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These are the user uploaded subtitles that are being translated: 1 00:00:08,975 --> 00:00:10,210 What's that? 2 00:00:10,276 --> 00:00:11,544 When crisis strikes... 3 00:00:11,611 --> 00:00:13,246 What is it, the engines? 4 00:00:11,611 --> 00:00:13,246 What is it, the engines? 5 00:00:13,313 --> 00:00:15,315 ...pilots must make life and death choices. 6 00:00:15,382 --> 00:00:16,349 Which one is it? 7 00:00:16,416 --> 00:00:19,419 It's the left. 8 00:00:16,416 --> 00:00:19,419 It's the left. 9 00:00:19,486 --> 00:00:20,620 It's the right one. 10 00:00:20,687 --> 00:00:22,555 Did he say the right one? 11 00:00:25,692 --> 00:00:28,695 But sometimes, accident investigators find 12 00:00:28,762 --> 00:00:30,330 evidence of baffling decisions. 13 00:00:28,762 --> 00:00:30,330 evidence of baffling decisions. 14 00:00:30,397 --> 00:00:31,331 Turn it off up there. 15 00:00:31,398 --> 00:00:32,198 Auto throttle. 16 00:00:32,265 --> 00:00:33,032 Pull here. 17 00:00:33,099 --> 00:00:34,300 It's off. 18 00:00:34,367 --> 00:00:36,336 Those guys had no idea what was going on. 19 00:00:34,367 --> 00:00:36,336 Those guys had no idea what was going on. 20 00:00:36,403 --> 00:00:37,737 ...with deadly consequences. 21 00:00:37,804 --> 00:00:40,473 The input of the first officer... 22 00:00:40,540 --> 00:00:41,608 Pull down. 23 00:00:41,674 --> 00:00:44,511 ...was the exact wrong thing to do. 24 00:00:41,674 --> 00:00:44,511 ...was the exact wrong thing to do. 25 00:00:44,577 --> 00:00:46,312 Three flights end in tragedy. 26 00:00:46,379 --> 00:00:48,481 Don't tell me he tried to do that in the air. 27 00:00:46,379 --> 00:00:48,481 Don't tell me he tried to do that in the air. 28 00:00:48,548 --> 00:00:51,584 When pilots add to the problems they're facing. 29 00:00:51,651 --> 00:00:53,186 It's not correcting. 30 00:00:53,253 --> 00:00:54,120 Oh, no. 31 00:00:53,253 --> 00:00:54,120 Oh, no. 32 00:00:54,187 --> 00:00:55,288 Don't tell me. 33 00:00:59,426 --> 00:01:02,195 Ladies and gentlemen, we are starting our approach. 34 00:00:59,426 --> 00:01:02,195 Ladies and gentlemen, we are starting our approach. 35 00:01:02,262 --> 00:01:03,430 We lost both engines. 36 00:01:03,496 --> 00:01:04,497 Put the mask over your nose. 37 00:01:04,564 --> 00:01:05,698 - Emergency descend. - Mayday. 38 00:01:05,765 --> 00:01:06,533 Mayday. 39 00:01:05,765 --> 00:01:06,533 Mayday. 40 00:01:06,599 --> 00:01:08,101 Brace for impact. 41 00:01:08,168 --> 00:01:11,504 Look at the last one. 42 00:01:11,571 --> 00:01:13,206 It's gonna crash. 43 00:01:11,571 --> 00:01:13,206 It's gonna crash. 44 00:01:24,751 --> 00:01:29,322 It's a busy night at Heathrow Airport in London. 45 00:01:29,389 --> 00:01:31,858 The crew of British Midland Flight 92 46 00:01:29,389 --> 00:01:31,858 The crew of British Midland Flight 92 47 00:01:31,925 --> 00:01:34,861 completes the final takeoff preparations for a short flight 48 00:01:34,928 --> 00:01:38,097 to Belfast. 49 00:01:34,928 --> 00:01:38,097 to Belfast. 50 00:01:38,164 --> 00:01:40,533 Why don't you let them know we're ready to go? 51 00:01:40,600 --> 00:01:42,836 Will do. 52 00:01:40,600 --> 00:01:42,836 Will do. 53 00:01:42,902 --> 00:01:44,471 Hi, ladies and gentlemen. 54 00:01:44,537 --> 00:01:45,772 Welcome aboard. 55 00:01:45,839 --> 00:01:47,507 We're just finishing up our final checks, 56 00:01:47,574 --> 00:01:50,376 but we'll have you on your way in just a few minutes. 57 00:01:47,574 --> 00:01:50,376 but we'll have you on your way in just a few minutes. 58 00:01:54,881 --> 00:01:59,519 There are 118 passengers on the Boeing 737. 59 00:01:59,586 --> 00:02:01,321 One of them is Nigel Baldwin. 60 00:01:59,586 --> 00:02:01,321 One of them is Nigel Baldwin. 61 00:02:01,387 --> 00:02:04,123 I was excited, just had an exciting weekend, 62 00:02:04,190 --> 00:02:05,658 making the final arrangements for our wedding, 63 00:02:05,725 --> 00:02:08,461 and I just settled back, like everybody else. 64 00:02:05,725 --> 00:02:08,461 and I just settled back, like everybody else. 65 00:02:14,200 --> 00:02:16,736 Midland 92, you're cleared for takeoff. 66 00:02:16,803 --> 00:02:20,206 Captain Kevin Hunt flew the plane in from Belfast. 67 00:02:16,803 --> 00:02:20,206 Captain Kevin Hunt flew the plane in from Belfast. 68 00:02:20,273 --> 00:02:22,408 He's a 23-year veteran, who's logged 69 00:02:22,475 --> 00:02:25,411 more than 750 hours in 737s. 70 00:02:22,475 --> 00:02:25,411 more than 750 hours in 737s. 71 00:02:25,478 --> 00:02:26,679 Thrust set. 72 00:02:26,746 --> 00:02:28,414 First Officer, David McClelland... 73 00:02:28,481 --> 00:02:29,883 Here we go. 74 00:02:29,949 --> 00:02:32,185 ...takes the controls for the return trip. 75 00:02:29,949 --> 00:02:32,185 ...takes the controls for the return trip. 76 00:02:32,252 --> 00:02:34,254 He's been a pilot for six years. 77 00:02:44,330 --> 00:02:51,237 Midland 92 cleared to flight level 350. 78 00:02:44,330 --> 00:02:51,237 Midland 92 cleared to flight level 350. 79 00:02:51,304 --> 00:02:59,445 Flight level 350, Midland 92. 80 00:02:51,304 --> 00:02:59,445 Flight level 350, Midland 92. 81 00:02:59,512 --> 00:03:01,214 Could I have a coffee too, please? 82 00:02:59,512 --> 00:03:01,214 Could I have a coffee too, please? 83 00:03:01,281 --> 00:03:04,250 The plane has only been in the air for 10 minutes. 84 00:03:10,423 --> 00:03:13,426 What's that? 85 00:03:10,423 --> 00:03:13,426 What's that? 86 00:03:13,493 --> 00:03:15,595 I just knew there was something not quite right. 87 00:03:19,966 --> 00:03:22,769 Whoa. 88 00:03:22,835 --> 00:03:25,204 You smell that? 89 00:03:22,835 --> 00:03:25,204 You smell that? 90 00:03:25,271 --> 00:03:26,472 Is that smoke? 91 00:03:34,380 --> 00:03:35,515 What is it, the engines? 92 00:03:39,285 --> 00:03:40,587 We can hear it. 93 00:03:40,653 --> 00:03:43,890 It was sort of a humming vibration. 94 00:03:40,653 --> 00:03:43,890 It was sort of a humming vibration. 95 00:03:43,957 --> 00:03:45,458 It's a fire, Kevin. 96 00:03:45,525 --> 00:03:49,262 Which one is it? 97 00:03:45,525 --> 00:03:49,262 Which one is it? 98 00:03:49,329 --> 00:03:50,363 It's the left. 99 00:03:54,367 --> 00:03:55,568 It's the right one. 100 00:03:55,635 --> 00:03:59,539 The pilots need to act quickly. 101 00:03:59,606 --> 00:04:02,542 OK, throttle it back. 102 00:03:59,606 --> 00:04:02,542 OK, throttle it back. 103 00:04:02,609 --> 00:04:03,977 Throttling back. 104 00:04:04,043 --> 00:04:06,579 They try to stabilize the problem engine 105 00:04:04,043 --> 00:04:06,579 They try to stabilize the problem engine 106 00:04:06,646 --> 00:04:08,581 by reducing power on that side. 107 00:04:16,990 --> 00:04:19,626 It seems to be running all right now. 108 00:04:16,990 --> 00:04:19,626 It seems to be running all right now. 109 00:04:19,692 --> 00:04:20,893 But we've still got the smoke. 110 00:04:25,932 --> 00:04:27,667 This is Midland 92. 111 00:04:27,734 --> 00:04:29,268 We've got an engine fire. 112 00:04:29,335 --> 00:04:31,371 We need to divert to East Midlands. 113 00:04:29,335 --> 00:04:31,371 We need to divert to East Midlands. 114 00:04:31,437 --> 00:04:32,572 Understood. 115 00:04:32,639 --> 00:04:35,808 Cleared for descent to 10,000 feet. 116 00:04:35,875 --> 00:04:37,610 Shutting down the engine 117 00:04:35,875 --> 00:04:37,610 Shutting down the engine 118 00:04:37,677 --> 00:04:39,712 will prevent the fire from spreading. 119 00:04:39,779 --> 00:04:41,014 Shutting down now. 120 00:04:46,719 --> 00:04:51,858 The pilots turn toward nearby East Midlands Airport. 121 00:04:46,719 --> 00:04:51,858 The pilots turn toward nearby East Midlands Airport. 122 00:04:51,924 --> 00:04:54,727 Landing lights. 123 00:04:51,924 --> 00:04:54,727 Landing lights. 124 00:04:54,794 --> 00:04:56,496 On. 125 00:04:56,562 --> 00:04:57,897 Flaps one, please. 126 00:04:57,964 --> 00:04:59,699 They will have to make the landing 127 00:04:59,766 --> 00:05:00,767 with only one engine. 128 00:04:59,766 --> 00:05:00,767 with only one engine. 129 00:05:00,833 --> 00:05:01,868 Power, please. 130 00:05:22,855 --> 00:05:24,557 We're losing another engine. 131 00:05:22,855 --> 00:05:24,557 We're losing another engine. 132 00:05:27,760 --> 00:05:30,797 Five Bella number 1. 133 00:05:27,760 --> 00:05:30,797 Five Bella number 1. 134 00:05:30,863 --> 00:05:32,832 Try reloading the other one. 135 00:05:37,870 --> 00:05:40,473 It's not... I can't seem to... 136 00:05:44,577 --> 00:05:47,714 I remember the flames coming over the top of the engine, 137 00:05:47,780 --> 00:05:50,683 and they were just sort of licking around the sides. 138 00:05:47,780 --> 00:05:50,683 and they were just sort of licking around the sides. 139 00:05:50,750 --> 00:05:52,919 I have to stretch the glide. 140 00:05:52,985 --> 00:05:56,055 The captain lifts the nose in a last-ditch attempt 141 00:05:52,985 --> 00:05:56,055 The captain lifts the nose in a last-ditch attempt 142 00:05:56,122 --> 00:05:58,591 to reach the runway. 143 00:05:58,658 --> 00:06:01,961 Damn it! 144 00:05:58,658 --> 00:06:01,961 Damn it! 145 00:06:02,028 --> 00:06:03,563 Pull up. 146 00:06:03,629 --> 00:06:04,931 Close tank. 147 00:06:04,997 --> 00:06:06,632 Close tank. 148 00:06:04,997 --> 00:06:06,632 Close tank. 149 00:06:13,473 --> 00:06:14,907 There were people screaming. 150 00:06:14,974 --> 00:06:20,780 There were people crying, having fear for their lives. 151 00:06:14,974 --> 00:06:20,780 There were people crying, having fear for their lives. 152 00:06:20,847 --> 00:06:22,081 Pull up. 153 00:06:22,148 --> 00:06:22,982 Brace! 154 00:06:23,049 --> 00:06:23,916 Brace! 155 00:06:37,497 --> 00:06:39,766 British Midland Flight 92 156 00:06:39,832 --> 00:06:42,802 slams into an embankment a half mile short at the airport. 157 00:06:39,832 --> 00:06:42,802 slams into an embankment a half mile short at the airport. 158 00:06:52,111 --> 00:06:55,448 87 of the 126 people aboard survive. 159 00:06:52,111 --> 00:06:55,448 87 of the 126 people aboard survive. 160 00:07:00,019 --> 00:07:02,522 Emergency crews are on the scene within minutes. 161 00:07:07,794 --> 00:07:11,097 Many are injured, including First Officer McClelland. 162 00:07:11,164 --> 00:07:13,232 Captain Hunt has a broken spine. 163 00:07:11,164 --> 00:07:13,232 Captain Hunt has a broken spine. 164 00:07:17,203 --> 00:07:19,705 As rescue efforts continue, a team 165 00:07:17,203 --> 00:07:19,705 As rescue efforts continue, a team 166 00:07:19,772 --> 00:07:22,542 from Britain's Air Accidents Investigation branch 167 00:07:22,608 --> 00:07:25,044 arrives on the scene. 168 00:07:22,608 --> 00:07:25,044 arrives on the scene. 169 00:07:25,111 --> 00:07:26,512 I've got close enough 170 00:07:26,579 --> 00:07:28,514 to see the runway lights. 171 00:07:28,581 --> 00:07:30,783 I think all of the team, their first impression 172 00:07:28,581 --> 00:07:30,783 I think all of the team, their first impression 173 00:07:30,850 --> 00:07:32,785 was that this airplane seems to have had 174 00:07:32,852 --> 00:07:37,056 some problem with engine power. 175 00:07:32,852 --> 00:07:37,056 some problem with engine power. 176 00:07:37,123 --> 00:07:40,493 Investigators searched the area for even the smallest 177 00:07:40,560 --> 00:07:43,529 fragments of engine debris, anything 178 00:07:40,560 --> 00:07:43,529 fragments of engine debris, anything 179 00:07:43,596 --> 00:07:45,898 that might help explain the cause of the disaster. 180 00:07:54,941 --> 00:07:57,777 The pilots are too badly injured to be interviewed. 181 00:07:57,844 --> 00:08:00,746 Investigators speak to the controller who assisted them. 182 00:07:57,844 --> 00:08:00,746 Investigators speak to the controller who assisted them. 183 00:08:00,813 --> 00:08:02,615 They said they had an engine fire. 184 00:08:06,686 --> 00:08:08,855 This is Midland 92. 185 00:08:08,921 --> 00:08:10,156 We've got an engine fire. 186 00:08:10,223 --> 00:08:12,692 We need to divert to East Midlands. 187 00:08:10,223 --> 00:08:12,692 We need to divert to East Midlands. 188 00:08:12,758 --> 00:08:14,026 Understood. 189 00:08:14,093 --> 00:08:17,029 Cleared for descent to 10,000 feet. 190 00:08:17,096 --> 00:08:21,234 The 737 can be flown with only one working engine, 191 00:08:17,096 --> 00:08:21,234 The 737 can be flown with only one working engine, 192 00:08:21,300 --> 00:08:23,970 so why was the plane unable to reach the runway? 193 00:08:27,874 --> 00:08:30,610 Investigators examine the recovered engines. 194 00:08:27,874 --> 00:08:30,610 Investigators examine the recovered engines. 195 00:08:30,676 --> 00:08:33,012 What they find surprises them. 196 00:08:33,079 --> 00:08:34,747 Both engines failed. 197 00:08:34,814 --> 00:08:38,517 Both engines showed pretty low-speed rotation 198 00:08:34,814 --> 00:08:38,517 Both engines showed pretty low-speed rotation 199 00:08:38,584 --> 00:08:41,754 at the impact, so it was a question of sorting 200 00:08:41,821 --> 00:08:45,091 out why they were both there. 201 00:08:41,821 --> 00:08:45,091 out why they were both there. 202 00:08:45,157 --> 00:08:48,628 Dual engine failure is almost unheard of. 203 00:08:45,157 --> 00:08:48,628 Dual engine failure is almost unheard of. 204 00:08:48,694 --> 00:08:51,597 How did it happen? 205 00:08:51,664 --> 00:08:54,133 Flight 92's voice and flight data recorders 206 00:08:51,664 --> 00:08:54,133 Flight 92's voice and flight data recorders 207 00:08:54,200 --> 00:08:55,668 might provide some answers. 208 00:08:58,371 --> 00:09:02,875 So the right engine stops here, 209 00:08:58,371 --> 00:09:02,875 So the right engine stops here, 210 00:09:02,942 --> 00:09:07,580 and the left gives out more than 15 minutes later here. 211 00:09:02,942 --> 00:09:07,580 and the left gives out more than 15 minutes later here. 212 00:09:07,647 --> 00:09:08,915 Whatever the two problems were, they 213 00:09:08,981 --> 00:09:11,250 didn't happen at the same time. 214 00:09:11,317 --> 00:09:12,852 Let's hear it. 215 00:09:11,317 --> 00:09:12,852 Let's hear it. 216 00:09:12,919 --> 00:09:15,121 The team hopes the cockpit voice recorder 217 00:09:15,187 --> 00:09:16,756 will reveal what went wrong. 218 00:09:21,294 --> 00:09:23,963 That's an engine vibration. 219 00:09:24,030 --> 00:09:25,031 It can't be anything else. 220 00:09:27,767 --> 00:09:30,970 Let's see what you do about that. 221 00:09:27,767 --> 00:09:30,970 Let's see what you do about that. 222 00:09:31,037 --> 00:09:32,204 Whoa. 223 00:09:32,271 --> 00:09:33,606 What is it the engines? 224 00:09:33,673 --> 00:09:34,807 We could hear the banging 225 00:09:34,874 --> 00:09:36,575 of this and the shaking. 226 00:09:34,874 --> 00:09:36,575 of this and the shaking. 227 00:09:36,642 --> 00:09:39,278 And it's obvious that the crew were 228 00:09:39,345 --> 00:09:41,013 pretty rattled by this as well. 229 00:09:41,080 --> 00:09:44,583 Which one is it? 230 00:09:41,080 --> 00:09:44,583 Which one is it? 231 00:09:44,650 --> 00:09:45,685 It's the left. 232 00:09:48,654 --> 00:09:49,755 It's the right one. 233 00:09:49,822 --> 00:09:51,724 Did he say the right one? 234 00:09:51,791 --> 00:09:54,627 It was a little bit of a mystery 235 00:09:51,791 --> 00:09:54,627 It was a little bit of a mystery 236 00:09:54,694 --> 00:09:57,363 that the voice recorder showed them 237 00:09:57,430 --> 00:10:00,099 apparently opting for the right engine 238 00:09:57,430 --> 00:10:00,099 apparently opting for the right engine 239 00:10:00,166 --> 00:10:02,201 as being where the problem was. 240 00:10:02,268 --> 00:10:04,870 I can't see anything wrong with the right engine 241 00:10:04,937 --> 00:10:06,038 at this point. 242 00:10:04,937 --> 00:10:06,038 at this point. 243 00:10:06,105 --> 00:10:07,340 Were you suspecting 244 00:10:07,406 --> 00:10:09,642 that the right engine had been shut down, 245 00:10:09,709 --> 00:10:12,311 but it was the left engine that had the problem. 246 00:10:09,709 --> 00:10:12,311 but it was the left engine that had the problem. 247 00:10:12,378 --> 00:10:16,716 It was vital that we got the crew's version of events. 248 00:10:16,782 --> 00:10:18,784 The captain is still recovering 249 00:10:16,782 --> 00:10:18,784 The captain is still recovering 250 00:10:18,851 --> 00:10:21,654 from his severe injuries, so investigators 251 00:10:21,721 --> 00:10:23,889 interview the first officer. 252 00:10:23,956 --> 00:10:26,425 It started with the vibrations in the right engine. 253 00:10:23,956 --> 00:10:26,425 It started with the vibrations in the right engine. 254 00:10:29,829 --> 00:10:32,398 When the vibrations were really fierce, 255 00:10:29,829 --> 00:10:32,398 When the vibrations were really fierce, 256 00:10:32,465 --> 00:10:36,769 Captain Hunt suggested that we throttle back. 257 00:10:32,465 --> 00:10:36,769 Captain Hunt suggested that we throttle back. 258 00:10:36,836 --> 00:10:38,938 Throttling back. 259 00:10:39,005 --> 00:10:40,773 We throttle back the right engine, 260 00:10:40,840 --> 00:10:42,074 and the vibration stopped. 261 00:10:40,840 --> 00:10:42,074 and the vibration stopped. 262 00:10:42,141 --> 00:10:44,677 Seems to be running all right now. 263 00:10:44,744 --> 00:10:49,215 The vibration and the noise went away, 264 00:10:44,744 --> 00:10:49,215 The vibration and the noise went away, 265 00:10:49,281 --> 00:10:50,783 so it would have indicated to them 266 00:10:50,850 --> 00:10:52,051 we've done the right thing. 267 00:10:52,118 --> 00:10:53,953 The team is forced to consider 268 00:10:54,020 --> 00:10:55,321 an extraordinary theory. 269 00:10:58,257 --> 00:11:02,928 This could be two unrelated engine failures, fire 270 00:10:58,257 --> 00:11:02,928 This could be two unrelated engine failures, fire 271 00:11:02,995 --> 00:11:05,431 on the left side and an entirely different 272 00:11:05,498 --> 00:11:07,800 one on the right side. 273 00:11:05,498 --> 00:11:07,800 one on the right side. 274 00:11:07,867 --> 00:11:10,403 What led to two separate failures? 275 00:11:14,006 --> 00:11:16,075 Investigators hope engine fragments 276 00:11:16,142 --> 00:11:20,913 recovered near the crash site will provide an explanation. 277 00:11:16,142 --> 00:11:20,913 recovered near the crash site will provide an explanation. 278 00:11:20,980 --> 00:11:22,481 One piece stands out. 279 00:11:27,053 --> 00:11:28,788 Gotcha. 280 00:11:28,854 --> 00:11:31,791 A section of fan blade shows signs of metal fatigue. 281 00:11:28,854 --> 00:11:31,791 A section of fan blade shows signs of metal fatigue. 282 00:11:34,427 --> 00:11:38,697 Even a single broken blade can cause a dangerous reaction. 283 00:11:34,427 --> 00:11:38,697 Even a single broken blade can cause a dangerous reaction. 284 00:11:38,764 --> 00:11:42,068 This finding could explain how the engine failures began. 285 00:11:38,764 --> 00:11:42,068 This finding could explain how the engine failures began. 286 00:11:45,071 --> 00:11:47,306 It would have been a lot of physical vibration. 287 00:11:47,373 --> 00:11:50,142 The passengers reported that it was 288 00:11:47,373 --> 00:11:50,142 The passengers reported that it was 289 00:11:50,209 --> 00:11:53,479 like the sound of in a tumble dryer of rocks and stuff 290 00:11:53,546 --> 00:11:54,947 being thrown around. 291 00:11:53,546 --> 00:11:54,947 being thrown around. 292 00:11:55,014 --> 00:11:56,382 It would have really been quite violent. 293 00:11:57,016 --> 00:11:59,185 A metallurgical examination 294 00:11:59,251 --> 00:12:02,021 reveals which engine the damaged blade came from. 295 00:11:59,251 --> 00:12:02,021 reveals which engine the damaged blade came from. 296 00:12:07,326 --> 00:12:11,330 Blade 17, left engine. 297 00:12:11,397 --> 00:12:13,265 The blade that broke first 298 00:12:11,397 --> 00:12:13,265 The blade that broke first 299 00:12:13,332 --> 00:12:16,902 and then triggered the vibration came from the left engine. 300 00:12:16,969 --> 00:12:19,371 Investigators face a compelling question. 301 00:12:16,969 --> 00:12:19,371 Investigators face a compelling question. 302 00:12:19,438 --> 00:12:22,241 If the vibrations were coming from the left engine, 303 00:12:22,308 --> 00:12:25,478 why did the pilot shut down the right one? 304 00:12:22,308 --> 00:12:25,478 why did the pilot shut down the right one? 305 00:12:25,544 --> 00:12:27,012 It's hard to believe they would 306 00:12:27,079 --> 00:12:28,814 shut down the wrong engine. 307 00:12:28,881 --> 00:12:30,416 There was a lot of skepticism 308 00:12:28,881 --> 00:12:30,416 There was a lot of skepticism 309 00:12:30,483 --> 00:12:33,219 from the operations inspectors, the pilots on the team 310 00:12:33,285 --> 00:12:36,355 because here, we have a very experienced, 311 00:12:33,285 --> 00:12:36,355 because here, we have a very experienced, 312 00:12:36,422 --> 00:12:39,525 well-qualified crew. 313 00:12:39,592 --> 00:12:42,361 Which one is it? 314 00:12:39,592 --> 00:12:42,361 Which one is it? 315 00:12:42,428 --> 00:12:45,898 It's the left. 316 00:12:45,965 --> 00:12:48,000 Ah, it's the right one. 317 00:12:48,067 --> 00:12:49,869 And it's very, very 318 00:12:49,935 --> 00:12:53,572 difficult to accept that such a basic mistake could be made. 319 00:13:00,045 --> 00:13:03,015 When their left engine began vibrating, 320 00:13:03,082 --> 00:13:05,251 the pilots of Flight 92 mistakenly 321 00:13:03,082 --> 00:13:05,251 the pilots of Flight 92 mistakenly 322 00:13:05,317 --> 00:13:07,019 shut down the right engine. 323 00:13:07,086 --> 00:13:09,355 It's the left. 324 00:13:09,421 --> 00:13:11,323 Ah, it's the right one. 325 00:13:09,421 --> 00:13:11,323 Ah, it's the right one. 326 00:13:11,390 --> 00:13:14,293 Throttle it back. 327 00:13:14,360 --> 00:13:17,363 I don't think we'll ever know why he changed 328 00:13:14,360 --> 00:13:17,363 I don't think we'll ever know why he changed 329 00:13:17,429 --> 00:13:18,964 his mind, the diagnosis. 330 00:13:22,034 --> 00:13:24,503 Once the left engine caught fire, 331 00:13:22,034 --> 00:13:24,503 Once the left engine caught fire, 332 00:13:24,570 --> 00:13:26,839 investigators believe that mistake ended 333 00:13:26,906 --> 00:13:29,208 any hope of a safe landing. 334 00:13:26,906 --> 00:13:29,208 any hope of a safe landing. 335 00:13:29,275 --> 00:13:33,412 But a major question remains, why did the vibration suddenly 336 00:13:33,479 --> 00:13:36,048 stop in the damaged left engine when the crew 337 00:13:33,479 --> 00:13:36,048 stop in the damaged left engine when the crew 338 00:13:36,115 --> 00:13:37,416 shut down the right one? 339 00:13:37,483 --> 00:13:40,853 They reduced the power on the right engine, 340 00:13:37,483 --> 00:13:40,853 They reduced the power on the right engine, 341 00:13:40,920 --> 00:13:44,323 but somehow, the left engine settles down. 342 00:13:50,162 --> 00:13:54,099 The team analyzes every action the pilots made. 343 00:13:50,162 --> 00:13:54,099 The team analyzes every action the pilots made. 344 00:13:54,166 --> 00:13:56,202 When the crisis hit, they reduced 345 00:13:56,268 --> 00:13:58,037 power to the right engine. 346 00:13:58,103 --> 00:14:00,105 Seems to be running all right now. 347 00:13:58,103 --> 00:14:00,105 Seems to be running all right now. 348 00:14:00,172 --> 00:14:03,275 The engine problems appear to stop. 349 00:14:03,342 --> 00:14:07,179 I'm in no doubt that that was, by far, the most dominant cue 350 00:14:03,342 --> 00:14:07,179 I'm in no doubt that that was, by far, the most dominant cue 351 00:14:07,246 --> 00:14:09,281 for them that they had done the right thing, 352 00:14:09,348 --> 00:14:11,016 and the problem lay in the right engine. 353 00:14:09,348 --> 00:14:11,016 and the problem lay in the right engine. 354 00:14:11,083 --> 00:14:13,619 But the flight data shows that just seconds 355 00:14:13,686 --> 00:14:16,121 before reducing power, the first officer 356 00:14:16,188 --> 00:14:17,223 made one other adjustment. 357 00:14:16,188 --> 00:14:17,223 made one other adjustment. 358 00:14:17,289 --> 00:14:18,057 That's it. 359 00:14:18,123 --> 00:14:19,024 Of course. 360 00:14:22,394 --> 00:14:24,363 He had to disconnect the auto throttle. 361 00:14:28,167 --> 00:14:29,501 Throttle it back. 362 00:14:28,167 --> 00:14:29,501 Throttle it back. 363 00:14:29,568 --> 00:14:32,104 To reduce power on the right-hand side, 364 00:14:32,171 --> 00:14:35,074 the pilot must first switch off the auto throttle. 365 00:14:32,171 --> 00:14:35,074 the pilot must first switch off the auto throttle. 366 00:14:35,140 --> 00:14:36,508 Pull the throttle off. 367 00:14:39,478 --> 00:14:43,249 Switching to manual has an unforeseen consequence. 368 00:14:39,478 --> 00:14:43,249 Switching to manual has an unforeseen consequence. 369 00:14:43,315 --> 00:14:45,618 It reduces power to the left engine 370 00:14:45,684 --> 00:14:50,456 and a temporary, but dramatic improvement in performance. 371 00:14:45,684 --> 00:14:50,456 and a temporary, but dramatic improvement in performance. 372 00:14:50,522 --> 00:14:53,559 It was damaged, but it was reasonably happy operating 373 00:14:50,522 --> 00:14:53,559 It was damaged, but it was reasonably happy operating 374 00:14:53,626 --> 00:14:56,028 at a low power setting, which is all 375 00:14:56,095 --> 00:14:58,364 it needed because they were constantly descending 376 00:14:56,095 --> 00:14:58,364 it needed because they were constantly descending 377 00:14:58,430 --> 00:14:59,632 towards the airfield. 378 00:14:59,698 --> 00:15:01,634 With its right engine shut down, 379 00:15:01,700 --> 00:15:05,437 the plane flew for nearly 17 minutes on only the damaged 380 00:15:01,700 --> 00:15:05,437 the plane flew for nearly 17 minutes on only the damaged 381 00:15:05,504 --> 00:15:08,407 left engine, but when the crew increased power... 382 00:15:08,474 --> 00:15:09,942 Power, please. 383 00:15:10,009 --> 00:15:12,311 ...part of the broken number 17 blade 384 00:15:10,009 --> 00:15:12,311 ...part of the broken number 17 blade 385 00:15:12,378 --> 00:15:15,614 was sucked into the left engine causing a catastrophic failure. 386 00:15:24,723 --> 00:15:27,092 Investigators conclude that the pilot's 387 00:15:27,159 --> 00:15:29,261 incorrect assessment triggered a chain 388 00:15:27,159 --> 00:15:29,261 incorrect assessment triggered a chain 389 00:15:29,328 --> 00:15:31,063 of events that led to disaster. 390 00:15:31,130 --> 00:15:34,300 It was probably the killer blow because what that meant 391 00:15:31,130 --> 00:15:34,300 It was probably the killer blow because what that meant 392 00:15:34,366 --> 00:15:36,702 was that they felt that what they had done, 393 00:15:36,769 --> 00:15:40,272 which was to close the right-hand engine down, was 394 00:15:40,339 --> 00:15:42,408 the correct thing to have done. 395 00:15:42,474 --> 00:15:45,577 When pilots compound problems in flight, 396 00:15:45,644 --> 00:15:47,980 they may have only seconds to correct the error 397 00:15:45,644 --> 00:15:47,980 they may have only seconds to correct the error 398 00:15:48,047 --> 00:15:49,214 and save their aircraft. 399 00:15:53,052 --> 00:15:55,254 Congonhas Airport in Sao Paulo, Brazil. 400 00:16:01,327 --> 00:16:05,064 89 passengers are getting ready for TAM Airlines Flight 402 401 00:16:01,327 --> 00:16:05,064 89 passengers are getting ready for TAM Airlines Flight 402 402 00:16:05,130 --> 00:16:06,065 to Rio de Janeiro. 403 00:16:09,401 --> 00:16:12,538 One of TAM's most experienced pilots is in command. 404 00:16:09,401 --> 00:16:12,538 One of TAM's most experienced pilots is in command. 405 00:16:12,604 --> 00:16:17,242 Jose Antonio Moreno has almost 6,500 flying hours. 406 00:16:12,604 --> 00:16:17,242 Jose Antonio Moreno has almost 6,500 flying hours. 407 00:16:17,309 --> 00:16:18,544 Before we start, checklist. 408 00:16:18,610 --> 00:16:20,079 Yes, captain. 409 00:16:20,145 --> 00:16:21,613 Already done. 410 00:16:21,680 --> 00:16:23,048 Good. 411 00:16:21,680 --> 00:16:23,048 Good. 412 00:16:23,115 --> 00:16:24,283 Go ahead and call the tower so we 413 00:16:24,350 --> 00:16:25,284 can get these engines started. 414 00:16:25,351 --> 00:16:26,752 You got it. 415 00:16:26,819 --> 00:16:30,222 First Officer Ricardo Luis Gomez is less experienced. 416 00:16:26,819 --> 00:16:30,222 First Officer Ricardo Luis Gomez is less experienced. 417 00:16:30,289 --> 00:16:33,525 He qualified to fly the Fokker 100 only a week ago. 418 00:16:33,592 --> 00:16:37,529 Sao Paolo, TAM 402, we're ready to go 419 00:16:33,592 --> 00:16:37,529 Sao Paolo, TAM 402, we're ready to go 420 00:16:37,596 --> 00:16:39,398 and requesting engine start. 421 00:16:39,465 --> 00:16:41,734 TAM 402, you're clear to start. 422 00:16:39,465 --> 00:16:41,734 TAM 402, you're clear to start. 423 00:16:41,800 --> 00:16:45,304 Fire them up. 424 00:16:45,371 --> 00:16:47,172 Starting number 1. 425 00:16:45,371 --> 00:16:47,172 Starting number 1. 426 00:16:53,245 --> 00:16:54,580 Starting engine 2. 427 00:17:00,285 --> 00:17:03,288 TAM 402, you are cleared for takeoff. 428 00:17:03,355 --> 00:17:05,557 Runway 17, right. 429 00:17:03,355 --> 00:17:05,557 Runway 17, right. 430 00:17:05,624 --> 00:17:07,493 Here we go. 431 00:17:07,559 --> 00:17:08,460 Take off thrust. 432 00:17:21,306 --> 00:17:23,675 V1, rotate. 433 00:17:21,306 --> 00:17:23,675 V1, rotate. 434 00:17:37,322 --> 00:17:40,759 Suddenly, TAM flight 402 is in trouble. 435 00:17:37,322 --> 00:17:40,759 Suddenly, TAM flight 402 is in trouble. 436 00:17:40,826 --> 00:17:41,693 No. No. 437 00:17:41,760 --> 00:17:43,195 No. No. 438 00:17:43,262 --> 00:17:45,431 Less than 50 feet in the air, 439 00:17:45,497 --> 00:17:49,601 the plane rolls dangerously to the right. 440 00:17:45,497 --> 00:17:49,601 the plane rolls dangerously to the right. 441 00:17:49,668 --> 00:17:52,771 The captain struggles to level the plane, 442 00:17:49,668 --> 00:17:52,771 The captain struggles to level the plane, 443 00:17:52,838 --> 00:17:54,673 but now, there's a new problem. 444 00:17:57,409 --> 00:17:59,178 Airspeed is dropping. 445 00:17:57,409 --> 00:17:59,178 Airspeed is dropping. 446 00:17:59,244 --> 00:18:01,580 It has to be an absolutely sick feeling for 447 00:18:01,647 --> 00:18:04,483 that flight crew at that point. 448 00:18:01,647 --> 00:18:04,483 that flight crew at that point. 449 00:18:07,553 --> 00:18:09,154 Pull up. 450 00:18:13,325 --> 00:18:15,227 25 seconds after takeoff... 451 00:18:20,799 --> 00:18:21,733 Terrain. 452 00:18:20,799 --> 00:18:21,733 Terrain. 453 00:18:21,800 --> 00:18:22,701 Terrain. 454 00:18:22,768 --> 00:18:23,669 Terrain. 455 00:18:26,305 --> 00:18:28,640 ...TAM Flight 402 crashes 456 00:18:26,305 --> 00:18:28,640 ...TAM Flight 402 crashes 457 00:18:28,707 --> 00:18:30,576 into a Sao Paulo neighborhood. 458 00:18:38,951 --> 00:18:42,821 The crash kills all 95 people on board the plane. 459 00:18:38,951 --> 00:18:42,821 The crash kills all 95 people on board the plane. 460 00:18:42,888 --> 00:18:45,224 On the ground, another four are dead. 461 00:18:45,290 --> 00:18:46,525 Many more are injured. 462 00:18:45,290 --> 00:18:46,525 Many more are injured. 463 00:18:51,964 --> 00:18:54,600 A team of investigators from the Brazilian Air Force 464 00:18:54,666 --> 00:18:56,201 arrives at the scene. 465 00:18:56,268 --> 00:18:59,571 Major Carlos da Conceicao is in charge. 466 00:18:56,268 --> 00:18:59,571 Major Carlos da Conceicao is in charge. 467 00:19:01,306 --> 00:19:03,208 When I got there, it was really 468 00:19:03,275 --> 00:19:05,210 a scene of total devastation. 469 00:19:03,275 --> 00:19:05,210 a scene of total devastation. 470 00:19:08,814 --> 00:19:12,784 The plane took down everything in its path. 471 00:19:08,814 --> 00:19:12,784 The plane took down everything in its path. 472 00:19:12,851 --> 00:19:13,952 It was like a war zone. 473 00:19:17,656 --> 00:19:22,227 What went wrong when Flight 402 took off? 474 00:19:17,656 --> 00:19:22,227 What went wrong when Flight 402 took off? 475 00:19:22,294 --> 00:19:24,563 Here, it's from the cockpit. 476 00:19:24,630 --> 00:19:26,665 Piece by piece, they recover 477 00:19:26,732 --> 00:19:29,868 the aircraft's components to begin the search for answers. 478 00:19:26,732 --> 00:19:29,868 the aircraft's components to begin the search for answers. 479 00:19:29,935 --> 00:19:31,870 We know that the aircraft 480 00:19:31,937 --> 00:19:35,407 departed controlled flight at a very, very low altitude. 481 00:19:31,937 --> 00:19:35,407 departed controlled flight at a very, very low altitude. 482 00:19:35,474 --> 00:19:37,876 The first culprit in that type of instance 483 00:19:37,943 --> 00:19:40,345 would be loss of thrust. 484 00:19:37,943 --> 00:19:40,345 would be loss of thrust. 485 00:19:40,412 --> 00:19:42,381 Investigators scrutinize 486 00:19:42,447 --> 00:19:45,517 the flight data and spot something 487 00:19:45,584 --> 00:19:46,885 odd about the thrust settings. 488 00:19:45,584 --> 00:19:46,885 odd about the thrust settings. 489 00:19:46,952 --> 00:19:48,820 The power is all over the place. 490 00:19:51,823 --> 00:19:54,626 The thrust was increasing 491 00:19:54,693 --> 00:19:56,862 and decreasing, increasing and decreasing, 492 00:19:56,929 --> 00:19:59,231 and then finally, full thrust. 493 00:19:56,929 --> 00:19:59,231 and then finally, full thrust. 494 00:19:59,298 --> 00:20:00,966 Was very confusing. 495 00:20:01,033 --> 00:20:02,501 Why would this happen. 496 00:20:02,568 --> 00:20:04,369 Investigators consider a connection 497 00:20:02,568 --> 00:20:04,369 Investigators consider a connection 498 00:20:04,436 --> 00:20:05,571 with another piece of evidence. 499 00:20:05,637 --> 00:20:08,540 OK, so you saw something moving 500 00:20:08,607 --> 00:20:10,375 at the back of the engine. 501 00:20:08,607 --> 00:20:10,375 at the back of the engine. 502 00:20:10,442 --> 00:20:13,445 A witness saw one of the plane's thrust reversers 503 00:20:13,512 --> 00:20:15,314 open just before the crash. 504 00:20:18,350 --> 00:20:21,553 Can you bring up all the data on the thrust reversers? 505 00:20:25,824 --> 00:20:28,327 Thrust reversers deploy on landing 506 00:20:25,824 --> 00:20:28,327 Thrust reversers deploy on landing 507 00:20:28,393 --> 00:20:30,495 to help slow the aircraft. 508 00:20:30,562 --> 00:20:32,331 They are never used in the air. 509 00:20:33,799 --> 00:20:35,934 The reverser is an aerodynamic brake, 510 00:20:36,001 --> 00:20:37,736 which is used on landing. 511 00:20:37,803 --> 00:20:39,905 Why would it open during takeoff? 512 00:20:37,803 --> 00:20:39,905 Why would it open during takeoff? 513 00:20:42,975 --> 00:20:44,610 There. 514 00:20:44,676 --> 00:20:47,579 The flight data reveals that after takeoff, 515 00:20:44,676 --> 00:20:47,579 The flight data reveals that after takeoff, 516 00:20:47,646 --> 00:20:50,349 the right thrust reverser opened and closed 517 00:20:50,415 --> 00:20:54,820 twice, then remained deployed. 518 00:20:50,415 --> 00:20:54,820 twice, then remained deployed. 519 00:20:54,886 --> 00:20:57,723 This shouldn't even be possible. 520 00:20:54,886 --> 00:20:57,723 This shouldn't even be possible. 521 00:20:57,789 --> 00:21:02,861 I was amazed, because that's just not supposed to happen. 522 00:21:02,928 --> 00:21:04,630 Thrust reverser systems 523 00:21:02,928 --> 00:21:04,630 Thrust reverser systems 524 00:21:04,696 --> 00:21:06,765 are designed to prevent an accidental deployment 525 00:21:06,832 --> 00:21:07,699 in flight. 526 00:21:10,102 --> 00:21:11,970 Investigators test the reversers, 527 00:21:12,037 --> 00:21:13,972 looking for flaws, which might explain 528 00:21:14,039 --> 00:21:15,941 why one opened during flight. 529 00:21:14,039 --> 00:21:15,941 why one opened during flight. 530 00:21:21,580 --> 00:21:23,849 The movement of the thrust reversers, 531 00:21:21,580 --> 00:21:23,849 The movement of the thrust reversers, 532 00:21:23,915 --> 00:21:25,517 it was a big mystery. 533 00:21:32,491 --> 00:21:34,526 They discover the problem, 534 00:21:32,491 --> 00:21:34,526 They discover the problem, 535 00:21:34,593 --> 00:21:36,628 a faulty landing sensor. 536 00:21:36,695 --> 00:21:40,432 It intermittently signaled the reverser to open and close. 537 00:21:36,695 --> 00:21:40,432 It intermittently signaled the reverser to open and close. 538 00:21:46,538 --> 00:21:50,609 If there is an uncommanded thrust reverser deployment, 539 00:21:50,676 --> 00:21:54,379 the system would automatically retard 540 00:21:50,676 --> 00:21:54,379 the system would automatically retard 541 00:21:54,446 --> 00:21:58,016 the thrust level back to idle. 542 00:21:54,446 --> 00:21:58,016 the thrust level back to idle. 543 00:21:58,083 --> 00:21:59,885 But the aircraft should still 544 00:21:59,951 --> 00:22:02,888 be able to climb safely with just one engine, 545 00:22:02,954 --> 00:22:06,758 so why couldn't Flight 402? 546 00:22:02,954 --> 00:22:06,758 so why couldn't Flight 402? 547 00:22:06,825 --> 00:22:07,959 OK. 548 00:22:08,026 --> 00:22:09,594 Go ahead, please. 549 00:22:08,026 --> 00:22:09,594 Go ahead, please. 550 00:22:09,661 --> 00:22:12,464 Investigators listen to the audio captured 551 00:22:12,531 --> 00:22:13,832 by the cockpit voice recorder. 552 00:22:19,071 --> 00:22:20,405 RICARDO LUIS GOMEZ No. 553 00:22:20,472 --> 00:22:21,673 No. No No. No 554 00:22:20,472 --> 00:22:21,673 No. No No. No 555 00:22:21,740 --> 00:22:23,909 He sounds like he's fumbling with something? 556 00:22:25,877 --> 00:22:27,479 It's locked. 557 00:22:27,546 --> 00:22:29,047 What's locked? 558 00:22:27,546 --> 00:22:29,047 What's locked? 559 00:22:29,114 --> 00:22:30,449 JOSE ANTONIO MORENO 560 00:22:30,515 --> 00:22:31,717 Turn it off up there. Auto throttle. 561 00:22:31,783 --> 00:22:33,051 Pull here. 562 00:22:33,118 --> 00:22:34,019 RICARDO LUIS GOMEZ (ON RECORDING): It's off. 563 00:22:33,118 --> 00:22:34,019 RICARDO LUIS GOMEZ (ON RECORDING): It's off. 564 00:22:37,089 --> 00:22:39,024 It sounds like the crew thought the problem 565 00:22:39,091 --> 00:22:41,426 was the auto throttle. 566 00:22:39,091 --> 00:22:41,426 was the auto throttle. 567 00:22:41,493 --> 00:22:44,563 The pilots are focused on the auto throttle. 568 00:22:44,629 --> 00:22:46,631 They never discussed the reverser. 569 00:22:44,629 --> 00:22:46,631 They never discussed the reverser. 570 00:22:46,698 --> 00:22:47,799 Turn it off up there. 571 00:22:47,866 --> 00:22:48,800 Here too. 572 00:22:48,867 --> 00:22:49,701 It's off! 573 00:22:49,768 --> 00:22:51,036 It's off! 574 00:22:51,103 --> 00:22:52,804 And there was no alarm to warn them 575 00:22:51,103 --> 00:22:52,804 And there was no alarm to warn them 576 00:22:52,871 --> 00:22:54,039 that the reverser deployed. 577 00:22:54,106 --> 00:22:55,373 RICARDO LUIS GOMEZ No. 578 00:22:55,440 --> 00:22:56,708 No. No. 579 00:22:56,775 --> 00:22:58,810 No. 580 00:22:56,775 --> 00:22:58,810 No. 581 00:22:58,877 --> 00:22:59,745 Oh, God. 582 00:23:05,884 --> 00:23:08,520 Those guys had no idea what was going on. 583 00:23:08,587 --> 00:23:10,856 It's now clear to investigators 584 00:23:08,587 --> 00:23:10,856 It's now clear to investigators 585 00:23:10,922 --> 00:23:14,860 that the crew was confused, but they still need to determine 586 00:23:14,926 --> 00:23:17,129 why the pilots reacted as they did 587 00:23:14,926 --> 00:23:17,129 why the pilots reacted as they did 588 00:23:17,195 --> 00:23:18,864 in those critical last seconds. 589 00:23:18,930 --> 00:23:23,902 You want to get clear what, in fact, happened so 590 00:23:18,930 --> 00:23:23,902 You want to get clear what, in fact, happened so 591 00:23:23,969 --> 00:23:26,138 that this won't happen again. 592 00:23:26,204 --> 00:23:28,774 To obtain a more detailed picture, 593 00:23:26,204 --> 00:23:28,774 To obtain a more detailed picture, 594 00:23:28,840 --> 00:23:31,443 the team combines the flight data and the cockpit 595 00:23:31,510 --> 00:23:34,613 voice recording to create a real-time animation 596 00:23:31,510 --> 00:23:34,613 voice recording to create a real-time animation 597 00:23:34,679 --> 00:23:35,814 of the flight. 598 00:23:35,881 --> 00:23:37,482 Let's see what we got. 599 00:23:39,985 --> 00:23:42,220 Take up speed was 127 knots. 600 00:23:49,194 --> 00:23:52,631 It reveals why the crew acted the way they did 601 00:23:49,194 --> 00:23:52,631 It reveals why the crew acted the way they did 602 00:23:52,697 --> 00:23:54,065 when the reverser was deployed. 603 00:23:54,132 --> 00:23:55,734 RICARDO LUIS GOMEZ (ON RECORDING): It's locked. 604 00:23:55,801 --> 00:23:58,203 Hold it. 605 00:23:55,801 --> 00:23:58,203 Hold it. 606 00:23:58,270 --> 00:24:00,806 He must be reacting to the movement of the thrust lever. 607 00:24:00,872 --> 00:24:01,540 RICARDO LUIS GOMEZ No. 608 00:24:01,606 --> 00:24:02,073 No. No. 609 00:24:02,140 --> 00:24:03,508 No. No. 610 00:24:03,575 --> 00:24:04,509 The automation just moved it to idle, 611 00:24:03,575 --> 00:24:04,509 The automation just moved it to idle, 612 00:24:04,576 --> 00:24:06,011 just like it's supposed to. 613 00:24:06,077 --> 00:24:07,679 The sudden loss of thrust in the right engine 614 00:24:07,746 --> 00:24:10,615 indicates that the failsafe system did activate 615 00:24:07,746 --> 00:24:10,615 indicates that the failsafe system did activate 616 00:24:10,682 --> 00:24:12,584 when the reverser deployed. 617 00:24:12,651 --> 00:24:13,618 Turn it off up there. 618 00:24:13,685 --> 00:24:14,252 Auto throttle. 619 00:24:14,319 --> 00:24:15,120 Pull here. 620 00:24:15,187 --> 00:24:17,856 It's off! 621 00:24:15,187 --> 00:24:17,856 It's off! 622 00:24:17,923 --> 00:24:19,891 But the pilots misinterpret 623 00:24:19,958 --> 00:24:22,894 the lever's movement. 624 00:24:19,958 --> 00:24:22,894 the lever's movement. 625 00:24:22,961 --> 00:24:24,729 Oh, no. 626 00:24:24,796 --> 00:24:27,866 Don't tell me. 627 00:24:24,796 --> 00:24:27,866 Don't tell me. 628 00:24:27,933 --> 00:24:29,701 They think the throttle 629 00:24:29,768 --> 00:24:32,637 is malfunctioning and reducing thrust to the right engine. 630 00:24:35,774 --> 00:24:38,109 I think the first officer is deliberately putting 631 00:24:38,176 --> 00:24:41,646 the engine back to full power. 632 00:24:38,176 --> 00:24:41,646 the engine back to full power. 633 00:24:41,713 --> 00:24:44,749 When the thrust reverser accidentally deploys 634 00:24:44,816 --> 00:24:49,688 in the Fokker 100, a cable automatically 635 00:24:44,816 --> 00:24:49,688 in the Fokker 100, a cable automatically 636 00:24:49,754 --> 00:24:52,057 pulls back the throttle to reduce engine power. 637 00:24:49,754 --> 00:24:52,057 pulls back the throttle to reduce engine power. 638 00:24:58,363 --> 00:25:01,800 Pilots shouldn't be able to override it, 639 00:25:01,867 --> 00:25:05,103 yet the first officer managed to do exactly that. 640 00:25:01,867 --> 00:25:05,103 yet the first officer managed to do exactly that. 641 00:25:11,776 --> 00:25:12,677 Terrain. 642 00:25:12,744 --> 00:25:13,311 Terrain. 643 00:25:13,378 --> 00:25:15,647 Pull up. 644 00:25:13,378 --> 00:25:15,647 Pull up. 645 00:25:15,714 --> 00:25:16,314 Terrain. 646 00:25:16,381 --> 00:25:17,249 Terrain. 647 00:25:23,622 --> 00:25:24,823 The levers are here. 648 00:25:27,826 --> 00:25:31,062 It was very important to, in fact, 649 00:25:31,129 --> 00:25:34,199 examine the cable what condition was it in. 650 00:25:31,129 --> 00:25:34,199 examine the cable what condition was it in. 651 00:25:34,266 --> 00:25:36,735 This connects to the faulty reverser. 652 00:25:36,801 --> 00:25:39,905 Investigators discover that the cables separated 653 00:25:36,801 --> 00:25:39,905 Investigators discover that the cables separated 654 00:25:39,971 --> 00:25:42,274 at a key connection point. 655 00:25:42,340 --> 00:25:44,876 That connector should be able to withstand the force 656 00:25:44,943 --> 00:25:46,845 that the pilots exert. 657 00:25:44,943 --> 00:25:46,845 that the pilots exert. 658 00:25:46,912 --> 00:25:49,080 Only this time, it didn't. 659 00:25:49,147 --> 00:25:53,084 Three times, the safety system pulls back the power, 660 00:25:49,147 --> 00:25:53,084 Three times, the safety system pulls back the power, 661 00:25:53,151 --> 00:25:55,820 and three times, the first officer puts 662 00:25:55,887 --> 00:25:58,924 the engines back to full power. 663 00:25:55,887 --> 00:25:58,924 the engines back to full power. 664 00:25:58,990 --> 00:26:02,294 Investigators conclude that when the thrust lever 665 00:26:02,360 --> 00:26:04,596 snapped to idle for the first time, 666 00:26:02,360 --> 00:26:04,596 snapped to idle for the first time, 667 00:26:04,663 --> 00:26:07,832 the first officer used all his strength to move it forward. 668 00:26:07,899 --> 00:26:11,336 The object is to get the airplane as high 669 00:26:07,899 --> 00:26:11,336 The object is to get the airplane as high 670 00:26:11,403 --> 00:26:13,305 and fast as you possibly can. 671 00:26:13,371 --> 00:26:15,874 Given the information that this flight crew had, 672 00:26:13,371 --> 00:26:15,874 Given the information that this flight crew had, 673 00:26:15,941 --> 00:26:18,777 I would venture to say that 99% of all flight crews 674 00:26:18,843 --> 00:26:22,113 would have reacted exactly the same way. 675 00:26:18,843 --> 00:26:22,113 would have reacted exactly the same way. 676 00:26:22,180 --> 00:26:24,282 With the throttle held forward, 677 00:26:24,349 --> 00:26:28,219 the reverser opened again, triggering the failsafe cable, 678 00:26:24,349 --> 00:26:28,219 the reverser opened again, triggering the failsafe cable, 679 00:26:28,286 --> 00:26:30,689 but the first officer continued pushing. 680 00:26:33,825 --> 00:26:36,962 That combined force was stronger than the manufacturer 681 00:26:37,028 --> 00:26:38,129 anticipated. 682 00:26:38,196 --> 00:26:39,764 The cable separated. 683 00:26:38,196 --> 00:26:39,764 The cable separated. 684 00:26:39,831 --> 00:26:43,335 Had ended up with the thrust reverser fully open 685 00:26:43,401 --> 00:26:46,738 and with full thrust on that engine where 686 00:26:43,401 --> 00:26:46,738 and with full thrust on that engine where 687 00:26:46,805 --> 00:26:48,139 the thrust reversers were open. 688 00:26:48,206 --> 00:26:50,942 With one engine at full forward power 689 00:26:51,009 --> 00:26:54,112 and the other in full reverse, the plane rolled 690 00:26:51,009 --> 00:26:54,112 and the other in full reverse, the plane rolled 691 00:26:54,179 --> 00:26:55,814 into an uncontrollable dive. 692 00:26:55,880 --> 00:26:57,048 Terrain. Terrain. 693 00:26:57,115 --> 00:26:58,116 Pull up. 694 00:26:57,115 --> 00:26:58,116 Pull up. 695 00:27:01,353 --> 00:27:04,723 Once he put the engine back to full power, 696 00:27:01,353 --> 00:27:04,723 Once he put the engine back to full power, 697 00:27:04,789 --> 00:27:06,291 they didn't stand a chance. 698 00:27:06,358 --> 00:27:08,827 The crew's actions were central to the fatal crash 699 00:27:08,893 --> 00:27:12,230 of TAM 402, but why did an automated 700 00:27:08,893 --> 00:27:12,230 of TAM 402, but why did an automated 701 00:27:12,297 --> 00:27:14,966 system designed to help keep an aircraft safe, 702 00:27:15,033 --> 00:27:16,701 so confuse the crew? 703 00:27:15,033 --> 00:27:16,701 so confuse the crew? 704 00:27:16,768 --> 00:27:18,670 The thought came, why? 705 00:27:18,737 --> 00:27:20,005 How did this happen? 706 00:27:20,071 --> 00:27:21,373 - How did the crew... - No. 707 00:27:21,439 --> 00:27:22,107 No. No. 708 00:27:21,439 --> 00:27:22,107 No. No. 709 00:27:22,173 --> 00:27:23,441 No. No. 710 00:27:23,508 --> 00:27:25,143 ...not understand what was happening to them? 711 00:27:28,013 --> 00:27:30,749 Let's see how much time these guys spent training for this. 712 00:27:30,815 --> 00:27:34,419 Investigators need to find out if the TAM pilots knew 713 00:27:30,815 --> 00:27:34,419 Investigators need to find out if the TAM pilots knew 714 00:27:34,486 --> 00:27:37,756 what to do if the Fokker 100's thrust reversers deployed 715 00:27:37,822 --> 00:27:39,024 accidentally. 716 00:27:37,822 --> 00:27:39,024 accidentally. 717 00:27:40,925 --> 00:27:43,795 We found out that TAM had consulted with Fokker 718 00:27:43,862 --> 00:27:45,997 to find out whether there was any need 719 00:27:43,862 --> 00:27:45,997 to find out whether there was any need 720 00:27:46,064 --> 00:27:49,200 to train for a reverser deployment during takeoff. 721 00:27:56,775 --> 00:27:58,943 A failure so rare, they decided not to train for it. 722 00:27:56,775 --> 00:27:58,943 A failure so rare, they decided not to train for it. 723 00:28:00,779 --> 00:28:03,915 Fokker formally responded, but the probability 724 00:28:00,779 --> 00:28:03,915 Fokker formally responded, but the probability 725 00:28:03,982 --> 00:28:07,886 that the reverser would open during takeoff was very small, 726 00:28:07,952 --> 00:28:11,423 and this training was not necessary. 727 00:28:07,952 --> 00:28:11,423 and this training was not necessary. 728 00:28:11,489 --> 00:28:12,824 Turn it off up there. 729 00:28:12,891 --> 00:28:13,825 Here too. 730 00:28:13,892 --> 00:28:14,726 It's off! 731 00:28:14,793 --> 00:28:15,860 It's off! 732 00:28:14,793 --> 00:28:15,860 It's off! 733 00:28:15,927 --> 00:28:17,762 Confused and untrained, 734 00:28:17,829 --> 00:28:19,864 the first officer restored the power 735 00:28:19,931 --> 00:28:21,099 he wanted for the takeoff. 736 00:28:19,931 --> 00:28:21,099 he wanted for the takeoff. 737 00:28:25,804 --> 00:28:27,305 Unfortunately, they 738 00:28:25,804 --> 00:28:27,305 Unfortunately, they 739 00:28:27,372 --> 00:28:31,242 didn't have enough information to make the right decisions 740 00:28:31,309 --> 00:28:32,310 at the right time. 741 00:28:44,322 --> 00:28:48,026 After the crash, TAM Airlines added new training 742 00:28:44,322 --> 00:28:48,026 After the crash, TAM Airlines added new training 743 00:28:48,093 --> 00:28:51,529 to instruct its pilots how to respond if a reverser deploys 744 00:28:48,093 --> 00:28:51,529 to instruct its pilots how to respond if a reverser deploys 745 00:28:51,596 --> 00:28:53,431 during takeoff. 746 00:28:53,498 --> 00:28:57,235 The cockpit is a complex network of integrated systems. 747 00:28:53,498 --> 00:28:57,235 The cockpit is a complex network of integrated systems. 748 00:28:57,302 --> 00:28:59,838 When flight crews confront one failure, 749 00:28:59,904 --> 00:29:03,141 it takes just one bad decision to create another far more 750 00:28:59,904 --> 00:29:03,141 it takes just one bad decision to create another far more 751 00:29:03,208 --> 00:29:04,075 serious problem. 752 00:29:14,419 --> 00:29:18,089 AirAsia, Flight 8501 cruises high above the sea, 753 00:29:14,419 --> 00:29:18,089 AirAsia, Flight 8501 cruises high above the sea, 754 00:29:18,156 --> 00:29:19,324 north of Indonesia. 755 00:29:24,629 --> 00:29:28,533 Captain Irianto is in command of the Airbus A320. 756 00:29:24,629 --> 00:29:28,533 Captain Irianto is in command of the Airbus A320. 757 00:29:28,600 --> 00:29:32,237 He has logged more than 20,000 flying hours. 758 00:29:32,303 --> 00:29:35,340 His first officer is Rahmi Emmanuel Purcell. 759 00:29:32,303 --> 00:29:35,340 His first officer is Rahmi Emmanuel Purcell. 760 00:29:35,406 --> 00:29:38,510 He's amassed about 2,000 flying hours, much of it 761 00:29:38,576 --> 00:29:39,944 on the Airbus. 762 00:29:38,576 --> 00:29:39,944 on the Airbus. 763 00:29:40,011 --> 00:29:41,279 It was the first officer that 764 00:29:41,346 --> 00:29:43,248 was manipulating the controls. 765 00:29:43,314 --> 00:29:45,917 The captain was in command of the flight, 766 00:29:43,314 --> 00:29:45,917 The captain was in command of the flight, 767 00:29:45,984 --> 00:29:49,854 but was performing the duties of the pilot monitoring, 768 00:29:49,921 --> 00:29:53,291 or the non-flying pilot. 769 00:29:49,921 --> 00:29:53,291 or the non-flying pilot. 770 00:29:53,358 --> 00:29:55,393 Today's flight originated 771 00:29:55,460 --> 00:29:58,029 in the Indonesian city of Surabaya. 772 00:29:55,460 --> 00:29:58,029 in the Indonesian city of Surabaya. 773 00:29:58,096 --> 00:30:01,232 The route heads across the Java Sea to Singapore. 774 00:30:07,906 --> 00:30:10,175 Looks like weather ahead. 775 00:30:07,906 --> 00:30:10,175 Looks like weather ahead. 776 00:30:10,241 --> 00:30:12,577 I'm going to radio for a higher cruise. 777 00:30:12,644 --> 00:30:14,112 Get around that weather. 778 00:30:14,179 --> 00:30:16,281 Good idea. 779 00:30:14,179 --> 00:30:16,281 Good idea. 780 00:30:16,347 --> 00:30:19,284 But before the captain can do that, the flight 781 00:30:19,350 --> 00:30:21,186 computer sends a fault warning 782 00:30:19,350 --> 00:30:21,186 computer sends a fault warning 783 00:30:21,252 --> 00:30:22,320 ECAM actions. 784 00:30:22,387 --> 00:30:24,422 The ECAM system monitors 785 00:30:24,489 --> 00:30:26,624 the plane's functions and lists actions 786 00:30:26,691 --> 00:30:28,293 to be taken by the crew. 787 00:30:26,691 --> 00:30:28,293 to be taken by the crew. 788 00:30:28,359 --> 00:30:33,064 FAC 1 off and on. 789 00:30:28,359 --> 00:30:33,064 FAC 1 off and on. 790 00:30:33,131 --> 00:30:35,433 FAC 2 off and on. 791 00:30:35,500 --> 00:30:36,634 Resetting the aircrafts 792 00:30:36,701 --> 00:30:38,870 to flight augmentation computers, 793 00:30:36,701 --> 00:30:38,870 to flight augmentation computers, 794 00:30:38,937 --> 00:30:41,072 or FACs, addresses the fault... 795 00:30:41,139 --> 00:30:42,373 Warning cleared. 796 00:30:42,440 --> 00:30:44,275 ...and silences the warnings. 797 00:30:52,116 --> 00:30:53,184 A few minutes later... 798 00:30:57,288 --> 00:30:59,324 Same. 799 00:30:59,390 --> 00:31:01,559 FAC 1 off and on. 800 00:31:01,626 --> 00:31:05,630 After the crew addresses the second fault... 801 00:31:01,626 --> 00:31:05,630 After the crew addresses the second fault... 802 00:31:05,697 --> 00:31:10,969 AirAsia 8501, you are cleared 2340. 803 00:31:05,697 --> 00:31:10,969 AirAsia 8501, you are cleared 2340. 804 00:31:11,035 --> 00:31:13,004 ...Jakarta air traffic control 805 00:31:13,071 --> 00:31:14,305 clears the flight to climb. 806 00:31:17,375 --> 00:31:21,045 The controller waits for confirmation, 807 00:31:17,375 --> 00:31:21,045 The controller waits for confirmation, 808 00:31:21,112 --> 00:31:23,448 but the pilots are distracted. 809 00:31:23,514 --> 00:31:25,683 Here we go again. 810 00:31:25,750 --> 00:31:27,552 ECAM actions. 811 00:31:25,750 --> 00:31:27,552 ECAM actions. 812 00:31:27,619 --> 00:31:32,557 PAC 1 off and on. 813 00:31:32,624 --> 00:31:36,027 Very annoying and very time consuming to deal 814 00:31:32,624 --> 00:31:36,027 Very annoying and very time consuming to deal 815 00:31:36,094 --> 00:31:37,362 with this recurring problem. 816 00:31:40,031 --> 00:31:42,200 Enough of this. 817 00:31:42,267 --> 00:31:43,301 ECAM actions. 818 00:31:46,504 --> 00:31:49,007 In Jakarta, the controller is 819 00:31:49,073 --> 00:31:50,408 trying to contact the flight. 820 00:31:50,475 --> 00:31:53,177 AirAsia 8501, do you read me? 821 00:31:50,475 --> 00:31:53,177 AirAsia 8501, do you read me? 822 00:31:53,244 --> 00:31:54,379 Please acknowledge. 823 00:31:58,383 --> 00:32:01,052 But in the cockpit, the fault warnings 824 00:32:01,119 --> 00:32:03,521 have increased dramatically. 825 00:32:01,119 --> 00:32:03,521 have increased dramatically. 826 00:32:03,588 --> 00:32:06,457 AirAsia 8501, do you read me? 827 00:32:06,524 --> 00:32:07,725 Please acknowledge. 828 00:32:07,792 --> 00:32:09,227 The displays indicate the plane 829 00:32:07,792 --> 00:32:09,227 The displays indicate the plane 830 00:32:09,294 --> 00:32:10,995 is now rolling sharply left. 831 00:32:11,062 --> 00:32:13,398 Level. 832 00:32:13,464 --> 00:32:14,332 OK, level. 833 00:32:18,436 --> 00:32:19,537 Level. 834 00:32:19,604 --> 00:32:20,438 - RAHMI EMMANUEL - I'm trying. 835 00:32:23,408 --> 00:32:24,742 It's not responding. 836 00:32:24,809 --> 00:32:28,146 AirAsia 8501, please confirm. 837 00:32:24,809 --> 00:32:28,146 AirAsia 8501, please confirm. 838 00:32:28,212 --> 00:32:33,584 You are climbing to flight level 340. 839 00:32:28,212 --> 00:32:33,584 You are climbing to flight level 340. 840 00:32:33,651 --> 00:32:36,454 The plane is now climbing higher and higher. 841 00:32:45,396 --> 00:32:47,665 Then suddenly, it falls. 842 00:32:55,773 --> 00:32:56,607 Altitude! 843 00:32:56,674 --> 00:32:59,377 I see it. 844 00:32:56,674 --> 00:32:59,377 I see it. 845 00:32:59,444 --> 00:33:03,414 The rate of descent here was very, very high. 846 00:32:59,444 --> 00:33:03,414 The rate of descent here was very, very high. 847 00:33:03,481 --> 00:33:06,684 Flight 8501 plummets from the sky, 848 00:33:06,751 --> 00:33:08,586 speeding toward the sea below. 849 00:33:11,723 --> 00:33:15,560 AirAsia Flight 8501 is falling fast. 850 00:33:15,626 --> 00:33:17,228 Pull. 851 00:33:15,626 --> 00:33:17,228 Pull. 852 00:33:17,295 --> 00:33:19,197 The pilots are helpless. 853 00:33:25,636 --> 00:33:30,074 The plane vanishes from radar and plunges into the Java Sea. 854 00:33:25,636 --> 00:33:30,074 The plane vanishes from radar and plunges into the Java Sea. 855 00:33:39,117 --> 00:33:41,652 The loss of AirAsia 8501 856 00:33:39,117 --> 00:33:41,652 The loss of AirAsia 8501 857 00:33:41,719 --> 00:33:45,156 was a classic case of a flight degenerating 858 00:33:45,223 --> 00:33:47,792 from mundane, normal cruise conditions 859 00:33:45,223 --> 00:33:47,792 from mundane, normal cruise conditions 860 00:33:47,859 --> 00:33:51,129 to the loss of the aircraft in a span of just 20 minutes. 861 00:33:51,195 --> 00:33:53,364 Rescue teams searched the area, 862 00:33:51,195 --> 00:33:53,364 Rescue teams searched the area, 863 00:33:53,431 --> 00:33:56,167 but of the 162 passengers and crew, 864 00:33:56,234 --> 00:33:58,469 there are no survivors and only a few 865 00:33:56,234 --> 00:33:58,469 there are no survivors and only a few 866 00:33:58,536 --> 00:33:59,804 pieces of floating debris. 867 00:34:02,507 --> 00:34:05,276 An international team of air safety investigators 868 00:34:02,507 --> 00:34:05,276 An international team of air safety investigators 869 00:34:05,343 --> 00:34:07,612 flies to Jakarta to join local experts. 870 00:34:10,381 --> 00:34:13,284 They need to find out why a highly sophisticated 871 00:34:13,351 --> 00:34:16,287 airliner, flying at cruising altitude suddenly 872 00:34:13,351 --> 00:34:16,287 airliner, flying at cruising altitude suddenly 873 00:34:16,354 --> 00:34:18,423 fell from the sky. 874 00:34:18,489 --> 00:34:21,459 We had a lot of little pieces everywhere. 875 00:34:21,526 --> 00:34:24,729 My first reaction was, it's not going to be easy. 876 00:34:21,526 --> 00:34:24,729 My first reaction was, it's not going to be easy. 877 00:34:24,796 --> 00:34:28,533 Two weeks after the crash, the plane's black boxes 878 00:34:24,796 --> 00:34:28,533 Two weeks after the crash, the plane's black boxes 879 00:34:28,599 --> 00:34:30,701 are recovered from the sea. 880 00:34:30,768 --> 00:34:33,237 Investigators analyze the cockpit voice recording. 881 00:34:33,304 --> 00:34:34,806 CAPTAIN IRIANTO (ON RECORDING): Jakarta air traffic 882 00:34:33,304 --> 00:34:34,806 CAPTAIN IRIANTO (ON RECORDING): Jakarta air traffic 883 00:34:34,872 --> 00:34:39,644 control, AirAsia 8501 request climb to 38,000 884 00:34:39,710 --> 00:34:41,179 to clear storm clouds. 885 00:34:39,710 --> 00:34:41,179 to clear storm clouds. 886 00:34:44,749 --> 00:34:48,453 Almost immediately, they discover something. 887 00:34:44,749 --> 00:34:48,453 Almost immediately, they discover something. 888 00:34:48,519 --> 00:34:50,354 RAHMI EMMANUEL PURCELL (ON RECORDING): ECAM actions. 889 00:34:50,421 --> 00:34:53,257 CAPTAIN IRIANTO (ON RECORDING): FAC 1 off and on. 890 00:34:50,421 --> 00:34:53,257 CAPTAIN IRIANTO (ON RECORDING): FAC 1 off and on. 891 00:34:53,324 --> 00:34:57,128 FAC 2 off and on. 892 00:34:57,195 --> 00:34:58,429 Warning cleared. 893 00:34:57,195 --> 00:34:58,429 Warning cleared. 894 00:34:58,496 --> 00:35:01,799 They were dealing with some kind of warning. 895 00:35:01,866 --> 00:35:03,701 Play recording. 896 00:35:03,768 --> 00:35:06,537 CAPTAIN IRIANTO (ON RECORDING): ECAM actions, same. 897 00:35:03,768 --> 00:35:06,537 CAPTAIN IRIANTO (ON RECORDING): ECAM actions, same. 898 00:35:06,604 --> 00:35:08,306 OK, the warning came back. 899 00:35:08,372 --> 00:35:13,444 They were getting continual fault warnings through what's 900 00:35:08,372 --> 00:35:13,444 They were getting continual fault warnings through what's 901 00:35:13,511 --> 00:35:16,147 called an ECAM system, electronic central aircraft 902 00:35:16,214 --> 00:35:17,682 monitoring system. 903 00:35:17,748 --> 00:35:19,383 CAPTAIN IRIANTO (ON RECORDING): Here we go again. 904 00:35:19,450 --> 00:35:22,453 At this point, the crew's behavior was standard. 905 00:35:19,450 --> 00:35:22,453 At this point, the crew's behavior was standard. 906 00:35:22,520 --> 00:35:27,291 They were communicating on what checklist to apply. 907 00:35:27,358 --> 00:35:28,759 There it is again. 908 00:35:27,358 --> 00:35:28,759 There it is again. 909 00:35:28,826 --> 00:35:31,395 RAHMI EMMANUEL PURCELL (ON RECORDING): ECAM actions. 910 00:35:31,462 --> 00:35:34,899 Then the recording reveals something unexpected. 911 00:35:31,462 --> 00:35:34,899 Then the recording reveals something unexpected. 912 00:35:34,966 --> 00:35:37,335 No, I've got a better idea. 913 00:35:37,401 --> 00:35:40,671 After a fourth fault, the captain appears to take 914 00:35:37,401 --> 00:35:40,671 After a fourth fault, the captain appears to take 915 00:35:40,738 --> 00:35:41,873 a different course of action. 916 00:35:41,939 --> 00:35:44,675 Hold recording. 917 00:35:44,742 --> 00:35:47,778 Now, the autopilot has disengaged. 918 00:35:44,742 --> 00:35:47,778 Now, the autopilot has disengaged. 919 00:35:47,845 --> 00:35:50,581 An unexpected disengagement of the auto 920 00:35:50,648 --> 00:35:52,950 throttle and autothrust system results 921 00:35:50,648 --> 00:35:52,950 throttle and autothrust system results 922 00:35:53,017 --> 00:35:55,920 in a pretty loud warning. 923 00:35:58,856 --> 00:36:00,591 RAHMI EMMANUEL PURCELL (ON RECORDING): What was that? 924 00:36:00,658 --> 00:36:03,461 OK, let's see what we have. 925 00:36:03,528 --> 00:36:05,830 RAHMI EMMANUEL PURCELL (ON RECORDING): Master caution. 926 00:36:03,528 --> 00:36:05,830 RAHMI EMMANUEL PURCELL (ON RECORDING): Master caution. 927 00:36:05,897 --> 00:36:06,831 Why? 928 00:36:06,898 --> 00:36:07,765 Checking. 929 00:36:10,735 --> 00:36:13,237 Then a more serious alarm sounds. 930 00:36:13,304 --> 00:36:14,539 CAPTAIN IRIANTO (ON RECORDING): Level. 931 00:36:17,608 --> 00:36:19,410 Stall warning. 932 00:36:19,477 --> 00:36:20,645 CAPTAIN IRIANTO (ON RECORDING): Pull. 933 00:36:20,711 --> 00:36:22,346 Slowly. 934 00:36:20,711 --> 00:36:22,346 Slowly. 935 00:36:22,413 --> 00:36:23,581 RAHMI EMMANUEL PURCELL (ON RECORDING): What's going on? 936 00:36:23,648 --> 00:36:24,815 CAPTAIN IRIANTO (ON RECORDING): Pull! 937 00:36:28,753 --> 00:36:31,556 What caused this technically sophisticated 938 00:36:31,622 --> 00:36:32,823 aircraft to stall? 939 00:36:32,890 --> 00:36:36,894 The autopilot disconnects, the aircraft stalls, they struggle 940 00:36:32,890 --> 00:36:36,894 The autopilot disconnects, the aircraft stalls, they struggle 941 00:36:36,961 --> 00:36:42,733 to recover, it makes no sense. 942 00:36:36,961 --> 00:36:42,733 to recover, it makes no sense. 943 00:36:42,800 --> 00:36:45,703 Investigators look for clues in the plane's 944 00:36:45,770 --> 00:36:46,704 maintenance records. 945 00:36:45,770 --> 00:36:46,704 maintenance records. 946 00:36:50,441 --> 00:36:52,843 They quickly find one. 947 00:36:50,441 --> 00:36:52,843 They quickly find one. 948 00:36:52,910 --> 00:36:55,880 There had been an issue with the rudder travel limit unit, 949 00:36:55,947 --> 00:36:56,814 or RTLU. 950 00:36:59,884 --> 00:37:03,454 The RTLU prevents the rudder from deflecting too far 951 00:37:03,521 --> 00:37:05,456 in either direction mid-flight. 952 00:37:03,521 --> 00:37:05,456 in either direction mid-flight. 953 00:37:10,795 --> 00:37:13,030 Records reveal that it had been malfunctioning 954 00:37:13,097 --> 00:37:14,432 for almost a year. 955 00:37:17,635 --> 00:37:20,871 23 reports of the exact same failure. 956 00:37:20,938 --> 00:37:24,575 The RTLU failures on this particular airframe 957 00:37:20,938 --> 00:37:24,575 The RTLU failures on this particular airframe 958 00:37:24,642 --> 00:37:26,510 had become increasingly frequent. 959 00:37:26,577 --> 00:37:28,779 After each failure, maintenance 960 00:37:26,577 --> 00:37:28,779 After each failure, maintenance 961 00:37:28,846 --> 00:37:30,681 workers reset the RTLU... 962 00:37:30,748 --> 00:37:34,452 They just kept resetting it and then 963 00:37:30,748 --> 00:37:34,452 They just kept resetting it and then 964 00:37:34,518 --> 00:37:35,920 putting it back in service. 965 00:37:35,987 --> 00:37:38,522 ...and failed to find a more permanent fix. 966 00:37:38,589 --> 00:37:40,324 They were returning the airplane 967 00:37:38,589 --> 00:37:40,324 They were returning the airplane 968 00:37:40,391 --> 00:37:44,495 to service after reset, and from a legal standpoint, 969 00:37:44,562 --> 00:37:47,999 it did clear the problem, but obvious that whatever the fault 970 00:37:44,562 --> 00:37:47,999 it did clear the problem, but obvious that whatever the fault 971 00:37:48,065 --> 00:37:50,568 was they hadn't found it because the problem 972 00:37:50,635 --> 00:37:51,936 continued to reoccur. 973 00:37:52,003 --> 00:37:54,038 The aircraft could operate normally, 974 00:37:52,003 --> 00:37:54,038 The aircraft could operate normally, 975 00:37:54,105 --> 00:37:57,642 despite the warnings, but on the night of the crash, It didn't. 976 00:37:57,708 --> 00:37:58,576 Why? 977 00:37:57,708 --> 00:37:58,576 Why? 978 00:38:01,445 --> 00:38:03,547 Investigators hope to find the answer 979 00:38:03,614 --> 00:38:04,715 on the flight data recorder. 980 00:38:03,614 --> 00:38:04,715 on the flight data recorder. 981 00:38:04,782 --> 00:38:06,550 So here's the first warning. 982 00:38:06,617 --> 00:38:09,487 It clearly was the RTLU. 983 00:38:09,553 --> 00:38:12,790 They do the fix, simply resetting the entire system. 984 00:38:09,553 --> 00:38:12,790 They do the fix, simply resetting the entire system. 985 00:38:12,857 --> 00:38:16,394 Two more times, the RTLU warning goes off, 986 00:38:12,857 --> 00:38:16,394 Two more times, the RTLU warning goes off, 987 00:38:16,460 --> 00:38:19,830 and each time, they did the right thing. 988 00:38:19,897 --> 00:38:22,800 Then it went off on a fourth time, 989 00:38:19,897 --> 00:38:22,800 Then it went off on a fourth time, 990 00:38:22,867 --> 00:38:25,770 then suddenly, there was a glitch. 991 00:38:25,836 --> 00:38:28,673 Investigators believe that glitch caused 992 00:38:25,836 --> 00:38:28,673 Investigators believe that glitch caused 993 00:38:28,739 --> 00:38:31,642 the autopilot to disconnect and put the plane 994 00:38:31,709 --> 00:38:33,411 into a dangerous left bank. 995 00:38:33,477 --> 00:38:37,615 The single event of autopilot, auto throttle disengagement 996 00:38:33,477 --> 00:38:37,615 The single event of autopilot, auto throttle disengagement 997 00:38:37,682 --> 00:38:40,618 sends the investigators in two different directions... 998 00:38:37,682 --> 00:38:40,618 sends the investigators in two different directions... 999 00:38:40,685 --> 00:38:45,723 one, what caused it, two, how did the crew handle it. 1000 00:38:45,790 --> 00:38:47,692 As investigators struggle 1001 00:38:45,790 --> 00:38:47,692 As investigators struggle 1002 00:38:47,758 --> 00:38:50,661 to answer those questions... 1003 00:38:50,728 --> 00:38:52,430 Hello, NTSC. 1004 00:38:50,728 --> 00:38:52,430 Hello, NTSC. 1005 00:38:52,496 --> 00:38:54,999 ...they get a tantalizing new lead. 1006 00:38:55,066 --> 00:38:56,534 Wait, wait, slow down. 1007 00:38:56,600 --> 00:38:57,968 What happened? 1008 00:38:58,035 --> 00:39:00,071 Investigators receive an unexpected call, 1009 00:38:58,035 --> 00:39:00,071 Investigators receive an unexpected call, 1010 00:39:00,137 --> 00:39:04,141 offering new information about the captain of AirAsia 8501. 1011 00:39:04,208 --> 00:39:06,610 Start from the beginning. 1012 00:39:06,677 --> 00:39:08,012 Where was he? 1013 00:39:08,079 --> 00:39:10,681 Three days before the accident, 1014 00:39:08,079 --> 00:39:10,681 Three days before the accident, 1015 00:39:10,748 --> 00:39:13,150 this same captain was about to fly 1016 00:39:13,217 --> 00:39:16,387 from Indonesia to Kuala Lumpur, when 1017 00:39:13,217 --> 00:39:16,387 from Indonesia to Kuala Lumpur, when 1018 00:39:16,454 --> 00:39:18,656 he had an RTLU malfunction. 1019 00:39:18,723 --> 00:39:20,725 He asked for an engineer to come into the cockpit 1020 00:39:20,791 --> 00:39:22,560 and try to fix that. 1021 00:39:20,791 --> 00:39:22,560 and try to fix that. 1022 00:39:22,626 --> 00:39:24,028 RTLU problem again? 1023 00:39:24,095 --> 00:39:26,797 Yeah, it just keeps coming back. 1024 00:39:26,864 --> 00:39:29,734 The maintenance engineer rebooted the system. 1025 00:39:26,864 --> 00:39:29,734 The maintenance engineer rebooted the system. 1026 00:39:32,503 --> 00:39:35,406 There. 1027 00:39:32,503 --> 00:39:35,406 There. 1028 00:39:35,473 --> 00:39:37,007 ...but the problem returned. 1029 00:39:39,677 --> 00:39:40,878 I've got an idea. 1030 00:39:39,677 --> 00:39:40,878 I've got an idea. 1031 00:39:44,014 --> 00:39:45,950 He then pulled the circuit 1032 00:39:46,016 --> 00:39:49,787 breakers for the main computer. 1033 00:39:46,016 --> 00:39:49,787 breakers for the main computer. 1034 00:39:49,854 --> 00:39:51,922 Maintenance on the ground 1035 00:39:51,989 --> 00:39:55,760 has a very specific list of circuit breakers that says you 1036 00:39:51,989 --> 00:39:55,760 has a very specific list of circuit breakers that says you 1037 00:39:55,826 --> 00:39:59,830 can utilize pulling these circuit breakers to reset 1038 00:39:55,826 --> 00:39:59,830 can utilize pulling these circuit breakers to reset 1039 00:39:59,897 --> 00:40:01,499 computers within the airplane. 1040 00:40:01,565 --> 00:40:03,667 The captain watched as the problem 1041 00:40:03,734 --> 00:40:06,637 appeared to be resolved. 1042 00:40:03,734 --> 00:40:06,637 appeared to be resolved. 1043 00:40:06,704 --> 00:40:08,072 Problem solved. 1044 00:40:08,139 --> 00:40:11,742 And can I do the same thing if it happens again? 1045 00:40:08,139 --> 00:40:11,742 And can I do the same thing if it happens again? 1046 00:40:11,809 --> 00:40:16,480 Yeah, just do what the ECAM tells you to do. 1047 00:40:11,809 --> 00:40:16,480 Yeah, just do what the ECAM tells you to do. 1048 00:40:16,547 --> 00:40:20,718 Don't tell me he tried to do that in the air? 1049 00:40:20,785 --> 00:40:24,021 Investigators think they now know what the captain 1050 00:40:20,785 --> 00:40:24,021 Investigators think they now know what the captain 1051 00:40:24,088 --> 00:40:26,457 did to cause the crisis. 1052 00:40:26,524 --> 00:40:28,626 Begins simulation. 1053 00:40:26,524 --> 00:40:28,626 Begins simulation. 1054 00:40:28,692 --> 00:40:30,661 To see if they're right, 1055 00:40:30,728 --> 00:40:33,664 they simulate the events in the cockpit. 1056 00:40:33,731 --> 00:40:37,868 OK, so let's start with the RTLU warnings, OK? 1057 00:40:33,731 --> 00:40:37,868 OK, so let's start with the RTLU warnings, OK? 1058 00:40:40,571 --> 00:40:41,906 FAC 1, off. 1059 00:40:41,972 --> 00:40:43,174 FAC 2, off. 1060 00:40:46,610 --> 00:40:47,278 Good. 1061 00:40:50,147 --> 00:40:52,082 Enough of this. 1062 00:40:52,149 --> 00:40:54,185 After a fourth alarm. 1063 00:40:52,149 --> 00:40:54,185 After a fourth alarm. 1064 00:40:54,251 --> 00:40:55,586 ECAM actions? 1065 00:40:55,653 --> 00:40:57,121 No. 1066 00:40:57,188 --> 00:40:58,689 I've got a better idea. 1067 00:40:57,188 --> 00:40:58,689 I've got a better idea. 1068 00:40:58,756 --> 00:41:01,625 Investigators believe the captain pulled 1069 00:41:01,692 --> 00:41:03,160 two critical circuit breakers. 1070 00:41:05,796 --> 00:41:08,065 Captain pulls the circuit breaker 1. 1071 00:41:13,704 --> 00:41:16,140 The result is immediate. 1072 00:41:19,009 --> 00:41:22,746 And there goes the autopilot disconnect warning. 1073 00:41:19,009 --> 00:41:22,746 And there goes the autopilot disconnect warning. 1074 00:41:25,583 --> 00:41:27,117 This had to be what he did. 1075 00:41:27,184 --> 00:41:29,920 He was, perhaps, copying what he'd seen the ground engineer 1076 00:41:27,184 --> 00:41:29,920 He was, perhaps, copying what he'd seen the ground engineer 1077 00:41:29,987 --> 00:41:32,556 do, but of course, the consequences in flight, 1078 00:41:32,623 --> 00:41:37,294 disabling critical systems are quite different. 1079 00:41:32,623 --> 00:41:37,294 disabling critical systems are quite different. 1080 00:41:37,361 --> 00:41:42,533 His fix for a minor fault created a new problem. 1081 00:41:37,361 --> 00:41:42,533 His fix for a minor fault created a new problem. 1082 00:41:42,600 --> 00:41:44,268 Pulling the circuit breaker disables 1083 00:41:44,335 --> 00:41:48,672 the autopilot, which sends the plane into a 54-degree roll. 1084 00:41:44,335 --> 00:41:48,672 the autopilot, which sends the plane into a 54-degree roll. 1085 00:41:52,977 --> 00:41:54,979 The first officer doesn't notice the plane 1086 00:41:55,045 --> 00:41:57,815 is banking until the captain sits down again. 1087 00:41:57,882 --> 00:41:58,949 Oh, my God. 1088 00:41:57,882 --> 00:41:58,949 Oh, my God. 1089 00:41:59,016 --> 00:42:00,985 Oh. 1090 00:42:01,051 --> 00:42:03,120 The co-pilot's movement 1091 00:42:03,187 --> 00:42:05,322 of the stick to its extreme rightmost 1092 00:42:03,187 --> 00:42:05,322 of the stick to its extreme rightmost 1093 00:42:05,389 --> 00:42:09,994 position resulted in a very violent roll to the right. 1094 00:42:10,060 --> 00:42:13,197 The FDR data shows how extreme the plane's movements 1095 00:42:10,060 --> 00:42:13,197 The FDR data shows how extreme the plane's movements 1096 00:42:13,264 --> 00:42:14,565 were. 1097 00:42:14,632 --> 00:42:18,769 So the plane rolled 54 degrees left, 1098 00:42:14,632 --> 00:42:18,769 So the plane rolled 54 degrees left, 1099 00:42:18,836 --> 00:42:24,341 and he pulled back almost level in just 2 seconds. 1100 00:42:18,836 --> 00:42:24,341 and he pulled back almost level in just 2 seconds. 1101 00:42:24,408 --> 00:42:27,044 That would scramble anybody's gyros. 1102 00:42:27,111 --> 00:42:28,913 Maybe that was the confusion. 1103 00:42:27,111 --> 00:42:28,913 Maybe that was the confusion. 1104 00:42:28,979 --> 00:42:32,149 As soon as the first officer had leveled the aircraft, 1105 00:42:32,216 --> 00:42:36,053 the fluid in his ear canals keeps spinning to the right. 1106 00:42:32,216 --> 00:42:36,053 the fluid in his ear canals keeps spinning to the right. 1107 00:42:36,120 --> 00:42:37,655 The aircraft is level, but there's 1108 00:42:37,721 --> 00:42:39,223 a very strong illusion from the ears 1109 00:42:39,290 --> 00:42:40,758 that you're turning to the right. 1110 00:42:39,290 --> 00:42:40,758 that you're turning to the right. 1111 00:42:40,824 --> 00:42:44,962 And then he pulls it as hard as he can, 1112 00:42:45,029 --> 00:42:46,664 and the plane starts climbing. 1113 00:42:45,029 --> 00:42:46,664 and the plane starts climbing. 1114 00:42:49,133 --> 00:42:51,268 This is a massive input. 1115 00:42:51,335 --> 00:42:54,838 The airplane would pitch up very quickly. 1116 00:42:51,335 --> 00:42:54,838 The airplane would pitch up very quickly. 1117 00:42:54,905 --> 00:42:56,073 What's going on? 1118 00:42:56,140 --> 00:42:57,875 He was completely baffled. 1119 00:42:57,942 --> 00:43:01,045 His vertigo may have led him to believe that the aircraft 1120 00:42:57,942 --> 00:43:01,045 His vertigo may have led him to believe that the aircraft 1121 00:43:01,111 --> 00:43:03,180 was pitching down, so he's actually recovering 1122 00:43:03,247 --> 00:43:05,049 from an imaginary pitch down. 1123 00:43:03,247 --> 00:43:05,049 from an imaginary pitch down. 1124 00:43:05,115 --> 00:43:06,917 He was disoriented. 1125 00:43:06,984 --> 00:43:10,788 The plane stalls and begins to fall out of the sky. 1126 00:43:06,984 --> 00:43:10,788 The plane stalls and begins to fall out of the sky. 1127 00:43:10,854 --> 00:43:14,858 The captain attempts to regain control, but his efforts fail. 1128 00:43:14,925 --> 00:43:18,762 I think the crew had started to lose their spatial awareness 1129 00:43:14,925 --> 00:43:18,762 I think the crew had started to lose their spatial awareness 1130 00:43:18,829 --> 00:43:19,997 completely. 1131 00:43:20,064 --> 00:43:21,398 The first officer continues 1132 00:43:21,465 --> 00:43:24,034 pulling back on his side stick until the very end. 1133 00:43:21,465 --> 00:43:24,034 pulling back on his side stick until the very end. 1134 00:43:24,101 --> 00:43:26,804 The input of the first officer... 1135 00:43:26,870 --> 00:43:28,806 Pull down! 1136 00:43:26,870 --> 00:43:28,806 Pull down! 1137 00:43:28,872 --> 00:43:32,109 ...was the exact wrong thing to do. 1138 00:43:32,176 --> 00:43:34,144 What's going on? 1139 00:43:34,211 --> 00:43:38,015 When a flight crew faces a failure mid-flight, 1140 00:43:38,082 --> 00:43:41,018 one bad decision can trigger bigger problems 1141 00:43:38,082 --> 00:43:41,018 one bad decision can trigger bigger problems 1142 00:43:41,085 --> 00:43:42,886 that lead to catastrophe. 1143 00:43:46,757 --> 00:43:49,093 No one's going to be able to reach up and grab 1144 00:43:49,159 --> 00:43:50,794 you and bring you safely back. 1145 00:43:50,861 --> 00:43:53,664 What it finally comes down to is how well that captain 1146 00:43:50,861 --> 00:43:53,664 What it finally comes down to is how well that captain 1147 00:43:53,731 --> 00:43:57,368 and first officer orchestrate what they have been taught, 1148 00:43:57,434 --> 00:43:59,169 with the situation that they have, 1149 00:43:57,434 --> 00:43:59,169 with the situation that they have, 1150 00:43:59,236 --> 00:44:01,338 to try to bring everybody back down to Earth safely. 84659

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