All language subtitles for Four Years of the War in Ukraine Russian Roulette

Where now for Russia's war in Ukraine?

That's the topic for today's discussion

marking the four-year anniversary of

Russia's invasion of Ukraine. I'm Max

Bergman. I'm the director of the Europe

Russia Eurasia program and the Stewart

Center here at CSIS. Uh and it's a real

uh honor and privilege to be here with

uh with distinguished colleagues. This

is uh a live stream Russian Roulette

podcast recording. And if you're

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our YouTube feed, and subscribe to the

CSIS uh YouTube channel for more events

like this. Um, without further ado, let

let me introduce our panelists for what

uh will be, I think, an incredibly

important and engaging discussion.

First, I'm delighted to be joined by my

dear colleague, Marice Maria Snaggavaya.

Maria is, as all our regular listeners

will know, is a co-host of the Russian

podcast with me. She's a senior fellow

here at CSIS, where she leads our

research on Russia and Eurasia. Next, uh

we're delighted that Hannah not can join

us here in studio. Hannah is normally uh

located in Berlin. She is the director

of the Eurasia non-prololiferation

program at the James Martin Center for

Non-Proliferation Studies in Monterey,

California. Uh and is most importantly,

at least to us is a senior associate

non-resident fellow with our team here

at CSIS. Um and I importantly Hana is

out uh to promote a new book that is

coming out in August. The book is titled

uh We Shall Outlast Them: Putin's Global

Campaign to Defeat the West, which is

forthcoming with Norton. It's going to

be out in August 2026. And

unfortunately, I think that book is

going to be uh still quite current when

it comes out uh at the end of the summer

and and looks like at least from I think

what our discussion will point to is

going to be uh really relevant for the

for the years ahead. Um and she's also

out with a piece in the New York Times

titled Putin had high hopes for Trump.

They have been dashed. that's something

maybe we could talk more about. Um,

we're going to put those uh th of those

links in the uh show notes of our

podcast for those listening uh on uh on

the podcast feed. Um, we're also joined

by JP Gretch. Uh, JP is joining us um uh

virtually from uh from Minnesota. He is

the newest member of our team here at

CSIS and we're thrilled to introduce him

uh as a non-resident senior associate

with the CSIS Europe Russia Eurasia

program. JP is a retired US Army colonel

and foreign area officer uh where he

focused on Eastern Europe and

transatlantic cooperation. He served as

a military attache in Ukraine in Russia.

Uh including uh was was on the ground

was was working at the embassy as the

defense atache in Moscow when the war

broke out four years ago. Uh he was also

the security cooperation chief in

Estonia and most recently as military

adviser to the deputy assistant

secretary of defense for Russia,

Eurasia, and Ukraine at the Pentagon.

JP, welcome aboard and thanks for

joining us. Uh and last but certainly

not least, we're joined uh by the always

insightful Michael Kimage. Michael is

the founding director of an independent

Kennan Institute uh and was appointed

the director of the Kenan Institute at

the Wilson Center previously in January

of 2025. Uh he is the professor of

history also at the Catholic University

of America. uh and from 2014 to 2016 uh

he served on the secretary's policy

planning staff where he had the

misfortune of being my colleague there

at the department of state. Uh he he

covered the Russia Ukraine portfolio uh

and has been um a frequent commenter

about Ukraine including has a book on

Ukraine called Collisions. Um all right

let let's jump into the conversation and

maybe a first question to sort of set

the stage and maybe Michael I'll start

with you. Four years is a long time,

right? This is a it's a it's a

presidential administration here in the

United States. This war began four years

ago. And I want to, you know, have, you

know, maybe have you go back and or put

yourself in the mind of Vladimir Putin

and how do you think he is reflecting on

the last four four years? Uh how has

this war turned out? Um where do you

think Russia is right now and and how it

sees this uh this this situation? and

and you know if he's if he's having a

sip of wine in the Kremlin, what is he

thinking about um about how his decision

from four years ago? Well, one thing

that you could sense with the

inscrutable Vladimir Putin is that in

the leadup to the February 2022 invasion

and in the first few weeks and months

after the invasion, he looked very

nervous. Uh you could see in his body

language, his tone of voice and at a

certain point uh a few months into the

war, that nervousness passed. And I

think you can infer from that that

whatever his deepest fears may have been

with the invasion uh and probably those

fears crystallized a bit more in the

fall of 2022 than perhaps on the eve of

the invasion that that's passed. Uh and

he does seem to speak about this with

comfort and uh ease. The war has become

a part of his status quo. Uh and the

image that he projects and probably

believes in his heart of hearts is that

he can manage the challenges that are

coming. uh and you you can sort of sense

that in the way that he governs his

country, conducts the war, approaches uh

diplomacy. In other words, not a mood of

desperation. However, just make a second

and and brief point, I don't imagine him

at the moment, if he's sipping wine uh

or herbal tea in the Kremlin, I don't

think that this is a particularly

celebratory moment. uh a lot of the

doors that seem that they could be

opening and I think we'll get into this

in the course of the conversation in the

last year or the last two years haven't

really opened the door of Ukraine's

collapse. You know, it's a door that at

least rhetorically the Kremlin keeps

expecting to open. Uh and it hasn't. Uh

and more close to home, the door of the

Trump administration that was going to

make concession after concession and

pave the way for Russia to triumph in

Ukraine, whatever that might mean, that

two door too has not opened. uh and the

door of European fragmentation, you

know, it's there up to a point here and

there, but it's not enough uh for Putin

to open that door and walk through it uh

to some kind of triumph in Ukraine. So,

a lot of doors are shutting around

Vladimir Putin. He may try to, you know,

resist that circumstance or not accept

it, but I don't think he can ignore it.

Hana, maybe I turn to you with with the

same question, but maybe a different

take of of what what has surprised you

over the last four years in in assessing

how this war has turned out, how

Russia's reacted, how the Ukrainians re

what, you know, if you were to go back

four years, four years ago and talk to

yourself on this day and say, "Okay,

Hanote, expert analyst about Russia.

Here's some of the things that that you

should know about how this is going to

turn out." What would what would what

would have surprised you?

>> I think to be fair I was surprised by

Ukraine's resilience and staying power

against Russia. I think I would have

been among the analysts who would have

thought that if Russia is going to

invade this is probably going to be a

short war and Russia is going to force

some sort of fear comple in Ukraine that

both Ukraine and and Ukraine's western

backers will have to to accept. Um, more

broadly, I'm sort of aligned with with

Michael in the sense that this is not

the war that Putin hoped for. I think he

banked on a short war and a quick

victory and probably also a reality in

which Russia's ties with the West would

not be fully severed. So, this sort of

reorientation of Russia towards the east

and the south, I think it's a reality

with which Russia has accommodated

itself fairly well now. And if you're

Vladimir Putin and you fundamentally

believe that the West is in decline,

that Europe is decadent and divided and

is going to falter eventually

>> in its support for Ukraine and that

Russia is the one that just cares more

and has the longer staying power. I

think you still prepared to sort of see

this through, but it's not the reality

that that Russia had hoped for. I think

>> Maria, maybe over to you on on the

reaction inside of Russia. Um, I think

if you had told me four years ago that

there would be more than 1.2 two million

casualties, which a CSASS report

recently has has uh concluded, um or you

would have, you know, incredible loss of

life, um uh inside of Russia, a massive

international sanctions regime,

tremendous diplomatic uh isolation, um

sort of the unifying of of the West and

and Finland and Sweden joining NATO and

uh the probably the largest uh US

military assistance effort, I think,

since World War too, at least in a war

that we're not fighting. Um, I would

have said, "Oh man, Putin's going to be

in real trouble internally." Uh, and

that the Russian public is not going to

sort of stand for that. But I think that

would been borne out wrong. So, I'm that

would have been sort of my surprise, but

I'm curious what do you see of the

Russian reaction that may have surprised

you or didn't surprise you, you know, in

the last four years? Absolutely and I

echo everything that my colleagues said.

Uh but as much as Ukraine's resilience

should be absolutely admired, I will

flag that unfortunately the Russian

resilience also is something that went

beyond what I think most analysts would

have expected at the time just as you

flagged Max. And in a lot of ways I

think the war has been quite revealing

in exposing many of the assumptions

about Russia that we've gotten wrong. In

a lot of ways, I think the anticipation

that there will be major protests

against this horrible war of attrition

and again as CSS has estimated the total

loss, total casualties in this war that

Russia has accumulated exceed all of the

wars the Soviet Union fought combined

after second world war. So except for

the second world war, this is the by far

the bloodiest war for Russia. And yet we

see basically no serious resistance to

it. No serious resentment accumulate

within the Russian societ again based on

the limited number of data that's

available but somewhat trustworthy based

on different indicators. So what it

tells us is that a lot of the

assumptions I think about Russia were

made based on just projecting what we

know about the western style societies.

Unfortunately, Russia is not that. And

this is something that makes the war all

the more problematic and atrocious just

because the elites and the people, the

population in Russia just lack the

mechanisms, the tools, I would say both

mental and institutional to communicate

with the Kremlin. On top of that, I will

flag that the war turned out to be much

more ideological, I think ideational

than what we expected. I think this

administration uh started the yet

another uh series of round of peace

talks anticipating this was going to be

some sort of territorial war. So Russia

gets this piece of territory, Ukraine

gets to hold that piece of territory.

But as we see consistently and this was

has been the pardon with both

administrations, Biden and Trump. Biden

before the invasion and Trump obviously

last year no matter the concessions that

have been offered to Putin. Um he is

unwilling to reject his ultimate core

demands that are bases he points it out

on these original reasons origin

original problems uh that made this war

possible and unfortunately it means that

uh the war is likely to last likely to

last much longer.

>> Thank you JP. Let me let me turn to you.

You were in Moscow. You were at the US

embassy uh as the defense attaches four

years ago. You were looking at the

Russian military very closely.

What has surprised you or or you know

when you reflect back on the last four

years and and your your

time there in in uh Moscow? How do you

think the Russian military um is

thinking about this war? So both your

reflection and maybe how do you think

they're looking back on it? Maybe not I

want to ask you to put your yourself in

in in Putin's shoes, but how do you

think you know some of the military

officers that um that you may have

interacted with on the Russian side are

thinking about this war four years in?

>> Well, thank you Max and thanks for

having me here today and wish it was

under more auspicious circumstances of

course. Um you know looking back uh it's

a great question uh four years ago um

you know we at least at the embassy at

that time uh observe some of these same

sort of trends and I think same sort of

observations and trying to figure out uh

were the Russian forces and over their

head uh what you know how much to what

extent would Ukraine armed forces resist

and defend themselves. I think uh when I

look back at that time, I also often

think about how the Russian military and

how Putin ostensibly uh was thinking and

looking at the West uh and looking at

the West's moves in the leadup to the

war. Uh and one particular instance that

sort of jumps to mind, I think that we

sometimes forget is how the Russian

government viewed um our withdrawal from

Afghanistan uh which happened the year

prior. Uh, and I just raised this

because I think the Russian military uh,

in terms of their structure, in terms of

their leadership, um, are often looking

at the next moves through how they view

their adversaries. And I think their

main adversaries in some ways is not

Ukraine in this instance, but the United

States and the West. uh and they are

often looking for cues, looking for

signals, I think uh reflected through uh

the United States military and their

operations

uh through European armies and their

operations or their support uh for

various initiatives across Europe or

across the globe and queuing off of

those signals. And so the one thing I

think uh that could be interesting to

see is how uh or I think you know

putting myself uh in the in the shoes of

the Russian military is how they're

looking at our recent operations in

Venezuela for instance uh how they're

looking uh at recent uh foray into

Arctic security for instance and queuing

off the US military's uh I think uh its

its moves uh its strategies its

published documents

Uh, and I think that will probably

foreshadow a lot of how the Russian

military is thinking uh about its next

moves in Ukraine as well.

>> Maybe JP, I can follow up and ask, you

know, if you were to maybe to move our

conversation to focus a bit on on how

things are playing out presently. Um it

does seem that the war over the last few

years while there's been some movement,

the actual battle lines have have just

sort of not really shifted uh all that

dramatically. Uh and that we've it feels

that we are in uh a a grinding war of

attrition that kind of feels like it has

no end in sight. And I'm curious how you

see the current state of play right now

uh on the battlefield in Ukraine. Um and

you know and if you were to you know say

do you do you think this is the war that

the that the Russian military is

prepared to fight or are they really

struggling? How how do you see the

current dynamic right now on on on the

front lines?

Uh I look at the the current sort of um

pace of operations in Ukraine from two

different dimensions uh both in terms of

I think functional dimensions and and

geographic dimen dimensions and that is

I think there's almost like two fights

going on in Ukraine right now. There's a

fight on the ground uh which is as we

all know and have seen represented by a

large artitional sort of character where

every little you know offensive movement

down to the squad size is picked up by a

sensor and can be taken out by artillery

or FPV or for you know uh one of the

drones are just directed at uh those

movements. Um and so it's characterized

by you know a very static uh defensive

nature of war where there's not a lot of

territory exchange between both sides

where in essence we have this 20 km zone

set up between the sides and there's

this proliferation of sensors along the

battlefield that sort of detects every

single little movement um that prevents

the massing of forces to exploit uh any

sort of uh salient uh or major thrust uh

you know across uh the battlefield And

so you've seen this sort of bear out in

numbers. You know, the Kremlin has only

gained, I think, around 1,900 square

kilometers in the last in 2025. Slightly

more, but not much more than 2024.

Uh, and so it's interesting to see how

uh I think in in many ways this really

benefits Ukraine, and I can get into

that um at a later point. Uh but on the

another side, I think about the the air

strikes um hitting Kev and hitting

energy infrastructure and hitting

civilian infrastructure for that matter

uh in Ukraine every day. Every day we

see anywhere from 400 to 800 strikes uh

hitting Ukraine, a mixture of shot

heads, ballistic missiles, and every day

you see the Ukrainian air defenses

taking out probably anywhere from 75 to

90% uh of the incoming strikes, which is

still in and of itself pretty remarkable

given the volume of strikes are

happening on Ukraine. But in this case,

uh the the advantage is clearly for

Russia. um the proliferation the the the

ability of Russia to scale up production

of shot heads to scale up um ballistic

missiles is really working to Ukraine's

detriment unfortunately and no matter

how many air defenses uh or Patriot

batteries um and Humvees with uh machine

guns on the back of them it's very hard

uh to meet that threat. Uh the

innovation factor really hasn't caught

up um with the sheer volume of strikes

uh hitting Ukraine. No, that's a great

point. We uh for our our our regular

Russian Roulette podcast listeners will

know that we had a a podcast episode

looking at uh Ukraine's energy

infrastructure recently. Uh and and the

the toll that right now it's taking on

Ukrainians uh is really tremendous

because power outages are are happening

um all the time and it's an incredibly

cold winter. Um although March is around

the corner, their hope is that that

Ukraine is looking uh to get get through

this winter at the very least and then

uh we'll have to figure out how how to

prepare for next winter because I think

it's its power grid is is increasingly

um a major uh uh fixed target that

Russia is is uh knows and is able to to

to focus on. Maria, maybe that's a good

segue to talk a bit about the economic

side of this war. Um four years ago uh

before even the invasion took place

there was a massive western effort to

think about sanctions to sort of game

plan uh a sanctions response. This was

actually one of the major threats that

the Biden administration made to uh to

Russian President Putin that there would

be you know massive economic sanctions

if if an invasion were to occur.

Reflecting on the four years, um I you

know the US and the West in many ways

followed through. The EU is looking to

finalize its now 20th sanctions package.

Uh the Trump administration has

escalated the sanctions even more now

going after the Russian energy sector.

If you take a step back and look at how

how the sanctions performed um what is

what is your take? That's part of the

learning curve that I flagged before. Uh

meaning that yes, Russia is quite huge

economy unprecedented from what has been

uh like previously previous countries

that were uh similarly sanctioned and it

also has an quite amazing ability to

adjust to the sanctions. Part of that is

the legacy of the 1990s where many of

the Russian businessmen learn how to

survive in violation of multiple rules.

That is definitely is incentivized by

the state. And of course, last but not

the least, we also have the China

elephant in the room or broadly speaking

the global south. All those countries

neighboring Russia or located further

away that for various reasons actually

are complacent in helping Russia to um

circumvent this sanctions. Having said

that, what is unique about last year and

this is the fourth time we're doing this

event is that for the first time we see

that the economic strain finally came to

Russia in a very significant manner in

the first couple years of war remember

observers laughing at the sanctions

saying hey you know where are they

Putin's economy grew at 3 to 4%

surpassing many western economies all of

that is gone and for the first time we

seriously we see how the uh the

sanctions and the war combined start

putting serious strain on the economy.

Uh the Kremlin is increasingly forced to

make u unfortunate for the Kremlin

trade-offs like for example they raised

taxes quite significantly including the

VAT which is painful for the for the

economy. They're trying to control the

inflation that's been accelerated

because of the the militaryian policies

but that means that they're killing

multiple businesses in the same time. In

fact, the number of the new startups at

the lowest level in 14 years in Russia

as of latest statistics. Most

importantly, the oil uh the energy

revenues have been hit. I'm not going to

be giving all the credit to the western

sanctions. Of course, it's a combination

of the war, the horrible cost that it

imposes on the Russian society and of

course the oil price oil market dynamic

where for the first time in many years

we see there's more supply of oil than

demand and that has been pushing the oil

prices down but euros Russian brand of

oil has particular high discount because

of the associated western sanctions and

I will give the Trump administration

credit where the pressure on India is

one of the key purchases of the Russian

oil and sanctions on Ross Nef will

definitely contribute to this overall

dynamic. So as we see Russian deficit

has been widening quite dramatically uh

way still below the threshold where we

they should be really worried but quite

unpleasant and uh first of all they've

been rewiring re uh doing the budget

last year several times and still ended

up with a deficit much larger than they

expected and already in January this

year the they already ate up half of the

anticipated deficit for this upcoming

year which means that the real deficit

will be much larger, maybe three times

larger or something like that. Again,

this is not something catastrophic for

them. I'm not saying that they're about

to, you know, collapse unfortunately for

Ukraine, but this is certainly

unpleasant and Putin's putting an

increasing strain on Putin. And as you

can see, the Kremlin, I think allegedly,

accordingly, has been somewhat shifting

its relationship with this

administration where uh every single

time that Trump is making certain offer,

the Kremlin doesn't just shrug it off,

right? They're trying to sweet talk

Trump into saying, "Hey, sure, but he's

we have an counter proposal. We have

this deal." What it means that the

Kremlin is becoming more sensitive to

the Western I would say. Again, far from

decisive, but certainly a move in the

right direction.

>> Yeah, I think when I when I think back

on sanctions, I mean, I think there was

an assumption that this would just that

sanctions were were in some ways a kill

switch to the Russian economy, that

clearly wasn't the case. There was also

the fact that you know that the

European, US, Western economies, the

global economy was heavily integrated

into in

um with with Russia particularly in the

energy space. One thing that I think I

would give some Europeans some credit

for is that if you know if you were to

predict and you know this time four

years ago, if you were to go to the you

know German uh business industry

associations and say you know in in in

what is it in September, October of that

year? So in, you know, six to nine

months, you're going to basically be

completely cut off from Russian gas.

What's that going to do to your economy?

Their answer would be we'll be in a

great depression. And when the

Nordstream uh one and two pipelines

exploded in the fall of 2022, you that

had huge impacts on Europe's economy, uh

the huge energy crisis, uh prices

spiked, which was a real economic boom,

uh boon to Russia, just overall energy

prices going up. But you've seen Europe

react uh not turn back to Russian uh

energy in the last four years. There's

still some residuals, Russian LG and and

the one pipeline that is is currently

the focus. But in general, the Europe's

major economies essentially were forced

to quit cold turkey and uh and I don't

think are are really set on on turning

back.

>> I'll just quickly add to that that in

fact we're flagging Ukraine's

resilience. We flag Russia's resilience,

but it's al something should be said

about Western European resilience.

altogether all of the parties are far

more resilient than what we would expect

from uh this war of attrition.

>> Yeah. And I think the US generating

suddenly uh an funding that was sort of

unimaginable

uh in in 2021, you know, tens of

billions of dollars for Ukraine military

assistance has to be mentioned too. Um H

maybe turn it back to Russia, Russia's

place in the world, how how that's

evolved over the last four years.

uh you know Vladimir Putin used to be a

regular in European capitals and in in I

think it was 2018 2019 uh President

Mcron host him and Angala Merkel and

Zalinsky together for for peace talks um

there's been a huge change in how Russia

engages and approaches the world. What

has shifted now in Russian foreign

policy? Is Russia's are they as isolated

as as we want or or how do you see

Russia's place in the world?

So the way that I think about this

question about global Russia if you wish

uh is to say that persevering in this

war against Ukraine and the west became

the organizing principle of Russia's

entire foreign policy. That means that

all of Russia's actions in the world

have come to be judged against this

question. Does it help Russia persevere

in the war outlast the west? And so that

has resulted in quite a bit of Russian

foreign policy adaptation. And if I if I

had to draw a balance sheet today, I

would say that Russia's foreign policy

has been successful in helping Russia

secure economic lifelines, as Maria

noted, avoiding full international

isolation and therefore to prosecute the

war. But this shift has also produced

unintended consequences for Russia that

will actually weaken Russian power

projection in the world over the long

term. So let me sort of go through some

of the successes and some of the

failures as I see them. I think in terms

of success, foreign economic

statecraftraft is sort of right up the

list. You know, we've talked about

Russia reorienting oil exports to

customers like China, India. That's been

absolutely instrumental. The assembling

of the shadow fleet to circumvent the

the the G7 price cap. There's also the

the the import what we call the Eurasian

roundabout. about Russia's ability to

import both consumer goods and dual use

goods through third countries to

circumvent western restrictions. I think

all of that has been critical perhaps

most important and JP noted the Shahai

drone production. I think this turn to

Iran early in the war to procure not

just the Shia drones but also the

production technology has been really

important for Russia's war and then a

bit later the turn to the DPRK for

artillery shells, missiles and then

later

um troops um and of course the Chinese

support throughout with dual use goods.

So that's sort of on the economic

statecraftraft side. I would note that

Russia has also been fairly successful

in what you could call the war of

narratives, meaning selling its own

story about this war, about the origins

and the nature of this war to receptive

global audiences, where Russia portrays

this war not as a war against Ukraine,

but as a proxy war against what it calls

the collective west, NATO, as an

anti-neocolonial war, and grafting that

narrative onto sensitivities in parts of

of the non-western world. I think

there's been a certain success there and

obviously Russia has massively stepped

up the game to disseminate its

narratives in the non-western world. You

know, we've had RT being taken off air

in Western societies and opening new

offices in the non-western world,

Russian houses opening, Russia

reassigning diplomats to embassies in

the non-western world. So, that's

another I think calibrated success. Um

and then in international diplomacy, you

know, I would sort of take issue with

this characterization that this war has

isolated Russia. You know, if you look

at uh Russia's hustling to elevate the

bricks, the Russians hosted the bricks

chairmanship in 2024. They hosted

hundreds of events, a big summit in

Kazan. We had the UN secretary general

present and a lot of states represented.

And so I think the interesting question

here to ask though is to what extent is

this about appearance of not being

internationally isolated and perhaps

neutralizing criticism over the war. I

think there they've done fairly well. I

have sort of questions over Russia being

able to create something durable and

really sort of putting forward a vision

for you know um a a more multipolar

order that it promises. Just quickly on

on the failures or the let's call it

unintended consequences.

I think the flip side of the Chinese

support is the growing Russian

dependence on China and asymmetry in

that relationship. That is a long-term

challenge for Russia. We can talk more

about China perhaps later in the

conversation. Another unintended

consequence is what happened in Europe.

You've already noted the expansion of of

NATO to include Finland and Sweden and

growing defense spending. I think, you

know, for a Russia that argued in

February 2022 that it needed to wage war

to make itself more secure, Russia has

in many ways made itself less secure.

And the third, I think, unintended

consequence or failure is a a a certain

Russian retreat from other parts of the

world where the Russians used to be more

present. I'm thinking of the South

Caucuses. I'm thinking of the Middle

East regions where other players a

player like Turkey a player like

Azeraijan have gained in leverage visav

Russia Russia's partners coming under

growing pressure Maduro in Venezuela the

fall of the Assad regime in Syria what's

happening with Iran. Um so there's a

certain impetence that is on display.

I'll just close by sort of submitting to

you two caveats on making that argument.

I think it's it's sort of too simplistic

to say that this Russian um impotence or

pacivity, you know, in terms of saving

Assad or doing more for the Iranians,

that it's all due to the war in Ukraine.

I think that's probably simplistic. I

think we can imagine a world in which

the US or Israel decided to strike Iran

and there was no war in Ukraine and

Russia wouldn't have acted much

differently. So, I think we shouldn't

overstate the war in Ukraine as an

explanatory v variable. And I think we

should also be cautious not to overstate

a sort of Russian retreat. There's

regions in the world where Russia is

actually making advances like for

example the Africa corps in the Sahil.

It has also held on to its bases in

Syria. So Russia is sort of down but not

out. And to me as an analyst the

interesting question is sort of assuming

an end to the war in Ukraine. to what

extent will Russia be able to restore

some of the influence and some of the

power projection that have perhaps

suffered as a result of this war?

>> No, I think those are are great points.

You know, one one sort of additional

thought is, you know, in some ways

they've succeeded in in prompting the

rearmament of of Germany and turning uh

Germany into potentially a major

military power again. Germany is on

track to spend as much uh as the UK and

France combined. uh and that you know at

least historically has been a Russian

nightmare as German military power.

Another is that the arm sales uh that

has really oftenimes been kind of the

backbone of Russian foreign policy has

suffered uh just because Russia needs

its its arms for itself. France has

overtaken Russia as the second largest

uh uh seller of arms in the world.

>> But again, that's a trend that started

before the war in Ukraine, right? The

decline in Russian arm sales.

>> Yeah. And I think you can go back to

2014 these sort of long-term trends um

in North Korea that that relationship is

also very interesting the Russia North

Korea relationship with the one hand is

he feels very short- termist um on uh

especially on Russia's side uh but uh

you know and sort of undermines Russia's

any pretense of Russia of being a a

non-prololiferation champion although it

it doesn't seem like you know they're

going to care that much about about sort

of coming back to that that position uh

in the world um after playing sort of a

con at times a constructive role on Iran

and other issues. Michael, maybe to turn

it to you. I mean, I want your thoughts

on everything that's been discussed, but

but maybe if you could al also reflect

on Ukraine, you know, four years um into

this war. Uh it struck me that I think

the kind of western narrative when we

saw this Russia invasion of Ukraine is

that this was the most black and white

good versus evil conflict I think in our

lifetimes so to speak. Uh where it was a

authoritarian state invading a democracy

that had done you know that just wanted

to live its lives live its life and and

there was a huge outpouring of of

support for for Zalinsky for Ukraine. um

throughout 2022 into 2023 feels like

we're in kind of a different place now.

Um but also maybe, you know, how has

Ukraine itself evolved over the last

four years of being just in a constant

state of of war, of feeling wartime

anxiety, the losses on the front? How

how do you assess this from a Ukrainian

perspective?

Well, to start with your uh the first

part of your uh your question and so to

go back to a few things that Hana was

saying a moment ago, there's uh an irony

to to Russia's global position in this

conflict and it's that, you know, for a

very long time, Russia has been making

the argument for multipolarity. Putin is

classically a ruler who wants to make up

the rules as he goes along. you know,

sort of comfortable with anarchy up to a

point, you know, forcing all these

problems onto the doorsteps of others.

And that had been his recipe for quite a

while. And now you have the Trump

administration which is for different

reasons and with a different agenda

using a somewhat similar style, right?

It's writing the rules as it goes along.

It's putting problems on the door

doorsteps of other powers, other

countries, uh, other regions and doing

so in a way that is contributing to

global international disorder. And it's

actually a very difficult world for

Russia to navigate. Uh that's the irony

of this development that in effect the

world that both Russia and to a degree

the United States are creating uh is not

a world that globally speaking seems

especially favorable to Russia which may

be a matter of the proportion the kind

of degree of power that Russia brings to

the table globally which is quite a bit

less I think than Putin would like it uh

to be. what the implications are that

for the war in Ukraine, I wouldn't begin

to know. But it's it's um one of the

confusing places, one of many confusing

places that Putin finds himself at the

moment. And again, a kind of argument

against a lot of champagne being drunk

in in the Kremlin at the present uh at

the present moment. Uh you know, two

answers to the question about Ukraine.

And I think the two necessary answers is

that for reasons entirely understandable

for both Ukraine and the countries

supporting it. There was a bit of a myth

created that Ukrainians are superhumanly

resilient. Uh that velinsky is you know

Winston Churchill redux. Although let's

remember that Winston Churchill was

voted out of office uh as soon as that

war ended. And you know if you take a

sober view of Winston Churchill on

questions of empire and other things

it's not a monochromatic picture

>> wartime management of you pushing for

the invasion of Italy other things that

are questioned in retrospect.

>> Exactly. So even the myths sometimes are

less mythic

>> not to question Winston Churchill.

>> Right. The myths are less mythic than

they than they purport to be. uh but uh

you know the biggest risk I I would say

that this country took at the time and

and and maybe in Europe it's similar is

that it was a kind of Hollywood script

created that the underdog is going to

triumph over uh adversity and and you

know the remarkable Ukrainians and

Zilinsky are going to do it. It's not

that all of the elements of that

narrative are false, but they are

romantic and mythic and uh maybe

sentimental uh in nature and reality has

exerted itself in ways that are

difficult to hide in a few areas. And so

there's the corruption scandal in

Ukraine uh last fall which does touch on

the figure of uh Zalinski. You have the

fact, this is not Silinski's fault, but

it's just a fact that the country is in

martial law. You have not had elections

for four years. Uh and that's not

simple. uh and you know wars don't make

countries more liberal and more

democratic they tend to have the

opposite uh effect and so some of that

is also uh visible as well uh and it's

just clear in a different sense that

Ukraine's mountain decline when it comes

to joining Europe uh is a steep mountain

it's not going to be an easy uh easy

march from where it is now to some you

know organic part of the European club

and I think we all sort of sense that at

the moment it just makes this narrative

a different one from the narrative of of

Zilinski's inevitable triumph. But the

second point I think is probably more

important. Yes, Ukrainians are not

superhuman, but to go back to Maria's

point, they've withstood or on the verge

of withstanding another very difficult

winter. Um, yes, there are manpower

problems, but there's been a lot of

innovation uh on the Ukrainian side. And

we can fun we can focus a lot on the

binaries. EU membership, NATO

membership. But if we focus a little bit

more on the complexities, we see that

there's a lot of defense industrial

cooperation between Ukraine and Europe.

I would assume also between Ukraine uh

and the US feedback loops of information

uh and creativity that are going to

matter in the long going to matter long

term for this uh for this conflict.

Zilinsky has not fallen. You know, free

press has not been squedched uh in

Ukraine. It remains a pluralistic

society. So look, you know, take a

realistic score scorecard, not a

Hollywood scorecard. Uh I think Ukraine

has done extraordinarily well, including

over the past year.

>> Maybe we can turn to, you know, sort of

assess the present and what that means

for the future. So Michael, maybe just

go back to you. um negotiations uh that

are being uh uh initiated and led by the

Trump administration

um uh essentially to try to negotiate a

a ceasefire and end to this war. They

sort of settled on trying to view this

not not through uh an ideological lens

but but I think their interpretation is

that this is a territorial dispute that

uh if you could settle the donbos you

settle the war. Um, what do you think of

the current state of negotiations? Where

do you think this is headed? Do you

think we're headed toward uh some sort

of ceasefire, peace agreement in in in

2026?

>> It's hard for me to believe that we are.

U I would say um with the Trump

administration,

there's nothing wrong and nothing bad

about it having created a diplomatic

process. Uh that's to the good. Um, if

the war is going to have any kind of

negotiated settlement, there's going to

have to be a long run-up to that and

that has begun. Uh, and

um, it's also not wrong to experiment

and to try and to sort of see what's

plausible and possible. And in theory,

one could imagine that there's a vector

that could open in the next few months

prior to the midterms where President

Trump can kind of give Russia the best

deal conceivable. So Russia might want

to take that and Ukraine might feel that

there's a need for domestic reasons and

other reasons to cut its losses and

figure out some kind of compromise and

that there can be an arrangement made

that yields at the very least an

operational pause if not a more durable

ceasefire. I have a hard time imagining

a kind of true settlement to the

conflict even if that vector

materializes over the next couple of

months. But I will flag two concerns

that I would have at the present moment

which is not that the Trump

administration is doing diplomacy but

it's how they're doing it. Doing this

without deep consultation with the

European Union, with European partners

and allies, with the frontline states,

with the various coalitions of the

willing that are there in Europe seems

to me like diplomatic malpractice that

it's sort of taking the major agent in

the conflict outside of uh Ukraine,

Europe, uh, and putting it on the

sidelines. I just don't see how that

works. And also, as there's been quite a

bit of reporting in the last week in the

New York Times and the Economist and

elsewhere, Russia is dangling, you know,

billions, trillions of deals before the

Trump administration, before the Trump

and Whitkoff families, uh, you know,

obviously Russia is trying to, you know,

play the angles there, uh, I have no

idea if that's going to succeed. But if

even an inch of progress is made for

Russia in that, uh, in that domain, I

think it makes the diplomacy also much

more difficult. It makes it harder for

Ukraine to sign on to it. It makes it

harder for the Europeans to sign on if

they feel that this is kind of

transactional deal making that benefits

individuals in Washington as opposed to

a really sustainable and adequate

solution to the problems at hand.

>> Just maybe one quick thought to add to

this. I I do think that the the key

question this year will be whether

Russia will reach a point where the

economic pain of this war and the losses

reach a sort of level where Vladimir

Putin will say it is better to re reach

a ceasefire. um make some concessions as

opposed to keep keep fighting. I'm

actually less concerned about what has

long been this worst case scenario that

Ukrainians and Europeans certainly are

worried about, which is this idea that

we get to a point where the Trump

administration will essentially force

Ukraine into a a bad deal, into a sort

of surrender deal where they'll have to

cave to Russian maximalist demands. And

that is I say that because um I've been

watching the Trump administration's ma

zaparandi over the last year and I think

um things like the handling of the new

board of peace or even the Greenland

threats that we've had a few weeks ago

suggest that

Donald Trump does care about intensely

negative feedback. He he wants to be

perceived as the peacemaker. He he likes

the idea of settling wars. He wants that

kind of praise. But the way that the

Greenland saga played out also suggests

that when there is very strong push back

from the markets, from Europeans,

perhaps from within his own party, he

does sort of walk away from these

maximalist demands. And I think it's

quite clear that if he were to force

Ukraine into a bad deal, there would be

intense resistance. And and so I'm not

sure really he can do that. And so

unless the Russians come around to

lowering their demands, I also don't see

the space emerging where uh at least a

pause to the fighting will be possible.

>> Yeah. No, Maria, maybe over to you

because one one question I have is I

think I guess the question I have is we

sort of at times create a dichotomy of

war and ceasefire.

And do you think that I mean isn't

another path for Putin to just kind of

continue the war but at a lower rate of

intensity? Um I I guess how how do you

how do you see the negotiations and and

the the options available to to Russia?

First of all, I echo everything that my

colleagues have said. And if there's one

good thing uh despite the horrible uh

torture that's currently Russia is um

imposing on Ukraine as we speak, there

is a path forward for Ukraine. I think

the last year definitely flagged that

even with possibly worst case scenario

with the US distancing itself and

decreasing the military aid, there is

still a way forward with the European

support even if it's definitely

extremely difficult for Ukraine. In that

sense, we are I think on the pathway

towards this war of attrition going

forward with one of the sides hopefully

it will be Russia eventually given up

but Russia is not yet yet there and also

one more point of flag is that

unfortunately we don't quite understand

what is Putin does Putin even know like

when we try to put ourselves in his head

what is the information that he receives

right likely it's not the same one that

we do and judging by his statements his

previous articles about like this

long-term um affinity between Russia and

Ukraine and the also the forecast that

they made at the start of this war.

Clearly that completely wrong and that's

the key problem which is one of the

problems with autocracy in general. This

is likely to recreate the loop uh in

which he will keep doubling down.

There's new ISW reporting that says that

he's likely preparing another offensive

in the summer. And uh well, they're not

raising enough money, not they're not

recruiting enough soldiers. Like, by the

way, January was the first year when the

losses that Russia suffered exceed the

number of the men they recruit.

According to Ukrainian data, they lost

44,000 people while they recruited about

35 to 40. Uh this is not sustainable. He

will have to do something about that.

that likely will have to do with

additional maybe mobilization or some

sort of techniques. But even if he

eventually abandons these goals, he will

probably not abandon the territorial

goals. Uh they've achieved additional

territory through the offensive. He

still unfortunately as we show you know

Max in our publication at CS with CSS he

still has a lot of tools at his disposal

at

incurring losses on Ukraine by sending

missiles and drones and Russia has

skyrocketed its drone production that

unfortunately is still very much

possible. So there's no clear way out of

this situation. The only reason I think

that he would consider stopping is

potential orchestrating some smaller but

more like consequential offensive on

NATO in the long term. But because it's

unlikely he's he's going to be tried

both at the same time. Uh but for now um

what we see is unfortunately more um of

the same.

>> JP, let me bring you back in here. Um,

if you sort of project out throughout

2026, I mean, where do you see things

headed uh, militarily on the

battlefield? I mean there I guess there

is always this potential in the cat and

mouse game of of military innovation uh

that perhaps the Ukrainians or the

Russians uh make some innovation or

develop some new technique and that

gives them the upper hand or or do you

do you think we're just kind of in a in

a nutritional fight that will just

continue? Where do you where do you

think Russia is is headed right now

militarily um over this next year and do

you think that's sustainable in

indefinitely? Is there is there a point

that Russia will have to sort of say we

can't we just can't keep keep fighting

this way and and taking these losses?

How do you see this this sort of next

year years playing out?

>> Well, far from me to sort of try to

predict the uh the tipping point or the

vulnerabilities. I think we've all

>> we've all failed at that um over the

course of the last four years. But um I

do think you know I just wanted to pull

the thread on Maria's point earlier

about manpower. I think I just want to

hit on that a little bit more and just

to elaborate um in many ways I mean I

think a lot of people are pointing to

sort of the endemic sort of weaknesses

on the Ukrainian side with manpower and

it's been a lot of attention on you know

not lowering the conscription age lower

than 25. Um there's been some negative

press about you know young Ukrainian

males um going abroad, not returning and

the pressure campaigns in foreign

countries on Ukrainian males to return

and fight for their country. But in many

ways I think the manpower strain is

actually more acute for Russia and than

Ukraine. And I think in many ways um

this this you know replenishment rate uh

or the failure to to meet the

replenishment rate as Maria uh

previously said um could really lead I

think to or exacerbate some internal

sort of discord uh and pressures that's

already sort of latent inside the

Russian military right now. Um, we've

already seen, you know, the region

struggle to make their manpower quotas.

We've already seen uh the uh enlistment

bonuses go way up for enlisting in in

the Russian military. And and just from

a military point of view, Russia's

tactics and Russia's strategy is

increasingly reliant on mass, you know,

the firepower and manpower required to

make advances on the battlefield. Um,

Russia, the Russian military is not uh

innovating any any new found maneuver

tactic uh that we've seen uh besides

small scale infantry assaults across

this kill zone which have effectively

been neutralized by the Ukrainian

defenses. It's always easier to defend

than to attack and it always requires a

a heck of a lot more manpower to do

this. And so uh the failure to meet that

replenishment rate for the Russian armed

forces has I think some interesting

consequences uh that we could see

reverberate. U thinking back two years

ago, three years ago, um these internal

divisions inside the Russian military

are probably always there. I don't think

we have a good handle uh on what these

exact um dis, you know, points of

friction are. you know, who I certainly

didn't have it on my bingo card with

Pragoian and Bagner rising up um you

know, two or three years ago when we saw

that happening. So, I think those

internal tensions, those internal um

points of friction in the military are

still there. I think it'll be

interesting to see how Russia does or

does not adapt um to this manpower

shortage on the battlefield uh going

forward. uh for Ukraine's part, I think

it's actually in all things considered

done quite an effective uh way of

meeting that threat. Uh and it can't,

you know, it requires less manpower to

do so and to defend in depth like

Ukraine has been doing over the last

year.

>> Maybe in the in the final 10 minutes

that we have, I I think it's sort of

worth sort of thinking about and

projecting sort of forward. You know, if

you were to ask me two years ago, three

years ago, four years ago, you know, if

this time 2022 and said 2026, it's going

to be entering year five of this war.

The intensity and scale of the fighting

is is, you know, exactly where it was,

or it's at the same level roughly as it

was, you know, last year, the year

before. Is it time to start thinking

about this as as sort of a long war and

not start thinking about this in three

months, six month, year-long, you know,

increments, but to think about this more

as the next four years about what needs

to be done. Um, with the hope that

that's not the case. But um maybe

Michael, I'm curious for for your

thoughts on on how, you know, now that

the United States military assistance is

is basically it's it's winding down. Um

and this is sort of transitioning over

to the Europeans as the major financeers

of Ukraine's war effort. And you know,

how should Europe how should the

Ukrainians be thinking about this war?

Um is it in six-month in increments? Is

or is it do they need to begin to have a

multi-year strategy? And what should

that look like?

>> Well, I think the answer to me

emphatically is a multi-year strategy if

not wants to use if one wants to use a

dramatic term, a generational strategy

because the deep underlying issues are

uh indeed so deep when it comes to this

to this war. We've spoken about a

ceasefire. We've spoken about negotiated

settlements, but let's really think

about what it would mean to normalize

relations, you know, between Europe and

and Russia. I think the United States is

a little bit more of a wild card, but

normalization means that Russia has to

leave Ukraine and it probably means war

crimes uh trials and it probably means

reparations uh as well. How many decades

are we from that, including a postutin

Russia? I think that would have a hard

time signing on to those uh to those

realities. And I think on the Ukrainian

side, it's essential to think of this as

a generational struggle because even if

the guns were to fall silent, the threat

is not going to disappear. the

resentment on the Russian side, some of

the strategic concerns that Putin has

are not going to uh evaporate and

certainly Russia's capacity, even if

Russia goes through a hard time

politically or economically, Russia's

capacity is not going to uh is not going

to disappear. And so the long-term

strategy and, you know, in in 30 seconds

uh would be, you know, to build up as

much conventional military capacity

uh as possible and at the same time to

build up the diplomatic wherewithal uh

to manage all of this. And that includes

Ukraine which of course is talking to

Russia in many different ways at the

moment and will have to uh in the future

uh and the transatlantic relationship

sort of fragmented and troubled as it is

cannot be detached from the project of

deterrence uh and also in a different

sense from escalation management which

is in part political in part diplomatic

part economic uh in part uh military. So

this is the most predictable of all

answers you're going to get but we're

kind of at the beginning. we're in 1948

uh and the the Cold War is beginning and

we have to think in those arcs uh today

as people were capable of doing back

then.

>> I think that that's a great point. I

think that's also where I think on the

European side is that you know there's a

big effort to figure out how to finance

Ukraine and there was a passage of a

loan. It's currently being held up by

the Hungarian uh by the by Hungary right

now. Um but my guess is the EU finds a

way. that this is going to be something

that Europeans are probably going to

have to do again and again and again and

not viewing, you know, the last December

European Council as sort of a one-off.

Um Hana, maybe same question to you and

then also but from, you know, sort of

Russia's perspective. I think part of

what you've outlined uh in your previous

answer was sort of how Russia's, you

know, playing sort of the long game

strategy of reorienting its entire sort

of approach to the world to to further

the war effort. And maybe you could talk

a little bit about China as well and the

Russia China relationship and how

central that's I think going to be or or

presently is for for for Russia. But so

h how how are how are the Russians

thinking about this in terms of um you

know six month or nine months or is this

a multi-year generational effort?

>> So just briefly to add to Michael's

point I think the sort of balance

between deterrence of Russia and then

some form of escalation management or

guardrails are sort of right on. I mean,

if I look at this sort of zooming out

from the Ukraine battlefield for a

moment, I think there's a view in Europe

that we'll have a adversarial

relationship with Russia for a long time

to come, regardless of how the war ends

and we're in a situation where we're

rearming conventionally. New start has

expired and there's not going to be

formal nuclear arms control for a while.

Russia has large number of non-strategic

nuclear weapons. It will continue to

engage in a hybrid campaign against

Europe. And so how do you sort of manage

that confrontation and prevent it from

escalating I think is going to be one of

the big tasks for Europe because you

need also political buyin for something

that is not just deterrence with Russia

and all of this is happening in an

environment where the Europeans are very

concerned about the durability of US

commitment to Europe. So you have these

sort of heightened fears in that regard

and so I think that's going to be a

major challenge going forward. Turning

to the Russia China relationship, um

yes, I do think there is we're probably

on a trajectory of growing Russian

dependence on China and a growing

asymmetry in that relationship. I mean,

you'd have you'd need a full reversal in

the Russia rest relationship for that to

sort of be corrected. And I just don't

see that. So we're already in a in a

situation now where I think 30% of

Russia's export revenue comes from China

and 40% of imports come from China and

there's just no alternative to a country

that can simultaneously provide this big

market to take Russian hydrocarbon

resources provide it with modern

technology that the Russian military

will need to reconstitute the financial

tools to circumvent western sanctions

and the logistical proximity for all of

that trade. And so my sense is that

there's probably elites in Moscow who

are worried about this trajectory who

would like Russia to become not quite so

dependent on China and to sort of hedge.

But the reality is also that Russia is

going to be constrained in terms of its

room to maneuver. And I think for for us

analysts, I think the interesting

questions to ask are what implications

is this growing dependence going to have

going forward. If we think for instance

about a potential war in the Taiwan

Strait, you know, is this growing

Russian Chinese uh cooperation going to

manifest in Russian support for instance

to China in in in in the event of war in

the Indo-Pacific? Those are the kinds of

questions that we need to be asking.

Yeah, it it does raise the kind of

typical Kissinger question about Europe

is that he doesn't know who to call when

he wants to call Europe. And there is

talk within Europe of okay, the

Europeans are sidelining these

negotiations, but there probably needs

to be a red phone somewhere in Europe

that then can go to Moscow so that there

can be clear lines of communications.

There's talk about creating a special

envoy position within the European Union

to engage or within Europe overall to to

be kind of that point of contact to

engage. Um uh JP maybe could come come

to you um just on the military

assistance side. You had sort of a front

row seat to to supporting uh Ukraine

militarily at least from a US

perspective. if this is going to be a

longer war um effort uh you know is

Europe currently set up to do this uh to

fill the gap that we leave how do you

sort of see the situation unfolding and

you know what really needs to

materialize there if if anything uh to

kind of maintain Ukraine Ukraine's war

effort um so that it's it's at least

things don't move all that dramatically

on the battlefield.

>> That's a great question Michael. I think

uh in many ways Europe has begun this

transformation as we've seen over the

last one to two years and sort of you

know mobilizing their defense industrial

base and several different sectors. You

know we've seen this in ammunition

production has gone up. Um it it took

way too long to get there. Uh but it has

scaled up. Um the the production of

armored vehicles albeit less important

for today's warfare has gone up. uh the

production of drones and drone support

and unmanned vehicle uh and weapon

systems to Ukraine has gone up. There's

several different consortiums across

Europe that are already in Ukraine uh

making defense technology which is more

than we can say for the United States.

Um, and so they've worked out uh some of

these arrangements

um to help embolden I think Ukrainian

production but also enter into these

really important joint production

facilities to help bolster the Ukrainian

defenses. I think where European um

support uh is still has uh some ways to

go is fulfilling those sort of

critically enabling functions as we like

to say in the US military in terms of

intelligence support um and other sort

of logistical I think throughput uh that

helps get Ukraine where it needs to be.

Although in some of those spheres we've

seen some modest improvement as well.

And so I think that's the way I'm

looking at it uh in terms of uh European

support uh to Ukraine. And I think it'll

be interesting to see what future

looking ahead which uh defense

industries further set up arrangements

uh with Ukrainian defense industry and

the future of the Ukrainian procurement

system which is probably receiving so

many requests from so many sides. It's

really hard to decipher what they need

and and when they need it. Maria, maybe

final question to you and and to sort of

touch on what the questions I've just

just asked about this sort of long war

approach. Is that what you see is

happening uh inside of Russia that

they're sort of gearing up for a

long-term generational struggle whether

against Ukraine or the West? How how do

you see this playing out? Unfortunately

on the societal level uh the regime has

invested a lot of resources uh trying to

destroy the whatever remaining you know

se segments of the liberal institutions

they were closing off some of the key

and and reworking the museums for

example devoted to the memory of

repressions deeply doubling down on

indoctrination of the youth which used

to be uh the most like progressive maybe

liberal segment of the population and as

we can see that delivers already as the

younger Russians have become

increasingly more quote unquote

patriotic. They were the ones more

skeptical about the war also partly

because they are the ones to die in this

war uh first. We also see the growing

criminalization of society. Something I

think we underestimated when looking at

the consequences of the second world

war. all these uh you know traumatized

soldiers coming back in the Russian

case. They're also often the ones who

recently have been in prison because as

we know the regime has actively recorded

those for those convicts uh and send

them to the war. So over the last four

years at least uh over thousand of uh

civilians had been killed or injured by

the returning uh soldiers. half of them

are former convicts and the um uh courts

are actually quite lenient towards those

cases. Imagine what happens when 700,000

of those come back or maybe they will

not come back but it's clear that some

sort of consequences for the Russian

society will be very detrimental in a

way that it's hard really to envision a

you know quick liberalization of

democratization after the regime ends.

Last but not the least uh this is the

war that's ideation of this regime. is

committed not to repeat the the mistakes

in the view Gorbachev has done when he

liberalized the system. Most likely the

next person who succeeds Putin will be

drawing from this sicknam and coutura

elites currently in control of the

decision-m that means it may go means

some normalization of the relationship

meaning descalation but it does not mean

going back to where we were before 2022.

Last but not the least, even if there is

some settlement, because the regime is

driven, as argued before, by this really

ambitious goal of re imagining European

security and the global order, as we

have discussed, it's likely that any

ceasefire is only going to be temporary.

Unfortunately, with this army of 700,000

people, it's likely that they're going

to want to make it use again, make use

it again.

>> Well, that that's not an uplifting note

to end our conversation. Um uh I think

maybe just to close on one uplifting

note. I think if you were to survey all

you know the the expert community four

years ago would have said my god you

know Russia is going to do a full-scale

invasion. Ukraine is going to be um is

really going to be up against it in its

survival is is unlikely. And that's

where I think the the Hollywood style

Zalinsky movie should probably be you

know darkest hour. uh there should be a

portrayal of it because his his

willingness to stay in Kev to stand uh

and fight I think really did set an

example and Ukraine still exists today

four years later. Uh unfortunately we're

probably going to have the same

conversation um this time next year but

I think it would also be in a situation

where Ukraine is still here still the

the prospect of Ukraine uh Ukraine

survival going anywhere I think is very

unlikely. Um but unfortunately we're

going to have to leave it there. I

really want to thank uh our great

panelists uh for joining us. Uh I also

want to thank you for tuning in uh to

our Russian Roulette podcast listeners.

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