Original subtitles

- McCord named John Dean as having had advanced knowledge

of the Watergate operation.

- Right away you could see the beginnings of an effort

to smear John Dean.

- I'm the low guy on the totem pole, and they thought they

could dump things on me.

- This was a Dean plot. - I know it.

- I didn't do it.

- Pressure was building today on President Nixon to appoint

an independent investigator.

- It kept looking worse and worse.

- John Dean has reported today ready to testify.

- They want war? I'll give 'em war.

I began by telling the President that there was

a cancer growing on the presidency,

and if the cancer was not removed,

the President himself would be killed by it.

I had let them very clearly know that I was not going

to participate in the matter any further

and I thought it was time that everybody

start thinking about telling the truth.

I, for the first time, said in front of the President

that I thought that Haldeman, Ehrlichman, and Dean

were all indictable for instruction of--

obstruction of justice.

I could tell that both Haldeman and particularly Ehrlichman

were very unhappy with my comment.

- John Dean starts out as a very flawed human being.

He was the typical suck-up and apparatchik.

He was blinded by the power

and the access to all that power can bring

and did not have the experience

or the ethical fortitude to resist the things

that he got involved in.

- John Dean has got to the bottom of page 90

in a statement that is expected to be about 245 pages.

So he's, uh, by no means halfway through.

He's been talking steadily for about two and one-half hours.

Almost every paragraph

contains some sort of a bombshell.

male narrator: The special prosecutors hadn't known

what Dean would say because Dean had refused to talk

to them without immunity, so they had watched

Dean on television along with everyone else.

- The statements that Dean was making seemed farfetched.

It was hard for me to believe that, um, President Nixon

who--say what you will about him--had this reputation

for surrounding himself with efficient

and no-nonsense people--

would be dependent on someone

as young as John Dean to be in a central role providing

advice about obstructing the investigation.

Clearly his assertions needed to be tested, um,

to the Nth degree in order to be proved credible.

But there was a powerful reason to think

that Dean might be telling the truth.

- He had a huge incentive to testify about everything

that he possibly could because he was testifying under

a grant of use immunity which meant that anything

he talked about or anything we found out about as a result

of what he testified to we could never use against him

in a trial.

- Meeting with the President on April 15th.

As I was driving into the White House,

I wondered to myself if the meeting was a set-up.

The President, almost from the outset, began asking me

a number of leading questions, which was somewhat unlike

his normal conversational relationships I'd had with him.

Which made me think that the conversation was being taped

and a record was being made to protect himself.

- After more than six hours

of unchallenged testimony yesterday,

John Dean returns to the Senate Watergate Committee

this morning to answer questions.

- These senators on both sides of the aisle know that

in front of the nation they have got to ask

the tough questions.

As you know, Frank, the senators are armed

with the White House material, logs supplied

by the White House, and they will use those logs

to try to, ah, jar Dean's story.

- You're fully aware, Mr. Dean, of the gravity of the charges

you have made under oath against the highest official

of our land, the President of the United States?

- Yes, I am.

- And being so aware, do you still stand on your statement?

- Yes, I do.

- Why didn't you, as Counsel to the President,

go to him at that time and tell him what was happening?

- Senator, I was participating in the cover-up at that time.

- Now you're testifying I believe under use immunity

that this committee has granted to you.

- That is correct.

- You would not be here testifying today had we not

granted that use immunity, would you?

- Probably be before the prosecutors, downtown.

- Now, you refused to testify before the Grand Jury,

I believe, did you not? - That is correct.

- You pled the Fifth Amendment there?

- That is correct.

- You have been bargaining with them for immunity, which has

not yet been granted. Is that an accurate statement?

- That is correct, Senator.

- The net sum of your testimony is fairly mind-boggling.

It occurs to me that at this point the central question

is simply put.

What did the President know,

and when did he know it?

Howard Baker became famous for that question,

but it was less sincere than it seemed.

- His famous question of

what did he know and when did he know it was really--

I spotted it as did Charlie immediately.

It was an effort to get me to perjure myself

by narrowing me down.

'Cause Baker had been told by then that,

"We think we can have a way to discredit Dean."

So that's why they tried to pull me through tape--

by conversation by conversation by conversation,

to which I under-testified.

Nixon and Haldeman had hoped to catch Dean

in mistakes about names, places, and dates,

which is why they wanted Baker to ask

extremely detailed questions.

But as Howard Baker listened to Dean,

he began to realize that Nixon probably couldn't survive,

and so the White House started losing its mole.

- He never really even tried to lay a glove on me,

because he didn't know what would come out.

Next, the White House argued that Dean

had masterminded the cover-up without Nixon's knowledge.

Nixon's Watergate attorney, J. Fred Buzhardt,

sent the Watergate Committee a long list of accusations.

- And as you know, Mr. Chairman,

the White House has prepared a memorandum

and a set of questions for use by this committee,

and so with that in mind, I wish to proceed, sir.

Dean's activity in the cover-up

also made him, perhaps unwittingly,

the principal author

of the political and constitutional crisis

that Watergate now epitomizes.

It would have been embarrassing for the President

if the true facts had become known

shortly after June 17,

but it is the kind of embarrassment

that an immensely popular President

could easily have weathered.

The political--

The political problem has been magnified

1,000 fold because the truth is coming out--

coming to light so belatedly because of insinuations

that the White House was a party to the cover-up

and above all because the White House was led

to say things about Watergate that have since been found

to have been untrue.

These added consequences were John Dean's doing.

- Well, Senator, I think that, uh,

my testimony answers, in great detail,

my dealings wi Mr. Haldeman, Mr. Ehrlichman,

and the President,

and based on what I know and knowing the--

the, uh, position I held on the White House staff,

there is no way conceivable that I could have done

and conceived and implemented the plan

that they're trying to suggest that I did.

- Relieved of his Watergate duties by the President

and aware that his own complicity had become obvious,

Dean decided to strike out on his own to hunt for immunity

for the long list of wrongs he had committed.

His increasingly shrill efforts

since that date to save himself

by striking out recklessly at others

are too familiar and too painful to require mention.

This ends the memorandum, Mr. Chairman.

- I would only add to that, uh, Senator,

I think that if anyone who has been on the receiving end

of adverse publicity, it's been this witness

and not any of the other witnesses,

and I have not dealt in personalities,

nor will I deal in personalities

at any time during these hearings.

- John Dean lived right across the street from me,

and I had the opportunity on several occasions

to talk to him informally.

I happened to be over at John's house

and I asked him at that time,

was there anything else, aside from what he had testified to,

that might be of interest?

And it was then that he showed me the, uh, the enemies list.

- These are from a file, uh,

that's entitled "Opponents List and Political Enemies Project."

- And, Sam, I understand you have a copy

of the enemies list that's been referred to.

- I do. I do, Frank. It's not complete.

Remember, Dean said there were several updatings.

- I'll first read their names first,

but then I will tell you more about them as inscribed here.

One, Arnold Picker of United Artists,

described as a top Muskie fundraiser.

- Ed Guthman, Managing Editor of "The L.A. Times,"

a former Kennedy aide.

"A highly sophisticated hatchet man against us in '68."

- Morton Halperin, leading executive at Common Cause,

and it says, "A scandal would be most helpful here,"

as a designation under him.

- Black Panthers, Brookings Institution,

Common Cause, Council for a Livable World,

Farmers Union NFO,

National Student Association,

Southern Christian Leadership Conference,

and I'm just skimming now, Frank.

- Don't skim, Sam. Go ahead.

It's all interesting.

- And National Student Association.

- Daniel Schorr of the Columbia Broadcasting System

in Washington.

The note here is, "A real media enemy."

- Apparently you're not on the list, Frank.

- Well, that's all right. That's all right.

Neither are you, are you, Sam?

- I haven't found my name either.

Let me just do one more--

I know you want to take it back,

but here's a celebrities list. - No, no.

- Carol Channing, Bill Cosby,

Jane Fonda, Steve McQueen,

Joe Namath, Paul Newman, Gregory Peck,

Tony Randall, Barbra Streisand, and Dick Gregory.

The White House apparently didn't like any of them, Frank.

- Didn't like Joe Namath, the football player?

- Well, his name's on the list.

It says, "Joe Namath, New York Giants, businessman..."

- New York Giants? - "And actor."

- Who made up that list? - Well, I don't know!

Is this the list? Is this the portion of the list

that's been turned over to you by John Dean

as being so-called enemies of the White House?

It is an addition to a list we got earlier.

- That would appear to be, Sam.

- I don't think, I don't think, Sam, it's all of it.

- That's not all of it?

Well, there must be 200 names on this list.

- There are more. - There are more.

- What is your understanding of what the White House

was gonna do to these people or try to do to them?

- Well, as you know, in some of the papers

that you've already seen, you've seen very derogatory

personal type of comments.

In other instances, you've seen the suggestive use

of the Internal Revenue Service.

- So your testimony produces quite a stir.

- 80 million Americans, that's what I was told.

The ones that blew me away is--

were when Sam Dash, who was apparently surprised also,

said I was--part of my fan club included people like

Elizabeth Taylor.

They were getting telegrams from people like that.

- He had done something that was stunningly brave,

to come out and take on

the President of the United States.

Think what it takes to stick a knife

in the heart of a president,

and there was no guarantee

that Nixon wasn't going to stay in power at that point.

- I'm quite aware of the fact that in some circumstances

it's gonna be my word against one man's word,

it's gonna be my word against two men,

it's gonna be my word against three men,

and probably in some cases

it's gonna be my word against four men,

but I am prepared to stand on my word and the truth

and the knowledge and the facts I have,

and, uh, I know the truth is my ally in this,

and I think ultimately the truth is going to come out.

- So he has given very damaging testimony.

As always, the question is, is he to be believed?

- The credibility of this man as the country perceives it

is so important.

The presidency itself could hang on it.

The committee forced Ehrlichman

and Haldeman to testify after Dean.

- Let's be clear.

I did not cover up anything to do with Watergate.

They denied everything,

and there was not yet any definitive evidence

against them, but they got nailed anyway.

- So there came a time when you were administering

an investigative unit?

- Yes, in a--in a literal sense, that's true.

- A literal sense? - Yes, sir.

- But not in an actual sense?

- Well, I didn't--

Here I am, dueling with a professor on the words.

- No, I'm not dueling with you.

I'm just trying to get a--

- Professor, if you say actual, it's actual.

- As soon as Howard Baker realized

that much of what was being said about Nixon was true

and based in fact, he immediately backed off

and became probably the most prominent questioner

of witnesses.

- When did you first learn of the break-in?

- On the day following the break-in

when I received this telephone call toward dusk,

late in the afternoon.

- Did you talk to the President on the 17th?

- No, I didn't. Not that I can recall.

- Did you talk to Mr. Haldeman on the 17th?

- I think I talked to him the following day.

- Were you concerned about it?

- Not--not particularly.

- If someone on my staff, even remotely on my staff

were charged with breaking and entering

to the Democratic National Committee headquarters

or someone I was even

associated with in a newspaper column,

that I would be determined to find out if that happened.

Now, was there this air of urgency in the White House

on your part or Haldeman's part or Dean's part?

It's not coming through that way.

It sounds like a routine staff operation,

but this wasn't a routine staff operation.

- Uh...

Point one, he wasn't on my staff,

but that's-- that's beside the point.

- Some believe that your questioning

was really for the first time a very strong,

hostile questioning of an administration witness.

Now is that a fair statement?

- No, I don't think it is, really.

If it is, it's an unconscious situation,

because I'm trying today

as I was trying when these hearings began

to treat everyone the same

and to pursue the matter as dispassionately

as very passionate circumstances will permit.

- Do you believe that spending political campaign funds

to pay for the defense of the criminal defendants

could embarrass the President?

- I don't know. I don't know what--

It depends on the circumstances and the situation, I think.

- What about these circumstances

and this situation involving the Watergate?

- I don't know that I can make a judgment on that.

- I'd like to submit to you a document,

"Re: Charlotte, North Carolina, demonstration.

"One, the most recent intelligence

"that has been received from the advanceman, Bill Henkel,

and the U.S.S.--" United States Secret Service, I gather,

"is that we will have demonstrators

"in Charlotte tomorrow.

"The number is running between 100 and 200.

"The advanceman's gut reaction is between 150 and 200.

They will be violent,"

with a penciled underlining of "violent."

"They will have extremely obscene signs,"

underlining "obscene."

And next to the word "obscene,"

penciled in writing which to me,

and you'll have to confirm this--

it seems to be the same as the writing

below your initialing.

It appears to be yours. If not, I want you to say so--

saying, "Good."

Is that your writing there where it says, "Good"?

- I believe it is, yes, sir. - Mm-hmm.

- "As has been indicated by their handbills.

"It will not only be directed toward the President,

but also toward Billy Graham,"

underlining--underlining, "also toward Billy Graham,"

where you penciled in "Great."

My question specifically relates

to exactly what mentality it is in the White House

that goes ahead and indicates good

when the word violence is mentioned,

when obscenity is mentioned,

which violence and which obscenity

is to be directed against the President of the United States.

How in any way can that be good?

- Slowly but surely as the facts came out,

the American people were scratching their heads

as to their own President.

- I think it reflects poor judgment on Nixon's part,

his, um, choice of people surrounding him.

- I follow it a lot, and I know that Nixon,

he's the head of it.

He knows everything that goes on in the White House,

and they say he didn't, but you know he knows all about it.

- Even if he isn't, you know, it bothers me

in the sense that he would surround himself

with the people that he surrounded himself with

who were involved in it.

Though increasingly isolated,

Nixon continued to fight, including blocking requests

from Ervin's Watergate Committee.

- I'll sit on those papers

if I have to burn every Goddamn paper in this house.

I spoke to Ervin today.

I said, "What's your goal, Senator?"

He'd written a letter demanding documents.

He said, "We want any activities

to do with Watergate."

And I said, "No, Senator. That's not happening.

Everything from your committee leaks."

I was decent,

but I was very tough.

- I think the press has had it, and they know it.

- As far as I'm concerned,

so we'll have a constitutional crisis.

If we lose, I'll burn the papers.

"Your council isn't gonna paw through my papers."

He got the message.

Baker was too soft.

He threw softballs to Dean, he mishandled Mitchell.

- That's bad, but actually it's working out pretty well.

Mitchell came across as a mature, tough guy.

- Really? - Yeah, and compared

to the selfish little bastards Magruder and Dean,

at least you could see why Mitchell was in a top job.

I of course believe what you say, but it's irrelevant.

90% of the stuff they're talking about

goes on all the time.

- That's right.

- Then you consider the massive things

you've done for the country.

The treasonable actions that these people condoned.

- They are treason.

- Taking 10,000 documents in the middle of the war,

attacking the military.

Mansfield cut off the funds for the war.

That is immoral.

- Well, don't you worry.

- I don't worry.

- Keep--keep fighting.

A few days later,

a Watergate Committee investigator

questioned an obscure White House official,

Alexander Butterfield.

Butterfield's answers were a huge surprise,

and they suddenly revealed Nixon's biggest secret,

something nobody had known, not Nixon's own staff,

not Woodward and Bernstein,

not the FBI,

not the special prosecutor.

- Subcommittee will come to order.

- My name is Alexander Porter Butterfield.

- Mr. Butterfield, are you aware of the installation

of any listening devices of the Oval Office of the President?

- I was aware of listening devices, yes, sir.

- As far as you know, did Mr. Ehrlichman

or Mr. Dean know about the existence

or the presence of those devices?

- That would be very unlikely.

My guess is that they definitely did not know.

- One last question, if one were therefore

to reconstruct the conversations

at any particular date, what would be the best way

to reconstruct those conversations, Mr. Butterfield?

- Well, in the obvious manner, Mr. Dash.

To obtain the tape and play it.

- I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.

- We have just heard startling testimony

that the President's office,

the President's phone are all bugged.

- We heard about it as the nation heard about it.

That was a game-changer.

- John Dean didn't know about it.

He had been relying solely on his notes and memory

to testify to specific conversations,

and now there's a chance that every one of those is recorded,

every single word he spoke,

and he knows, as we did,

that if they didn't confirm exactly what he said,

he'd have no credibility and our case was over.

Nixon's lawyer, J. Fred Buzhardt,

was blindsided by the tapes because Nixon had lied to him.

A month earlier, Buzhardt had heard

that Nixon had offered to play a tape

for Henry Petersen of the Justice Department.

So Buzhardt asked Nixon about tapes,

and Nixon lied about them on tape.

- He said Henry had told him that you had offered

to permit him to hear a tape of a conversation with Dean

that you had on--had on Sunday, April 15th.

We did not comment on that.

- I haven't got a tape.

I don't have any tape.

- So that was a misunderstanding on his part?

- In fact, I haven't any notes on that.

- Had you known there was a taping system?

- No. - Did it surprise you?

- Yes, I--yes, it did.

It jolted me, it surprised me.

And a week after it became known, after I thought on it,

I sent Nixon a memo, I said,

"You're gonna have to keep the Dean tapes,

those conversations--"

Again, I didn't think they'd impeach Nixon.

I wasn't sure that-- did I believe Nixon.

"Keep the Dean tapes,

"keep the Brezhnev and all the other foreign policy tapes.

"Take the rest of them out and burn them.

"Take all the tapes out and burn them,

"and get rid of the Archie Cox and the--

"and the special prosecutor's office

"of the independent counsel.

"Shut the thing down because this is gonna grow

into a monster, and it will kill us."

- The White House today confirmed

that the President no longer secretly records conversations.

Deputy News Secretary Gerald Warren said, quote,

"The system has been deactivated."

- The Senate Watergate Committee

has just voted unanimously to issue a subpoena

to President Nixon for the tapes

that he's refused to release to the committee.

The special prosecutors

wanted those tapes too.

- There was discussion about whether this was a set-up,

whether the tapes would have been fabricated

or otherwise designed to lead us down the garden path,

but irrespective of that, we needed to get them.

First, Cox asked politely.

- I would urge that the tapes be furnished for use

in my investigation without restriction.

This procedure strikes me as the method

of establishing the truth, which is most fair

to everyone concerned, including the President.

The White House refused,

so Cox issued subpoenas.

- Special prosecutor Archibald Cox arrived

to tell the grand jury that the President

had declined to turn over the tapes,

but the grand jurors rose one by one

and confirmed it was their wish

to command the President to produce the tapes.

- We felt any conversations

that were in furtherance of a crime

were not protected by executive privilege,

and so we were very careful to pick conversations

that we felt we could make a very valid argument

were likely to contain conversations

about committing a crime.

- Traditionally, executive privilege has been enough

to deny to the House or the Senate

of presidential--

personal presidential communications.

- Since Cox is in the Executive Branch,

there is no separation of powers obstacle,

which the President could raise.

So while the Congress may not get the tapes,

Mr. Cox may get them.

The subpoenas to obtain the tapes

constituted Nixon's next crisis.

Once again, he responded

with a nationally televised speech.

- Many have urged that in order to help prove the truth

of what I have said, I should turn over

to the special prosecutor and the Senate Committee

recordings of conversation that I held in my office

or on my telephone.

However, a much more important principle is involved

in this question than what the tapes might prove

about Watergate.

Each day, a President of the United States

is required to make difficult decisions on grave issues.

It is absolutely necessary,

if the President is to be able to do his job

as the country expects,

that he be able to talk openly and candidly

with his advisors about issues and individuals.

This kind of frank discussion is only possible

when those who take part in it

know that what they say is in strictest confidence.

This principle of confidentiality

of presidential conversations is at stake

in the question of these tapes.

- The tapes argument occurred before

Judge Sirica first at the district court level.

The President took the position, through his attorney,

that he, as President,

could not be compelled to do anything.

- I'm sure that the President's legal position

is presented in good faith.

I think it's quite wrong.

- Judge Sirica ruled

a week after the argument in our favor,

but the White House appeals.

As the pressure on him mounted,

Nixon's public façade started to crack.

- Something seemed to anger the President.

As he arrived, he accentuated a command

to his aide, Ron Ziegler, with a hefty shove.

Meanwhile, William Ruckelshaus

left the FBI to become Elliot Richardson's deputy

at the Justice Department.

By then, they both realized that Nixon might not survive.

- And when I left the FBI,

which was in July of 1973,

I told Elliot Richardson that after being there

for three months, I had concluded

that the President was heavily involved in Watergate,

uh, pretty much up to his neck.

But as serious as Watergate already was,

Ruckelshaus and Richardson had also been

secretly managing another crisis,

one that made Watergate even more dangerous.

- We spent most of the summer of 1973

engaged in the investigation of Agnew.

Some prosecutors from Baltimore

came to Elliot, who was then Attorney General,

Elliot Richardson, and had told him

that they were receiving a number of witnesses

in a grand jury who claimed that Agnew

had received bribes when he was the Governor of Maryland

and then subsequently Vice President.

- Washington was stunned today by the disclosure

that Vice President Agnew is under criminal investigation

by federal authorities in his home state of Maryland.

- I am denying them outright, and I am labeling them,

and I think a person in my position at a time like this

might be permitted this departure from normal language

as damned lies.

- Have you ever considered stepping down

even temporarily until the matter is cleared up?

- I have not.

- A White House spokesman would only say "no comment."

- Ziegler sort of cut the legs out from under him,

saying in effect, "Agnew's on his own,"

so I called Haig and I said, "What are we doing?

"This guy's standing up defending himself.

Why aren't we standing with him?"

And Al said, "We got him taking envelopes in the basement."

I had no idea.

- The case against Agnew was so strong

that it was just impossible to ignore.

We were really worried about it,

because the President was obviously in trouble,

well, we had this fear that here would be

the Vice President raising his hand as a witness

in his own trial and the doors bursting open

and saying, "Leave your right hand up.

You're the next President of the United States."

- I will not resign if indicted.

I will not resign if indicted.

- Mr. President? - Mr. Tice.

- Should Vice President Agnew be indicted,

would you expect him to resign or somehow otherwise

stand down temporarily until cleared?

- Uh, the Vice President has not been indicted.

Charges have been thrown out by innuendo and otherwise,

which he has denied to me personally

and which he has denied publicly,

and to talk about indictment and to talk about resignation

even now--I'm not--I'm not questioning your right

to ask the question, understand,

but for me to talk about it would be totally inappropriate,

and I make no comment in answer to that question.

- Mr. President? - Mr. President?

Then with both President Nixon

and Vice President Agnew under investigation,

a Mideast war plunged the United States

into a global crisis.

Egypt and Syria, supported by the Soviet Union,

mounted a surprise attack against Israel.

- It is an all-out war.

That's how Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Dayan

describes an invasion of the Golan Heights

and the east bank of the Suez by Syria and Egypt.

The Yom Kippur War triggered multiple

geopolitical crises and a superpower confrontation.

Nixon ordered a massive airlift

of emergency military supplies for Israel,

angering Arab nations and the Soviet Union.

- The Soviet Union, according to Washington sources,

has started an airlift to resupply Egypt and Syria.

The State Department issued a public warning

to the Russians, saying their actions

could hurt U.S.-Soviet relations.

- Saudi Arabia announced today a cutoff

of all oil shipments to the United States

because of U.S. arms supplies to Israel.

Israel says its tanks have pushed deeper into Egypt

on the western side of the Suez Canal

and are now only 45 miles from Cairo.

- U.S. Intelligence now reports

that the Soviets have also given Egypt

35 new Russian fighter planes.

- Secretary of State Henry Kissinger

has flown to Moscow.

- The White House story is that the Kissinger mission

should not be seen as a distraction

from Cox or Watergate, but rather that it's the result

of a serious invitation from the Russians

for urgent talks to end the war.

In the middle of the Mideast war

and with Nixon's fate still unresolved,

the Vice Presidency suddenly became vacant.

- Vice President Agnew,

bearing himself as a tax cheat,

resigned today under an agreement

which protects him from prosecution

on charges of grafting.

- As he left the court, the former Vice President

was publicly still maintaining innocence

of any criminal activities.

- The reason that I have changed my decision

to fight this matter is because that I believe

it would be against the national interest,

have a brutalizing effect on my family

to go through a long, two-year struggle

concerning this matter.

- What did you think when you learned

that Mr. Agnew had in fact been taking bribes in?

- Well, you know, I was-- I wrote him a note,

and I said, you know, "I think you set a standard

"for courage in politics by a Vice President

that will stand for a long time,"

and I just told him how much I admired him

and regret what was happening to him.

- It was a long, long time

before they put his statue in the Capitol.

I mean, it was only a few years ago that they finally--

and it's still controversial,

but every Vice President has a bust in the Capitol,

as you know.

- Today we had the Arab-Israeli War

in full and ominous swing,

and the astounding and unprecedented resignation

of the Vice President.

We also face the unresolved question

of the President's secret White House tapes.

Judge John J. Sirica ruled

that the Senate Watergate Committee

couldn't subpoena Nixon's tapes,

but Sirica also ruled that the special prosecutor

could subpoena them, so Nixon continued to resist,

and Chief of Staff Al Haig

became Nixon's chief explainer.

- At issue at this moment, General Haig, are those tapes.

If there is nothing to hide,

what in the world could better serve all of us

than for the President to say, "Here are the tapes.

"They prove that I was right.

"They prove that I was not involved.

"The American people have the right to hear those tapes.

Let's settle this business."

- Any President-- any President

may have said things which,

if brought to public consciousness

and brought to public light,

could do severe damage, not only to the individual,

but even more importantly to the institution

of the presidency itself.

- As Nixon continued to resist,

it was totally unclear how this was gonna play out.

We knew that a big storm was coming.

We just didn't know from what direction

or how bad it was gonna be.

- When we were planning what's gonna happen,

who's gonna serve a subpoena on the White House?

How are we going to enforce it?

You know, who's gonna go in to get the tapes?

What if the President refuses?

And we thought, well, maybe we should take

some of the key documents and bring them to our homes.

- I had done a prosecution memo

about all the evidence that we had

about President Nixon.

I took a copy of that and put in my grandmother's basement.

Meanwhile, the special prosecutors

had been playing another chess game with John Dean.

They needed Dean's testimony,

but Dean was demanding total immunity in return.

Archibald Cox didn't like that idea,

but he needed Dean, so the bargaining went on for months.

- Without Dean, it wasn't absolutely clear

that we would have a case.

Besides the tapes,

that was the next-to-last peg in a hole.

- John Dean was set on getting immunity.

Archie Cox, however, held fast to the proposition

that Dean, because of his central role

in the obstruction of justice,

should not be granted immunity

by any prosecution authorities.

So he said, "I don't care how long it takes.

Dean does not get immunity, does not walk free."

And we set about to find something

that was prosecutable but which Dean

had not testified about before the Senate,

and finally Dean gave up.

- For six months, Dean held out for total immunity.

Today, Dean settled for just one count of conspiracy.

- Not going to have any comment.

I'm sorry, we issued a statement in court,

and that's available to the press.

- He agreed on his part, that he would give us

what information he could, freely,

that would be in help in our investigation.

- For Dean, there were risks and pain either way.

I think he had to make kind of a global life choice,

and he made it.

Dean's guilty plea signaled

that he would now be testifying

against Ehrlichman, Haldeman, Mitchell and Nixon.

So now, control of the tapes was essential

to Nixon's survival, and his back was against the wall.

Not coincidentally, Dean's plea deal was announced

on Friday, October 19, the day before Nixon

faced a midnight deadline over surrendering the tapes.

- All day today, Washington waited

for the President's lawyers to take the next step

in the great and historic case

of the nine disputed secret White House tapes.

- Midnight tonight is the deadline

for President Nixon to appeal to the Supreme Court

the order for him to surrender

the White House Watergate tapes.

So Nixon tried a last-minute gambit.

In our interview, Patrick Buchanan

portrayed it as a reasonable compromise.

- We didn't want to give up the tapes,

but we were willing to give up everything on Watergate

on the tapes, to transcribe that

and to make summaries of that

and have that verified by Senator John Stennis.

Bur Mr. Buchanan, ever the loyalist,

left a few little things out.

- It's called the Stennis Compromise.

Very devious.

Very Nixonian.

- We couldn't really do a compromise

that didn't enable us to have the tapes

as evidence at trial.

That was sort of the red line.

So it had to fit the rules of evidence.

- The only relevant and admissible evidence

would be the tapes themselves.

And there was another problem:

Senator Stennis.

- Senator Stennis, who was Chairman

of the Senate Armed Services Committee,

had the nickname "The Undertaker."

By reason of things that those in authority

thought should never see the light of day

being buried in his committee.

- I've never seen the tapes. I don't know...

- But don't-- - How they gonna look

and how difficult it'd be to hear and rehear.

Frankly, I've been told that there's some there

that's almost unintelligible.

I mean, you can't hear it.

- The President was obviously desperate

to get these tapes back under his control

and not have them released,

and he was trying to think of every way to do it.

We were spending practically the entire day

trying to figure out what to do next.

- Sources close to the negotiations

indicated late today that so far all efforts

to reach a compromise on the tapes case had failed,

but Attorney General Elliot Richardson

was described as "still trying."

- I think Elliot was trying very hard

to work out a compromise 'cause he thought

that was his responsibility as Attorney General.

- Al Haig called me and said,

"We're gonna give these summaries,

and we're gonna tell Cox," who was balking,

"that he's gonna have to accept these,

"and if he doesn't, well, he can do what he wants to do.

But if he persists, Richardson will fire him."

I said three words, "Is Elliot aboard?"

And Al said, "Yes."

I said, "In that case, let's go ahead."

On the evening of Friday, October 19,

the White House publicly ordered Cox

to stop pursuing the tapes.

Cox refused, issued a public statement himself

and announced a press conference

for the next morning.

- Anybody know UPI's number?

- Uh...

- Jim Doyle from Archibald Cox's office.

I have a long statement. Are you ready?

"In my judgment the President

"is refusing to comply

with the court decrees."

- Friday night, the President had sent

a letter to Richardson telling him to fire Cox.

Richardson called Cox and read the letter to him

over the phone

but said he was not going to issue the order

because he didn't think it was appropriate,

and finally on Saturday morning,

Cox held his press conference.

- Archie Cox lays out why it is

that he cannot accept the so-called Stennis Compromise.

- Some things I feel very deeply about are at stake,

and I hope that I can explain and defend them steadfastly.

I'm not looking for a confrontation,

and I'm certainly not out to get

the President of the United States.

- Mr. Cox? - Mr. Cox?

- Mr. Cox, so much has been made of the tapes

that I'd like to ask you whether you consider the tapes

absolutely vital to the case you're developing.

- I think it is vital to know whether they're vital.

- Sir, you're rather unique in our history

because you've personally rebuffed

the President of the United States.

I'm sure it took a lot of moral courage.

How could you expect to succeed?

- Well, I thought it was worth a try.

I thought it was important.

If it could be done,

I thought it would help the country.

And if I lost, what the hell?

- Nixon called me to the Oval Office,

and I was in there about 45 minutes,

and he said, "We have to fire Cox,"

and Nixon gave me the reasoning.

He said, "I can't be seen by Brezhnev right now

as caving in to my own Attorney General."

Nixon did care about looking strong

to Brezhnev because the Soviets were still

supporting Egypt and Syria in the Yom Kippur War.

But Brezhnev was also an excuse to fire Cox

and keep control of the White House tapes.

- Richardson got a call from the White House

saying that the President wanted to see him.

He went over to the White House,

and the President insisted that he fire Cox,

and he wouldn't do it.

My assistant came up and said,

"The President wants you on the phone."

Well, it was pretty clear what he wanted,

and when I got there, it was actually Haig

that was on the phone, it wasn't the President.

And he said,

"The President wants you to fire Archibald Cox."

And I said, "Well, I've thought about it and I can't do it.

"I think it's fundamentally wrong what he's done.

"Cox has done nothing wrong,

"except carry out his responsibilities,

"and I just can't bring myself to fire a man

who's done what he's hired to do by the President."

And Haig said, "Well, your commander in chief

is ordering you to fire Cox."

I said, "Oh, come on, Al,

"I know he's the commander in chief.

"I don't have to listen to you to determine that.

"What is he gonna do, blow me out of my office

if I don't do the right thing?"

- We all go home,

awaiting further developments.

Because it's Saturday afternoon,

I'm taking the evening off.

Nothing happens in official Washington

on a Saturday night.

- What's your general reaction to the developments of the day?

- Well, there'll be an announcement

out of the White House later on.

I can't say a thing. - There will be?

- Does it have to do with the resignation

of the Attorney General? - Well, it might,

but you'll have to get it from them.

Excuse me. - Thank you, Bill.

- Although the Deputy Attorney General

didn't have much to say to reporters at that moment,

it was evident from his appearance that

something big was about to happen in Washington tonight.

- But, look, I was 30 years old.

I was--you know, thought I was so sophisticated,

coming from New York and having been

a federal prosecutor for five years.

I didn't know squat about real power

and how it might be exercised.

At 8:20 p.m. Saturday evening,

all normal television broadcasts

were suddenly interrupted.

- This is Nelson Benton at the White House.

President Nixon has discharged Archibald Cox

as Watergate special prosecutor.

Attorney General Elliot Richardson has resigned

his post as Attorney General,

and when Deputy Attorney General William Ruckelshaus

refused to carry out orders from the President,

he was discharged as Deputy Attorney General.

Uh, the acting Attorney General now

will be Solicitor General Bork,

who informed special prosecutor Cox

that he had been discharged.