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00:00:02,226 --> 00:00:05,605
Landing
at Calicut Airport...
2
00:00:05,605 --> 00:00:07,315
Speed brake up.
3
00:00:09,359 --> 00:00:10,818
...the pilots
of Air India Express
4
00:00:10,818 --> 00:00:14,864
Flight 13-44 run out
of tarmac to stop.
5
00:00:14,864 --> 00:00:16,866
Oh, crap!
6
00:00:23,039 --> 00:00:26,668
Twenty-one
people are killed.
7
00:00:28,252 --> 00:00:30,129
Start up the hydraulics.
8
00:00:31,047 --> 00:00:33,675
Did the brakes
malfunction?
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00:00:34,384 --> 00:00:35,760
No sign of fluid leak.
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00:00:35,760 --> 00:00:37,887
The brakes didn't fail.
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00:00:39,472 --> 00:00:41,724
When investigators
listen to the Cockpit
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00:00:41,724 --> 00:00:43,309
Voice Recorder...
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00:00:43,309 --> 00:00:45,228
Put the wipers on.
14
00:00:45,228 --> 00:00:47,897
...they discover
a malfunction
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00:00:47,897 --> 00:00:50,817
of an entirely different nature.
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00:00:51,818 --> 00:00:53,736
What's happened to it?
17
00:00:54,946 --> 00:00:59,742
So was this crash caused by
a faulty windshield wiper?
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00:01:03,454 --> 00:01:05,748
Mayday! Mayday!
19
00:01:07,583 --> 00:01:09,919
Pull up!
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00:01:25,727 --> 00:01:28,104
{\an8}It's monsoon
season in India.
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00:01:29,772 --> 00:01:32,734
{\an8}Air India Express,
Flight 13-44
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00:01:32,734 --> 00:01:35,945
{\an8}is on approach to
Calicut International Airport.
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{\an8}The pilot flying
is Captain Deepak Sathe.
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00:01:41,409 --> 00:01:45,955
He's a highly experienced
59-year-old commercial pilot.
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00:01:45,955 --> 00:01:48,666
Visibility is
just above minimums
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00:01:48,666 --> 00:01:50,960
so we can make
an attempt. Okay?
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00:01:50,960 --> 00:01:52,712
Check.
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00:01:54,088 --> 00:01:56,299
{\an8}The captain had flown
in and out of Calicut
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{\an8}a number of times.
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{\an8}So he was very familiar
with the airfield,
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00:02:00,762 --> 00:02:04,766
{\an8}the terrain around,
and the weather conditions.
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00:02:05,600 --> 00:02:07,935
The runway is wet,
expect turbulence,
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00:02:07,935 --> 00:02:10,938
expect weather,
all precautions.
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00:02:12,940 --> 00:02:16,819
First Officer
Akhilesh Kumar is aged 32.
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00:02:16,819 --> 00:02:20,656
He joined Air India Express
three years ago and has almost
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00:02:20,656 --> 00:02:23,076
2000 flying hours.
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00:02:23,076 --> 00:02:26,370
He has less experience
navigating through monsoons
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00:02:26,370 --> 00:02:28,748
than the Captain.
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00:02:28,748 --> 00:02:30,667
That area experiences
very heavy showers
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00:02:30,667 --> 00:02:36,339
along with reduced visibility
and strong winds.
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00:02:37,632 --> 00:02:40,218
In addition to the 5 crew,
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00:02:40,218 --> 00:02:44,097
there are 184
Indian nationals onboard.
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00:02:44,097 --> 00:02:49,894
All are being repatriated amid
the ongoing COVID-19 outbreak.
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00:02:49,894 --> 00:02:54,023
It's one of more than 2,000
flights into India to date,
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00:02:54,023 --> 00:02:56,901
bringing home thousands
of workers stranded abroad
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00:02:56,901 --> 00:03:00,279
when flights were grounded
due to COVID restrictions.
47
00:03:01,364 --> 00:03:04,075
So the passengers
on these flights were mostly
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00:03:04,075 --> 00:03:05,243
blue-collar workers,
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00:03:05,243 --> 00:03:09,372
people who had flown
to Dubai to work in malls,
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00:03:09,372 --> 00:03:11,040
in small restaurants.
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00:03:13,543 --> 00:03:17,046
About 50 miles from
the airport, Captain Sathe
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00:03:17,046 --> 00:03:19,048
begins his approach briefing.
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00:03:20,049 --> 00:03:23,886
For a go-around, wind shear
on approach, approach to stall
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00:03:23,886 --> 00:03:27,807
and recovery on go-around as
briefed in the first sector.
55
00:03:29,225 --> 00:03:30,435
Check.
56
00:03:31,144 --> 00:03:34,272
Approach briefing is basically
one pilot communicating
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00:03:34,272 --> 00:03:37,483
to the other what his
plan of action is.
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00:03:39,235 --> 00:03:40,486
Any doubts?
59
00:03:42,238 --> 00:03:43,698
No.
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00:03:43,698 --> 00:03:46,826
Any questions?
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00:03:48,286 --> 00:03:50,204
No questions.
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00:03:52,915 --> 00:03:55,460
Today's flight
from Dubai to Calicut
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00:03:55,460 --> 00:03:57,754
takes just under 4 hours.
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00:04:01,090 --> 00:04:03,843
Calicut tower,
Express India 1-3-4-4
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00:04:03,843 --> 00:04:06,929
on ILS runway 2-8.
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00:04:08,264 --> 00:04:10,683
Twelve miles
from the airport...
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00:04:10,683 --> 00:04:12,852
Any change in the visibility?
68
00:04:14,020 --> 00:04:17,023
...the Captain wants
a weather update.
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00:04:17,023 --> 00:04:21,444
Any change in the visibility,
Express India 1-3-4-4?
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00:04:22,487 --> 00:04:24,364
Uh, standby.
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00:04:24,364 --> 00:04:26,324
Air India Express 1-3-4-4,
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00:04:26,324 --> 00:04:30,203
latest visibility is 2,000
meters and, uh, light rain.
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00:04:31,079 --> 00:04:33,873
Copy.
Express India 1-3-4-4.
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00:04:35,792 --> 00:04:39,837
Two thousand metres visibility
on a tricky airport
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00:04:39,837 --> 00:04:43,299
with light rain,
the pilots are basically
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00:04:43,299 --> 00:04:46,886
a bit more anxious
than a normal approach.
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00:04:50,264 --> 00:04:54,727
Calicut's runway
is built on a tabletop plateau.
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00:04:54,727 --> 00:04:57,480
There are steep drop-offs
at both ends.
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00:04:58,773 --> 00:05:02,819
There is no margin of error.
If you exceed the landing limit,
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00:05:02,819 --> 00:05:05,279
you go straight down
into a valley.
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00:05:07,448 --> 00:05:11,160
The pilots are flying
a Boeing 7-37-800
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00:05:11,160 --> 00:05:14,247
specially modified
for difficult landings.
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00:05:14,247 --> 00:05:18,835
{\an8}It has modified spoilers
and braking performance
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00:05:18,835 --> 00:05:19,919
{\an8}and allows it to stop
85
00:05:19,919 --> 00:05:23,423
{\an8}faster than other models
of the 7-3-7-800.
86
00:05:26,175 --> 00:05:28,678
Just two minutes from
Calicut Airport,
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00:05:28,678 --> 00:05:31,013
the crew gets ready for landing.
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00:05:32,098 --> 00:05:34,142
Put the wipers on.
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00:05:38,187 --> 00:05:40,565
Lead in lights
in sight.
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00:05:40,565 --> 00:05:42,108
Yeah.
91
00:05:46,487 --> 00:05:48,948
What's happened to it?
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00:05:49,824 --> 00:05:53,536
Oh, crap. The wiper is gone.
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00:05:53,536 --> 00:05:56,122
What a day for the wiper to go.
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00:05:58,124 --> 00:06:01,044
With decreased visibility
hindering their approach,
95
00:06:01,044 --> 00:06:03,921
the pilots must make
a crucial decision.
96
00:06:07,300 --> 00:06:11,679
If they do not have the runway
or any of the elements in sight,
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00:06:11,679 --> 00:06:14,640
at that point,
they have to take a decision
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00:06:14,640 --> 00:06:16,768
to continue or to go around.
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00:06:21,189 --> 00:06:25,902
Approaching minimums.
500. Minimums.
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00:06:26,861 --> 00:06:29,197
Uhhh...
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00:06:29,197 --> 00:06:29,947
let's go around.
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00:06:35,244 --> 00:06:38,206
A half mile from
the airport, Captain Sathe
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00:06:38,206 --> 00:06:42,001
aborts the landing
and decides to try it again.
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00:06:50,635 --> 00:06:53,513
Express India 1-3-4-4,
request reason for go-around.
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00:06:55,515 --> 00:06:58,601
{\an8}When pilots go missed on
an approach, it's important
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00:06:58,601 --> 00:07:01,270
{\an8}information to share with
air traffic control because
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00:07:01,270 --> 00:07:03,981
{\an8}that can help other pilots
who are coming into the airport
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00:07:03,981 --> 00:07:06,526
{\an8}anticipate any hazard
that may be there.
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00:07:06,526 --> 00:07:10,405
Due to weather,
Express India 1-3-4-4.
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00:07:10,405 --> 00:07:12,281
Heavy rain.
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00:07:12,281 --> 00:07:13,366
Uh, roger.
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00:07:19,080 --> 00:07:23,251
While Flight 13-44
completes its go-around,
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00:07:23,251 --> 00:07:27,380
a crew waiting to take-off
contacts the tower.
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00:07:28,423 --> 00:07:31,676
Calicut, Air India
4-2-5, we are ready for taxi
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00:07:31,676 --> 00:07:35,638
and we appreciate if you can
give us one-zero for departure.
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00:07:37,598 --> 00:07:41,811
The departing crew
wants to switch runways.
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00:07:41,811 --> 00:07:46,524
Runway 2-8 and runway 1-0
are the same strip of runway
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00:07:46,524 --> 00:07:49,152
but they are in
the opposite directions.
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00:07:50,194 --> 00:07:51,654
Roger, expect 1-0.
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00:07:51,654 --> 00:07:55,032
Taxi via Charlie, enter back
track, line up runway 1-0.
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00:07:55,783 --> 00:07:58,828
Via Charlie,
enter backtrack, line up 1-0,
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00:07:58,828 --> 00:08:01,164
Air India 4-2-5.
Thank you, sir.
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00:08:03,082 --> 00:08:06,419
Typically, departure
aircraft want to taxi
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00:08:06,419 --> 00:08:09,505
the least time and get
airborne as soon as possible.
125
00:08:09,505 --> 00:08:12,592
Runway 1-0 is closest
to the apron.
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00:08:13,718 --> 00:08:17,513
To accommodate the departing
aircraft, controllers change
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00:08:17,513 --> 00:08:21,184
the active runway
from 2-8 to 1-0.
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00:08:22,518 --> 00:08:25,563
Express India 1-3-4-4,
wind is now 2-7-0 degrees,
129
00:08:25,563 --> 00:08:28,107
zero eight knots, confirm
you'd like to make an approach
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00:08:28,107 --> 00:08:29,650
for runway 1-0?
131
00:08:32,653 --> 00:08:35,114
Yeah, we'd like to try
if you can give us an update
132
00:08:35,114 --> 00:08:38,534
on the visibility
for runway 1-0.
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00:08:40,161 --> 00:08:42,914
Visibility is the same,
sir, at 2,000 meters,
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00:08:42,914 --> 00:08:44,415
and we'll notify you
of any improvement.
135
00:08:44,415 --> 00:08:48,127
And now wind is
2-6-0 degrees, 0-5 knots.
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00:08:48,127 --> 00:08:53,216
Okay. Set up for 1-0.
Let's try.
137
00:09:02,809 --> 00:09:04,894
Localizer alive.
138
00:09:04,894 --> 00:09:06,562
Check.
139
00:09:08,523 --> 00:09:11,401
The localizer
is part of the I-L-S,
140
00:09:11,401 --> 00:09:13,486
or Instrument Landing System,
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00:09:13,486 --> 00:09:17,824
that provides lateral guidance
to the runway's centreline.
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00:09:25,289 --> 00:09:27,709
Cabin crew, landing stations.
143
00:09:28,793 --> 00:09:34,090
Flight 13-44 is now
only 6 miles from the runway.
144
00:09:35,925 --> 00:09:37,093
Shall we do it?
145
00:09:37,093 --> 00:09:40,263
Captain Sathe tries
the wipers again.
146
00:09:40,263 --> 00:09:43,099
Just a sec.
147
00:09:44,267 --> 00:09:46,561
What is this?
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00:09:46,561 --> 00:09:51,190
The Captain's wiper is working
more slowly than it should.
149
00:09:51,190 --> 00:09:54,318
I guess this is
the fastest it'll go.
150
00:09:54,318 --> 00:09:58,239
Okay, glide slope captured.
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00:09:59,615 --> 00:10:03,995
The glide slope is also part
of the instrument landing system
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00:10:03,995 --> 00:10:06,831
and guides the plane
on a 3-degree slope
153
00:10:06,831 --> 00:10:10,376
to the runway threshold.
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00:10:11,627 --> 00:10:13,880
Flaps 25.
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00:10:14,672 --> 00:10:18,217
Flaps 25 selected.
Moving.
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00:10:20,053 --> 00:10:22,972
Calicut tower, Express India
1-3-4-4,
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00:10:22,972 --> 00:10:27,226
on ILS runway 1-0.
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00:10:27,226 --> 00:10:29,312
Express India
1-3-4-4, roger.
159
00:10:29,312 --> 00:10:31,814
Light rain over the field.
Runway surface wet.
160
00:10:31,814 --> 00:10:38,154
Wind 2-5-0 degrees, 0-8 knots.
Runway 1-0 cleared to land.
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00:10:39,489 --> 00:10:41,365
Four miles from the runway,
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00:10:41,365 --> 00:10:44,160
the crew receives
clearance to land.
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00:10:45,328 --> 00:10:47,038
Okay, runway in sight.
164
00:10:47,038 --> 00:10:48,915
Runway in sight, check.
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00:10:51,292 --> 00:10:55,338
This time, the pilots
can see the runway.
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00:10:55,338 --> 00:10:59,425
Approaching minimums.
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00:10:59,425 --> 00:11:00,760
500.
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00:11:01,511 --> 00:11:04,305
As a pilot, when you're coming
in for a landing where there's
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00:11:04,305 --> 00:11:06,682
weather and visibility
just above minimums,
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00:11:06,682 --> 00:11:10,019
you're keeping a sharper eye
because things could change
171
00:11:10,019 --> 00:11:11,062
at a moment's notice.
172
00:11:13,439 --> 00:11:17,193
Flight 13-44 crosses
the runway threshold.
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00:11:21,280 --> 00:11:24,534
30... 20.
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00:11:30,206 --> 00:11:31,999
Speed brake up.
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00:11:33,084 --> 00:11:37,296
The speed brakes are deployed
to help slow the plane.
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00:11:39,090 --> 00:11:40,633
Auto brake disarm.
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00:11:44,637 --> 00:11:47,390
But the plane isn't
stopping fast enough.
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00:11:49,726 --> 00:11:50,810
Oh, crap!
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00:11:56,441 --> 00:12:00,153
The 7-37 falls off
the end of the runway...
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00:12:03,406 --> 00:12:06,325
...and breaks apart.
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00:12:08,911 --> 00:12:14,167
Rescuers rush to save
the 190 people onboard,
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00:12:14,167 --> 00:12:16,294
as every second
could mean the difference
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00:12:16,294 --> 00:12:18,296
between life and death.
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00:12:23,259 --> 00:12:25,678
In driving
rain and darkness,
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00:12:25,678 --> 00:12:29,098
surviving passengers begin
to emerge from the wreckage
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00:12:29,098 --> 00:12:32,393
of Air India Express
Flight 13-44.
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00:12:32,393 --> 00:12:35,146
The heavy rain
benefits the rescue.
188
00:12:36,147 --> 00:12:41,611
It was very helpful in fact
for dousing the post-crash fire.
189
00:12:41,611 --> 00:12:44,280
It ultimately
helped us save lives.
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00:12:45,573 --> 00:12:49,410
169 people survive the crash.
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00:12:49,410 --> 00:12:52,455
59 walk away without injuries.
192
00:13:03,174 --> 00:13:06,010
But 21 of those
onboard are dead.
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00:13:08,388 --> 00:13:12,850
Captain Deepak Sathe
and First Officer Akhilesh Kumar
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00:13:12,850 --> 00:13:14,977
are among them.
195
00:13:25,947 --> 00:13:27,448
Investigators from India's
196
00:13:27,448 --> 00:13:30,076
Aircraft Accident
Investigation Bureau
197
00:13:30,076 --> 00:13:33,746
the A-A-I-B,
arrive on the scene.
198
00:13:33,746 --> 00:13:39,043
This was the first accident
which AAIB would have been
199
00:13:39,043 --> 00:13:40,795
investigating on its own.
200
00:13:40,795 --> 00:13:44,590
So it was really an acid test
for AAIB to prove its mettle.
201
00:13:46,426 --> 00:13:49,804
{\an8}- The first question
investigators must answer -
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00:13:49,804 --> 00:13:53,558
{\an8}did something break off from
the airplane before the landing,
203
00:13:53,558 --> 00:13:56,352
{\an8}making it impossible
for the plane to stop?
204
00:14:01,607 --> 00:14:04,527
I've got the
next batch downloaded...
205
00:14:06,154 --> 00:14:07,697
Looking at them now.
206
00:14:09,115 --> 00:14:10,867
This was the second wave
of COVID,
207
00:14:10,867 --> 00:14:14,537
which was the most dangerous,
so there was an embargo
208
00:14:14,537 --> 00:14:18,124
as to how many people could sit
in a room and conduct a meeting.
209
00:14:19,083 --> 00:14:23,546
Investigators examine dozens
of photos from the crash scene.
210
00:14:25,214 --> 00:14:27,091
You agree it's all here?
211
00:14:28,718 --> 00:14:31,929
They conclude all
of the wreckage is contained
212
00:14:31,929 --> 00:14:33,556
within the crash site.
213
00:14:35,266 --> 00:14:40,063
The wreckage was not very
spread out. It was concentrated
214
00:14:40,063 --> 00:14:43,441
over a radius of about 200 feet.
215
00:14:44,525 --> 00:14:46,652
Let's regroup in a bit.
216
00:14:48,071 --> 00:14:51,991
All the damage was caused when
the plane over ran the runway.
217
00:14:55,036 --> 00:14:58,831
So we wanted to come out
with the probable reasons
218
00:14:58,831 --> 00:15:03,670
as to what has led the aircraft
to exit the runway.
219
00:15:14,055 --> 00:15:17,141
Only slightly off center...
220
00:15:17,141 --> 00:15:20,812
But at least they were lined up
with the runway properly.
221
00:15:20,812 --> 00:15:24,649
To better understand why
the plane overran the runway,
222
00:15:24,649 --> 00:15:28,653
investigators try to determine
where it initially touched down.
223
00:15:29,487 --> 00:15:31,531
So where do the marks start?
224
00:15:36,786 --> 00:15:40,498
On a dry runway it is very,
very easy to find the touchdown
225
00:15:40,498 --> 00:15:42,792
points because the tires,
226
00:15:42,792 --> 00:15:46,671
they leave some rubber deposit
on the point of touchdown.
227
00:15:50,842 --> 00:15:53,970
They work their way back
along the runway.
228
00:16:18,119 --> 00:16:20,163
Beyond 5,000 feet
229
00:16:20,163 --> 00:16:23,833
we were not able to locate
any touch tire marks.
230
00:16:23,833 --> 00:16:27,837
The tire marks had been washed
away due to heavy rain.
231
00:16:29,964 --> 00:16:33,009
Unable to determine where
the plane touched down,
232
00:16:33,009 --> 00:16:37,096
investigators examine
the runway itself.
233
00:16:37,096 --> 00:16:42,143
Did rubber deposits make
the runway too slippery?
234
00:16:42,143 --> 00:16:43,728
They perform a test
235
00:16:43,728 --> 00:16:47,190
to determine if the runway's
surface provided enough friction
236
00:16:47,190 --> 00:16:50,526
or grip for the plane
to decelerate properly.
237
00:16:51,778 --> 00:16:55,114
Our experience shows that
a aircraft of 7-3-7 class,
238
00:16:55,114 --> 00:16:57,867
it leaves a rubber deposit.
239
00:16:57,867 --> 00:17:00,953
And over a period of time
it becomes difficult
240
00:17:00,953 --> 00:17:02,705
for the tire to grip.
241
00:17:08,044 --> 00:17:10,254
Friction test results
just came in.
242
00:17:11,589 --> 00:17:16,636
Co-efficient of friction
ranges from...
243
00:17:16,636 --> 00:17:21,307
...6-3 to. 7-2.
244
00:17:22,517 --> 00:17:24,310
That's within standard.
245
00:17:32,235 --> 00:17:35,029
We were quite satisfied
with the condition
246
00:17:35,029 --> 00:17:38,908
of the paved surface
of Calicut Airport.
247
00:17:38,908 --> 00:17:41,661
There were no major
rubber deposits.
248
00:17:43,246 --> 00:17:47,000
With the runway surface ruled
out, investigators consider
249
00:17:47,000 --> 00:17:49,127
if the plane's tires
were too worn,
250
00:17:49,127 --> 00:17:52,422
causing it to hydroplane
on the wet runway.
251
00:17:53,423 --> 00:17:56,676
The grooves
on the tires, like on a car,
252
00:17:56,676 --> 00:17:58,928
are channels for water
to drain off.
253
00:17:58,928 --> 00:18:01,472
And if the tire
is bald, basically,
254
00:18:01,472 --> 00:18:02,932
the grooves are worn out.
255
00:18:02,932 --> 00:18:06,602
That will cause
the aircraft to slip.
256
00:18:07,979 --> 00:18:10,440
202 psi.
257
00:18:10,440 --> 00:18:12,984
Right in the required
pressure range.
258
00:18:15,278 --> 00:18:17,613
No skid burn...
259
00:18:19,157 --> 00:18:20,950
or bald spots.
260
00:18:20,950 --> 00:18:23,369
Just like
the others.
261
00:18:23,369 --> 00:18:27,040
If there was a case
of hydroplaning there would be
262
00:18:27,040 --> 00:18:32,628
white marks on the runway and
that portion of the tires
263
00:18:32,628 --> 00:18:35,089
would have been burnt.
264
00:18:35,089 --> 00:18:39,052
And here we didn't find
either of these.
265
00:18:40,887 --> 00:18:43,306
What about the brakes?
266
00:18:44,432 --> 00:18:46,184
Did the brakes malfunction
267
00:18:46,184 --> 00:18:48,978
causing the plane
to overrun the runway?
268
00:18:51,356 --> 00:18:53,066
Some corrosion...
269
00:18:55,943 --> 00:18:58,738
but nothing out of the ordinary.
270
00:18:59,781 --> 00:19:01,866
Let's check the hydraulics.
271
00:19:06,204 --> 00:19:09,082
We wanted to ascertain the
serviceability of hydraulics
272
00:19:09,082 --> 00:19:13,086
because this is
the braking system.
273
00:19:14,003 --> 00:19:15,755
Start up the hydraulics.
274
00:19:22,887 --> 00:19:25,139
No sign of fluid leak.
275
00:19:25,139 --> 00:19:27,100
The brakes didn't fail.
276
00:19:28,101 --> 00:19:29,102
No.
277
00:19:33,564 --> 00:19:34,982
I can say that there was
278
00:19:34,982 --> 00:19:39,362
no abnormality in
the deceleration devices.
279
00:19:42,156 --> 00:19:43,699
Okay...
280
00:19:46,369 --> 00:19:47,412
good.
281
00:19:49,997 --> 00:19:55,420
So, did the plane touchdown
within the touchdown zone?
282
00:19:57,171 --> 00:20:02,010
Investigators try to determine
if the crew of flight 13-44
283
00:20:02,010 --> 00:20:05,054
gave themselves
enough space to stop.
284
00:20:05,054 --> 00:20:06,723
Thank you.
285
00:20:13,980 --> 00:20:15,481
They have found an image...
286
00:20:24,032 --> 00:20:27,827
...from a closed circuit camera
located here.
287
00:20:30,163 --> 00:20:33,166
Looks like they're still about
15 feet above the runway,
288
00:20:33,166 --> 00:20:35,835
and they're past
the touchdown zone.
289
00:20:40,214 --> 00:20:44,010
We could see clearly
the aircraft floating
290
00:20:44,010 --> 00:20:47,847
but, unfortunately, we couldn't
see the exact touchdown point.
291
00:20:47,847 --> 00:20:51,684
So that means they flew
well past the touchdown area
292
00:20:51,684 --> 00:20:54,020
before putting the plane down.
293
00:20:56,856 --> 00:20:58,441
That's right.
294
00:21:06,491 --> 00:21:11,287
Why would the pilots land so
far past the touchdown zone
295
00:21:12,747 --> 00:21:15,208
and risk the lives
of everyone on board?
296
00:21:24,884 --> 00:21:27,804
I have the ATC recordings.
297
00:21:29,013 --> 00:21:32,225
Let's hope we get
some answers.
298
00:21:33,851 --> 00:21:36,312
Investigators turn
to conversations between
299
00:21:36,312 --> 00:21:41,317
Air India Express Flight 13-44
and the controller
300
00:21:41,317 --> 00:21:44,987
to learn why the plane
overflew the touchdown zone.
301
00:21:48,116 --> 00:21:51,327
Calicut tower,
Express India 1-3-4-4
302
00:21:51,327 --> 00:21:54,330
on ILS runway 2-8.
303
00:21:56,749 --> 00:21:58,501
Okay, it sounds like
they initially planned
304
00:21:58,501 --> 00:22:00,837
to land on runway 2-8.
305
00:22:00,837 --> 00:22:04,173
So why did they
land on 1-0 instead?
306
00:22:06,259 --> 00:22:10,930
Landing on runway 2-8 the
winds will be from your front.
307
00:22:10,930 --> 00:22:14,434
You'll be landing into the wind.
That creates more lift.
308
00:22:17,812 --> 00:22:19,856
But three-and-a-half
minutes later,
309
00:22:19,856 --> 00:22:22,191
the crew changes their plans.
310
00:22:22,191 --> 00:22:25,820
Tower, Express India
1-3-4-4, going around.
311
00:22:27,697 --> 00:22:28,948
Roger.
312
00:22:34,120 --> 00:22:36,122
So they called a go-around.
313
00:22:41,461 --> 00:22:43,880
During monsoon season,
it is not very uncommon
314
00:22:43,880 --> 00:22:46,924
to see a go-around because,
315
00:22:46,924 --> 00:22:50,720
of the low ceiling
and showers of rain,
316
00:22:50,720 --> 00:22:53,389
which suddenly
reduce visibility.
317
00:22:55,683 --> 00:22:59,395
Express India 1-3-4-4,
request reason for go-around.
318
00:22:59,395 --> 00:23:02,523
Due to weather,
Express India 1-3-4-4.
319
00:23:02,523 --> 00:23:04,609
Heavy rain.
320
00:23:04,609 --> 00:23:05,902
Uh, roger.
321
00:23:06,569 --> 00:23:09,405
Hmm. They probably
couldn't see the runway.
322
00:23:09,405 --> 00:23:11,199
Sounds about right.
323
00:23:13,576 --> 00:23:16,037
The crew realized that
the runway was not in sight,
324
00:23:16,037 --> 00:23:17,914
so they took
a call to go around,
325
00:23:17,914 --> 00:23:19,582
so that was absolutely in order.
326
00:23:21,125 --> 00:23:22,919
Calicut, Air India 4-2-5,
327
00:23:22,919 --> 00:23:24,504
we're ready for taxi
328
00:23:24,504 --> 00:23:28,007
and we appreciate if you can
give us 1-0 for departure.
329
00:23:30,218 --> 00:23:32,595
Then, investigators
hear another plane
330
00:23:32,595 --> 00:23:35,473
asking to swap the active runway
331
00:23:35,473 --> 00:23:40,269
and the controller advising
Flight 13-44 of the change.
332
00:23:41,604 --> 00:23:44,816
Express India 1-3-4-4,
wind is now 2-7-0 degrees,
333
00:23:44,816 --> 00:23:47,360
0-8 knots, confirm you'd
like to make an approach
334
00:23:47,360 --> 00:23:48,861
for runway 1-0?
335
00:23:51,155 --> 00:23:54,534
So, the controller
asked them to use 1-0.
336
00:24:00,623 --> 00:24:03,960
Calicut,
Express India 1-3-4-4.
337
00:24:04,794 --> 00:24:06,295
Go ahead.
338
00:24:06,295 --> 00:24:08,589
How's the
visibility on runway 1-0?
339
00:24:10,258 --> 00:24:12,385
Before accepting
the new runway,
340
00:24:12,385 --> 00:24:16,055
the pilots request clarification
of weather conditions.
341
00:24:16,055 --> 00:24:20,059
Both runways at 2,000 meters
with, uh, light rain.
342
00:24:20,893 --> 00:24:22,979
And how are
the surface winds?
343
00:24:24,522 --> 00:24:28,276
Surface winds now
2-6-0 degrees, 0-5 knots.
344
00:24:29,819 --> 00:24:31,487
Five knots.
345
00:24:33,072 --> 00:24:34,866
Is that within limits?
346
00:24:34,866 --> 00:24:37,452
Let's check...
347
00:24:42,665 --> 00:24:44,625
10 knots is the limit.
348
00:24:45,418 --> 00:24:49,005
Okay. So landing on 1-0 safely
is technically possible
349
00:24:49,005 --> 00:24:51,090
even if they'd be landing
in a tailwind.
350
00:24:58,014 --> 00:25:01,350
Just ten-and-a-half
minutes later,
351
00:25:01,350 --> 00:25:05,021
investigators hear the last
communication with the tower.
352
00:25:07,690 --> 00:25:12,653
Express India
1-3-4-4, on ILS runway 1-0.
353
00:25:15,198 --> 00:25:18,076
Express India
1-3-4-4, roger.
354
00:25:18,076 --> 00:25:20,453
Light rain over
the field, runway surface wet.
355
00:25:20,453 --> 00:25:26,125
Wind 2-5-0 degrees, 0-8 knots.
Runway 1-0 cleared to land.
356
00:25:26,918 --> 00:25:28,795
Runway 1-0
cleared to land,
357
00:25:28,795 --> 00:25:30,088
and what's the visibility?
358
00:25:33,216 --> 00:25:36,219
They're asking
about visibility again.
359
00:25:37,387 --> 00:25:38,971
It seems to be an issue.
360
00:25:42,600 --> 00:25:45,978
Visibility is the same,
sir, at 2,000 meters.
361
00:25:45,978 --> 00:25:48,606
Copy sir,
Express India 1-3-4-4.
362
00:25:50,525 --> 00:25:57,490
Two-and-a-half minutes later,
they overfly the landing zone.
363
00:26:00,410 --> 00:26:03,371
An 8 knot tailwind.
I mean it's still within limits.
364
00:26:04,747 --> 00:26:07,625
Despite missing
the touchdown zone,
365
00:26:07,625 --> 00:26:10,003
could the crew have
safely stopped their plane
366
00:26:10,003 --> 00:26:12,380
on the runway?
367
00:26:12,380 --> 00:26:14,340
Speed brake up.
368
00:26:23,641 --> 00:26:26,227
Investigators
examine the flight parameters
369
00:26:26,227 --> 00:26:30,189
of Air India Express
Flight 13-44.
370
00:26:30,189 --> 00:26:32,108
The data could shed light
371
00:26:32,108 --> 00:26:34,610
on precisely where
the aircraft landed,
372
00:26:34,610 --> 00:26:39,282
after CCTV footage captured
it passing the touchdown zone.
373
00:26:41,576 --> 00:26:44,370
Can you isolate the
weight on wheels parameter?
374
00:26:50,752 --> 00:26:55,006
Weight on wheels is a sensor
which indicates to the FDR
375
00:26:55,006 --> 00:26:58,551
the moment weight
comes on the wheels.
376
00:26:59,177 --> 00:27:01,137
That's what we're looking for.
377
00:27:01,137 --> 00:27:06,059
The plane touched down
at 19:40:25
378
00:27:06,059 --> 00:27:07,727
So how far down
the runway is that?
379
00:27:09,604 --> 00:27:13,191
Using the ground speed
of the aircraft, investigators
380
00:27:13,191 --> 00:27:16,819
calculate how far the plane
flew over the runway.
381
00:27:18,821 --> 00:27:21,574
4,438 feet
from the threshold.
382
00:27:22,658 --> 00:27:26,704
It became very clear to us
as to where the aircraft
383
00:27:26,704 --> 00:27:28,748
had exactly touched down.
384
00:27:31,834 --> 00:27:35,588
He overshot the touchdown zone
by nearly 1500 feet...
385
00:27:38,508 --> 00:27:40,718
...leaving less than
half the runway for stopping.
386
00:27:42,637 --> 00:27:46,265
Can the plane even stop on half
a runway in a tailwind?
387
00:27:47,725 --> 00:27:50,520
Let me calculate
the actual landing distance.
388
00:27:51,854 --> 00:27:55,650
The actual landing distance
is the distance required
389
00:27:55,650 --> 00:27:58,027
from touchdown to stop.
390
00:27:58,027 --> 00:27:59,612
Weight?
391
00:28:02,532 --> 00:28:04,784
63000 kilos.
392
00:28:05,827 --> 00:28:06,953
Wind?
393
00:28:06,953 --> 00:28:09,497
Last reported tailwind
before Flight 1-3-4-4
394
00:28:09,497 --> 00:28:13,292
began its approach
was actually 10 knots.
395
00:28:13,292 --> 00:28:14,669
Flaps?
396
00:28:14,669 --> 00:28:16,212
30.
397
00:28:18,589 --> 00:28:20,633
7,803 feet.
398
00:28:22,260 --> 00:28:23,761
So according
to the information they had
399
00:28:23,761 --> 00:28:26,097
before accepting the approach,
400
00:28:26,097 --> 00:28:29,434
they needed to touchdown here
401
00:28:29,434 --> 00:28:32,395
to have any chance of stopping
before the end of the runway.
402
00:28:34,480 --> 00:28:38,943
Flight 13-44 should have
touched down 3,000 feet earlier
403
00:28:38,943 --> 00:28:41,446
in order to stop safely.
404
00:28:41,446 --> 00:28:44,073
So why did the pilots
not give themselves
405
00:28:44,073 --> 00:28:45,908
enough runway to stop the plane?
406
00:28:52,040 --> 00:28:53,958
When the aircraft
touches down,
407
00:28:53,958 --> 00:28:55,835
you experience harsh braking,
408
00:28:55,835 --> 00:28:58,338
reverse thrust, more noise.
409
00:28:58,338 --> 00:29:01,340
But here, it was totally silent.
410
00:29:01,340 --> 00:29:03,384
And the passengers,
they would be wondering,
411
00:29:03,384 --> 00:29:05,845
why is the aircraft
not touching down?
412
00:29:10,141 --> 00:29:12,101
Investigators check
the transcripts
413
00:29:12,101 --> 00:29:14,812
of the cockpit voice recording
414
00:29:14,812 --> 00:29:16,647
for something that might explain
415
00:29:16,647 --> 00:29:18,900
why the pilots
carried out the landing
416
00:29:18,900 --> 00:29:20,818
without enough runway.
417
00:29:22,779 --> 00:29:25,490
The flight data gives us
what happened.
418
00:29:25,490 --> 00:29:29,494
But why it happened
comes from the CVR.
419
00:29:31,162 --> 00:29:32,455
Hey.
420
00:29:32,455 --> 00:29:35,458
During the first approach,
421
00:29:35,458 --> 00:29:37,377
the windshield wipers are on.
422
00:29:37,377 --> 00:29:39,712
And look what
happens afterwards.
423
00:29:45,718 --> 00:29:47,678
Lead-in lights in sight.
424
00:29:47,678 --> 00:29:50,056
Yeah.
425
00:29:50,056 --> 00:29:53,976
27 seconds after
starting the wiper ...
426
00:29:53,976 --> 00:29:56,813
What's happened to it?
427
00:29:56,813 --> 00:29:58,981
Oh, crap. The wiper's gone.
428
00:30:00,274 --> 00:30:02,026
...it malfunctions.
429
00:30:02,026 --> 00:30:04,487
What a day
for the wiper to go.
430
00:30:12,662 --> 00:30:15,581
Maybe that explains why he
was so worried about visibility.
431
00:30:17,625 --> 00:30:20,128
According to rules
for landing at Calicut
432
00:30:20,128 --> 00:30:22,255
during monsoon season,
433
00:30:22,255 --> 00:30:24,716
it is mandatory
for pilots to divert
434
00:30:24,716 --> 00:30:28,428
to an alternative airport
if the wipers malfunction.
435
00:30:29,887 --> 00:30:33,266
So was this crash caused
by a faulty windshield wiper?
436
00:30:36,644 --> 00:30:39,981
Unserviceability of a wiper
in rainy conditions
437
00:30:39,981 --> 00:30:41,357
is a no-go item.
438
00:30:42,400 --> 00:30:45,445
The crew pressed on
to land at Calicut.
439
00:30:47,238 --> 00:30:49,532
We couldn't fathom the reason.
440
00:30:51,993 --> 00:30:54,620
Let's see if the wiper was
working on the second approach.
441
00:30:56,706 --> 00:30:58,583
Heading to course.
442
00:30:59,125 --> 00:31:00,585
Shall we do it?
443
00:31:02,045 --> 00:31:03,880
Just a sec.
444
00:31:06,090 --> 00:31:08,051
What is this?
445
00:31:08,051 --> 00:31:11,554
I guess that's
the fastest it'll go.
446
00:31:13,931 --> 00:31:17,310
So the wiper is working,
just not as fast as it should.
447
00:31:19,187 --> 00:31:21,189
Despite the slow wiper,
448
00:31:21,189 --> 00:31:23,316
the pilots continue
the approach.
449
00:31:24,567 --> 00:31:26,778
Okay, runway in sight.
450
00:31:26,778 --> 00:31:28,571
Runway in sight, check.
451
00:31:34,243 --> 00:31:37,205
So, less than a mile
from the airport,
452
00:31:37,205 --> 00:31:39,791
both pilots can see the runway.
453
00:31:41,084 --> 00:31:43,586
The faulty wiper doesn't
seem to have prevented
454
00:31:43,586 --> 00:31:46,464
the pilots from seeing
the runway.
455
00:31:46,464 --> 00:31:49,676
And so far they are
still on the glide slope...
456
00:31:53,429 --> 00:31:58,017
But it looks like they deviate
below and then above it.
457
00:32:00,478 --> 00:32:04,482
The approach
became un-stabilized.
458
00:32:04,482 --> 00:32:06,651
And the actions
on the part of the crew
459
00:32:06,651 --> 00:32:10,822
to continue with
the approach really shocked us.
460
00:32:12,407 --> 00:32:13,908
So if they were above
the glideslope,
461
00:32:13,908 --> 00:32:16,536
that means when they crossed
the runway threshold,
462
00:32:16,536 --> 00:32:18,371
they were 40 feet too high.
463
00:32:19,288 --> 00:32:22,083
In a tail wind,
less than ideal.
464
00:32:27,672 --> 00:32:30,800
If you fly off of the glide
slope this close to the runway,
465
00:32:30,800 --> 00:32:33,344
it is unsafe
for you to continue,
466
00:32:33,344 --> 00:32:35,555
yet this crew did
continue their landing.
467
00:32:38,599 --> 00:32:40,935
Did the pilots believe
they could recover
468
00:32:40,935 --> 00:32:44,564
from an un-stabilized approach
and land safely?
469
00:32:49,819 --> 00:32:51,487
Auto-brake disarm.
470
00:32:53,990 --> 00:32:55,825
Oh, crap!
471
00:33:05,460 --> 00:33:07,962
Looks like the Captain
increases engine power
472
00:33:07,962 --> 00:33:09,839
to stabilize the landing.
473
00:33:12,133 --> 00:33:16,137
Investigators search
the FDR parameters to explain
474
00:33:16,137 --> 00:33:18,765
how the pilots of Flight 13-44
475
00:33:18,765 --> 00:33:21,684
dealt with their
un-stabilized approach.
476
00:33:23,895 --> 00:33:25,521
In order to have
a smooth landing,
477
00:33:25,521 --> 00:33:27,982
pilots typically add
a bit of thrust
478
00:33:27,982 --> 00:33:30,735
just before touchdown...
479
00:33:32,779 --> 00:33:35,740
which is probably what
the captain was trying to do.
480
00:33:37,617 --> 00:33:40,036
He's pushing throttles
well beyond 80% percent.
481
00:33:41,954 --> 00:33:44,582
30. 20.
482
00:33:46,667 --> 00:33:48,836
The Captain adds so much power
483
00:33:48,836 --> 00:33:51,714
the plane floats
down the runway.
484
00:33:57,345 --> 00:34:01,891
The plane floats over the
runway for more than 3,000 feet.
485
00:34:01,891 --> 00:34:06,604
Why wouldn't the Captain
just put the plane down?
486
00:34:10,358 --> 00:34:12,610
His wiper was barely working.
487
00:34:13,945 --> 00:34:16,697
It's night.
The weather is marginal.
488
00:34:16,697 --> 00:34:19,951
What if he lost track of
where he was along the runway?
489
00:34:22,370 --> 00:34:24,747
So when you approach
an airfield like Calicut,
490
00:34:24,747 --> 00:34:27,667
there are no lights
surrounding the runway.
491
00:34:27,667 --> 00:34:29,877
You just see the runway lights.
492
00:34:31,129 --> 00:34:35,717
So in case you have light rain
but low cloud ceiling,
493
00:34:35,717 --> 00:34:38,469
that is a very
unnerving feeling.
494
00:34:41,931 --> 00:34:44,976
The Captain didn't know where
to put the plane down
495
00:34:44,976 --> 00:34:46,728
because of his slow wiper
496
00:34:46,728 --> 00:34:50,648
and the heavy rain
which reduced his vision.
497
00:34:58,448 --> 00:35:00,658
They still could have
done a go-around.
498
00:35:02,785 --> 00:35:04,829
The plane can
carry out a go-around
499
00:35:04,829 --> 00:35:07,832
from any point of time,
even after touchdown
500
00:35:07,832 --> 00:35:10,626
so long the thrust reversers
are not deployed.
501
00:35:13,629 --> 00:35:15,256
So why didn't they?
502
00:35:27,852 --> 00:35:29,937
Just check it.
Put the plane down.
503
00:35:34,984 --> 00:35:36,235
Captain.
504
00:35:36,235 --> 00:35:38,863
- 10.
- Go around.
505
00:35:42,116 --> 00:35:44,952
The First Officer
called for a go-around.
506
00:35:45,787 --> 00:35:47,038
And the Captain
ignored him.
507
00:35:48,998 --> 00:35:52,126
Why would such an experienced
Captain not listen
508
00:35:52,126 --> 00:35:55,546
to his First Officer
at such a critical moment?
509
00:35:57,048 --> 00:35:59,509
That was fatal.
510
00:35:59,509 --> 00:36:02,345
If the captain
would have gone around
511
00:36:02,345 --> 00:36:04,889
the result could
have been different.
512
00:36:10,353 --> 00:36:11,979
Okay.
513
00:36:12,939 --> 00:36:15,191
I appreciate your assistance.
514
00:36:15,191 --> 00:36:16,734
Thanks.
515
00:36:18,194 --> 00:36:20,279
Investigators interview
other pilots
516
00:36:20,279 --> 00:36:22,073
who flew with Captain Sathe
517
00:36:22,073 --> 00:36:25,743
to determine how he worked
with others in the cockpit.
518
00:36:26,994 --> 00:36:29,163
That was the last pilot
on the list.
519
00:36:29,163 --> 00:36:30,540
And?
520
00:36:30,540 --> 00:36:32,583
Here's some of the ways
they described him:
521
00:36:32,583 --> 00:36:34,460
"cognitive rigidity",
522
00:36:34,460 --> 00:36:36,003
"goal oriented",
523
00:36:36,003 --> 00:36:38,798
"tendency towards
perfectionism".
524
00:36:38,798 --> 00:36:41,426
Sounds more like an air force
pilot than a civilian one.
525
00:36:41,426 --> 00:36:43,011
Which is what he was
526
00:36:43,011 --> 00:36:45,013
for 21 years at the start
of his career.
527
00:36:51,978 --> 00:36:54,814
The military aviators
are trained to be goal-oriented
528
00:36:54,814 --> 00:36:56,691
because for them the success
of a mission
529
00:36:56,691 --> 00:36:59,152
is the most important criteria.
530
00:37:00,153 --> 00:37:03,281
There's another reason
the Captain may have been
531
00:37:03,281 --> 00:37:05,700
determined to land in Calicut.
532
00:37:06,784 --> 00:37:10,872
The crew were now making
a second approach into Calicut,
533
00:37:10,872 --> 00:37:14,709
and if they had to go around
from this approach,
534
00:37:14,709 --> 00:37:17,795
they would,
by the operating procedures,
535
00:37:17,795 --> 00:37:20,798
be required to divert.
536
00:37:22,216 --> 00:37:24,969
Did the Captain resist
a second go-around
537
00:37:24,969 --> 00:37:27,930
so that he wouldn't be
forced to divert?
538
00:37:33,895 --> 00:37:36,022
Here's something...
539
00:37:36,022 --> 00:37:39,567
Investigators focus on
the Captain's flight schedule
540
00:37:39,567 --> 00:37:42,904
before and after
the day of the accident.
541
00:37:42,904 --> 00:37:44,822
Take a look.
542
00:37:44,822 --> 00:37:46,908
Captain Sathe was scheduled
to be on stand-by
543
00:37:46,908 --> 00:37:50,536
the day after the accident,
August 8th.
544
00:37:50,536 --> 00:37:55,083
But the day before the accident,
there was a scheduling change
545
00:37:55,083 --> 00:37:58,127
and Captain Sathe had to
pick up an additional flight.
546
00:38:01,089 --> 00:38:04,342
He was the only captain
who could fly out of Calicut,
547
00:38:04,342 --> 00:38:08,221
remember a tricky airport
and only captains can operate
548
00:38:08,221 --> 00:38:11,766
flights in and out
of a tabletop airport.
549
00:38:13,893 --> 00:38:16,354
So if he had diverted
to another airport
550
00:38:16,354 --> 00:38:18,272
instead of landing,
551
00:38:18,272 --> 00:38:21,275
the flight to Doha the next day
would have to be cancelled.
552
00:38:25,613 --> 00:38:27,323
He was committed to land
because he knew that
553
00:38:27,323 --> 00:38:29,450
there was no one else
to undertake the flight.
554
00:38:32,370 --> 00:38:34,956
But even if the Captain
forced the landing,
555
00:38:34,956 --> 00:38:39,002
the first officer could still
have taken over the controls
556
00:38:39,002 --> 00:38:41,713
and diverted.
So why didn't he?
557
00:38:43,131 --> 00:38:45,091
If the captain does not
carry out a go-around,
558
00:38:45,091 --> 00:38:47,009
the co-pilot is expected
to take over.
559
00:38:47,009 --> 00:38:50,805
In the safety of the flight,
that is a must.
560
00:38:51,806 --> 00:38:54,600
Captain. Go around!
561
00:39:00,982 --> 00:39:03,901
Investigators
examine the CVR transcripts
562
00:39:03,901 --> 00:39:08,281
of Flight 13-44 to determine
why the first officer
563
00:39:08,281 --> 00:39:09,824
failed to take control.
564
00:39:09,824 --> 00:39:11,784
They discover
a pattern emerging...
565
00:39:14,245 --> 00:39:16,581
Rate of descent, Captain.
566
00:39:16,581 --> 00:39:18,833
...of a dismissive Captain...
567
00:39:18,833 --> 00:39:22,545
Yeah, yeah. Correcting,
correcting, correcting.
568
00:39:22,545 --> 00:39:26,132
... and a First Officer
who didn't assert himself.
569
00:39:26,132 --> 00:39:29,260
Glide slope.
Glide slope.
570
00:39:29,260 --> 00:39:31,095
Check.
571
00:39:32,013 --> 00:39:34,098
Captain.
572
00:39:34,098 --> 00:39:35,850
Go around!
573
00:39:38,394 --> 00:39:42,774
The captain uses his authority
to dictate what he wants
574
00:39:42,774 --> 00:39:45,526
and the co-pilot is
too submissive to call out
575
00:39:45,526 --> 00:39:48,029
what he sees as unsafe.
576
00:39:50,031 --> 00:39:54,243
Was this type of behaviour
common at the airline?
577
00:39:54,243 --> 00:39:57,121
Investigators examine
Air India Express's
578
00:39:57,121 --> 00:39:58,748
Operations Manual.
579
00:40:01,376 --> 00:40:04,962
It would be very important
to understand how teamwork
580
00:40:04,962 --> 00:40:09,217
is encouraged in the cockpit of
an Air India Express aircraft.
581
00:40:13,137 --> 00:40:16,683
It says, "Captains need to
approve flight data
582
00:40:16,683 --> 00:40:19,060
presented by First Officers."
583
00:40:19,977 --> 00:40:21,396
That would certainly
promote a definite
584
00:40:21,396 --> 00:40:23,064
hierarchy in the cockpit.
585
00:40:25,650 --> 00:40:26,901
Maybe that's why
the First Officer
586
00:40:26,901 --> 00:40:28,653
didn't feel empowered enough
to grab the controls
587
00:40:28,653 --> 00:40:30,446
and do the go-around.
588
00:40:33,032 --> 00:40:36,202
We realized that
the language used amounted
589
00:40:36,202 --> 00:40:40,915
to the First Officer
is subservient to the Captain.
590
00:40:44,544 --> 00:40:48,923
Despite the Captain's
rigidity, one simple procedure
591
00:40:48,923 --> 00:40:51,509
could have saved
the passengers and crew.
592
00:40:55,221 --> 00:40:56,889
I don't recall
them ever calculating
593
00:40:56,889 --> 00:40:59,016
their landing distance.
594
00:41:02,020 --> 00:41:03,896
Because they were now
coming in with a tailwind
595
00:41:03,896 --> 00:41:07,567
onto runway 1-0, conditions
had changed entirely
596
00:41:07,567 --> 00:41:10,153
from the headwind on runway 2-8,
597
00:41:10,153 --> 00:41:14,949
and they needed to do a landing
distance calculation.
598
00:41:17,368 --> 00:41:19,370
You're right.
599
00:41:19,370 --> 00:41:21,497
He didn't do the calculation.
600
00:41:25,209 --> 00:41:30,048
They missed critical decisions
on the tailwind, the wet runway,
601
00:41:30,048 --> 00:41:32,800
and potential diversion options,
602
00:41:32,800 --> 00:41:35,178
in addition to calculating
landing distance.
603
00:41:36,971 --> 00:41:38,431
If they had done any of these,
604
00:41:38,431 --> 00:41:40,767
it would have helped them
understand there was too little
605
00:41:40,767 --> 00:41:44,062
margin of error
to conduct this approach.
606
00:42:10,505 --> 00:42:13,091
Different airport,
different outcome.
607
00:42:13,091 --> 00:42:15,468
The Captain would have been
able to pass controls
608
00:42:15,468 --> 00:42:17,345
to the First Officer,
609
00:42:17,345 --> 00:42:21,265
who had a fully working wiper,
to land the plane.
610
00:42:23,142 --> 00:42:24,852
If they had just
diverted to another airport,
611
00:42:24,852 --> 00:42:27,063
they'd all be alive today.
612
00:42:38,157 --> 00:42:40,118
There were so many
opportunities the crew had
613
00:42:40,118 --> 00:42:42,829
to conduct a missed approach
during this landing,
614
00:42:42,829 --> 00:42:45,665
but the crew took none of them.
615
00:42:50,753 --> 00:42:52,422
In their final report,
616
00:42:52,422 --> 00:42:56,092
investigators recommend
expanding simulator training
617
00:42:56,092 --> 00:42:58,761
for unstabilized approaches,
618
00:42:58,761 --> 00:43:00,972
stressing that the
First Officer should
619
00:43:00,972 --> 00:43:05,059
assertively assume control
and initiate a go-around
620
00:43:05,059 --> 00:43:07,979
if the Pilot Flying fails
to respond.
621
00:43:14,193 --> 00:43:16,529
Simulator training with
an emphasis on assertiveness
622
00:43:16,529 --> 00:43:19,115
would go a long way
in allowing first officers
623
00:43:19,115 --> 00:43:22,618
to take all appropriate actions
up to and including
624
00:43:22,618 --> 00:43:25,872
taking control of the aircraft
when the pilot in command
625
00:43:25,872 --> 00:43:28,041
does not respond appropriately.
626
00:43:38,217 --> 00:43:40,344
This accident is avoidable.
627
00:43:41,804 --> 00:43:47,143
We see the number of risks at
every stage the crew had taken,
628
00:43:47,143 --> 00:43:50,897
which were unnecessary risks.
629
00:43:50,897 --> 00:43:56,277
There was a human factor,
which came into play.
630
00:43:56,277 --> 00:43:59,364
They do not see their
consequences of their actions.
631
00:43:59,364 --> 00:44:03,034
That is a key point
in any accident.
632
00:44:26,891 --> 00:44:29,644
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