All language subtitles for Inside the CIA Secrets and Spies - S01E08 - Garry Harrington - The Real Jason Bourne

Most of us, when we're young, are
idealistic.

Well, I was idealistic.

And I was sort of a guy that liked to
push against authority.

I liked to do the unexpected.

I enjoyed chaos.

Different people are drawn to different
jobs. I was drawn to special things in

the military.

The CIA was not on my radar when I grew
up.

Something happened to me that it changed
my outlook to my life and how I viewed

my sense of purpose.

If there was a situation where it's
uncertain, what do you do when you

encounter bad guys?

When do you talk to people, negotiate?

When do you shoot people? When do you
run? When do you fight?

I'm willing to gamble my life, and I
don't mind gambling my life.

In espionage, there's a hierarchy of
sources when you're recruiting sources.

You know, everybody wants to recruit the
code clerk from the enemy country that

works in their embassy with all the
secret codes, right? That's the gold

standard that everybody wants. Well,
that actually very, very rarely happens.

My name is Gary Harrington.

I joined the CIA in 2004.

Before that, I was in Army Special
Forces and assigned to 5th Special

Group, which focuses on the Middle East.

I actually retired from the Army on a
Friday and then went to work at Langley

a CIA officer on Monday.

For me, by that point, my military
career involved decades of training and

in foreign countries and being in
Afghanistan.

being in Iraq.

And at that time, I had no idea I would
be back in Afghanistan trying to track

down al -Qaeda and Taliban.

On the ground in Afghanistan, it's
apparent the ongoing U .S. air attacks

damaged the Taliban's ability to wage
war.

During the Afghanistan war,

The CIA had multiple missions in
Afghanistan. We deployed because of 9

number one was destroying al -Qaeda,
getting Osama bin Laden. And so we had

get as close to the enemy as we could to
collect intelligence and to conduct our

operations against terrorists.

As these strikes continue, reports are
trickling in that Taliban commanders are

beginning to defect.

We need to get those sources. We need
the intelligence, and we need the impact

that having those guys secretly working
for us can provide.

My name is Chris. I was a CIA lifer,
worked for them over 30 years, and most

my time was spent on counterterrorism in
the Middle East.

Gary struck me right from the outset as
somebody that had good instincts and

good judgment. You know, he wasn't a
kid. He was an older Special Forces

soldier. He'd been in third world
countries before.

He'd worked with indigenous forces
before.

So right off the bat, I could see that
he brought something special to the

table.

In 2006 and 2007, I was in my second
year as an operations officer

for the CIA.

I served in sort of a quasi -position
where I did some paramilitary things at

nighttime, and then the rest of the day
I worked undercover in an embassy.

And about that time, I had had some
success at establishing contact with

some members of the Taliban in Pakistan.

I started learning some habits and
traditions.

of how you interact with people that
might provide information.

Now, learning that was almost like the
secret code, like I might offer money to

a Taliban mullah who can't take money or
can't take a gift, but I knew how to do

it in a way that would not offend him
and would give him cover to take

it. You know, I would give them just a
traditional gift that one of their

tribesmen might give them.

But then somewhere in that, I made sure
there might be some money in that.

And then I would never speak of it.

But then the next time I asked, would
you meet me, I rarely got a no.

I got word that someone that was on the
top ten wanted list, a Taliban

mullah, might be willing to come and
meet with me and perhaps

work.

Gary's effort to recruit a senior
Taliban leader was of high interest to

others. Bringing a high -level Taliban
commander over to our side could be of

tremendous importance.

A top -ten mullah in the Taliban would
know more about the organization of

strategic plans, maybe finances, avenues
of resupply, perhaps.

As a senior person, they knew someone
even higher on the list.

Maybe they were any of the Taliban that
had contact with al -Qaeda.

Of course, I had no proof of that, and
the proof would be, let's try to get him

to come across, and that would be our
proof.

When you consider an operation such
as... To meet this mullah, there are a

of things you have to take into mind.
The first face that Taliban mullah sees

shouldn't be an American face.

So an Afghan general was assigned by the
minister of defense to work with me,

and we developed this operation.

The only place he could meet was in a
very remote, dangerous place where there

had been no U .S. presence.

And it was far from any.

The Afghanistan -Pakistan border is a
lengthy one, some 1 ,500 miles with

terrain, some very mountainous, some
more desert stretches from Pakistan's

border with Iran all the way up to the
far north of Pakistan.

My name is Mike Vickers. I'm a former
CIA operations officer and former

undersecretary of defense for
intelligence.

The border region is quite dangerous.

Areas that, for instance, I could
operate in as a CIA officer in the 1980s

become no -go terrain.

After 9 -11, the environment had gotten
a lot more hostile, threats of

bombs or assassinations.

You know, every environment is
different.

And sometimes that's a scary thing.

Having physical courage is a big part of
being a CIA officer, especially a case

officer in the field. And so having
somebody like Gary and his Special

pedigree, that meant that you had that
physical courage quality that you need

go far out away from safe areas in the
hope of making a hugely important

achievement.

So we were told...

This guy would come out of Pakistan at
this really remote place, and

we were going to meet him and get him in
our control and then move him to

somewhere where we could sit down and
have a conversation about what we might

able to do together.

Fortunately, trying to figure how you
would get somewhere like that undetected

fits right in with...

my experience in training as a Special
Forces soldier.

So I worked with the SAD guys in the
Special Activities Division, which

later became known as the Special
Activities Center, to devise a plan,

would we do this?

All these areas out by the border of
Pakistan are essentially hostile.

My name is Mick Mulroy. I was a Marine.

I still am. We're always Marines. From
there, I was recruited into the Central

Intelligence Agency into a component
that's called Special Activity Center.

Once you leave the bases, you go into
harm's way, and you have to be ready

that moment on. Sometimes you go heavy
with a lot of very overt force, but you

can't do that on most intelligence
operations because you defeat the

clandestinity. So you have to plan for
all of that.

With the SAD guys doing a lot of the
planning, we figured that, okay, the

vanguard or the initial group of us
would get three thin -skinned vehicles.

when I say thin -skinned, I meant
unarmored, non -U .S.-looking cars or

SUVs or pickups that fit in with that
remote village, which was located on the

Pakistan border.

between the Nangarhar province and
Nuristan.

That area in particular is the wild west
of Pakistan.

You have different ethnic groups.

The Pakistani intelligence service has
informants, but it's also the insurgent

groups or terrorist groups that make it
very dangerous.

So it does make it a challenging
operational environment.

If it's a high -threat environment, then
the ideal is you have a three -inch

thick window, But then they're going to
know who you are. If you're going out in

a thin -skinned vehicle, if there's a
confrontation, then you're going to be

very vulnerable because the bullets can
go completely through it. So you have to

balance your ability to obviously
protect yourself with your ability to

in.

It's very rare that the CIA allowed
somebody to move in an unarmored

particularly an operations officer as I
was.

But it was deemed essential for this
mission.

And so at like 3 .30, 4 o 'clock in the
morning, we kicked off to go on this

mission.

And in our group was probably four or
five SAD guys, myself, and

I had that Afghan general wearing
civilian clothes and his driver.

They were in a separate pickup truck
than the U .S. guys.

These operations are usually seen as
long shots.

You operate on the assumption that this
could all be a provocation, could be a

trick. The goal could be to harm us, to
harm the case officer, harm others.

I was concerned that we could be being
set up.

We knew that it's not common for cars to
be traveling in the middle of the

night.

And if we have headlights on, well,
that's going to give us away really

So we want to drive with headlights off,
which means we have to have night

vision goggles on.

But who can drive at night without
light?

So we had a plan that if we ended up
coming right by a house, We would turn

the lights right before we got there, so
they might assume that we were a local

or somebody trying to travel to the
border.

Operations conducted close to the
Pakistan border could be especially

You had enemy across the border using
Pakistan territory for sanctuary, and so

the enemy had more opportunities, more
potential to make a move against us at

the border.

And they did. They did so routinely.

The Special Activities Division had a
group of Afghans that they

trained. We had two pickup trucks with
those, and then each of those trucks

had a machine gun mounted in the back,
and they would stay behind us.

like a 30 -minute delay between us and
them.

And, of course, guns tend to draw guns.
So you want them not necessarily with

you, but you want them to be able to
react. So if something happens, either

you're ambushed or this whole thing is a
setup, you can strong point in a

location long enough for these other
folks to show up.

So that was our security thing. We
didn't have a predator flying overhead

provide surveillance in advance.

We had no idea to call for air support.

So we drove outside of Zulalabad on
paved roads for a while and

then started getting on trails and
gravel roads.

It was dark.

You have to drive really slow.

That was our job, to be masters of
chaos. And in many ways, that typifies

Harrington.

because he can find himself amidst chaos
and find a, not just a good solution,

but a great solution to whatever that
challenge may be.

So I'm John Mulholland. I was a colonel
commanding the 5th Special Forces Group

when I met then Sergeant 1st Class Gary
Harrington the same day I took command

of it.

Gary became my...

My go -to guy when I had some hairy,
thorny problem that I really needed

to take ownership of now.

And he was also a man with the moral
courage to do the right thing.

The operations of Torp World were aimed
at pinpointing the number one high

-value target, which was Osama bin
Laden.

In the fiercest fighting yet of the Tora
Bora campaign, U .S. special forces

joined Afghan guerrillas in attacking al
-Qaeda positions.

There was intelligence that pinpointed
bin Laden in the Tora Bora mountains.

So I was asked to help support that, and
Gary was one of the first guys I sent

out there to do that.

We didn't really have many U .S. troops
on the ground at that time, so we're

going to try to use...

Local, untrained Afghan warlords to try
to go against al -Qaeda.

There's that tension that's always at
play with your indigenous counterpart.

But that trust and rapport, everything
begins with trust and rapport.

And I would say Gary was masterful at
doing that.

In war zones like Afghanistan, it's
littered with hidden caches of weapons.

And these things aren't necessarily
safeguarded like in an American

bunker. When they move these things,
it's...

Not unheard of, but a mistake's made and
there's a terrible explosion and they

lose people.

That means done, vaporized.

So in some cases, it's the more junior
local guys who get told, hey, you're

driving the truck that's full of a lot
of Big Bang in the back.

And Gary felt it was important for him
to show that, hey, look, I trust you

guys, and I'm willing to accept the same
amount of risk as you guys.

So one day on his own, Gary just jumped
in the front of the truck with so many

young guys driving one of those dicey,
explosive -filled trucks just to send

that message that, hey, I'm here with
you guys. We're all part of that. That

selflessness of Gary, willing to accept
that risk, took him to a whole other

level of respect with those indigenous
fighters in that group.

That's the kind of guy Gary was.

Finally, just before dawn, we rolled
into the outskirts of the town.

We wanted to get there before people
were moving around a lot because any

village, people have to get up and go
get water from a communal water pump.

So you wanted to be there before that
activity got too heavy.

When it comes to conducting risky
operations in a war zone, we've got to

maintain clandestinity, and we've got to
have a low profile.

There's probably bad guys living right
there in the village, but if not,

sure going to tell them, and it's going
to be found out very soon.

And then, of course, the reaction would
be, and they did this often, they would

set out on the radio.

there's Americans here, they're in this
location, their only way out of here is

these two routes, and then they would
try to start setting in ambushes.

As it was getting dawn, we were trying
to figure out, okay, we have three

vehicles, the two thin -skinned ones
that we were in, and then the Afghan

general had his truck. These are strange
vehicles that don't belong here, so how

are we going to get them out of sight?

We found one.

house that had you know it was a
compound with a big mud wall around it

enough room that we could get the
vehicles in it and out of sight but to

someone at random like this certainly
has the chance that they could turn you

over to the bad guys with all assets
whether they're intelligence

assets or action -oriented assets.

It is difficult to fully trust
individuals out there, but we do

can. But ultimately, it is a judgment
call.

So I had the general who spoke the
language go up and ask

the... Guy that lived there, it was a
man and his family.

You know, I don't think we were
threatening. Matter of fact, we always

nice to the people and help out where we
can, be extremely polite.

We paid them a little bit of money to
open the gates. We backed our vehicles

there and enclosed the gates.

And we stayed inside there as we tried
to use our cell phone to make contact

with this mullah that we hoped was
coming out of Pakistan.

We tried repeatedly to make contact with
this person at the phone number we had.

We were unable to get a good signal.

So because we couldn't get a signal, and
the time is going, and now the village

is waking up.

I'm hearing villagers move around.

You hear chatter, laughter.

Life is going on.

Now I know that by now, this family that
we're keeping sequestered in there

where we are is going to be missed.

First it'll start, and then word will
start spreading.

I always say it's sort of like when you
go in a place like that, it's like

lighting a fuse.

Picture dynamite. The problem is...

You don't, A, know how long the fuse is,
and B, you don't know how big the

explosive is on the other end.

All I know is the fuse is burning, and
very soon the bad guys will know that

we're there and that we are a ripe
target for them.

Cell coverage was non -existent in that
area.

The villagers told us that there was a
place further forward from where we were

that you could sometimes get a cell
signal.

Then the Afghan general turned to me and
said, hey, I blend in, let me go

forward to that place and try to make
phone contact. To go forward from where

were kind of meant you were stepping on
Pakistani territory.

And none of us had permission to be in
Pakistan, and the general surely

shouldn't have been there either.

But in the end, I decided that the
mission was going to be a bust, and let

give him one shot to try to go forward
and make contact.

Meeting with members of the enemy in the
war zone may be more drawn out than

some other operations, but the potential
payoff is huge.

And so if we could find a way forward
that we were comfortable with, We were

going to try it.

So I need to put some guidelines and
protection any time you let somebody go

out. And I told him that, hey, I can
give you 30 to 45 minutes, but we have

be out of here because now it's past 8,
30, 9 o 'clock. Word is out.

That fuse is burning. The fuse is
burning.

But, you know, off he went with the
promise he'd be back in 45 minutes.

30 minutes passes by.

I extend that to 45.

No general.

Now we're all getting quite hyper.

What has happened to him? Were the
Taliban or Al Qaeda waiting outside?

Did they grab him when he came out?

Are they getting ready to attack us?

Now, almost another hour has passed.

Even more people are aware we're here.
The attack may be in progress. So

everybody's getting more and more amped
up.

And the SAD guys are starting to ask me,
hey, what are we going to do?

And I was honored, to be honest, that
they asked me because a lot of SAD or

former special forces, Marine recon,
SEALs, that normally would be one of

calls.

I think the CIA special operations
people that were supporting him, that he

working with, had more trust in Gary
than they might have had in somebody

because they knew that Gary had a great
special forces background.

He's not all starry -eyed. He's got a
good grip on the situation.

I thought back several years before.

In 2002, when I had been the tactical
leader on a team, I was assigned

as a special forces soldier on an
intelligence mission, and there was the

team leader. His main job was to keep us
hooked up with this Afghan warlord.

And it was out in the middle of this
valley in the Taliban and al -Qaeda

territory.

So we just roll into this vulnerable
location.

There were probably a total of five or
six Americans.

And I noticed the person we were
supposed to meet didn't show up.

And then I noticed that what few locals
had been around disappeared.

You're thinking, is this an ambush?

You know, it kind of made my spine
tingle.

So as the tactical leader, I turned.

to the CIA team leader and said, I think
we're in a bad place.

People are disappearing.

We're really vulnerable here.

And I think we've been set up. And, you
know, he said, well, we're supposed to

meet this person here.

And I remember saying, hey, 10 minutes
more, but then we got to get, you know,

used to read stories about the special
forces guys in Vietnam, and they didn't

really care about authority.

did things their way.

And that, I admit that that appealed to
that part of my personality.

And so, yeah, I was like, it was time to
get out.

You know, it's like that thing you see
on a movie where they suddenly notice

that there are no birds and no animals
and it's definitely quiet.

That was the feeling in that moment,
that pregnant moment.

Before an ambush, so we were kind of
sitting ducks in the middle of this big

bolt.

And the CIA team leader happened to be
Chris.

I was blissfully unaware about how
dangerous things were getting.

I think the first time or two, I
probably pushed back and wanted to do a

more, collect some more intelligence,
make some more contact.

The operations officer, you know, he's
focused on doing his meeting and running

the intelligence aspects of that. And
it's my job to pay attention to the

safety. And so I was like, yeah, you
know, this seems like that moment

just before an ambush.

I realized that if Gary, this
experienced special forces soldier, is

nervous, then maybe I should be nervous
too.

Ultimately, Chris followed my
recommendation and we left.

After we got back, we found out that the
signals intelligence had overheard

Al Qaeda on the radio saying that
they...

had an ambush against us, but we left
before they could get everybody in

Had we stayed, we'd have been ambushed,
and there weren't really many of us to

be able to fight that off.

Gary Harrington did an awful lot for
that team, probably saved me from

probably saved the other team members
more than once.

I look back to how we avoided that
ambush.

Some of it was instinct.

But that instinct is born on decades of
training, being in foreign countries,

and, you know, all combined to help make
that instinct or that feeling an

informed one.

So I started discussing options with the
SAD team leader.

And at that point, our options were, A,
forget the general, we leave, and he and

his driver will have to make their own
way back, or, B, stay there longer and

try to give the general more time.

He also happened to have a letter on him
that was signed by the minister of

defense. If he were stopped and captured
by Taliban or al -Qaeda, that letter

would give him away as a member of the
government. So that would be instant

death for him.

And then what if he were stopped by
Pakistani officials?

Relations aren't that great between
Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Now you have a senior officer here
illegally in another country, and he's

got a letter that he's doing some kind
of secret mission or whatever for the

minister of defense. So that would be a
huge international incident.

The other alternative that the SAD guy
came up with was we can make one attempt

to try to recover the general.

Maybe he's a little bit further forward
trying to make phone contact. Maybe he's

made contact, and the guy says he'll be
there in a minute.

But now to do so, it's broad daylight,
and we're going to be seen when we come

out, and we're going forward.

further into Taliban and Al Qaeda
territory, what are we going to do? How

going to be protected?

Up to that point, the mission had been
to get the mullah that we came for.

With the general gone and our time
essentially run out, the mission

had to shift my mind.

Either you adapt.

or you die. That is the key to any
military operations, is the ability to

based on not what you planned, right,
but what is actually unfolding in front

you.

To try to go get him meant that we were
certainly going into more dangerous

Taliban -Al Qaeda territory.

The smart thing to do, what the agency
would want me to do, is leave now, get

your people out of here, save the
Americans.

It's tough about the Afghan, but he's
going to have to make it on his own.

But then there's that warrior ethos of
never leave a teammate behind.

And the Afghan was with us and trusting
us.

So I didn't want to leave him behind.

Now it gets back to that whole ethos of
working with your indigenous

counterparts. They're part of your team.

The S .A .D. guy said, well, we can call
up those two trucks of Afghans, the

machine guns on the truck, because the
secrecy is over. And then at least when

we move out, we'll be a force to be
reckoned with.

And, yeah, I debated that. But it was
kind of one of those moments where I

we kind of looked at each other like,
yeah, we're following the warrior's

We're not leaving. We're going.

So the warrior code is beyond just being
a good soldier. It is more.

of an ethical moral code than any of
that. It is wisdom. It is justice.

It is courage.

It is honor. It is your honor. That's
what matters more, and in some cases,

to be dramatic, than life itself.

So, sure enough, we left the compound.

The trucks came. We all left in our
little convoy.

So now, If it's my career, it's my
career. If we have to fight our way out,

know, we get in a gunfight, then that's
what it is. But we're doing it.

Horton favors the bold. And that was
something special about Gary is he

put off by the long shot nature of
something.

Long ago in my military career, I made
the decision I'm willing to gamble my

life. And I don't mind gambling my life.

When I was 17, I had a religious
experience that was a seminal moment.

I grew up around Charlotte, North
Carolina.

My parents were children of subsistence
farming families.

I was one of those people bullied a lot
in school.

And in high school, I started getting
panic attacks.

Once in a while, I'd start to go into a
class and suddenly waves of panic would

hit me. So I'd started skipping school.

Unfortunately, I did that enough times
where I failed the 11th grade.

I was distraught. It was nighttime.

I walked outside in the woods there. I
walked to a dark place.

Just needed time alone thinking about
having to face the realities that I

And while I'm there, I see, but off in
the corner over here, what I think is

like a little bubble, gas light.

I'm a rational thinking person.

So I, oh, it must be I've heard of swamp
gas or something.

And then it sort of slowly went this
way.

And then it started getting bigger.

Then at one point, essentially touched
the ground. Then I heard a voice come

of there.

I was terrified.

And the voice said, do not be afraid.

I have a purpose for you.

I didn't know what to think.

I was pretty shaken by it.

And then I wondered, well, what does
that mean?

I have to go be a preacher now?

That's not who I am.

So then when I became exposed to the
Marine Corps and the possibility that,

you're going to serve, from that moment
forward, I felt I had a purpose.

I'm going to serve my country and be in
battle. After that, I pushed every

opportunity I had to get involved in
whatever was the most dangerous thing,

most elite.

Who's facing combat?

I'll go there. High probability you're
going to get killed.

It dovetailed with what I said, hey, my
purpose, because I thought that's what

my role was.

So that sense of purpose was essential
for this mission.

One of the first things we hit, like a
kilometer or two down the road, is a

little rock and mud hut, and it was two
Afghan border guys.

They were the final outpost looking over
Pakistan.

Our operations were limited to the
country of Afghanistan.

In terms of conducting operations into
Pakistan, as a matter of normal course,

that was not going to happen.

And as we rolled up, they said, you
can't come here.

And we said, where are you going? We're
going forward.

They said, well, you can't do that. You
can't cross here.

And we're like, yeah, we're going.

So off we went.

So we've probably now gone a couple
kilometers past that checkpoint.

And suddenly from behind us, you see a
plume of dirt that looks like smoke

flying up. And there's some vehicle
racing down this dirt road as fast as it

can, trying to get to us.

Is this that ambush that we've been
expecting?

Now we all go on alert.

Is this a car going to hit us from this
side and then somebody else from

somewhere else?

So as this car starts approaching closer
and closer, we stop, got our weapons

ready, pointing towards the car, ready
to fight it out.

Part of being a professional when it
comes to either a military or

is not just shooting straight. It's also
knowing when to shoot and when not to

shoot and taking that.

level of discipline that you don't end
up harming somebody that either is an

innocent or obviously on your own team.

Everybody had their weapons ready to
start firing at the car.

And then it stopped like 50 yards behind
us.

And the door opened.

And out jumps the general.

And he's all happy.

And he comes running up, grabs me, and
starts hugging me. He almost has tears

his eyes.

And he was so, so happy.

Even with the speeding car, even knowing
that this could be, you know, somebody

coming to do harm to them, they held
fire as they should. And it turned out

be the exact person they were trying to
recover.

And I'm like, hey, where's your vehicle?
What happened? And he explained to us

that he and his driver had driven
forward and they saw a Pakistani border

outpost. And the people in the outpost
saw them, so they pulled their vehicle

over. on a hill before that and parked
it and turned it off.

And then the general said he told his
driver, get us out of here.

But he went to turn it, and this was a
dilapidated old pickup truck, and his

battery was dead.

And by now the Pakistanis are coming
towards them.

He realized that he had that letter on
him from the Minister of Defense and

he could not be stopped with that on him
without causing an international

incident.

So he told his driver that, hey, you
stay here with the vehicle because the

driver had an Afghan refugee card issued
by Pakistan. So he had some credibility

there. And just tell him that I'm some
guy you gave a ride to. And then the

general jumped out of the truck and
started running.

He claimed that the Pakistanis fired
twice.

But he ran for his life back towards
where we were.

And when he got back partway, somebody
told him that, hey, those Americans went

that way. So he commandeered a vehicle
and had that person drive him to where

were.

He was so thrilled that we came after
him. I'm not sure if he expected that.

it really, really sort of cemented the
bond between he and I from that point

forward.

One of CIA's most important

is the sacred bond we have with the
foreigners that help us.

I think a lot of the foreigners that
work with us feel it. Some of them

certainly have experienced it.

There's something in us, and especially
guys like Gary, that know we're not

going to leave that foreigner who's part
of our team, we're not leaving them

behind.

Once we had the general, That portion of
the mission is over. And while I had a

great sense of relief, okay, we've got
the general, then it was let's get the

hell out of here and turn the vehicles
around and start going.

But it was still going to be a perilous
trip out, and I was pretty nervous.

In the Afghanistan -Pakistan Theater,

Roads that run along the bottoms of
valleys are sometimes the only

There was a lot of times where our folks
had no choice but to go to a certain

location, traveling a certain road in
and coming out on the same road.

Generally, you don't want to do that
because if you've come in by that route,

they want to try to ambush you on your
way out, they might set up there.

And so that was kind of another thing
that made this even more dangerous.

And they could mount a pretty sizable
force pretty quickly.

So a platoon size, 30 individuals,
machine guns, rocket propelled grenades,

pretty complex ambushes.

They've been doing it forever.

While we certainly could run into IEDs
or an ambush.

We were emboldened and felt strengthened
by the fact that we'd just recovered

the general. So we drove until we
started getting on trails.

And once we got off the secondary roads
and the dirt roads and hit

Jalalabad, we knew that the danger was
over. And it was with a great

sense of relief.

that we had, I felt, gone into the belly
of the beast and come out.

To my knowledge, that mullah was never
captured.

I always have doubt now, did the guy
that we had contact with, did he get

feet, or was it all a lie to lure us
somewhere where we could be attacked?

One of the things you learn as a CIA
case officer is that you only have a

of successes for many, many attempts.

You know, I've heard people throw out
the numbers of, you know, one or two out

of 100.

But one of the things you develop early
on is an attitude that there's a lot of

value in making the good attempt. The
only way we're going to achieve anything

is to try.

To have a career as long as mine was,
which between the military and the

was 35 years, I had a sense of purpose.
For a lot of that time, my sense of

purpose may have been war.

I felt that my role in life was to
serve, and I didn't really expect to

it. As I neared the end of my military
career then, I started looking at the

agency.

is when I first started thinking that,
okay, maybe your job is to just keep

serving. Maybe this whole thing of
getting killed is not you.

I think that Gary's time early in the
war and the time that he spent working

alongside CIA officers, I think that
very much helped him in that next career

inside the CIA.

I think it was a natural evolution for
him to continue doing what he'd done so

well in Afghanistan and other parts of
the world.

A lot of people say, particularly with
the CIA, would you go back and do that

all again?

Hell yeah, I'd go back and do it again,
every bit of it again, to feel like I'm

serving my country and have the
adventure of a lifetime while doing it.

Being a case officer is a job that it's
going to take everything you've got.

It's going to take every class you've
ever taken, every job you've ever had,

every bit of work experience, every book
you've ever read, every movie you've

ever watched.

It's going to take everything you've got
to come up with the best set of

security measures that allow us to do
something that's really, really

get it done, come back alive, and then
go back the next day and do it again.

and not have anybody know.