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1
00:00:08,975 --> 00:00:10,210
What's that?
2
00:00:10,276 --> 00:00:11,544
When crisis strikes...
3
00:00:11,611 --> 00:00:13,246
What is it, the engines?
4
00:00:11,611 --> 00:00:13,246
What is it, the engines?
5
00:00:13,313 --> 00:00:15,315
...pilots must
make life and death choices.
6
00:00:15,382 --> 00:00:16,349
Which one is it?
7
00:00:16,416 --> 00:00:19,419
It's the left.
8
00:00:16,416 --> 00:00:19,419
It's the left.
9
00:00:19,486 --> 00:00:20,620
It's the right one.
10
00:00:20,687 --> 00:00:22,555
Did he say the right one?
11
00:00:25,692 --> 00:00:28,695
But sometimes,
accident investigators find
12
00:00:28,762 --> 00:00:30,330
evidence of baffling decisions.
13
00:00:28,762 --> 00:00:30,330
evidence of baffling decisions.
14
00:00:30,397 --> 00:00:31,331
Turn it off up there.
15
00:00:31,398 --> 00:00:32,198
Auto throttle.
16
00:00:32,265 --> 00:00:33,032
Pull here.
17
00:00:33,099 --> 00:00:34,300
It's off.
18
00:00:34,367 --> 00:00:36,336
Those guys had no
idea what was going on.
19
00:00:34,367 --> 00:00:36,336
Those guys had no
idea what was going on.
20
00:00:36,403 --> 00:00:37,737
...with
deadly consequences.
21
00:00:37,804 --> 00:00:40,473
The input of the
first officer...
22
00:00:40,540 --> 00:00:41,608
Pull down.
23
00:00:41,674 --> 00:00:44,511
...was the exact
wrong thing to do.
24
00:00:41,674 --> 00:00:44,511
...was the exact
wrong thing to do.
25
00:00:44,577 --> 00:00:46,312
Three flights end in tragedy.
26
00:00:46,379 --> 00:00:48,481
Don't tell me he tried
to do that in the air.
27
00:00:46,379 --> 00:00:48,481
Don't tell me he tried
to do that in the air.
28
00:00:48,548 --> 00:00:51,584
When pilots add to
the problems they're facing.
29
00:00:51,651 --> 00:00:53,186
It's not correcting.
30
00:00:53,253 --> 00:00:54,120
Oh, no.
31
00:00:53,253 --> 00:00:54,120
Oh, no.
32
00:00:54,187 --> 00:00:55,288
Don't tell me.
33
00:00:59,426 --> 00:01:02,195
Ladies and gentlemen,
we are starting our approach.
34
00:00:59,426 --> 00:01:02,195
Ladies and gentlemen,
we are starting our approach.
35
00:01:02,262 --> 00:01:03,430
We lost both engines.
36
00:01:03,496 --> 00:01:04,497
Put the
mask over your nose.
37
00:01:04,564 --> 00:01:05,698
- Emergency descend.
- Mayday.
38
00:01:05,765 --> 00:01:06,533
Mayday.
39
00:01:05,765 --> 00:01:06,533
Mayday.
40
00:01:06,599 --> 00:01:08,101
Brace for impact.
41
00:01:08,168 --> 00:01:11,504
Look at the last one.
42
00:01:11,571 --> 00:01:13,206
It's gonna crash.
43
00:01:11,571 --> 00:01:13,206
It's gonna crash.
44
00:01:24,751 --> 00:01:29,322
It's a busy night
at Heathrow Airport in London.
45
00:01:29,389 --> 00:01:31,858
The crew of British
Midland Flight 92
46
00:01:29,389 --> 00:01:31,858
The crew of British
Midland Flight 92
47
00:01:31,925 --> 00:01:34,861
completes the final takeoff
preparations for a short flight
48
00:01:34,928 --> 00:01:38,097
to Belfast.
49
00:01:34,928 --> 00:01:38,097
to Belfast.
50
00:01:38,164 --> 00:01:40,533
Why don't you let them
know we're ready to go?
51
00:01:40,600 --> 00:01:42,836
Will do.
52
00:01:40,600 --> 00:01:42,836
Will do.
53
00:01:42,902 --> 00:01:44,471
Hi, ladies and gentlemen.
54
00:01:44,537 --> 00:01:45,772
Welcome aboard.
55
00:01:45,839 --> 00:01:47,507
We're just finishing
up our final checks,
56
00:01:47,574 --> 00:01:50,376
but we'll have you on your
way in just a few minutes.
57
00:01:47,574 --> 00:01:50,376
but we'll have you on your
way in just a few minutes.
58
00:01:54,881 --> 00:01:59,519
There are 118
passengers on the Boeing 737.
59
00:01:59,586 --> 00:02:01,321
One of them is Nigel Baldwin.
60
00:01:59,586 --> 00:02:01,321
One of them is Nigel Baldwin.
61
00:02:01,387 --> 00:02:04,123
I was excited,
just had an exciting weekend,
62
00:02:04,190 --> 00:02:05,658
making the final
arrangements for our wedding,
63
00:02:05,725 --> 00:02:08,461
and I just settled back,
like everybody else.
64
00:02:05,725 --> 00:02:08,461
and I just settled back,
like everybody else.
65
00:02:14,200 --> 00:02:16,736
Midland 92, you're
cleared for takeoff.
66
00:02:16,803 --> 00:02:20,206
Captain Kevin Hunt
flew the plane in from Belfast.
67
00:02:16,803 --> 00:02:20,206
Captain Kevin Hunt
flew the plane in from Belfast.
68
00:02:20,273 --> 00:02:22,408
He's a 23-year
veteran, who's logged
69
00:02:22,475 --> 00:02:25,411
more than 750 hours in 737s.
70
00:02:22,475 --> 00:02:25,411
more than 750 hours in 737s.
71
00:02:25,478 --> 00:02:26,679
Thrust set.
72
00:02:26,746 --> 00:02:28,414
First Officer,
David McClelland...
73
00:02:28,481 --> 00:02:29,883
Here we go.
74
00:02:29,949 --> 00:02:32,185
...takes the
controls for the return trip.
75
00:02:29,949 --> 00:02:32,185
...takes the
controls for the return trip.
76
00:02:32,252 --> 00:02:34,254
He's been a pilot for six years.
77
00:02:44,330 --> 00:02:51,237
Midland 92 cleared
to flight level 350.
78
00:02:44,330 --> 00:02:51,237
Midland 92 cleared
to flight level 350.
79
00:02:51,304 --> 00:02:59,445
Flight level 350, Midland 92.
80
00:02:51,304 --> 00:02:59,445
Flight level 350, Midland 92.
81
00:02:59,512 --> 00:03:01,214
Could I have a
coffee too, please?
82
00:02:59,512 --> 00:03:01,214
Could I have a
coffee too, please?
83
00:03:01,281 --> 00:03:04,250
The plane has only
been in the air for 10 minutes.
84
00:03:10,423 --> 00:03:13,426
What's that?
85
00:03:10,423 --> 00:03:13,426
What's that?
86
00:03:13,493 --> 00:03:15,595
I just knew there
was something not quite right.
87
00:03:19,966 --> 00:03:22,769
Whoa.
88
00:03:22,835 --> 00:03:25,204
You smell that?
89
00:03:22,835 --> 00:03:25,204
You smell that?
90
00:03:25,271 --> 00:03:26,472
Is that smoke?
91
00:03:34,380 --> 00:03:35,515
What is it, the engines?
92
00:03:39,285 --> 00:03:40,587
We can hear it.
93
00:03:40,653 --> 00:03:43,890
It was sort of a
humming vibration.
94
00:03:40,653 --> 00:03:43,890
It was sort of a
humming vibration.
95
00:03:43,957 --> 00:03:45,458
It's a fire, Kevin.
96
00:03:45,525 --> 00:03:49,262
Which one is it?
97
00:03:45,525 --> 00:03:49,262
Which one is it?
98
00:03:49,329 --> 00:03:50,363
It's the left.
99
00:03:54,367 --> 00:03:55,568
It's the right one.
100
00:03:55,635 --> 00:03:59,539
The pilots
need to act quickly.
101
00:03:59,606 --> 00:04:02,542
OK, throttle it back.
102
00:03:59,606 --> 00:04:02,542
OK, throttle it back.
103
00:04:02,609 --> 00:04:03,977
Throttling back.
104
00:04:04,043 --> 00:04:06,579
They try to
stabilize the problem engine
105
00:04:04,043 --> 00:04:06,579
They try to
stabilize the problem engine
106
00:04:06,646 --> 00:04:08,581
by reducing power on that side.
107
00:04:16,990 --> 00:04:19,626
It seems to be
running all right now.
108
00:04:16,990 --> 00:04:19,626
It seems to be
running all right now.
109
00:04:19,692 --> 00:04:20,893
But we've still got the smoke.
110
00:04:25,932 --> 00:04:27,667
This is Midland 92.
111
00:04:27,734 --> 00:04:29,268
We've got an engine fire.
112
00:04:29,335 --> 00:04:31,371
We need to divert
to East Midlands.
113
00:04:29,335 --> 00:04:31,371
We need to divert
to East Midlands.
114
00:04:31,437 --> 00:04:32,572
Understood.
115
00:04:32,639 --> 00:04:35,808
Cleared for descent
to 10,000 feet.
116
00:04:35,875 --> 00:04:37,610
Shutting down the engine
117
00:04:35,875 --> 00:04:37,610
Shutting down the engine
118
00:04:37,677 --> 00:04:39,712
will prevent the
fire from spreading.
119
00:04:39,779 --> 00:04:41,014
Shutting down now.
120
00:04:46,719 --> 00:04:51,858
The pilots turn toward
nearby East Midlands Airport.
121
00:04:46,719 --> 00:04:51,858
The pilots turn toward
nearby East Midlands Airport.
122
00:04:51,924 --> 00:04:54,727
Landing lights.
123
00:04:51,924 --> 00:04:54,727
Landing lights.
124
00:04:54,794 --> 00:04:56,496
On.
125
00:04:56,562 --> 00:04:57,897
Flaps one, please.
126
00:04:57,964 --> 00:04:59,699
They will
have to make the landing
127
00:04:59,766 --> 00:05:00,767
with only one engine.
128
00:04:59,766 --> 00:05:00,767
with only one engine.
129
00:05:00,833 --> 00:05:01,868
Power, please.
130
00:05:22,855 --> 00:05:24,557
We're losing another engine.
131
00:05:22,855 --> 00:05:24,557
We're losing another engine.
132
00:05:27,760 --> 00:05:30,797
Five Bella number 1.
133
00:05:27,760 --> 00:05:30,797
Five Bella number 1.
134
00:05:30,863 --> 00:05:32,832
Try reloading the other one.
135
00:05:37,870 --> 00:05:40,473
It's not... I can't seem to...
136
00:05:44,577 --> 00:05:47,714
I remember the flames coming
over the top of the engine,
137
00:05:47,780 --> 00:05:50,683
and they were just sort of
licking around the sides.
138
00:05:47,780 --> 00:05:50,683
and they were just sort of
licking around the sides.
139
00:05:50,750 --> 00:05:52,919
I have to stretch the glide.
140
00:05:52,985 --> 00:05:56,055
The captain lifts the
nose in a last-ditch attempt
141
00:05:52,985 --> 00:05:56,055
The captain lifts the
nose in a last-ditch attempt
142
00:05:56,122 --> 00:05:58,591
to reach the runway.
143
00:05:58,658 --> 00:06:01,961
Damn it!
144
00:05:58,658 --> 00:06:01,961
Damn it!
145
00:06:02,028 --> 00:06:03,563
Pull up.
146
00:06:03,629 --> 00:06:04,931
Close tank.
147
00:06:04,997 --> 00:06:06,632
Close tank.
148
00:06:04,997 --> 00:06:06,632
Close tank.
149
00:06:13,473 --> 00:06:14,907
There were people screaming.
150
00:06:14,974 --> 00:06:20,780
There were people crying,
having fear for their lives.
151
00:06:14,974 --> 00:06:20,780
There were people crying,
having fear for their lives.
152
00:06:20,847 --> 00:06:22,081
Pull up.
153
00:06:22,148 --> 00:06:22,982
Brace!
154
00:06:23,049 --> 00:06:23,916
Brace!
155
00:06:37,497 --> 00:06:39,766
British Midland Flight 92
156
00:06:39,832 --> 00:06:42,802
slams into an embankment a
half mile short at the airport.
157
00:06:39,832 --> 00:06:42,802
slams into an embankment a
half mile short at the airport.
158
00:06:52,111 --> 00:06:55,448
87 of the 126 people
aboard survive.
159
00:06:52,111 --> 00:06:55,448
87 of the 126 people
aboard survive.
160
00:07:00,019 --> 00:07:02,522
Emergency crews are on
the scene within minutes.
161
00:07:07,794 --> 00:07:11,097
Many are injured, including
First Officer McClelland.
162
00:07:11,164 --> 00:07:13,232
Captain Hunt has a broken spine.
163
00:07:11,164 --> 00:07:13,232
Captain Hunt has a broken spine.
164
00:07:17,203 --> 00:07:19,705
As rescue efforts
continue, a team
165
00:07:17,203 --> 00:07:19,705
As rescue efforts
continue, a team
166
00:07:19,772 --> 00:07:22,542
from Britain's Air Accidents
Investigation branch
167
00:07:22,608 --> 00:07:25,044
arrives on the scene.
168
00:07:22,608 --> 00:07:25,044
arrives on the scene.
169
00:07:25,111 --> 00:07:26,512
I've
got close enough
170
00:07:26,579 --> 00:07:28,514
to see the runway lights.
171
00:07:28,581 --> 00:07:30,783
I think all of the team,
their first impression
172
00:07:28,581 --> 00:07:30,783
I think all of the team,
their first impression
173
00:07:30,850 --> 00:07:32,785
was that this airplane
seems to have had
174
00:07:32,852 --> 00:07:37,056
some problem with engine power.
175
00:07:32,852 --> 00:07:37,056
some problem with engine power.
176
00:07:37,123 --> 00:07:40,493
Investigators searched
the area for even the smallest
177
00:07:40,560 --> 00:07:43,529
fragments of engine
debris, anything
178
00:07:40,560 --> 00:07:43,529
fragments of engine
debris, anything
179
00:07:43,596 --> 00:07:45,898
that might help explain
the cause of the disaster.
180
00:07:54,941 --> 00:07:57,777
The pilots are too badly
injured to be interviewed.
181
00:07:57,844 --> 00:08:00,746
Investigators speak to the
controller who assisted them.
182
00:07:57,844 --> 00:08:00,746
Investigators speak to the
controller who assisted them.
183
00:08:00,813 --> 00:08:02,615
They said they
had an engine fire.
184
00:08:06,686 --> 00:08:08,855
This is Midland 92.
185
00:08:08,921 --> 00:08:10,156
We've got an engine fire.
186
00:08:10,223 --> 00:08:12,692
We need to divert
to East Midlands.
187
00:08:10,223 --> 00:08:12,692
We need to divert
to East Midlands.
188
00:08:12,758 --> 00:08:14,026
Understood.
189
00:08:14,093 --> 00:08:17,029
Cleared for descent
to 10,000 feet.
190
00:08:17,096 --> 00:08:21,234
The 737 can be flown
with only one working engine,
191
00:08:17,096 --> 00:08:21,234
The 737 can be flown
with only one working engine,
192
00:08:21,300 --> 00:08:23,970
so why was the plane
unable to reach the runway?
193
00:08:27,874 --> 00:08:30,610
Investigators examine
the recovered engines.
194
00:08:27,874 --> 00:08:30,610
Investigators examine
the recovered engines.
195
00:08:30,676 --> 00:08:33,012
What they find surprises them.
196
00:08:33,079 --> 00:08:34,747
Both engines failed.
197
00:08:34,814 --> 00:08:38,517
Both engines showed
pretty low-speed rotation
198
00:08:34,814 --> 00:08:38,517
Both engines showed
pretty low-speed rotation
199
00:08:38,584 --> 00:08:41,754
at the impact, so it was
a question of sorting
200
00:08:41,821 --> 00:08:45,091
out why they were both there.
201
00:08:41,821 --> 00:08:45,091
out why they were both there.
202
00:08:45,157 --> 00:08:48,628
Dual engine
failure is almost unheard of.
203
00:08:45,157 --> 00:08:48,628
Dual engine
failure is almost unheard of.
204
00:08:48,694 --> 00:08:51,597
How did it happen?
205
00:08:51,664 --> 00:08:54,133
Flight 92's voice and
flight data recorders
206
00:08:51,664 --> 00:08:54,133
Flight 92's voice and
flight data recorders
207
00:08:54,200 --> 00:08:55,668
might provide some answers.
208
00:08:58,371 --> 00:09:02,875
So the right
engine stops here,
209
00:08:58,371 --> 00:09:02,875
So the right
engine stops here,
210
00:09:02,942 --> 00:09:07,580
and the left gives out more
than 15 minutes later here.
211
00:09:02,942 --> 00:09:07,580
and the left gives out more
than 15 minutes later here.
212
00:09:07,647 --> 00:09:08,915
Whatever the two
problems were, they
213
00:09:08,981 --> 00:09:11,250
didn't happen at the same time.
214
00:09:11,317 --> 00:09:12,852
Let's hear it.
215
00:09:11,317 --> 00:09:12,852
Let's hear it.
216
00:09:12,919 --> 00:09:15,121
The team hopes
the cockpit voice recorder
217
00:09:15,187 --> 00:09:16,756
will reveal what went wrong.
218
00:09:21,294 --> 00:09:23,963
That's an engine vibration.
219
00:09:24,030 --> 00:09:25,031
It can't be anything else.
220
00:09:27,767 --> 00:09:30,970
Let's see what
you do about that.
221
00:09:27,767 --> 00:09:30,970
Let's see what
you do about that.
222
00:09:31,037 --> 00:09:32,204
Whoa.
223
00:09:32,271 --> 00:09:33,606
What is it the engines?
224
00:09:33,673 --> 00:09:34,807
We could hear the banging
225
00:09:34,874 --> 00:09:36,575
of this and the shaking.
226
00:09:34,874 --> 00:09:36,575
of this and the shaking.
227
00:09:36,642 --> 00:09:39,278
And it's obvious
that the crew were
228
00:09:39,345 --> 00:09:41,013
pretty rattled by this as well.
229
00:09:41,080 --> 00:09:44,583
Which one is it?
230
00:09:41,080 --> 00:09:44,583
Which one is it?
231
00:09:44,650 --> 00:09:45,685
It's the left.
232
00:09:48,654 --> 00:09:49,755
It's the right one.
233
00:09:49,822 --> 00:09:51,724
Did he say the right one?
234
00:09:51,791 --> 00:09:54,627
It was a little
bit of a mystery
235
00:09:51,791 --> 00:09:54,627
It was a little
bit of a mystery
236
00:09:54,694 --> 00:09:57,363
that the voice
recorder showed them
237
00:09:57,430 --> 00:10:00,099
apparently opting
for the right engine
238
00:09:57,430 --> 00:10:00,099
apparently opting
for the right engine
239
00:10:00,166 --> 00:10:02,201
as being where the problem was.
240
00:10:02,268 --> 00:10:04,870
I can't see anything
wrong with the right engine
241
00:10:04,937 --> 00:10:06,038
at this point.
242
00:10:04,937 --> 00:10:06,038
at this point.
243
00:10:06,105 --> 00:10:07,340
Were you suspecting
244
00:10:07,406 --> 00:10:09,642
that the right engine
had been shut down,
245
00:10:09,709 --> 00:10:12,311
but it was the left engine
that had the problem.
246
00:10:09,709 --> 00:10:12,311
but it was the left engine
that had the problem.
247
00:10:12,378 --> 00:10:16,716
It was vital that we got the
crew's version of events.
248
00:10:16,782 --> 00:10:18,784
The captain
is still recovering
249
00:10:16,782 --> 00:10:18,784
The captain
is still recovering
250
00:10:18,851 --> 00:10:21,654
from his severe injuries,
so investigators
251
00:10:21,721 --> 00:10:23,889
interview the first officer.
252
00:10:23,956 --> 00:10:26,425
It started with the
vibrations in the right engine.
253
00:10:23,956 --> 00:10:26,425
It started with the
vibrations in the right engine.
254
00:10:29,829 --> 00:10:32,398
When the vibrations
were really fierce,
255
00:10:29,829 --> 00:10:32,398
When the vibrations
were really fierce,
256
00:10:32,465 --> 00:10:36,769
Captain Hunt suggested
that we throttle back.
257
00:10:32,465 --> 00:10:36,769
Captain Hunt suggested
that we throttle back.
258
00:10:36,836 --> 00:10:38,938
Throttling back.
259
00:10:39,005 --> 00:10:40,773
We throttle back
the right engine,
260
00:10:40,840 --> 00:10:42,074
and the vibration stopped.
261
00:10:40,840 --> 00:10:42,074
and the vibration stopped.
262
00:10:42,141 --> 00:10:44,677
Seems to be running
all right now.
263
00:10:44,744 --> 00:10:49,215
The vibration and
the noise went away,
264
00:10:44,744 --> 00:10:49,215
The vibration and
the noise went away,
265
00:10:49,281 --> 00:10:50,783
so it would have
indicated to them
266
00:10:50,850 --> 00:10:52,051
we've done the right thing.
267
00:10:52,118 --> 00:10:53,953
The team
is forced to consider
268
00:10:54,020 --> 00:10:55,321
an extraordinary theory.
269
00:10:58,257 --> 00:11:02,928
This could be two unrelated
engine failures, fire
270
00:10:58,257 --> 00:11:02,928
This could be two unrelated
engine failures, fire
271
00:11:02,995 --> 00:11:05,431
on the left side and
an entirely different
272
00:11:05,498 --> 00:11:07,800
one on the right side.
273
00:11:05,498 --> 00:11:07,800
one on the right side.
274
00:11:07,867 --> 00:11:10,403
What led to
two separate failures?
275
00:11:14,006 --> 00:11:16,075
Investigators hope
engine fragments
276
00:11:16,142 --> 00:11:20,913
recovered near the crash site
will provide an explanation.
277
00:11:16,142 --> 00:11:20,913
recovered near the crash site
will provide an explanation.
278
00:11:20,980 --> 00:11:22,481
One piece stands out.
279
00:11:27,053 --> 00:11:28,788
Gotcha.
280
00:11:28,854 --> 00:11:31,791
A section of fan blade
shows signs of metal fatigue.
281
00:11:28,854 --> 00:11:31,791
A section of fan blade
shows signs of metal fatigue.
282
00:11:34,427 --> 00:11:38,697
Even a single broken blade can
cause a dangerous reaction.
283
00:11:34,427 --> 00:11:38,697
Even a single broken blade can
cause a dangerous reaction.
284
00:11:38,764 --> 00:11:42,068
This finding could explain
how the engine failures began.
285
00:11:38,764 --> 00:11:42,068
This finding could explain
how the engine failures began.
286
00:11:45,071 --> 00:11:47,306
It would have been
a lot of physical vibration.
287
00:11:47,373 --> 00:11:50,142
The passengers
reported that it was
288
00:11:47,373 --> 00:11:50,142
The passengers
reported that it was
289
00:11:50,209 --> 00:11:53,479
like the sound of in a tumble
dryer of rocks and stuff
290
00:11:53,546 --> 00:11:54,947
being thrown around.
291
00:11:53,546 --> 00:11:54,947
being thrown around.
292
00:11:55,014 --> 00:11:56,382
It would have really
been quite violent.
293
00:11:57,016 --> 00:11:59,185
A metallurgical examination
294
00:11:59,251 --> 00:12:02,021
reveals which engine the
damaged blade came from.
295
00:11:59,251 --> 00:12:02,021
reveals which engine the
damaged blade came from.
296
00:12:07,326 --> 00:12:11,330
Blade 17, left engine.
297
00:12:11,397 --> 00:12:13,265
The blade
that broke first
298
00:12:11,397 --> 00:12:13,265
The blade
that broke first
299
00:12:13,332 --> 00:12:16,902
and then triggered the vibration
came from the left engine.
300
00:12:16,969 --> 00:12:19,371
Investigators face a
compelling question.
301
00:12:16,969 --> 00:12:19,371
Investigators face a
compelling question.
302
00:12:19,438 --> 00:12:22,241
If the vibrations were
coming from the left engine,
303
00:12:22,308 --> 00:12:25,478
why did the pilot shut
down the right one?
304
00:12:22,308 --> 00:12:25,478
why did the pilot shut
down the right one?
305
00:12:25,544 --> 00:12:27,012
It's hard to
believe they would
306
00:12:27,079 --> 00:12:28,814
shut down the wrong engine.
307
00:12:28,881 --> 00:12:30,416
There was a lot of skepticism
308
00:12:28,881 --> 00:12:30,416
There was a lot of skepticism
309
00:12:30,483 --> 00:12:33,219
from the operations inspectors,
the pilots on the team
310
00:12:33,285 --> 00:12:36,355
because here, we have
a very experienced,
311
00:12:33,285 --> 00:12:36,355
because here, we have
a very experienced,
312
00:12:36,422 --> 00:12:39,525
well-qualified crew.
313
00:12:39,592 --> 00:12:42,361
Which one is it?
314
00:12:39,592 --> 00:12:42,361
Which one is it?
315
00:12:42,428 --> 00:12:45,898
It's the left.
316
00:12:45,965 --> 00:12:48,000
Ah, it's the right one.
317
00:12:48,067 --> 00:12:49,869
And it's very, very
318
00:12:49,935 --> 00:12:53,572
difficult to accept that such
a basic mistake could be made.
319
00:13:00,045 --> 00:13:03,015
When their left
engine began vibrating,
320
00:13:03,082 --> 00:13:05,251
the pilots of
Flight 92 mistakenly
321
00:13:03,082 --> 00:13:05,251
the pilots of
Flight 92 mistakenly
322
00:13:05,317 --> 00:13:07,019
shut down the right engine.
323
00:13:07,086 --> 00:13:09,355
It's the left.
324
00:13:09,421 --> 00:13:11,323
Ah, it's the right one.
325
00:13:09,421 --> 00:13:11,323
Ah, it's the right one.
326
00:13:11,390 --> 00:13:14,293
Throttle it back.
327
00:13:14,360 --> 00:13:17,363
I don't think
we'll ever know why he changed
328
00:13:14,360 --> 00:13:17,363
I don't think
we'll ever know why he changed
329
00:13:17,429 --> 00:13:18,964
his mind, the diagnosis.
330
00:13:22,034 --> 00:13:24,503
Once the left
engine caught fire,
331
00:13:22,034 --> 00:13:24,503
Once the left
engine caught fire,
332
00:13:24,570 --> 00:13:26,839
investigators believe
that mistake ended
333
00:13:26,906 --> 00:13:29,208
any hope of a safe landing.
334
00:13:26,906 --> 00:13:29,208
any hope of a safe landing.
335
00:13:29,275 --> 00:13:33,412
But a major question remains,
why did the vibration suddenly
336
00:13:33,479 --> 00:13:36,048
stop in the damaged left
engine when the crew
337
00:13:33,479 --> 00:13:36,048
stop in the damaged left
engine when the crew
338
00:13:36,115 --> 00:13:37,416
shut down the right one?
339
00:13:37,483 --> 00:13:40,853
They reduced the power
on the right engine,
340
00:13:37,483 --> 00:13:40,853
They reduced the power
on the right engine,
341
00:13:40,920 --> 00:13:44,323
but somehow, the left
engine settles down.
342
00:13:50,162 --> 00:13:54,099
The team analyzes
every action the pilots made.
343
00:13:50,162 --> 00:13:54,099
The team analyzes
every action the pilots made.
344
00:13:54,166 --> 00:13:56,202
When the crisis
hit, they reduced
345
00:13:56,268 --> 00:13:58,037
power to the right engine.
346
00:13:58,103 --> 00:14:00,105
Seems to be running
all right now.
347
00:13:58,103 --> 00:14:00,105
Seems to be running
all right now.
348
00:14:00,172 --> 00:14:03,275
The engine
problems appear to stop.
349
00:14:03,342 --> 00:14:07,179
I'm in no doubt that that was,
by far, the most dominant cue
350
00:14:03,342 --> 00:14:07,179
I'm in no doubt that that was,
by far, the most dominant cue
351
00:14:07,246 --> 00:14:09,281
for them that they had
done the right thing,
352
00:14:09,348 --> 00:14:11,016
and the problem lay
in the right engine.
353
00:14:09,348 --> 00:14:11,016
and the problem lay
in the right engine.
354
00:14:11,083 --> 00:14:13,619
But the flight
data shows that just seconds
355
00:14:13,686 --> 00:14:16,121
before reducing power,
the first officer
356
00:14:16,188 --> 00:14:17,223
made one other adjustment.
357
00:14:16,188 --> 00:14:17,223
made one other adjustment.
358
00:14:17,289 --> 00:14:18,057
That's it.
359
00:14:18,123 --> 00:14:19,024
Of course.
360
00:14:22,394 --> 00:14:24,363
He had to disconnect
the auto throttle.
361
00:14:28,167 --> 00:14:29,501
Throttle it back.
362
00:14:28,167 --> 00:14:29,501
Throttle it back.
363
00:14:29,568 --> 00:14:32,104
To reduce power
on the right-hand side,
364
00:14:32,171 --> 00:14:35,074
the pilot must first switch
off the auto throttle.
365
00:14:32,171 --> 00:14:35,074
the pilot must first switch
off the auto throttle.
366
00:14:35,140 --> 00:14:36,508
Pull the throttle off.
367
00:14:39,478 --> 00:14:43,249
Switching to manual
has an unforeseen consequence.
368
00:14:39,478 --> 00:14:43,249
Switching to manual
has an unforeseen consequence.
369
00:14:43,315 --> 00:14:45,618
It reduces power
to the left engine
370
00:14:45,684 --> 00:14:50,456
and a temporary, but dramatic
improvement in performance.
371
00:14:45,684 --> 00:14:50,456
and a temporary, but dramatic
improvement in performance.
372
00:14:50,522 --> 00:14:53,559
It was damaged, but it was
reasonably happy operating
373
00:14:50,522 --> 00:14:53,559
It was damaged, but it was
reasonably happy operating
374
00:14:53,626 --> 00:14:56,028
at a low power
setting, which is all
375
00:14:56,095 --> 00:14:58,364
it needed because they
were constantly descending
376
00:14:56,095 --> 00:14:58,364
it needed because they
were constantly descending
377
00:14:58,430 --> 00:14:59,632
towards the airfield.
378
00:14:59,698 --> 00:15:01,634
With its
right engine shut down,
379
00:15:01,700 --> 00:15:05,437
the plane flew for nearly 17
minutes on only the damaged
380
00:15:01,700 --> 00:15:05,437
the plane flew for nearly 17
minutes on only the damaged
381
00:15:05,504 --> 00:15:08,407
left engine, but when the
crew increased power...
382
00:15:08,474 --> 00:15:09,942
Power, please.
383
00:15:10,009 --> 00:15:12,311
...part of the
broken number 17 blade
384
00:15:10,009 --> 00:15:12,311
...part of the
broken number 17 blade
385
00:15:12,378 --> 00:15:15,614
was sucked into the left engine
causing a catastrophic failure.
386
00:15:24,723 --> 00:15:27,092
Investigators conclude
that the pilot's
387
00:15:27,159 --> 00:15:29,261
incorrect assessment
triggered a chain
388
00:15:27,159 --> 00:15:29,261
incorrect assessment
triggered a chain
389
00:15:29,328 --> 00:15:31,063
of events that led to disaster.
390
00:15:31,130 --> 00:15:34,300
It was probably the killer
blow because what that meant
391
00:15:31,130 --> 00:15:34,300
It was probably the killer
blow because what that meant
392
00:15:34,366 --> 00:15:36,702
was that they felt that
what they had done,
393
00:15:36,769 --> 00:15:40,272
which was to close the
right-hand engine down, was
394
00:15:40,339 --> 00:15:42,408
the correct thing to have done.
395
00:15:42,474 --> 00:15:45,577
When pilots
compound problems in flight,
396
00:15:45,644 --> 00:15:47,980
they may have only seconds
to correct the error
397
00:15:45,644 --> 00:15:47,980
they may have only seconds
to correct the error
398
00:15:48,047 --> 00:15:49,214
and save their aircraft.
399
00:15:53,052 --> 00:15:55,254
Congonhas Airport in
Sao Paulo, Brazil.
400
00:16:01,327 --> 00:16:05,064
89 passengers are getting ready
for TAM Airlines Flight 402
401
00:16:01,327 --> 00:16:05,064
89 passengers are getting ready
for TAM Airlines Flight 402
402
00:16:05,130 --> 00:16:06,065
to Rio de Janeiro.
403
00:16:09,401 --> 00:16:12,538
One of TAM's most experienced
pilots is in command.
404
00:16:09,401 --> 00:16:12,538
One of TAM's most experienced
pilots is in command.
405
00:16:12,604 --> 00:16:17,242
Jose Antonio Moreno has
almost 6,500 flying hours.
406
00:16:12,604 --> 00:16:17,242
Jose Antonio Moreno has
almost 6,500 flying hours.
407
00:16:17,309 --> 00:16:18,544
Before we start, checklist.
408
00:16:18,610 --> 00:16:20,079
Yes, captain.
409
00:16:20,145 --> 00:16:21,613
Already done.
410
00:16:21,680 --> 00:16:23,048
Good.
411
00:16:21,680 --> 00:16:23,048
Good.
412
00:16:23,115 --> 00:16:24,283
Go ahead and call
the tower so we
413
00:16:24,350 --> 00:16:25,284
can get these engines started.
414
00:16:25,351 --> 00:16:26,752
You got it.
415
00:16:26,819 --> 00:16:30,222
First Officer Ricardo Luis
Gomez is less experienced.
416
00:16:26,819 --> 00:16:30,222
First Officer Ricardo Luis
Gomez is less experienced.
417
00:16:30,289 --> 00:16:33,525
He qualified to fly the
Fokker 100 only a week ago.
418
00:16:33,592 --> 00:16:37,529
Sao Paolo, TAM 402,
we're ready to go
419
00:16:33,592 --> 00:16:37,529
Sao Paolo, TAM 402,
we're ready to go
420
00:16:37,596 --> 00:16:39,398
and requesting engine start.
421
00:16:39,465 --> 00:16:41,734
TAM 402,
you're clear to start.
422
00:16:39,465 --> 00:16:41,734
TAM 402,
you're clear to start.
423
00:16:41,800 --> 00:16:45,304
Fire them up.
424
00:16:45,371 --> 00:16:47,172
Starting number 1.
425
00:16:45,371 --> 00:16:47,172
Starting number 1.
426
00:16:53,245 --> 00:16:54,580
Starting engine 2.
427
00:17:00,285 --> 00:17:03,288
TAM 402, you
are cleared for takeoff.
428
00:17:03,355 --> 00:17:05,557
Runway 17, right.
429
00:17:03,355 --> 00:17:05,557
Runway 17, right.
430
00:17:05,624 --> 00:17:07,493
Here we go.
431
00:17:07,559 --> 00:17:08,460
Take off thrust.
432
00:17:21,306 --> 00:17:23,675
V1, rotate.
433
00:17:21,306 --> 00:17:23,675
V1, rotate.
434
00:17:37,322 --> 00:17:40,759
Suddenly, TAM
flight 402 is in trouble.
435
00:17:37,322 --> 00:17:40,759
Suddenly, TAM
flight 402 is in trouble.
436
00:17:40,826 --> 00:17:41,693
No.
No.
437
00:17:41,760 --> 00:17:43,195
No.
No.
438
00:17:43,262 --> 00:17:45,431
Less than
50 feet in the air,
439
00:17:45,497 --> 00:17:49,601
the plane rolls
dangerously to the right.
440
00:17:45,497 --> 00:17:49,601
the plane rolls
dangerously to the right.
441
00:17:49,668 --> 00:17:52,771
The captain struggles
to level the plane,
442
00:17:49,668 --> 00:17:52,771
The captain struggles
to level the plane,
443
00:17:52,838 --> 00:17:54,673
but now, there's a new problem.
444
00:17:57,409 --> 00:17:59,178
Airspeed is dropping.
445
00:17:57,409 --> 00:17:59,178
Airspeed is dropping.
446
00:17:59,244 --> 00:18:01,580
It has to be an
absolutely sick feeling for
447
00:18:01,647 --> 00:18:04,483
that flight crew at that point.
448
00:18:01,647 --> 00:18:04,483
that flight crew at that point.
449
00:18:07,553 --> 00:18:09,154
Pull up.
450
00:18:13,325 --> 00:18:15,227
25 seconds
after takeoff...
451
00:18:20,799 --> 00:18:21,733
Terrain.
452
00:18:20,799 --> 00:18:21,733
Terrain.
453
00:18:21,800 --> 00:18:22,701
Terrain.
454
00:18:22,768 --> 00:18:23,669
Terrain.
455
00:18:26,305 --> 00:18:28,640
...TAM
Flight 402 crashes
456
00:18:26,305 --> 00:18:28,640
...TAM
Flight 402 crashes
457
00:18:28,707 --> 00:18:30,576
into a Sao Paulo neighborhood.
458
00:18:38,951 --> 00:18:42,821
The crash kills all 95
people on board the plane.
459
00:18:38,951 --> 00:18:42,821
The crash kills all 95
people on board the plane.
460
00:18:42,888 --> 00:18:45,224
On the ground,
another four are dead.
461
00:18:45,290 --> 00:18:46,525
Many more are injured.
462
00:18:45,290 --> 00:18:46,525
Many more are injured.
463
00:18:51,964 --> 00:18:54,600
A team of investigators
from the Brazilian Air Force
464
00:18:54,666 --> 00:18:56,201
arrives at the scene.
465
00:18:56,268 --> 00:18:59,571
Major Carlos da
Conceicao is in charge.
466
00:18:56,268 --> 00:18:59,571
Major Carlos da
Conceicao is in charge.
467
00:19:01,306 --> 00:19:03,208
When I got
there, it was really
468
00:19:03,275 --> 00:19:05,210
a scene of total devastation.
469
00:19:03,275 --> 00:19:05,210
a scene of total devastation.
470
00:19:08,814 --> 00:19:12,784
The plane took down
everything in its path.
471
00:19:08,814 --> 00:19:12,784
The plane took down
everything in its path.
472
00:19:12,851 --> 00:19:13,952
It was like a war zone.
473
00:19:17,656 --> 00:19:22,227
What went wrong
when Flight 402 took off?
474
00:19:17,656 --> 00:19:22,227
What went wrong
when Flight 402 took off?
475
00:19:22,294 --> 00:19:24,563
Here, it's from the cockpit.
476
00:19:24,630 --> 00:19:26,665
Piece by
piece, they recover
477
00:19:26,732 --> 00:19:29,868
the aircraft's components to
begin the search for answers.
478
00:19:26,732 --> 00:19:29,868
the aircraft's components to
begin the search for answers.
479
00:19:29,935 --> 00:19:31,870
We know
that the aircraft
480
00:19:31,937 --> 00:19:35,407
departed controlled flight
at a very, very low altitude.
481
00:19:31,937 --> 00:19:35,407
departed controlled flight
at a very, very low altitude.
482
00:19:35,474 --> 00:19:37,876
The first culprit in
that type of instance
483
00:19:37,943 --> 00:19:40,345
would be loss of thrust.
484
00:19:37,943 --> 00:19:40,345
would be loss of thrust.
485
00:19:40,412 --> 00:19:42,381
Investigators scrutinize
486
00:19:42,447 --> 00:19:45,517
the flight data
and spot something
487
00:19:45,584 --> 00:19:46,885
odd about the thrust settings.
488
00:19:45,584 --> 00:19:46,885
odd about the thrust settings.
489
00:19:46,952 --> 00:19:48,820
The power is all
over the place.
490
00:19:51,823 --> 00:19:54,626
The thrust was increasing
491
00:19:54,693 --> 00:19:56,862
and decreasing,
increasing and decreasing,
492
00:19:56,929 --> 00:19:59,231
and then finally, full thrust.
493
00:19:56,929 --> 00:19:59,231
and then finally, full thrust.
494
00:19:59,298 --> 00:20:00,966
Was very confusing.
495
00:20:01,033 --> 00:20:02,501
Why would this happen.
496
00:20:02,568 --> 00:20:04,369
Investigators consider a connection
497
00:20:02,568 --> 00:20:04,369
Investigators consider a connection
498
00:20:04,436 --> 00:20:05,571
with another piece of evidence.
499
00:20:05,637 --> 00:20:08,540
OK, so you saw
something moving
500
00:20:08,607 --> 00:20:10,375
at the back of the engine.
501
00:20:08,607 --> 00:20:10,375
at the back of the engine.
502
00:20:10,442 --> 00:20:13,445
A witness saw one of
the plane's thrust reversers
503
00:20:13,512 --> 00:20:15,314
open just before the crash.
504
00:20:18,350 --> 00:20:21,553
Can you bring up all the
data on the thrust reversers?
505
00:20:25,824 --> 00:20:28,327
Thrust reversers
deploy on landing
506
00:20:25,824 --> 00:20:28,327
Thrust reversers
deploy on landing
507
00:20:28,393 --> 00:20:30,495
to help slow the aircraft.
508
00:20:30,562 --> 00:20:32,331
They are never used in the air.
509
00:20:33,799 --> 00:20:35,934
The reverser
is an aerodynamic brake,
510
00:20:36,001 --> 00:20:37,736
which is used on landing.
511
00:20:37,803 --> 00:20:39,905
Why would it open
during takeoff?
512
00:20:37,803 --> 00:20:39,905
Why would it open
during takeoff?
513
00:20:42,975 --> 00:20:44,610
There.
514
00:20:44,676 --> 00:20:47,579
The flight data
reveals that after takeoff,
515
00:20:44,676 --> 00:20:47,579
The flight data
reveals that after takeoff,
516
00:20:47,646 --> 00:20:50,349
the right thrust reverser
opened and closed
517
00:20:50,415 --> 00:20:54,820
twice, then remained deployed.
518
00:20:50,415 --> 00:20:54,820
twice, then remained deployed.
519
00:20:54,886 --> 00:20:57,723
This shouldn't
even be possible.
520
00:20:54,886 --> 00:20:57,723
This shouldn't
even be possible.
521
00:20:57,789 --> 00:21:02,861
I was amazed, because that's
just not supposed to happen.
522
00:21:02,928 --> 00:21:04,630
Thrust reverser systems
523
00:21:02,928 --> 00:21:04,630
Thrust reverser systems
524
00:21:04,696 --> 00:21:06,765
are designed to prevent
an accidental deployment
525
00:21:06,832 --> 00:21:07,699
in flight.
526
00:21:10,102 --> 00:21:11,970
Investigators test
the reversers,
527
00:21:12,037 --> 00:21:13,972
looking for flaws,
which might explain
528
00:21:14,039 --> 00:21:15,941
why one opened during flight.
529
00:21:14,039 --> 00:21:15,941
why one opened during flight.
530
00:21:21,580 --> 00:21:23,849
The movement
of the thrust reversers,
531
00:21:21,580 --> 00:21:23,849
The movement
of the thrust reversers,
532
00:21:23,915 --> 00:21:25,517
it was a big mystery.
533
00:21:32,491 --> 00:21:34,526
They discover the problem,
534
00:21:32,491 --> 00:21:34,526
They discover the problem,
535
00:21:34,593 --> 00:21:36,628
a faulty landing sensor.
536
00:21:36,695 --> 00:21:40,432
It intermittently signaled the
reverser to open and close.
537
00:21:36,695 --> 00:21:40,432
It intermittently signaled the
reverser to open and close.
538
00:21:46,538 --> 00:21:50,609
If there is an uncommanded
thrust reverser deployment,
539
00:21:50,676 --> 00:21:54,379
the system would
automatically retard
540
00:21:50,676 --> 00:21:54,379
the system would
automatically retard
541
00:21:54,446 --> 00:21:58,016
the thrust level back to idle.
542
00:21:54,446 --> 00:21:58,016
the thrust level back to idle.
543
00:21:58,083 --> 00:21:59,885
But the
aircraft should still
544
00:21:59,951 --> 00:22:02,888
be able to climb safely
with just one engine,
545
00:22:02,954 --> 00:22:06,758
so why couldn't Flight 402?
546
00:22:02,954 --> 00:22:06,758
so why couldn't Flight 402?
547
00:22:06,825 --> 00:22:07,959
OK.
548
00:22:08,026 --> 00:22:09,594
Go ahead, please.
549
00:22:08,026 --> 00:22:09,594
Go ahead, please.
550
00:22:09,661 --> 00:22:12,464
Investigators listen to the audio captured
551
00:22:12,531 --> 00:22:13,832
by the cockpit voice recorder.
552
00:22:19,071 --> 00:22:20,405
RICARDO LUIS GOMEZ
No.
553
00:22:20,472 --> 00:22:21,673
No. No
No. No
554
00:22:20,472 --> 00:22:21,673
No. No
No. No
555
00:22:21,740 --> 00:22:23,909
He sounds like he's
fumbling with something?
556
00:22:25,877 --> 00:22:27,479
It's locked.
557
00:22:27,546 --> 00:22:29,047
What's locked?
558
00:22:27,546 --> 00:22:29,047
What's locked?
559
00:22:29,114 --> 00:22:30,449
JOSE ANTONIO MORENO
560
00:22:30,515 --> 00:22:31,717
Turn it off up there.
Auto throttle.
561
00:22:31,783 --> 00:22:33,051
Pull here.
562
00:22:33,118 --> 00:22:34,019
RICARDO LUIS GOMEZ (ON
RECORDING): It's off.
563
00:22:33,118 --> 00:22:34,019
RICARDO LUIS GOMEZ (ON
RECORDING): It's off.
564
00:22:37,089 --> 00:22:39,024
It sounds like the
crew thought the problem
565
00:22:39,091 --> 00:22:41,426
was the auto throttle.
566
00:22:39,091 --> 00:22:41,426
was the auto throttle.
567
00:22:41,493 --> 00:22:44,563
The pilots are
focused on the auto throttle.
568
00:22:44,629 --> 00:22:46,631
They never discussed
the reverser.
569
00:22:44,629 --> 00:22:46,631
They never discussed
the reverser.
570
00:22:46,698 --> 00:22:47,799
Turn it off up there.
571
00:22:47,866 --> 00:22:48,800
Here too.
572
00:22:48,867 --> 00:22:49,701
It's off!
573
00:22:49,768 --> 00:22:51,036
It's off!
574
00:22:51,103 --> 00:22:52,804
And there was
no alarm to warn them
575
00:22:51,103 --> 00:22:52,804
And there was
no alarm to warn them
576
00:22:52,871 --> 00:22:54,039
that the reverser deployed.
577
00:22:54,106 --> 00:22:55,373
RICARDO LUIS GOMEZ
No.
578
00:22:55,440 --> 00:22:56,708
No.
No.
579
00:22:56,775 --> 00:22:58,810
No.
580
00:22:56,775 --> 00:22:58,810
No.
581
00:22:58,877 --> 00:22:59,745
Oh, God.
582
00:23:05,884 --> 00:23:08,520
Those guys had no
idea what was going on.
583
00:23:08,587 --> 00:23:10,856
It's now
clear to investigators
584
00:23:08,587 --> 00:23:10,856
It's now
clear to investigators
585
00:23:10,922 --> 00:23:14,860
that the crew was confused, but
they still need to determine
586
00:23:14,926 --> 00:23:17,129
why the pilots
reacted as they did
587
00:23:14,926 --> 00:23:17,129
why the pilots
reacted as they did
588
00:23:17,195 --> 00:23:18,864
in those critical last seconds.
589
00:23:18,930 --> 00:23:23,902
You want to get clear
what, in fact, happened so
590
00:23:18,930 --> 00:23:23,902
You want to get clear
what, in fact, happened so
591
00:23:23,969 --> 00:23:26,138
that this won't happen again.
592
00:23:26,204 --> 00:23:28,774
To obtain a
more detailed picture,
593
00:23:26,204 --> 00:23:28,774
To obtain a
more detailed picture,
594
00:23:28,840 --> 00:23:31,443
the team combines the
flight data and the cockpit
595
00:23:31,510 --> 00:23:34,613
voice recording to create
a real-time animation
596
00:23:31,510 --> 00:23:34,613
voice recording to create
a real-time animation
597
00:23:34,679 --> 00:23:35,814
of the flight.
598
00:23:35,881 --> 00:23:37,482
Let's see what we got.
599
00:23:39,985 --> 00:23:42,220
Take up speed was 127 knots.
600
00:23:49,194 --> 00:23:52,631
It reveals why the
crew acted the way they did
601
00:23:49,194 --> 00:23:52,631
It reveals why the
crew acted the way they did
602
00:23:52,697 --> 00:23:54,065
when the reverser was deployed.
603
00:23:54,132 --> 00:23:55,734
RICARDO LUIS GOMEZ (ON
RECORDING): It's locked.
604
00:23:55,801 --> 00:23:58,203
Hold it.
605
00:23:55,801 --> 00:23:58,203
Hold it.
606
00:23:58,270 --> 00:24:00,806
He must be reacting to the
movement of the thrust lever.
607
00:24:00,872 --> 00:24:01,540
RICARDO LUIS GOMEZ
No.
608
00:24:01,606 --> 00:24:02,073
No.
No.
609
00:24:02,140 --> 00:24:03,508
No.
No.
610
00:24:03,575 --> 00:24:04,509
The automation just
moved it to idle,
611
00:24:03,575 --> 00:24:04,509
The automation just
moved it to idle,
612
00:24:04,576 --> 00:24:06,011
just like it's supposed to.
613
00:24:06,077 --> 00:24:07,679
The sudden loss of
thrust in the right engine
614
00:24:07,746 --> 00:24:10,615
indicates that the failsafe
system did activate
615
00:24:07,746 --> 00:24:10,615
indicates that the failsafe
system did activate
616
00:24:10,682 --> 00:24:12,584
when the reverser deployed.
617
00:24:12,651 --> 00:24:13,618
Turn it off up there.
618
00:24:13,685 --> 00:24:14,252
Auto throttle.
619
00:24:14,319 --> 00:24:15,120
Pull here.
620
00:24:15,187 --> 00:24:17,856
It's off!
621
00:24:15,187 --> 00:24:17,856
It's off!
622
00:24:17,923 --> 00:24:19,891
But the
pilots misinterpret
623
00:24:19,958 --> 00:24:22,894
the lever's movement.
624
00:24:19,958 --> 00:24:22,894
the lever's movement.
625
00:24:22,961 --> 00:24:24,729
Oh, no.
626
00:24:24,796 --> 00:24:27,866
Don't tell me.
627
00:24:24,796 --> 00:24:27,866
Don't tell me.
628
00:24:27,933 --> 00:24:29,701
They think the throttle
629
00:24:29,768 --> 00:24:32,637
is malfunctioning and reducing
thrust to the right engine.
630
00:24:35,774 --> 00:24:38,109
I think the first officer
is deliberately putting
631
00:24:38,176 --> 00:24:41,646
the engine back to full power.
632
00:24:38,176 --> 00:24:41,646
the engine back to full power.
633
00:24:41,713 --> 00:24:44,749
When the thrust
reverser accidentally deploys
634
00:24:44,816 --> 00:24:49,688
in the Fokker 100, a
cable automatically
635
00:24:44,816 --> 00:24:49,688
in the Fokker 100, a
cable automatically
636
00:24:49,754 --> 00:24:52,057
pulls back the throttle
to reduce engine power.
637
00:24:49,754 --> 00:24:52,057
pulls back the throttle
to reduce engine power.
638
00:24:58,363 --> 00:25:01,800
Pilots shouldn't be
able to override it,
639
00:25:01,867 --> 00:25:05,103
yet the first officer
managed to do exactly that.
640
00:25:01,867 --> 00:25:05,103
yet the first officer
managed to do exactly that.
641
00:25:11,776 --> 00:25:12,677
Terrain.
642
00:25:12,744 --> 00:25:13,311
Terrain.
643
00:25:13,378 --> 00:25:15,647
Pull up.
644
00:25:13,378 --> 00:25:15,647
Pull up.
645
00:25:15,714 --> 00:25:16,314
Terrain.
646
00:25:16,381 --> 00:25:17,249
Terrain.
647
00:25:23,622 --> 00:25:24,823
The levers are here.
648
00:25:27,826 --> 00:25:31,062
It was very
important to, in fact,
649
00:25:31,129 --> 00:25:34,199
examine the cable what
condition was it in.
650
00:25:31,129 --> 00:25:34,199
examine the cable what
condition was it in.
651
00:25:34,266 --> 00:25:36,735
This connects to
the faulty reverser.
652
00:25:36,801 --> 00:25:39,905
Investigators discover
that the cables separated
653
00:25:36,801 --> 00:25:39,905
Investigators discover
that the cables separated
654
00:25:39,971 --> 00:25:42,274
at a key connection point.
655
00:25:42,340 --> 00:25:44,876
That connector should be
able to withstand the force
656
00:25:44,943 --> 00:25:46,845
that the pilots exert.
657
00:25:44,943 --> 00:25:46,845
that the pilots exert.
658
00:25:46,912 --> 00:25:49,080
Only this time, it didn't.
659
00:25:49,147 --> 00:25:53,084
Three times, the safety
system pulls back the power,
660
00:25:49,147 --> 00:25:53,084
Three times, the safety
system pulls back the power,
661
00:25:53,151 --> 00:25:55,820
and three times, the
first officer puts
662
00:25:55,887 --> 00:25:58,924
the engines back to full power.
663
00:25:55,887 --> 00:25:58,924
the engines back to full power.
664
00:25:58,990 --> 00:26:02,294
Investigators conclude
that when the thrust lever
665
00:26:02,360 --> 00:26:04,596
snapped to idle
for the first time,
666
00:26:02,360 --> 00:26:04,596
snapped to idle
for the first time,
667
00:26:04,663 --> 00:26:07,832
the first officer used all his
strength to move it forward.
668
00:26:07,899 --> 00:26:11,336
The object is
to get the airplane as high
669
00:26:07,899 --> 00:26:11,336
The object is
to get the airplane as high
670
00:26:11,403 --> 00:26:13,305
and fast as you possibly can.
671
00:26:13,371 --> 00:26:15,874
Given the information
that this flight crew had,
672
00:26:13,371 --> 00:26:15,874
Given the information
that this flight crew had,
673
00:26:15,941 --> 00:26:18,777
I would venture to say that
99% of all flight crews
674
00:26:18,843 --> 00:26:22,113
would have reacted
exactly the same way.
675
00:26:18,843 --> 00:26:22,113
would have reacted
exactly the same way.
676
00:26:22,180 --> 00:26:24,282
With the
throttle held forward,
677
00:26:24,349 --> 00:26:28,219
the reverser opened again,
triggering the failsafe cable,
678
00:26:24,349 --> 00:26:28,219
the reverser opened again,
triggering the failsafe cable,
679
00:26:28,286 --> 00:26:30,689
but the first officer
continued pushing.
680
00:26:33,825 --> 00:26:36,962
That combined force was
stronger than the manufacturer
681
00:26:37,028 --> 00:26:38,129
anticipated.
682
00:26:38,196 --> 00:26:39,764
The cable separated.
683
00:26:38,196 --> 00:26:39,764
The cable separated.
684
00:26:39,831 --> 00:26:43,335
Had ended up with the
thrust reverser fully open
685
00:26:43,401 --> 00:26:46,738
and with full thrust
on that engine where
686
00:26:43,401 --> 00:26:46,738
and with full thrust
on that engine where
687
00:26:46,805 --> 00:26:48,139
the thrust reversers were open.
688
00:26:48,206 --> 00:26:50,942
With one engine
at full forward power
689
00:26:51,009 --> 00:26:54,112
and the other in full
reverse, the plane rolled
690
00:26:51,009 --> 00:26:54,112
and the other in full
reverse, the plane rolled
691
00:26:54,179 --> 00:26:55,814
into an uncontrollable dive.
692
00:26:55,880 --> 00:26:57,048
Terrain.
Terrain.
693
00:26:57,115 --> 00:26:58,116
Pull up.
694
00:26:57,115 --> 00:26:58,116
Pull up.
695
00:27:01,353 --> 00:27:04,723
Once he put the engine
back to full power,
696
00:27:01,353 --> 00:27:04,723
Once he put the engine
back to full power,
697
00:27:04,789 --> 00:27:06,291
they didn't stand a chance.
698
00:27:06,358 --> 00:27:08,827
The crew's actions
were central to the fatal crash
699
00:27:08,893 --> 00:27:12,230
of TAM 402, but why
did an automated
700
00:27:08,893 --> 00:27:12,230
of TAM 402, but why
did an automated
701
00:27:12,297 --> 00:27:14,966
system designed to help
keep an aircraft safe,
702
00:27:15,033 --> 00:27:16,701
so confuse the crew?
703
00:27:15,033 --> 00:27:16,701
so confuse the crew?
704
00:27:16,768 --> 00:27:18,670
The thought came, why?
705
00:27:18,737 --> 00:27:20,005
How did this happen?
706
00:27:20,071 --> 00:27:21,373
- How did the crew...
- No.
707
00:27:21,439 --> 00:27:22,107
No.
No.
708
00:27:21,439 --> 00:27:22,107
No.
No.
709
00:27:22,173 --> 00:27:23,441
No.
No.
710
00:27:23,508 --> 00:27:25,143
...not understand what
was happening to them?
711
00:27:28,013 --> 00:27:30,749
Let's see how much time these
guys spent training for this.
712
00:27:30,815 --> 00:27:34,419
Investigators need to
find out if the TAM pilots knew
713
00:27:30,815 --> 00:27:34,419
Investigators need to
find out if the TAM pilots knew
714
00:27:34,486 --> 00:27:37,756
what to do if the Fokker 100's
thrust reversers deployed
715
00:27:37,822 --> 00:27:39,024
accidentally.
716
00:27:37,822 --> 00:27:39,024
accidentally.
717
00:27:40,925 --> 00:27:43,795
We found out that
TAM had consulted with Fokker
718
00:27:43,862 --> 00:27:45,997
to find out whether
there was any need
719
00:27:43,862 --> 00:27:45,997
to find out whether
there was any need
720
00:27:46,064 --> 00:27:49,200
to train for a reverser
deployment during takeoff.
721
00:27:56,775 --> 00:27:58,943
A failure so rare, they
decided not to train for it.
722
00:27:56,775 --> 00:27:58,943
A failure so rare, they
decided not to train for it.
723
00:28:00,779 --> 00:28:03,915
Fokker formally
responded, but the probability
724
00:28:00,779 --> 00:28:03,915
Fokker formally
responded, but the probability
725
00:28:03,982 --> 00:28:07,886
that the reverser would open
during takeoff was very small,
726
00:28:07,952 --> 00:28:11,423
and this training
was not necessary.
727
00:28:07,952 --> 00:28:11,423
and this training
was not necessary.
728
00:28:11,489 --> 00:28:12,824
Turn it off up there.
729
00:28:12,891 --> 00:28:13,825
Here too.
730
00:28:13,892 --> 00:28:14,726
It's off!
731
00:28:14,793 --> 00:28:15,860
It's off!
732
00:28:14,793 --> 00:28:15,860
It's off!
733
00:28:15,927 --> 00:28:17,762
Confused and untrained,
734
00:28:17,829 --> 00:28:19,864
the first officer
restored the power
735
00:28:19,931 --> 00:28:21,099
he wanted for the takeoff.
736
00:28:19,931 --> 00:28:21,099
he wanted for the takeoff.
737
00:28:25,804 --> 00:28:27,305
Unfortunately, they
738
00:28:25,804 --> 00:28:27,305
Unfortunately, they
739
00:28:27,372 --> 00:28:31,242
didn't have enough information
to make the right decisions
740
00:28:31,309 --> 00:28:32,310
at the right time.
741
00:28:44,322 --> 00:28:48,026
After the crash, TAM
Airlines added new training
742
00:28:44,322 --> 00:28:48,026
After the crash, TAM
Airlines added new training
743
00:28:48,093 --> 00:28:51,529
to instruct its pilots how to
respond if a reverser deploys
744
00:28:48,093 --> 00:28:51,529
to instruct its pilots how to
respond if a reverser deploys
745
00:28:51,596 --> 00:28:53,431
during takeoff.
746
00:28:53,498 --> 00:28:57,235
The cockpit is a complex
network of integrated systems.
747
00:28:53,498 --> 00:28:57,235
The cockpit is a complex
network of integrated systems.
748
00:28:57,302 --> 00:28:59,838
When flight crews
confront one failure,
749
00:28:59,904 --> 00:29:03,141
it takes just one bad decision
to create another far more
750
00:28:59,904 --> 00:29:03,141
it takes just one bad decision
to create another far more
751
00:29:03,208 --> 00:29:04,075
serious problem.
752
00:29:14,419 --> 00:29:18,089
AirAsia, Flight 8501
cruises high above the sea,
753
00:29:14,419 --> 00:29:18,089
AirAsia, Flight 8501
cruises high above the sea,
754
00:29:18,156 --> 00:29:19,324
north of Indonesia.
755
00:29:24,629 --> 00:29:28,533
Captain Irianto is in
command of the Airbus A320.
756
00:29:24,629 --> 00:29:28,533
Captain Irianto is in
command of the Airbus A320.
757
00:29:28,600 --> 00:29:32,237
He has logged more than
20,000 flying hours.
758
00:29:32,303 --> 00:29:35,340
His first officer is
Rahmi Emmanuel Purcell.
759
00:29:32,303 --> 00:29:35,340
His first officer is
Rahmi Emmanuel Purcell.
760
00:29:35,406 --> 00:29:38,510
He's amassed about 2,000
flying hours, much of it
761
00:29:38,576 --> 00:29:39,944
on the Airbus.
762
00:29:38,576 --> 00:29:39,944
on the Airbus.
763
00:29:40,011 --> 00:29:41,279
It was the
first officer that
764
00:29:41,346 --> 00:29:43,248
was manipulating the controls.
765
00:29:43,314 --> 00:29:45,917
The captain was in
command of the flight,
766
00:29:43,314 --> 00:29:45,917
The captain was in
command of the flight,
767
00:29:45,984 --> 00:29:49,854
but was performing the duties
of the pilot monitoring,
768
00:29:49,921 --> 00:29:53,291
or the non-flying pilot.
769
00:29:49,921 --> 00:29:53,291
or the non-flying pilot.
770
00:29:53,358 --> 00:29:55,393
Today's
flight originated
771
00:29:55,460 --> 00:29:58,029
in the Indonesian
city of Surabaya.
772
00:29:55,460 --> 00:29:58,029
in the Indonesian
city of Surabaya.
773
00:29:58,096 --> 00:30:01,232
The route heads across
the Java Sea to Singapore.
774
00:30:07,906 --> 00:30:10,175
Looks like weather ahead.
775
00:30:07,906 --> 00:30:10,175
Looks like weather ahead.
776
00:30:10,241 --> 00:30:12,577
I'm going
to radio for a higher cruise.
777
00:30:12,644 --> 00:30:14,112
Get around that weather.
778
00:30:14,179 --> 00:30:16,281
Good idea.
779
00:30:14,179 --> 00:30:16,281
Good idea.
780
00:30:16,347 --> 00:30:19,284
But before the
captain can do that, the flight
781
00:30:19,350 --> 00:30:21,186
computer sends a fault warning
782
00:30:19,350 --> 00:30:21,186
computer sends a fault warning
783
00:30:21,252 --> 00:30:22,320
ECAM actions.
784
00:30:22,387 --> 00:30:24,422
The ECAM
system monitors
785
00:30:24,489 --> 00:30:26,624
the plane's functions
and lists actions
786
00:30:26,691 --> 00:30:28,293
to be taken by the crew.
787
00:30:26,691 --> 00:30:28,293
to be taken by the crew.
788
00:30:28,359 --> 00:30:33,064
FAC 1 off and on.
789
00:30:28,359 --> 00:30:33,064
FAC 1 off and on.
790
00:30:33,131 --> 00:30:35,433
FAC 2 off and on.
791
00:30:35,500 --> 00:30:36,634
Resetting the aircrafts
792
00:30:36,701 --> 00:30:38,870
to flight augmentation
computers,
793
00:30:36,701 --> 00:30:38,870
to flight augmentation
computers,
794
00:30:38,937 --> 00:30:41,072
or FACs, addresses the fault...
795
00:30:41,139 --> 00:30:42,373
Warning cleared.
796
00:30:42,440 --> 00:30:44,275
...and
silences the warnings.
797
00:30:52,116 --> 00:30:53,184
A few minutes later...
798
00:30:57,288 --> 00:30:59,324
Same.
799
00:30:59,390 --> 00:31:01,559
FAC 1 off and on.
800
00:31:01,626 --> 00:31:05,630
After the crew
addresses the second fault...
801
00:31:01,626 --> 00:31:05,630
After the crew
addresses the second fault...
802
00:31:05,697 --> 00:31:10,969
AirAsia 8501, you
are cleared 2340.
803
00:31:05,697 --> 00:31:10,969
AirAsia 8501, you
are cleared 2340.
804
00:31:11,035 --> 00:31:13,004
...Jakarta
air traffic control
805
00:31:13,071 --> 00:31:14,305
clears the flight to climb.
806
00:31:17,375 --> 00:31:21,045
The controller waits
for confirmation,
807
00:31:17,375 --> 00:31:21,045
The controller waits
for confirmation,
808
00:31:21,112 --> 00:31:23,448
but the pilots are distracted.
809
00:31:23,514 --> 00:31:25,683
Here we go again.
810
00:31:25,750 --> 00:31:27,552
ECAM actions.
811
00:31:25,750 --> 00:31:27,552
ECAM actions.
812
00:31:27,619 --> 00:31:32,557
PAC 1 off and on.
813
00:31:32,624 --> 00:31:36,027
Very annoying and
very time consuming to deal
814
00:31:32,624 --> 00:31:36,027
Very annoying and
very time consuming to deal
815
00:31:36,094 --> 00:31:37,362
with this recurring problem.
816
00:31:40,031 --> 00:31:42,200
Enough of this.
817
00:31:42,267 --> 00:31:43,301
ECAM actions.
818
00:31:46,504 --> 00:31:49,007
In Jakarta,
the controller is
819
00:31:49,073 --> 00:31:50,408
trying to contact the flight.
820
00:31:50,475 --> 00:31:53,177
AirAsia 8501, do you read me?
821
00:31:50,475 --> 00:31:53,177
AirAsia 8501, do you read me?
822
00:31:53,244 --> 00:31:54,379
Please acknowledge.
823
00:31:58,383 --> 00:32:01,052
But in the
cockpit, the fault warnings
824
00:32:01,119 --> 00:32:03,521
have increased dramatically.
825
00:32:01,119 --> 00:32:03,521
have increased dramatically.
826
00:32:03,588 --> 00:32:06,457
AirAsia 8501, do you read me?
827
00:32:06,524 --> 00:32:07,725
Please acknowledge.
828
00:32:07,792 --> 00:32:09,227
The displays
indicate the plane
829
00:32:07,792 --> 00:32:09,227
The displays
indicate the plane
830
00:32:09,294 --> 00:32:10,995
is now rolling sharply left.
831
00:32:11,062 --> 00:32:13,398
Level.
832
00:32:13,464 --> 00:32:14,332
OK, level.
833
00:32:18,436 --> 00:32:19,537
Level.
834
00:32:19,604 --> 00:32:20,438
- RAHMI EMMANUEL
- I'm trying.
835
00:32:23,408 --> 00:32:24,742
It's not responding.
836
00:32:24,809 --> 00:32:28,146
AirAsia 8501, please confirm.
837
00:32:24,809 --> 00:32:28,146
AirAsia 8501, please confirm.
838
00:32:28,212 --> 00:32:33,584
You are climbing to
flight level 340.
839
00:32:28,212 --> 00:32:33,584
You are climbing to
flight level 340.
840
00:32:33,651 --> 00:32:36,454
The plane is now
climbing higher and higher.
841
00:32:45,396 --> 00:32:47,665
Then suddenly, it falls.
842
00:32:55,773 --> 00:32:56,607
Altitude!
843
00:32:56,674 --> 00:32:59,377
I see it.
844
00:32:56,674 --> 00:32:59,377
I see it.
845
00:32:59,444 --> 00:33:03,414
The rate of descent
here was very, very high.
846
00:32:59,444 --> 00:33:03,414
The rate of descent
here was very, very high.
847
00:33:03,481 --> 00:33:06,684
Flight 8501
plummets from the sky,
848
00:33:06,751 --> 00:33:08,586
speeding toward the sea below.
849
00:33:11,723 --> 00:33:15,560
AirAsia Flight 8501
is falling fast.
850
00:33:15,626 --> 00:33:17,228
Pull.
851
00:33:15,626 --> 00:33:17,228
Pull.
852
00:33:17,295 --> 00:33:19,197
The pilots are helpless.
853
00:33:25,636 --> 00:33:30,074
The plane vanishes from radar
and plunges into the Java Sea.
854
00:33:25,636 --> 00:33:30,074
The plane vanishes from radar
and plunges into the Java Sea.
855
00:33:39,117 --> 00:33:41,652
The loss of AirAsia 8501
856
00:33:39,117 --> 00:33:41,652
The loss of AirAsia 8501
857
00:33:41,719 --> 00:33:45,156
was a classic case of
a flight degenerating
858
00:33:45,223 --> 00:33:47,792
from mundane, normal
cruise conditions
859
00:33:45,223 --> 00:33:47,792
from mundane, normal
cruise conditions
860
00:33:47,859 --> 00:33:51,129
to the loss of the aircraft
in a span of just 20 minutes.
861
00:33:51,195 --> 00:33:53,364
Rescue teams
searched the area,
862
00:33:51,195 --> 00:33:53,364
Rescue teams
searched the area,
863
00:33:53,431 --> 00:33:56,167
but of the 162
passengers and crew,
864
00:33:56,234 --> 00:33:58,469
there are no survivors
and only a few
865
00:33:56,234 --> 00:33:58,469
there are no survivors
and only a few
866
00:33:58,536 --> 00:33:59,804
pieces of floating debris.
867
00:34:02,507 --> 00:34:05,276
An international team of
air safety investigators
868
00:34:02,507 --> 00:34:05,276
An international team of
air safety investigators
869
00:34:05,343 --> 00:34:07,612
flies to Jakarta to
join local experts.
870
00:34:10,381 --> 00:34:13,284
They need to find out why
a highly sophisticated
871
00:34:13,351 --> 00:34:16,287
airliner, flying at
cruising altitude suddenly
872
00:34:13,351 --> 00:34:16,287
airliner, flying at
cruising altitude suddenly
873
00:34:16,354 --> 00:34:18,423
fell from the sky.
874
00:34:18,489 --> 00:34:21,459
We had a lot
of little pieces everywhere.
875
00:34:21,526 --> 00:34:24,729
My first reaction was,
it's not going to be easy.
876
00:34:21,526 --> 00:34:24,729
My first reaction was,
it's not going to be easy.
877
00:34:24,796 --> 00:34:28,533
Two weeks after the
crash, the plane's black boxes
878
00:34:24,796 --> 00:34:28,533
Two weeks after the
crash, the plane's black boxes
879
00:34:28,599 --> 00:34:30,701
are recovered from the sea.
880
00:34:30,768 --> 00:34:33,237
Investigators analyze the
cockpit voice recording.
881
00:34:33,304 --> 00:34:34,806
CAPTAIN IRIANTO (ON
RECORDING): Jakarta air traffic
882
00:34:33,304 --> 00:34:34,806
CAPTAIN IRIANTO (ON
RECORDING): Jakarta air traffic
883
00:34:34,872 --> 00:34:39,644
control, AirAsia 8501
request climb to 38,000
884
00:34:39,710 --> 00:34:41,179
to clear storm clouds.
885
00:34:39,710 --> 00:34:41,179
to clear storm clouds.
886
00:34:44,749 --> 00:34:48,453
Almost immediately,
they discover something.
887
00:34:44,749 --> 00:34:48,453
Almost immediately,
they discover something.
888
00:34:48,519 --> 00:34:50,354
RAHMI EMMANUEL PURCELL (ON
RECORDING): ECAM actions.
889
00:34:50,421 --> 00:34:53,257
CAPTAIN IRIANTO (ON
RECORDING): FAC 1 off and on.
890
00:34:50,421 --> 00:34:53,257
CAPTAIN IRIANTO (ON
RECORDING): FAC 1 off and on.
891
00:34:53,324 --> 00:34:57,128
FAC 2 off and on.
892
00:34:57,195 --> 00:34:58,429
Warning cleared.
893
00:34:57,195 --> 00:34:58,429
Warning cleared.
894
00:34:58,496 --> 00:35:01,799
They were dealing with
some kind of warning.
895
00:35:01,866 --> 00:35:03,701
Play recording.
896
00:35:03,768 --> 00:35:06,537
CAPTAIN IRIANTO (ON
RECORDING): ECAM actions, same.
897
00:35:03,768 --> 00:35:06,537
CAPTAIN IRIANTO (ON
RECORDING): ECAM actions, same.
898
00:35:06,604 --> 00:35:08,306
OK, the warning came back.
899
00:35:08,372 --> 00:35:13,444
They were getting continual
fault warnings through what's
900
00:35:08,372 --> 00:35:13,444
They were getting continual
fault warnings through what's
901
00:35:13,511 --> 00:35:16,147
called an ECAM system,
electronic central aircraft
902
00:35:16,214 --> 00:35:17,682
monitoring system.
903
00:35:17,748 --> 00:35:19,383
CAPTAIN IRIANTO (ON
RECORDING): Here we go again.
904
00:35:19,450 --> 00:35:22,453
At this point, the crew's
behavior was standard.
905
00:35:19,450 --> 00:35:22,453
At this point, the crew's
behavior was standard.
906
00:35:22,520 --> 00:35:27,291
They were communicating on
what checklist to apply.
907
00:35:27,358 --> 00:35:28,759
There it is again.
908
00:35:27,358 --> 00:35:28,759
There it is again.
909
00:35:28,826 --> 00:35:31,395
RAHMI EMMANUEL PURCELL (ON
RECORDING): ECAM actions.
910
00:35:31,462 --> 00:35:34,899
Then the recording
reveals something unexpected.
911
00:35:31,462 --> 00:35:34,899
Then the recording
reveals something unexpected.
912
00:35:34,966 --> 00:35:37,335
No, I've got a better idea.
913
00:35:37,401 --> 00:35:40,671
After a fourth fault,
the captain appears to take
914
00:35:37,401 --> 00:35:40,671
After a fourth fault,
the captain appears to take
915
00:35:40,738 --> 00:35:41,873
a different course of action.
916
00:35:41,939 --> 00:35:44,675
Hold recording.
917
00:35:44,742 --> 00:35:47,778
Now, the autopilot
has disengaged.
918
00:35:44,742 --> 00:35:47,778
Now, the autopilot
has disengaged.
919
00:35:47,845 --> 00:35:50,581
An unexpected
disengagement of the auto
920
00:35:50,648 --> 00:35:52,950
throttle and autothrust
system results
921
00:35:50,648 --> 00:35:52,950
throttle and autothrust
system results
922
00:35:53,017 --> 00:35:55,920
in a pretty loud warning.
923
00:35:58,856 --> 00:36:00,591
RAHMI EMMANUEL PURCELL (ON
RECORDING): What was that?
924
00:36:00,658 --> 00:36:03,461
OK, let's see what we have.
925
00:36:03,528 --> 00:36:05,830
RAHMI EMMANUEL PURCELL (ON
RECORDING): Master caution.
926
00:36:03,528 --> 00:36:05,830
RAHMI EMMANUEL PURCELL (ON
RECORDING): Master caution.
927
00:36:05,897 --> 00:36:06,831
Why?
928
00:36:06,898 --> 00:36:07,765
Checking.
929
00:36:10,735 --> 00:36:13,237
Then a more
serious alarm sounds.
930
00:36:13,304 --> 00:36:14,539
CAPTAIN IRIANTO (ON
RECORDING): Level.
931
00:36:17,608 --> 00:36:19,410
Stall warning.
932
00:36:19,477 --> 00:36:20,645
CAPTAIN IRIANTO (ON
RECORDING): Pull.
933
00:36:20,711 --> 00:36:22,346
Slowly.
934
00:36:20,711 --> 00:36:22,346
Slowly.
935
00:36:22,413 --> 00:36:23,581
RAHMI EMMANUEL PURCELL (ON
RECORDING): What's going on?
936
00:36:23,648 --> 00:36:24,815
CAPTAIN IRIANTO (ON
RECORDING): Pull!
937
00:36:28,753 --> 00:36:31,556
What caused this
technically sophisticated
938
00:36:31,622 --> 00:36:32,823
aircraft to stall?
939
00:36:32,890 --> 00:36:36,894
The autopilot disconnects, the
aircraft stalls, they struggle
940
00:36:32,890 --> 00:36:36,894
The autopilot disconnects, the
aircraft stalls, they struggle
941
00:36:36,961 --> 00:36:42,733
to recover, it makes no sense.
942
00:36:36,961 --> 00:36:42,733
to recover, it makes no sense.
943
00:36:42,800 --> 00:36:45,703
Investigators look
for clues in the plane's
944
00:36:45,770 --> 00:36:46,704
maintenance records.
945
00:36:45,770 --> 00:36:46,704
maintenance records.
946
00:36:50,441 --> 00:36:52,843
They quickly find one.
947
00:36:50,441 --> 00:36:52,843
They quickly find one.
948
00:36:52,910 --> 00:36:55,880
There had been an issue with
the rudder travel limit unit,
949
00:36:55,947 --> 00:36:56,814
or RTLU.
950
00:36:59,884 --> 00:37:03,454
The RTLU prevents the rudder
from deflecting too far
951
00:37:03,521 --> 00:37:05,456
in either direction mid-flight.
952
00:37:03,521 --> 00:37:05,456
in either direction mid-flight.
953
00:37:10,795 --> 00:37:13,030
Records reveal that it
had been malfunctioning
954
00:37:13,097 --> 00:37:14,432
for almost a year.
955
00:37:17,635 --> 00:37:20,871
23 reports of the
exact same failure.
956
00:37:20,938 --> 00:37:24,575
The RTLU failures
on this particular airframe
957
00:37:20,938 --> 00:37:24,575
The RTLU failures
on this particular airframe
958
00:37:24,642 --> 00:37:26,510
had become
increasingly frequent.
959
00:37:26,577 --> 00:37:28,779
After each
failure, maintenance
960
00:37:26,577 --> 00:37:28,779
After each
failure, maintenance
961
00:37:28,846 --> 00:37:30,681
workers reset the RTLU...
962
00:37:30,748 --> 00:37:34,452
They just kept
resetting it and then
963
00:37:30,748 --> 00:37:34,452
They just kept
resetting it and then
964
00:37:34,518 --> 00:37:35,920
putting it back in service.
965
00:37:35,987 --> 00:37:38,522
...and failed to
find a more permanent fix.
966
00:37:38,589 --> 00:37:40,324
They were
returning the airplane
967
00:37:38,589 --> 00:37:40,324
They were
returning the airplane
968
00:37:40,391 --> 00:37:44,495
to service after reset, and
from a legal standpoint,
969
00:37:44,562 --> 00:37:47,999
it did clear the problem, but
obvious that whatever the fault
970
00:37:44,562 --> 00:37:47,999
it did clear the problem, but
obvious that whatever the fault
971
00:37:48,065 --> 00:37:50,568
was they hadn't found
it because the problem
972
00:37:50,635 --> 00:37:51,936
continued to reoccur.
973
00:37:52,003 --> 00:37:54,038
The aircraft
could operate normally,
974
00:37:52,003 --> 00:37:54,038
The aircraft
could operate normally,
975
00:37:54,105 --> 00:37:57,642
despite the warnings, but on the
night of the crash, It didn't.
976
00:37:57,708 --> 00:37:58,576
Why?
977
00:37:57,708 --> 00:37:58,576
Why?
978
00:38:01,445 --> 00:38:03,547
Investigators hope
to find the answer
979
00:38:03,614 --> 00:38:04,715
on the flight data recorder.
980
00:38:03,614 --> 00:38:04,715
on the flight data recorder.
981
00:38:04,782 --> 00:38:06,550
So here's the first warning.
982
00:38:06,617 --> 00:38:09,487
It clearly was the RTLU.
983
00:38:09,553 --> 00:38:12,790
They do the fix, simply
resetting the entire system.
984
00:38:09,553 --> 00:38:12,790
They do the fix, simply
resetting the entire system.
985
00:38:12,857 --> 00:38:16,394
Two more times, the
RTLU warning goes off,
986
00:38:12,857 --> 00:38:16,394
Two more times, the
RTLU warning goes off,
987
00:38:16,460 --> 00:38:19,830
and each time, they
did the right thing.
988
00:38:19,897 --> 00:38:22,800
Then it went off
on a fourth time,
989
00:38:19,897 --> 00:38:22,800
Then it went off
on a fourth time,
990
00:38:22,867 --> 00:38:25,770
then suddenly,
there was a glitch.
991
00:38:25,836 --> 00:38:28,673
Investigators believe that glitch caused
992
00:38:25,836 --> 00:38:28,673
Investigators believe that glitch caused
993
00:38:28,739 --> 00:38:31,642
the autopilot to disconnect
and put the plane
994
00:38:31,709 --> 00:38:33,411
into a dangerous left bank.
995
00:38:33,477 --> 00:38:37,615
The single event of autopilot,
auto throttle disengagement
996
00:38:33,477 --> 00:38:37,615
The single event of autopilot,
auto throttle disengagement
997
00:38:37,682 --> 00:38:40,618
sends the investigators in
two different directions...
998
00:38:37,682 --> 00:38:40,618
sends the investigators in
two different directions...
999
00:38:40,685 --> 00:38:45,723
one, what caused it, two,
how did the crew handle it.
1000
00:38:45,790 --> 00:38:47,692
As investigators struggle
1001
00:38:45,790 --> 00:38:47,692
As investigators struggle
1002
00:38:47,758 --> 00:38:50,661
to answer those questions...
1003
00:38:50,728 --> 00:38:52,430
Hello, NTSC.
1004
00:38:50,728 --> 00:38:52,430
Hello, NTSC.
1005
00:38:52,496 --> 00:38:54,999
...they get a
tantalizing new lead.
1006
00:38:55,066 --> 00:38:56,534
Wait, wait, slow down.
1007
00:38:56,600 --> 00:38:57,968
What happened?
1008
00:38:58,035 --> 00:39:00,071
Investigators receive an unexpected call,
1009
00:38:58,035 --> 00:39:00,071
Investigators receive an unexpected call,
1010
00:39:00,137 --> 00:39:04,141
offering new information about
the captain of AirAsia 8501.
1011
00:39:04,208 --> 00:39:06,610
Start from the beginning.
1012
00:39:06,677 --> 00:39:08,012
Where was he?
1013
00:39:08,079 --> 00:39:10,681
Three days before the accident,
1014
00:39:08,079 --> 00:39:10,681
Three days before the accident,
1015
00:39:10,748 --> 00:39:13,150
this same captain
was about to fly
1016
00:39:13,217 --> 00:39:16,387
from Indonesia to
Kuala Lumpur, when
1017
00:39:13,217 --> 00:39:16,387
from Indonesia to
Kuala Lumpur, when
1018
00:39:16,454 --> 00:39:18,656
he had an RTLU malfunction.
1019
00:39:18,723 --> 00:39:20,725
He asked for an engineer
to come into the cockpit
1020
00:39:20,791 --> 00:39:22,560
and try to fix that.
1021
00:39:20,791 --> 00:39:22,560
and try to fix that.
1022
00:39:22,626 --> 00:39:24,028
RTLU problem again?
1023
00:39:24,095 --> 00:39:26,797
Yeah, it
just keeps coming back.
1024
00:39:26,864 --> 00:39:29,734
The maintenance
engineer rebooted the system.
1025
00:39:26,864 --> 00:39:29,734
The maintenance
engineer rebooted the system.
1026
00:39:32,503 --> 00:39:35,406
There.
1027
00:39:32,503 --> 00:39:35,406
There.
1028
00:39:35,473 --> 00:39:37,007
...but the
problem returned.
1029
00:39:39,677 --> 00:39:40,878
I've got an idea.
1030
00:39:39,677 --> 00:39:40,878
I've got an idea.
1031
00:39:44,014 --> 00:39:45,950
He then
pulled the circuit
1032
00:39:46,016 --> 00:39:49,787
breakers for the main computer.
1033
00:39:46,016 --> 00:39:49,787
breakers for the main computer.
1034
00:39:49,854 --> 00:39:51,922
Maintenance on the ground
1035
00:39:51,989 --> 00:39:55,760
has a very specific list of
circuit breakers that says you
1036
00:39:51,989 --> 00:39:55,760
has a very specific list of
circuit breakers that says you
1037
00:39:55,826 --> 00:39:59,830
can utilize pulling these
circuit breakers to reset
1038
00:39:55,826 --> 00:39:59,830
can utilize pulling these
circuit breakers to reset
1039
00:39:59,897 --> 00:40:01,499
computers within the airplane.
1040
00:40:01,565 --> 00:40:03,667
The captain
watched as the problem
1041
00:40:03,734 --> 00:40:06,637
appeared to be resolved.
1042
00:40:03,734 --> 00:40:06,637
appeared to be resolved.
1043
00:40:06,704 --> 00:40:08,072
Problem solved.
1044
00:40:08,139 --> 00:40:11,742
And can I do the same
thing if it happens again?
1045
00:40:08,139 --> 00:40:11,742
And can I do the same
thing if it happens again?
1046
00:40:11,809 --> 00:40:16,480
Yeah, just do what the
ECAM tells you to do.
1047
00:40:11,809 --> 00:40:16,480
Yeah, just do what the
ECAM tells you to do.
1048
00:40:16,547 --> 00:40:20,718
Don't tell me he tried
to do that in the air?
1049
00:40:20,785 --> 00:40:24,021
Investigators think
they now know what the captain
1050
00:40:20,785 --> 00:40:24,021
Investigators think
they now know what the captain
1051
00:40:24,088 --> 00:40:26,457
did to cause the crisis.
1052
00:40:26,524 --> 00:40:28,626
Begins simulation.
1053
00:40:26,524 --> 00:40:28,626
Begins simulation.
1054
00:40:28,692 --> 00:40:30,661
To see
if they're right,
1055
00:40:30,728 --> 00:40:33,664
they simulate the
events in the cockpit.
1056
00:40:33,731 --> 00:40:37,868
OK, so let's start with
the RTLU warnings, OK?
1057
00:40:33,731 --> 00:40:37,868
OK, so let's start with
the RTLU warnings, OK?
1058
00:40:40,571 --> 00:40:41,906
FAC 1, off.
1059
00:40:41,972 --> 00:40:43,174
FAC 2, off.
1060
00:40:46,610 --> 00:40:47,278
Good.
1061
00:40:50,147 --> 00:40:52,082
Enough of this.
1062
00:40:52,149 --> 00:40:54,185
After a fourth alarm.
1063
00:40:52,149 --> 00:40:54,185
After a fourth alarm.
1064
00:40:54,251 --> 00:40:55,586
ECAM actions?
1065
00:40:55,653 --> 00:40:57,121
No.
1066
00:40:57,188 --> 00:40:58,689
I've got a better idea.
1067
00:40:57,188 --> 00:40:58,689
I've got a better idea.
1068
00:40:58,756 --> 00:41:01,625
Investigators believe the captain pulled
1069
00:41:01,692 --> 00:41:03,160
two critical circuit breakers.
1070
00:41:05,796 --> 00:41:08,065
Captain pulls the
circuit breaker 1.
1071
00:41:13,704 --> 00:41:16,140
The result is immediate.
1072
00:41:19,009 --> 00:41:22,746
And there goes the
autopilot disconnect warning.
1073
00:41:19,009 --> 00:41:22,746
And there goes the
autopilot disconnect warning.
1074
00:41:25,583 --> 00:41:27,117
This had to be what he did.
1075
00:41:27,184 --> 00:41:29,920
He was, perhaps, copying what
he'd seen the ground engineer
1076
00:41:27,184 --> 00:41:29,920
He was, perhaps, copying what
he'd seen the ground engineer
1077
00:41:29,987 --> 00:41:32,556
do, but of course, the
consequences in flight,
1078
00:41:32,623 --> 00:41:37,294
disabling critical systems
are quite different.
1079
00:41:32,623 --> 00:41:37,294
disabling critical systems
are quite different.
1080
00:41:37,361 --> 00:41:42,533
His fix for a minor
fault created a new problem.
1081
00:41:37,361 --> 00:41:42,533
His fix for a minor
fault created a new problem.
1082
00:41:42,600 --> 00:41:44,268
Pulling the circuit
breaker disables
1083
00:41:44,335 --> 00:41:48,672
the autopilot, which sends the
plane into a 54-degree roll.
1084
00:41:44,335 --> 00:41:48,672
the autopilot, which sends the
plane into a 54-degree roll.
1085
00:41:52,977 --> 00:41:54,979
The first officer
doesn't notice the plane
1086
00:41:55,045 --> 00:41:57,815
is banking until the
captain sits down again.
1087
00:41:57,882 --> 00:41:58,949
Oh, my God.
1088
00:41:57,882 --> 00:41:58,949
Oh, my God.
1089
00:41:59,016 --> 00:42:00,985
Oh.
1090
00:42:01,051 --> 00:42:03,120
The co-pilot's movement
1091
00:42:03,187 --> 00:42:05,322
of the stick to its
extreme rightmost
1092
00:42:03,187 --> 00:42:05,322
of the stick to its
extreme rightmost
1093
00:42:05,389 --> 00:42:09,994
position resulted in a very
violent roll to the right.
1094
00:42:10,060 --> 00:42:13,197
The FDR data shows how
extreme the plane's movements
1095
00:42:10,060 --> 00:42:13,197
The FDR data shows how
extreme the plane's movements
1096
00:42:13,264 --> 00:42:14,565
were.
1097
00:42:14,632 --> 00:42:18,769
So the plane rolled
54 degrees left,
1098
00:42:14,632 --> 00:42:18,769
So the plane rolled
54 degrees left,
1099
00:42:18,836 --> 00:42:24,341
and he pulled back almost
level in just 2 seconds.
1100
00:42:18,836 --> 00:42:24,341
and he pulled back almost
level in just 2 seconds.
1101
00:42:24,408 --> 00:42:27,044
That would scramble
anybody's gyros.
1102
00:42:27,111 --> 00:42:28,913
Maybe that was the confusion.
1103
00:42:27,111 --> 00:42:28,913
Maybe that was the confusion.
1104
00:42:28,979 --> 00:42:32,149
As soon as the first officer
had leveled the aircraft,
1105
00:42:32,216 --> 00:42:36,053
the fluid in his ear canals
keeps spinning to the right.
1106
00:42:32,216 --> 00:42:36,053
the fluid in his ear canals
keeps spinning to the right.
1107
00:42:36,120 --> 00:42:37,655
The aircraft is
level, but there's
1108
00:42:37,721 --> 00:42:39,223
a very strong
illusion from the ears
1109
00:42:39,290 --> 00:42:40,758
that you're turning
to the right.
1110
00:42:39,290 --> 00:42:40,758
that you're turning
to the right.
1111
00:42:40,824 --> 00:42:44,962
And then he pulls
it as hard as he can,
1112
00:42:45,029 --> 00:42:46,664
and the plane starts climbing.
1113
00:42:45,029 --> 00:42:46,664
and the plane starts climbing.
1114
00:42:49,133 --> 00:42:51,268
This is
a massive input.
1115
00:42:51,335 --> 00:42:54,838
The airplane would
pitch up very quickly.
1116
00:42:51,335 --> 00:42:54,838
The airplane would
pitch up very quickly.
1117
00:42:54,905 --> 00:42:56,073
What's going on?
1118
00:42:56,140 --> 00:42:57,875
He was completely baffled.
1119
00:42:57,942 --> 00:43:01,045
His vertigo may have led him
to believe that the aircraft
1120
00:42:57,942 --> 00:43:01,045
His vertigo may have led him
to believe that the aircraft
1121
00:43:01,111 --> 00:43:03,180
was pitching down, so
he's actually recovering
1122
00:43:03,247 --> 00:43:05,049
from an imaginary pitch down.
1123
00:43:03,247 --> 00:43:05,049
from an imaginary pitch down.
1124
00:43:05,115 --> 00:43:06,917
He was disoriented.
1125
00:43:06,984 --> 00:43:10,788
The plane stalls and
begins to fall out of the sky.
1126
00:43:06,984 --> 00:43:10,788
The plane stalls and
begins to fall out of the sky.
1127
00:43:10,854 --> 00:43:14,858
The captain attempts to regain
control, but his efforts fail.
1128
00:43:14,925 --> 00:43:18,762
I think the crew had started
to lose their spatial awareness
1129
00:43:14,925 --> 00:43:18,762
I think the crew had started
to lose their spatial awareness
1130
00:43:18,829 --> 00:43:19,997
completely.
1131
00:43:20,064 --> 00:43:21,398
The first
officer continues
1132
00:43:21,465 --> 00:43:24,034
pulling back on his side
stick until the very end.
1133
00:43:21,465 --> 00:43:24,034
pulling back on his side
stick until the very end.
1134
00:43:24,101 --> 00:43:26,804
The input of the
first officer...
1135
00:43:26,870 --> 00:43:28,806
Pull down!
1136
00:43:26,870 --> 00:43:28,806
Pull down!
1137
00:43:28,872 --> 00:43:32,109
...was the
exact wrong thing to do.
1138
00:43:32,176 --> 00:43:34,144
What's going on?
1139
00:43:34,211 --> 00:43:38,015
When a flight crew
faces a failure mid-flight,
1140
00:43:38,082 --> 00:43:41,018
one bad decision can
trigger bigger problems
1141
00:43:38,082 --> 00:43:41,018
one bad decision can
trigger bigger problems
1142
00:43:41,085 --> 00:43:42,886
that lead to catastrophe.
1143
00:43:46,757 --> 00:43:49,093
No one's going to be
able to reach up and grab
1144
00:43:49,159 --> 00:43:50,794
you and bring you safely back.
1145
00:43:50,861 --> 00:43:53,664
What it finally comes down
to is how well that captain
1146
00:43:50,861 --> 00:43:53,664
What it finally comes down
to is how well that captain
1147
00:43:53,731 --> 00:43:57,368
and first officer orchestrate
what they have been taught,
1148
00:43:57,434 --> 00:43:59,169
with the situation
that they have,
1149
00:43:57,434 --> 00:43:59,169
with the situation
that they have,
1150
00:43:59,236 --> 00:44:01,338
to try to bring everybody
back down to Earth safely.
84659
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