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These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:00:02,226 --> 00:00:05,605 (narrator): Landing at Calicut Airport... 2 00:00:05,605 --> 00:00:07,315 Speed brake up. 3 00:00:07,315 --> 00:00:09,359 (tense music) 4 00:00:09,359 --> 00:00:10,818 ...the pilots of Air India Express 5 00:00:10,818 --> 00:00:14,864 Flight 13-44 run out of tarmac to stop. 6 00:00:14,864 --> 00:00:16,866 Oh, crap! 7 00:00:18,409 --> 00:00:20,995 (engine roaring) 8 00:00:20,995 --> 00:00:23,039 (sirens wailing) 9 00:00:23,039 --> 00:00:26,668 (narrator): Twenty-one people are killed. 10 00:00:28,252 --> 00:00:30,129 Start up the hydraulics. 11 00:00:31,047 --> 00:00:33,675 (narrator): Did the brakes malfunction? 12 00:00:34,384 --> 00:00:35,760 No sign of fluid leak. 13 00:00:35,760 --> 00:00:37,887 The brakes didn't fail. 14 00:00:39,472 --> 00:00:41,724 (narrator): When investigators listen to the Cockpit 15 00:00:41,724 --> 00:00:43,309 Voice Recorder... 16 00:00:43,309 --> 00:00:45,228 (Captain): Put the wipers on. 17 00:00:45,228 --> 00:00:47,897 (narrator): ...they discover a malfunction 18 00:00:47,897 --> 00:00:50,817 of an entirely different nature. 19 00:00:51,818 --> 00:00:53,736 What's happened to it? 20 00:00:54,946 --> 00:00:59,742 So was this crash caused by a faulty windshield wiper? 21 00:01:03,454 --> 00:01:05,748 (Pilot): Mayday! Mayday! 22 00:01:07,583 --> 00:01:09,919 (alarms blaring) (VWS): Pull up! 23 00:01:11,129 --> 00:01:13,172 (radio chatter) 24 00:01:25,727 --> 00:01:28,104 {\an8}(narrator): It's monsoon season in India. 25 00:01:28,104 --> 00:01:29,772 {\an8}(thunder cracking) 26 00:01:29,772 --> 00:01:32,734 {\an8}Air India Express, Flight 13-44 27 00:01:32,734 --> 00:01:35,945 {\an8}is on approach to Calicut International Airport. 28 00:01:38,489 --> 00:01:41,409 {\an8}The pilot flying is Captain Deepak Sathe. 29 00:01:41,409 --> 00:01:45,955 He's a highly experienced 59-year-old commercial pilot. 30 00:01:45,955 --> 00:01:48,666 Visibility is just above minimums 31 00:01:48,666 --> 00:01:50,960 so we can make an attempt. Okay? 32 00:01:50,960 --> 00:01:52,712 Check. 33 00:01:54,088 --> 00:01:56,299 {\an8}The captain had flown in and out of Calicut 34 00:01:56,299 --> 00:01:57,884 {\an8}a number of times. 35 00:01:57,884 --> 00:02:00,762 {\an8}So he was very familiar with the airfield, 36 00:02:00,762 --> 00:02:04,766 {\an8}the terrain around, and the weather conditions. 37 00:02:05,600 --> 00:02:07,935 The runway is wet, expect turbulence, 38 00:02:07,935 --> 00:02:10,938 expect weather, all precautions. 39 00:02:12,940 --> 00:02:16,819 (narrator): First Officer Akhilesh Kumar is aged 32. 40 00:02:16,819 --> 00:02:20,656 He joined Air India Express three years ago and has almost 41 00:02:20,656 --> 00:02:23,076 2000 flying hours. 42 00:02:23,076 --> 00:02:26,370 He has less experience navigating through monsoons 43 00:02:26,370 --> 00:02:28,748 than the Captain. 44 00:02:28,748 --> 00:02:30,667 That area experiences very heavy showers 45 00:02:30,667 --> 00:02:36,339 along with reduced visibility and strong winds. 46 00:02:37,632 --> 00:02:40,218 In addition to the 5 crew, 47 00:02:40,218 --> 00:02:44,097 there are 184 Indian nationals onboard. 48 00:02:44,097 --> 00:02:49,894 All are being repatriated amid the ongoing COVID-19 outbreak. 49 00:02:49,894 --> 00:02:54,023 It's one of more than 2,000 flights into India to date, 50 00:02:54,023 --> 00:02:56,901 bringing home thousands of workers stranded abroad 51 00:02:56,901 --> 00:03:00,279 when flights were grounded due to COVID restrictions. 52 00:03:01,364 --> 00:03:04,075 So the passengers on these flights were mostly 53 00:03:04,075 --> 00:03:05,243 blue-collar workers, 54 00:03:05,243 --> 00:03:09,372 people who had flown to Dubai to work in malls, 55 00:03:09,372 --> 00:03:11,040 in small restaurants. 56 00:03:13,543 --> 00:03:17,046 About 50 miles from the airport, Captain Sathe 57 00:03:17,046 --> 00:03:19,048 begins his approach briefing. 58 00:03:20,049 --> 00:03:23,886 For a go-around, wind shear on approach, approach to stall 59 00:03:23,886 --> 00:03:27,807 and recovery on go-around as briefed in the first sector. 60 00:03:29,225 --> 00:03:30,435 Check. 61 00:03:31,144 --> 00:03:34,272 Approach briefing is basically one pilot communicating 62 00:03:34,272 --> 00:03:37,483 to the other what his plan of action is. 63 00:03:39,235 --> 00:03:40,486 Any doubts? 64 00:03:42,238 --> 00:03:43,698 No. 65 00:03:43,698 --> 00:03:46,826 Any questions? 66 00:03:48,286 --> 00:03:50,204 No questions. 67 00:03:52,915 --> 00:03:55,460 (narrator): Today's flight from Dubai to Calicut 68 00:03:55,460 --> 00:03:57,754 takes just under 4 hours. 69 00:03:59,380 --> 00:04:01,090 (rain pattering) 70 00:04:01,090 --> 00:04:03,843 Calicut tower, Express India 1-3-4-4 71 00:04:03,843 --> 00:04:06,929 on ILS runway 2-8. 72 00:04:08,264 --> 00:04:10,683 Twelve miles from the airport... 73 00:04:10,683 --> 00:04:12,852 Any change in the visibility? 74 00:04:14,020 --> 00:04:17,023 ...the Captain wants a weather update. 75 00:04:17,023 --> 00:04:21,444 Any change in the visibility, Express India 1-3-4-4? 76 00:04:22,487 --> 00:04:24,364 (Tower Controller): Uh, standby. 77 00:04:24,364 --> 00:04:26,324 Air India Express 1-3-4-4, 78 00:04:26,324 --> 00:04:30,203 latest visibility is 2,000 meters and, uh, light rain. 79 00:04:31,079 --> 00:04:33,873 (Kumar): Copy. Express India 1-3-4-4. 80 00:04:35,792 --> 00:04:39,837 Two thousand metres visibility on a tricky airport 81 00:04:39,837 --> 00:04:43,299 with light rain, the pilots are basically 82 00:04:43,299 --> 00:04:46,886 a bit more anxious than a normal approach. 83 00:04:50,264 --> 00:04:54,727 (narrator): Calicut's runway is built on a tabletop plateau. 84 00:04:54,727 --> 00:04:57,480 There are steep drop-offs at both ends. 85 00:04:58,773 --> 00:05:02,819 There is no margin of error. If you exceed the landing limit, 86 00:05:02,819 --> 00:05:05,279 you go straight down into a valley. 87 00:05:07,448 --> 00:05:11,160 The pilots are flying a Boeing 7-37-800 88 00:05:11,160 --> 00:05:14,247 specially modified for difficult landings. 89 00:05:14,247 --> 00:05:18,835 {\an8}It has modified spoilers and braking performance 90 00:05:18,835 --> 00:05:19,919 {\an8}and allows it to stop 91 00:05:19,919 --> 00:05:23,423 {\an8}faster than other models of the 7-3-7-800. 92 00:05:23,423 --> 00:05:25,091 (tires screeching) 93 00:05:26,175 --> 00:05:28,678 Just two minutes from Calicut Airport, 94 00:05:28,678 --> 00:05:31,013 the crew gets ready for landing. 95 00:05:32,098 --> 00:05:34,142 Put the wipers on. 96 00:05:38,187 --> 00:05:40,565 (Kumar): Lead in lights in sight. 97 00:05:40,565 --> 00:05:42,108 (Captain Sathe): Yeah. 98 00:05:46,487 --> 00:05:48,948 What's happened to it? 99 00:05:49,824 --> 00:05:53,536 Oh, crap. The wiper is gone. 100 00:05:53,536 --> 00:05:56,122 What a day for the wiper to go. 101 00:05:58,124 --> 00:06:01,044 With decreased visibility hindering their approach, 102 00:06:01,044 --> 00:06:03,921 the pilots must make a crucial decision. 103 00:06:03,921 --> 00:06:07,300 (tense music) 104 00:06:07,300 --> 00:06:11,679 If they do not have the runway or any of the elements in sight, 105 00:06:11,679 --> 00:06:14,640 at that point, they have to take a decision 106 00:06:14,640 --> 00:06:16,768 to continue or to go around. 107 00:06:16,768 --> 00:06:19,354 (exhales deeply) 108 00:06:21,189 --> 00:06:25,902 (EGPWS): Approaching minimums. 500. Minimums. 109 00:06:26,861 --> 00:06:29,197 Uhhh... 110 00:06:29,197 --> 00:06:29,947 let's go around. 111 00:06:29,947 --> 00:06:33,993 (engine accelerating) 112 00:06:35,244 --> 00:06:38,206 A half mile from the airport, Captain Sathe 113 00:06:38,206 --> 00:06:42,001 aborts the landing and decides to try it again. 114 00:06:50,635 --> 00:06:53,513 Express India 1-3-4-4, request reason for go-around. 115 00:06:55,515 --> 00:06:58,601 {\an8}When pilots go missed on an approach, it's important 116 00:06:58,601 --> 00:07:01,270 {\an8}information to share with air traffic control because 117 00:07:01,270 --> 00:07:03,981 {\an8}that can help other pilots who are coming into the airport 118 00:07:03,981 --> 00:07:06,526 {\an8}anticipate any hazard that may be there. 119 00:07:06,526 --> 00:07:10,405 (Kumar): Due to weather, Express India 1-3-4-4. 120 00:07:10,405 --> 00:07:12,281 Heavy rain. 121 00:07:12,281 --> 00:07:13,366 Uh, roger. 122 00:07:19,080 --> 00:07:23,251 While Flight 13-44 completes its go-around, 123 00:07:23,251 --> 00:07:27,380 a crew waiting to take-off contacts the tower. 124 00:07:28,423 --> 00:07:31,676 (Pilot): Calicut, Air India 4-2-5, we are ready for taxi 125 00:07:31,676 --> 00:07:35,638 and we appreciate if you can give us one-zero for departure. 126 00:07:37,598 --> 00:07:41,811 (narrator): The departing crew wants to switch runways. 127 00:07:41,811 --> 00:07:46,524 Runway 2-8 and runway 1-0 are the same strip of runway 128 00:07:46,524 --> 00:07:49,152 but they are in the opposite directions. 129 00:07:50,194 --> 00:07:51,654 Roger, expect 1-0. 130 00:07:51,654 --> 00:07:55,032 Taxi via Charlie, enter back track, line up runway 1-0. 131 00:07:55,783 --> 00:07:58,828 (Pilot): Via Charlie, enter backtrack, line up 1-0, 132 00:07:58,828 --> 00:08:01,164 Air India 4-2-5. Thank you, sir. 133 00:08:03,082 --> 00:08:06,419 Typically, departure aircraft want to taxi 134 00:08:06,419 --> 00:08:09,505 the least time and get airborne as soon as possible. 135 00:08:09,505 --> 00:08:12,592 Runway 1-0 is closest to the apron. 136 00:08:13,718 --> 00:08:17,513 To accommodate the departing aircraft, controllers change 137 00:08:17,513 --> 00:08:21,184 the active runway from 2-8 to 1-0. 138 00:08:22,518 --> 00:08:25,563 Express India 1-3-4-4, wind is now 2-7-0 degrees, 139 00:08:25,563 --> 00:08:28,107 zero eight knots, confirm you'd like to make an approach 140 00:08:28,107 --> 00:08:29,650 for runway 1-0? 141 00:08:32,653 --> 00:08:35,114 Yeah, we'd like to try if you can give us an update 142 00:08:35,114 --> 00:08:38,534 on the visibility for runway 1-0. 143 00:08:40,161 --> 00:08:42,914 Visibility is the same, sir, at 2,000 meters, 144 00:08:42,914 --> 00:08:44,415 and we'll notify you of any improvement. 145 00:08:44,415 --> 00:08:48,127 And now wind is 2-6-0 degrees, 0-5 knots. 146 00:08:48,127 --> 00:08:53,216 Okay. Set up for 1-0. Let's try. 147 00:09:02,809 --> 00:09:04,894 Localizer alive. 148 00:09:04,894 --> 00:09:06,562 Check. 149 00:09:08,523 --> 00:09:11,401 The localizer is part of the I-L-S, 150 00:09:11,401 --> 00:09:13,486 or Instrument Landing System, 151 00:09:13,486 --> 00:09:17,824 that provides lateral guidance to the runway's centreline. 152 00:09:25,289 --> 00:09:27,709 (Kumar over speaker): Cabin crew, landing stations. 153 00:09:28,793 --> 00:09:34,090 (narrator): Flight 13-44 is now only 6 miles from the runway. 154 00:09:35,925 --> 00:09:37,093 Shall we do it? 155 00:09:37,093 --> 00:09:40,263 Captain Sathe tries the wipers again. 156 00:09:40,263 --> 00:09:43,099 (Kumar): Just a sec. 157 00:09:44,267 --> 00:09:46,561 (groans) - What is this? 158 00:09:46,561 --> 00:09:51,190 The Captain's wiper is working more slowly than it should. 159 00:09:51,190 --> 00:09:54,318 I guess this is the fastest it'll go. 160 00:09:54,318 --> 00:09:58,239 Okay, glide slope captured. 161 00:09:59,615 --> 00:10:03,995 The glide slope is also part of the instrument landing system 162 00:10:03,995 --> 00:10:06,831 and guides the plane on a 3-degree slope 163 00:10:06,831 --> 00:10:10,376 to the runway threshold. 164 00:10:11,627 --> 00:10:13,880 Flaps 25. 165 00:10:14,672 --> 00:10:18,217 (Kumar): Flaps 25 selected. Moving. 166 00:10:20,053 --> 00:10:22,972 Calicut tower, Express India 1-3-4-4, 167 00:10:22,972 --> 00:10:27,226 on ILS runway 1-0. 168 00:10:27,226 --> 00:10:29,312 Express India 1-3-4-4, roger. 169 00:10:29,312 --> 00:10:31,814 Light rain over the field. Runway surface wet. 170 00:10:31,814 --> 00:10:38,154 Wind 2-5-0 degrees, 0-8 knots. Runway 1-0 cleared to land. 171 00:10:39,489 --> 00:10:41,365 Four miles from the runway, 172 00:10:41,365 --> 00:10:44,160 the crew receives clearance to land. 173 00:10:45,328 --> 00:10:47,038 Okay, runway in sight. 174 00:10:47,038 --> 00:10:48,915 Runway in sight, check. 175 00:10:51,292 --> 00:10:55,338 This time, the pilots can see the runway. 176 00:10:55,338 --> 00:10:59,425 (EGPWS): Approaching minimums. 177 00:10:59,425 --> 00:11:00,760 500. 178 00:11:01,511 --> 00:11:04,305 As a pilot, when you're coming in for a landing where there's 179 00:11:04,305 --> 00:11:06,682 weather and visibility just above minimums, 180 00:11:06,682 --> 00:11:10,019 you're keeping a sharper eye because things could change 181 00:11:10,019 --> 00:11:11,062 at a moment's notice. 182 00:11:11,062 --> 00:11:13,439 (tense music) 183 00:11:13,439 --> 00:11:17,193 Flight 13-44 crosses the runway threshold. 184 00:11:21,280 --> 00:11:24,534 (EGPWS): 30... 20. 185 00:11:26,661 --> 00:11:28,955 (tires screeching) 186 00:11:30,206 --> 00:11:31,999 Speed brake up. 187 00:11:33,084 --> 00:11:37,296 The speed brakes are deployed to help slow the plane. 188 00:11:39,090 --> 00:11:40,633 Auto brake disarm. 189 00:11:44,637 --> 00:11:47,390 But the plane isn't stopping fast enough. 190 00:11:49,726 --> 00:11:50,810 Oh, crap! 191 00:11:53,980 --> 00:11:56,441 (tires screeching) 192 00:11:56,441 --> 00:12:00,153 The 7-37 falls off the end of the runway... 193 00:12:00,153 --> 00:12:03,406 (thunderous crash) 194 00:12:03,406 --> 00:12:06,325 ...and breaks apart. 195 00:12:06,325 --> 00:12:08,911 (sirens wailing) 196 00:12:08,911 --> 00:12:14,167 Rescuers rush to save the 190 people onboard, 197 00:12:14,167 --> 00:12:16,294 as every second could mean the difference 198 00:12:16,294 --> 00:12:18,296 between life and death. 199 00:12:18,296 --> 00:12:21,299 (indistinct frenzied shouting) 200 00:12:21,674 --> 00:12:23,259 (rain pelting) (sirens wailing) 201 00:12:23,259 --> 00:12:25,678 (narrator): In driving rain and darkness, 202 00:12:25,678 --> 00:12:29,098 surviving passengers begin to emerge from the wreckage 203 00:12:29,098 --> 00:12:32,393 of Air India Express Flight 13-44. 204 00:12:32,393 --> 00:12:35,146 The heavy rain benefits the rescue. 205 00:12:36,147 --> 00:12:41,611 It was very helpful in fact for dousing the post-crash fire. 206 00:12:41,611 --> 00:12:44,280 It ultimately helped us save lives. 207 00:12:45,573 --> 00:12:49,410 169 people survive the crash. 208 00:12:49,410 --> 00:12:52,455 59 walk away without injuries. 209 00:12:52,455 --> 00:12:58,086 (indistinct shouting) 210 00:12:58,086 --> 00:13:03,174 (somber music) 211 00:13:03,174 --> 00:13:06,010 But 21 of those onboard are dead. 212 00:13:08,388 --> 00:13:12,850 Captain Deepak Sathe and First Officer Akhilesh Kumar 213 00:13:12,850 --> 00:13:14,977 are among them. 214 00:13:25,947 --> 00:13:27,448 Investigators from India's 215 00:13:27,448 --> 00:13:30,076 Aircraft Accident Investigation Bureau 216 00:13:30,076 --> 00:13:33,746 the A-A-I-B, arrive on the scene. 217 00:13:33,746 --> 00:13:39,043 This was the first accident which AAIB would have been 218 00:13:39,043 --> 00:13:40,795 investigating on its own. 219 00:13:40,795 --> 00:13:44,590 So it was really an acid test for AAIB to prove its mettle. 220 00:13:46,426 --> 00:13:49,804 {\an8}- The first question investigators must answer - 221 00:13:49,804 --> 00:13:53,558 {\an8}did something break off from the airplane before the landing, 222 00:13:53,558 --> 00:13:56,352 {\an8}making it impossible for the plane to stop? 223 00:13:58,980 --> 00:14:01,607 (intriguing music) 224 00:14:01,607 --> 00:14:04,527 I've got the next batch downloaded... 225 00:14:06,154 --> 00:14:07,697 Looking at them now. 226 00:14:09,115 --> 00:14:10,867 This was the second wave of COVID, 227 00:14:10,867 --> 00:14:14,537 which was the most dangerous, so there was an embargo 228 00:14:14,537 --> 00:14:18,124 as to how many people could sit in a room and conduct a meeting. 229 00:14:19,083 --> 00:14:23,546 Investigators examine dozens of photos from the crash scene. 230 00:14:25,214 --> 00:14:27,091 You agree it's all here? 231 00:14:28,718 --> 00:14:31,929 They conclude all of the wreckage is contained 232 00:14:31,929 --> 00:14:33,556 within the crash site. 233 00:14:35,266 --> 00:14:40,063 The wreckage was not very spread out. It was concentrated 234 00:14:40,063 --> 00:14:43,441 over a radius of about 200 feet. 235 00:14:44,525 --> 00:14:46,652 Let's regroup in a bit. 236 00:14:48,071 --> 00:14:51,991 All the damage was caused when the plane over ran the runway. 237 00:14:55,036 --> 00:14:58,831 So we wanted to come out with the probable reasons 238 00:14:58,831 --> 00:15:03,670 as to what has led the aircraft to exit the runway. 239 00:15:14,055 --> 00:15:17,141 Only slightly off center... 240 00:15:17,141 --> 00:15:20,812 But at least they were lined up with the runway properly. 241 00:15:20,812 --> 00:15:24,649 To better understand why the plane overran the runway, 242 00:15:24,649 --> 00:15:28,653 investigators try to determine where it initially touched down. 243 00:15:29,487 --> 00:15:31,531 So where do the marks start? 244 00:15:36,786 --> 00:15:40,498 On a dry runway it is very, very easy to find the touchdown 245 00:15:40,498 --> 00:15:42,792 points because the tires, 246 00:15:42,792 --> 00:15:46,671 they leave some rubber deposit on the point of touchdown. 247 00:15:50,842 --> 00:15:53,970 They work their way back along the runway. 248 00:15:59,100 --> 00:16:02,019 (tense music) 249 00:16:13,322 --> 00:16:14,991 (exhales deeply) 250 00:16:18,119 --> 00:16:20,163 Beyond 5,000 feet 251 00:16:20,163 --> 00:16:23,833 we were not able to locate any touch tire marks. 252 00:16:23,833 --> 00:16:27,837 The tire marks had been washed away due to heavy rain. 253 00:16:29,964 --> 00:16:33,009 Unable to determine where the plane touched down, 254 00:16:33,009 --> 00:16:37,096 investigators examine the runway itself. 255 00:16:37,096 --> 00:16:42,143 Did rubber deposits make the runway too slippery? 256 00:16:42,143 --> 00:16:43,728 They perform a test 257 00:16:43,728 --> 00:16:47,190 to determine if the runway's surface provided enough friction 258 00:16:47,190 --> 00:16:50,526 or grip for the plane to decelerate properly. 259 00:16:51,778 --> 00:16:55,114 Our experience shows that a aircraft of 7-3-7 class, 260 00:16:55,114 --> 00:16:57,867 it leaves a rubber deposit. 261 00:16:57,867 --> 00:17:00,953 And over a period of time it becomes difficult 262 00:17:00,953 --> 00:17:02,705 for the tire to grip. 263 00:17:08,044 --> 00:17:10,254 Friction test results just came in. 264 00:17:11,589 --> 00:17:16,636 Co-efficient of friction ranges from... 265 00:17:16,636 --> 00:17:21,307 ...6-3 to. 7-2. 266 00:17:22,517 --> 00:17:24,310 That's within standard. 267 00:17:24,310 --> 00:17:28,606 (mysterious music) 268 00:17:32,235 --> 00:17:35,029 We were quite satisfied with the condition 269 00:17:35,029 --> 00:17:38,908 of the paved surface of Calicut Airport. 270 00:17:38,908 --> 00:17:41,661 There were no major rubber deposits. 271 00:17:43,246 --> 00:17:47,000 With the runway surface ruled out, investigators consider 272 00:17:47,000 --> 00:17:49,127 if the plane's tires were too worn, 273 00:17:49,127 --> 00:17:52,422 causing it to hydroplane on the wet runway. 274 00:17:53,423 --> 00:17:56,676 (Amit Singh): The grooves on the tires, like on a car, 275 00:17:56,676 --> 00:17:58,928 are channels for water to drain off. 276 00:17:58,928 --> 00:18:01,472 And if the tire is bald, basically, 277 00:18:01,472 --> 00:18:02,932 the grooves are worn out. 278 00:18:02,932 --> 00:18:06,602 That will cause the aircraft to slip. 279 00:18:07,979 --> 00:18:10,440 202 psi. 280 00:18:10,440 --> 00:18:12,984 Right in the required pressure range. 281 00:18:15,278 --> 00:18:17,613 No skid burn... 282 00:18:19,157 --> 00:18:20,950 or bald spots. 283 00:18:20,950 --> 00:18:23,369 (investigator): Just like the others. 284 00:18:23,369 --> 00:18:27,040 If there was a case of hydroplaning there would be 285 00:18:27,040 --> 00:18:32,628 white marks on the runway and that portion of the tires 286 00:18:32,628 --> 00:18:35,089 would have been burnt. 287 00:18:35,089 --> 00:18:39,052 And here we didn't find either of these. 288 00:18:40,887 --> 00:18:43,306 What about the brakes? 289 00:18:44,432 --> 00:18:46,184 Did the brakes malfunction 290 00:18:46,184 --> 00:18:48,978 causing the plane to overrun the runway? 291 00:18:51,356 --> 00:18:53,066 Some corrosion... 292 00:18:55,943 --> 00:18:58,738 but nothing out of the ordinary. 293 00:18:59,781 --> 00:19:01,866 Let's check the hydraulics. 294 00:19:06,204 --> 00:19:09,082 We wanted to ascertain the serviceability of hydraulics 295 00:19:09,082 --> 00:19:13,086 because this is the braking system. 296 00:19:14,003 --> 00:19:15,755 Start up the hydraulics. 297 00:19:17,799 --> 00:19:20,718 (machine whirring) 298 00:19:22,887 --> 00:19:25,139 No sign of fluid leak. 299 00:19:25,139 --> 00:19:27,100 The brakes didn't fail. 300 00:19:28,101 --> 00:19:29,102 No. 301 00:19:33,564 --> 00:19:34,982 I can say that there was 302 00:19:34,982 --> 00:19:39,362 no abnormality in the deceleration devices. 303 00:19:42,156 --> 00:19:43,699 Okay... 304 00:19:46,369 --> 00:19:47,412 good. 305 00:19:49,997 --> 00:19:55,420 So, did the plane touchdown within the touchdown zone? 306 00:19:57,171 --> 00:20:02,010 Investigators try to determine if the crew of flight 13-44 307 00:20:02,010 --> 00:20:05,054 gave themselves enough space to stop. 308 00:20:05,054 --> 00:20:06,723 Thank you. 309 00:20:13,980 --> 00:20:15,481 They have found an image... 310 00:20:24,032 --> 00:20:27,827 ...from a closed circuit camera located here. 311 00:20:30,163 --> 00:20:33,166 Looks like they're still about 15 feet above the runway, 312 00:20:33,166 --> 00:20:35,835 and they're past the touchdown zone. 313 00:20:40,214 --> 00:20:44,010 We could see clearly the aircraft floating 314 00:20:44,010 --> 00:20:47,847 but, unfortunately, we couldn't see the exact touchdown point. 315 00:20:47,847 --> 00:20:51,684 So that means they flew well past the touchdown area 316 00:20:51,684 --> 00:20:54,020 before putting the plane down. 317 00:20:56,856 --> 00:20:58,441 That's right. 318 00:21:06,491 --> 00:21:11,287 Why would the pilots land so far past the touchdown zone 319 00:21:12,747 --> 00:21:15,208 and risk the lives of everyone on board? 320 00:21:24,884 --> 00:21:27,804 I have the ATC recordings. 321 00:21:29,013 --> 00:21:32,225 Let's hope we get some answers. 322 00:21:33,851 --> 00:21:36,312 Investigators turn to conversations between 323 00:21:36,312 --> 00:21:41,317 Air India Express Flight 13-44 and the controller 324 00:21:41,317 --> 00:21:44,987 to learn why the plane overflew the touchdown zone. 325 00:21:46,155 --> 00:21:48,116 (radio static) 326 00:21:48,116 --> 00:21:51,327 (FO Kumar): Calicut tower, Express India 1-3-4-4 327 00:21:51,327 --> 00:21:54,330 on ILS runway 2-8. 328 00:21:56,749 --> 00:21:58,501 Okay, it sounds like they initially planned 329 00:21:58,501 --> 00:22:00,837 to land on runway 2-8. 330 00:22:00,837 --> 00:22:04,173 So why did they land on 1-0 instead? 331 00:22:06,259 --> 00:22:10,930 Landing on runway 2-8 the winds will be from your front. 332 00:22:10,930 --> 00:22:14,434 You'll be landing into the wind. That creates more lift. 333 00:22:17,812 --> 00:22:19,856 But three-and-a-half minutes later, 334 00:22:19,856 --> 00:22:22,191 the crew changes their plans. 335 00:22:22,191 --> 00:22:25,820 (FO Kumar): Tower, Express India 1-3-4-4, going around. 336 00:22:27,697 --> 00:22:28,948 Roger. 337 00:22:34,120 --> 00:22:36,122 So they called a go-around. 338 00:22:41,461 --> 00:22:43,880 During monsoon season, it is not very uncommon 339 00:22:43,880 --> 00:22:46,924 to see a go-around because, 340 00:22:46,924 --> 00:22:50,720 of the low ceiling and showers of rain, 341 00:22:50,720 --> 00:22:53,389 which suddenly reduce visibility. 342 00:22:55,683 --> 00:22:59,395 (ATC): Express India 1-3-4-4, request reason for go-around. 343 00:22:59,395 --> 00:23:02,523 (FO Kumar): Due to weather, Express India 1-3-4-4. 344 00:23:02,523 --> 00:23:04,609 Heavy rain. 345 00:23:04,609 --> 00:23:05,902 (ATC): Uh, roger. 346 00:23:06,569 --> 00:23:09,405 Hmm. They probably couldn't see the runway. 347 00:23:09,405 --> 00:23:11,199 Sounds about right. 348 00:23:13,576 --> 00:23:16,037 The crew realized that the runway was not in sight, 349 00:23:16,037 --> 00:23:17,914 so they took a call to go around, 350 00:23:17,914 --> 00:23:19,582 so that was absolutely in order. 351 00:23:21,125 --> 00:23:22,919 (Captain Air India 425): Calicut, Air India 4-2-5, 352 00:23:22,919 --> 00:23:24,504 we're ready for taxi 353 00:23:24,504 --> 00:23:28,007 and we appreciate if you can give us 1-0 for departure. 354 00:23:30,218 --> 00:23:32,595 (narrator): Then, investigators hear another plane 355 00:23:32,595 --> 00:23:35,473 asking to swap the active runway 356 00:23:35,473 --> 00:23:40,269 and the controller advising Flight 13-44 of the change. 357 00:23:41,604 --> 00:23:44,816 Express India 1-3-4-4, wind is now 2-7-0 degrees, 358 00:23:44,816 --> 00:23:47,360 0-8 knots, confirm you'd like to make an approach 359 00:23:47,360 --> 00:23:48,861 for runway 1-0? 360 00:23:51,155 --> 00:23:54,534 So, the controller asked them to use 1-0. 361 00:24:00,623 --> 00:24:03,960 (Captain Sathe): Calicut, Express India 1-3-4-4. 362 00:24:04,794 --> 00:24:06,295 Go ahead. 363 00:24:06,295 --> 00:24:08,589 (Captain Sathe): How's the visibility on runway 1-0? 364 00:24:10,258 --> 00:24:12,385 (narrator): Before accepting the new runway, 365 00:24:12,385 --> 00:24:16,055 the pilots request clarification of weather conditions. 366 00:24:16,055 --> 00:24:20,059 Both runways at 2,000 meters with, uh, light rain. 367 00:24:20,893 --> 00:24:22,979 (Captain): And how are the surface winds? 368 00:24:24,522 --> 00:24:28,276 (ATC): Surface winds now 2-6-0 degrees, 0-5 knots. 369 00:24:29,819 --> 00:24:31,487 (FO Kumar): Five knots. 370 00:24:33,072 --> 00:24:34,866 Is that within limits? 371 00:24:34,866 --> 00:24:37,452 Let's check... 372 00:24:42,665 --> 00:24:44,625 10 knots is the limit. 373 00:24:45,418 --> 00:24:49,005 Okay. So landing on 1-0 safely is technically possible 374 00:24:49,005 --> 00:24:51,090 even if they'd be landing in a tailwind. 375 00:24:56,137 --> 00:24:58,014 (radio static) 376 00:24:58,014 --> 00:25:01,350 (narrator): Just ten-and-a-half minutes later, 377 00:25:01,350 --> 00:25:05,021 investigators hear the last communication with the tower. 378 00:25:07,690 --> 00:25:12,653 (FO Kumar): Express India 1-3-4-4, on ILS runway 1-0. 379 00:25:12,653 --> 00:25:15,198 (tense music) 380 00:25:15,198 --> 00:25:18,076 (ATC): Express India 1-3-4-4, roger. 381 00:25:18,076 --> 00:25:20,453 Light rain over the field, runway surface wet. 382 00:25:20,453 --> 00:25:26,125 Wind 2-5-0 degrees, 0-8 knots. Runway 1-0 cleared to land. 383 00:25:26,918 --> 00:25:28,795 (FO Kumar): Runway 1-0 cleared to land, 384 00:25:28,795 --> 00:25:30,088 and what's the visibility? 385 00:25:30,088 --> 00:25:33,216 (intriguing music) (recording pauses) 386 00:25:33,216 --> 00:25:36,219 They're asking about visibility again. 387 00:25:37,387 --> 00:25:38,971 It seems to be an issue. 388 00:25:40,098 --> 00:25:42,600 (recording resumes) 389 00:25:42,600 --> 00:25:45,978 Visibility is the same, sir, at 2,000 meters. 390 00:25:45,978 --> 00:25:48,606 (FO Kumar): Copy sir, Express India 1-3-4-4. 391 00:25:48,606 --> 00:25:50,525 (suspenseful music) 392 00:25:50,525 --> 00:25:57,490 Two-and-a-half minutes later, they overfly the landing zone. 393 00:26:00,410 --> 00:26:03,371 An 8 knot tailwind. I mean it's still within limits. 394 00:26:04,747 --> 00:26:07,625 Despite missing the touchdown zone, 395 00:26:07,625 --> 00:26:10,003 could the crew have safely stopped their plane 396 00:26:10,003 --> 00:26:12,380 on the runway? 397 00:26:12,380 --> 00:26:14,340 Speed brake up. 398 00:26:17,593 --> 00:26:19,721 (tense music) 399 00:26:23,641 --> 00:26:26,227 (narrator): Investigators examine the flight parameters 400 00:26:26,227 --> 00:26:30,189 of Air India Express Flight 13-44. 401 00:26:30,189 --> 00:26:32,108 The data could shed light 402 00:26:32,108 --> 00:26:34,610 on precisely where the aircraft landed, 403 00:26:34,610 --> 00:26:39,282 after CCTV footage captured it passing the touchdown zone. 404 00:26:41,576 --> 00:26:44,370 Can you isolate the weight on wheels parameter? 405 00:26:50,752 --> 00:26:55,006 Weight on wheels is a sensor which indicates to the FDR 406 00:26:55,006 --> 00:26:58,551 the moment weight comes on the wheels. 407 00:26:59,177 --> 00:27:01,137 That's what we're looking for. 408 00:27:01,137 --> 00:27:06,059 The plane touched down at 19:40:25 409 00:27:06,059 --> 00:27:07,727 So how far down the runway is that? 410 00:27:09,604 --> 00:27:13,191 Using the ground speed of the aircraft, investigators 411 00:27:13,191 --> 00:27:16,819 calculate how far the plane flew over the runway. 412 00:27:18,821 --> 00:27:21,574 4,438 feet from the threshold. 413 00:27:22,658 --> 00:27:26,704 It became very clear to us as to where the aircraft 414 00:27:26,704 --> 00:27:28,748 had exactly touched down. 415 00:27:31,834 --> 00:27:35,588 He overshot the touchdown zone by nearly 1500 feet... 416 00:27:38,508 --> 00:27:40,718 ...leaving less than half the runway for stopping. 417 00:27:42,637 --> 00:27:46,265 Can the plane even stop on half a runway in a tailwind? 418 00:27:47,725 --> 00:27:50,520 Let me calculate the actual landing distance. 419 00:27:51,854 --> 00:27:55,650 The actual landing distance is the distance required 420 00:27:55,650 --> 00:27:58,027 from touchdown to stop. 421 00:27:58,027 --> 00:27:59,612 Weight? 422 00:28:02,532 --> 00:28:04,784 63000 kilos. 423 00:28:05,827 --> 00:28:06,953 Wind? 424 00:28:06,953 --> 00:28:09,497 Last reported tailwind before Flight 1-3-4-4 425 00:28:09,497 --> 00:28:13,292 began its approach was actually 10 knots. 426 00:28:13,292 --> 00:28:14,669 Flaps? 427 00:28:14,669 --> 00:28:16,212 30. 428 00:28:18,589 --> 00:28:20,633 7,803 feet. 429 00:28:22,260 --> 00:28:23,761 So according to the information they had 430 00:28:23,761 --> 00:28:26,097 before accepting the approach, 431 00:28:26,097 --> 00:28:29,434 they needed to touchdown here 432 00:28:29,434 --> 00:28:32,395 to have any chance of stopping before the end of the runway. 433 00:28:34,480 --> 00:28:38,943 Flight 13-44 should have touched down 3,000 feet earlier 434 00:28:38,943 --> 00:28:41,446 in order to stop safely. 435 00:28:41,446 --> 00:28:44,073 So why did the pilots not give themselves 436 00:28:44,073 --> 00:28:45,908 enough runway to stop the plane? 437 00:28:45,908 --> 00:28:49,829 (mysterious music) 438 00:28:52,040 --> 00:28:53,958 When the aircraft touches down, 439 00:28:53,958 --> 00:28:55,835 you experience harsh braking, 440 00:28:55,835 --> 00:28:58,338 reverse thrust, more noise. 441 00:28:58,338 --> 00:29:01,340 But here, it was totally silent. 442 00:29:01,340 --> 00:29:03,384 And the passengers, they would be wondering, 443 00:29:03,384 --> 00:29:05,845 why is the aircraft not touching down? 444 00:29:10,141 --> 00:29:12,101 Investigators check the transcripts 445 00:29:12,101 --> 00:29:14,812 of the cockpit voice recording 446 00:29:14,812 --> 00:29:16,647 for something that might explain 447 00:29:16,647 --> 00:29:18,900 why the pilots carried out the landing 448 00:29:18,900 --> 00:29:20,818 without enough runway. 449 00:29:22,779 --> 00:29:25,490 The flight data gives us what happened. 450 00:29:25,490 --> 00:29:29,494 But why it happened comes from the CVR. 451 00:29:31,162 --> 00:29:32,455 Hey. 452 00:29:32,455 --> 00:29:35,458 During the first approach, 453 00:29:35,458 --> 00:29:37,377 the windshield wipers are on. 454 00:29:37,377 --> 00:29:39,712 And look what happens afterwards. 455 00:29:44,133 --> 00:29:45,718 (wiper swiping) 456 00:29:45,718 --> 00:29:47,678 Lead-in lights in sight. 457 00:29:47,678 --> 00:29:50,056 Yeah. 458 00:29:50,056 --> 00:29:53,976 27 seconds after starting the wiper ... 459 00:29:53,976 --> 00:29:56,813 (Captain Sathe): What's happened to it? 460 00:29:56,813 --> 00:29:58,981 Oh, crap. The wiper's gone. 461 00:30:00,274 --> 00:30:02,026 ...it malfunctions. 462 00:30:02,026 --> 00:30:04,487 What a day for the wiper to go. 463 00:30:12,662 --> 00:30:15,581 Maybe that explains why he was so worried about visibility. 464 00:30:17,625 --> 00:30:20,128 According to rules for landing at Calicut 465 00:30:20,128 --> 00:30:22,255 during monsoon season, 466 00:30:22,255 --> 00:30:24,716 it is mandatory for pilots to divert 467 00:30:24,716 --> 00:30:28,428 to an alternative airport if the wipers malfunction. 468 00:30:29,887 --> 00:30:33,266 So was this crash caused by a faulty windshield wiper? 469 00:30:36,644 --> 00:30:39,981 Unserviceability of a wiper in rainy conditions 470 00:30:39,981 --> 00:30:41,357 is a no-go item. 471 00:30:42,400 --> 00:30:45,445 The crew pressed on to land at Calicut. 472 00:30:47,238 --> 00:30:49,532 We couldn't fathom the reason. 473 00:30:51,993 --> 00:30:54,620 Let's see if the wiper was working on the second approach. 474 00:30:56,706 --> 00:30:58,583 (FO Kumar): Heading to course. 475 00:30:59,125 --> 00:31:00,585 Shall we do it? 476 00:31:02,045 --> 00:31:03,880 Just a sec. 477 00:31:06,090 --> 00:31:08,051 What is this? 478 00:31:08,051 --> 00:31:11,554 I guess that's the fastest it'll go. 479 00:31:13,931 --> 00:31:17,310 So the wiper is working, just not as fast as it should. 480 00:31:19,187 --> 00:31:21,189 Despite the slow wiper, 481 00:31:21,189 --> 00:31:23,316 the pilots continue the approach. 482 00:31:24,567 --> 00:31:26,778 Okay, runway in sight. 483 00:31:26,778 --> 00:31:28,571 Runway in sight, check. 484 00:31:34,243 --> 00:31:37,205 So, less than a mile from the airport, 485 00:31:37,205 --> 00:31:39,791 both pilots can see the runway. 486 00:31:41,084 --> 00:31:43,586 The faulty wiper doesn't seem to have prevented 487 00:31:43,586 --> 00:31:46,464 the pilots from seeing the runway. 488 00:31:46,464 --> 00:31:49,676 And so far they are still on the glide slope... 489 00:31:53,429 --> 00:31:58,017 But it looks like they deviate below and then above it. 490 00:32:00,478 --> 00:32:04,482 The approach became un-stabilized. 491 00:32:04,482 --> 00:32:06,651 And the actions on the part of the crew 492 00:32:06,651 --> 00:32:10,822 to continue with the approach really shocked us. 493 00:32:12,407 --> 00:32:13,908 So if they were above the glideslope, 494 00:32:13,908 --> 00:32:16,536 that means when they crossed the runway threshold, 495 00:32:16,536 --> 00:32:18,371 they were 40 feet too high. 496 00:32:19,288 --> 00:32:22,083 In a tail wind, less than ideal. 497 00:32:22,083 --> 00:32:25,378 (tense music) 498 00:32:27,672 --> 00:32:30,800 If you fly off of the glide slope this close to the runway, 499 00:32:30,800 --> 00:32:33,344 it is unsafe for you to continue, 500 00:32:33,344 --> 00:32:35,555 yet this crew did continue their landing. 501 00:32:38,599 --> 00:32:40,935 Did the pilots believe they could recover 502 00:32:40,935 --> 00:32:44,564 from an un-stabilized approach and land safely? 503 00:32:46,899 --> 00:32:49,819 (tires screeching) 504 00:32:49,819 --> 00:32:51,487 Auto-brake disarm. 505 00:32:53,990 --> 00:32:55,825 Oh, crap! 506 00:32:55,825 --> 00:32:58,786 (tires screeching) 507 00:32:58,786 --> 00:33:00,913 (engine roaring) 508 00:33:05,460 --> 00:33:07,962 Looks like the Captain increases engine power 509 00:33:07,962 --> 00:33:09,839 to stabilize the landing. 510 00:33:09,839 --> 00:33:12,133 (intriguing music) 511 00:33:12,133 --> 00:33:16,137 (narrator): Investigators search the FDR parameters to explain 512 00:33:16,137 --> 00:33:18,765 how the pilots of Flight 13-44 513 00:33:18,765 --> 00:33:21,684 dealt with their un-stabilized approach. 514 00:33:23,895 --> 00:33:25,521 In order to have a smooth landing, 515 00:33:25,521 --> 00:33:27,982 pilots typically add a bit of thrust 516 00:33:27,982 --> 00:33:30,735 just before touchdown... 517 00:33:32,779 --> 00:33:35,740 which is probably what the captain was trying to do. 518 00:33:37,617 --> 00:33:40,036 He's pushing throttles well beyond 80% percent. 519 00:33:41,954 --> 00:33:44,582 (EGPWS): 30. 20. 520 00:33:46,667 --> 00:33:48,836 The Captain adds so much power 521 00:33:48,836 --> 00:33:51,714 the plane floats down the runway. 522 00:33:57,345 --> 00:34:01,891 The plane floats over the runway for more than 3,000 feet. 523 00:34:01,891 --> 00:34:06,604 Why wouldn't the Captain just put the plane down? 524 00:34:08,940 --> 00:34:10,358 (sighs) 525 00:34:10,358 --> 00:34:12,610 His wiper was barely working. 526 00:34:13,945 --> 00:34:16,697 It's night. The weather is marginal. 527 00:34:16,697 --> 00:34:19,951 What if he lost track of where he was along the runway? 528 00:34:22,370 --> 00:34:24,747 So when you approach an airfield like Calicut, 529 00:34:24,747 --> 00:34:27,667 there are no lights surrounding the runway. 530 00:34:27,667 --> 00:34:29,877 You just see the runway lights. 531 00:34:31,129 --> 00:34:35,717 So in case you have light rain but low cloud ceiling, 532 00:34:35,717 --> 00:34:38,469 that is a very unnerving feeling. 533 00:34:39,137 --> 00:34:41,931 (tense music) 534 00:34:41,931 --> 00:34:44,976 The Captain didn't know where to put the plane down 535 00:34:44,976 --> 00:34:46,728 because of his slow wiper 536 00:34:46,728 --> 00:34:50,648 and the heavy rain which reduced his vision. 537 00:34:58,448 --> 00:35:00,658 They still could have done a go-around. 538 00:35:02,785 --> 00:35:04,829 The plane can carry out a go-around 539 00:35:04,829 --> 00:35:07,832 from any point of time, even after touchdown 540 00:35:07,832 --> 00:35:10,626 so long the thrust reversers are not deployed. 541 00:35:13,629 --> 00:35:15,256 So why didn't they? 542 00:35:21,179 --> 00:35:24,265 (radio static) 543 00:35:24,265 --> 00:35:27,852 (wiper thumping) (tense music) 544 00:35:27,852 --> 00:35:29,937 Just check it. Put the plane down. 545 00:35:34,984 --> 00:35:36,235 Captain. 546 00:35:36,235 --> 00:35:38,863 (EGPWS): 10. - Go around. 547 00:35:42,116 --> 00:35:44,952 The First Officer called for a go-around. 548 00:35:45,787 --> 00:35:47,038 And the Captain ignored him. 549 00:35:48,998 --> 00:35:52,126 Why would such an experienced Captain not listen 550 00:35:52,126 --> 00:35:55,546 to his First Officer at such a critical moment? 551 00:35:57,048 --> 00:35:59,509 That was fatal. 552 00:35:59,509 --> 00:36:02,345 If the captain would have gone around 553 00:36:02,345 --> 00:36:04,889 the result could have been different. 554 00:36:07,058 --> 00:36:10,353 (somber music) 555 00:36:10,353 --> 00:36:11,979 Okay. 556 00:36:12,939 --> 00:36:15,191 I appreciate your assistance. 557 00:36:15,191 --> 00:36:16,734 Thanks. 558 00:36:18,194 --> 00:36:20,279 Investigators interview other pilots 559 00:36:20,279 --> 00:36:22,073 who flew with Captain Sathe 560 00:36:22,073 --> 00:36:25,743 to determine how he worked with others in the cockpit. 561 00:36:26,994 --> 00:36:29,163 That was the last pilot on the list. 562 00:36:29,163 --> 00:36:30,540 And? 563 00:36:30,540 --> 00:36:32,583 Here's some of the ways they described him: 564 00:36:32,583 --> 00:36:34,460 "cognitive rigidity", 565 00:36:34,460 --> 00:36:36,003 "goal oriented", 566 00:36:36,003 --> 00:36:38,798 "tendency towards perfectionism". 567 00:36:38,798 --> 00:36:41,426 Sounds more like an air force pilot than a civilian one. 568 00:36:41,426 --> 00:36:43,011 (investigator): Which is what he was 569 00:36:43,011 --> 00:36:45,013 for 21 years at the start of his career. 570 00:36:51,978 --> 00:36:54,814 The military aviators are trained to be goal-oriented 571 00:36:54,814 --> 00:36:56,691 because for them the success of a mission 572 00:36:56,691 --> 00:36:59,152 is the most important criteria. 573 00:37:00,153 --> 00:37:03,281 There's another reason the Captain may have been 574 00:37:03,281 --> 00:37:05,700 determined to land in Calicut. 575 00:37:06,784 --> 00:37:10,872 The crew were now making a second approach into Calicut, 576 00:37:10,872 --> 00:37:14,709 and if they had to go around from this approach, 577 00:37:14,709 --> 00:37:17,795 they would, by the operating procedures, 578 00:37:17,795 --> 00:37:20,798 be required to divert. 579 00:37:22,216 --> 00:37:24,969 Did the Captain resist a second go-around 580 00:37:24,969 --> 00:37:27,930 so that he wouldn't be forced to divert? 581 00:37:33,895 --> 00:37:36,022 Here's something... 582 00:37:36,022 --> 00:37:39,567 Investigators focus on the Captain's flight schedule 583 00:37:39,567 --> 00:37:42,904 before and after the day of the accident. 584 00:37:42,904 --> 00:37:44,822 Take a look. 585 00:37:44,822 --> 00:37:46,908 Captain Sathe was scheduled to be on stand-by 586 00:37:46,908 --> 00:37:50,536 the day after the accident, August 8th. 587 00:37:50,536 --> 00:37:55,083 But the day before the accident, there was a scheduling change 588 00:37:55,083 --> 00:37:58,127 and Captain Sathe had to pick up an additional flight. 589 00:38:01,089 --> 00:38:04,342 He was the only captain who could fly out of Calicut, 590 00:38:04,342 --> 00:38:08,221 remember a tricky airport and only captains can operate 591 00:38:08,221 --> 00:38:11,766 flights in and out of a tabletop airport. 592 00:38:13,893 --> 00:38:16,354 So if he had diverted to another airport 593 00:38:16,354 --> 00:38:18,272 instead of landing, 594 00:38:18,272 --> 00:38:21,275 the flight to Doha the next day would have to be cancelled. 595 00:38:25,613 --> 00:38:27,323 He was committed to land because he knew that 596 00:38:27,323 --> 00:38:29,450 there was no one else to undertake the flight. 597 00:38:32,370 --> 00:38:34,956 But even if the Captain forced the landing, 598 00:38:34,956 --> 00:38:39,002 the first officer could still have taken over the controls 599 00:38:39,002 --> 00:38:41,713 and diverted. So why didn't he? 600 00:38:43,131 --> 00:38:45,091 If the captain does not carry out a go-around, 601 00:38:45,091 --> 00:38:47,009 the co-pilot is expected to take over. 602 00:38:47,009 --> 00:38:50,805 In the safety of the flight, that is a must. 603 00:38:51,806 --> 00:38:54,600 Captain. Go around! 604 00:38:54,600 --> 00:38:56,728 (wiper thumping) 605 00:38:59,522 --> 00:39:00,982 (tense music) 606 00:39:00,982 --> 00:39:03,901 (narrator): Investigators examine the CVR transcripts 607 00:39:03,901 --> 00:39:08,281 of Flight 13-44 to determine why the first officer 608 00:39:08,281 --> 00:39:09,824 failed to take control. 609 00:39:09,824 --> 00:39:11,784 They discover a pattern emerging... 610 00:39:11,784 --> 00:39:14,245 (rain pelting) 611 00:39:14,245 --> 00:39:16,581 Rate of descent, Captain. 612 00:39:16,581 --> 00:39:18,833 ...of a dismissive Captain... 613 00:39:18,833 --> 00:39:22,545 Yeah, yeah. Correcting, correcting, correcting. 614 00:39:22,545 --> 00:39:26,132 ... and a First Officer who didn't assert himself. 615 00:39:26,132 --> 00:39:29,260 (EGPWS): Glide slope. Glide slope. 616 00:39:29,260 --> 00:39:31,095 Check. 617 00:39:32,013 --> 00:39:34,098 Captain. 618 00:39:34,098 --> 00:39:35,850 Go around! 619 00:39:38,394 --> 00:39:42,774 The captain uses his authority to dictate what he wants 620 00:39:42,774 --> 00:39:45,526 and the co-pilot is too submissive to call out 621 00:39:45,526 --> 00:39:48,029 what he sees as unsafe. 622 00:39:50,031 --> 00:39:54,243 Was this type of behaviour common at the airline? 623 00:39:54,243 --> 00:39:57,121 Investigators examine Air India Express's 624 00:39:57,121 --> 00:39:58,748 Operations Manual. 625 00:40:01,376 --> 00:40:04,962 It would be very important to understand how teamwork 626 00:40:04,962 --> 00:40:09,217 is encouraged in the cockpit of an Air India Express aircraft. 627 00:40:13,137 --> 00:40:16,683 It says, "Captains need to approve flight data 628 00:40:16,683 --> 00:40:19,060 presented by First Officers." 629 00:40:19,977 --> 00:40:21,396 That would certainly promote a definite 630 00:40:21,396 --> 00:40:23,064 hierarchy in the cockpit. 631 00:40:25,650 --> 00:40:26,901 Maybe that's why the First Officer 632 00:40:26,901 --> 00:40:28,653 didn't feel empowered enough to grab the controls 633 00:40:28,653 --> 00:40:30,446 and do the go-around. 634 00:40:33,032 --> 00:40:36,202 We realized that the language used amounted 635 00:40:36,202 --> 00:40:40,915 to the First Officer is subservient to the Captain. 636 00:40:44,544 --> 00:40:48,923 Despite the Captain's rigidity, one simple procedure 637 00:40:48,923 --> 00:40:51,509 could have saved the passengers and crew. 638 00:40:55,221 --> 00:40:56,889 I don't recall them ever calculating 639 00:40:56,889 --> 00:40:59,016 their landing distance. 640 00:41:02,020 --> 00:41:03,896 Because they were now coming in with a tailwind 641 00:41:03,896 --> 00:41:07,567 onto runway 1-0, conditions had changed entirely 642 00:41:07,567 --> 00:41:10,153 from the headwind on runway 2-8, 643 00:41:10,153 --> 00:41:14,949 and they needed to do a landing distance calculation. 644 00:41:17,368 --> 00:41:19,370 You're right. 645 00:41:19,370 --> 00:41:21,497 He didn't do the calculation. 646 00:41:25,209 --> 00:41:30,048 They missed critical decisions on the tailwind, the wet runway, 647 00:41:30,048 --> 00:41:32,800 and potential diversion options, 648 00:41:32,800 --> 00:41:35,178 in addition to calculating landing distance. 649 00:41:36,971 --> 00:41:38,431 If they had done any of these, 650 00:41:38,431 --> 00:41:40,767 it would have helped them understand there was too little 651 00:41:40,767 --> 00:41:44,062 margin of error to conduct this approach. 652 00:41:45,480 --> 00:41:47,482 (tires screeching) 653 00:41:47,482 --> 00:41:49,525 (engine roaring) 654 00:41:49,525 --> 00:41:52,487 (thunderous crash) 655 00:41:55,490 --> 00:41:58,326 (sirens wailing)(somber music) 656 00:41:58,326 --> 00:42:03,164 (radio chatter) (indistinct chattering) 657 00:42:10,505 --> 00:42:13,091 Different airport, different outcome. 658 00:42:13,091 --> 00:42:15,468 The Captain would have been able to pass controls 659 00:42:15,468 --> 00:42:17,345 to the First Officer, 660 00:42:17,345 --> 00:42:21,265 who had a fully working wiper, to land the plane. 661 00:42:23,142 --> 00:42:24,852 If they had just diverted to another airport, 662 00:42:24,852 --> 00:42:27,063 they'd all be alive today. 663 00:42:30,692 --> 00:42:35,363 (somber music continues) 664 00:42:38,157 --> 00:42:40,118 There were so many opportunities the crew had 665 00:42:40,118 --> 00:42:42,829 to conduct a missed approach during this landing, 666 00:42:42,829 --> 00:42:45,665 but the crew took none of them. 667 00:42:45,665 --> 00:42:49,377 (rain pattering) 668 00:42:50,753 --> 00:42:52,422 In their final report, 669 00:42:52,422 --> 00:42:56,092 investigators recommend expanding simulator training 670 00:42:56,092 --> 00:42:58,761 for unstabilized approaches, 671 00:42:58,761 --> 00:43:00,972 stressing that the First Officer should 672 00:43:00,972 --> 00:43:05,059 assertively assume control and initiate a go-around 673 00:43:05,059 --> 00:43:07,979 if the Pilot Flying fails to respond. 674 00:43:14,193 --> 00:43:16,529 Simulator training with an emphasis on assertiveness 675 00:43:16,529 --> 00:43:19,115 would go a long way in allowing first officers 676 00:43:19,115 --> 00:43:22,618 to take all appropriate actions up to and including 677 00:43:22,618 --> 00:43:25,872 taking control of the aircraft when the pilot in command 678 00:43:25,872 --> 00:43:28,041 does not respond appropriately. 679 00:43:28,041 --> 00:43:30,752 (sirens wailing) 680 00:43:30,752 --> 00:43:33,254 (indistinct shouting) 681 00:43:35,131 --> 00:43:38,217 (somber music) 682 00:43:38,217 --> 00:43:40,344 This accident is avoidable. 683 00:43:41,804 --> 00:43:47,143 We see the number of risks at every stage the crew had taken, 684 00:43:47,143 --> 00:43:50,897 which were unnecessary risks. 685 00:43:50,897 --> 00:43:56,277 There was a human factor, which came into play. 686 00:43:56,277 --> 00:43:59,364 They do not see their consequences of their actions. 687 00:43:59,364 --> 00:44:03,034 That is a key point in any accident. 688 00:44:05,286 --> 00:44:09,624 (♪) 689 00:44:26,891 --> 00:44:29,644 Subtitling: difuze 53968

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