infrastructures has
been implemented.

Yet there is still hope. There may be
time to act decisively to protect the

critical infrastructures.

before nature or man hurls the EMP
hammer.

Given good planning, adequate resources,
and the will to move quickly, much

could be accomplished even in one year.

For example, the 300 most important EHV
transformers servicing our most populous

cities and the nuclear power reactors
might be protected on an accelerated

basis.

And the year 2012 has seen some amazing
progress toward national EMP

preparedness, even if it is as yet only
paper progress.

President Obama's Presidential Decision
Directive 8 has, for the first time, led

to the recognition in the Strategic
National Risk Assessment, developed by

direction of the White House, of natural
EMP from a geomagnetic superstorm as

one of the greatest threats for which
the nation must prepare.

If President Obama invested some of his
political leadership in the cause of EMP

preparedness, if he gave EMP protection
the kind of financial and regulatory

support that he accords to climate
change, the White House could get the

done and perhaps single -handedly save
the nation.

President Obama's re -election could
well be fortuitous for the cause of EMP

preparedness. The President already
knows about the EMP threat, so he will

have to learn on the job.

President Obama's inherent skepticism
about the claims of industry and his

greater trust in government expertise
would serve well the cause of EMP

preparedness in our struggle with
industry lobbyists and the NERC.

President Obama reportedly will try
another round of government spending to

stimulate the economy and his repeatedly
promised investment in infrastructure

projects. Any money spent on protecting
critical infrastructures from EMP would

be money well spent.

As the second -term president, Obama can
and probably will act boldly and to the

very limits of his authority to achieve
his objectives.

Such a president is needed to rescue the
American people from the looming EMP

catastrophe.

Congress in 2012 launched numerous
initiatives designed to greatly advance

-military preparedness for EMP. At
minimum, these raise consciousness and

greater conscientiousness in the
departments and agencies of the U .S.

government. The Department of Defense in
2012 continued to harden military

systems against EMP. Although these
hardening programs are intended for

warfighting purposes, they inherently
make the DoD better able to help the

Department of Homeland Security recover
the critical infrastructures and rescue

the American people in the aftermath of
an EMP event.

During Hurricane Sandy, the Defense
Department cooperated and made available

resources to prepare and recover from
the hurricane to an unprecedented

Hopefully this is a new trend that will
lead to the much greater and more

ambitious cooperation needed between DOD
and DHS to achieve the necessary civil

-military preparedness for an EMP
catastrophe.

The Department of Homeland Security in
2012, for the first time in a

congressional hearing, acknowledged its
responsibility to protect the critical

infrastructures from a natural or
nuclear EMP event.

As 2012 draws to a close, DHS is finally
working on and may adopt a new national

planning scenario focused on EMP, one of
the chief recommendations of the

Congressional EMP Commission.

All emergency preparedness, planning,
training, and resource allocation at the

federal, state, and local levels is
based on the national planning

The inclusion of a national planning
scenario for EMP would be an enormous

forward.

In November 2012, the U .S. Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission directed

electric power industry to develop a
plan to protect the national electric

from natural EMP, including by hardening
the grid.

Technical hardening of the grid from
natural EMP would also provide some,

incomplete, protection against nuclear
EMP.

Now in 2012, despite amazing progress
toward EMP preparedness in the policy

realm, there were also severe defeats
and setbacks.

The SHIELD Act, the single most
important congressional initiative for

preparedness that would mandate
protection of the national electric grid

of relying on the voluntary cooperation
of industry, failed to pass.

Industry lobbyists managed to keep
SHIELD bottled up in the House Energy

Commerce Committee.

Congressman Trent Fanks will reintroduce
the SHIELD Act and fight for its

passage in the next Congress.

But now, SHIELD cannot pass in time to
be of any use protecting the grid during

the solar maximum.

and perhaps not before Iran gets the
bomb and the capability to make a

EMP attack.

Worse still, the champions of EMP
preparedness in the Senate are retiring

will not return in 2013.

Senators John Kyle, Joe Lieberman, and
Jim Webb will be gone in 2013, with no

one to take their place on the firing
line, at least not yet.

The bad economy is crippling the EMP
movement at the grassroots level. People

who fear for their jobs and the
immediate welfare of their families must

generous donating their time and
resources for political activism. Even

task force on national and homeland
security, which is operated on a

basis with very little financial
resources through 2012, may perish in

Worth Dill, Congressman Roscoe Bartlett,
who started the EMP movement and has

long been the national leader on EMP
preparedness, lost his seat in the 2012

elections. Maryland Democrats
gerrymandered Bartlett's seat, making

-election impossible.

Even though the EMP movement is on the
brink of victory in the crucial campaign

for sound government policies, our
losses in people may well cost us the

The EMP crusaders have never been
numerous or well -funded. EMP

been a David versus Goliath struggle,
pitting a handful of political leaders,

scientists, and grassroots activists,
having virtually no resources,

against the twin Goliaths of government
bureaucracy and industry having

virtually unlimited monies and armies of
lobbyists.

In 2013, we EMP crusaders may come to
our Alamo.

I will hope instead for our Thermopylae,
or better yet, a Salamis.

And I hope fervently, fighting against
fear and resignation, that our struggle

for national preparedness is not
terminated by the sun or a nuclear

delivering upon us an EMP apocalypse.

And just briefly, I'm going to introduce
them.

General Ken Krosniak, sir.

Thank you.

Ambassador Henry Cooper, who's been very
active in this in many ways for many

years.

General Robert Newman, sir.

And, of course, you've heard Paul
Stockton.

And Captain James Turbush, sir. Thank
you very much. And with that, I'm going

turn it over, and I think we're going to
start.

right over here with General Krosniak.

Thank you, sir.

Especially, it's great to be, it's a
real honor to be up here with the panel

that's here, especially with my idol,
Dr. Stockton, over here.

I remember he came to the Army War
College as a DDE class of 2012 and gave

23rd of July, I remember it said, I have
your speech memorized, when you said

that EMP keeps you awake at night.

I mean, Secretary Panetta had asked you
to come over there and talk about the

Title X, Title 32, and New Madrid Fault,
and so on.

And that really perked our interest
quite a bit at the Army War College

it raised it to a different level with
our commandant.

The bottom line up front, I was asked to
talk about EMP preparedness for the

military or survival. And I agree with
Dr. Stockton that response is the big,

that's the long pole in the tent, to use
a military term.

And for emergency or regional
catastrophes, and there are

owned a bar in New Orleans, it's a
catastrophe when it was underwater.

But it's a regional catastrophe.

The U .S. military is admirably prepared
to do that. We have well -trained,

staffed exercise plans with NORTHCOM, R
-NORTH, National Guard Bureau.

They do a very excellent job, and we've
seen that.

However, the military is not prepared
for a catastrophic, a cataclysmic event

such as if it reaches that level that we
just saw a few moments ago.

An albisa is a maximum -maximum complex
catastrophe, whatever you might call it,

but I call it a cataclysmic event,
almost a tragedy.

But as Dr. Sotner said, we can attack
this elephant and bite it off bite by

and actually walk it down to the base
and mitigate as much as possible. You're

not going to mitigate everything, but
you can, like Congressman Frank said,

can take it in small bites now and
hopefully have some impact to save.

going to lose a lot of lives anyway, but
save some lives, quite a few.

I'll focus on three areas quickly.

With my few years of military service,

I've noticed that the most important
things that I've picked up in my few

of study of this, not as much as the
other gentlemen here have been studying

is basically on troops, training, and
communications.

First one is troops.

You need people. You need people
identified. You need them trained and so

And we do not have military personnel
right now.

Probably within NORTHCOM, within R
-North and so on, we have wonderful

forces, you know, chemical, biological,
radiological, nuclear -enhanced forces

out there that are very good at what
they do.

The State Adjutant Generals, General
Newman had the Human Home

Response Forces and so on, and they're
excellently trained if they can get out

the front gate.

But there aren't that many of them. What
you're eventually going to need when,

as Dr. Stockton said one time,

When the state governor calls FEMA and
says, send us all you've got, and the

state, well, they send them everything
they've got.

And then the FEMA director, Craig
Duguay, contacts the president. The

calls the SECDEF and said, send me
everything you've got.

Eventually, we're going to need general
purpose forces.

General purpose forces will not be
trained to go into this no -notice

game. Some of you have been on some
football and baseball teams when you

younger. It's a little pickup game, but
you have to have what I call training

now. You have to be able to at least
acclimate and make these forces aware of

what kind of environment they're going
to be going into.

Now, the Soberny forces are trained for
this, and some of the home response

forces are trained, but you're going to
have untrained military forces going

into multiple regions, not just one
region, but maybe all ten regions, maybe

four or five regions. But what do you do
in the military?

You always plan.

Worst case situation.

So all 10 FEMA regions are involved.
Let's just say it's a cascading effect

the National Geographic blackout.

All regions, all at the same time, over
vast urban and suburban areas, multiple

jurisdictions for a very long, prolonged
period of time, maneuvering within a

humanitarian disaster environment with
overwhelming mass casualty, graze

registration, sanitation, medical needs,
without the benefit of the defense

industrial base because you're going to
need those critical...

just -in -time logistics providers and
so on, to be able to bring products and

so on into the defense industrial base
to be able to resupply the military,

resulting very little situational
awareness, which is essential for the

GPS for those forces because your
position, navigation, and timing, a lot

radios are synced to the GPS.

synchronization and so on, loss of air
traffic control.

I can go on and on, but you see this all
within a radiologic leak and hazmat

contaminated environment.

And being a first responder myself, a
fire company and rescue and vice

of the ambulance company in Carlisle,
small town, we still run 8 ,500 calls

even in that small town, but you're
going to be overwhelmed.

And you have to be able to think as a
military commander, you have to be able

think that in.

with FEMA.

And FEMA, Craig Fugate, about a year
ago, put out a wonderful, I'll put it on

the, I'll give it to Chuck to put on the
web. In fact, I was going to try to put

it on behind me, but I didn't want to
take up too much time than I am already.

But he put out a wonderful scenario
called Critical Communications During

After a Superstorm.

And basically, it boils down to this.
After 30 days, even the plain old

telephone system, everything is down,
except

those that are operated with HF, Mars,
ham radio operators, and so on, as long

as you have power for your generator,
you'll have HF line of sight. But we in

the military, we deal B -Lock.

Everything's beyond line of sight. It
goes through satellites and so on.

And when Bill Murtaugh, we know you
start discussing satellite scintillation

so on.

And I'm going to wrap it up. One more
sentence. The other one was training.

If you can actually start training
people, at least develop plans and

for a...

nationwide magnitude, of which we have
no plans right now, and start exercising

them at least and get a lot of the smart
minds in here to incorporate some of

their ideas on how we can at least
respond and hopefully mitigate the loss

lives that are naturally going to occur
anyway.

General, thank you very much.

Ambassador, Ambassador Cooper.

I want to link back to the first panel
this morning just a little bit with what

I say.

I want to address two issues. One is
the, I'll call it the threat from short

-range missiles off our coast, including
from the south, as well as the

satellite launch that was mentioned by
Jim Woolsey.

The good news, as far as I'm concerned,
is the Senate.

If they get around to passing eventually
the Defense Authorization Act, which is

under consideration now and is supposed
to be passed in the next couple of

weeks, it will demand that the Secretary
or instruct the Secretary of Defense to

come back with a program recommendation.

for how to improve the East Coast
defense, including against threats from

South. And it's my belief that the
Department of Defense, below the

is prepared to deal with this question.
So many of the issues of concern I

believe DOD may address over the next
year or so.

It's appalling to me that they've let it
go this far without dealing with the

short -range threats since we've known
about it for well over a decade.

And there are options.

There will be a lot of talk. You'll hear
about needing a new site for missile

defense along the East Coast, extending
all the way to Ohio is one of the places

being considered. I'll let you think
about why that is.

And I just want to make an observation
that the Aegis ships that we have

deployed, and last year a day at random
would have found four to six operating

or in port along our east coast, have
the inherent capability of shooting down

ICBMs that come at us over the North
Pole.

We demonstrated that by shooting down a
satellite in 2008, I believe it was.

So all that is needed is a radar up in
Maine to make this happen. If you move

the one that exists, and I forget what
Army base it is, to Maine, it would cost

like $20 million.

If you bought a new one, it would cost
like $300 million.

A lot of money, but chump change in the
broader scheme of things, and certainly

far less than building a new site, and
we could overnight have defenses for

those of us who live along these coasts
from threats from the north.

Our ships can also defend against short
-range missiles if they're nearby, and

that is the case when they're in ports
as well.

So it's a matter of training in that
case, and the Navy can certainly provide

that capability if, in fact, they're
called upon to do it.

The problem, a key problem, is that none
of our ships operate in the Gulf of

Mexico, so we're wide open to threats
from the south, whether they come from

vessels off the coast there or from
Venezuela, which has ties, as you may

to Iran and other places.

And the other thing that was mentioned
was the satellite threat.

If the Iranians or North Koreans choose
to do it, they can overfly.

the range capability of the defense
interceptors that we have, and we have

directed toward the south now, and the
ships can provide interim capability for

that. We need, ultimately, I believe,
space defenses to deal with that, but

that's years away for other reasons.

Enough said about those. The second
issue I want to come back to is the

that was talked about.

by Ken at the end. I believe training is
a key issue on the response side to

deal with this problem, and training
beginning with the local responder

community. And I believe the cohesion
that the National Guard can play,

including linked back to the missile
defense world, where they man the sites,

you may know, in Alaska and some of the
command centers around the country.

So the basic infrastructure exists
within the National Guard that's linked

NORTHCOM and the federal level. And the
Guard itself is made up, as you know, of

firemen and police and doctors and
whomever when they're not in Middle East

wherever and they're working from home.
So you have the inherent ability of

integrating the local responders within
the Guard if we simply prepare.

and I believe training is needed. In
South Carolina, I'm working with the

adjutant general there, who has been
working for a number of years, and we

intend to put together an exercise.

If this meeting had been week after
next, I could have told you a little

about the plan, but it's our intention
to involve the inherent capabilities in

South Carolina and neighboring states.

perhaps extending to all of FEMA Region
4, which is headquartered, if you're

familiar, in Atlanta.

And with Bob Newman's help, who knows
the Adjutant General of South Carolina,

maybe we'll come to Virginia and even
Baltimore as we think about a scenario

to be included in one of the normal
National Guard scenarios, Vigilant Guard

2015.

And it's my intention, at least, to
encourage thinking between now and the

execution of that exercise with
intermediate steps that can be taken to

train, to help train the community of
people right now who have, maybe it's

zero understanding, but it's closer to
zero than what is needed understanding

what they will be called upon to do if
we have a blackout situation from any

number of threats.

Thank you.

All right. Thank you very much.

General Newman.

Thank you, Rich.

It was said by some famous American that
all politics are local. Well, you've

heard it also said that all disasters
are local.

And those of us that have experienced
the need to bring disaster relief to our

fellow citizens understand the meaning
of this.

First responders of what I call first
responders of consequence, those people

that can bring a lot of stuff to help
relieve an emergency situation, you're

talking about the National Guard.

Now, we're often guilty of assuming that
everyone understands that the National

Guard is a dual -headed organization,
and you hear terms like Title X and

32 thrown around. Let me simplify it for
everyone so we're on a common sheet to

begin the discussion.

The National Guard has two commanders.

When mobilized under federal orders,
their commander -in -chief is the

of each state or the Commonwealth of
Puerto Rico or the territories.

We have 54 tags, 54 National Guard
units.

In that capacity, in the Title 32 role,
which is U .S. Code Title 32, the Guard

is funded for all its training, for all
the equipment that it uses by the

federal government.

But it takes all that training that is
used for the war fight.

To go to Afghanistan and Iraq or
whatever a Title X mission, the

direct the Guard. It uses those
capabilities, those trained resources,

guardsmen, airmen, and soldiers to do
whatever the governor determines that

will do.

In the other role, and this is where
most of us think we know the National

Guard, you'll see them in Afghanistan.

You'll hear about a Guard unit returning
or one that's departing or one that's

serving over there. We think that the
Guard is the reserve of our country, and

they're over there fighting.

the fight against the bad guys, and
that's true.

But in this context and in the
discussions we've had over the last two

think it's obvious that the National
Guard can play an important role not

in preparing to defend against a
catastrophic, or as Ken said, a

attack. Did I say that right?

Cataclysmic attack.

But also to help recover from one, which
I think is the real challenge, as

Secretary Stockton was talking about.

I can tell you now that at least from my
time, and I've been out of uniform for

three years now, the National Guard was
not ready for this mission. We had not

planned. We had not trained. We had not
exercised to the degree necessary to

handle a cataclysmic event. Now, sure,
we had units that could do that, and we

had partnerships with other states
through emergency assistance compacts.

partnerships with the United States
Northern Command and others. But on an

individual basis, I can tell you that
the guard was not there.

And we've seen how difficult it is on
this mission of preparation for a

cataclysmic event, whether it's an EMP
or a cyber attack, something that puts

out of normal society for more than 30
days, let's say.

The feds just don't seem to get it. Or,
as Dr. Stocks has said, or maybe as Rich

or someone, you know, this is hard to
do. Rich, I think you were talking about

that. There are a lot of...

A lot of cooks brewing this stew and a
lot of people with money and power, and,

of course, that not only breeds conflict
but an honest discussion with often few

resulting with seldom results in good
success.

I like to suggest that the National
Guard is one of the vehicles that this

should embrace to help us prepare for a
cataclysmic event and then to respond

for one. Here are a few reasons why I
think we should do that.

First of all, 90 % of the time the
National Guard is under the command of

governors, and the governor is a
powerful political elected leader.

He has immediate call -in to the
president. He has immediate

regular discussions with our CODEL,
congressional delegations, if you will,

senators and representatives from the
state.

He has, through the National Guard,
relationships with the Department of

Defense. He has, through his Homeland
Security advisor,

relationships with DHS, and it goes on
from there. And on the state level, he

has accessed a number of important
agencies, such as his fire programs

his Department of Emergency Management,
those people that actually plan and

operate the emergency forces during a
disaster.

He can access these folks, sell his
ideas, the necessity of a properly

defense and then response capability if
he chooses to do so. I think that the

mission of this group should, through
the Guard and through the governor, just

as Secretary Stockton suggested, to
build from the bottom up the message

need to get out and prepare better and
prepare our forces to respond.

And I think that if we take that away
from our meetings here over the last two

days, we will have accomplished a great
deal.

I'll conclude my remarks by saying that
Ambassador Cooper and I are going to

visit with the Adjutants General at
their February meeting here in

couple months from now, and we plan to
discuss this to start the ball rolling.

And I think that from the response that
I've received from the few tags with

whom I've spoken, there is a great
recognition that this new mission needs

embraced more boldly than it has in the
past, and I predict we'll have great

success. Thank you, Rachel.

General, you're what, 10 seconds old?

Take that out of Dr.

Stockett's room. All right, very well.
Captain Trubush, sir.

Let's see if this works.

Well, great. First of all, I wanted to
say thank you.

Thank you to Chuck Manto and InfraGard
for inviting me today. Thanks also for

including me on such a distinguished
panel.

I get to work at NORAD and United States
NORTHCOM. I work in the Science and

Technology Directorate, and this is one
of the projects I've had the opportunity

to spend a little time on.

I want to make three quick points today.
Let's see, I have five minutes and ten

slides, so it should be a piece of cake.
Okay.

Number one, the health consequences of
these threats, EMP, solar

storms, and also cyber attack, are
significant, and significant for health

because of the specific vulnerabilities
that health -critical infrastructure,

that the public health and medical
sector are subject to.

The health sector is not fully prepared,
and we could go on with numerous

examples, but I think Superstorm Sandy
will highlight particular health care

vulnerabilities and some lack of
preparation.

And the third thing, the third very
quick point that I hope to make, is that

both of these vulnerabilities require
change to policy.

So non -material and material solutions.
So changes to infrastructure, hardware,

if you will, alone are not going to do
it.

So how did we get started? Well, in
conjunction with the Johns Hopkins

Public Health and also the University of
Pittsburgh Center for Health Security,

we wrote a couple of papers on this
subject. And I will go ahead and make

reference to this.

a book by William Fortune, one second
after I describe it as a terrible book,

but in the context of a terrifying,
terrible book. And so it

had, and I'm a public health doctor by
training, so it had three public health

scenarios through my reading.

The first one, of course, was the
effects on people who are in hospital.

or in long -term care facilities, or
rely specifically on life -saving

medication.

That group is the first to succumb to
such an event or such an environment,

let me say. The second group had to do
with considerable loss of life

with social unrest.

And the third had to do with society
coming back to the carrying capacity of

land.

The first public health die -off, if you
will, was of particular concern to me.

So I mentioned this collaboration with
Johns Hopkins and UPMC, and we did a

literature review, and it turned out
that there really has not been much.

written about this subject. The
Millennium Bug was good for a few

then in 2003 there was also another
article about health consequences of a

event. But really this is an unplowed
field.

So many of you have seen this slide
before. It talks about the

and interdependence.

of critical infrastructure.

I would highlight that both civilian and
military capabilities rely upon these

infrastructures. And Dr. Stockton has
made this point many times that over 90

of the services to military bases, and
so that would be energy,

sewage, food, transportation, et cetera,
et cetera, We rely upon

the civilian sector just like you do,
and I would particularly also include

fact that our telecommunications, if you
will, our IT backbone, we ride on

civilian infrastructure just like the
rest of you.

A series of cascading failures could
interrupt some mission -critical

of the military, and this was, in
essence, the beginning of this project.

tried to link some of the mission
-critical functions that our boss,

Jacoby, has here in the homeland, and
that would include such things as...

force protection, and by extension,
force health protection. Well, that gets

into where we in the medical business,
if General Jacoby doesn't have healthy

troops to send in to respond to a
disaster, there will be some lack. So

we improve the resiliency of military
medical

facilities? That's the essence of this
project.

So health is a mission -critical
function.

And it turns out that military health
care facilities are just as vulnerable

civilian ones.

This one shows there are 16 now, 16
critical infrastructure sectors. It was

mentioned earlier that they rely upon
each other, but that health care and

public health is particularly reliant on
power and

IT.

It turns out that the way we practice
medicine now in the 21st century has

a long ways from even 20 years ago, and
now particularly information technology

is embedded in pretty much everything we
do in health and medical.

So these are some of the health
consequences. And I'll run through this

very quickly, but, you know, there's a
requirement now through the Affordable

Care Act that we do electronic medical
records basically for all patient

encounters. The medical supply chain and
the just -in -time delivery system is

absolutely reliant on web -based
systems, pharmaceuticals likewise,

administration.

A friend of mine going to the hospital
not too long ago and was asking for

immunizations, and she was told, I'm
sorry, we can't give you your kids.

shots. Our computers are down.

So we are very reliant on this. Imaging
lab results, certain medical equipment,

health communications, emergency
responders, this was mentioned already,

increasingly technologically driven.

And finally, as you can imagine, a dark,
hot hospital is a very

unsafe place to be.

So these consequences,

these health consequences may be
mitigated.

Most hospitals have a power system. Most
hospitals will have auxiliary power in

the form of generators.

But as we saw from Superstorm Sandy,
they would tend not to last more than

three to five days if for no other
reason than the requirement to refuel.

these systems also need to be
maintained.

Longer term, these threats.

solar storm, cyber attack, and aging
infrastructure.

And I'm glad to see that the EMP SIG
also looks at other significant threats

which could bring down the grid, such as
pandemic.

I have one last slide here. Let me just
go ahead and say that military is not

immune.

We have some hardening, if you will, but
definitely need collaboration,

cooperation, communication with the
private sector, and transitioning of

these mitigating projects that we have
started in the military to help

make bases more energy resilient.

are the way to go. So I'll leave it with
public -private partnerships as the key

message. Thank you.

Thank you very much.

It's very difficult to have this many
distinguished speakers talk about an

of this level of importance in the time
allotted, but the good thing is that now

you have an opportunity to ask some
questions.

So I would like to open this up.

If you have questions, please raise your
hand.

Keep it brief so we can get as many
questions in as we can.

Yes, as many as we can. And if you could
say who the question is addressed to.

Yes, sir.

I'm Alan Roth, and it's addressed to
whoever they have to answer this

But we talk so much of a disaster
occurring based on, let's say, cyber

attack, EMT, and other things.

But I haven't heard much about multiple
tacit attacks.

If China has infiltrated our
infrastructure through the Internet

the way I've heard they have, and
they're just waiting for the right time,

Wouldn't that right time be when we're
having a heat wave or a deep freeze or a

major nor 'easter coming up the coast or
other really bad things going on at the

same time?

How much planning, how much thought goes
into your work that includes

this factor of having multiple things
happening at the same time?

Alan, I think that's a very important
consideration, and it's been taken into

account for some time. I believe it
needs to be considered even further. So

you've mentioned the possibility that an
adversary would have ample warning of a

storm approaching the United States,
such as Sandy.

But I would say we also need to think
about a combined arms attack.

That is the possibility that a cyber
attack would be supported by a

kinetic attack with improvised explosive
devices or some other kinetic means on

critical components of infrastructure.

To have those two events occur
simultaneously could present exceptional

challenges rather than one threat vector
alone.

I'd like to add the thought and to
remind you that during the Cold War, we

worried about the Soviet Union attacking
the United States. We planned,

literally, to deal with an EMP attack as
a precursor attack on the United

States, basically with an attempt to
shut down our ability to communicate

our strategic forces. And when I say
our, I mean supporting the President's

decision.

We spent an awful lot of money on
hardening that system against

pulse. We didn't spend a penny on
hardening the critical infrastructures

support the Homeland Defense mission for
a whole lot of other scenarios.

And I hope that the current Department
of Defense continues to support the

testing and the...

surveys and all the rest that are
assured to have maintained, needed to

a hardened system of communication and
our strategic force.

But I have to tell you that we've shut
down a lot of the testing vehicles that

we used during Cold War to save money or
for whatever the other reasons are.

So I worry about whether or not we have
maintained even the capability that we

worked enormously hard during the Cold
War to achieve.

to deal with a precursor attack.

And as was stated here, if China or
someone else is going to use this EMP,

you will, as the primary mechanism, I
think you can surely count on cyber and

other activities as a prelude.

Okay, we have a question in the back
here.

Frank Turner, I was wondering if the
panel would comment, please, on we've

the perspective from DOD, we've heard
from the states.

Can you talk a little bit about what you
think your specific roles and

responsibilities would be, especially
all the way from prevention to response,

and how you would pass command and
control back and forth?

Sounds like a guard question, but I'm
not sure.

Frank, I think the guard...

as I mentioned earlier, has the
responsibility to plan for all

And this is a unique disaster that
awaits us. So we need to do better

better interaction. The whole -of
-government approach used in the OCONUS

discussions now has application to the
states doing this. We need to train with

our fellow responders, whether it's at
the federal level or at the state level.

And then we need to exercise to make
sure that we can press to test and the

circuits are connected.

I think the key here is this is not
business as usual. The events we're

discussing here over the last couple of
days are events that are going to task.

perhaps not a state but the entire
region, maybe even the entire country.

If we're not prepared for this
insignificant training exercises, we're

going to be prepared to take it on when
it actually happens. So I think we need

to have a different paradigm when we
discuss these types of emergencies and

develop training exercises to ensure
that we have the capabilities to do

Thank you, sir. And that's very true
because the military...

It does really great at planning for the
last war. You stay within your own

comfort level, like a good staff officer
will.

But this is really thinking out of the
box right now. So this will open a whole

new brain shift. That would be nice.

A whole new paradigm shift of planning.

So this is going to be unique, but it's
got to come from the top down.

Or, like I always say as a combat
engineer, the best way to take a bridge

of a bridge too far, I think.

The best way to take a bridge, according
to Robert Redford, was to take both

ends at the same time.

You attack it from the senior
leadership, the 30 ,000 -foot level, and

attack it from the tactical level of
people, just an uprising within the

to contact their first responders and
say, what are you doing, National Guard

unit commander, what are you doing to
protect us from an EMP? What are you

doing? Then have it all go up through
the FEMA fusion center and work its way

and work its way down.

We have a question in the middle of the
room.

Don Donahue from the Diagenic Group and
the American Board of Disaster Medicine.

Dr. Turbush, you touched upon health
care and medicine.

And, you know, health care, there are
hyper -logarithmic advances in

and there's federal policies that are
basically pushing us.

It goes beyond critical infrastructure.
It could be down to the individual, my

pacemaker. I don't have a pacemaker, but
my pacemaker could be remotely

controlled.

I'd like a broader panel. How do we
address that? How do we address it

very individual and broad -based
technological challenge?

I can't protect my hospital. How do I
protect the 10 ,000 people that I

Well,

thank you for that question.

There are numerous examples of medical
equipment which are vulnerable to

hacking, if you will, cyber attack.
Pacemaker, you mentioned.

The one example I would use is that
Kaiser Permanente, that has a footprint

all over the country, bought some 8
,000, I believe, IV pumps.

And it turns out that these new
sophisticated IV pumps can be programmed

remotely from someone at a terminal and
so on. Their IT security

person at Kaiser Permanente, to their
credit, decided.

no, we're going to go ahead and instead
fat -finger every one of those just to

obviate that possibility.

This comes under the area of cybercrime,
and those are issues, but they tend to

be one -at -a -time issues or could be
one -at -a -time issues. The more

significant thing is that medical
equipment pretty much across the board

computer chip in it.

And if there was something such as an
EMP,

or extreme solar weather that could
affect a majority of those devices.